Appendix — ASARCO, Inc. v. Montana Department of Revenue
Supreme Court brief1978
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Supreme Court, U. .
FILED ©
NOV 7 1977
| MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK
IN THE
— Court of the United States
OcToBEeR TERM, 1977
No. 77 265 8
ASARCO IN cORrORATED (formerly The American
Smelting and Refining Company), Appellant,
V.
MontTANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE
OF THE STATE OF MONTANA, Appellee.
On Appeai from the
Supreme Court of Montana
C. RupotF PRrrRSON
GrOROR W. BRATTY
ALAN T. CATHCART
1200-18th Street, N. W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Counsel for Appellant
Passs or Bron 8. Aa PRINTING, Inc., WasHINoTON, D. C.
—
*
APPENDICES
INDEX
Page
ArrRNDIX A:
Opinion of the Supreme Court of Montana la
Order of the Supreme Court of Montana Denying
Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing .......... 18a
Findings, Opinion, Conclusions of Law and Judg-
ment of the State District Court ............ 19a
Findings, Conclusions of Law and Order of the
rr 39a
ArrEN DR B:
Final Judgment Entered by the State Distriet
Court on August 18, 1977ũT7ʒ7/77ʒ777 . 46a
Aprenpix C:
Notice of Appeal filed in the State District Court
e . cbinin 48a
Notice of Appeal filed in the Supreme Court of
Montana on October 6, 1977ĩ ũ ꝶ·)i 49a
Arr xxo D:
Section 84-1503, Revised Code of Montana 1947 .. 5la
Chapter 10 of Montana Corporation License Tax
tions as Adopted mber 30, 1966 .. 5la
ArrENDRN E:
Extracts from the Brief of the Department in the
Supreme Court of Montana ................ 59a
Arr rom F:
Protest of Proposed Deficiency Assessments filed
by Appellant with the Department .......... 64a
ii Index Continued
Page
Appenpix G:
Extracts from Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing
in the Suvreme Court of Montana .......... fla
Appenpix H:
Extracts from the Department’s Response to
Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing in the
Supreme Court of Montana ................ 78a
la
APPENDIX A
No. 13249
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1977
Montana DeparTMeNT oF Revenve, State or Montana,
Petitioner and Appellant,
— vs —
TRE American SMELTING AND Rerininc Company,
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from: District Court of the First Judicial Dis-
trict, Honorable Peter Meloy, Judge pre-
siding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Terry B. Cosgrove argued, Helena, Montana
Theodore W. DeLooze argued, Salem, Oregon
For Respondent:
Hughes, Bennett and Cain, Helena, Montana
George T. Bennett argued, Helena, Montana
Charles Smith, Helena, Montana
For Amicus Curiae:
William D. Dexter appeared, Olympia, Washington
Submitted: January 27, 1977
Decided July 11, 1977
Filed: July 11, 1977
/s/ Tuomas J. Kearney
Thomas J. Kearney
Clerk
2a
Mr. Chief Justice Paul G. Hatfield delivered the Opinion
of the Court.
This is an appeal by the Montana Department of
Revenue (DOR) from a judgment entered in the district
court, Lewis and Clark County, affirming a final decision
of the State Tax Appeal Board (STAB). The STAB
decision ordered a recomputation of the deficiency as-
sessment levied by DOR against American Smelting and
Refining Company (ASARCO).
In 1972 the auditors of the Multistate Tax Commission
conducted an audit of ASARCO’s records for the tax
years 1967-1970. Subsequent to this audit, additional cor-
poration license taxes were assessed against ASARCO
by DOR. The amount of this deficiency assessment is the
underlying issue upon appeai.
ASARCO is a New Jersey corporation engaged in na-
tional and international operations in the business of min-
ing, smelting, refining, manufacturing, buying and selling
nonferrous metals and minerals. ASARCO basically en-
gages in two separate, but related areas of operation. The
first is a primary metal operation consisting of the mining,
milling, smelting and refining of nonferrous metals. The
second is a nonferrous alloy operation consisting of the
manufacture and sale of alloy products.
For the tax years in question ASARCO owned mines
in Colorado, Washington, Arizona, New Mexico and Ida-
ho in addition to mines in Canada and other foreign
countries. It operated smelters and refineries in Texas,
Maryland, Colorado, Montana, Missouri, Arizona, Ne-
braska, New Jersey, Washington and California for the
years in question. Alloy manufacturing plants were lo-
cated in Texas, New Jersey, California, Oklahoma and
Indiana. ASARCO sales offices were located in New York,
Baltimore, Boston, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, Mil-
waukee, Philadelphia, Rochester and St. Louis.
3a
ASARCO owns and operates a smelter in East Helena
which is its principal operation in Montana. This smelter
receives lead ores and concentrates from company mines
as well as unrelated suppliers. The smelted, but unrefined
lead product is then shipped to other units of ASARCO
for further treatment and eventual sale. Anaconda Com-
pany purchased various by-products of the East Helena
smelter for the years in question. In addition to the East
Helena smelter ASARCO owns certain active and inac-
tive mining properties in Montana.
Prior to 1962 ASARCO reported its income from its
Montana properties by separate accounting, pursuant to
section 84-1503, R.C.M. 1947. Under that method ASARCO
determined the gross receipts from its Montana proper-
ties and deducted all expenses incurred by or attributable
to such properties to arrive at Montana income. Where
overhead expenses such as the cost of transportation were
attributable to more than one state, they were appor-
tioned to determine the Montana portion.
In 1962 ASARCO recognized that its business was uni-
tary in nature and it could no longer use separate ac-
counting for its income. Pursuant to section 84-1503 it
requested permission from DOR to change from separate
accounting to the unitary method of accounting. Permis-
sion was granted by DOR and a ‘‘hybrid’’ system of re-
porting income was institu‘ed. Under this hybrid sys-
tem, all but a negligible amount of total company income
from rents, royalties, dividends, interest and sales of
tangible and intangible properties was allocated to sources
outside Montana. After deductions for the allocated in-
come, ASARCO’s operating net income was apportioned
to Montana sources by the use of a three factor formula.
An in-depth examination of ASARCO’s hybrid system
indicates the following procedure was used to compute
tax liability for the years in question. ASARCO classi-
fied the income listed below as nonbusiness income under
4a
DOR’s 1967 regulations, deducted it from its apportion-
able income, and allocated it as indicated:
(a) Income from mine royalties paid by the lessees of
ASARCO’s Keystone Mine previously operated by
ASARCO and located in the State of Colorado was al-
located to the State of Colorado;
(b) Income from patents and copyrights on items de-
veloped by ASARCO’s research department and used
in ASARCO’s operations and licensed to others, was al-
located to commercial domicile;
(c) Income from rental of housing units on mining
properties and rented to employes was allocated to the
state where such rental units are located:
(d) Interest income from United States obligations,
customers notes and bonds, notes on the sale of a plant
and General Cable stock, from state and municipal bonds,
time certificates, bankers acceptances, and commercial
paper was allocated to the state of commercial domicile;
(e) Gains from the sales of tangible properties were
allocated to the state of sale;
(f) Dividends paid on stocks were allocated to state of
commercial domicile;
(g) Gains from the sale of stock were allocated to the
state of commercial domicile; and
(h) Income from securities deposited with Montana
state agencies and from money deposited in Montana was
allocated to Montana.
The percentage of apportionable income or loss at-
tributable to Montana sources was calculated by the use
of this formula:
Montana property + Montana Payroll + Montana Sales
Total ASARCO Total ASARCO Total ASARCO
Property Payroll Sales
=__%
Averaged by dividing by 3
5a
The percentage obtained was then multiplied by
ASARCO’s total apportionable income to determine the
Montana contribution.
DOR contends the hybrid system used by ASARCO
to calculate its Montara income incorrectly interpreted
section 84-1503, R.C.M. 1947. That section at the time in
question, stated:
If the income of any corporation from sources with-
in the state cannot be properly segregated from in-
come without the state, then, in that event, the
amount of the net income returned shall be that pro-
portion of the taxpayer’s total net income which the
taxpayer’s gross business done in the state of Mon-
tana bears to the total gross business of the tax-
payer, and apportionment shall be made under the
rules and regulations prescribed by the state board
of equalization, giving consideration to sales, property
and payroll and such other factors as may be deemed
applicable; provided, however, that the state board
of equalization shall, upon the presentation of satis-
factory evidence, determine that the income from
sources within the state of Montana may be properly
segregated from income from sources without the
state of Montana and shall allow separate account-
ing. The board shall publish not less than once a
year, all rules and regulations pertaining to this
section. All decisions by the board under this sec-
tion shall be subject to judicial review in an action
prosecuted by the corporation in the district court
of Lewis and Clark county. The taxpayer cannot
change from one method of accunnting to another
method of accounting without urst obtaining per-
mission from the board.“
DOR interprets the above statute as creating only two
methods of deter ining income from sources within Mon-
6a
tana—separate accounting or apportionment of total net
income. Separate accounting is available only if income
from sources within the state may be segregated from
sources without the state. In the absence of the above
conditions, total business net income must be apportioned.
DOR determined that the income classified by ASARCO
as nonbusiness income was, in fact, business income as
defined by DOR’s 1967 regulations. DOR therefore re-
stored this income to apportionable net income. In addi-
tion, DOR included in apportionable net income the net
income of six of ASARCO’s wholly owned subsidiaries.
DOR contends that ASARCO and the six subsidiary cor-
porations were engaged in a unitary business and there-
fore the combination was merely an extension of the ap-
portionment method of taxation dictated by section 84-
1503.
Pursuant to DOR’s calculations of ASARCO’s Mon-
tana income additional corporate license taxes were as-
sessed. Protest was made by ASARCO and a hearing was
held before the director of DOR. The director’s decision
affirmed the deficiency assessment. Thereafter ASARCO
appealed to STAB which reversed the director’s decision.
DOR then petitioned the district court, Lewis and Clark
County, requesting a review of the STAB order. On De-
cember 17, 1975, the district court entered judgment
affirming the decision of STAB. DOR appeals the dis-
trict court judgment.
Three issues are before the Court upon appeal:
1) Whether DOR had the authority, pursuant to sec-
tions 84-1503 and 84-1508, R.C.M. 1947, to adopt its
Regulations 1001-1020 (Chapter 10) concerning rules for
the apportionment of corporate net income?
2) Whether ASARCO was correct in its deduction
of alleged nonbusiness income from apportionable net in-
come prior to apportionment?
—— —
o-~ —äb᷑ ¶ R —äz— eG — — tae ee — — — —ml̃⁊p — vw
7a
3) Whether the income from six of ASARCO’s wholly
owned subsidiaries was properly included in apportionable
net income?
On December 30, 1966, DOR adopted its Regulations
1001-1020 (Chapter 10). These regulations were effective
with respect to tax years beginning on and after January
1, 1967. Included within these regulations are specific
rules for allocation and apportionment of corporate income
derived from sources both within and without Montana.
In addition key terms are specifically defined as to their
application to the regulations.
The regulations provide for two methods of accounting
for income; apportionment according to a three-factor
formula and separate accounting. Separate accounting is
allowed only in situations where income can be specifically
segregated as to source. Apportionment of income must
be used in all other cases. The apportionment system
adopts what may be categorized as a ‘‘business vs. non-
business test in regard to determining what income is
apportioned and what income may be allocated to source.
Under this system all business income is apportioned by
use of the three-factor formula while only nonbusiness
income may be allocated to source. Business income is
defined as all income arising from transactions and ac-
tivity in the regular course of the taxpayer’s trade or
business and includes income from tangible and intangi-
ble property if the acquisition, management and dispo-
sition of the property constitute integral parts of the
taxpayer’s regular trade or business operations. Non-
business income is defined as all income other than busi-
ness income.
ASARCO urges these regulations were ineffective as ap-
plied to it for the tax years 1967-1970 for two reasons:
1. DOR by virtue of section 84-1503 had the authority
to adopt rules and regulations only as to the apportion-
8a
ment of such income as could not be segregated as to
source.
2. The regulations adopt a ‘‘business vs. nonbusiness”’
income test rather than the ‘‘source’’ of income test
found in section 84-1503 and are therefore fatally incon-
sistent.
Any contention that DOR lacks the authority to adopt
rules and regulations interpreting taxation statutes is
without merit. In regard to the statute in question, the
power to adopt rules and regulations is clearly and un-
ambiguously stated within the text of the statute. Fur-
thermore section 84-1508, R.C.M. 1947, gives DOR power to
provide ‘‘such other regulations as may from time to
time be found necessary.’’ We affirmed this principle in
State ex rel. Fulton v. District Court, 139 Mont. 573, 366
P.2d 435.
The crux of this entire case is the interpretation of sec-
tion 84-1503 and DOR Regulations 1001-1020. There is
no merit in ASARCO “, contention that DOR has only
authority to adopt rules and regulations for the appor-
tionment of income incapable of segregation as to source.
The function of the Supreme Court when construing
a statute is simply to ascertain and declare what is in
substance stated therein, and not to insert what has been
omitted or to omit what has been inserted. Dunphy v.
Anaconda Co., 151 Mont. 76, 438 P.2d 660; In re Trans-
portation of School Children, 47 Mont. 618, 161 P.2d
901; Section 93-401-15, R.C.M. 1947. The fundamental
rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the
legislature controls. Matter of Senate Bill No. 23, Chap-
ter 491, Montana Session Laws of 1973, 168 Mont. 102,
540 P.2d 975, 32 St. Rep. 954; Hammill v. Young, 168
Mont. 81, 540 P.2d 971, 32 St.Rep. 935; Dunphy v. Ana-
conda Co., supra; Section 93-401-16, R.C.M. 1947. Where
the intent of the legislature can be determined from the
—
9a
plain meaning of the words used, the courts may not go
further and apply any other means of interpretation.
State ex rel. Huffman v. District Court, 154 Mont. 201,
461 P.2d 847; Dunphy v. Anaconda Co., supra. Here,
the plain meaning of the words used by the legislature
unmistakably discloses its intent. DOR clearly has the
authority to adopt rules and regulations as to the ap-
portionment of corporate income without regard to source.
There also is no merit in ASARCO’s second conten-
tion. ASARCO argues that section 84-1503 contains a
source of income“ test to be used in determining appor-
tionable income vs. allocatable income. ASARCO con-
cludes that this apparent conflict with the business vs.
nonbusiness income test found in the regulations makes
the regulations ineffective as applied to ASARCO. As
support for its theory of inconsistency between the stat-
ute and the regulations, ASARCO points out that section
84-1503 was amended in 1974, and the amended statute
conforms to the regulations.
In the construction of an amendatory act it will be
presumed that the legislature, in passing it, intended to
make some change in the existing law, and therefore the
Court should endeavor to give effect to the amendment.
Pilgeram v. Hass et al., 118 Mont. 431, 167 P.2d 339;
Nichols v. School District No. 3, 87 Mont. 181, 287 P.624.
However, this presumption of change is not conclusive.
This Court stated in School District No. 12 v. Pondera
County, 89 Mont. 342, 297 P. 498, that a change in a
statute may be made merely to express more clearly the
original intent of the legislature. Such is the case here.
The unamended statute is not a model of clear draft-
manship in regard to guidelines for the apportionment of
corporate income. DOR therefore adopted Regulations
1001-1020 to provide clear guidelines for taxpayer com-
pliance. The legislature thereafter saw fit to clarify the
section by the 1974 amendment to section 84-1503. The
10a
unamended version of section 84-1503 is not in conflict
with the regulations and therefore ASARCO must re-
port its income in compliance with those regulations.
Regarding ASARCO’s second issue, we find the hy-
brid system of reporting income used by ASARCO to
be invalid under section 84-1503. As above, the crux of
this issue is the interpretation of section 84-1503 and
Regulations 1001-1020. The intent of the legislature in
regard to the determination of what income is appor-
tionable income is clear and unambiguous. Section 84-
1503 provides for two methods of accounting for income;
separate accounting and apportionment.
Section 84-1503 provides a test for the determination
of the correct method of accounting to be used by a
corporation in reporting its Montana corporation license
tax. If income from all sources within Montana can ‘‘be
properly segregated from income without the state’’ then
and only then, may the separate accounting method be
used. Furthermore if the separate accounting method is
applicable, total net income must be allocated to source
rather than the hybrid system used by ASARCO.
ASARCO recognized its business was unitary in na-
ture in 1962. It requested and was granted permission
by DOR to discontinue the separate accounting system
then in use. Hence both parties agree that ASARCO must
apportion its income and the question becomes what
income is included in apportionable net income.
The regulations are clear and simple. All business in-
come is apportionable and nonbusiness income is allocated
to source. ASARCO argues that certain items of income
listed above are nonbusiness income and therefore prop-
erly deductible from apportionable net income. This con-
tention is incorrect.
The regulations state that business income includes in-
come derived from tangible and intangible property if the
lla
acquisition, management, and disposition of the property
constitute integral parts of the taxpayer’s regular trade
or business operation. After an in-depth examination of
the income in question, we find this income is derived
from sources that are integral portions of its business.
This finding is in direct conflict with the district court’s
finding of fact which state this income is nonbusiness in-
come. The test of whether this income is in reality busi-
ness or nonbusiness income is a matter of statutory in-
terpretation. We feel therefore that the finding of the
district court is in error. We are confronted herein with
a conclusion of law, rather than a finding of fact. Listed
below are examples of the relationship of this alleged
nonbusiness income to ASARCO.
1) Royalty Ineome—The royalty income arose from
two sources, mine royalties and patent royalties. The
mine royalties arose when ASARCO leased its Keystone
mine in Colorado to an unrelated mining concern.
ASARCO had operated this mine prior to the leasing.
The royalty was computed on the basis of mine produc-
tion. The patent income arose from royalties paid for
the use of devices developed by ASARCO’s research de-
partment. These devices were developed initially for
ASARCO’s use in its various plants and mines. The main
item included herein was a vertical feed furnace.
2) Rental Income. The majority of this income is de-
rived from homesites rented to employees working near
ASARCO mines and plants. Mr. Pecca, an ASARCO
official, testified at the DOR hearing:
„This is the, it’s almost exclusively rents received
from employees working at the company mines which
are located in remote areas and the company is re-
quired to provide houses.
3) Interest Income—The interest income arose from
customers’ notes on bonds, U.S. government notes, notes
12a
taken on the sale of a plant and stock, state and munici-
pal bonds, and time certificates and other commercial
paper. All were clearly liquid securities and were there-
fore readily available for use in meeting company obli-
gations and debts.
4) Gains on the Sale of Stock—ASARCO bought and
sold stock in various corporations during the years in
question. Included within the sales were stock of General
Cable, Revere Copper, Kennicott Copper, and Hecla
Mining Company. These corporations are all engaged in
the business of either producing metal ore or manufactur-
ing the refined product into goods. The stock was used by
ASARCO for business purposes, such as gaining access
to raw materials or access to potential customers for its
refined metals. Therefore all the above income was gen-
erated by the unitary business operation of ASARCO.
The concept of including income from the sale of tangi-
ble and intangible property and income derived from
rents, royalties and interest within apportionable net
income is not new nor unique. In Sperry and Hutchinson
Co. v. Department of Revenue, 270 Or. 329, 527 P.2d 729,
731, short term securities held to satisfy the need for
liquid capital were held to be apportionable. The Oregon
court stated:
‘“*S & H argues that because this income is the re-
turn on an intangible it must be allocated to/legal
situs. Nothing in our former law requires such an
arbitrary result and our current law expressly pro-
hibits it.“ 527 P.2d 731.
The current law referred to by the Oregon court is in
pertinent part identical to the DOR regulations here in
question. A similar result dealing with short term in-
tangibles was reached in Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc.
v. Comm. of Taxation, 276 Minn. 479, 151 N.W.2d 294.
13a
In Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v. Michigan Corporation
and Securities Commission, 351 Mich. 652, 88 N. W. 2d
564, 572, the issue was whether an investment portfolio
containing certain steel stocks should be included in de-
termining the book net worth of the corporation. The
court held the stocks were closely related to the com-
pany’s business, quoting with approval from Flint v.
Stone Tracy Company, 220 U.S. 107, 31 S.Ct. 342, 55 L.Ed.
389:
Nor can it be justly said that investments have no
real relation to the business transacted by a corpora-
tion. The possession of large assets is a business
advantage of great value; it may give credit which
will result in more economical business methods; it
may give a standing which shall facilitate purchases;
it may enable the corporation to enlarge the field
of its activities and in many ways give it business
standing and prestige.’’ 88 N.W.2d 572.
See also: Great Lakes Pipe Line Co. v. Commissioner
of Taxation, 272 Minn. 403, 138 N.W.2d 612.
Concerning the final issue, DOR is correct in its con-
tention that net income and apportionment factors of six
of ASARCO’s wholly owned subsidiaries must be in-
cluded in ASARCO’s computation of apportionable net
income. This is merely an extension of the unitary method
of taxation. Simply stated, the traditional concept of a
combination of various units of a corporation for unitary
method tax computation is extended to a combination of
various related or affiliated corporations.
In the instant case, the six affiliated corporations are
clearly separate and distinct from ASARCO. However
all are wholly owned by ASARCO and share common
members of their respective boards of directors with
ASARCO. A close relationship exists between ASARCO’s
business operation and the subsidiaries in that the sub-
l4a
sidiaries all provide ASARCO with material, services,
or a market for its products. From the discussion of the
individual corporation’s operations listed below, it is
clear the corporations are dependent upon each other and
each in turn contributes to the other’s business success.
1) Federated Metals of Canada—Federated Metals is
a Canadian corporation which basically operates the same
business in Canada as ASARCO’s American operation.
ASARCO provides Federated with certain central serv-
ices such as operations technology and accounting and
financial services. In addition, sales between the two
corporations are significant.
2) ASARCO Mercantile Company—ASARCO Mercan-
tile is engaged solely in the purchase and sale of ma-
chinery for ASARCO’s subsidiaries. All central services
are provided by ASARCO.
3) Enthone, Inc_—Enthone is a Connecticut corporation
engaged in the manufacture and sale of metal finishing
chemicals and supplies used in metal plating. About 16%
of Enthone’s raw materials were purchased from
ASARCO. Central services were provided by ASARCO.
4) International Metal Company—This company is
ASARCO’s exclusive sales outlet for materials delivered
to foreign countries. ASARCO provides all central serv-
ices.
5) Lone Star Lead Construction Co.—Lone Star is a
Texas corporation engaged in lining tanks with lead for
protection against corrosive contents. The vast majority
of its lead requirements are purchased from ASARCO.
15a
6) Northern Peru Mining Co.— All production from
Northern Peru's mines are sold to ASARCO and re-
fined in its plants.
In addition to the foregoing, Mr. Pecca testified as to
other services provided by ASARCO to all its subsidi-
aries. These include:
1. ASARCO handles central insurance of the subsidi-
aries.
2. Services provided by ASARCO are billed to the
subsidiaries, including top management.
3. All United States and state returns are prepared
by ASARCO for the subsidiaries.
4. Legal services are provided by ASARCO for the
subsidiaries whenever necessary.
5. Essential capital is provided for the subsidiaries,
who do not go to outside sources without first going to
ASARCO.
Coca Cola Company v. Department of Revenue, 271
Or. 517, 533 P.2d 788, 790, 792, is on all fours with the
instant case. There the Oregon court said:
The principal issue in this case is whether the in-
come from Coca Cola and its wholly owned subsidi-
aries may be combined and the apportionment form-
ula applied to the sum to determine the income prop-
erly attributable to Oregon.’’ 533 P.2d 790.
The Oregon court first stated that in order to properly
combine the incomes of the parent and subsidiary, the
business operation must be unitary. The unitary test was
defined as whether the business units, or in this case
corporations, are dependent upon each other and con-
tribute to the operation of the other’s business. Zale-
Salem, Inc. v. Tax Com., 237 Or. 261, 391 P.2d 601. Un-
— — —
16 17a
questionably this test is met in the instant case. The enter judgment in favor of the Montana Department of
Oregon court in Coca Cola Company then stated: | Revenue in the amount of the original deficiency assess-
‘‘We must now decide whether the fact that Coca — /s/ [illegible]
Cola and its wholly owned subsidiaries are organized 4 r *
as separate corporate entities precludes the Depart- ' We .
ment of Revenue from combining their incomes to | ä
reflect the true character of their unitary business. | Js, Gene B. Day
We hold that it does not.“ Gene B. Daly
The question is fundamentally one of whether a | /s/ — — 1 — 1
business should stand in a better position for pur- /s/ Frank I. om
poses of determining income merely because it chooses Frank I. Haswell
to use a multiple corporation organizational scheme. | /s/ D 2 Gum
We do not feel that it should. We agree with the Daniel J. Shea
following statement of the California Supreme Court: Justi
7 [Alecepting, as we must, the application of
the law to unincorporated wholly controlled branches
or businesses located in other jurisdictions as set
forth in Butler Brothers v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 664,
111 P. 2d 334; Id., 315 U.S. 501, 62 S.Ct. 701, 86 L. Ed.
991, the conclusion is ifresistible that the same rule
should apply to incorporated wholly controlled
branches or businesses so located. * * °*’ Edison
California Stores v. McColgan, supra at 473-74, 183
P.2d at 17.“
The decision of the district court is reversed. This case
is remanded to tk: district court with instructions to
18a
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
(Caption Omitted in Printing)
Order
[Fp Aveust 11, 1977]
Per Curiam:
Having considered respondent’s petition for rehearing
in the above named cause,
Ir Is Orperep that the petition for rehearing is hereby
denied for the reasons stated in appellant’s objections
to respondent’s petition for rehearing.
Darxp this 10th day of August, 1977.
/3/ [ILLEGIBLE]
Chief Justice
/3/ James Conway Harrow
Js, Franx I. Haswetn
Js, Dante. J. Suea
Justices
19a
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF MONTANA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LEWIS 4 CLARK.
No. 37750
Montana DeparTMENT or Revenue, State or Montana,
Petitioner,
vs.
Tae American SMELTING AND Rerintinc Company,
Respondent.
Findings From the Record, Opinion,
Conclusions of Law. and Judgment.
This matter constitutes a proceeding for review of a
final determination of the State Tax Appeal Board of the
State of Montana pursuant to Section 84-709.1 R.C.M. 1947,
and with respect to the Montana Corporation License Tax
liability of respondent for the years 1967, 1968, 1969 and
1970.
On the 14th day of March, 1974, the State Tax Appeal
Board of the State of Montana in those certain proceed-
ings entitled American Smelting and Refining Company,
Appellant, vs. The Department of Revenue of the State
of Montana, Respondent’’, being No. CT-1973-17 before the
State Tax Appeal Board, made and entered its Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order.
That thereafter, and pursuant to Section 84-709.1, R.C.M.
1947, the Department of Revenue of the State of Montana,
filed its Petition for proceedings for review of said Find-
ings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (herein re-
ferred to as ‘‘final decision’’) of said State Tax Appeal
Board of the State of Montana. That said Petition for
Review was filed on the 9th day of April, 1974.
That on the 16th day of May, 1974, the Department of
Revenue filed its motion : present additional evidence
20a
and a request for oral hearings and written briefs, and on
the 2nd day of December, 1974, filed an Amended Petition
to Present Additional Evidence.
The Department of Revenue of the State of Montana
was represented in this matter by Theodore W. deLooze,
Special Assistant Attorney General, admitted for the pur-
poses of this proceeding, and Terry B. Cosgrove, Special
Assistant Attorney General. The respondent, The American
Smelting and Refining Company, was represented by
George T. Bennett of the firm of Hughes, Bennett & Cain.
The matter having been fully briefed and twice orally
argued to the court, and the court having taken the appli-
cation of the Department of Revenue for leave to intro-
duce evidence under advisement, and the matter having
otherwise been submitted upon the record made before the
State Tax Appeal Board of the State of Montana, the
Court makes the following Findings From The Record,
Opinion, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment:
Finpincs From tHe Recorp
1. That the appellant, American Smelting and Refining
Company (ASARCO), is a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the State of New Jersey, and is
qualified to do and doing business in the State of Montana,
and maintains its commercial domicile at 120 Broadway,
New York City, New York.
2. That the appellant is engaged in the business of min-
ing, smelting, refining, manufacturing, buying and selling
non-ferrous metals and other minerals, and, in addition,
receives income in the form of dividends, interest, pat-
ents, royalties, mine royalties and gains from the sale of
certain properties.
3. That the following active companies are wholly owned
subsidiaries of the appellant:
(a) ASARCO Developments (NZ) Ltd., a New Zea-
land corporation, engaged in the examination of
21a
mining properties, principally for others, in New
Zealand;
(b) ASARCO Exploration Company of Canada, Ltd.,
a Canadian corporation, engaged in the examina-
tion of mining properties;
(e) ASARCO (Australia) Pty., Limited, an Australian
corporation, engaged in the examination of min-
ing properties principally for others, in Aus-
tralia;
(d) ASARCO International Corporation, a Delaware
corporation, engaged in the sale of asbestos fibre
produced by Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd.;
(e) ASARCO Mercantile Company, a Texas corpora-
tion, engaged in the purchase aud sale of manu-
factured products, principally for ASARCO and
certain subsidiaries;
(f) Bolivian Lead Corporation, a New York corpora-
tion, engaged in mining in Bolivia, South America;
(g) Compania American Smelting, S.A., a Chilean
corporation, engaged in the leasing of mineral
rights in Chile;
(h) Enthone, Incorporated, a Connecticut corpora-
tion, engaged in the manufacture and sale of metal
and other surface finishing chemicals and sup-
plies ;
(i) Federated Metals Canada Limited, a Canadian
corporation, engaged in producing chemicals in
Canada;
(j) International Metal Company, a New York corpo-
ration, a dealer in concentrates and metals;
(k) Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., a Delaware corpo-
ration, engaged in mining of asbestos ore and the
production of asbestos fibre in Canada;
22a
(1) Lone Star Lead Construction Corp., a New York
corporation, engaged as a contractor in construc-
tion of non-ferrous tank houses; and
(m) Northern Peru Mining Corporation, a Delaware
corporation, engaged in mining non-ferrous metals
in Peru.
4. That appellant owns and operates a smelter in East
Helena, Montana, where it receives lead ores and concen-
trates from company mines as well as unrelated suppliers.
The appellant’s East Helena, Montana, lead smelter ships
the refined lead product to other units of the appellant for
further treatment and ultimate sale, and sells by-products
of its smelting operation. The appellant also owns in Mon-
tana active and inactive mining properties.
5. That appellant is a unitary business and files its
Montana tax returns using the apportionment method.
6. That an audit was conducted of the books and records
of appellant for the years 1967, 1968, 1969, and 1970, by an
auditor of the Multistate Tax Commission.
7. That due to the audit conducted on the books and
records of appellant that a deficiency assessment was levied
against appellant for the years 1967, 1968, 1969, and
1970, in the amount of $409,145.07, of which $71,845.69 was
interest, none of which has been paid.
8. That appellant reported its income for Montana Cor-
poration License Tax purposes for the taxable years 1967
through 1970 in the following manner:
(a) Income from mine royalties consisting of the Key-
stone Mine in the State of Colorado was allocated
to the State of Colorado;
(b) Income from patents and copyrights were allo-
cated to commercial domicile;
23a
(c) Income from rental of housing units on mining
properties was allocated to the state where such
rental units are located;
(d) Interest income was allocated to the state of com-
mercial domicile;
(e) Gains from sales of tangible properties were allo-
cated to the state of sale;
(f) Dividends paid on stocks were allocated to state
of commercial domicile; and
(g) All other income was apportioned by the formula
prescribed by Section 84-1503, R.C.M. 1947.
9. That the Corporation License Tax Bureau of the De-
partment of Revenue, in making the deficiency assessment
as set forth in Exhibit E“, included all income of the
appellant, and by Federated Metals of Canada, ASARCO
Mercantile Company, Enthone, Inc., International Metal
Company, Lone Star Lead Construction Corp., and North-
ern Peru Mining Corporation; and treated all of such in-
come as apportionable by formulae whereby there was ap-
portioned to the State of Montana an allocated part based
on the relationship between the tangible property, sales,
and payroll, with respect to the Montana operation in re-
lation to the total operations.
10. That, with the exception of securities deposited with
various state agencies and monies deposited locally in the
State of Montana, the income from which have been allo-
cated to the State of Montana, all of the appellant’s
stocks, bonds, commercial paper and other evidences of
indebtedness are located outside of the State of Montana.
11. That all of the appellant’s income from mine royal-
ties, patents, copyrights, rental, interest, dividends and
gains upon sales of tangible or intangible properties, can
be properly segregated as to sources within and sources
without the State of Montana.
24a
12. That the business operations conducted by the ap-
pellant and the business operations conducted by its affili-
ated corporations are not interrelated or interdependent to
the extent that the net income of the appellant and any one
or more of its affiliated corporations cannot resonably be
determined without reference to the operations conducted
by the other companies and that the income of the affiliated
corporations has been properly reported by separate ac-
counting.
13. That the appellant for a number of years has
owned common stock of General Cable Corporation. That,
pursuant to a Consent Decree entered by the United
States District Court on March 15, 1967, in a proceeding
commenced by the Anti-Trust Division of the Justice De-
partment, the appellant and General Cable Corporation
were enjoined from having a director or officer who was
at the same time a director, officer or employee of the
other, and that the appellant give a proxy covering its
stock holdings to the persons designated by General
Cable’s board of directors prior to any stockholders’
meeting. On July 24, 1970, the Consent Decree was modi-
fied to require complete divestiture by appellant of all
of its common stockholdings of General Cable Corpora-
tion. Pursuant thereto, appellant did sell such stock in
the taxable year 1970.
14. That this is a proper proceeding for review of the
final decision of the State Tax Appeal Board of the State
of Montana instituted before this Court by the filing of
a Petition within thirty (30) days after service of the
final decision of the State Tax Appeal Board and pur-
suant to Section 84-709.1, R. C. M.
15. That the issues determined by the State Tax Ap-
peal Board of the State of Montana by its final decision
on the 14th day of March, 1974, were as follows:
(a) Whether American Smelting and Refining Com-
pany, for Montana Corporation License Tax purposes
25a
and pursuant to Sections 84-1501, et seq., R. C. M. 1947,
properly reported the following items of income as being
from sources without the State of Montana, viz., (1) in-
come from mine royalties consisting of the Keystone
Mine in the State of Colorado; (2) income from patents
and copyrights; (3) income from rental of housing units
on mining properties located outside the State of Mon-
tana; (4) interest income earned on bonds, commercial
paper and other evidence of indebtedness invested, main-
tained and located outside the State of Montana; (5)
gains from sales of properties located outside the State
of Montana; and (6) dividends paid on stocks located
and maintained at commercial domicile; and
(b) Whether the respondent, American Smelting and
Refining Company, could be required by the Department
to combine the income of Federated Metals of Canada,
Asarco Mercantile Company, Enthone, Inc., Interna-
tional Metal Company, Lone Star Lead Construction
Corp., and Northern Peru Mining Corporation, with its
income and allocate the same to the State of Montana.
16. The State Tax Appeal Board of the State of Mon-
tana determined as to the first issue that for the taxable
years 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970, the respondent Ameri-
can Smelting and Refining Company had properly sepa-
rated its income from sources within the State of Mon-
tana from income from sources without the State of
Montana.
17. That as to the second issue the State Tax Appeal
Board of the State of Montana determined that the busi-
ness operations conducted by the respondent American
Smelting and Refining Company and the business opera-
tions conducted by its affiliated corporations were not
interrelated or interdependent to the extent that the net
income of the respondent American Smelting and Re-
fining Company in any one or more of its affiliated corp-
orations could not reasonably be determined without
26a
reference to the operations conducted by the other com-
panies, and that the income of the affiliated corporations
was properly reported by separate accounting.
18. That the respondent, Montana Department of Reve-
nue of the State of Montana, has by its amended petition
to present additional evidence, asked that the respondent
American Smelting and Refining Company be required to
answer certain questions with respect to its dividend, rental,
royalty, interest income, and gains on sale of capital as-
sets, the questions all being generally, whether, with re-
spect to such income received by the taxpayer for the
years listed, such income was ‘‘used in the trade or busi-
ness of the company”’ after it had been earned or derived.
19. The Department, appellant here, has offered no
reason why such proposed additional evidence was not
produced at the proceedings before the Department of
Revenue or before the State Tax Appeal Board and is
now the subject of an application before this Court.
From the foregoing Findings From the Record, the
Court makes the following:
OrIN LON
The respondent filed its Montana Corporation License
Tax returns for the taxable years in question and there-
after the Department of Revenue, acting in conjunction
with the Multi-state Tax Commission, audited such re-
turns and made adjustments with respect thereto. It is
these adjustments that are the subject of this controversy.
First, in adjusting the corporation license tax liability
of the respondent for the taxable years in question, the
Department made the following described adjustment to
dividend income, rental income, royalty income and gains
on sales of capital assets, whereas the respondent had,
as to such income, reported the same as follows accord-
ing to the findings of the Montana State Tax Appeal
Board:
27a
(a) Income from mine royalties consisting of the
Keystone Mine in the State of Colorado was
allocated to the State of Colorado;
(b) Income from patents and copyrights were allo-
cated to commercial domicile;
(c) Income from rental of housing units on mining
properties was allocated to the state where such
rental units are located;
(d) Interest income was allocated to the state of
commercial domicile;
(e) Gains from sales of tangible properties were al-
located to the state of sale;
(f) Dividends paid on stocks were allocated to state
of commercial domicile; and
(g) All other income was apportioned by the formu-
la prescribed by Section 84-1503, R.C.M. 1947.
As to its income from investments held and maintained
in Montana, the respondent treated such income as en-
tirely earned from sources within the State of Montana
and reported the income accordingly.
The Department of Revenue, purporting to act under
the principles“ of the Uniform Division of Income for
Tax Purposes Act, treated all of the respondent’s in-
vestment income, whether earned from sources within
or sources without the State of Montana, as business
income and required the same to be apportioned be-
tween Montana and other states according to a formula
based upon the ratio of sales, property and payroll within
and without the State of Montana. The State Board of
Equalization of the State of Montana, and predecessor
to the Department of Revenue, purported to adopt on
December 30, 1966, and effective with respect to tazable
years beginning on and after January 1, 1967, regulations
28a
numbered 1001, et seq., for the ‘‘allocation and appor-
tionment of income.“
The Department of Revenue contends that its prede-
cessor had a right to adopt such regulations and that it
has a right to enforce such regulations under the provi-
sions of Section 84-1503, R.C.M. 1947.
Under the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Pur-
poses Act, and under the regulations adopted by the
prior State Board of Equalization and attempted to be
enforced by the Department of Revenue, there is a dis-
tinction drawn between ‘‘businss income’’ and non-busi-
ness income.“ The term business income' is defined as
income arising from transactions and activity in the
regular course of the taxpayer’s trade or business and
includes income from tangible and intangible property
if the acquisition, management, and disposition of the
property constitute integral parts of the taxpayer’s regu-
lar trade or business operations.’’ As to rents, capital
gains, interest, dividends, royalties and other similar
types of investment income, if it is found to constitute
non-business income it is allocated pursuant to specific
allocation rules therein incorporated. Thus, as to the
passive or investment income of the respondent as de-
scribed by the Montana State Tax Appeal Board, the
Department of Revenue contended that respondent was
a unitary business within the meaning of the definition
contained in Regulations 1001, et seq; that all of the
income of the respondent constituted ‘‘business income;
and that, therefore, all of the passive or investment in-
come of the respondent, whether it was clearly earned
from sources within the State of Montana or clearly
earned from sources without the State of Montana, was
to be allocated according to the formula the factors of
which are payroll, property and sales.
In this Court’s opinion, Section 84-1503, R.C.M. 1947,
as effective for the taxable years 1967 through 1970, in-
29a
elusive, is controlling. Pursuant to that section, the De-
partment of Revenue and its predecessor, the State Board
of Equalization, had the authority to adopt regulations
as to the apportionment of income only where it finds
that such income cannot be properly segregated as to
sources within or without the State. The section pro-
vided, for the taxable years in question:
If the income of any corporation from sources
within the state cannot be properly segregated from
income without the state, then, in that event, the
amount of the net income returned shall be that
proportion of the taxpayer’s total net income which
the taxpayer’s gross business done in the state of
Montana bears to the total gross business of the
taxpayer, and apportionment shall be made under
the rules and regulations prescribed by the state
board of equalization, giving consideration to sales,
property and payroll and such other factors as may
be deemed applicable; provided, however, that the
state board of equalization shall, upon the presen-
tation of satisfactory evidence, determine that the
income from sources within the state of Montana
may be properly segregated from income from sources
without the state of Montana and shall allow separate
accounting. The board shall publish not less than
once a year, all rules and regulations pertair‘ng to
this section. All decisions by the board under this
section shall be subject to judicial review in an ac-
tion prosecuted by the corporation in the district
court of Lewis and Clark county. The taxpayer can-
not change from one method of accounting to another
method of accounting without first obtaining per-
mission from the board.
Under the clear and unambiguous language of this
section, the taxing authorities of the State of Montana
had the authority to adopt rules and regulations only as
30a
to the apportionment of such income as could not be
segregated as to source. If income could be segregated
as to source, then it was allocable to that source in its
entirety. Secondly, this section very clearly provides that
the taxing authorities of the State of Montana must, upon
the presentation of ‘‘satisfactory evidence’’, determine
„that the income from sources within the State of
Montana may be properly segregated from income from
sources without the State of Montana and shall allow
separate accounting’’. Here, the State Tax Appeal Board,
by its Finding No. 10 determined:
That, with the exception of securities deposited
with various state agencies and monies deposited
locally in the State of Montana, the income from
which have been allocated to the State of Montana,
all of the Appellant’s (Respondent’s) stocks, bonds,
commercial paper and other evidences of indebted-
ness are invested in intangibles outside of the State
of Montana and all of such evidences of indebted-
ness are located outside of the State of Montana.
The Montana State Tax Appeal Board, by its Finding
No. 11, found and determined:
That all of the Appellant’s (Respondent’s) income
from mine royalties, patents, copyrights, rental, in-
terest, dividends and gains upon sales of tangible or
intangible properties, can be properly segregated as
to sources within and sources without the State of
Montana.“
The Department of Revenue apparently does not quar-
rel with the Findings of the State Tax Appeal Board
quoted hereinabove. To the contrary, the contention of
the Department is that ‘‘source of income’’ is no longer
the test, that the test is whether or not such income con-
stitutes business income as defined in the Uniform
3la
Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act. In this respect,
this Court must point out that Section 84-1503, R. C. M.
1947, was in fact amended by Section 2, Chapter 5 of
the Laws of 1974, effective as to all taxable years on
and after December 31, 1973, to specifically make applic-
able to the Montana Corporation License Tax the pro-
visions of the Uniform Division of Income for Tax
Purposes Act, and, in addition, by Section 84-1503,
R.C.M. 1947, Subsection (1)(a), a definition of unitary
business. Prior to this amendment, the only definition of
unitary business contained in the Montana Corporation
License Tax Act was in Section 84-1509, R.C.M. 1947,
with regard to affiliated corporations. The Montana Cor-
poration License Tax Act, prior to this amendment, did
not contain any definition of nor did it make any dis-
tinction between so-called business or ‘‘non-business’’
income. There is no issue before this Court as to whether
or not the respondent is a unitary business under Section
84-1503, R. C. M. 1947, as amended by Section 2, Chapter 5,
Laws of 1974, and effective for all taxable years on and
after December 31, 1973. Very clearly the question here is
the interpretation of Section 84-1503, R.C.M. 1947, prior
to the 1974 amendments. Section 84-1503, R.C.M. 1947,
prior to such amendments, is clear and unambiguous. It
allows the taxpayer to segregate income which can be
clearly identified as to source. There appears to be no
question here that if this is the test that the income of the
respondent which is in question here can be identified
as to source. This being determinative, the decision of the
Montana State Tax Appeal Board with respect thereto
is correct.
In interpreting Section 84-1503, R. C. M., prior to its
amendment in 1974, this Court is to ascertain and give
effect to the intention of the Legislature as expressed
in the statute; Section 93-401-16, R. C. M. Where the
plain meaning of words used indicate the legislative in-
32a
tent, courts may not go further and apply any other
means of interpretation. State ex rel. Huffman v. District
Court, 154 Mont. 201, 461 P.2d 847.
Here, the key language of Section 84-1503, as then
effective, is:
If the income of any corporation from sources with-
in the state cannot be properly segregated from in-
come without the state, then, in that event..
(Emphasis supplied.)
The ‘‘event’’ which triggers Section 84-1503 is where
income cannot be properly segregated and this is the
express holding of the Supreme Court in Montana Life
Insurance Company v. Shannon, 106 Mont. 500, 78 P.2d
946, where it is said (P.504):
Furthermore, when the amount of gross income
within the state was known and determined properly,
then the principal question involved in this litiga-
tion was thereby settled. In the circumstances of this
case, the Board could not properly invoke the rule
of Section 2297.1 (now Section 84-1503, R. C. M.
1947) as the statute has no application here.’’
Additionally, the Department was required under Sec-
tion 84-1503, R. C. M., as effective, to allow the taxpayer to
segregate income intermingled as to source by separate
accounting and upon ‘‘satisfactory’’ evidence that this
could be done.
In contrast, the Legislature has changed this rule by its
1974 amendments to Section 84-1503, R. C. M. Under this
section as amended, separate accounting is not allowed to a
‘‘unitary’’ business and the term ‘‘unitary”’ is defined in
different terms from those contained in Section 84-1509,
R. C. M.
33a
In short, it would appea. that the Legislature by this
amendment in 1974, has changed the rule from ‘‘source of
income’’ to nature of income (business or non-business)
and changed the rule of accounting as to unitary and non-
unitary businesses.
There is a presumption that in amending an existing
statute (Section 84-1503), that the legislature intended to
make a change therein; State ex rel Dick Irvin, Inc., v.
Anderson, (1974) —— Mont. ——, 525 P.2d 564; Montana
Milk Control Brd. v. Community Creamery Company, 139
Mont. 523, 366 P.2d 151; Van Tigham v. Lennane, 136 Mont.
547, 349 P.2d 569.
Here there is more than just a presumption of change as
to such statute. Here, clearly, the Legislature has shifted
from the ‘‘source’’ rule to the unitary or ‘‘non-unitary”’
„business“, ‘‘non-business’’ income approach. In light of
this the attempt by the taxing authorities to make such a
change by Regulations 1001, et seq., prior to such 1974
legislative change, was ineffective.
Turning to the second issue, the respondent, in reporting
its taxable income to the State of Montana for the taxable
years 1967 through and including 1970, did not include the
income of any of its affiliated corporations which are not
doing business within the State of Montana. The Depart-
ment of Revenue in making its deficiency assessments for
these years included with the income of respondent the in-
come of Federated Metals of Canada, Asarco Mercantile
Company, Enthone, Inc., International Metal Company,
Lone Star Lead Construction Corp., and Northern Peru
Mining Corporation, on the theory that all of these corpo-
rations were ‘‘unitary’’ under Regulations 1001, et seq.
This income then having been deemed to be the income of
the respondent was apportioned according to the formula
based upon sales, property and payroll.
34a
The Montana State Tax Appeal Board, by its Finding of
Fact No. 12, found and determined:
That the business operations conducted by the Appel-
lant (Respondent) and the business operations con-
ducted by its affiliated corporations are not interrelated
or interdependent to the extent that the net income
of the Appellant (Respondent) and any one or more
of its affiliated corporations cannot reasonably be de-
termined without reference to the operations con-
ducted by the other companies and that the income of
the affiliated corporations has been properly reported
by separate accounting.“
In light of this Finding of Fact, the State Tax Appeal
Board correctly determined that under Section 84-1509,
R. C. M. 1947, the Department could not require the in-
come of these affiliated corporations to be combined or con-
solidated with the income of the respondent.
The Department of Revenue, on the other hand, argues
that Section 84-1509, R. C. M. 1947, is not the controlling
statute. At page 17 of the Department’s final brief in this
matter, it states, commencing at Line 26:
In no way can Scction 84-1509 be read as a statute
providing for combination. The authority for combin-
ing the company and its subsidiaries is found in the
case law and the Department’s Regulations 1001.“
The Court has examined the Department’s Regulatioa
**1001’’. Section 1001 of the Department’s regulations
speaks in all three paragraphs of ‘‘a corporation subject
to this tax’’, or ‘‘a corporation engaged in a ‘unitary’
business operation within and without Montana’’, and ‘‘a
corporation not engaged in a unitary business... . In all
instances, this regulation deals with a single corporation.
If it was the intent of this regulations to apply to affiliated
corporations, then it should have so stated. In any event,
35a
it is the opinion of this Court that the Department of Rev-
enue and its predecessor, the State Board of Equalization,
had no authority to go beyond the clear provisions of Sec-
tion 84-1509, R. C. M. 1947. The Legislature of the State
of Montana having, by Section 84-1509, R. C. M. 1947, ad-
dressed itself to the problem of the combining or consoli-
dating of income of affiliated corporations, and this section
being the only section in the Montana Corporation License
Tax Act which deals with affiliated corporations, it is con-
trolling.
The express mention of one subject or authority in an
act (affiliated corporations under Section 84-1509) excludes
other similar matters not mentioned; Helena Valley Irri-
gation District v. State Highway Commission, 150 Mont.
192, 433 P. 2d 791; Reed v. Reed, 130 Mont. 409, 304 P.2d
590; Stephens v. City of Great Falls, 119 Mont. 368, 175
P.2d 408. The Court must reject the Department’s conten-
tion that it can rely upon its own regulations or ‘‘case
law’’ to come to a different requirement than that ex-
pressed in the act.
The Court has examined the ‘‘case law’’ as cited by the
Department and such ‘‘case law’’ consists of cases from
the State of California and the State of Oregon construing
statutes of those states which are different from those con-
tained in the Montana Corporation License Tax Act. It is
the opinion of this Court that the Department of Revenne
must, for the taxable years here in question, find its au-
thority to combine or consolidate the income of affiliated
corporations under the provisions of Section 84-1509, R. C.
M. 1947, and the State Tax Appeal Board, having deter-
mined that this section does not require the combination
or consolidation of the respondent with its affiliated cor-
porations, its decision must be affirmed.
Lastly, the Department of Revenue has filed herein an
Amended Petition to Present Additional Evidence. There
has been no satisfactory reason advanced by the Depart-
36a
ment for failure to present the evidence before the State
Tax Appeal Board. (See Section 82-4216 as amended.) Ad-
ditionally such evidence is irrelevant in view of this Court’s
opinion as to the law under which the American Smelting
and Refining Company is to be taxed for the years in
question.
Conc.Lusions or Law
I.
That the Findings of Fact, Conelusions of Law and Or-
der of the State Tax Appeal Board of the State of Mon-
tana so made on the 14th day of March, 1974, constituting
its final decision, should be by this Court affirmed in all
respects.
II.
That the application of the appellant, Department of
Revenue, for leave to introduce additional evidence should
be denied.
III.
That pursuant to Section 84-1503, R. C. M. as effective for
the taxable years 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970, the Depart-
ment of Revenue had the authority to adopt rules and reg-
ulations only with respect to the ‘‘apportionment’’ of in-
come which could not be properly segregated as to source.
The Department of Revenue of the State of Montana had
no authority under this section to adopt regulations which
attempted to define source of income or to define unitary
business or unitary operation.
IV.
That Section 84-1503, R.C.M. 1947, for the taxable years
in question, required that the Department of Revenue al-
low a taxpayer upon satisfactory evidence to separately
account for income from sources within the State of Mon-
37a
tana and income from sources without the State of Mon-
tana.
V.
That Section 84-1509, R. C. M. 1947, is the only provision
of the Corporation License Tax Act applicable for the tax-
able years 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970 which contains a defi-
nition of unitary business operation or deals with the re-
quirement of consolidated or combined returns of income
between related corporations. That the definition of unitary
‘business operation therein contained requires that one busi-
ness operation be so conducted by the corporation and the
affiliated group that they are interrelated or interdepend-
ent to the extent that the net income of one corporation
cannot be reasonably determined without reference to the
operations conducted by the other corporations.
VI.
That the State Tax Appeal Board correctly found and
determined that the respondent’s dividend income, rental
income, royalty income and income from gains on sale of
assets had been properly segregated and identified as to
its source within or without Montana under Section 84-
1503, R. C. M. 1947.
VII.
That the State Tax Appeal Board correctly found and
determined that all of the respondent's stocks, bonds, com-
mercial paper and other evidences of indebtedness are in-
vested in intangibles outside of the State of Montana ex-
cept as to those investments held in Montana and totally
allocated to Montana, and that all of such evidences of in-
debtedness are located outside of the State of Montana
and therefore such income having been identified as to
source was properly reported by respondent.
38a
VIII.
That the State Tax Appeal Board correctly found and
determined that the business operations conducted by the
respondent, American Smelting and Refining Company, and
the business operations conducted by its affiliated corpora-
tions are not interrelated or interdependent to the extent
that the net income of the respondent and any one or more
of its affiliated corporations cannot reasonably be deter-
mined without reference to the operations conducted by
the other companies and that the income of the affiliated
corporations had been properly reported by separate ac-
counting.
IX.
That the respondent, American Smelting and Refining
Company, properly reported its income for the taxable
years 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970 pursuant to the appro-
priate provisions of the Montana Corporation License Tax
Act as contained in Sections 84-1501, et seq., R.C.M. 1947.
JUDGMENT
Upon the foregoing Findings From The Record and
Conclusions of Law, the Court makes the following Judg-
ment:
Ir Is Heresy Orperep, Apsupcep and Decreep that the
final decision of the State Tax Appeal Board of the State
of Montana as contained in its Findings of Fact, Conclu-
sions of Law and Order’’, is in all respects by this Court
affirmed.
Dated this 17 day of December, 1975.
/s/ Peter G. MxLor
District Judge
39a
BEFORE THE STATE TAX APPEAL BOARD
OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
(Caption Omitted in Printing)
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
Hearing on the appeal of American SMELTING AND RerFtn-
Id Company, pursuant to Section 84-708, R. C. M. 1947, came
on regularly for hearing before the Board on January 7,
1974, at 10:00 a.m., in the City of Helena, Montana, from
a decision of the Department of Revenue denying Appel-
lant’s requested relief with respect to the combining or con-
solidating of affiliated corporations with Appellant for tax
purposes and refusing to set aside the deficiency assess-
ments levied against said Appellant based thereon and the
decision of the Department of Revenue in treating all of
Appellant’s income, regardless of source or nature, as allo-
catable by formula, contrary to the Corporation License Tax
Act of the State of Montana, and refusing to set aside the
deficiency assessments based thereon for the taxable years
1967, 1968, 1969, and 1970; the Appellant, American Smelt-
ing and Refining Company, appearing through its attorney,
George T. Bennett, Esq., of the firm of Hughes, Bennett
and Cain, Helena, Montana; and the Department of Rev-
enue being represented by Terry B. Cosgrove, Esq., Assist-
ant Tax Counsel; and the Board having heard the testi-
mony and having examined all of the evidence and briefs
offered by all parties, and the Board being fully advised in
the premises, does hereby make its Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Law and Order as follows:
Fixbixos or Fact
1. That the Appellant, American Smelting and Refin-
ing Company (ASARCO), is a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the State of New Jersey, and is
qualified to do and doing business in the State of Montana,
40a
and maintains its commercial domicile at 120 Broadway,
New York City, New York.
2. That the Appellant is engaged in the business of min-
ing, smelting, refining, manufacturing, buying and selling
non-ferrous metals and other minerals, and, in addition, re-
ceives income in the form of dividends, interest, patents,
royalties, mine royalties and gains from the sale of certain
properties.
3. That the following active companies are wholly
owned subsidiaries of the Appellant:
(a) ASARCO Developments (NZ) Ltd., a New Zea-
land corporation, engaged in the examination of
mining properties, principally for others, in New
Zealand;
(b) ASARCO Exploration Company of Canada, Ltd.,
a Canadian corporation, engaged in the examina-
tion of mining properties;
(e) ASARCO (Australia) Pty., Limited, an Austra-
lian corporation, engaged in the examination of
mining properties, principally for others, in Aus-
tralia;
(d) ASARCO International Corporation, a Delaware
corporation, engaged in the sale of ashestos fibre
produced by Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd.;
(e) ASARCO Mercantile Company, a Texas corpora-
tion, engaged in the purchase and sale of manu-
factured products, principally for ASARCO and
certain subsidiaries ;
(f) Bolivian Lead Corporation, a New York corpora-
tion, engaged in mining in Bolivia, South Amer-
ica;
(g) Compania American Smelting, S.A., a Chilean
corporation, engaged in the leasing of mineral
rights in Chile;
4la
(h) Enthone, Incorporated, a Connecticut corporation,
engaged in the manufacture and sale of metal and
other surface finishing chemicals and supplies;
(i) Federated Metals Canada Limited, a Canadian
corporation, engaged in producing chemicals in
Canada;
(j) International Metal Company, a New York cor-
poration, a dealer in concentrates and metals;
(k) Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., a Delaware corpo-
ration, engaged in mining of asbestos ore and the
production of asbestos fibre in Canada;
(1) Lone Star Lead Construction Corp., a New York
corporation, engaged as a contractor in construc-
tion of non-ferrous tank houses; and
(m) Northern Peru Mining Corporation, a Delaware
corporation, engaged in mining non-ferrous metals
in Peru.
4. That Appellant owns and operates a smelter in East
Helena, Montana, where it receives lead ores and concen-
trates from company mines as well as unrelated suppliers.
The Appellant’s East Helena, Montana, lead smelter ships
the refined lead product to other units of the Appellant for
further treatment and ultimate sale, and sells by-products
of its smelting operation. The Appellant also owns in Mon-
tana active and inactive mining properties.
5. That Appellant is a unitary business and files its Mon-
tana tax returns using the apportionment method.
6. That an audit was conducted of the books and records
of Appellant for the years 1967, 1968, 1969, and 970, by an
auditor of the Multistate Tax Commission.
7. That due to the audit conducted on the books and
records of Appellant that a deficiency assessment was
levied against Appellant for the years 1967, 1968, 1969,
42a
and 1970, in the amount of $409,145.07, of which $71,845.69
was interest, none of which has been paid.
8. That Appellant reported its income for Montana
Corporation License Tax purposes for the taxable years
1967 through 1970 in the following manner:
(a) Income from mine royalties consisting of the
Keystone Mine in the State of Colorado was allo-
cated to the State of Colorado;
(b) Income from patents and copyrights were allo-
cated to commercial domicile;
(c) Income from rental of housing units on mining
properties was allocated to the state where such
rental units are located;
(d) Interest income was allocated to the state of com-
mercial domicile ;
(e) Gains from sales of tangible properties were allo-
cated to the state of sale;
(f) Dividends paid on stocks were allocated to state
of commercial domicile; and
(g) All other income was apportioned by the formula
prescribed by Section 84-1503. R.C.M. 1947.
9. That the Corporation License Tax Bureau of the
Department of Revenue, in making the deficiency assess-
ment as set forth in Exhibit E“, included all income of
the Appellant, and by Federated Metals of Canada,
ASARCO Mercantile Company, Enthone, Inc., Interna-
tional Metal Company, Lone Star Lead Construction Corp.,
and Northern Peru Mining Corporation; and treated all
of such income as apportionable by formulae whereby
there was apportioned to the State of Montana an allo-
cated part based on the relationship between the tangible
property, sales, and payroll, with respect to the Montana
operation, in relation to the total operations.
43a
10. That, with the exception of securities deposited with
various state agencies and monies deposited locally in the
State of Montana, the income from which have been allo-
cated to the State of Montana, all of the Appellant’s
stocks, bonds, commercial paper and other evidences of
indebtedness are invested in intangibles outside of the
State of Montana and all of such evidences of indebted-
ness are located outside of the State of Montana.
11. That all of the Appellant’s income from mine royal-
ties, patents, copyrights, rental, interest, dividends and
gains upon sales of tangible or intangible properties, can
be properly segregated as to sources within and sources
without the State of Montana.
12. That the business operations conducted by the Ap-
pellant and the business operations conducted by its affili-
ated corporations are not interrelated or interdependent
to the extent that the net income of the Appellant and any
one or more of its affiliated corporations cannot reasonably
be determined without reference to the operations conducted
by the other companies and that the income of the affiliated
corporations has been properly reported by separate ac-
counting.
13. That the Appellant for a number of years has owned
common stock of General Cable Corporation. That, pursu-
ant to a Consent Decree entered by the United States Dis-
trict Court on March 15, 1967, in a proceeding commenced
by the Anti-Trust Division of the Justice Department, the
Appellant and General Cable Corporation were enjoined
from having a director or officer who was at the same time
a director, officer or employee of the other, and that the
Appellant give a proxy covering its stock holdings to the
persons designated by General Cable’s board of directors
prior to any stockholders’ meeting. On July 24, 1970, the
Consent Decree was modified to require complete divesti-
ture by Appellant of all of its common stockholdings of
General Cable Corporation. Pursuant thereto, Appellant
did sell such stock in the taxable year 1970.
44a
ConcLusions or Law
1. That the gain upon the sale by Appellant of its shares
of common stock of General Cable Corporation was income
derived from a forced sale and was not income from a sale
in the regular course of Appellant’s trade or business.
2. That as to those matters on appeal to this Board, the
Appellant properly reported all of its income from mine
royalties, patents, copyrights, rental, interest, dividends
and gains upon sale of tangible or intangible properties
and properly allocated such income to sources within and
without the State of Montana.
3. That Appellant properly reported all of its income
from its integrated mining, smelting and refining business,
and properly apportioned to the State of Montana the
proper portion thereof under appropriate formulae as to
those matters on appeal to this Board.
4. That all Appellant’s income as to those matters on
appeal to this Board was properly reported, allocated and
apportioned in accordance with the Montana Corporation
License Tax Act effective for the taxable years in ques-
tion.
5. That the Appellant cannot be required to file com-
bined or consolidated reports with any affiliated corpora-
tion.
ORDER
Based on the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, Ir Is Heresy Onperep:
1. That the Taxpayer’s appeal from the decision of the
Department of Revenue is granted.
2. That the Corporation License Tax Bureau of the De-
partment of Revenue recompute the deficiency assessment
for the taxable years 1967, 1968, 1969, and 1970, in accord-
ance with the Corporation License Tax Returns filed by
45a
Appellant (Exhibits ‘‘A’’ to D') and render a statement
to the Appellant for such taxes and interest thereon to
date as and for the Appellant’s liability, subject, however,
to the adjustments hereafter mentioned, which were or-
dered by the Department of Revenue following its hearing
in this matter and which were not « part of this appeal:
(a) Adjustment for the value of the Block P Mine in
the property factor;
(b) Adjustment for property in bonded warehouses;
(c) Adjustment for inventory in transit;
(d) Adjustment for payments of tax made by Tax-
payer as a result of Federal audit; and
(e) Adjustments necessary by reason of the Federal
audit for taxable year 1969.
3. Subject to the above, and subject to the 1970 Federal
audit, the deficiencies for all taxable years in question are
hereby set aside and vacated.
Datep this 14th day of March, 1974.
By Orper oF THE
Srate Tax Appeat Boarp
/s/ Ray J. Wayrynen
Ray J. Wayrynen, Chairman
/3/ Heven M. Peterson
Helen M. Peterson, Member
Member J. Monz Cooper dissenting:
I dissent.
/3/ J. Mom Coorer
J. Morley Cooper, Member
ATTEST :
/s/ Vernon B. Muze
Vernon B. Miller, Secretary
46a
APPENDIX B
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF MONTANA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LEWIS AND
CLARK
Montana DepaRTMENT oF Revenue, of the State of
Montana, Petitioner,
-Vs-
AMERICAN SMELTING AND Rerininc Company, Respondent.
No. 37750
Judgment on Remittitur
(Filed August 18, 1977)
Tuts Action came on regularly for hearing before this
Court, the Petitioner, Montana Department of Revenue,
appeared in this matter by Theodore W. deLooze, Special
Assistant Attorney General, and Terry B. Cosgrove, Spe-
cial Assistant Attorney General, the Respondent, American
Smelting and Refining Company appeared by its attorney,
George T. Bennett of the firm of Hughes, Bennett & Cain.
The matter having been fully briefed and twice orally
argued to the Court, the Court entered Findings From the
Record, Opinion, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, on
the 17th day of December, 1975, in favor of the Respond-
ent.
That Order was appealed to the Montana Supreme
Court, after the filing of briefs and oral argument, the
said Montana Supreme Court reversed the Judgment and
47a
a Remittitur was issued by the Clerk of the Montana Su-
preme Court on the llth day of August, 1977, and this
Court was directed to enter Judgment in favor of the
Petitioner.
Wauenrerore, by virtue of the law and by reason of the
premises aforesaid, It Is OnpEreEp, AJuDGED AND DEcREED
AND Tus Dogs Orper, A upon A&D Decree that the Re-
spondent, American Smelting and Refining Company, is
ordered to pay to the Petitioner, Montana Department of
Revenue, $497,776.47, plus interest, as provided by law, and
that Petitioner have execution therefore.
Done anv Daten TRIAS 18 or Aveust, 1977.
75s, Jm C. Meoy
District Judge
48a
APPENDIX C
In Tue Districr Court For Tue Fer Juicer.
Districr Or TRR State Or Montana, In Anp For
Tue County Or Lewis Anp CLARK
Civil No. 37750
Montana DEPARTMENT OF Revenut, State or Montana,
Petitioner,
s-
ASARCO Incorporatep (formerly THe AMERICAN
Sme.tinc Anp Rerininc Company), Respondent.
Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court
of the United States
Notice is hereby given that the Respondent above-named,
ASARCO Incorporated (formerly The American Smelt-
in and Refining Company), hereby appeals to the Su-
preme Court of the United States from the final judg-
ment, opinion and order of the Supreme Court of the
State of Montana, reversing the judgment of the Dis-
trict Court of the First Judicial District, and from the
order denying petition for rehearing, entered in this action
on August 11, 1977.
This appeal is taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1257(2).
/s/ Grorce T. Bennett
George T. Bennett
Counsel for Respondent
(Affidavit Of Service Omitted In Printing)
49a
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF MONTANA
Cause No. 13249
Montana DepartTMENT Or RevENvE
Or TRR State Or Montana,
Petitioner and Appellant,
S-
ASARCO Incorporatep (formerly THe AMERICAN
Smeitine AND Rerinina Company),
Defendant and Respondent.
Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court
of the United States
(Filed October 6, 1977)
/8/ Ricuarp T. Consoy
Richard T. Conboy
Deputy Clerk of Supreme Court
Helena, Montana
Notice is hereby given that the Defendant and Re-
spondent above-named, ASARCO Incorporated (formerly
The American Smelting and Refining Company), hereby
appeals to the Supreme Court of the United States from
the final judgment, opinion and order of the Supreme
Court of the State of Montana, reversing the judgment
oi the District Court of the First Judicial District, and
from the order denying petition for rehearing, entered
in this action on August 11, 1977.
50a
This appeal is taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2).
7s, Grorce T. Bennett
George T. Bennett
Counsel for Defendant and Respondent
(Affidavit Of Service Omitted In Printing)
51a
APPENDIX D
Section 84-1503, Revised Code of Montana 1947:
If the income of any corporation from sources
within the state cannot be properly segregated from
income without the state, then, in that event, the
amount ot the net income returned shall be that pro-
portion of the taxpayer’s total net income which the
taxpayer’s gross business done in the state of Mon-
tana bears to the total gross business of the taxpayer,
and apportionment shall be made under the rules
and regulations prescribed by the state board of
equalization, giving consideration to sales, property
and payroll and such other factors as may be deemed
applicable; provided, however, that the state board
of equalization shall, upon the presentation of satis-
factory evidence, determine that the income from
sources within the state of Montana may be properly
segregated from income from sources without the
state of Montana and shall allow separate account-
ing. The board shall publish not less than once a year,
all rules and regulations pertaining to this section.
All decisions by the board under this section shall
be subject to judicial review in an action prosecuted
by the corporation in the district court of Lewis and
Clark county. The taxpayer cannot change from one
method of accounting to another method of account-
ing without first obtaining permission from the
board.“
Amended Regulation (Chapter 10) Adopted December 30, 1966.
Effective With Respect to Taxable Years Beginning on or After
January 1, 1967.
1001. General. When the income of a corporation sub-
ject to this tax is derived from or attributable to sources
both within and without Montana, the tax is measured
by the total net income derived from or attributable to
52a
sources within Montana, and the corporation shall al-
locate and apportion its income as provided in this chap-
ter of these regulations. It is the intent of regulations
1002 through 1019 to adopt the principles embodied in
the ‘‘Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes
Act’’, and they shall be so construed.
A corporation engaged in a ‘‘unitary’’ business opera-
tion within and without Montana must apportion its busi-
ness income as provided for under section 1010. A busi-
ness is unitary when the operation of the business with-
in the state is dependent upon or contributory to the
operation of the business outside the state or if the units
of the business within and without the state are closely
allied and not capable of separate maintenance as inde-
pendent businesses.
A corporation not engaged in a unitary business opera-
tion must allocate its business income by means of
separate accounting methods as provided for under sec-
tion 1020; provided, its books and records are so kept
that the income and expense attributable to business
operations within the state can be properly segregated
from total income and expense. If the corporation’s books
and records do not permit such proper segregation, its
business income must be apportioned according to the
provisions of section 1010.
1002. Definitions. As used in this chapter of these regu-
lations, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) ‘‘Business income’’ means income arising from
transactions and activity in the regular course of the
taxpayer’s trade or business and includes income from
tangible and intangible property if the acquisition, man-
agement, and disposition of the property constitute inte-
gral parts of the taxpayer’s regular trade or business
operations.
53a
(b) ‘‘Commercial domicile’’ means the principal place
from which the trade or business of the taxpayer is di-
rected or managed.
(e) ‘*Compensation’’ means wages, salaries, commis-
sions and any other form of remuneration paid to em-
ployees for personal services.
(d) ‘‘Non-business income means all income other
than business income.
(e) ‘‘Sales’’ means all gross receipts of the taxpayer
not allocated under sections 1005 through 1009 of these
regulations.
(f) State“ means any state of the United States, the
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
any territory or possession of the United States, and any
foreign country or political subdivision thereof.
1003. Any corporation having income from business ac-
tivity which is taxable both within and without this state
shall allocate and apportion its net income as provided
in this chapter of these regulations.
1004. For purposes of allocation and apportionment of
income under this chapter of these regulations, a corpora-
tion is taxable in another state if (1) in that state it is
subject to a net income tax, a franchise tax measured by
net income, a franchise tax for the privilege of doing
business, or a corporate stock tax, or (2) that state has
jurisdiction to subject the corporation to a net income
tax regardless of whether, in fact, the state does or does
not.
1005. Rents and royalties from real or tangible personal
property, capital gains, interest, dividends, or patent or
copyright royalties, to the extent that they constitute
nonbusiness income, shall be allocated as provided in
section 1006 through 1009 of this chapter of these regu-
lations.
54a
1006. (a) Net rents and royalties from real property
located in this state are allocable to this state.
(b) Net rents and royalties from tangible personal
property are allocable to this state:
(1) if and to the extent that the property is utilized
in this state, or
(2) in their entirety if the taxpayer’s commercial
domicile is in this state and the taxpayer is not
organized under the laws of or taxable in the
state in which the property is utilized.
(c) The extent of utilization of tangible personal prop-
erty in a state is determined by multiplying the rents and
royalties by a fraction, the numerator of which is the
number of days of physical location of the property in
the state during the rental or royalty period in the tax-
able year and the denominator of which is the number of
days of physical location of the property everywhere
during all rental or royalty periods in the taxable year.
If the physical location of the property during the rent-
al or royalty period is unknown or unascertainable by the
taxpayer, tangible personal property is utilized in the
state in which the property was located at the time the
rental or royalty payer obtained possession.
1007.
(a) Capital gains and losses from sales or other dis-
positions of real property located in this state are al-
locable to this state.
(b) Capital gains and losses from sales or other dis-
positions of tangible personal property are allocable to
this state if:
(1) the property had a situs in this state at the time
of the sale or other disposition, or
55a
(2) the taxpayer’s commercial domicile is in this
state and the taxpayer is not taxable in the
state in which the property had a situs.
(c) Capital gains and losses from sales or other dis-
positions of intangible personal property are allocable
to this state if the taxpayer’s commercial domicile is in
this state.
1008. Interest and dividends are allocable to this state
if the taxpayer’s commercial domicile is in this state.
1009.
(a) Patent and copyright royalties are allocable to this
state:
(1) if and to the extent that the patent or copyright
is utilized by the payer in a state in which the
taxpayer is not taxable and the taxpayer’s com-
mercial domicile is in this state.
(b) A patent is utilized in a state to the extent that it
is employed in production, fabrication, manufacturing, or
other processing in the state or to the extent that a
patented product is produced in the state. If the basis of
receipts from patent royalties does not permit allocation
to states or if the accounting procedures do not reflect
states of utilization, the patent is utilized in the state in
which the taxpayer’s commercial domicile is located.
(c) A copyright is utilized in a state to the extent that
printing or other publication originates in the state. If the
basis of receipts from copyright royalties does not permit
allocation to states or if the accounting procedures do not
reflect states of utilization, the copyright is utilized in the
state in which the taxpayer’s commercial domicile is
located.
1010. All business income shall be apportioned to this
state by multiplying the income by a fraction, the numer-
56a
ator of which is the property factor plus the payroll factor
plus the sales factor, and the denominator of which is
three.
1011. The property factor is a fraction, the numerator
of which is the average value of the taxpayer’s real and
tangible personal property owned or rented and used in
this state in the production of business income during the
tax period and the denominator of which is the average
value of all the taxpayer’s real and tangible personal
property owned or rented and used in the production of
business income during the tax period.
1012. Property owned by the taxpayer is valued at its
original cost. Property rented by the taxpayer is valued
at eight times the net annual rental rate. Net annual
rental rate is the annual rental rate paid by the taxpayer
less any annual rental rate received by the taxpayer from
sub-rentals.
1013. The average value of property shall be determined
by averaging the values at the beginning and ending of
the tax period but the State Board of Equalization may
require to reflect properly the average value of the tax-
payer’s property.
1014. The payroll factor is a fraction, the numerator of
which is the total amount paid in thie state during the tax
period by the taxpayer for compensation related to busi-
ness income, and the denominator of which is the total
compensation related to business income paid everywhere
during the tax period.
1015. Compensation is paid in this state if;
(a) the individual’s service is performed entirely with-
in the state; or
(b) the individual’s service is performed both within
and without the state, but the service performed with-
57a
out the state is incidental to the individual’s service
within the state; or
(e) some of the service is performed in the state and
(1) the base of operations or, if there is no base of
operations, the place from which the service is directed
or controlied is in the state or (2) the base of operations
or the place from which the service is directed or con-
trolled is not in any state in which some part of the
service is performed, but the individual’s residence is in
this state.
1016. The sales factor is a fraction, the numerator of
which is the total sales of the taxpayer in this state
during the tax period, and the denominator of which is
the total sales of the taxpayer everywhere during the
tax period.
1017. Sales of tangible personal property are in this
state if:
(a) the property is delivered or shipped to a pur-
chaser, other than the United States government, within
this state regardless of the f.o.b. point or other conditions
of the sale; or
(b) the property is shipped from an office, store, ware-
house, factory, or other place of storage in this state and
(1) the purchaser is the United States government, or
(2) the taxpayer is not taxable in the state of the pur-
chaser.
1018. Sales, other than sales of tangible personal prop-
erty, are in this state if:
(a) the income-producing activity is performed in this
state; or
(b) the income-producing activity is performed both
in and outside this state and a greater proportion of the
income-producing activity is performed in this state than
in any other atate, based on costs of performance.
58a
1019. If the allocation and apportionment provisions of
sections 1002 through 1018 of this chapter of these regu-
lations do not fairly represent the extent of the tax-
payer’s business activity in this state, the taxpayer may
petition for or the State Board of Equalization may re-
quire, in respect to all or any part of the taxpayer’s
business activity, if reasonable:
(a) separate accounting, if permitted within the scope
of section 1001 of this chapter of these regulations;
(b) the exclusion of any one or more of the factors;
(e) the inclusion of one or more additional factors
which will fairly represent the taxpayer’s business ac-
tivity in this state; or
(d) the employment of any other method to effectuate
an equitable allocation and apportionment of the tax-
payer’s income.
1020. Use of Separate Accounting Method. in applying
the separate accounting method, each item of income is
segregated and directly allocated according to its source.
Any expense or other deductible items, including a rea-
sonable allowance for general overhead expenses, attribut-
able to the earning of such income are likewise segre-
gated and deducted from such income. Items of nonbusi-
ness income are to be allocated as provided for under
sections 1005 through 1009 of this chapter of these regu-
lations.
59a
13249
No. 37750
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF MONTANA
Montana DEeparTMENT oF Revenue, State or Montana,
Petitioner-Appellant,
V.
TRR AMERICAN SMELTING AND Rerintne Company,
Defendant-Respondent
Appellant's Brief
Appellant’s Brief on Appeal from the District Court of
the First Judicial District of the State of Montana,
in and for the County of Lewis and Clark. '
Txropore W. de Looze
Special Assistant Attorney General
Depariment of Justice
State Office Building
Salem, Oregon 97310
Terry B. Coscrove
Special Assistant Attorney General
P. O. Box 1144
Helena, Montana 59601
Attorneys for Petitioner-Appellant
Georce T. Bennetr
Hueues, Bennett & Cain
406 Fuller Avenue
Helena, Montana 59601
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
60a
(11)
4. Tax consequences of Department’s action.
Each action of the Department: (1) Adding back into
apportionable income, dividends, interest, royalties, rents
and gains from the sale of properties: and (2) Com-
bining the net income of ASARCO and its six unitary
subsidiaries without regard to such add backs may be
considered separately. The following figures show:
1. Income from Montana sources as reported by
ASARCO.
2. Income from Montana sources arrived at by adding
back business income into apportionable income.
3. Income om Montana sources apportioning the com-
bined net income of ASARCO and its six unitary subsidi-
aries.
4. Income from Montana sources by apportioning the
total combined net income of the unitary corporations,
including the added back business income. As to the fol-
lowing figures demonstrate, for two of the four years
combination by itself is a tax gain to the taxpayer and
tax loss to Montana. The bulk of the tax effect of the
Department’s [12] action is in adding back into appor-
tionable income that income determined by the Depart-
ment to be business income and apportionable under its
1967 regulations. Figures for each of the years are as
follows:
1967
1. Reported income. $ 277,832
2. Adding back business income. 1,029,035
3. Combined reporting only. 265,563
4. Adding back business income and
combining. 972,092
6la
1968
1. Reported income. 6,981
2. Adding back business income. 1,176,823
3. Combined reporting only. 120,093
4. Adding back business income and
combining. 1,125,987
1969
1. Reported income. 306,064
2. Adding back business income. 1,885,233
3. Combined reporting only. 346,702
4. Adding back business income and
combining. 1,827,489
1970
1. Reported income. (2,421)
2. Adding back business income. 2,381,685
3. Combined reporting only. (125,322)
4. Adding back business income and
combining. 2,280,491
0 6 *
[48]
* * *
Section 84-1509 R. C. M., 1947 provides for consolidation
of corporations and not the combined method of reporting.
The lower court’s rejection of combination is in part on
the grounds that Section 84-1509 is the controlling statute.
The court stated that the legislature had addressed itself
to the problem ‘‘of the combining or consolidating of in-
come of affiliated corporations, and this section being the
only section in the Montana corporation license tax which
62a
deals with affiliated corporations, it is controlling.’’ (Opin-
ion, p. 15). Section 84-1509 R.C.M., 1947 deals solely with
the determination of the tax liability of the number of
corporations which are affiliated, where all of the corpora-
tions have a tax liability to the State of Montana. Other-
wise, there could be no statutory authority for the pro-
vision in that statute to apportion the liability to the re-
spective affiliated corporations. If Montana had no juris-
diction, how could the liability be enforced? In the instant
case what is being used is an accounting method to deter-
mine the tax liability of the single corporation, ASARCO.
Since the six corporations being combined with ASARCO
are not subject to the jurisdiction of Montana, in no way
could Montana constitutionally consolidate [49] ASARCO
with its wholly-owned subsidiaries under Section 84-1509
R.C.M., 1947. This, the district court did not understand. In
a consolidaticn, a portion of the income of each corporation
in the group of corporations is being taxed. In the combina-
tion, only that part of the entire net income of the group
which is attributable to the ONE corporation over which
the state has jurisdiction, is taxed. In a consolidation, the
property, payroll and sales located in Montana of each
member of the group are in the numerators of the appor-
tionment factors. In combination, the numerators are from
only one corporation. The apportionment factors in each
case include in the denominators the entire property, the
entire payroll, and the entire sales of the combined group.
Suppose that Montana wished to consolidate the net in-
come of Union Pacific Railroad Company, a holding com-
pany, and its three subsidiaries, one a railroad operation,
one an oil exploration, and one a real estate operation. If
Montana had jurisdiction to tax all three corporations, it
could consolidate the net income of all four corporations.
It would then be determining the combined income of the
consolidated group.
63a
In the instant case we are determining the income of
ASARCO, a single corporation, by apportioning the com-
bined income of it and related corporations. There is no
tax jurisdiction over the affiliates.
64a
APPENDIX F
BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE
OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
In THE Marrer or THE Protest or AMERICAN SMELTING &
Rerininc Company, a New Jersey corporation.
Frotest of Proposed Deficiency Assessments Montana
Corporation License Tax—Taxable Years
1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970
Comes now American Sme.tine & Rerininc Company, a
New Jersey corporation, and for its protest of proposed
deficiency assessments of Montana Corporation License
Tax for the taxable years 1967, 1968, 1969, and 1970, states
as follows:
1. That your Protestanc, American Sme!ting & Refining
Company, hereinafter referred to as ‘‘Taxpayer’’, is a cor-
poration organized under the laws of the State of New
Jersey with its principal place of business located at 120
Broadway, New York, New York, and that it is engaged
in the business of mining, smelting, refining, manufactur-
ing, buying and selling non-ferrous metals, metaliferous
and other mineral products. That Taxpayer is engaged
in the business in the State of Montana of operating a lead
smelter in East Helena, Lewis and Clark County, and
holding currently idle minerals lands.
2. That as a corporation organized and existing under
the laws of another state and having its principal place of
business and corporate domicile outside of the State of
Montana, Taxpayer has, for many years last past, includ-
ing the taxable years 1967, 1968, 1969, and 1970, reported
its total net income from all sources within the State of
Montana and paid a percentage license fee thereon, all as
required by law.
65a
3. That Taxpayer has, as aforesaid, filed the necessary
returns for corporation license tax purposes showing its
total net income received from sources within the State of
Montana and has fully paid the tax thereon including all
tax due with respect to the years 1967, 1968, 1969, and
1970. That, notwithstanding the foregoing, the Corporation
Tax Bureau of the Department of Revenue of the State of
Montana has proposed deficiency assessments for the years
1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970 as more particularly set forth
in the letter (with attached schedules) of R. L. Kerns,
Auditor, Corporation Tax Bureau, dated March 5, 1973,
the same being hereunto attached as Exhibit ‘‘A’’ and by
this reference made a part of this Protest.
4. That as to Taxpayer, pursuant to Section 84-1503,
RCM, the Department of Revenue (and previously the
State Board of Equalization) has determined the income
accruing from sources within the Siate of Montana pursu-
ant to a formula and factors adopted by rules and regula-
tions prescribed by said state agency, and this Taxpayer
has properly reported all such income and paid the corpo-
ration license tax thereon in accordance with such rules
and regulations, formulae and factors for all years through
and including 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970. That the proposed
deficiency assessments as contained in Exhibit A“ here-
to constitutes an illegal and unlawful departure from the
rules and regulations prescribed by the State Board of
Equalization (now the Department of Revenue) pursuant
to said Section 84-1503, RCM, and constitutes an illegal
and unlawful attempt to impose corporation license tax
upon income having no relationship to the Montana activi-
ties or the value of the privilege of doing business in Mon-
tana of and by this Taxpayer ard has no reasonable rela-
tionship to corporate activities within the State of Montana
conducted by Taxpayer; and constitutes an illegal and un-
lawful attempt to impose a corporation license tax upon
income from interest, dividends, royalties, rentals and the
sale of capital assets not arising from transactions or ac-
66a
tivities in the regular course of Taxpayer’s trade or busi-
ness or the corporate activities of Taxpayer within the
State of Montana.
5. That Taxpayer is informed and on such information
states that the proposed deficiency assessments as con-
tained in Exhibit ‘‘A’’ hereto are based upon audits,
studies, formulae and factors adopted by the Multistate
Tax Commission, which said Multistate Tax Compact is
void and illegal by reason of conflict with Article I, Sec-
tion 10, Clause 3 of the Constitution of the United States,
which provides in pertinent part that ‘‘No state shall,
without the consent of Congress, .. enter into any agree-
ment or compact with another state or with a foreign
power . .; and the Congress of the United States has
never consented to a Multistate Tax Compact. In addition,
said attempted and purported assessments of deficiency
(Exhibit A“ hereto) are illegal, as attempted to be ap-
plied to this Tapayer, for the reason that pursuant to
Article III of the Multistate Tax Compact, as adopted in
the State of Montana by Section 84-6701, by Paragraph 1
of said Article III, it is provided that the taxpayer may
elect to apportion and allocate income in the manner pro-
vided by the laws of the State of Montana or may elect to
apportion and allocate in accordance with Article IV of
said Multistate Tax Compact. That your Taxpayer has
never elected to apportion and allocate income in accord-
ance with Article IV of said Multistate Tax Compact but,
to the contrary, has elected to apportion and allocate in-
come in the manner provided by the Corporation License
Tax Act of the State of Montana, being Sections 84-1501,
et seq, RCM. ’
6. That after receipt of the deficiency assesments as con-
tained in Exhibit ‘‘A’’ hereto, the Taxpayer, acting by and
through its duly authorized attorneys, requested a copy of
the audits conducted by the Multistate Tax Commission
upon which said deficiency assessments were based, and
67a
said attorneys were informed of the existence of said
audits by Mr. R. L. Kerns, Auditor, Corporation Tax
Bureau, and Mr. Gerald L. Foster, Chief Auditor, Corpo-
ration Tax Bureau, and further informed that copies of
said audits would not be furnished to Taxpayer’s said
attorneys. That by reason of the refusal of the Corpora-
tion Tax Bureau of the Department of Revenue to furnish
said audits so made by the Multistate Tax Commission,
this Taxpayer cannot fully ascertain the manner in which
said deficiency assessments (Exhibit ‘‘A’’ hereto) were
prepared and cannot fully ascertain what items of income,
deduction, apportionment or otherwise were used in arriv-
ing at said deficiency assessments.
7. That the Corporation Tax Bureau of the Department
of Revenue, in authorizing the auditors of the Multistate
Tax Commission to act as agents of the State of Montana,
has unlawfully and illegally delegated to unauthorized per-
sons the right to make tax examinations and audits on be-
half of the State of Montana; and, further, in attempting
to assert the deficiency assessments, Exhibit ‘‘A’’ hereto,
has acted illegally and in excess of the authority granted
by the Corporation License Tax Act of the State of Mon-
tana; has attempted to act under the purported authority
of the Multistate Tax Compact (Section 84-6701, RCM)
even though Congress has not authorized said Compact;
and has attempted to force upon Taxpayer an election to
appropriate and allocate income in accordance with Article
IV of the Multistate Tax Compact even though Taxpayer
has made no such election.
8. That, asserting against this Taxpayer said deficiency
assessments (Exhibit ‘‘A’’ hereto) constitutes, as to this
Taxpayer, a denial of due process of law and of equal
protection of law in that this Taxpayer sannot ascertain
from the deficiency assessments so made (Exhibit ‘‘A’’
hereto) upon what factors, items of income, apportionment
and other matters the deficiency assessmen 4 are proposed;
68a
and that by the refusal of the Corporation Tax Bureau of
the Department of Revenue to furnish Taxpayer with a
copy of said audits this Taxpayer cannot properly pre-
pare its Protest and is thereby further denied due process
of law and equal protection of law.
9. That Taxpayer is informed and believes that by said
deficiency assessments (Exhibit ‘‘A’’ hereto) the State
of Montana is attempting, contrary to law, to classify the
Taxpayer and six other corporations, as one unitary busi-
ness for Montana Corporation License Tax purposes con-
trary to Section 84-1509, RCM.
10. That Taxpayer is informed and therefore states that
by said deficiency assessments (Exhibit A“ hereto, the
State of Montana illegally and unlawfully attempts to allo-
cate rents, royalties from real or tangible personal prop-
erty, capital gains, interest, dividends, patent or copy-
wright royalties and other income to the State of Montana
although the same does not constitute business income, did
not arise from transactions and activity in the regular
course of Taxpayer’s trade or business, and bears no rea-
sonable relationship to the corporate activities of Tax-
payer within the State of Montana or to the privilege of
doing business within the State of Montana which is the
subject of taxation under the Corporation License Tax
Act of the State of Montana.
11. That Taxpayer is informed and therefore states that
by said deficiency assessments (Exhibit ‘‘A’’ hereto) the
State of Montana has purported to apply the provisions
of Section 482, Internal Revenue Code, as to allocation of
income and deduction to the Taxpayer and certain corpo-
rations, all without authority of law.
12. That Taxpayer is informed and therefore states that
by said deficiency assessments (Exhibit ‘‘A’’ hereto) the
State of Montana has illegally and unlawfully attempted
to apply Section 78 of the Internal Revenue Code with re-
spect to dividends received by Taxpayer or other corpo-
69a
rations and to thereby include in gross income not only
the actual dividends so received but also the foreign taxes
deemed to have been paid by virtue of having received
such dividends commonly known as ‘‘Gross-up of Divi-
dends’’.
13. That Taxpayer is informed and therefore states that
by such deficiency assessments (Exhibit ‘‘A’’) there has
been an attempt to allocate to Montana, by some formula,
income or claimed income which should not properly be so
allocated and that there is no relationship between the
property, payroll and sales of the Taxpayer and the in-
come or claimed income attempted to be allocated to the
State of Montana; and that not only has there been an
attempt to allocate unitary income, but also income of a
dual or multiform nature and upon a basis which does not
recognize the actual activities in furtherance of the busi-
ness of the Taxpayer.
14. That the illegal and unlawful attempt by the Cor-
poration Tax Bureau to apportion to the State of Montana
income as aforesaid constitutes an illegal and unlawful
burden upon interstate commerce.
Wuenrerore, having protested said deficiency assessments
(Exhibit ‘‘A’’ hereto), your Taxpayer prays that the De-
partment of Revenue set aside all of such deficiencies and
interest thereon and find and determine that the Tax-
payer has properly reported for all of said years its in-
come from sources within the State of Montana and prop-
erly paid a tax thereon and that said purported and pre-
tended deficiencies are null and void,
On, In Tue Atrernattves, that the Department of Rev-
enue: (a) order the Corporation Tax Bureau to furnish
the Taxpayer with all copies of all audits and other infor-
mation upon which said deficiency assessments (Exhibit
„A“ hereto) were made, including, without limitation, all
audits and other information furnished by the Multistate
70a
Tax Commission, and (b) that thereafter the Department
of Revenue hold a hearing upon this Protest and that at
such time the Taxpayer be allowed an opportunity to pre-
sent additional evidence relating tc its tax liability.
Respectfully submitted this 4th day of April, 1973.
American Smettina & RHINO Compary,
a New Jersey corporation
Alexander J. Gillespie, Jr.
Vice President and General Counsel
120 Broadway
New York, New York 10005
Hughes, Bennett & Cain
/s/ By Gon T. Bennett
George T. Bennett
406 Fuller Avenue
Helena, Montana 59601
Attorneys for Taxpayer
Recervep and Fmezp this 4th day of April, 1973.
DepPaRTMENT OF REVENUE OF THB
State or Montana
By Board of Equal
Its Vernon Miller, Secretary
71a
APPENDIX G
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
Cause No. 13249
Montana DepartTMEnT OF REVENUE
or THE State or Montana,
Petitioner and Appellant,
V-
Tun American SMELTING AND RETI XING Company,
Defendant and Respondent.
Respondent's Petition for Rehearing With Argument and
Authorities Integrated Therein
Comes now the Defendant and Respondent, Taz ARI.
can SmeELtTiIne anp Rermvinc Company (ASARCO), and re-
spectfully petitions the Supreme Court of the State of
Montana for rehearing pursuant to Rule 34 of the Rules of
Appellate Civil Procedure on the grounds and for the rea-
sons that the decision of this Court made and entered on
the 11th day of July, 1977 should be reversed, altered,
amended or revised, because facts material to the decision
and questions decisive of the case submitted by counsel
were overlooked by the Court and that the decision is in
conflict with express statutes and controlling decisions to
which the attention of the Court was not directed.
[Material on pp. 2-19 of original document omitted. ]
Matrer Snort Be Remanvep For ConsipERATION OF
SupstTantTiaL Constitutional Quesiions Rarsep By
Pieapines AND OveRLOOKED By tHE Court
In its Protest to the Department of Revenue, ASARCO
alleged that imposition of the asserted tax deficiency would
72a
be contrary to the Commerce Clause and Due Process
Clause of the Federal Constitution. (See Protest, pp. 2,
3, 4, 5 and 6). Because STAB and the District Court held
that the proposed assessment was not proper as a matter
of Montana statutory law, they never reached the Federal
Constitutional issues in this case. Accordingly, even if this
Court decides that the matters discussed above do not war-
rant reconsideration, the case should still be remanded to
permit full development of the facts and legal arguments
bearing on the important constitutional issues raised by
the Protest.
In particular, the case should be remanded for the fol-
lowing reasons:
1. Status of the Multistate Tax Compact: The audit
giving rise to the proposed tax adjustment in this case was
conducted by auditors of the Multistate Tax Commission,
purporting to act under the authority of the Multistate
Tax Compact. (See STAB Findings, Paragraph 6; District
Court Findings, Paragraph 6; Petitioner-Appellant’s
Brief, p.3). The validity of the Multistate Tax Compact
under the Federal Constitution is now at issue in U.S.
Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission (U.S. Sup. Ot.
Dkt. No. 76-635, October Term, 1976) which is awaiting
oral argument in the United States Supreme Court. This
is a class action by U.S. Steel on behalf of all corporations
similarly situated which would include ASARCO. The
Montana taxing authorities were expressly made a party
(J. Morley Cooper, as Chairman of the State Board of
Equalization). For this Court’s convenience, a copy of the
appellant’s brief on the merits in the U.S. Steel case is
attached as Exhibit ‘‘B’’ to this petition. If the U.S. Su-
preme Court holds that the Multistate Tax Compact is un-
constitutional, grave questions will arise as to the validity
of the audit conducted in this case by the Multistate Tax
Commission. Accordingly, final judgment should not be
entered in the present case until STAB and the court be-
73a
low have had an opportunity to consider the impact of the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in the pending U.S. Steel
case,
2. Taxation of Passive Income from Property Outside
Montana. Grave constitutional questions are raised by this
Court’s decision that Montana has jurisdiction to tax divi-
dends, royalties, rents, interest, and gains on stock sales
realized by ASARCO from transactions occurring wholly
outside the State. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that
the interstate operations of a foreign corporation may be
subjected to state taxation only if ‘‘the levy is not discrimi-
natory and is properly apportioned to local activities with-
in the taxing state forming sufficient nexus to support the
same’’, Northwestern Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 US
450, 452 (1959) (emphasis added). It is clear that ‘‘the due
process clause denies to the state power to tax or regulate
the corporation’s property and activities elsewhere’’. Con-
necticut General Life Insurance Co. u. Johnson, 303 US
77, 80-81 (1938). ‘‘ When, as in this case, there are different
taxing jurisdictions, . . . and the question is necessarily
one of apportionment, evidence may always be received to
show that a state has applied a method, which, albeit fair
on its face, operates so as to reach profits which are in no
just sense attributable to transactions within its jurisdic-
tion. Hans Rees’ Sons v. North Carolina ex rel. Mar-
well, 283 U.S. 123, 134 (1931) (emphasis added).
Applying these principles, at least two State Supreme
Courts have held that dividend income received by a cor-
poration in one state from subsidiaries operating entirely
in other states or foreign jurisdictions may not constitu-
tionally be included in the corporation’s apportionable net
income for purposes of computing its income tax liability
in the former state. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Clayton, 147 SE2
522 (Sup.Ct. N.C. 1966); Square D Company v. Kentucky
Board of Tax Appeals, 415 SW2 594 (Ct. of App. Ky.
1967). Similar considerations led Judge (later Mr. Justice)
74a
Cardozo to hold that the Federal Constitution precluded
New York from taxing a corporation doing business in
that state on any part of the interest income it earned on
bonds held outside the state. People ex rel. Alpha Portland
Cement Co. v. Knapp, 129 NE 202 (Ct. of App. N.Y. 1920).
At page 24 of the Department’s Brief, it is stated:
„Montana could not constitutionally tax ASARCO
if ASARCO did not have income from sources within
the state.“ (Emphasis supplied.)
Also at pages 48 and 49 of the Department’s brief appears
the following:
„Since the six corporations being combined with
ASARCO are not subject to the jurisdiction of Mon-
tana, in no way could Montana constitutionally con-
solidate ASARCO with its wholly-owned subsidiaries
under Section 84-1509 R.C.M., 1947.’’ (Emphasis sup-
plied.)
This Court, at page 13 of its opinion, states that the
case of Coca Cola Company v. Department of Revenue,
271 OR 517, 533 P2 788, is ‘‘on all fours with the instant
case“. This clearly indicates the Court’s misunderstanding
of this issue. In the Coca Cola case, both the parent cor-
poration and its subsidiary were doing business in Oregon,
were subject to Oregon’s jurisdiction, were deriving in-
come from Oregon sources, and, accordingly, both had
filed returns with Oregon (pp. 789 and 790 Pac.Rpts.). This
is far different from the situation with ASARCO where
the Department admits that none of the affiliated corpora-
tions are subject to the jurisdiction of the State of Mon-
tana and that ‘‘in no way could Montana constitutionally
consolidate ASARCO with its wholly-owned subsidiaries
How can this Court square its statement that:
75a
**DOR clearly has the authority to adopt rules and
regulations as to apportionment of corporate income
without regard to source. (Page 7.)
with the Department’s admission that to do so would be
unconstitutional (P. 24 of Appellant’s brief)?
While the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet passed on
the constitutionality of applying state income tax appor-
tionment statutes to passive income realized from out-of-
state property, the foregoing state decisions make it clear
that any attempt by a state to reach such income poses
serious constitutional questions, at the very least. As stated
in a recent leading article, which the Department cited
with approval in connection with another point in its brief
in this Court (p. 39):
. . . the specific allocation of investment income is
at least logically consistent with the proposition that a
state should only tax income from in-state sources.
Certainly, it would not square with the underlying
rational of the Supreme Court cases to subject such
income to formulary apportionment.’’ *
Since STAB and the District Court found it unnece
to reach this issue in their original consideration „“ ue
case, the case should be remanded and the record should
be reopened to determine whether, on the facts of this case,
the Montana statute as interpreted by this Court will re-
sult in ‘‘extra-territorial values being taxed’’. See Butler
Bros. v. McColg-m, 315 U.S. 501, 507 (1942).
3. Inclusion of Subsidiaries in the Tax Base. As inter-
preted by this Court, the Montana statute means that the
„net income and apportionment factors of six of
* Rudolph, ‘‘State Taxation of Interstate Business: The Unitary
Business Concept and Affiliated Corporate Groups’’, 25 Tax Law
Rev. 171, 185 (1970).
76a
ASARCO’s wholly owned subsidiaries must be included in
ASARCO’s computation of apportionable income,’’ even
though the six subsidiaries ‘‘are clearly separate and dis-
tinct from ASARCO”’’. (Slip Opinion, p. 11). Since the
record establishes that none of the six subsidiaries has
assets or business activities of any kind in Montana, in-
clusion of the subsidiaries’ net income in the Montana
tax base is obviously subject to serious challenge on con-
stitutional grounds. See e.g., Interstate Finance Co. v.
Wisconsin Department of Taxation, 137 NW2 28 (Sup.
Ct. Wis. 1965); People ex rel. Alpha Portland Cement Co.
v. Knapp, supra. See also, State Taxation of Interstate
Commerce, H. Rep. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 245
(1964).
Those who seek to defend the constitutionality of the
result reached by this Court in the present case generally
do so by asserting that the state is not taxing the income
of the out-of-state subsidiaries, but is merely using that
income to measure the amount of tax properly payable by
the local corporation on its income. See, e.g., Keesling, ‘‘A
Current Look at the Combined Report and Uniformity
in Allocation Practices’’, 42 Journal of Taxation 106, 108
(1975). However, ‘‘[w]hen passing on the constitutionality
of a state taxing scheme, it is firmly established that
{the U.S. Supreme Court] concerns itself with the practical
operation of the tax, that is, substance rather than form’’.
American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S. 451, 455 (1965) (em-
phasis added). Regardless of how the taxing structure ap-
proved by this Court is described verbally, it can have the
practical effect of imposing tax on the out-of-state income
of separate companies having no contact of any kind with
Montana. Because STAB and the District Court concluded
that the Montana statute did not permit a combined calcn-
lation, they did not have to reach the constitutional ques-
tion. The case should therefore be remanded for a finding
as to whether or not the practical operation“ of the
77a
statute, as interpreted by this Court, is to impose a con-
stitutionally impermissible tax on the income of out-of-
state corporations which are admittedly not subject to
Montana’s taxing jurisdiction in their own right.
{Material on pp. 26-27 of original document omitted. ]
Respectfully submitted this Ist day of August, 1977.
Hucues, Bennett & Cain
Sruart L. KrLLINER
Joun F. SuLlLwax
By /s/ Georce T. Bennetr
George T. Bennett
406 Fuller Avenue
P. O. Box 1166
Helena, Montana 59601
Attorneys For American
Smelting and Refining
Company
78a
APPENDIX H
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
Cause No. 13249
Montana DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF THE
Srate or Montana, Petitioner d Appellant,
-V8-
Tue American SMELTING AND Rerinine Company,
Defendant d Respondent.
Appellant's Objections To Respondent's Petition
for Rehearing
Comes Now the Petitioner and Appellant, Taz Montana
DepaRTMENT OF Revenve (Department) and objects to
American SMELTING AND Rerininc Company’s (ASARCO)
Petition for rehearing filed herein on August 1, 1977. For
convenience of the Court, the Department has followed
point by point the Petition of the Respondent, and has also
integrated as to each point raised, its argument and au-
thorities.
Petitions for rehearing are governed by Rule 34, Rules
of Appellant Civil Procedure, and the grounds upon which
rehearing petitions are granted are extremely limited.
„A petition for rehearing may be presented upon the
following grounds and none other: That some fact, ma-
terial to the decision, or some question decisive of the
case submitted by counsel, was overlooked by the
Court or that the decision is in conflict with an ex-
press statute or controlling decision to which the
attention of the Court was not directed.’’
It is on those grounds and none other upon which this
Court could order a rehearing in this matter. It is sub-
mitted by the Department, that this matter was thoroughly
79a
briefed by all parties, that the Court did not overlook any
facts or questions submitted by counsel, and that the case
is not in conflict with any statute or controlling decision.
{Material on pp. 2-12 of original document omitted.]
Issue VIII
Matrer Soul Nor Be Remanpep ror CONSIDERATION OF
SuBstTanTiaL ConsTITUTIONAL QuEsTiIoNs Raisep By
PLEADINGS AND OVERLOOKED By THE Court.
To begin with, the Department objects to the taxpayer
now requesting that additional issues should be decided
in this case which were not raised at the original hearing
before this Court. Attached as exhibit C to this objection
is the taxpayer’s proposed Findings, Conclusions and Or-
der submitted to the Department of Revenue at the initial
hearing on this matter. The taxpayer did not include any
provision in its findings or conclusions as to the constitu-
tionality of the acts of the Department of Revenue.
Also attached as Exhibit D are the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Order entered by the State Tax
Appeal Board, which were verbatim the proposed Find-
ings of Facts and Conclusions of Law submitted by the
taxpayer, and they again do not refer to any unconstitu-
tional aspect of the case.
Finally, in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order of the District Court, proposed by the taxpayer,
attached as Exhibit E which were adopted verbatim by
the Court, no where did the taxpayer raise the constitu-
tional questions it now seeks to interpose. The taxpayer
was not precluded at any stage from the hearing before
the Department of Revenue to the hearing in the District
Court, from raising the constitutional questions. The tax-
payer did not raise those issues at any stage in the pro-
ceedings, and clearly did not raise those issues before this
Court. This Court has repeatedly stated that it will not on
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a motion for rehearing consider questions not originally
raised in the action. Mares vs Mares et al, 60 M.36, 199P.
267.
„However, this is the first time that this point has
been presented, urged or argued, and it is the settled
rule that this Court will not, on an application for
rehearing, consider grounds for reversal not presented
upon the original hearing.’’ P. 55
It is the position of the Department, that even if these
matters had been raised previously, which we contend they
were not, they were clearly not raised in the original hear-
ing in this Court on this matter and cannot now be raised
by the taxpayer.
Sub-Section 1
Status of the Multi-State Tax Compact
The taxpayer asserts that because the audit was per-
formed by the Multi-State Tax Commission, and the va-
lidity of the compact is at issue in the United States Su-
preme Court, that it effects the decision in some way. In
opposition, we cite to the Court the brief of the taxpayer
filed in opposition to the motion of the Multi-State Tax
Commission to participate in this matter as amicus curiae,
dated May 12, 1976. In that brief, the taxpayer takes a
somewhat different position.
„It is true that the audit which formed this basis of
this litigation was conducted by the Multi-State Tax
Commission. But this act has no bearing whatsoever on
the issue on appeal herein. There never was any ques-
tion in this case as to the audit information. Thus, the
issue on appeal does not relate to the validity of the
mechanics of the audit. Rather, the issue on the De-
partment’s appeal concerns the time at which the
principals of UDITPA became effective in Montana.
This issue, ASARCO submits, is solely and exclusively
8la
one of Montana law, in which the Multi-State Tax
Commission has not one bit of interest with respect
to which there is no need whatsoever to ‘uniform in-
terpretation and application by the member states’ of
— Multi-State Tax Commission.“ (Emphasis sup-
plied)
The Department could not have have rebutted the argo
ment any better than the taxpayer has.
Sub-Section 2
Taxation of Passive Income from Property Outside
Montana
The Respondent begins this argument with the following
statement:
„Grave constitutional questions are raised by this
Court’s decision that Montana has jurisdiction to tax
dividends, royalties, rents, interest and gains on stock
sales realized by ASARCO from transactions occurr-
ing wholly outside the state.’’ p. 21.
These grave constitutional questions have never been pre-
sented to this Court prior to this petition for hearing. If
this had been a consideration of the taxpayer, these cases
could have been briefed and argued prior to this late date.
As the Mares case supra indicates, it is not proper in a
petition for rehearing to raise new issues.
On page 23 of the Respondent’s petition, beginning at
line 13, it is again clear the taxpayer’s misunderstanding
of the issue of combination. The Court was quite correct in
ruling that the case of Coca-Cola Co. vs. Department of
Revenue, 271 OR 517, 533 P.2d 788, is on all fours with the
instant case. The question there involved the unitary op-
eration of Coca-Cola and its subsidiaries. The situation
is exactly the same with the taxpayer and the subsidiaries
82a
which were combined, because they were conducting a uni-
tary operation.
Finally, it is incorrect for the taxpayer to indicate that
STAB and the District Court found it unnecessary to
reach these new constitutional issues, because the fact
simply is, that the issues were in fact never presented to
those tribunals for their decision. More importantly, they
were not presented to this Court by the taxpayer, prior to
this time.
Sub-Section 3
Inclusion of Subsidiaries in the Tax Base
Sub-Section 3 is a rehash of sub-section 2 of this issue.
The taxpayer has not cited any case whereby the acts of
the Department as upheld by this Court are unconstitu-
tional. Rather the taxpayer is asking this Court to give
them another opportunity to reargue their case on different
grounds. The Department contends that these issues were
not raised before STAB or the District Court and there-
fore the case cannot now be remanded for a determination
of these new issues.
[Material on pp. 15-16 of original document omitted. ]
ConcLusIon
A careful review of the petition, clearly indicates that the
taxpayer has not raised any issue which comes within the
parameter of Rule 34 Montana Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure. Of the first eight issues, if they were raised they
were discussed by the parties in the briefs and by this
Court in the opinion, and are laid to rest; if they were not
raised, they cannot be argued now. Of the constitutional
issues, these were not raised in the prior proceedings;
they were clearly not raised in the original hearing before
this Court; the taxpayer had every opportunity to argue at
the prior stages the constitutional question, and failed to
do so. It is improper at this stage of the proceedings to
83a
grant a rehearing to hear issues not previously raised.
Finally, the Court’s opinion did not overlook any issues
raised; the deficiency assessment will not include any
amount represented by ‘‘gross up’’; the question of the
gain on the sale of stock of General Cable and Revere
Copper was clearly considered by the Court and found to
be business income.
THEREFORE, the Department respectfully requests that
the petition of the Respondent for rehearing be denied on
all grounds.
Dartep this 4th day of August, 1977.
Respectfully submitted,
Terry B. Coscrove
Tueopore B. peLooze
/s/ Terry B. Coscrove
Special Assistant Attorney
General
P. O. Box 1144
Helena, Montana 59601
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.