Petition — Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. United States

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Text

i “~ Supreme Court, U. a

) FILED

tt- 67 1 NOV 10 j977

K, JR., CLERK

ee . ae

In THE

_ Supreme Court of the United States

Es easieinbiiinss

Detta Ar Lives, Ino.,

Petitioner,

v.

Unrrep Srates or AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

Grorce N. ToMpxKINs, JR.

Counsel for Petitioner

Delta Air Lines, Inc.

1251 Avenue of the Americas

New York, New York 10020

PAGE

NN I aa aesesinnianienanions 1

PRES ENGR SIPEG SRF CON RE RE ERO 2

I I a bteceecetnanniasiniameioh 2

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved ...... +

EERE Ee eT DOO NT TD 5

NY PIII isda csictaealacetla ieielaanceeas thaaidaninsithieatniiciiaiten 5

B. Dispositions in the Courts Below 2.000000... 6

Reasons for Granting the Writ 00.00.0000. 10

I. The Court of Appeals Misinterpreted and Mis-

applied the Clearly Erroneous Standard for

Appellate Review Set Forth in Federal Rule of

Ciwil Prece@ere GB(a) —~...ncccecececeoecees-- SE eh 11

A. Causation Is a Question of Ultimate Fact ...... 12

B. The District Court’s Clearly Erroneous Find-

ing of No Negligence Tainted the Ultimate

Finding of No Causation ...........................00-0-..-. 15

C. The District Court Did Not Apply the Cor-

rect Legal Standard for Determining Proxi-

SE ceil iclasiniabacisttetticclcicediiphinsistcibesciasniess 19

II. The Court of Appeals Decision Has Effectively

Denied Petitioner Due Process of Law ................ 24

il

PAGE

III. The Decision of the Court of Appeals Is in Con-

flict With a Decision of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Seventh Cireuit —.00000000222... 28

or scandens videsaribteesteemnendtiiiaelaniaeidetteiadtiat st Ea 30

ey ar ee ~ ee seessselaiianenshiseiadaiacsumnass 31

TaBLE oF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Addison v. Green Cafe, Inc., 84 N.E.2d 33 (Mass. 1949)

23n.13

Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) 000... 25, 26

Ashland Oi & Refining Co. v. Kenny Construction Co.,

BOG F’.Sd GBS (Gths Cir. 19GB) cence cccosenncceeseneee 14n.11

Baumgartner vy. United States, 322 U.S. 665 (1944)...... 12

Chandler v. United States, 226 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1955)

14n.11

Cordovan Associates, Inc, v. Dayton Rubber Co., 290

og 8 Lt RUNES esp eas econ 14

Crosby v. United States, 496 F.2d 1384 (5th Cir. 1974)

14n.11

Dickens v. United States, 378 F.Supp. 845 (S.D. Texas

ERNE LEA . Wee OVINE Ak CART ha as aA EE in 18

Ford vy. Flaherty, 305 N.E.2d 112 (Mass. 1973) ............ 6n.5

Guzman v. Pichirilo, 369 U.S. 698 (1962) 0000. peers 22

Hartz v. United States, 387 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1968),

reversing 249 F.Supp. 119 (N.D. Ga. 1965) _...00...... 17n.12

ili

PAGE

Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2d

Cir.) cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967) ......... a 18

Kelley v. Southern Pacific Co., 419 U.S. 318 (1974)....21, 27

Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir.

1974) cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975) ~............. 10, 28, 29

Maddux v. Cox, 382 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1967) ............ 22, 27

Malloy v. Newman, 310 Mass. 269, 37 N.E.2d 1001

Nl elas 23n.13

Mamiye Bros. v. Barber Steamship Lines, Inc., 360

F.2d 774 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 385 U.S. 835 (1966)

14n.11

McMaster v. United States, No. 76-1270 (1st Cir. 1977) 11

Metropolitan Coal Co. v. Johnson, 265 F.2d 173 (1st

ales ESE VR Oey Sa ee 23n.13

Morrison vy. Medaglia, 287 Mass. 46, i191 N.E. 133

fier AES Ge a0 SRY: RR 23n.13

Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) _....22222... eee 11n.10

Official Creditors’ Committee of Fox Markets, Inc. v.

Ely, 337 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1964) 2.000002... 14n.11

Owen v. Commercial Union Fire Insurance Co. of New

York, 211 F.2d 488 (4th Cir. 1954) 20... 14n.11

Perfectform Corp. v. Perfect Brassiere Co., 256 F.2d

736 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 919 (1958) ...... 14n.11

Protective Committee for Independent Stockholders of

TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414

RIES AEA eee a ee one Fn 21, 27

Stork v. United States, 430 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1970) ... 18

Todd v. United States, 384 F.Supp. 1284 (M.D. Fla.

REESE Te Oe en cee ee 18

iv

PAGE

United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp.,

377 F.2d 872 (2d Cir, 1967), rev’d on other grounds,

Re ST), NL 14n.11

United States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 353

th SR) 5 OMIT 13, 21

United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127

CT) occesccsensinnssocesentnsisnenstnssmsaiiimmamaamans ae 14, 21

United States v. John J. Felin d Co., 334 U.S. 624

CRE) cceccevxesnsseicscoesiensszesnisencbesiannaaiaianan 13

United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960)

13, 21

United States v. Singer Manufacturing Co., 374 U.S.

BEG (TRGB) a ecaccceccecscesecsnaseqsissiniesienspessunsnnniannninannnnn 13, 21

United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454 (6th Cir.

BOT) necceccecesensoesesesessssusisasnscnensiananiinsaananiaiiantnn 14n.11

Whalen v. Shivek, 93 N.E.2d 393 (Mass. 1950) ........... 23n.13

White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976) _...... 24

William G. Roe & Co. v. Armour & Co., 370 F.2d 829

(GER Che. BGT). cacccecccciesconcesonsctusnnsnseniannesnn 22, 27

Other Authorities:

Pap. B. Cov. BP. GB(G) eencesesecese passim

Mass. Gen. Laws, Chapter 231B §§1, 2 000000000... 2n.2, 7,19

Mass. Gen. Laws. Chapter 231B §$1, 2) 20000... 2n.2, 7,19

mis Co | EN 5

UB. Comae. Asem. VY oncccccecccesccsmsussesie 4

Federal Tort Claims Act,

IS Come) nna 2n.2

iP Coe | en 5

BB UBS. GRGBA(T) nececcecenesssserssnmenneseneeeene 2

BB UBD. GRIGG cccccccesssessscnsssisiieensviimsnnaanane 2,5

—_—_—_—

OTE CO TNs Lee ——

Iw THE

Supreme Court of the United States

a

Detra Are Lives, Ixc.,

Petitioner,

Vv.

Unirep States or AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

Petitioner’ prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review

the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for

the First Cireuit entered in this case on August 12, 1977.

Opinions Below

The opinion of the Court of Appeals is not reported,

either officially or unofficially; it is printed in the Appendix

to this Petition at pages la-33a.

The opinion of the District Court is reported at 412

F. Supp. 959 (D. Mass. 1976) and is printed in the Ap-

pendix at pages 34a-121a.

1 Hereinafter referred to either as Petitioner or Delta.

to

Jurisdiction

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on

August 12, 1977. Appendix at p. 122a. The jurisdiction of

this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

Questions Presented

Petitioner brought this action against the United States?

to recover contribution towards the damages paid by Delta

to the estates of passengers killed in an aircraft accident

which occurred in Boston, Massachusetts, on July 31, 1973.

In numerous actions brought against Delta by the estates of

the deceased passengers, all of which were consolidated in

the District of Massachusetts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1407,

Delta did not contest its liability for negligence. Pursuant

te the Massachusetts law on contribution among joint tort-

feasors, however, Delta pursued this action against the

United States claiming that the air traffic controllers em-

ployed by the United States were negligent in the handling

of the Delta aircraft and that this negligence contributed

to the accident.*

After a nonjury trial,‘ the District Court found that the

air traffic controllers were not negligent and that the sole

proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the

* Pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, 2671,

et seq. and Mass. General Laws, Chapter 231 B §§ 1, 2.

>The Massachusetts contribution statute provides that the rela-

tive degrees of fault of joint tortfeasors shall not be considered in

determining the pro rata shares of the tortfeasors in the total lia-

bility. Mass. Gen. Laws Anno. §2. Since Delta did not contest its

liability to the estates of the passengers as a joint tortfeasor, the

only question before the District Court for resolution at the trial

was the alleged liability of the United States.

* As required by 28 U.S.C. §1346(b).

——— a

3

‘Delta pilot and co-pilot. Without articulating any legal

standard or applicable law for determining the question of

causation, the District Court also held that the allegedly

negligent acts of the air traffic controllers, even if they had

been proven, did not proximately cause or contribute to

the accident. Judgment, therefore, was entered for the

United States.

The Court of Appeals held that the finding of the District

Court that the air traffic controllers were not negligent

was “clearly erroneous” and further held that the United

States, through its air traffic controller employees, had

been substantially and unjustifiably negligent in failing to

render to Delta the air traffic control services mandated

by the Terminal Air Traffic Control Manual of the Federal

Aviation Administration. The Court of Appeals held,

however, that the ultimate finding of the District Court,

that the sole proximate cause of the accident was the

negligence of the Delta flight crew, was a question of fact

and was not “clearly erroneous”; the judgment for the

United States was affirmed accordingly.

The questions presented, therefore, are:

1. Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) and

its clearly erroneous test may be applied in review-

ing the ultimate finding of causation where:

(a) the Court of Appeals determines that the Dis-

trict Court’s factual findings as to a prerequi-

site, interrelated and dispositive issue were

clearly erroneous; and

(b) the District Court did not apply the correct

standard of law to the issue of causation.

2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in applying the

“clearly erroneous” rule to an ultimate issue of fact

4

despite holdings of the Court and in other Circuit

Courts to the contrary.

3. Whether the petitioner was deprived of due process

of law where no trier of fact or reviewing court,

applying the correct legal standard for proximate

cause, made a finding as to whether the proven neg-

ligence of the United States caused or contributed to

the accident.

4. Whether the courts below erred in failing to apply

a federal rule of contribution and indemnity as among

joint tortfeasors to the claims of Delta against the

United States.

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved

FirtH AMENDMENT TO THE Unitep States ConstTITUTION

No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law.

U.S. Const. amend V.

FeperaL Rue or Crviz Procepure 52(a)

FINDINGS BY THE CouRT

(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts with-

out a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall

find the facts specially and state separately its con-

clusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered

pursuant to Rule 58; and in granting or refusing

interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set

forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which

constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for find-

ings are not necessary for purposes of review. Find-

ings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly er-

5

roneous, and due regard shall be given to the op-

portunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility

of the witnesses...

Fep. R. Crv. P. 52(a).

Statement of the Case

A. The Facts

On July 31, 1973 at approximately 11:08 a.m., a Delta

DC-9 aireraft crashed while making an instrument landing

system (ILS) approach to Runway 4R at Logan Inter-

national Airport, Boston, Massachusetts. The 83 pas-

sengers on the aircraft died in the crash, as did the 5 crew

members and a Delta cockpit observer.

Lawsuits were filed against Delta in various District

Courts by the estates of the passengers. Eventually, these

suits were transferred to the District of Massachusetts by

the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation pursuant to

28 U.S.C. §1407. 395 F. Supp. 1405. Delta did not contest

its liability for negligence to the estates of the passengers

and, eventually, all cases were disposed of by Delta by way

of settlement or trial on damages only. Delta sued the

United States for contribution and indemnity for these

amounts, as well as for the loss of the aircraft.

Prior to the commencement of the trial against the

United States, the District Court held that Delta was not

entitled to contribution or indemnity with respect to any

action brought against Delta by the estate of a passenger

pursuant to the Massachusetts death statute since that

statute was considered to be punitive in nature and the

United States is not liable, under the Federal Tort Claims

Act, for punitive damages. 28 U.S.C. §2674. The District

Court further dismissed all claims for indemnity in the

cases brought under the death statutes of other states

6

since the law of Massachusetts does not recognize a right

to indemnity in favor of a tort feasor who is guilty of ac-

tive negligence.® The only issues, therefore, that were the

subject of the nonjury trial before the District Court were

the claims of Delta for contribution pursuant to the Massa-

chusetts contribution statute and for the loss of the air-

craft. Delta contended at this trial that the air traffie con-

troller was negligent in failing to render required serv-

ices to the Delta flight crew and that this negligence was a

contributing cause of the accident for which the United

States should be held liable for contribution under Massa-

chusetts law.

B. Dispositions in the Courts Below

1. The District Court. The District Court held:

The plaintiffs have the burden of proving by a fair

preponderance of the credible evidence that a duty of

eare to them existed on the part of ATC,’ that ATC

negligently breached that duty, and that such breach

was, in whole or in part, a proximate cause of the

erash.

On all the credible evidence I find that plaintiffs

have failed to sustain their burden. I rule that plain-

tiffs have not proven by a preponderance either that

ATC personnel were negligent or that the conduct of

ATC, however characterized, was a proximate cause of

the crash either in whole or in any part.

I find that the sole and exclusive cause of the ac-

cident was the negligence of the pilot and copilot of

D 723.

412 F.Supp. at 998, App. at pps. 115a-116a.

’ Ford v. Flaherty, 305 N.E.2d 112 (Mass. 1973).

§ Air Traffic Control.

\

~~

7

In evaluating the evidence, the District Court failed

to articulate the legal standards that it was bound to

apply to the facts. As to the issue of causation, the Dis-

trict Court never articulated any test for causation what-

soever. Rather, throughout its opinion the District Court

appeared to be weighing the evidence in order to deter-

mine whether any individual action of the Government

was the proximate cause of the accident,’ as opposed to

whether any such action was a contributing cause to the

accident.

Under the Massachusetts contribution statute, Chapter

231 B, §$1, 2 Massachusetts General Laws, a court is

prohibited from considering the relative degrees of fault

of concurrent tortfeasors. The District Court, however, con-

tinually compared and contrasted the negligence of peti-

tioner to that of the United States air traffic controllers

(ATC). This resulted in the failure of the District Court to

determine whether the ATC negligence was a cause of the

accident for, as can be seen in the above cited conclusion,

the District Court determined that the negligence of peti-

tioner was the sole canse of the accident.

What the District Court did determine was: (1) that the

air traffic controllers had no duty to provide the information

and services in question to petitioner, 412 F.Supp. at 976,

App. at p. 64a; (2) that the information and services to

be provided were, at best, “third priority” services, Id. at

976, 989-991, App. at p. 64a; and (3) that the controller in-

7 On the precise issue of causation resulting from the cumulative

negligent failures of ATC, the crucial passage appears at 412

F.Supp. 983 where the District Court concludes:

I do not find . . . that the proximate cause of this crash was

the alleged negligence of ATC. (emphasis added).

Yet this was clearly not the correct standard for determining

the issue of whether the failure of ATC to render these services

contributed to the accident.

8

volved was entirely justified in failing to perform these

functions, Id. at 989-991, App. at pps. 97a-98a.

2. The Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held

that the District Court’s finding that the United States

was not negligent was clearly erroneous. The Court of

Appeals found that: (1) the United States had a duty, set

forth in the Terminal Air Traffic Control Manual, to pro-

vide the services in question to petitioner; (2) the air traffic

controller failed to meet this duty because of “a substantial

and unjustified failure to follow procedures made manda-

tory by the Manual”; and (3) this failure was not justified

by the controller’s other duties inasmuch as he “admitted

that he had simply forgotten about D[elta Flight] 723.”

App. at p. 25a. In the section of the Court of Appeals’

opinion devoted to reviewing the District Court’s finding

of no negligence as to the United States, the Court of Ap-

peals also stated:

The fact that the procedures here in question are

made mandatory by the Government indicates not only

that they are not to be treated casually but that pilots

may rely on their being followed. Moreover, it is clear

from all the testimony that the three omissions by

Mr. Taylor contributed to an increased cockpit work-

load. We therefore cannot treat Mr. Taylor’s lapses

as trivial. Pilots and passengers alike are entitled to

expect better service from the air traffic control

system and, although pilots are undoubtedly respon-

sible for the safety of their aircraft, controllers are

concurrently responsible for adhering to procedures

which minimize the difficulties for the crew.

App. at p. 23a (emphasis added).

9

[NJone of the witnesses could recall an instance where

all of the services not given to D 723 were similarly

withheld from another flight.

App. at p. 19a.

The Court of Appeals then turned to the causation issue

and held that it must apply the “clearly erroneous” rule

to this finding of the District Court. For the first and only

time in this lawsuit, a court briefly addressed the legal

standard for proximate cause. The Court of Appeals held

that the legal standard to be applied was that embodied in

§431 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Though the

Court of Appeals cited a Massachusetts case, no Massa-

chusetts court has ever adopted the Restatement test.®

More significantly, the District Court, in its opinion, never

used any of the terms which symbolize and inhere in the

Restatement test. The Court of Appeals not only did not

comment on the fact th. * the District Court had not artieu-

lated any standard, it failed entirely to explain or justify

why it, the Court of Appeals, was employing a different

standard.

Nonetheless, having articulated a test, the Court of

Appeals did not apply it to the facts of the case in order

to determine whether a preponderance of the evidence

established causation, Somewhat reluctantly,’ the Court

of Appeals concluded that the District Court’s finding of

no causation was not clearly erroneous.

*It is significant that the Massachusetts standard of proximate

eause had been fully and accurately set out in the briefs before

both the District Court and the Court of Appeals. See infra n.13.

*The Court of Appeals stated, with regard to some of the Gov-

ernment’s negligence and its causative relationship to the accident,

that it found the matter “troublesome.” App. at p. 31a.

10

Reasons for Granting the Writ

wThis case presents a matter of utmost importance to

this Court in the proper interpretation and application of

the “clearly erroneous” standard for appellate review set

forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). The mis-

interpretation and misapplication of the standard, in re-

viewing the findings and decision of the District Court, has

caused the Court of Appeals to reach an ultimate decision

which is, inherently and basically, wrong. This misappli-

eation of the “clearly erroneous” standard for appellate

review has deprived petitioner Delta of due process.

There is compelling need, in the national interest of

uniformity in the treatment and resolution of litigation

arising out of aviation disasters, for the adoption of a

federal rule of comparative negligence, such as the Court

of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit adopted in Kohr v.

Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (1974), cert. denied,

421 U.S. 978 (1975). This case presents a clear situation

where the Kohr rule should be applied in determining the

relative responsibility of the United States for an avia-

tion accident where the clear negligence of an air traffic

controller employed by the United States has been estab-

lished by the evidence.

11

I.

The Court of Appeals Misinterpreted and Misapplied

the Clearly Erroneous Standard for Appellate Review

Set Forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).

The Court of Appeals applied the “clearly erroneous”

standard in affirming the ultimate decision of the District

Court that there was no causation established as to the

United States.’® This interpretation of Rule 52(a) and the

application of the “clearly erroneous” rule to the District

Court’s finding of no causation was fatally wrong because:

(A) the challenged finding was one of “ultimate fact” and,

therefore, the clearly erroneous standard was inapplicable;

(B) the District Court’s clearly erroneous factual findings

of no negligence tainted its “finding” of no causation; and

(C) the Court of Appeals apparently believed that the

District Court had applied the wrong legal test for deter-

mining causation.

In most cases, review by the Court can only be based

on the decision appealed from and the language contained

therein. The reasoning and bases for the conclusions of

the Court of Appeals are entitled to a favorable construc-

tion by the Court. However, after the appellate decision

in this case, individual plaintiff-appellants, in a companion

ease of McMaster v. United States, No. 76-1270 (1st Cir.

1977) filed a petition for rehearing. In a brief Memoran-

dum and Order Denying Rehearing (App. pps. 123a to

*® This Court’s informal “two-court” rule with regard to factual

findings is not applicable to the questions presented. Petitioner

is not challenging the findings of fact below per se, but, rather.

whether the Court of Appeals was correct in applying the “clearly

erroneous” rule to such findings. If this Court concludes that the

“elearly erroneous” standard was properly applied, petitioner

agrees that this Court’s “two-court” rule is applicable. Neil vy.

Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).

12

125a), the Court of Appeals revealed, to an unusual extent,

the thought processes and the points in the District Court’s

opinion on which it relied in reaching the decision sought

to be reviewed herein. This second opinion provides the

Court with an insight into the original decision and deci-

sively points to the erroneous interpretation of Rule 52(a)

made by the Court of Appeals.

A. Causation Is a Question of Ultimate Fact.

In Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665 (1944),

the Court provided its most detailed explanation of findings

of fact:

The phrase “finding of fact” may be a summary

characterization of complicated factors of varying

significance for judgment. Such a “finding of fact”

may be the ultimate judgment on a mass of details in-

volving not merely an assessment of the trustworthi-

ness of witnesses but other appropriate inferences

that may be drawn from living testimony which elude

print. The conclusiveness of a “finding of fact” de-

pends on the nature of the materials on which the find-

ing is based. The finding even of a so-called “sub-

sidiary fact” may be a more or less difficult process

varying according to the simplicity or subtlety of the

type of “fact” in controversy. Finding so-called ul-

timate “facts” more clearly implies the application of

standards of law. And so the “finding of fact” even if

made by two courts may go beyond the determination

that should not be set aside here. Though labeled

“finding of fact,” it may involve the very basis on

which judgment of fallible evidence is to be made.

Thus, the conclusion that may appropriately be drawn

from the whole mass of evidence is not always the

13

ascertainment of the kind of “fact” that precludes con-

sideration by this Court.

322 U.S. 670-671.

The Court repeatedly has adhered to this position. For

instance. in reviewing a decision of the Court of Claims,

the Court stated: ,

There are facts and facts, even in Court of Claims’

litigation. It is the function of the Court of Claims

to make findings. But when a judgment based on such

findings is here brought in question it is the function

of this Ceurt to ascertain the meaning of the findings

in order to determine their legal significance. ... Where

the conclusion is a “composite of fact and law,” Cedar

Rapids Gas Light Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 223 US 655,

668, 56 L ed 594, 604, 32 S Ct 389, this Court may

certainly hold that as a matter of law the findings are

erroneous. ,

United States v. John J. Felin & Co., 334 U.S. 624 at 639-40

(1948).

Other decisions of the Court have reached this conelusion

where it has been determined that the ultimate finding

reached may have been undermined by the application of

an improper legal standard. Under such circumstances,

the error is one of law and hence, freely reviewable. In

United States v. Singer Manufacturing Co., 374 U.S. 174

(1963), the Court stated:

Insofar as that conclusion derived from the [district]

court’s application of an improper standard to the

facts, it may be corrected as a matter of law.

374 U.S. at 194n.9. To the same extent see United States vy.

E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 598 n.28

(1957); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29,

14

43-44 (1960); United States v. General Motors Corp., 384

U.S, 127, 142 n.16 (1966).

A clear statement of this principle is in Cordovan Asso-

ciates, Inc. v. Dayton Rubber Co., 290 F.2d 858 (6th Cir.

1961) :

Where a finding designated as a finding of fact is not

in reality a finding of fact, but is a conclusion of law

or a mixed finding of fact and conclusion of law, it is

not binding on the appellate court. [citations omitted]

Where a finding is of an ultimate fact in the making of

which is involved the application of legal principles,

it is subject to review.

290 F.2d at 860."

In its Memorandum and Order Denying Rehearing

(hereinafter “second opimion”) the Court of Appeals

states:

We add that we were of course not unaware that the

legal standards applicable to issues of negligence and

proximate cause may present issues of law; still, the

basic issue here remains the court’s factual evaluation

of the connection, or lack thereof, between controller’s

conduct and the crash.

App. at p. 125a.

11 See, United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454, 460-61 (6th

Cir. 1973); United Artists Television, Inc. vy. Fortnightly Corp.,

377 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1967), rev’d on other grounds, 392 U.S. 390

(1968) ; Mamiye Bros. v. Barber Steamship Lines, Inc., 360 F.2d

774 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 835 (1966 ) : Perfectform Corp.

v. Perfect Brassiere Co., 256 F.2d 736 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358

U.S. 919 (1958); Owen v. Commercial Union Fire Insurance Co.

of New York, 211 F.2d 488 (4th Cir. 1954) ; Crosby v. United

States, 496 F.2d 1384 (5th Cir. 1974) ; Ashland Oil & Refining Co.

v. Kenny Construction Co., 395 F.2d 683 (6th Cir. 1966) : Chandler

v. United States, 226 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1955) ; Official Creditors’

Committee of Fox Markets, Inc. v. Ely, 337 F.2d 461 (9th Cir.

1964).

15

Thus, the Court of Appealr concedes that the issue of

causation may involve questions of law and fact, some

of which may properly be freely reviewable. Concededly,

causation normally presents a question of fact where it is

clear that, in the first instance, the correct legal standard

was applied in determining negligence. However, this is

never correct where the District Court entirely fails to

articulate or, in any way, evidence the legal standard of

proximate causation upon which this ultimate factual find-

ing must rest. Thus, in this case, it was plainly wrong for

the Court of Appeals to treat the finding of no causation

as a simple question of fact protected by the clearly erro-

neous rule. Only where the appellate court is convinced

that the correct legal standard of proximate cause has been

applied does the question of causation become one of fact

alone.

B. The District Court’s Clearly Erroneous Finding of No

Negligence Tainted the Ultimate Finding of No Causation.

In this case, the issues of negligence and causation were

closely intertwined. As a matter of common sense, it is

highly questionable whether a trier of fact who has con-

cluded that certain acts are unimportant, non-negligent,

excusable and even compelled by events, can then conclude

that those acts were responsible for a tragic result. Yet,

the Court of Appeals has concluded that the District Court

was not affected in any way by his clearly erroneous con-

clusions as to negligence even though, clearly, the District

Court believed ATC to be acting properly in ignoring what

it believed to be unimportant services,

Specifically, the District Court held: (1) that ATC had

no duty to provide certain services and information to peti-

tioner; (2) that the services and information were, at best,

of a third priority; and (3) that the air traffic controller

involved was excused from performing these third priority

16

services in any case because he had a first priority emer-

gency to deal with.

As to all three of these points, crucial testimony was

provided by witnesses Ball (for petitioner), Roseborough

and Burke (for the United States), as well as many others.

The District Court rejected Ball's testimony, as well as

that of the rest of the witnesses for petitioner, and found

that, on the basis of testimony of witnesses for the United

States, the United States was not negligent for the reasons

given above. The District Court was wrong in its evalua-

tion of the testimony and the Court of Appeals so held. Yet

these three witnesses also testified as to causation, and the

District Court again believed only the witnesses for the

United States. The United States witnesses’ opinions were

that none of the controller’s failures caused or contributed

to the accident. The District Court found this testimony to

be “factual” and correct. 412 F.Supp. at 993. App. at p.

102a.

The Court of Appeals, in examining the question of

negligence, found: (1) “it is clear from all of the testimony

that the ... omissions . . . contributed to an increased cock-

pit workload,” (App. at p. 23a); (2) that “none of the wit-

nesses could recall” so many simultaneous negligent acts

being committed by ATC (App. at p. 19a); and (3) that

the Government’s failure was “substantial and... un-

justified.” App. at p. 17a It is difficult to rationalize the

Court of Appeals’ acquiescence in the District Court’s find-

ing that the no causation conclusion was “factual” where

the Court of Appeals had already determined that this con-

clusion was based on a combination of facts that had never

occurred before. The Court of Appeals second opinion

only makes this more illogical. Compare the lower

Court's conclusion in its first opinion, that it should not

disturb the District Court’s finding “that the sole cause of

17

the crash was the negligence of the Delta crew”, with its

characterization of this tragedy in its second opinion, as

“this largely still unexplained accident.” App. at p. 123a.

In its second opinion, the Court of Appeals cites, as an

example of the District Court’s correct treatment of the

causation issue, the District Court’s handling of the causa-

tion cases cited by the petitioner to the District Court

(App. at p. 123a). If the Court of Appeals did, as it so

states, rely on this section of the District Court’s opinion

(App. at pps. 106a-115a), its decision should be reversed,

simply because the taint of the District Court’s clearly

erroneous finding of no negligence invalidated its con-

sideration of the causation issue.

In Section VI of the District Court’s opinion (App.

106a-115a), it distinguishes all of the cases cited on the

basis of the difference between its negligence findings and

those contained in those cases. The District Court starts

by distinguishing, as “inapposite”, seven cases on the

ground that those cases did not involve holdings of pilot

negligence. Yet, each of these cases stand for the proposi-

tion that, despite the pilot’s sole responsibility for the

safety of his aircraft, ATC breaches of their concurrent

duties have been held to be proximate or contributing

causes of the accident. Several of these cases find ATC

failures, very similar to but of a lesser degree than those

herein, to have been proximate causes of accidents. Finally,

some of these cases held the Government liable despite

findings of pilot negligence.** Thus, the District Court

eschewed consideration of these cases because they did not

** A clear example of how the District Court erroneously distin-

guished this almost unanimous authority can be seen by reading

Hartz v. United States, 387 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1968), reversing

249 F.Supp. 119 (N.D. Ga. 1965). In fact, these two opinions

reveal a case factually indistinguishable from this one, but with a

completely different legal result.

18

appear to be consistent with its finding of no negligence

in this case.

The remaining four cases which the District Court did

not find “inapposite” contain even more telling examples

of how the District Court’s clearly erroneous finding of

no negligence infected its determination of the causation is-

sue. Despite its extraordinarily similar factual circum-

stances in ATC failure to warn and act promptly, the

District Court distinguished Stork v. United States, 430

F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1970) because of the type of negligence

found in that case. With regard to Todd v. United States,

384 F.Supp. 1284 (M.D. Fla. 1975), the District Court

stated:

In this respect Todd is distinguishable from the case

at bar. In the instant case the ATC handling of D 723

to the point of DH was not negligent.

412 F.Supp. at 996, App. at p. 110a.

As to Dickens v. United States, 378 F.Supp. 845 (S.D.

Texas 1974), the District Court stated:

The Dickens case is distinguishable from the case at

bar in that the basis of ATC negligence there was a

failure to warn of a hazard known to the controller

but unknown to and unknowable by the pilot. In the

case at bar, the possible hazard to landing caused by

sea fog was a condition known to the pilot and the

erew of D 723.

412 F.Supp. at 996. App. at p. 1lla. The same error in-

fects the District Court’s lengthy handling of Ingham v.

Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,

389 U.S. 931 (1967), a case whose holding as to causation

is indistinguishable from the case at bar.

19

It must be remembered that the right to contribution,

if governed by the law of Massachusetts as the District

Court held, provides that the relative degrees of fault

shall not be considered in determining the pro rata shares

of tortfeasors in the total liability. Chapter 231B 4§1, 2,

Massachusetts General Law. It is clear that the District

Court did consider the relative degrees of fault, and, in

fact, was overwhelmingly concerned with issues of relative

negligence in this case. The District Court’s conclusions

and findings with regard to negligence were dispositive,

not only of the case before it, but also of the District Court’s

consideration of the causation issue. The irony is that,

although the Court of Appeals held that the District Court

was clearly erroneous as to its finding of no negligence,

the Court of Appeals, by affirming, upheld the District

Court’s other negligence finding which stated that peti-

tioner’s sole negligence caused this accident.

The Court of Appeals in its second opinion summarily

cited the District Court’s handling of the above authorities

on the causation issue as evidencing the District Court’s

proper handling of that isste. This is absolute proof of

why the “clearly erroneous” standard should not have

been applied in reviewing the finding of no causation.

Clearly, the Court of Appeals found itself so shackled by

the rvle that it could not even review the District Court’s

hand! .g of the law on the causation issue in order to see

the tainted effect caused by the District Court’s clearly

erroneous finding of no negligence,

C. The District Court Did Not Apply the Correct Legal

Standard for Determining Proximate Cause.

The District Court, in its opinion, never articulated any

legal standard for proximate cause. The Court of Appeals

took no cognizance of this in its opinion. The Court of

Appeals did, however, articulate a proximate cause stan-

20

dard. It did not, however, apply that standard to the

facts of this case, because, constrained by its application

of the “clearly erroneous” rule, the Court of Appeals de-

termined only that the District Court’s factual finding of

no causation was not clearly erroneous. The crucial ques-

tion which the Court of Appeals failed to explicitly address

was whether or not the District Court applied the correct

legal standard in determining causation.

In articulating a legal standard for proximate cause, the

Court of Appeals chose that of the Restatement (Second)

Torts $431. That standard emplovs the “substantial fac-

tor” test. It is impossible to discuss that test or to apply

it to facts without using the words “substantial” or “fac-

tor” as is evidenced by the Court of Appeals repeated use

of those terms throughout its discussion of causation.

These words are not merely symbolic, but inhere in and

capture the essence of the test itself. It is, therefore, sig-

nificant that the District Court never used this language

anywhere in its opinion.

Nor did the District Court ever cite any case law or other

authority which might indicate what legal standard for

proximate cause, if any, it was applying. While it is true

that the District Court does mention the terms “a proxl-

mate cause”, “a contributing cause” and languag® indicat-

ing such concepts, it never addresses the issue of what

standard underlies the use of such language or terms. While

the Court of Appeals does not explicitly address the issue

of what standard the District Court applied, by selecting

a standard which is clearly not present in the District

Court’s opinion, it would appear that the Court of Appeals

perceived both the lack of an explicit standard in the lower

court, as well as the necessity of employing a different

standard. Thus, the Court of Appeals at least impliedly

held that the District Court’s legal basis was wrong.

21

In Protective Committee for Independent Stockholders

of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414

(1968), the Court stated that:

In this there was error, and it was an error which in-

fected the conclusions of the trial court .... Evalua-

tions of evidence reached by the accurate application

of erroneous legal standards are erroneous evalua-

tions.

390 U.S. at 444-45. This principle merely reflects the

Court’s long-standing rule that erroneous applications of

legal standards are not subject to the “clearly erroneous”

test; rather, they are freely reviewable. United States v.

E. I. DuPont de Nemours € Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957) ; United

States v. Singer Manufacturing Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963);

United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966) ;

United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).

The most recent decision holding that the trier of fact

must reexamine the record on remand because it initially

applied an erroneous legal standard is Kelley v. Southern

Pacific Co., 419 U.S. 318 (1974). Kelley sued the defendant

railroad under the F.E.L.A. for injuries sustained while

unloading automobiles from a railroad car. Kelley was

employed by a wholly owned subsidiary of the railroad, and

thus the question was whether he was an “employee” of

the railroad so-ms to be covered by the F.E.L.A. The Dis-

trict Court found that Kelley was so covered on grounds

that the subsidiary’s employees were agents of the railroad

and because work which Kelley performed fulfilled a non-

delegable duty of the railroad.

The Court of Appeals reversed and entered judgment for

the railroad, holding that “employment” had to be based

on a master-servant and not an agency relationship.

22

The Court vacated and remanded for the District Court

to determine whether the facts could support a verdict

under the appropriate legal standard of master-servant:

[While the Court of Appeals may have meant to sug-

gest that in its view the record could not support a

finding of employment, that suggestion is not de-

veloped in its opinion, and we think the best course

at this point is to require the trier of fact to re-ex-

amine the record in light of the proper legal standard.

419 U.S. at 332.

In Guzman v. Pichirilo, 369 U.S. 698 (1962), the Court

outlined what it would have done had it found itself in

the position the Court of Appeals apparently was in when

reviewing the District Court’s decision:

If we were convinced . . . that the trial court’s action

was colored by a misunderstanding of such legal prin-

ciples, we would have to remand .. . for further find-

ings by the trial court [on the issue there involved].

E.g. Kweskin v. Finkelstein, 223 F2d 677, 679 (CA

7th Cir 1955).

369 U.S. at 701. See also Maddux v. Cox, 382 F.2d 119

(Sth Cir. 1967), where the Court of Appeals remanded for

a new determination of proximate causation after finding

that one of the two district court findings of contributory

negligence was clearly erroneous and William G. Roe &

Co. v. Armour & Co., 370 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1967), which

remanded the case for a new finding of causation applying

the correct standard.

Thus, it is clear that the Court of Appeals should not

have reviewed the District Court’s finding of causation to

determine if it was clearly erroneous where they felt that

a different standard should be applied. What renders the

judgment of the Court of Appeals inherently wrong is that

23

neither the Court of Appeals nor the District Court used

the correct legal standard of proximate cause applicable

in this case.

18 The applicable Massachusetts standards for proximate causa-

tion where there is more than one cause or for determining whether

an act is a contributing cause are quite different from the “sub-

stantial factor test.”

Under Massachusetts law, the intervening negligence of a third

party does not, generally, exonerate the earlier wrongdoer. The

Court in Morrison v. Medaglie, 287 Mass. 46, 191 N.E. 133, 134

(1934), set forth the applicable legal standards under which the

question of proximate causation of prior negligence should be

considered :

[T]he intervening negligence of a third person, which con-

tributed to an injury, does not necessarily break the causal

connection between the conduct of an earlier wrongdoer, and

the injury. A causal connection may nevertheless be found,

either on the theory of Burke v. Hodge, 217 Mass. 182, 104

N.E. 450, that the negligence of the earlier wrongdoer

remained a dangerous force until the negligence of the later

wrongdoer concurred and combined with it to cause injury.

or on the theory of Lane v. Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 136,

restated in Horan v. Inhabitants of Watertown, 217 Mass.

185, 104 N.E. 464, that the earlier wrongdoer ought to have

foreseen that his negligence would be followed by negligence

of another resulting in injury, and consequently that in law

the act of that other is the act of the original wrongdoer be-

cause it is the natural and probable consequence of his

wrongdoing.

See also, Metropolitan Coal Co. v. Johnson, 265 F.2d 173 (1st Cir.

1959) ; Whalen v. Shivek, 93 N.E.2d 393 (Mass. 1950) : Addison v.

Green Cafe, Inc., 84 N.E.2d 33 (Mass. 1949); and Malloy v. New-

man, 310 Mass. 269, 37 N.E.2d 1001, 1005-6 (1941).

24

Il.

The Court of Appeals Decision Has Effectively Denied

Petitioner Due Process of Law.

No court in this case has determined, based upon a cor-

rect legal standard for proximate cause, whether petitioner

has or has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence

that ATC negligence caused or contributed to the accident.

The District Court did not because it found no ATC neg-

ligence and did not apply a correct legal standard to its

determination. The Court of Appeals did not because it

never determined the correct legal standard. Even if it

had, the Court of Appeals’ adherence to the clearly errone-

ous rule would have prevented an application of such stan-

dard to the facts of this case. Thus, the Court of Appeals

would never have applied the correct legal standard in

order to determine whether a preponderance of the evi-

dence supported a finding of causation. Thus, petitioner’s

claim has ‘fallen between the cracks’ in a constitutionally

impermissible way.

In White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976), the

court stated:

The requirements of due process include a determina-

tion of the issues according to articulated standards.

The lack of such standards in this case deprives any

hearing, whether before an agency or a court, of its

meaning and value as an opportunity for the plaintiffs

to prove [their claim].

530 F.2d at 754. Since the District Court never applied any

articulated standard for proximate cause, it clearly failed

to meet this requirement of due process. Petitioner has

shown, in addition, that the District Court’s clearly errone-

ous finding of no ATC negligence fundamentally under-

25

mined the District Court’s evaluation of the authorities

cited by petitioner as supporting a finding of causation.

These two factors combine to render the District Court’s

determination of the merits, on the basis of a preponder-

ance of the evidence, meaningless. Thus, petitioner was

denied due process in the District Court.

The decision of the Court of Appeals failed to remedy

this denial. In effect, petitioner was placed in the position

of proving causation in light of a new test (still not the

correct one, but certainly different from the one used by

the District Court), beyond a reasonable doubt, in order

to overcome the clearly erroneous standard. The Court

has condemned, as violative of due process, similar pro-

cedures which require a party to prove its claim with a

different or higher burden of proof than that to which his

claim would ordinarily be subjected. Armstrong v. Manzo,

380 U.S. 545 (1965). In that case, the Court held invalid

a situation wherein one party, because of lack of notice,

was forced to seek to overturn a pre-existing judgment.

He was placed in a position of having the burden of proof

in this subsequent proceeding where he would not have had

the burden in the original action. Thus, the Court held the

subsequent proceeding did not result in the adjudication

of his claim in a way that comported with due process.

The Court stated:

A fundamental requirement of due process is “the

opportunity to be heard.” Grannis v. Ordean, 234 US

385, 394, 58 L ed 1363, 1369, 34 S Ct 779. It is an

opportunity which must be granted at a meaningful

time and in a meaningful manner. The trial court

could have fully accorded this right to the petitioner

only by granting his motion to set aside the decree

and consider the case anew. Only that would have

wiped the slate clean. Only that would have restored

26

the petitioner to the position he would have occupied

had due process of law been accorded to him in the

first place.

380 U.S. at 552-3.

Similarly, in the case at bar, after the Court of Appeals

determined that the District Court had erred in its fact

finding of no ATC negligence and that the District Court

had not applied the correct legal standard for determining

proximate cause, the Court of Appeals should have re-

manded for a new trial. Instead, the Court imposed upon

petitioner the extraordinary burden of proving its case

beyond a reasonable doubt.* It is no less debilitating to

change the burden of proof from “preponderance” to “be-

yond a reasonable doubt” than it is to place the burden

of proof of “preponderance” on the wrong party. Cer-

tainly, as the Court stated in Armstrong, supra at 551:

The burdens thus placed upon the petitioner were

real, not purely theoretical. For “it is plain that

where the burden of proof lies may be decisive of the

outcome.”

Petitioner would add that the weight of the burden of

proof may be more decisive than its placement.

The Court of Appeals decision, therefore, worked as a

final denial of petitioner’s due process right to a full and

fair determination of its claims against the United States.

Yet, the Court of Appeals could easily have resolved this

case without denying petitioner due process in either of

two ways. Firstly, after finding ATC negligence and ascer-

taining the correct legal standard for proximate cause,

** Petitioner submits this as the closest articulated burden to

proving that there is no “substantial” evidence whatsoever to

support the District Court's finding.

27

the Court of Appeals could have remanded for a new trial

or application of the proper standard of proximate cause

to the proven ATC negligence. In its second opinion, the

Court of Appeals derided this alternative, noting: “a re-

trial of the proximate cause issue would in essence be one

more bite at the same apple.” Yet other courts have not

balked at allowing “one more bite” where justice so dic-

tates. Kelley v. Southern Pacific Co., 419 U.S. 318 (1974);

William G. Roe & Co. v. Armour & Co., 370 F.2d 829 (Sth

Cir. 1967); Maddux v. Cox, 382 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1967).

Secondly, the Court of Appeals might have held that the

finding of proximate cause was an ultimate issue of fact

comprised of mixed questions of law and fact. By doing

so, the Court of Appeals could then have reviewed the

District Court’s finding freely. It could have established

the applicable legal standard and applied it to the factual

findings of ATC negligence. The Court of Appeals, in its

second opinion, held that it could not do so because of the

application of its Local Rule 15. Yet courts have repeatedly

held that mixed questions of law and fact are freely re-

viewable,’* and such review is required where an erroneous

legal standard has been applied. Protecttve Committee

for Independent Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc.

v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414 (196_).

In conclusion, it is clear that petitioner never has had an

opportunity to fully and fairly have its claims adjudicated.

No court has ever determined whether petitioner proved

by a preponderance of ihe evidence that the proven ATC

negligence caused or contributed to the crash. No court

has ever applied the correct legal standard for proximate

cause to this proven negligence. No court, in short, has

decided petitioner’s claims properly. Given this, it is diffi-

cult for petitioner to accept that the Court can, consonant

18 See cases cited supra at p. 15 n.11.

28

with fundamental principles of due process and its role as

ultimate protector of the fair administration of justice,

accept the decisions below and allow these essentially in-

correct adjudications to stand.

Il.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals Is in Conflict

With a Decision of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit.

The District Court, in this case, applied Massachusetts

law in dismissing all claims by petitioner seeking indem-

nification for sums paid in settlement of claims by the

estates of passengers who died in the crash of petitioner’s

aircraft. The application of Massachusetts law also re-

sulted in the dismissal of claims for contribution brought

by petitioner for claims arising under the Massachusetts

death statute which is considered punitive in nature. The

District Court did not dismiss petitioner’s claims for con-

tribution based upon the death statutes of other states.

Thus, the application of state law to petitioner’s claims

for contribution and indemnity resulted in inconsistent

treatment of claims arising out of one accident.

Petitioner argued in the Court below that the applica-

tion of state law was in conflict with the federal rule

of contribution and indemnity in aviation tort cases

adopted by the United States Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Cireuit in Kohr y. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504

F.2d 400 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975). In

affirming the District Court, the First Cireuit placed itself

in direet conflict with Kohr.

The Seventh Circuit, in Kohr, relied primarily on the

“predominant, indeed, almost exclusive interest of the fed-

29

!

eral government in regulating the affairs of the nation’s

airways” in its decision to apply a federal rule of con-

tribution and indemnity in aviation tort cases. 504 F.2d

at 403. The Court there also found other important fac-

tors in the case mandating the adoption of such a rule,

stating:

When the notion of federal preemption over aviation

is viewed in combination with the fact that this litiga-

tion ensues from a mid-air collision occurring in na-

tional airspace, that the Government is a party to the

action pursuant to Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C.

§$1346(b) et seq.), and that this litigation has since its

inception been subject to the supervision of the Judi-

cial Panel created by the Multidistrict Litigation Act

(28 U.S.C. § 1407 et seq.), there is no perceptible rea-

son why federal law should not be applied to deter-

mine the rights and liabilities of the parties involved.

504 F.2d at 404.

All of these factors were present in the case at bar.

Further, as already stated, there also existed the problem

of great concern in Kohr for “inconsistency of result in

similar collision occurrences as well as within the same

occurrence due to the application of differing state laws

on contribution and indemnity.” 504 F.2d 403,

In affirming the decision of the District Court, except as

to its findings on ATC negligence, the Court below has

adopted the application of state law with regard to con-

tribution and indemnity in disregard of the Kohr decision,

thereby creating a conflict in the Circuit Courts of Appeals.

This conflict, whether to apply federal or state law, can

be resolved only by the Court.

30

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted

that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of

the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

in this case, as prayed herein.

Georce N. Tompkins, Jr.

Counsel for Petitioner

Delta Air Lines, Inc.

1251 Avenue of the Americas

New York, New York 10020

Of Counsel:

Connon & ForsytH

NATHANIEL F. Kwappen

Streruen J. Fearon

Ropert Fviton

November 10, 1977

31

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that I have, this 10th day of November,

1977, served the foregoing petition for a writ of certiorari

upon respondents by depositing same in a United States

mail box at One Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New York

10020, with first class postage prepaid, addressed to

Michael J. Pangia, Esq., counsel of record for respondent,

at his post office address, Aviation Unit, Civil Division

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530 and James

N. Gabriel, United States Attorney, at his post office

address, at Office of the U.S. Attorney, 1525 John W.

McCormack Building, Boston, Massachusetts 02108.

November 10, 1977

Grorce N. Tompkins, Jr.

Counsel for Petitioner

APPENDIX

OS a aN ee he

Opinion of Court of Appeals

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For tHe First Circuit

No. 76-1269

Detta Air Livzs, Inc.,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

Unitrep States or AMERICA,

Defendant, Appellee.

No. 76-1270

Karen Harensic McMaster, Erc. Er au,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

Unirep States oF AMERICA,

Defendant, Appellee.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

{Hon. Anprew A. Carrrey, U.S. District Judge]

Before:

Corrin, Chief Judge, CaMpBELL, Circuit Judge,

Gicnoux, District Judge.*

* Of the District of Maine, sitting by designation.

la

2a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

Grorce N. Tompkins, Jr., with whom Robert

Fulton and Condon & Forsyth were on brief,

for appellant.

Micuaet B. Lartr and Auan R. Horrmay, with

whom Kaplan, Latti and Flannery was

on brief, Karen Haelsig McMaster, ete.,

et al.

Micuakt J. Panota, Attorney, United States De-

partment of Justice, with whom James N.

Gabriel, United States Attorney, was on

brief, for appellee.

August 12, 1977

CaMPBELL, Circuit Judge.

On July 31, 1973, a Delta Air Line DC-9 aircraft crashed

during an approach in fog to Logan International Airport

in Boston, Massachusetts. Eighty-three passengers, the

erew of five and a Delta cockpit observer died in the acci-

dent.

The various lawsuits arising out of the accident were

transferred for pretrial proceedings in the District of

Massachusetts. See, e.g., In re Delta Airlines Crash at

Boston, Massachusetts, on July 31, 1973, 395 F.Supp. 1405

(Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 1975); In re Delta Airlines Crash at

Boston, Massachusetts, on July 31, 1973, 373 F. Supp. 1406

(Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 1974). All claims were consolidated

for a non-jury trial on the issue of liability.

Delta did not contest its own liability to the estates of

deceased passengers but sought contribution and indemnifi-

3a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

cation from the United States under the Federal Tort

Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), based on the alleged negli-

gence of an air traffic controller who handled the flight.

The airline also sought recovery for the loss of the air-

craft and other consequential damages. Individual suits

against the United States were brought as well by the

families of crewmembers barred under workmen’s compen-

sation statutes from bringing suit against Delta.

Delta conceded at the eleven-day trial that crew negli-

gence contributed to the accident, but argued that negli-

gence on the part of air traffic control was also a

contributing factor. The individual plaintiffs sought to

prove that the controller was negligent and that this

negligence was a proximate cause of the crash. The Gov-

ernment took the position that the crew’s negligence was

the sole cause of the accident.

On February 19, 1976, the court filed a lengthy opinion

which concluded “that the sole and exclusive cause of the

accident was the negligence of the pilot and co-pilot of

D 723”. In re Aircrash Disaster, 412 F. Supp. 959, 998

(D. Mass. 1976). Judgment for the United States was en-

tered and notice of appeal was subsequently filed by Delta

and by the individual plaintiffs. We affirm.

I

On July 31, 1973, at approximately eight minutes after

eleven in the morning (1508:05 Greenwich Mean Time,

hereinafter GMT), Delta flight 723 (D 723), a regularly

scheduled passenger flight from Burlington, Vermont to

Boston, Massachusetts, crashed into a seawall at the pe-

rimeter of Logan International Airport while making an

instrument landing system (ILS) approach in fog to

runway four right (4R).

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Opinion of Court of Appeals

D 723 had made an unscheduled stop at Manchester,

New Hampshire to pick up some passengers whose flight

had been cancelled due to the weather. At 10:14 a.m.

(1414 GMT), D 723 was informed that its departure from

Manchester would be delayed because of traffic delays at

Logan caused by adverse weather conditions. The flight

eventually left Manchester at approximately ten minutes

before eleven (1450 GMT) for the 18 minute flight to

Logan.

Shortly after takeoff, D 723 contacted Boston Approach

Control Arrival Radar #1 (Approach) which was being

manned by Mr. Taylor. Approach told the flight to plan

on receiving radar vectors for an instrument landing ap-

proach to runway 4R. A radar vector is “a [magnetic

compass] heading issued to an aircraft to provide navi-

gational guidance by radar.” See 412 F. Supp. at 965

n.6. Approach also gave D 723 its only enroute weather

advisory: “Weather is partial obscuration, estimated four

hundred overcast, mile an’ a half and fog.” The flight

climbed to 4,000 feet and at 10:52 a.m. (1452 GMT), D 723

was identified by Approach on the radar scope. Four

minutes after the plane left Manchester, Approach in-

structed it to “fly heading now one eight zero [180°],

radar vectors ILS four right.” This meant that the plane

was to fly south and would be given further headings which

would feed it into the instrument landing system (ILS)

for runway 4R at Logan.

Because of the low ceiling and limited visibility at Logan

Airport, D 723, and the other aircraft flying into Logan

on July 31, were required to make an instrument landing

system approach. The two major components of the in-

strument landing system are the localizer and the glide

slope, see 412 F. Supp. at 965 nn. 7 & 9. The localizer is

5a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

an electronic beam which, in combination with radio equip-

ment in the plane, allows a pilot to align his aircraft so

that it is headed straight for the centerline of the intended

runway for landing. The localizer course for runway 4R

is 035°. If the plane deviates to the right or the

left of this course, the aircraft’s instrumentation tells the

pilot which way to turn to reintercept the localizer, i.e.,

to get back on course. The glide slope, also an electronic

beam which operates in combination with a receiver in the

plane, aids the pilot in making the descent. A plane which

stays on the glide slope will eventually touch down at the

intended point on the runway, the ILS touchdown zone.

FAA regulations and Delta procedures require that when,

during the descent, an altitude known as the decision

height (DH) is reached—216 feet above sea level for

runway 4R at Logan—the Captain must determine if the

landing environment is in sight and whether a safe landing

can be made.’ If not, he must execute a missed approach

by applying power and climbing back up to altitude. Other-

wise, the landing approach continues, although the Cap-

tain is free to discontinue the approach should he deem

it necessary. There was testimony at trial that a missed

approach may be executed in a DC-9 at any time up to

and including touchdown.

All flights approaching Boston on the morning of July

31, 1973, were under the control of air traffic controllers

who handle the air traffic from a darkened room where

* Delta’s procedures require the pilot who is not actually flying

the plane to call out the altitude when the aircraft is 200 feet and

100 feet above decision height. At decision height, he must say

either “Decision height, contact” or “Decision height, no contact”

indicating whether or not visual contact has been made with the

runway environment. If there is no contact, a missed approach

must be executed.

6a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

each airplane is tracked on a radar scope. See 412 F.

Supp. at 972 n.18. The function of approach control is to

promote the “safe, orderly and expeditious” flow of

traffic arriving and departing from a terminal area, See

id. at 978 n.22 (definition of approach contro] service).

Approach controllers operating in these terminal areas,

including Boston, do so according to procedures set out

in the Federal Aviation Administration’s handbook, Ter-

minal Air Traffic Control (the Manual). The Manual pro-

vides that action verbs in the imperative mean that a pro-

cedure is mandatory. The Manual also prescribes duty

priorities, the first being to separate aircraft, the second

to tend to “second priority services” that do not involve

air traffic separation and the third to give “additional

services to the extent possible”. See 412 F. Supp. at 964

n.6 quoting Manual 28. Iscluded in the last category is

the dissemination of weather information. See Manual

7361.

Section 1360 of the Manual in use on July 31, 1973, re-

quired an approach controller to issue certain information

and instructions to an aircraft before it reached the so-

called approach gate. This would constitute a second

priority duty. The approach gate for runway 4R at Logan

is a point 6.3 miles from the runway landing threshold

and 1 mile outside the outer marker, the final approach

fix. Id. at 965 n.8. The following information should have

been given: 1) D 723’s position relative to the outer

marker (the final approach fix); 2) a vector to intercept

the final approach course; 3) a clearance for the aircraft

to make the instrument approach; and 4) an instruction

to go ahead and monitor Boston Local Control (the Tower)

then contact it upon reaching the final approach fix or,

alternatively, an instruction to switch over to the Tower

—_—_—<——~

7a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

immediately. The handbook gives this example: “Three

miles from outer marker, turn left heading zero one zero,

cleared for I-L-S runway three six approach. Monitor

one one eight point three; report to tower when over the

outer marker.” Furthermore, $1351 of the Manual states

as a guideline that the maximum localizer interception

angle to be given when a plane is 2 miles or more outside

the approach gate is 30° Paragraph 1352 requires, by its

use of verbs in the imperative, that the controller “vector

aireraft to intercept the localizer course at least 2 miles

from the approach gate and at an altitude not above the

glide slope.” [Emphasis original] As will be seen, D 723

was never given its position relative to the approach fix

and was not turned over to the Tower until well after

passing the approach gate. Further, it was given an in-

terception angle larger than 30° and was not instructed

to descend to an altitude “not above the guide slope.”

With this background, we return to D 723. About 6

minutes after it took off from Manchester, the flight, which

had leveled off at 4,000 feet, was told to descend to 3,000

feet. Approach never assigned a lower altitude. Between

10:57 a.m. and 11:04 a.m., Approach issued various com-

pass heading changes to D 723 which brought it west of

Boston and around to the south of Logan Airport in prepa-

ration for the instrument approach to runway 4R. Just

past 11:04 a.m. (1504:27 GMT), less than 4 minutes before

the crash, Approach said: “. .. and Delta seven two three

fly heading of, zero eight zero [080°] and intercept. the

localizer course and fly it inbound over.” [D 723 replied,

“Okay zero eight zero for interception.” The transmis-

sion from Approach constituted “a vector to intercept the

final approach course” and was given more than 2 miles

and approximately 14% minutes prior to D 723’s reaching

8a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

the approach gate. Therefore, the second of the required

four pre-approach instructions was given before the flight

reached the approach gate. The angle of intercept, how-

ever, was 15° greater than that suggested by the Manual.

The intercept heading of 080° necessitated a heading

change, or intercept angle, of 45° as the airplane made

its left turn on to the localizer course of 035°. Of more

significance, however, no clearance to descend to an alti-

tude “not above glide slope” was given; this was contrary

to mandatory Manual prucedures. Thus, the flight re-

mained at 3,000 feet at a point when planes making the

approach would, according to testimony, customarily have

been descended to 2,900 feet.

Some thirty seconds prior to arriving at the approach

gate, D 723 asked if it were “cleared for ILS”. Ap-

proach responded, “Yes, seven two three is cleared for

ILS, yes.” The flight profile indicates that this transmis-

sion from Approach occurred before D 723 reached the

approach gate. Thus, the third of the four mandatory

instructions was timely given to D 723, albeit at the insti-

gation of the aircraft. However, at no time was the flight

given the first mandatory instruction, its position relative

to the final approach fix; furthermore, at the point that

D 723 had passed the approach gate and reached the final

approach fix, it had not received the fourth mandatory

instruction, to monitor the Tower frequency or, alterna-

tively, to report to the Tower.

The plaintiffs claim that the fact D 723 was not turned

over to the Tower was critical because a significant

weather change had taken place at Logan subsequent to

the weather report relayed to the aircraft after its take

off from Manchester. At almost 6 minutes past 11 (1505 :42

GMT), the Tower informed Eastern 572, the plane im-

9a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

mediately preceding D 723 on the approach to 4R, “...

the fog’s movin’ back in from the south across the airport

now it’s just approaching runway four right”. D 723 was

less than a mile from the approach gate, had not been

told to monitor the Tower and did not hear this transmis-

sion. Had D 723 contacted the Tower at the outer marker,

testimony suggests that it would have received the fog

warning. This would have occurred shortly after 11:06:14

a.m., almost 2 minutes prior to the accident. At 7 minutes

past 11 (1507:03 GMT), about 1 minute before the crash

when D 723 was well inside the outer marker, but before

it had been switched to Tower, there was an internal com-

munication from the Tower to the radar room that the

fog was “coming right back across again so you can get

ready for some [missed approaches], its real thick again.”

Mr. Taylor, the approach controller handling D 723, testi-

fied that he did not hear anything about the fog bank.

Meanwhile, D 723’s approach continued with the co-

pilot flying the aircraft and the Captain handling the radio

communications and other chores, D 723 crossed the outer

marker 1 minute and 51 seconds before impact at a speed

of 207 knots which was, according to the testimony, over

40 knots too fast. The flight profile shows, and various

witnesses testified, that D 723 did not execute a good

approach; it was off course to the left of the localizer

until the final momenis and was never established on the

glide slope. See id. at 999. Nevertheless, there was testi-

mony by Delta’s expert that the approach would have

been acceptable had the ceiling been at 400 feet as initially

reported to D 723. Plaintiffs argued that the excessive

intercept angle and the fact that D 723 was forced to begin

its approach 1,000 feet too high contributed to the devia-

tions. While there was testimony tending to confirm this

10a

Optnion of Court of Appeals

view, there was other testimony, and the district court

found, that the deviations were caused by the crew’s neglli-

gent reliance on the flight director, a sophisticated instru-

ment that had been set in the wrong mode.

Fifty-one seconds before the accident and only at the

request of the local control coordinator whose job it was

to coordinate approaches, Approach cleared D 723 to land

and told it, finally, to go to the Tower frequency. This

clearance was received 2 minutes and some 4 miles after

the plane had crossed the approach gate and at a point

in the approach where the cockpit voice recorder reveals

the crew was concerned with problems in flying the plane.’

* Following is an excerpt from the cockpit voice recorder.

“CAM-1” refers to the Captain and “CAM-2” to the First Officer

who was flying the airplane. “Approach” is Mr. Taylor and “D

723” someone, probably the Captain, handling the radio work in

the plane.

1506 :47.5 GMT

CAM-2: Gettin down (ah) thousand feet a minute

1506 :50.5 GMT

CAM-1: Leave it below one [unintelligible]

eeee

1507 :05.0 GMT

CAM-2: This ... command bar shows [unintelligible]

eeee

CAM-1: Yeah that doesn’t show much

1507 :14.0 GMT

Approach: Seven two three is cleared to land. Tower one

nineteen one

1507 :17.0 GMT

D 723: Seven two three

1507 :19.0 GMT

CAM-1: Going like a....

According to testimony, the reference to the command bar con-

cerned the vertical bar on the flight director which, when operating

properly, gives a pilot information about his position relative to

the localizer course. At the time the comment was made the flight

profile shows that D 723 was at its largest deviation left of the

lla

Opinion of Court of Appeals

The aircraft was 3% to 4 miles from the touchdown zone

and was at 700 feet having just descended below the glide

slope on its approach.

D 723 did not contact the Tower immediately. In the

seconds after the transmission from Approach, the Cap-

tain made a remark which indicated that the plane was

going too fast, see 412 F. Supp. at 982; 25 seconds before

impact, apparently perceiving a malfunction in the flight

director, the Captain ordered a switch to “raw data” or

primary instrumentation. Only then, 22 seconds before

the crash, did D 723 contact the Tower which responded,

2 seconds later as the plane was descending through 325

feet, “Cleared to land four right, traffie’s clearin’ at the

end, the RVR shows more than six thousand, a fog bank

is movin’ in, its pretty heavy across the approach end.”

D 723 acknowledged the Tower’s clearance and weather

advisory 13 seconds before the accident by saying simply,

“seven two three”. This was the last transmission from

the aircraft and it was made fractions of a second before

the plane descended through decision height. Insofar as

the cockpit recorder shows, the crew did not make manda-

tory altitude call-outs nor did anyone refer to altitude

throughout the approach.’ Discussion in the cockpit fol-

lowing receipt of the fog warning indicates no vocalized

reaction whatever to the reported fog bank; instead, both

localizer. Thereafter, the flight path shows a continuing correction

to the right toward the localizer.

At 1507 :19, the aircraft was, according to the flight profile, going

143 knots. Its target speed was 124 knots.

* Just before 11 a.m. (1459 GMT), the crew apparently set the

radio altimeters so that a light would flash when the plane was

at decision height. This is good procedure and Delta’s expert

testified that it did not indicate that the crew in any way thought

- @ missed approach was likely.

12a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

the co-pilot who was flying the plane, and the pilot voiced

concern only with getting the airplane on course. Despite

the focussed efforts, the aircraft was never successfully

established on the localizer. Moreover, inexplicably, it

descended in the last 11 seconds at a rate of descent of

1200 feet per minute, almost twice the normal rate of

650-700 feet per minute which D 723 had, during the latter

phases of the approach, maintained. D 723 crashed 4153

feet short of the touchdown zone on runway 4R and about

165 feet to the right of the runway centerline. See 412

F. Supp. at 963.

Three planes which immediately followed D 723 on the

ILS approach were successively cleared to land. (The

Tower was unable to see the crash site because of fog

and for some reason did not realize that D 723 was not

accounted for.) Two of them executed missed approaches

because they were unable to see the runway environment

due to fog. The third was told by the Tower to make a

missed approach, apparently as a result of first reports

of a plane down on runway 4R. Upon confirmation of the

crash, the airport was closed.

In order to complete the factual picture as it pertains

to the issues in this case, it is necessary to backtrack in

time a bit and focus on Approach’s difficulties with an-

other aircraft during D 723’s approach.

Just past 11:02 a.m., while D 723 was in the process of

being vectored by Approach and was still almost 3 min-

utes away from the approach gate, Allegheny 666 (AL

666) reported in the Millis holding pattern 20 miles south-

west of Boston at 8,000 feet. AL 666, however, had been

assigned 9,000 feet and another aircraft, Eastern 1020 (EA

1020), was already at 8,000 feet in the holding pattern.

Approach reacted to this potential conflict immediately by

13a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

directing EA 1020 to make a left turn to the northeast

that would take it toward Logan and out of the holding

pattern and by instructing AL 666 to maintain its south-

westerly heading which would take it out of the holding

pattern in a direction away from Logan. Approach then

gave D 723 a vector of 150° and instructed another air-

eraft at Millis to descend out of 7,000 feet to 6,000 feet.

Next approach verified EA 1020's left turn and, satisfied

that it was now safe to do so, directed AL 666 to reverse

its course, return to Millis and hold.

At 11:04 a.m. (1504:27), D 723 was given its final vector

for intercepting the localizer, but no position report, no

clearance for the approach and no instruction to monitor

the Tower. Fifty-two seconds later, Approach attempted

to verify AL 666’s altitude. AL 666 did not reply and

Approach repeated it radio call to the flight four more

times. It was after the fourth of these five attempts to

raise AL 666 that D 723 asked if it were cleared for the

approach. Approach replied simply “yes, seven two three

cleared ILS, yes” then made a fifth call to AL 666, this

time receiving a response culminating in a confirmation at

11:06 a.m., that AL 666 was still at 8,000 feet. Eleven

seconds later, D 723 crossed the outer marker inbound.

Approach continued to handle the numerous other traffic

in its jurisdiction including setting up EA 1020 and an-

other aircraft for their approaches to runway 4R. There

were, however, no communications to D723 between the

time it was cleared for the ILS approach at 11:05:41 a.m.,

when the plane was roughly 1 mile outside the approach

gate and almost 2 miles from the outer marker, and

11:07:14 a.m., when the aireraft, then 51 seconds and

slightly less than 2 miles from the site of impact, was, at

the request of the local control coordinator, cleared by

Approach to land and to switch to the Tower.

l4a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

Delta premised its theory of Government liability on

the contention that had Manual procedures been followed,

D 723 would have been aware that the fog bank was in the

vicinity of runway 4R prior to beginning its approach

and would not have encountered the heavy fog unex-

pectedly in the last critical stages of flight, become dis-

oriented, lost control of the aircraft and crashed. An

essential part of this theory is that at some point the

crew had ground contact then lost it in the fog. Delta

further contended that the cumulative effects of the non-

standard service led to an unstabilized condition which made

it impossible for the erew to react quickly enough when

it flew into the fog bank. The individual plaintiffs argued

that failure of Approach to turn D 723 over to the Tower

prevented D 723 from receiving timely warning of the

thickening fog and also produced a number of last minute

controller-cockpit communications which seriously dis-

tracted the crew from attention to essential landing pro-

cedures. The Government countered that the controller

was, during the entire approach of D 723, properly con-

centrating his attention on maintaining separation of

another aircraft, AL 666, and that, in any event, the safe

completion of D 723’s flight was entirely in the hands of

the crew.

The district court found that the controller’s attention

was

“appropriately focussed on concentrated communication

efforts with [Allegheny 666] and other aircraft, co-

ordination efforts with other controllers concerning

intended routes for other approaching aircraft, the

sequence of aircraft being vectored to their approach

courses, and the avoidance of potential conflicts with

departing aircraft.”

lda

Opinion of Court of Appeals

412 F. Supp. at 991. In particular the conrt found that

corcern over Allegheny 666 caused the controller to delay

ordering Delta to switch to the Tower frequency. /d. at

900.

Although Delta had conceded its negligence from the

onset of the trial, the court also made specific findings in

support of its conclusion that the crew had been grossly

negligent. There was negligence, the court found, in the

crew’s reliance on the flight director’s faulty indications,

its failure to control the aircraft’s speed, or to stabilize

on the localizer and glide slope, its permitting the aircraft

to dive in the last moments of the flight and its failure

to make a decision at decision height regarding whether

to continue the approach. /d. at 966. The court ruled

ultimately that the plaintiffs had not proven “by a pre-

ponderance [of the evidence] either that ATC [air traffic

control] personnel were negligent or that the conduct of

ATC, however characterized, was a proximate cause of

the crash either in whole or in part.” Jd. at 988.

II

Once the Government undertakes to provide services

otherwise not required of it, those services must be per-

formed in the exercise of due care and the Government

will be liable for injuries shown to have been proximately

caused by the lack of such care. Ingham v. Eastern Air

Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227, 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389

U.S. 931 (1967). See Indian Towing Co. v. United States,

350 U.S. 61 (1955); Yates v. United States, 497 F.2d 878,

884 (10th Cir. 1974).‘ In determining whether or not the

‘This principle applies fully to the federal air traffic control

system which has been developed at the command of Congress, see

49 U.S.C. §§ 1347(a), 1348(b) (4), and which has as its purpose

16a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

Government should be held concurrently liable for the

erash of D 723, the appropriate inquiry is whether in the

circumstances the approach controller was under a duty

to provide the flight with those services which were omit-

ted, end, if so, whether his failure to give the information

and instructions had a “reasonably close causal connec-

tion” with the accident. See W. Prosser, Law of Torts

§30 at 143 (4th ed. 1971). For the reasons set forth

below we believe that the approach controller, Mr. Taylor,

did have a duty to both the crew and the passengers to

comply more fully than he did with the mandatory ap-

proach procedures outlined in the Manual; and we do not

accept the district court’s finding that concern about AL

666 was a satisfactory excuse for what was tantamount,

on occasion, to forgetting D 723. The district court’s

finding, however, that the controller’s omissions did not

proximately cause the accident is not clearly erroneous

and we therefore affirm.

A. Duty Imposed by Manual Procedures

Other courts have said that, as a basic premise, the

Government’s duty of care in the maintenance and promo-

tion of a safe and efficient air traffic control system is

defined in part by the provisions in the procedure manuals.

the promotion of the “safe, orderly and expeditious flow of air

traffic”, 412 F. Supp. at 978 n.22; 49 U.S.C. § 1303(c). See Yates

v. United States, 497 F.2d 878, 884 (10th Cir. 1974); Ingham v.

Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227, 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,

389 U.S. 931 (1967). Both pilots and passengers are entitled to

rely on the services provided by Government controllers. See In

Re Air Crash at New Orleans (Moisant Field), 544 F.2d 270, 273

(6th Cir. 1976); Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., supra, 373

F.2d at 235-36. See also Freeman v. United States, 509 F.2d 626,

629 (6th Cir. 1975) (controller's duty extends to parachutists).

—E

17a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

See Spaulding v. United States, 455 F.2d 222, 226 (9th

Cir. 1972); Gill v. United States, 429 F.2d 1072, 1075 (5th

Cir. 1970). See generally Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines,

Inc., supra, 373 F.2d at 233-36. This duty extends to both

flight crews and their passengers. See, e.g., In Re Air

Crash at New Orleans (Moisant Field), 544 F.2d 270,

273 (6th Cir. 1976). While failure to conform to every

mandatory Manual procedure, however trivial the devia-

tion, would not necessarily constitute negligence, and while

it might not be negligent to deviate from established pro-

cedures in the face of a higher priority concern, nonethe-

less a substantial and unjustified failure to follow proce-

dures made mandatory by the Manual is persuasive as an

indication of a lack of due care.

Appellants complain that Mr. Taylor failed in four

respects to give standard service to D 723: he gave a

final vector to the localizer which required too great an

intercept angle; he omitted the position report; he kept

the aircraft at 3,000 feet when it should have been at

2,000 feet to intercept the glide slope from below; and he

failed to turn the flight over to local tower control at or

before the aircraft reached the outer marker. The first

of these was contrary to recommended but not mandatory

procedures. The other three lapses represented non-

standard service in violation of specific mandatory Manual

provisions. We discuss each of the four factors in turn.

5 These cases also held that a controller’s duty may flow from

customary pilot reliance upon a nonspecified procedure. At times

there may be a duty on the part of controllers to warn pilots of

potential dangers including changes in the weather. See Spaulding

v. United States, 455 F.2d 222, 226 (9th Cir. 1972) ; Gill v. United

States, 429 F.2d 1072, 1075 (5th Cir. 1970); Ingham v. Eastern

Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.d 227, 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.

931 (1967).

18a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

The Manual prescribes, as a guideline, that the maxi-

mum localizer intercept angle for a plane two miles or

more outside the approach gate be 30°. Manual at { 1351.

Within two miles, the angle is reduced to 20°. Id. D 723

intercepted the localizer approximately two miles from

the approach gate. Delta’s expert testified that the greater

the intercept angle the more difficult it is to get stabilized

quickly on the localizer course. The farther away from

the outer marker the turn is made, however, the less sig-

nificant the amount of turning the aircraft must do be-

comes simply because there is more time to stabilize the

heading before the final approach begins at the outer

marker. Thus, the reason for the suggested maximum

heading change is not related to the pilot’s ability suc-

cessfully to execute the turn required by a larger intercept

angle, but rather to the need to minimize the maneuvering

required to get set up for the final approach. A very large

intercept angle quite close to the outer marker will in-

crease the crew workload and diminish, to some degree,

the chances that the aircraft will be stabilized on the

localizer heading as early in the final approach phase as

desirable.

The district court found that Approach was not negli-

gent in giving to D 723 a 45° intercept, 15° greater than

that recommended. The finding rested in part on the fact

that the 45° intercept, as well as greater ones, had been

used successfully with other aircraft that day. 412 F.

Supp. at 988.6 There was also evidence that intercept

6 The court also found it significant that a nonradar approach

procedure for aircraft established by the Government contemplated

a 50° intercept angle relative to the final approach course. This

procedure, however, is for planes approaching the airport from

the holding pattern at the Millis intersection twenty miles from

19a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

angles in excess of 30° were not unusual. This, combined

with the fact that the angles suggested in the Manual are

guides and not absolute values, and that pilots are free

to refuse approaches which they find difficult to handle,

leads us to accept the district court’s finding that the vec-

tor to the final approach course which required a turn of

more than 30° was not, by itself, indicative of a lack of

due care.

The three deviations from mandatory procedures seem

to us more serious; they cannot be explained as acceptable

customary procedures. While experts testified that on

oceasion individual services are not provided in compli-

ance with the Manual, this is the exception and not the

rule. Mr. Taylor himself testified that he normally gave

arriving aircraft the services required by the Manual and

none of the witnesses could recall an instance where all of

the services not given to D 723 were similarly withheld

from another flight.

We start with Approach’s failure to give D 723 its

position relative to the outer marker, information which

must be given to the crew before it is 3 miles from that

point. Delta’s expert testified that the aircraft’s distance

from the outer marker cannot be determined from aircraft

instrumentation, and that the knowledge assists the crew

in planning speed reduction in preparation for the ap-

proach. While it is no doubt true that the crew knew or

should have known by a mental time-distance-speed cal-

culation its general position south of Boston, the radar

controller was better able to know more exactly the air-

eraft’s position. D 723 had not been responsible for its

Logan Airport. The greater intercept angle required by that proce-

dure is in no way inconsistent with the smaller ones recommended

for planes intercepting the localizer course closer in to the airport.

20a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

own navigating but had been following headings given to

it by Approach. In light of the mandatory Manual pro-

cedure and the fact that the information is customarily

given to all incoming flights, the crew and, more especially,

the passengers, were entitled to rely on Approach to give

the position report.

A further troublesome factor in the handling of D 723

is that the flight was kept at 3,000 feet, and, as a result,

was required to intercept the glideslope from above. While

all agreed that occasionally pilots do this in making instru-

ment approaches, there was also expert testimony that

pilots are trained to intercept the glide slope from below.’

Further, the sophisticated instrumentation in airliners is

designed with such an intercept in mind. Having to inter-

cept from above greatly increases crew responsibilities

and workload. It is, for example, difficult for a jet aircraft

to descend rapidly and still keep the speed down to that

desired during the approach. It is the purpose of the pro-

cedure to achieve the minimum crew workload by making

7 Aircraft making the ILS approach to runway 4R are generally

cleared down to 2,000 feet at a point three or more miles outside

the outer marker. Once cleared for the approach,—this is also done

three miles or more outside the marker—they maintain 2,000 feet

until intercepting the glideslope from below roughly half a mile

before actually reaching the outer marker. According to testimony,

when flying a DC-9 like D 723, the crew will put down 15° of

flaps and slow to 160 knots before reaching this point. As the air-

eraft instruments show that interception is imminent, the crew

lowers the gear and the flaps to 50° in order to increase drag

and slow the plane. The aircraft rotates to a slightly nosedown

attitude. It is then relatively easy for the pilot to stabilize both

airspeed and the rate of descent on the glide slope without any

large power adjustments. An added benefit is that when the plane

is properly on the glide slope prior to reaching the outer marker,

the crew can check the altimeters as the plane passes over the

marker. The point at which the glide slope and the marker beacon

intersect is known to be at 1819 feet above sea level for the ap-

proach to runway 4R.

2la

Opinion of Court of Appeals

this very exacting phase of flight as uncomplicated and

routine as possible. That pilots should be capable of han-

dling the additional problems caused by the intercept does

not relieve the controller of his duty to the crew and

passengers to adhere to procedures established to make

the pilots’ tasks simpler and to enhance safety.

Finally, Mr. Taylor did not turn D 723 over to the

Tower at or before the outer marker as he was required

to do by §1360d of the Manual.

“The principal purpose of this paragraph is to

ensure that frequency changes are made prior to pass-

ing the final approach fix. However, at times it will

be desirable to retain an aircraft on the approach

control frequency to provide a single-frequency ap-

proach or other radar services. When this occurs, it

will be necessary to relay tower clearances or instrue-

tions to preclude changing frequencies prior to land-

ing or approach termination.”

Manual § 1360 d. Note. Mr. Taylor had no reason to keep

D 723 on the Approach frequency. Once he discovered the

flight was still with him, he turned it over to the Tower

instead of undertaking to relay all communications him-

self. As a result, the erew was required to switch frequen-

cies and to engage in last minute communications with the

Tower at a time when concentration should have been

focussed on the instrument approach and, more particu-

larly, on the mandatory altitude callouts as the aircraft

reached decision height. This is the type of distraction

that the procedure seeks to prevent.

* At 1507:43 GMT, D 723, then at roughly 370 to 380 feet, re-

ported to the Tower. The Tower, at 1507:45.5 GMT responded

with a clearance to land and the report of a fog bank across the

22a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

Another consequence of the failure to turn D 723 over

to the Tower at or before the outer marker was that D 723

did not learn of the fog bank in the vicinity of runway 4R

until twenty seconds before the crash. While appellants do

not argue that radar controllers must warn pilots about

airport weather conditions’ this is the kind of information

crews can reasonably expect to receive from the local

Tower controller who is in a position to observe and relay

last minute weather changes that cannot be observed from

the cockpit or the radar room. The duty to turn the air-

craft over to the Tower at the appropriate time and place

arises in part from the desirability of landing aircraft

receiving information of a distinctly local character.

The established Manual procedures for setting up air-

craft for the instrument approach and for turning them

over to local control are important to the safe and efficient

approach end of the runway. At the beginning of the Tower's

transmission, D 723 was at 350 feet and by the end it was at 260

feet. The mandatory ecallouts should have been made when the

plane was at 419 feet and 319 feet. See note 1 supra.

® It has been held that the Government’s duty to provide services

with due care to pilots includes communicating current weather

information, Gill v. United States, 429 F.2d 1072, 1075 (5th Cir.

1970), as well as giving appropriate warnings when controllers

are in a better position to make observations than pilots, Spaulding

v. United States, 455 F.2d 222, 226 & n.8 (9th Cir. 1972). Here,

the Tower personnel were in the best situation to observe the ap-

proaching fog bank and, even without a mandatory Manual pro-

vision, were under a duty to pass on this warning to inbound

pilots, which the Tower in fact did. As we have already found

that it was a breach of the duty of due care not to turn D 723

over to the Tower at or before the outer marker there is no need

to consider if Mr. Taylor himself should have been informed of

the fog bank so he could pass it on to all incoming flights. The

critical issue, discussed in Part III infra, is whether D 723’s learn-

ing of the fog 1% to 2 minutes earlier would have significantly

changed the course of events.

23a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

termination of flights conducted in instrument flight condi-

tions. The fact that the procedures here in question are

made mandatory by the Government indicates not only

that they are not to be treated casually but that pilots may

rely on their being followed. Morevor, it is clear from

all the testimony that the three omissions by Mr. Taylor

contributed to an increased cockpit workload. We there-

fore cannot treat Mr. Taylor’s lapses as trivial. Pilots and

passengers alike are entitled to expect better service from

the air traffic control system and, although pilots are un-

doubtedly responsible for the safety of their aircraft,

controllers are concurrently responsible for adhering to

procedures which minimize the difficulties for the crew.

Accord Moisant Field, supra, 544 F.2d at 273. Unless there

were circumstances which would reasonably have caused

a controller to act as Mr. Taylor did, the handling of D 723

was negligent. We turn, then, to the problems caused by

Allegheny 666 to determine if they provided sufficient

excuse for the lapse in service to D 723.

B. The Separation Problem

After reviewing the record, we are left with a strong

conviction that the separation problem created by Alle-

gheny 666 did not justify the controller’s failure to give

D 723 standard service. Neither the transcripts of radio

communications between Approach and the numerous air-

craft it was handling, nor the testimony of Mr. Taylor

supports the district court’s finding that Mr. Taylor was

involved in an emergency situation over a seven minute

period.

At approximately two and one half minutes after eleven

(1502:25 GMT), AL 666 reported in the Millis holding

24a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

pattern at 8,000 feet, the same altitude already occupied

by EA 1020. (D 723 was at the time on a radar vector

flying a heading of 220°.) Approach responded quickly to

the potentially serious conflict by directing both aircraft

to leave the holding pattern, EA 1020 to the northeast

toward Logan Airport and AL 666 to the southwest. It

was soon determined that the two aircraft had followed

instructions and the immediate problem was resolved. Ap-

proach continued to control other aircraft including D 723

to which new vectors were issued. At 11:03 a.m. (1503:28

GMT), Approach told AL 666 to reverse its course and to

return to Millis and hold. Mr. Taylor testified that at the

time he gave this instruction he was satisfied that, from a

separation point of view, it was safe to send AL 666 back

to Millis. Almost a full minute later, at 11:04:27 a.m.,

Approach gave D 723 a final vector to intercept the local-

izer, but no instruction to descend and to go to Tower

frequency, no clearance for the approach and no position

report. Not only does it appear from the transcript that

there was no reason for Mr. Taylor to withhold a complete

standard clearance at that time, but Mr. Taylor himself

testified that he had intended to give the full clearance

and he didn’t know why he had not. Nevertheless, Ap-

proach continued to handle the various aircraft in its

jurisdiction, vectoring some in readiness for approaches

and descending others within the holding pattern. During

the early part of minute 11:05 a.m., five attempts to raise

AL 666 and to reconfirm its altitude as 8,000 feet were

unsuccessful. At 11:05 a.m. (1505:40 GMT), D 723 asked

if it were cleared for the ILS approach and the response

was “Yes, seven two three is cleared for ILS yes.”

Shortly thereafter, AL 666 reported that it was still at

25a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

8,000 feet’? and Approach took the time to discuss with

the flight AL 666’s expected approach clearance time.

D 723 crossed the outer marker at 11:06:14, after dis-

cussion between Approach and AL 666 had, for the mo-

ment, ceased, yet Approach still did not turn D 723 over

to the Tower and only did so when reminded by the local

control coordinator. Mr. Taylor, in his testimony, as

much as admitted that he had simply forgotten about D 723.

A econtroller’s job is a busy one requiring the juggling

of many aircraft at once and the skillful handling of a

constantly changing situation. Too much attention to any

one aircraft or problem, however, may mean that others

in the system do not get the service to which they are

entitled. Mr. Taylor may have been preoccupied with

AL 666; he had not in twenty years of experience had

two airplanes report in a holding pattern at the same

altitude. Certainly immediate, concentrated attention to

the problem was necessary. Once the potential crisis was

defused, however, there was no longer a legal excuse for

1° Approach’s problems with AL 666 were not yet over, however.

At 11:09 am., Approach had to ask the flight to return to the

Millis holding pattern hecause it had strayed seven miles to the

north. During his testimony Mr. Taylor stated that during the

period he was trying to raise AL 666 to reconfirm its altitude

(minute 1504 GMT), he observed that the flight was overshooting

the holding pattern. However, under redirect by the Government’s

attorney, Mr. Taylor conceded that, at the time he was making

the calls, AL 666 must have still been in the holding pattern. The

reason for this is because at holding pattern speed it would have

taken AL 666 only 2 to 2.1 minutes to get to a point 7 miles north

of Millis and so the overshoot by the aircraft most likely would

not have been noticed until sometime after 11:07 a.m. when D 723

was finally turned over to the Tower. Therefore, any actions Mr.

Taylor was required to take to avoid traffic conflicts in the area

— of Millis were not relevant to the service or lack thereof to

26a

Optnion of Court of Appeals

failing to deal properly with all of the aircraft under his

control. That Mr. Taylor may have been reacting to feel-

ings of worry and concern, while understandable, will not

justify the Government for failing to afford appropriate

services when it could have done so. We must hold, there-

fore, that Mr. Taylor’s handling of D 723 was negligent.

Our finding that Mr. Taylor’s omissions constituted

negligence does not end the inquiry, however. Though

falling below the requisite standard of care, an act or

omission is not actionable unless also shown to be a sub-

stantial cause of the injury complained of. We consider

next the district court’s finding that there was no causal

connection between the way in which D 723 was handled

by air traffic control and the accident.

III

Our finding of controller negligence in failing to follow

established mandatory procedures is grounded on the

premise that the unexcused violation by a federal employee

of procedures established by the Government which have

as their purpose the protection of those who were in fact

harmed constitutes negligence. This is analogous to the

familiar tort principle that violation of a statute or ad-

ministrative regulation is either negligence per se, see

Restatement of Torts (Second) § 288B(1), or evidence of

negligence, see Guinan v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp.,

267 Mass. 501, 516, 167 N.E. 235, 242 (1929). Cf. Gill v.

United States, supra, 429 F.2d at 1075 (federal regulations

may impose duties and standards of conduct on actors in

suit under Federal Tort Claims Act). While such a finding

exposes the Government to the possibility of liability it

must also be shown that the negligent conduct is a legal

27a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

cause of harm; here there must be a proven causal rela-

tionship between Mr. Taylor’s omissions and the crash

of D 723. Accord, Spaulding v. United States, swpra,

455 F.2d at 225-26. See generally Moisant Field, supra.

Section 431 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states

in part,

“The actor’s negligent conduct is a legal cause of

harm to another if (a) his conduct is a substantial

factor in bringing about the harm.”

See also Teasdale v. Beacon Oil Co., Inc. 266 Mass. 25,

27-28, 164 N.E. 612, 613 (1929). Thus, “[i]t is not enough

that the harm would not have occurred had the actor not

been negligent”, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431,

comment a. The act must be a “substantial” cause in

bringing about the harm.

“The word ‘substantial’ is used to denote the fact

that the defendant’s conduct has such an effect in

producing the harm as to lead reasonable men to

regard it as a cause, using that word in the popular

sense, in which there always lurks the idea of responsi-

bility, rather than in the so-called ‘philosophic sense’,

which includes every one of the great number of

events without which any happening would not have

occurred. Each of these events is a cause in the so-

called ‘philosophic sense’, yet the effect of many of

them is so insignificant that no ordinary mind would

think of them as causes.”

The question of legal cause is for the factfinder; the

issue involves essentially no legal judgments. Therefore,

we must uphold the district court’s finding unless it is

clearly erroneous.

28a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

In attempting to establish that Mr. Taylor’s conduct was

a substantial cause of the crash of D 723, Delta and the

individual plaintiffs had the burden of persuasion."* See

Restatement (Second) of Torts §433B; Prosser, supra

at 241. They were thus required to convince the district

court as factfinder that it was more likely than not that

the omissions by Mr. Taylor were a “substantial” cause

of the accident. This they failed to do. The district court

found that the sole cause of the crash was the negligence

of the Delta crew and in so doing made the factual de-

termination that there was not sufficient proof of a causal

connection between air traffic control service, however

characterized, and the accident.

While causation in fact is often a determination that

can be made based on inferences from common knowledge,

the present case is one where laymen, unaided, could not

be expected to draw such inferences. Expert testimony

was of utmost importance. The district court, having

heard all the evidence, was entitled to weigh the conflicting

testimony of expert witnesses and to draw all reasonable in-

ferences from the testimony it credited.”

12 Only if there existed a tort rule analogous to the Pennsylvania

Rule in maritime law, see Seaboard Tug & Barge, Inc. v. Rederi

AB/Disa, 213 F.2d 772, 775 (1st Cir. 1954), could the proof of

negligence on the present facts shift to the Government the burden

of persuasion on the issue of causation. Such a rule would have

the effect of making the Government an insurer and there is no

support for this concept in either Massachusetts law or the Re-

statement (Second) of Torts. Nor are we convinced that this would

be desirable as a matter of policy.

22 The individual plaintiffs appeal from the court’s virtual re-

jection of the testimony of Roys Jones, an expert witness called

by them. They claim that the court must have applied an incor-

rect legal standard or Jones’ testimony would have been credited.

“The trial court has wide discretion in determining when a pur-

ported expert is sufficiently qualified to take the stand and render

29a

Opinion of Court of Appeals ;

Viewing all of the evidence, even in the light most

favorable to appellants, we think that the district court

had ample support for its finding that there was no causal

relationship between air traffic control service and the

accident. Delta’s expert conceded that no one of the ir-

regularities in service would, by itself, cause a problem

for a well-trained airline crew. He explained that, stand-

ing alone, the vector requiring a 45° intercept would be

no problem, that failing to receive a position report prior

to reaching the outer marker would not preclude a satis-

factory approach, that having to intercept the glide slope

from above would not be an insurmountable task, that not

being told to go to the Tower at or before the outer marker

and being switched well inside the outer marker would not

necessarily prevent successful completion of the approach.

Although stating that a combination of any two or more

would adversely effect the cockpit workload, the expert

testified that even so, the lack of services and the attendant

problems “would [not] necessarily cause any great alarm”,

and that, in fact, the approach of D 723 was not unman-

ageable and was not, as a practical matter, totally unac-

ceptable for everyday purposes until the very last stages

of flight. There is evidence that the crew was not con-

cerned by the lack of air traffic control service. As the

aircraft intercepted the localizer some two miles from the

outer marker, D 723 called Approach, asked if it were

cleared for the ILS approach, then acknowledged the

clearance by saying “alrighty”. There was testimony that

an opinion in a certain area.” Forbro Design Corp. v. Raytheon

Co., 5382 F.2d 758, 762 (1st Cir. 1976). Here the court allowed

Jones to testify, but as a factfinder found that his lack of recent

experience as a controller and the fact that he had no fiving ex-

perience in commercial jets deprived his opinions of probative

value. That finding was not clearly erroneous.

30a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

this implied that the crew felt ready to make the ap-

proach. It can thus be reasonably inferred that in the

early stages of the ILS approach, the crew of D 723 was

not disturbed by the omissions of Mr. Taylor.

In contrast to the somewhat tentative testimony on

behalf of Delta, the Government’s expert, an FAA flight

examiner in the DC-9, testified unequivocally that the non-

standard air traffic control service received by D 723 could

not have caused the accident. He testified that the Captain

had, at all times, not only the option but the obligation to

make a missed approach if too many difficulties developed.

A missed approach can be executed in a DC-9 from very

low levels and in a matter of seconds. A reasonable in-

ference from the fact that D 723 did not go around and

apparently made no attempt to do so would be that even

in the last stages of the flight, none of the additional work-

load caused by the lack of service to D 723 appeared to the

Captain to create a problem of major proportions even

with the added factor that the flight director was not

functioning properly and the aircraft was, for much of the

approach, well left of the localizer.**

As to the specific effects of the various omissions, there

was convincing evidence that the excursions to the left

of the localizer course were related to the faulty signals

18 The individual plaintiffs’ contention that transmissions from

the Tower during the time the aircraft was approaching decision

height seriously distracted the pilots, is likewise without strong

support. Pilots testified that it was better to get the weather in-

formation even late in the approach than not to receive it at all.

Moreover, in the opinion of the Government’s expert, although the

Captain was the one who should have been making the callouts,

see note 1 supra, and he was also the one who was handling the

radio, there was no reason for the radio work to interfere with the

altitude callouts. Nor would the communications be seriously dis-

tracting to the First Officer who was flying the plane but not talk-

ing on the radio.

3la

Opinion of Court of Appeals

from the flight director and not to the angle of intercept

provided by Approach. The flight profile shows that the

45° turn onto the localizer was accomplished without ex-

cessive deviation to the right of course as might be ex-

pected if the required turn was too great. The cockpit

voice recorder reveals that during the approach the First

Officer expressed concern about the flight director and,

ultimately, that the Captain ordered that he stop using

the sophisticated device altogether. It was therefore rea-

sonable for the district court to find it more likely than

not that the cause of the deviations from the localizer

had nothing whatever to do with the service or the lack

thereof by the controller.

We find more troublesome the question of whether the

lack of a position report and the intercept above glide

slope were causally connected to the aircraft’s speed con-

trol difficulties and the fact that D 723 was never stabilized

on the glide slope and eventually flew into the ground short

of the runway. The answer is that D 723 had apparently

coped adequately with any speed and rate of descent prob-

lems by the time it had reached decision height. There

was expert testimony to the effect that from the outer

marker inbound, a gradual reduction in speed took place

so that shortly before the aircraft reached decision height,

it had also reached the target speed of 124 knots. More-

over, although the aircraft was never established on the

glide slope, the rate of descent during most of the period

was within normal limits and, according to expert testi-

mony, the plane’s glide path flattened out just after it

dropped below the glide slope. That the speed and the

rate of descent were basically under control toward the

end of the approach is corroborated to some extent by the

testimony of Delta’s expert that the approach was, until

32a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

the end, acceptable, if not ideal. A reasonable inference,

then, is that whatever difficulties might have been caused

by poor controller service had been handled successfully

by the time D 723 reached decision height. While unques-

tionably something occurred at about the time the plane

reached decision height—the rate of descent went from

approximately 700 fet per minute to 1200 feet per minute

and the speed increased to 130 knots where it remained

until impact—on the evidence we think that the district

court was entitled to find that the controller services were

unrelated to the last minute loss of control.

It was Delta’s theory, in essence, that had the weather

been as reported, the sloppy approach would not have

mattered. However, because D 723 was in an unstabilized

position at decision height, due in part to the service it

had received from the controller, the crew was unable to

deal succesfully with the fog bank which was purportedly

entered unexpectedly after establishing some ground con-

tact. Thus, the really important factual question in this

case is whether the crash would not have happened if

D 723 had been switched to the Tower frequency at the

outer marker and so had learned of the fog bank at the

beginning of the final approach instead of a minute and

a half later, less than 20 seconds before impact. On this

point, airline pilots testified that the information about

the fog bank would be useful and welcome at any phase of

the approach. Delta’s expert explained that the new in-

formation would require rapid evaluation and decision-

making of the type regularly engaged in by pilots. The

witness further stated that the transmission D 723 received

from the Tower would not indicate to him that he would

be unable to complete the approach to a landing but only

that he might have to fly through some fog before reach-

33a

Opinion of Court of Appeals

ing the runway. Moreover, while there was some testimony

that the weather report D 723 received early in its flight—

estimated 400 feet overcast, 14% miles in fog—would not

have caused a pilot to be particularly concerned about the

possibility of a missed approach, there was other testi-

mony by witnesses for both Delta and the Government

that, given the forecast for the area, the weather report

received, and the unpredictability of fog, especially near

the water, any pilot would be anticipating the possibility

of a missed approach that morning. Finally, the cockpit

voice recorder reveals that the crew did not react at all

to the Tower transmission reporting the fog bank when

it was finally received. We cannot say that the court could

not reasonably have inferred that, as Delta’s expert indi-

cated, the pilots simply did not consider the report to have

any major bearing on the probability that they would be

able to go ahead and land. If, as one might conclude from

both the testimony and the evidence of a lack of reaction

to the additional weather information, the crew continued

for some reason to believe that the weather at the airport

was basically as it had been reported to them earlier, the

argument that receiving news of the fog a minute and a

half sooner would have made the crew act differently is

not conclusive. The district court was entitled to find that

Delta and the individual plaintiffs did not show by a

preponderance of the evidence a causal connection between

D 723’s having learned of the fog bank only late in the

approach and the accident.

Without an established causal connection, the fact that

the controller did not provide proper services in several

respects is not a sufficient basis for holding the Govern-

ment liable.

Affirmed.

34a

Opinion of District Court

In re ArrcrasH Disaster at Boston, MassacHUSETTS,

Juty 31, 1973.°

United States District Court,

D. Massachusetts.

Feb. 19, 1976.

OPINION

_ Carrrey, Chief Judge.

I. IntrRopvction

All of the above-captioned cases arise out of the tragic

crash of a Delta Airlines, Inc. (Delta) DC-9 twin-engine

jet airliner at approximately 11:08 a.m.,' July 31, 1973,

at Logan Airport, Boston, Massachusetts.

The aircraft, which was identified as Delta Flight 723

(hereafter D 723) was scheduled to fly that morning from

Burlington, Vermont to Logan Airport. It made an un-

scheduled stop at Manchester, New Hampshire, and then

flew from Manchester to Boston. In attempting to effec-

tuate an Instrument Landing System (ILS)? approach at

* Titles of Consolidated cases are listed following Appendix, see

pages ——--——.

Control tower records and transmissions between the tower

and various aircraft are expressed in terms of Greenwich Mean

Time (GMT). 10:00 a. m. Eastern Daylight Savings Time appears

in the exhibits as 1400 GMT; 11:00 a. m. appears in the exhibits

as 1500 GMT.

* The Instrument Landing System (ILS) is a system in the air-

eraft which provides the lateral, longitudinal, and vertical guid-

ance necessary for a landing. The ground equipment consists of

35a

Opinion of District Court

Runway 4-R* at Logan Airport, the aircraft smashed into

a seawall along the edge of the airport. The elevation of

the runway is 16 feet above sea level, and the elevation of

the ground at the point of impact with the seawall is 11.45

feet above sea level. The aircraft impacted 4153 feet short

of the so-called ILS touchdown point,‘ and about 165 feet

to the right of the center line of the runway. The wreckage

of the aircraft was scattered along a magnetic heading of

017° in an area 250 feet wide and 790 feet long. The head-

ing of Runway 4-R is 035°.

All 89 persons aboard the aircraft died as a result of

the crash. A large number of lawsuits were filed against

Delta by representatives of the estates of the 82 passen-

gers, Delta, in turn, commenced litigation charging the

United States with liability premised on the alleged negli-

gence of various air traffic controllers employed at Logan

two highly directional transmitting systems and, along the ap-

proach, three (or fewer) marker beacons. The directional trans-

mitters are known as the localizer and glide slope transmitters.

The system may be divided functionally into three parts:

(1) Guidance information-localizer, glide slope,

(2) Range information-marker beacons, and

(3) Visual information-approach lights, touchdown and cen-

ter line lights, and runway lights.

* Runways are numbered by reference to the heading expressed

in degrees which their center line runs as compared to true north.

Runway 4R at Logan Airport has a center line 42/5 from true

north.

‘The displaced threshold is designated on the approach charts

for Runway 4-R as being a point located a distance of 2507 feet

from the approach end of the runway. This is the nearest point

to the approach end at which an aircraft using this runway may

touch down on that runway when making a landing when visual

flight rules (VFR apply).

The ILS touchdown point is 3660 feet up the runway from the

approach end thereof. This is the earliest point at which an air-

eraft may touch down for its landing when making an approach

when instrument flight rules (IFR) apply.

36a

Opinion of District Court

Airport. Additional suits were filed directly against the

United States on behalf of the estates of all members of

the crew of D 723, as well as a suit on behalf of the estate

of Joseph E. Burrell who was occupying the jump seat in

the cockpit of this aircraft. Litigation is still pending be-

tween the Burrell estate and Delta to determine whether

his status at the time of the crash was that of a passenger

entitled to sue Delta in a common law action for tort, or

that of a crew member whose recovery is limited to that

available under the applicable workmen’s compensation

law. Direct suits against the United States were also filed

on behalf of the estates of several conceded passengers

and Burrell.

The above-captioned actions were consolidated for pur-

poses of a non-jury trial on the issue of liability only.

Delta has brought a direct action against the United States

claiming a right of contribution equal to 50 per cent of

the total amount Delta is required to pay out in settlement

to the estates of the passengers. Delta also seeks to recover

herein the value of the airplane destroyed in the crash.

The jurisdiction of all claims against the United States is

premised on the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1346(b).

At the trial the parties called 26 witnesses and intro-

duced into evidence portions of eight depositions, and a

number of documentary exhibits including manuals, air

navigation maps and charts, and graphs. They also intro-

duced photographs, tape recordings and transcripts of ra-

dio communications between ATC and various aircraft

and the transcript of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR)§

found in the wreckage of D 723.

5 The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) is a device located within

the cockpit of the airplane which makes a record of intra-cockpit

37a

Opinion of District Court

The evidence includes a transcript of all communications

between D 723 and ATC, and between ATC and other air-

craft in the vicinity, as well as a transcript of all intra-

cockpit conversations during the last 17 minutes of the

flight. Also admitted were a flight profile and a flight data

graph preserved by a flight data recorder device salvaged

from the wreckage. The foregoing are reliable evidence

of the flight path, headings, air speeds, altitudes, cockpit

conversations and radio communications during relevant

portions of this ill-fated flight.** Additionally, the Court

took a view of some duration of actual operations in the

TRACON room and in the cab of the new control tower

at Logan Airport. The Court also spent about one half

hour in the pilot’s seat of a Delta DC-9 examining at close

range the instrument panel and other portions of the cock-

pit under the tutelage of a Delta captain.

Plaintiffs’ theory of negligence is premised on the claim

that the air traffic controllers on duty at the Logan Airport

control tower the day of the accident, all of whom were

eoncededly tovernment employees acting within the scope

of their official duties, were negligent in the following ways:

(1) they violated the provisions of the Terminal Air Traffic

conversations between the various members of the flight crew as

well as radio transmissions to and from the aircraft. The cockpit

voice recorder was salvaged from the wreckage and a tape of the

contents thereof, as well as a transcript of the tape are in evidence.

In making its findings of fact, the Court has used the transcript of

the conversations recorded by the CVR (PX 18).

** See Appendix hereto, a composite of several exhibits which

separately establish the headings, air speeds and altitudes flown

by D 723, which indicates by means of two separate graphs the

aircraft’s deviation from the center line of the localizer course

and from the path of the glide slope in the final minutes of its

approach to Runway 4-R.

The Appendix also sets forth the transcript of conversations

within the cockpit and between D 723 and the control tower.

38a

Opinion of District Court

Control Manual‘ in effect on the day of the accident by

6 The Terminal Air Traffic Control Manual is a document pro-

mulgated by the Federal Aviation Administration for use by con-

trollers in ATC towers at airports. It is in evidence as PX 9.

Paragraph 1 thereof states its purpose as follows:

1. PURPOSE.

This handbook prescribes air traffic control procedures and

phraseology for use by personnel providing terminal air traffic

control services. It is one of the air traffic control manuals

referred to in Part 65 of the Federal Aviation Regulations.

Controllers are required to be familiar with the provisions of

this handbook which pertain to their operational responsibility

and to exercise their best judgment if they encounter situations

not covered by it. (Emphasis added.)

Plaintiffs’ theory is that compliance with certain paragraphs of

this manual was mandatory on the part of the controllers, partic-

ularly 77 1351, 1352 and 1360. However, { 28 of the manual, cap-

tioned “Duty Priority,” provides as follows:

28. Duty Prioriry.

Give first priority to separation of aircraft as required in

this manual. Give second priority to services that are required

but do not involve separation of aircraft. Give third priority

to additional services to the extent possible.

Paragraphs 1351, 1352 and 1360 read as follows:

1351. Frat ApproacH CouRSsE INTERCEPTION.

Except as provided in 1352 and 1362, vector aircraft to inter-

cept final approach course before reaching the approach gate

and, if a precision approach is to be made, before intercepting

the glide slope. Use information from the accompanying table

as a guide to determine the maximum interception angles when

vectoring aircraft to intercept a final approach course.

1352. Vectors To LocaLizER COURSE.

Whenever the reported weather is below the basic VFR

minima, or upon pilot request, vector aircraft to intercept the

localizer course at least 2 miles from the approach gate and at

an altitude not above the glide slope.

1360. ArrivaL INSTRUCTIONS.

Issue all of the following to an aircraft before it reaches the

approach gate:

a. Position relative to the final approach fix. If the final

approach fix is not portrayed on the radar display or if none

39a

Opinion of District Court

failing to provide the crew of D 723 with accurate, complete

and current advice that banks of sea fog were obscuring

visibility at the approach end of Runway 4-R on which

D 723 was about to attempt a landing; (2) they violated

the provisions of the Manual by failing to advise D 723 to

intercept the localizer course’ at least two miles from the

is prescribed in the procedure, issue position information

relative to the navigation aid which provides final approach

guidance or relative to the airport.

b. Vector to intercept the final approach course, if re-

quired.

e. Approach clearance, except when conducting a radar

approach. If terrain or traffic does not permit unrestricted

descent to lowest published altitude specified in approach

procedure prior to final approach descent, controllers shall:

(1) Defer issuance of approach clearance until there

are no restrictions, or (2) Issue altitude restrictions with

approach clearance specifying when or at what point un-

restricted descent can be made.

d. Instructions to do one of the following:

(1) Monitor local control frequency, reporting to the

tower when over the approach fix. (2) Contact the tower

on local control frequency. (3) Contact the final con-

troller on the appropriate frequency if final approach

guidance will be provided on a different frequency. (4)

When radar is used to establish final approach fix—inform

the pilot that after being advised that he is over the fix,

he is to contact the tower on local control frequency.

The word “vector” as used in these paragraphs, and as used

throughout the testimony of the various witnesses, is defined on

page 13 of the manual as “a heading issued to an aircraft to pro-

vide navigational guidance by radar.” A “heading” is a course

to be followed which is described in terms of degrees of the compass.

*The Loealizer is an electronic beam which is located approx-

imately on the center line of a runway. It runs parallel with the

runway and is projected out from the approach end of the runway

for a number of miles by an electronic transmitter. The localizer

for Runway 4-R extended outward from the approach end of that

runway approximately 35 miles. Commercial airplanes are equipped

with electronic instrumentation which allows them to “intercept”

40a

Opinion of District Court

approach gate® at an altitude not above the glide slope;°

(3) they violated the provisions of the Manual by failing

the localizer beam, i.e., receive it on a radio receiver, and align the

plane on the center thereof by maneuvering its path while in flight.

Instruments in the cockpit indicate to the pilot whether or not he

is properly aligned, i.e., centered on, the localizer course. If the

aireraft is centered on the localizer, it is following a course in flight

which will bring it in to the runway at the intended touchdown

point.

* Approach Gate is a reference to a point farther away from the

beginning of the runway than the so-called “outer marker.” The

outer marker is a fixed electronic or radio beam which transmits

a signal upward from a known point on the ground.

The approach gate is defined in the manual as that point in the

final approach course which is one mile from the approach fix on

the side away from the airport or five miles from the landing

threshold. For Runway 4-R this would be a point one mile south-

east of the outer marker which, in turn, is 5.3 nautical miles from

the airport. Thus, the approach gate for 4-R is 6.3 nautical miles

from the approach end of the runway.

For Runway 4-R at Logan Airport, the outer marker is located

in Milton, Massachusetts, 5.3 miles distant from the end of the

runway. It transmits the Morse Code signal for BO, the first two

letters of Boston. D 723 was equipped with electronic instrumenta-

tion so that when it flew over the outer marker the Morse Code

signal for the letters BO was audible to the crew in the cockpit,

and the fact that it was audible appears in PX 18, the transcript

of the CVR, which establishes that D 723 flew over the outer marker

on the day of the crash at 1455:20, at which point the Captain ob-

served, “Boston outer marker, it’s identified,” and the copilot re-

sponded, “Thank you.”

*The Gilde Slope is another electronic aid to navigation, con-

sisting of an electronic beam which is projected outward and up-

ward from the approach end of Runway 4-R at an angle of 3°.

Commercial airplanes (including D 723) are equipped with elec-

tronic instrumentation which allows the interception of a glide

slope and the aligning of the aircraft therewith as it makes its

descent to the intended runway. If the plane is maneuvered so as

to maintain proper alignment with the glide slope, the instrumenta-

tion on the instrument panel before both the pilot and the copilot

tells them that they are centered, or “stabilized,” on the glide

slope as well as on the localizer course described in footnote 7.

Maintaining the aircraft in such stabilized position will cause it

to touch ground at the intended point on the runway.

4la

Opinion of District Court

to order D 723 to intercept the localizer at an angle of 30°

or less; (4) they violated the provisions of the Manual by

failing to provide D 723 with information establishing (a)

its position relative to the final approach, (b) a proper

approach clearance,’® and (c) instructions to contact the

tower on local control frequency"! or to monitor local con-

trol frequency; and (5) they issued non-standard, con-

7° An Approach Clearance is a transmission from an air traffic

controller designated “approach controller” to an incoming air-

eraft advising the pilot in command that he is authorized to use a

particular runway at that time. The clearance amounts to an in-

struction that no other planes are so located as to interfere with

that pilot’s flying down on to the particular runway, and also indi-

eates that the runway is clear of obstruction, such as taxiing air-

craft, supply trucks, automobiles, ete. The issuance of a clearance

is a grant of permission to use the runway, but does not require

the pilot to actually land on that runway. The ultimate authority

for making the decision to land or go-around rests with the pilot.

(See footnote 12.)

*) There are three different positions in a control tower at a busy

metropolitan airport such as Logan, which, at different points in

time, become involved in giving instructions to an incoming air-

eraft. The three positions are called approach control, local control

and ground control. As an incoming airplane nears the airport at

which it intends to land, it first comes within the jurisdiction of

an approach controller, who receives notice from an air traffic

center of that particular aireraft’s presence, its altitude and its

air speed. The approach controller issues instructions to the in-

coming plane as to what course to follow as it nears the airport in

the course of its descent for landing. The approach controller or

controllers establish a sequence for the landing of various incoming

aireraft, and when a particular aircraft’s turn is reached it is

instructed to change its radio frequency from that on which the

approach controller transmits to that on which the local controller

transmits. The local controller’s frequency is normally called

“tower frequency.” Instructions may be given to the aircraft for

the final leg or stages of landing by the local controller, including

final clearance or authorization to land. After the plane has landed

made its run-out and turned on to a taxiway, it is told to switch

to ground control frequency and the ground controller directs the

aircraft toward the terminal where it will discharge its passengers

or cargo.

42a

Opinion of District Court

fusing and distracting radio communications during the

final phase of D 723’s approach.

The United States takes and maintains the position that

this unfortunate disaster was caused solely and exclusively

by the negligence of the crew of D 723. Specifically, the

Government argues that the negligence of the Delta crew

was gross in nature, in that the data obtained from the

flight path and voice recorders establishes that this crew:

(1) failed to sean their instruments and/or chose to ignore

the information reflected thereon; (2) intercepted the lo-

calizer at an excessive rate of speed; (3) failed to maintain

the localizer course; (4) failed to intercept and maintain

the glide slope; (5) failed to make the required course

deviation call-outs and the required altitude call-outs; (6)

relied on information provided from a flight director which

was found in the wreckage to have been set to the wrong

mode; (7) failed to heed conflicting information being sup-

plied by the more reliable primary instruments; (8) as-

signed a non-crew member the responsibility of partic-

ipating in the approach-checklist and descent-checklist in

violation of Delta’s procedural manual; (9) failed to stabi-

lize the aireraft during the approach both altitude-wise

and speed-wise; (10) allowed the aircraft to dive below

the glide slope during the last three miles of the approach;

(11) ignored warnings from the decision height flashing

light and the fact that that light illuminated prior to the

middle marker light; and (12) failed to make the required

decision regarding continuing the approach when they

reached decision height? (DH).

** Decision height (DH) is a predetermined altitude established

with reference to a particular runway. It is an altitude at which

the captain in command of an incoming plane must exercise his

command authority and decide whether or not he can safely com-

plete the landing in progress. On July 31, 1973 the established DH

for Runway 4-R was an altitu?> of 216 feet.

43a

Opinion of District Court

The witnesses who testified at the trial fall into the

following categories: air traffic controllers, pilots qualified

on the DC-9, air traffic control experts, an expert weather

observer, an engineering expert, four Jay witnesses who

were in the vicinity of the crash and testified as to their

observations of the prevailing weather, and four other

witnesses who were employed at Logan and were among

the first persons to arrive at the scene of the accident and

to report the crash.

Il. WeratHer

A. Official Observations

A very substantial portion of this trial was concerned

with conflicting testimony about the weather which pre-

vailed on the morning of July 31, 1973, both up to and

after the time of this crash. It has been stipulated that

the crash occurred at 11:08.05 Eastern Daylight Savings

Time (1508:05 GMT).

To place the testimony relative to prevailing weather in

perspective, and more importantly to place in perspective

the amount of information about the weather which was,

or should have been, known by the pilot and co-pilot of

D 723, the following information established either by ex-

hibits or testimony should be understood.

This flight originated in Burlington, Vermont and made

an unscheduled intermediate stop in Manchester, New

Hampshire, While the aircraft was still at the Manchester

Airport, the following exchange took place between ATC

of the Manchester tower and the crew of D 723 at 1404:

Tower: 723... Boston can’t handle you right now

so there will be a little delay

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Opinion of District Court

Tower: Boston advises there will be right now at

least a 30 minute delay with the delay on ground at

Manchester

723: You want us to hold on the runway

Tower: Whenever Boston tower can take you will

advise

723: OK, thank you sir, little cluttered up this

morning

Tower: Getting missed approaches" at Boston, that

seems to be the problem

723: Ah, so.

At 1423 the Manchester tower called Boston and then

advised the crew of D 723 “just called Boston tower, they

advised indefinite delays, no time.”

The Manchester weather station reported patchy ground

fog that morning. At 1500 Manchester reported, “partial

obscuration estimated 1000’ ceiling, overcast, 3 miles vis-

ibility in fog.” The weather station at Bedford, Massa-

chusetts, which is on the route of this plane’s flight from

18 A Missed Approach describes a procedure which a pilot who

has been cleared for landing elects to follow if he decides that the

aircraft cannot be safely landed under then prevailing conditions.

There term reflects a deliberate choice by the pilot not to complete

a landing but, rather, to “go around again.”

For each runway there is in existence a document called an

“approach plate,” which is an air navigational map for use by

pilots effectuating a landing on that particular runway. The ap-

proach plate for Runway 4-R at Logan is in evidence as PX 10.

It deseribes the procedure to be followed by a pilot who elects to

execute a missed approach rather than to complete a landing on

4-R. Briefly stated, that procedure is to pull up, climb to 3000 feet

and go to a point on the map designated as the Danvers inter-

section, where a so-called “holding pattern” is to be flown until the

pilot receives further instructions from ATC or, alternatively,

elects to divert his flight to some other airport.

45a

Opinion of District Court

Manchester southward, reported. “indefinite 400’ ceiling,

full obscuration, 14 mile visibility in fog.”

The official area weather forecast issued for the period

7:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon, July 31, 1973, was “ceiling 200

full obscuration, visibility within 4% mile in fog, occasion-

ally ceiling 400’ full obscuration visibility, 1 mile in fog.”

Air Met, a weather warning issued by the United States

Weather Bureau, stated for the period 9:00 a.m. to 12:00

noon that day: “coastal waters, coastal New England, New

Jersey and lowlands into New England, eastern New York,

ceilings and visibility well below 1000 feet, 2 mile visibility

in fog, coastal waters and coastal sections and ground fog

elsewhere. Fog continuing coastal waters becoming patchy

outer Cape Cod with fog patches occasionally drifting over

immediate coastal sections and remainder of Massachusetts,

New Hampshire and Maine, and dissipating elsewhere.”

The Air Met contained a section captioned “Clouds and

Weather.” It provided for the time period 9:00 a.m. to

12:00 noon that day: “coastal waters zero or near zero

ceilings and visibilities in fog. Few rain showers, possibly

a few thunderstorms outer coastal waters.”

The last official observation made by the U. S. Weather

Bureau at Logan Airport prior to the accident was made

at 1453 (15 minutes before the crash) by Harry Terban,

a veteran weather observer who has been employed by

the National Weather Service for 24 years. Mr. Terban,

who I find to be a highly credible and well qualified weather-

man, was responsible for taking all weather observations

that were subsequently sent out for transmission as the

prevailing weather for Boston. To the extent that there is

a contradiction between Mr. Terban’s testimony as to the

state of the weather at Logan that day and the testimony

of other witnesses thereto, I believe Mr. Terban’s testi-

46a

Opinion of District Court

mony. His 1453 observation, which he made at Logan Air-

port, read as follows “partial obscuration, estimated 500,

broken, 25,000 overcast. The surface visibility one and one

half miles, tower visibility one and one half miles, the

obscuration to vision fog, air temperature 68° dew point

64° wind estimated at 100° at 2 knots.”

Mr. Terban also testified that his observation point is

on the roof of a building which is approximately 7500 feet

from the approach end of Runway 4-R and that there was

a fog condition at the entire airport until after the taking

of the 1453 observation. He explained that a partial ob-

scuration exists when at least */,. but not more than °/,,

of the sky is obscured by a surface-based phenomenon.

He also explained that the visibility quoted in the weather

report is the maximum which an observer can see in at

least 50% of the horizon circle. The first observation he

made after the time of the accident was at 1512 when he

determined an estimated ceiling of 400 feet and surface

visibility to be 1 mile. He sent out this information on the

teleautograph system, which sends the latest weather in-

formation to other weather stations, airports and major

airlines. He also made a special observation at 1533 at

which time he did not observe any definable bank of fog

approaching the runway end of 4-R. In fact, he testified

that he did not observe any definable bank of fog at any

earlier time that day.

B. Regulations

It is significant to note at this point the requirement

that the pilots of all commercial passenger-carrying planes

have a specific obligation to fully apprise themselves of

prevailing and expected weather conditions along the route

of their flights. The pertinent regulations are as follows:

47a

Opinion of District Court

14 C.F.R. 91.5, which provides

“Each pilot in command shall before beginning a

flight, familiarize himself with all available informa-

tion concerning that flight. This information must in-

clude

(a) for a flight under IFR™ ... weather reports

and forecasts, fuel requirements, alternatives available

if the planned flight cannot be completed... .”

14 C.F.R. 121.599, which requires:

“No aircraft dispatcher may release a flight unless

he is thoroughly familiar with reported and forecast

weather conditions on the route to be flown.”

14 C.F.R. 121.601, which requires:

“(a) The aircraft dispatcher shall provide the pilot

in command all available current reports or informa-

tion on airport conditions and irregularities of naviga-

tion facilities that may affect the safety of the flight.

14TFR means Instrument Flight Rules. These rules become ef-

fective when weather conditions are below the minimum under

VFR, Visual Flight Rules.

The acronyms IFR and VFR are accepted aviation terminology

used to distinguish between two types of flying. If a plane has the

necessary instruments to operate under IFR conditions, it is called

IFR-equipped, and if a pilot has been qualified to fly the plane by

such instruments in IFR weather he is called “instrument rated.”

Only an instrument-rated pilot may make an IFR flight and

then only in an IFR-equipped aircraft. Normally, IFR flights

must be flown at altitudes and on airways assigned by air traffic

control. A pilot proposing to fly an IFR flight must first file with

and obtain approval from air traffic control of an IFR flight plan.

This requirement is predicated on the obvious fact that various

aircraft flying under IFR conditions frequently are in such low

visibility as to preclude their ability to see each other. Conse-

quently they depend on instructions from FAA centers and control

towers to insure their separation and avoidance of midair collisions.

48a

Opinion of District Court

(b) During a flight, the aircraft dispatcher shall

provide the pilot in command any additional available

information of meteorological conditions ... that may

affect the safety of the flight.”

14 C.F.R. 121.603, which provides:

“(a) Before beginning a flight, each pilot in com-

mand shall obtain all available current reports or in-

formation on aircraft conditions ... that may affect

the safety of the flight.”

While still climbing after takeoff from Manchester to

the assigned altitude near Lawrence, the crew of D 723

was advised by Boston approach control at 1451 as follows:

“... the Boston altimeter is 30.11, weather is partial

obscuration, estimated 400’ ceiling, overcast a mile and

a half and fog.”

The foregoing establishes the contents of the various

weather reports, knowledge of which was made obligatory

on the crew by the above-quoted requirements from 14

C.F.R.

C. Lay Opinions

A number of witnesses testified about the nature and

extent of the fog which prevailed at, on above, or near

Logan Airport on July 31, 1973. Their testimony leaves no

doubt that it was an unusually foggy day. However, the

degree of density of the fog, the altitude of the lowest

portion thereof, and whether or not it was in the configura-

tion of a definable bank were the subject of conflicting

testimony.

49a

Opinion of District Court

Among those witnesses who testified were several men

who, in the course of their normal employment either in the

trucking industry or the maritime industry, were located

in the Castle Island section of the City of Boston on the

morning of July 31, 1973.

Warren Hutchins, an engineer employed by the Boston

Towboat Company, testified that he was aboard the tug

MARS which was tied up at a pier at Castle Island because

of the fog from 9:30 until 11:20 a. m. on July 31, 1973. He

testified that because of the fog he could not see the airport

from his position at Castle Island, which was about 3000

feet from the airport and directly across the channel from

the approach end of Runway 4-R. Mr. Hutchins said that

shortly before the crash he saw a plane pass directly over-

head for about a second or two and then he lost it in the fog.

He said he has made a hobby of watching planes land and

he believed this one to be extremely low as it passed over

him.

Richard F. Giroux testified that he was on a coffee break

about 11:00 a.m. at Castle Island and saw a plane go over-

head on which he could read “Delta.” It then disappeared

into the fog about halfway across the channel. He heard a

erash-like sound about five seconds after last seeing the

plane. Two or three minutes later, he heard another plane

which sounded as if it were a lot higher than the Delta

plane. It was on approximately the same course as the

Delta plane.

Thomas Karacoudas testified that at about 11:00 a. m. he

observed a plane go over Castle Island toward the airport

and disappear into the fog as it crossed the channel. He

said he could observe the word “Delta” on the plane, and

he also said that fog obscured the whole airport as he looked

toward it from where he was on Castle Island. He ex-

50a

Opinion of District Court

pressed the opinion that this was the lowest airplane he had

ever seen making an approach.

William Rae testified that he was at Castle Island and

could not see the airport because of the fog condition until

an improvement occurred at about 11:20 a. m. He observed

the plane go over and noted the word “Delta” on its tail

section. It disappeared into the fog in a matter of seconds.

I find that these four witnesses at Castle Island establish

that at the time they made their observations fog obscured

their view of the airport. I find that their testimony that

the Delta aircraft which passed over them shortly after

11:00 a. m. was making an abnormally low approach to the

runway to Logan is factual and corroborated by the ev-

idence supplied by the flight recorder.

Additional testimony as to the nature and extent of the

fog prevailing that morning came from two witnesses,

Geoffrey F. Keating and Harris Cusick, who were present

at the airport in the course of their employment on a con-

struction project at the airport, and from Chief Charles T.

Arena and Deputy Chief Peter Cutrone of the Airport Fire

Department. Still additional testimony as to the prevailing

fog conditions came from First Officer Keith Chappell, co-

pilot of Eastern Airlines (EAL) Flight 572, the last plane

to land on Runway 4-R prior to the accident, and from

Captain Vernon H. Young, the pilot in command of EAL

945 who was waiting at the end of Runway 15-R for that

flight to receive a clearance to take off for San Juan, Puerto

Rico. This group testified as follows:

Geoffrey F. Keating, an engineer employed on a construc-

tion project at Logan Airport, testified that because of the

fog conditions, gravel-hauling trucks were stopped that

morning at about 9:00 a. m. because their route normally

took them across active runways. He stated that the fog

5la

Opinion of District Court

condition varied all through the morning, that at times the

airport tower and the downtown Boston skyline were visible

and that at other times his view of those buildings was

obliterated by fog. He stated he could not see Castle Island

from Logan Airport at any time that morning, and he

expressed the opinion that when he saw flame near the ap-

proach end of Runway 4-R he also saw fog which he esti-

mated to be at a height equivalent to two light poles. Mr.

Keating first went to the end of 4-R, observed the flames,

then went to the fire station and reported the accident to

Chief Arena. Mr. Keating testified that the first time he

went to the vicinity of Runway 4-R, and about five minutes

before he saw the flames, he did notice that the old control

tower was visible, but that the upper half of the new tower

was not visible. The new tower is about 500 feet high. He

did not look toward the tower the second time he went to

the approach end of 4-R.

On the day of the accident Harris Cusick was a fellow

employee of Mr. Keating. Mr. Cusick grew up in Winthrop,

the town abutting Logan Airport. He had been working

at the airport for about six years prior to the crash. His

background included attendance at an Air Force Weather

Observation School and three years service on active duty

as an Air Force weatherman. He expressed the opinion

that the visibility improved somewhat around 10:00 a. m.,

but began to deteriorate again before 11:00. He expressed

opinions as to the ceiling and visibility near the end of

Runway 4-R when he arrived there some ten or fifteen min-

utes after the crash had occurred.

I do not credit this witness’ testimony since I find him

to be strongly biased in favor of plaintiffs, as he conceded

under cross-examination. He likewise conceded, in sub-

stance, that he was “miffed” because the National Trans-

52a

Opinion of District Court

portation Safety Board did not eall him but did call Mr.

Keating as a witness at the post-accident hearing it held in

Peabody, Mass. in August 1973. Mr. Cusick resented this

because he felt that his training and experience in the

United States Air Force made him a far more qualified and

reliable witness than Mr. Keating as to the weather condi-

tions prevailing at the time of the accident. Mr. Cusick

showed further bias by making an attack on what he be-

lieved to be the deficiencies of the transmissometer system*®

for Runway 4-R. His attack was based primarily on his

own ipse dixit. I totally discount Mr. Cusick’s testimony.

Chief Arena and Deputy Chief Cutrone testified in sub-

stance that in their opinion the fog was thick at the ap-

proach end of Runway 4-R at the time they arrived there,

more than ten minutes after the crash. I find that the con-

dition at the time they arrived there does not establish

what the conditions were at 1508, and more particularly,

that it does not establish any inaccuracy on the part of the

18 The Transmissometer consists of two pieces of electronic equip-

ment situated on the ground at a point 692 feet to the side of the

center line of Runway 4-R and 397 feet from the displaced threshold

thereof. The displaced threshold is the nearest point to the ap-

proach end of the runway on which an airplane may touchdown

and then only if operating under VFR rules. Runway 4-R has a

total length of 10,000 feet, 7493 feet of which extend beyond the

displaced threshold and 6340 feet of which extend beyond the

touchdown point to be used when a plane is landing on an ILS

approach. See footnote 4.

One part of the transmissometer system emits a beam of light

which is received and measured by the second component of the

system. Approximately every 52 seconds this device relays to the

control tower a reading as to the number of feet of visibility along

the runway in the vicinity of which the transmissometer is located.

The purpose of this reading is to give an incoming pilot some idea

of the visibility at ground level along the runway on which he

expects to touchdown his aircraft. It does not establish the nature

or extent of the “slant” vision available to an incoming pilot. Cf.

footnote 17.

53a

Opinion of District Court

RVR* readings. Nor does it cast any light on what slant

view"’ was available to the crew of D 723 during the course

of the approach, nor, most importantly, as to what the

available visibility was at the time the plane reached DH

and proceeded on down to impact.

Captain Vernon H. Young, of Eastern Airlines, testified

that on July 31, 1973 he was in command of EAL 945 to

San Juan, Puerto Rico, which was scheduled to depart at

1320. In faet, he did not “push off” from the gate until

1453, and as he taxied away from the Eastern Airlines

terminal, heading toward the outer runway, he was facing

the approach end of 4-R and Castle Island, at about 1458

or 1459. He saw fog between 4-R and Castle Island which

he considered unusually dense for that time of year. When

he reached the far end of Runway 15-R and was facing

down the runway, his view of the approach end of 4-R was

obstructed by some of the terminal buildings. He estimated

that at 1505 about half the airport was obscured, including

all but the most northern end of 4-R. He said that he did

not see EAL 572 pass him on its roll-out to the taxiway,

although he was facing the runway on which it successfully

landed and rolled out. It should be noted that his failure to

*® The RVR system consists of two electronic components of the

transmissometer located near and along the course of a runway.

Approximately every 52 seconds the device sends to the air traffic

controllers a readout called the Runway Visual Range. This pur-

ports to reflect the visibility along the surface of the runway. This

readout is transmitted by the controllers to all approaching air-

eraft, and if the RVR reading is less than 2400 feet, applicable

regulations do not permit the pilot to begin an approach. However

if an approach has begun and the aircraft has passed inside of the

outer marker, even if the pilot learns thereafter that the RVR has

dropped below 2400 feet, he may continue the approach at least to

DH. Cf. footnote 15.

7 Slant View is the visibility available to a pilot as he looks to-

ward the runway while on the final descent for his landing.

ota

Opinion of District Court

see EAL 572 is inconsistent with the testimony of Flight

Officer Chappell, the copilot of EAL 572, which I believe, to

the effect that when he landed the RVR reported a visibility

of 6000 feet and that, in fact, the actual RVR was even

greater along 4-R at the time he touched down and rolled

out.

Captain Young, who appeared voluntarily at the request

of a pilot employed by Delta, testified that he is aware that

there is a regulation which requires pilots to report to the

tower any change in weather conditions that may be essen-

tial to the safety of others. He did not report the above-

described condition and his failure to do so is one of the

reasons I do not accept his testimony as factual.

In testimony which I find highly significant, Captain

Young conceded that the only person who could determine

whether or not the visibility at DH enabled a pilot to land

would be the pilot himself. This is true, he testified, no mat-

ter what anyone other than the pilot saw or reported about

the visibility. He testified unequivocally that it is com-

pletely up to the pilot to make a decision at DH as to

whether a safe landing can be executed and this decision

is to be based on what he then can or cannot see of the

runway or its environment. He testified that the RVR

value is important primarily because it establishes whether

it is legal to pass the outer marker, i. e., whether a pilot

must execute a missed approach becau

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