Petition — Keyes v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals

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Supreme Court, U. S.

FILED

OCT 27 1977

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcToBER TERM, 977

™ = 6 1 5

ARTHUR H. Keyes and LUCILLE KEYEs,

On behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,

Petitioners

V.

THE District or CoLUMBIA CouRT OF APPEALS, et ul.,

Respondents

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PETITION FOR

WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND PETITION FOR

WRIT OF MANDAMUS

GILBERT HAHN, JR., Esq.

11th Floor

1150 Connecticut Ave., N.W.

Washington, D. C. 20036

Attorney for Petitioners

DENNIS OAKES

Mary KATHLEEN HITE

Wo tr, BLock, ScHoRR AND

So.is-CoHEN

11th Floor

1150 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D. C. 20036

Of Counsel

Press or Byron 8S. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WasHINGTON, D. C.

INDEX

Motion for Leave to File Peti-

tion for Writ of Mandamus. .... 1

Petition for Writ of Mandamus to

the District of Columbia Court

of Appeals, Particularly to the

Honorable Kelly and the Honor-

able Gallagher, Associate Judges

and the Honorable Pair, Asso-

ciate Judge, Retired, of said

Court of Appeals ...+«-e«eee-s.

Opinions Below. ..«<«sexeecvees

eee. 6s. 6 6 en © ate 6 8 4

qo uu ellUWwW

Question Presented ....+.-+«. -«

Constitutional Provisions In-

Ul 6 6 6 «oe ete 6 6 lw] 8 6

Statement of the Case .....s. - 6

Reasons for Granting the Writ... 9

Gaomeewesegm scescceceveuxuvctenvse

Appendix

Order of the Court of Appeals

dated October 11, 1977. ..... A-l

Order of the Court of Appeals

dated October 13, 1977. . .. . . A-3

Petitioners’ “Motion to the

Court En Banc to Withdraw the

Mandate of This Court In Order

to Prevent Injustice and Grant

Hearing En Banc in No. 8790

Because Of District of Colum-

bia v. Burlington, Decided |

Tone is 1577 : _ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE

PETITION FOR

WRIT OF MANDAMUS

ii

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1977

NO.

ARTHUR H. KEYES and

LUCILLE KEYES,

On behalf of themselves and

others similarly situated,

Petitioners

Ve.

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

COURT OF APPEALS, e* al.,

Respondents

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PETITION FOR

WRIT OF MANDAMUS

Petitioners respectfully move this Court

for leave to file the petition for writ of

mandamus, hereto annexed, under Section 16°1

of Title 28 of the United States Code, direct-

ed to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,

=2<

and particularly the Honorable Catherine B.

Kelly, the Honorable George R. Gallagher,

and the Honorable Hubert B. Pair, Judges of

the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Respectfully submitted,

Gilbert Hahn, Jr., Esq.

Wolf, Block, Schorr and

Solis-Cohen

llth Floor

1150 Conn. Ave., N. W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

783-3344

Attorney for Petitioners

PETITION FOR

WRIT OF MANDAMUS

=-3-

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1977

NO.

ARTHUR H. KEYES and

LUCILLE KEYES,

On behalf of themselves and

others similarly situated,

Petitioners

Vv.

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

COURT OF APPEALS, et al.,

Respondents

PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO THE DISTRICT

OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS, AND

PARTICULARLY TO THE HONORABLE KELLY

AND THE HONORABLE GALLAGHER, ASSOCIATE

JUDGES AND THE HONORABLE PAIR, ASSO-

CIATE JUDGE, RETIRED, OF SAID COURT

OF APPEALS

Petitioners, Arthur and Lucille Keyes,

-4-

et al., pray that a writ of mandamus issue

to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals

and particularly to the Honorable Catherine

B. Kelly and the Honorable George R. Gallag-

her and the Honorable Hubert B. Pair, Judges

of said Court of Appeals, directing and com-

manding the aforesaid judges and the District

of Columbia Court of Appeals to withdraw and

stay the Court's mandate in the District of

Columbia v. Keyes, 362 A.2d 729 (1976), sole-

ly to allow petitioners to apply for a writ

of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the

United States.

OPINIONS BELOW

The per curiam order of the District of

Columbia Court of Appeals in the instant case

denying petitioners' Motion to Withdraw and

Stay the Court's Mandate Pending Application

-5-

The per curiam order of the District

of Columbia Court of Appeals denying peti-

tioners' "Motion to The Court En Banc to

Withdraw the Mandate of This Court in No.

8790 Issued April 26, 1977 During this

Same Term in Order to Prevent Injustice

and Grant Hearing En Banc in No. 8790 Be-

cause of District of Columbia v. Burling-

ton Decided June 13, 1977" is unreported

and is reprinted in the Appendix, infra,

p.A-3.

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked under Section 165l(a) of Title

28, United States Code.

Petitioners have sought the relief

requested here from the highest court in

the District of Columbia and have been

to the Supreme Court of the United States denied. Therefore, this Court is the only

for a Writ of Certiorari is unreported and is court that can now grant the relief sought.

reprinted in the Appendix, infra, p. A-l.

-6-

QUESTION PRESENTED

If the Petitioners ultimately prevail

in the Supreme Court through the writ of

certiorari process and the result is an

order to the District of Columbia Court

of Appeals to withdraw its mandate and to

grant petitioners a hearing en banc would

‘not petitioners be denied their constitu-

tional right to a hearing if that relief

were rendered worthless for the reason that

the current term of the District of Colum-

bia Court of Appeals had by then expired?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED

The Fifth Amendment to the United

States Constitution provides in part:

No person shall. . .be deprived

of life, liberty or property,

without due process of law. . .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioners seek a withdrawal and stay

of mandate in order to file a timely peti-

tion for a writ of certiorari from an order

~Jo=

of the District of Columbia Court of Ap-

peals of September 13, 1977 denying Peti-

tioners "Motion to the Court En Banc to

Withdraw the Mandate of This Court in No.

8790 Issued April 26, 1977 During this

Same Term In Order to Prevent Injustice

and Grant Hearing En Banc in No. 8790

Because of District of Columbia v. Bur-

lington, Decided June 13, 1977". (Appen-

dix, infra, p. A-5)

On September 22, 1977 petitioners

moved the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals to withdraw and stay its mandate

in District of Columbia v. Keyes, pend-

ing application to the Supreme Court for

a writ of certiorari. Petitioners'

Motion was denied, per curiam, on October

li, 1977.

The mandate in this case issued April

26, 1977 during the present term of the

District of Columbia Court of Appeals,

on

and petitioners’ "Motion to the Court En

Banc to Withdraw the Mandate, etc." was

timely filed during the present term of

Court. Petitioners intend to file a peti-

tion for a writ of certiorari within the

time allowed by law. However, pursuant

to Rule 2 of the Rules of the District of

Columbia Court of Appeals, the current

term of the Court of Appeals will expire

on December 31, 1977. Petitioners cannot

predict that the writ of certiorari pro-

cess will be completed before December 31,

1977. It can, however, be assumed that

should the writ be granted, any further

proceedings in the Supreme Court will not

be completed during the current term of

the Court of Appeals. (January 1 to Decem-

ber 31, 1977.)

Petitioners are simply asking this

Court to order the Court of Appeals to with-

draw and stay its mandate during the pen-

ae ed

dency in this Court of the petitioners’

petition for a writ of certiorari.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Petitioners’ petition for a writ of

certiorari will be irreparably prejudiced

if the mandate of the District of Colum-

bia Court of Appeals is not withdrawn and

stayed pending the preparation, filing,

consideration and decision on the peti-

tion and any further proceedings in the

Supreme Court of the United States.

Petitioners will suffer irreparable

harm if the mandate is not withdrawn and

stayed while petitioners seek Supreme

Court review of their serious due process

claims set forth in the "Motion to The

Court En Banc to Withdraw the Mandate,

etc." denied by the District of Columbia

Court of Appeals on September 13, 1977.

There can be no prejudice to respondents

from the granting of this motion. The

2 1 0-

granting of the motion will, however, safe-

guard petitioners’ due process rights to an

effective remedy should petitioners prevail

in the Supreme Court during the next term

of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

CONCLUSION

In the absence of the issuance of a

writ of mandamus by this Court, the District

of Columbia Court of Appeals will have suc-

cessfully deprived petitioners of due pro-

cess of law.

Petitioners respectfully urge that the

Writ of Mandamus issue.

Respectfully submitted,

GILBERT HAHN, JR., ESQ.

Wolf, Block, Schorr and

Solis-Cohen

llth Floor

1150 Conn. Ave., N. W.

Washington, D. C. 20036

783-3344

Attorney for Petitioners

APPENDIX

A-1

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

COURT OF APPEALS

FILED Oct 11 1977

Alexander L. Stevas

Clerk

NO. 8790 January Term, 1977

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

a Municipal Corporation, and

WALTER E. WASHINGTON, and

KENNETH BACK,

Appellant

Vv. Tax Div.No. 2214

ARTHUR H. KEYES, JR., and

LUCILLE KEYES,

On behalf of themselves and

others similarly situated,

Appellees.

BEFORE: Kelly and Gallagher, Associate

Judges, and Pair, Associate

Judge, Retired.

ORDER

On consideration of appellees’ motion

to withdraw and stay this Court's mandate

pending application to the Supreme Court

of the United States for a writ of certio-

rari, it is

A-2

ORDERED that appellees’ motion is

denied.

PER CURIAM

Copies to:

Honorable Joyce Hens Green

Associate Judge, Superior Court

of the District of Columbia

Clerk, Superior Court of the

District of Columbia

Louis P. Robbins, Esquire

Principal Deputy Corporation Counsel

Gilbert Hahn, Jr., Esquire

1150 Connecticut Avenue NW,

20036

—- -—-~

A-3

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

COURT OF APPEALS

FILED Sep 13 1977

Alexander L. Stevas

Clerk

NO. 8790 January Term, 1977

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

a Municipal Corporation, and

WALTER E. WASHINGTON, and

KENNETH BACK,

Appellants,

Vv. Tax Div.No. 2214

ARTHUR H. KEYES, JR., and

LUCILLE KEYES,

On behalf of themselves and

others similarly situated,

Appellees.

BEFORE: Newman, Chief Judge; Kelly, Kern,

Gallagher, Nebeker, Yeagley, Harris

and Mack, Associate Judges; Pair,

Associate Judge, Retired.

On consideration of appellees' "Motion

to the Court En Banc to Withdraw the Man-

date of this Court in No. 8790 Issued April

26, 1977 During This Same Term in Order to

Prevent Injustice and Grant Hearing En Banc

in No. 8790 Because of District of Columbia

v. Burlington Decided June 13, 1977" and of

responsive pleadings filed with respect

A-5

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

thereto, it is COURT OF APPEALS

ORDERED by the Court en banc that REC'D JUL 7 1977

appellees’ aforesaid motion is denied.

Alexander L. Stevas

others similarly situated

Gilbert Hahn, Jr., Esquire

1150 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Appellees

llth Floor (36)

PER CURIAM Clerk

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, a :

Copies to: | Municipal Corporation, and =:

WALTER E. WASHINGTON and :

Honorable Joyce Hens Green KENNETH BACK :

Judge, Superior Court of the District ;

of Columbia Appellants :

Clerk, Superior Court of the District v. : NO. 8790

of Columbia :

ARTHUR H. KEYES, JR., and :

Louis P. Robbins, Esquire LUCILLE KEYES, :

Principal Deputy Corporation Counsel On behalf of themselves and :

MOTION TO THE COURT EN BANC TO WITHDRAW

THE MANDATE OF THIS COURT IN NO. 8790

ISSUED APRIL 26, 1977 DURING THIS SAME

TERM IN ORDER TO PREVENT INJUSTICE AND

GRANT HEARING EN BANC IN NO. 8790 BE-

CAUSE OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. BUR-

LINGTON DECIDED JUNE 13, 1977

Come now Appellees in the above-entit-

led case, through counsel, and pray to the

entire bench of this Court that it withdraw

the mandate of this Court in No. 8790 issued

A-6

April 26, 1977 in order to prevent injus-

tice and, following the withdrawal of the

mandate, grant a hearing en banc. As

grounds therefor appellees state the fol-

lowing:

1. Relief Requested: Appellees move

the Court for the following relief:

(a) Withdrawal of the mandate in

No. 8790 issued April 26, 1977, and

(b) Granting a hearing en banc.

2. Grounds for Relief.

The panel of the Court which adjudi-

cated the Keyes matter created two basic

"due process" problems.

(i) The panel specifically re-

quested the parties to comment on the

applicability of Burlington I which

had been drafted by a panel contain-

ing two of the judges who were con-

sidering Keyes. The full Court later

vacated Burlington I prior to the

A-7

Keyes decision. Nevertheless, the

panel decided Keyes on the vacated

principle of Burlington I asserting

an absence of subject-matter juris-

diction.

(ii) The vacating of Burling-

ton I was communicated to the Dis-

trict but never communicated to coun-

sel for the Keyes taxpayers. This

gave the District a one-sided advan-

tage over the Keyes taxpayers and pre-

vented counsel for the taxpayers from

taking advantage of the vacating of

Burlington I. Only a hearing can re-

dress that damage. At that hearing,

counsel can reargue the appeal based

on the non-existence of the Burling-

ton I principle.

3. What happened.

District of Columbia v. Keyes, 362 A.

2d 729 (1976) was argued December 5, 1974.

A-8

Following briefing and argument, on Febr-

uary 27, 1976, the panel (Judges Kelly,

Gallagher and Pair) issued an Order as

follows:

This cause came on for considera-

tion on the record on appeal and

the court heard argument of coun-

sel. A question has arisen which

the parties did not cover in their

briefs, and accordingly, the

Court desires the parties to sub-

mit supplemental memoranda addres-

sed to the following question:

Bearing in mind (a) that this

Court in District of Columbia v.

Green, (310 A.2d 848 (1973)) speci-

fically approved the trial court's

finding that an injunctive remedy

was available in that case due to

the “exceptional and extraordi-

nary” circumstances there present-

ed (at 853) and (b) that this Court

recently reiterated that proposi-

tion in District of Columbia v.

Burlington Apartment House Co.

T7A The Burlington Hotel, D.C.App.,

. (No. 7986, January 29,

1576) at pages 4-5 of the slip

opinion, are the a llees in this

case barred from the relier sought

by reason of their failure to pur-

sue their statutory remedies in

seeking refunds for the fiscal

year here involved? in addressing

themselves to the question, the par-

ties should discuss District of

A-9

Columbia v. Berenter, 151 U.S.

App. 196, 466 F.2d 367 (1972).

(Emphasis supplied.)

Counsel for appellants shall

cause their supplemental memor-

andum to be filed on or before

March 8, 1976, and counsel for

appellees shail cause their

memorandum to be filed on or be-

fore March 15, 1976, and coun-

sel shall cause their respec-

tive pleadings to be personally

served on opposing counsel.

Per Curiam

The District filed its memorandum on

March 15, 1976. Taxpayers filed thei:

memorandum on March 24, 1976. On April 23,

1976 this Court vacated the January 29,

1976 Burlington I opinion. See page 2

slip opinion in D.C. v. Burlington decided

June 13, 1977 (Burlington II).

On April 23, 1976, counsel for the

District of Columbia was notified that

Burlington I had been vacated. Counsel

for the Keyes taxpayers was never so noti-

fied.

A-10

Keyes was decided on July 23, 1976

specifically on the Burlington I princi-

ple, but without mentioning Burlington I

by name. Taxpayers moved timely on Sep-

tember 16, 1976 for rehearing and hearing

en banc. Of course, taxpayers did not in-

clude in that motion the overwhelming

argument that Keyes had been decided on

the Burlington I principle after Burling-

ton I had been vacated. They could not

have included this argument because only

the District was informed that Burling-

ton I had been vacated.

4. What harm did this do?

What happened caused two kinds of

harm: substantive and procedural.

(A) The substantive harm. The key

holding in Keyes was to some extent fore-

cast in the February 27, 1976 question to

counsel: viz: "Are the Appellees in this

case barred from relief sought by reason

A-11

of their failure to pursue their statutory

remedies in seeking refunds for the fiscal

year here involved?" In other words, were

the Keyes taxpayers barred from all juris-

diction in the Superior Court to have a tax

refund because they had not first taken

their case to the Board of Equalization and

Review?

The only case in the District of Colum-

bia that had ever supported such a principle

was Burlington

But, before Keyes was decided, Burling-

ton I was vacated by the full Court without

notice to cc insel for taxpayers. Keyes was

then decided on the Burlington I principle

of "failure to pursue their statutory reme-

dies.”

Let us look at this Court's opinion in

Keyes.

Recovery of taxes illegally or

erroneously assessed and volun-

tarily paid was not permitted at

common law and is a matter with-

great peril."

A-12

in the purview of the legisia-

tive branch. Therefore, refunds

of taxes so assessed and paid

will not be made absent an

authorizing statute. District

of Columbia v. McFall, 88 U.S.

App.D.C. 217, 188 F.2d 991 (1951);

Lindner v. District of Columbia,

D.C.Mun.App., 32 A.2da 540 (1943).

Under the statutory procedure

applicable to this case, the re-

covery of refunds through appeal

to the Superior Court requires,

as a first step, a complaint to

the Board of Equalization and Re-

view. Subject matter urisdiction

of the Superior Court does not

attach until that prerequisite has

been satisfied, ict cata Faluad based

on a final de Scomtnahian of the

Superior Court presupposes that

the taxpayer has complied with the

procedure mandated by the legisla-

ture. m, "aggrieved" for any rea-

son, taxpayer must a al with

ae in the Sormitted time to to

zation and Review. D.c.

of Es 1573-5 47-709. This was not

done in this case. The taxpayers

failed to follow their administra-

tive remedies for fiscal year 1973.

(Keyes, 362 A.2d 732-3) (Emphasis

supplied.)

Further, the Court issued a warning

that taxpayers would "bypass the Board at

2d, supra at 734)

(Keyes, Footnote ll, 362 A.

A-13

ll. We note that the fiscal

year 1974 taxpayers who resorted

to the Board of Equalization and

Review and raised the issue of un-

equal debasement factors found

the Board unresponsive to their

arguments. Hence, in Green, where

only injunctive relief was sought,

we stated that a taxpayer in that

case had “no meaningful ability to

challenge his assessment at all"

because the Board declined to in-

quire into the non-judgmental as-

pects of the assessment process.

District of Columbia v. Green,

Supra at 856. This was one of the

extraordinary circumstances upon

which the grant of injunctive re-

lief in Green was based. However,

the fact that an administrative

body may wrongly perceive the

nature or scope of its powers or

responsibilities in a given in-

stance is not a justification for

bypassing that body in all in-

stances when it is an essential

element in a procedure of purely

statutory origin. In fact, it

would be a rare instance when tax-

payers would not bypass the Board

at great peril.

The substantive harm in all this is

that not one word of this was the decided

law of the District of Columbia on the date

the Keyes decision came down. Burlington

I, which had said exactly this, had been

withdrawn and vacated. There was no hoid-

A-14

ing in any other decision in the District

that bypassing the Board excluded all

jurisdiction in the Superior Court to hear

a tax refund case.

Nothing sustained the key sentence in

Keyes: "Subject matter jurisdiction does

not attach until that prerequisite (com-

plaint to the Board) has been satisfied."

When the Burlington case was ulti-

mately decided in 1977, following reargu-

ment en banc, (Burlington II) the princi-

ple of Burlington I was specifically re-

pudiated.

We begin by clarifying what is

not at issue in this case. Unques-

tionably there are jurisdictional

prerequisites to the Superior

Court's consideration of a tax-

payer's challenge. See D.C. Code

1973, §§ 47-709, -2403, and

-~2404; D.C. Code 1976 Supp.,

§ 47-646(i). See also George Hy-

man Construction Co. v. District

of Columbia, D.C.App., 3 "

; District of Columbia

v. Berenter, 151 U. S.App.D.C. 156,

466 F.2d 367 (1972). Prior pay-

ment of the tax assessed and due

A-15

at the time of the filing of a

petition in the Tax Division of

the trial court is one such pre-

requisite. Under certain cir-

cumstances, the taxpayer first

must complain to the Board of

Equalization and Review before

seeking relief in the trial court.

(Emphasis supplied.)

What are the “certain circumstances"

which reguire prior complaint to the Board?

The answer is more obviously defined

by stating the circumstances where prior

complaint is not required.

As this Court said: (Burlington II,

Slip opinion, pp. 9-10)

If we were to accept the Dis-

trict's argument, Burlington

would be compelled to contest

a particular assessment-~al-

ready in the process of being

shown to be unlawful--through

the Board to the Superior Court

in every successive fiscal year.

Such a multiplicity of litiga-

tion on a single issue not only

would be impractical and fname A

able, but also has been deemed

unwarranted by this court. In

pistrict of Columbia v. Green,

48 (1973),

we held. that when taxpayers can

A-16

show that in reality they had

no effective administrative reme-

dy, the fact that they have “by-

pass[(ed] the useless administra-

tive procedure” will not deprive

the trial court of the power to

grant equitable relief. It is

plain that any appeal to the Board

concerning the 1974 assessment,

based as it inevitably would have

been on the identical arguments

which the Board already had reject-

ed in connection with the 1973

assessment, would have been a

futile procedure which the tax-

payer should not be penalized for

bypassing. (Emphasis supplied.)

This is exactly the situation in Keyes,

a class action for 33,000 taxpayers on exac-

tly the same single issue, where there can

be no denial of "multiplicity of litigation",

"useless administrative procedure" and “futile

procedure”.

Even more striking is the effect of the

dissenting opinion in Burlington II, which

was signed by the two judges who had writ-

ten the majority opinion in Keyes. +/ It

says:

The statutory scheme for re-

17 Judge Pair, now retired, was also on the

Keyes panel.

A-17

lief from allegedly inaccurate

fiscal year assessments is found

in D.C. Code 47-709 et al. and

the administrative remedies out-

lined there must be exhausted. ..

Appellee had an adequate remedy

at law to contest his 1974

assessment but failed to invoke

the jurisdiction of the Superior

Court. . .D.C. v. Keyes. (slip

opinion, pp.13-17)

How can all this be summarized?

Keyes was decided by two judges!/

based on a legal principle of subject-mat-

ter jurisdiction contained in a vacated

preliminary Burlington opinion, which was

followed by a final Burlington opinion de-

claring exactly the opposite principle of

subject-matter jurisdiction. And the two

judges who decided Keyes filed a dissent in

the final Burlington opinion citing Keyes

as the support for their dissent.

Here is the ultimate bootstrap on

which 33,000 taxpayers are deprived of

their just recovery on the basis of an

ln me agg , was on

A-18

asserted absence of subject-matter juris-

diction.

(B) The Procedural Harm. The Corpora-

tion Counsel as counsel in Burlington, was

notified in the Burlington case on April

23, 1976 that Burlington had been withdrawn

and vacated and that the case had been set

for argument en banc. Counsel for the

Keyes taxpayers who were not counsel in

Burlington was never notified of this

either by the Court or by the Corporation

Counsel.

The slip opinion in Burlington I was

printed and distributed prior to its being

withdrawn and vacated. However, the order

withdrawing and vacating the opinion in

Burlington I was never published anywhere.

27 We have verified with the Clerk’s Office that

|

|

:

2/

A-19

How would anyone know the opinion had

been vacated? Up to the date the final

opinion was issued in Burlington II, only

by checking this Court's docket in Bur-

lington would any lawyer know that the

preliminary opinion in Burlington I had

been withdrawn and vacated.

Even more striking is the fact that

the vacating of Burlington I was apparent-

ly not fully circulated in the Corpora-

tion Counsel's office.

A series of cases was tried before

Judge John G. Penn in the Tax Division

of Superior Court, during the period

March 1, 1976 to June 1, 1977 in each of

which Burlington I was cited to Judge

Penn by the Assistants Corporation Coun-

sel with no disclosure that Burlington I

had been vacated. It is clear that the

particular Assistants Corporation Counsel

who were handling those cases were not

A-20

aware of the vacating of Burlington I and,

obviously, Judge Penn and opposing counsel

in these cases were not aware of it.2/

37 (a) D.C.R.L.A. and L'Enfant Plaza Properties,

Inc. v. D.C., Tax Docket Trial Court's

Memorandum Order and Trial Findings, citing Bur-

lington I, was entered March 23, 1976 and the Final

order was signed 4/14/76. District of Columbia's

Notice of Appeal was filed 5/14/76 but was subse-

quently withdrawn by stipulation.

(b) D.C.R.L.A. and Bresler and Reiner, Inc.

v. D.C., Tax Docket 2288: Trial Court"s opinion and

order was dated April 30, 1976 and it cited Bur

ton I. Final Order was signed May 26, 1976. No

appeal was taken by the District of Columbia.

(c) D.C.R.L.A. and Bresler and Reiner, Inc.

v. D.C., Tax x Docket 2289. Trial Court Opinion and

Order was dated September 30, 1976 and cited

on - Final Order was signed October 20,

ict of Columbia filed a notice of

appeal and then dismissed the appeal.

(a) D.C.R.L.A. and Trilon Plaza Co. v. D.C.,

Tax Dockets 2311 and 2374 were tried in February

and March, 1976 and are awaiting decision in the

Trial Court. There were repeated citations to

the Burlington I opinion during the course of the

trial.

(e) D.C.R.L.A. and Trilon Plaza Co. v. D.C.,

Tax Docket 2372: The case was tried May 17 and 18,

1977 and during the trial there were repeated

cetations ae I. The case was settled by

stipulation between the parties.

Burl I was also cited by counsel in

Peti for Judgment filed in October,

A-21

The lack of procedural due process is

obvious.

Before the panel decided Keyes it

specifically asked for comment on Burling-

ton I on February 27, 1976. The comments

were filed March 15, 1976 and March 24,

1976. Burlington I was then withdrawn and

vacated April 23, 1976 without notice to

counsel for taxpayers. Keyes was decided

on July 23, 1976 squarely based on the

Burlington I principle, but with no refer-

ence to the fact that the Court had vaca-

ted Burlington I.

Counsel for Keyes were deprived of

the powerful value of the vacating of

37 (cont'd)

976 in Tax Dockets 2369, 2370, 2375, and 2374.

A-22

Burlington I and the substantial doubt

thereby cast on the validity of the

Burlington principle.

Counsel for Keyes, in preparing the

petition for reargument in Keyes filed

September 16, 1976, did not include the

overwhelming argument that Keyes had been

decided on the Burlington I principle

after Burlington I had been vacated, with

notice only to one side in the case.

If we had been told that Burlington

I had been vacated, our petition for re-

hearing en banc filed September 16, 1976

would have contained a paragraph something

like the following:

"This opinion is identical

with the opinion in Burlington

handed down on Janua 29, 1976.

Like Burlington, it finds that

the failure to follow the adminis-

trative path annuls the subject-

matter jurisdiction of the Supe-

rior Court. Burlington has been

vacated by this Court and has been

set down for rehearing en banc

before the full Court.

A-23

This case should receive

identical treatment, since it

raises the identical issue of

subject-matter jurisdiction.

We respectfully request that

the opinion in Keyes be similar-

ly vacated, and e appeal held

in abeyance until the decision in

Burlington, or preferably listed

for argument en banc on the same

day that Burlington will be heard."

We are confident that this Court in

September, 1976 would without question have

granted us the same treatment as Burlington.

The demands of equal treatment for both

sides and due process require that the

appellees have a fair hearing before this

Court. In the words of Justice Frankfurter,

Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v.

44 (1951) (concurring opinion):

. « «"due process,” unlike some

legal rules, is not a technical

conception with a fixed content

unrelated to time, place and cir-

cumstances. Expressing as it

does in its ultimate analysis

respect enforced by law for that

feeling of just treatment which

A-24

has been evolved through cen-

turies of Anglo-American consti-

tutional history and civiliza-

tion, "due process” cannot be

imprisoned within the treache-

rous limits of any formula. Re-

presenting a profound attitude

of fairness between man and man,

and more particularly between

the individual and government,

"due process" is compounded of

history, past course cof deci-

sions, and stout confidence in

the strength of the democratic

faith which we profess. It is

not a yardstick. It is a pro-

cess. It is a delicate process

of adjustment inescapably invol-

ving the exercise of judgment by

those whom the Constitution en-

trusted with the unfolding of the

process.

Taxpayers respectfully ask the Court

for the "just treatment" required by the

due process guarantee.

5. Withdrawal of Mandate.

(a) Grounds. The mandate in

No. 8790 issued April 26, 1977. This is in

the January 1977 term. See Rule 2 of the

Rules of this Court. It is within the

power of this Court to withdraw the mandate

A-25

for "good cause". See Greater Boston

Television Corp. v. FCC, 149 U.S.App.D.C.

322, 463 F.2d 268, 276-79 (D.C.Cir. 1971)

(Leventhal, Tamm and MacKinnon J.J.).

Decision to recall mandate by an

appellate court will be granted for "good

cause" shown. "Good cause” is the show-

ing of a need to avoid injustice. It has

a foundation in the inherent power of the

4/

court— and may be done during the term

the mandate issued. >/

The basic principle authorizing an

appellate court to vacate any judgment

is as may be just under the circumstances.

In courts the power is also statu-

tory. 28 USCA §2106.

5/ In federal courts the mandate may issue

outside the term. 28 USCA §452.

A-26

Greater Boston Television Corp., supra.~

(b) Effect. No one is hurt by

the withdrawal of the mandate. The posi-

tion of the District has not changed. No

money has been spent by the District in

reliance on the mandate. The parties are

in exactly the same position they were in

in 1973.

67 We do not think the District will object

On procedural grounds in any case. In the

U. S. Court of Appeals in No. 74-1482, Met.

March 13, 1975 to - A

copy of the District's motion is a

(Exhibit A). As will appear, the Court on

March 31, 1976 granted the motion, which

had been opposed. As a result, the District

was ultimately able to reverse the result,

the closing of the Incinerator.

A copy of the Court's Order recalling man-

date is attached (Exhibit B).

A-27

Conclusion

This case, in essence, raises a de-

ceptively simple issue. The panel which

wrote the Keyes opinion in July, 1976

squarely decided that the Superior Court

had no subject-matter jurisdiction over

the controversy (everything else said in

the opinion is the rankest dictum). That

decision was based on an earlier Burling-

ton I opinion in January, 1976 signed by

the same two judges who wrote the majority

opinion in Keyes. That earlier opinion

had been vacated by the full court in

April, 1976 before Keyes was written.

The two judges, however, repeated in Keyes

in July what had been vacated in April

by the full court. Counsel for Keyes was

never informed directly or indirectly,

that the earlier Burlington I opinion

had been vacated by the full Court and

based all of his subsequent actions in

A-28 A-29

the case on the assumption that this ear- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

lier Burlington I opinion was still in

I hereby certify that a copy of the

full force and effect. foregoing Motion to the Court En Banc to

Promptly upon learning the true fact Withdraw the Mandate of this Court in No.

that the full Court had vacated that opi- 8790 Issued April 26, 1977 During this Same

nion before Keyes was decided, counsel for Term in Order to Prevent Injustice and

Keyes filed this motion. Grant Hearing En Banc in No. 8790 Because

It is rather hard to think of a series of District of Columbia v. Burlington De-

of events which more effectively could deny cided June 13, 1977, was mailed, postage

the 33,000 Keyes taxpayers equal protec- prepaid, this 7th day of July, 1977, to

tion of the laws and the right to a full Louis Robbins, Esq., Assistant Corpora-

and fair hearing. tion Counsel, D.C., District Building,

Respectfully submitted, 14th and E Streets, N. W., Washington,

— D. C. 20004, Counsel for Appellants.

GILBERT HAHN, JR., ESO. ’ -

PHILIP W. AMRAM, ESQ.

MARY KATHLEEN HITE, ESQ. GILBERT HAHN, JR., ESQ.

Wolf _sck, Schorr and

Sc chen

llth . oor

1150 Connecticut Avenue,N.W.

Washington, D. C. 20036

(202) 783-3344

Counsel for Appellees

A-30 Exhibit A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 74-1482

Metropolitan Washington Coali

tion for Clean Air, et al.

Civil Ac-

tion 1424-73

Vv.

District of Columbia, et al.

Appellants

No. 74-1507

Metropolitan Washington Coali

tion for Clean Air, et al.

Appellants

Civil Ac-

tion 1424-73

Vv.

District of Columbia

)

)

=)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

-)

)

)

)

)

)

A Municipal Corporation )

MOTION TO RECALL MANDATE

On the grounds and for the reasons set

forth below, appellee-appellants in the

above-entitled cause move the Court to re-

call the mandate issued on March 1l, 1975.

The order issued by the Court granting

the motion of the Metropolitan Washington

Coalition for Clean Air for summary reversal

A-31

in No. 74-1507, dismissing the appeal in

74-1482, and directing the Clerk to

promptly certify the order to the District

Court has left the appellee-appellants

without an opportunity to move the Court

for reconsideration of its order. The

order states that an opinion of Court

will be filed at a later date. Until

the appellee-appellants have had the

opportunity to study the opinion of this

Court, they will have no way of deter-

mining the grounds upon which the Court

has entered the order.

The Court is therefore requested to

recall its mandate in order to give the

appellee-appellants the opportunity to

move this Court for reconsideration

should that be advisable after the

opinion has issued.

A-32

/c/ C. Francis Murphy

C. FRANCIS MURPHY

Corporation Counsel, D. C.

/s/ Louis P. Robbins

LOUIS P. ROBBINS

Principal Assistant Cor-

poration Counsel, D.C.

/s/ John C. Salyer

JOHN C. SALYER

Assistant Corporation

Counsel, D. C.

Attorneys for District

of Columbia

District Building

Washington, D.C. 20004

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the

foregoing motion to recall mandate was

mailed, postage prepaid, to Gilbert Hahn,

Jr., Esquire, Amram, Hahn & Sandground,

700 Colorado Building, Washington, D.C.

20005, this 13th day of March, 1975.

/s/ John C. Salyer

Assistant Corporation

Counsel, D. C.

A-33

Exhibit B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

NO. 74-1482 SEPTEMBER TERM, 1974

Civil Action 1488-73

Metropolitan Washington Coalition

for Clean Air, et al.

Vv. FILED MAR 31 1975

District of Columbia, HUGH E. KLINE

et al., Clerk

Ap. liants

NO. 74-1507 Civil Action 1424-73

Metropolitan Washington Coalition

for Clean Air, et al.,

Appellants

Vv.

District of Columbia,

a municipal corporation

Before: Wright and Leventhal, Circuit

Judges

On consideration of appellees-appel-

lants' motions for extension of time for re-

consideration and to recall mandate, and of

the oppositions thereto, it is

A-34

ORDERED by the Court that the afore-

said motions are granted and the Clerk of

the District Court is requested to return

forthwith the certified copy of this

Court's order of March 11, 1975, and, it

is

FURTHER ORDERED by the Court that

the time for filing a motion for recon-

sideration is extended for a period of 10

days from the issuance of this Court's

opinion.

Per Curiam

For the Court:

HUGH E. KLINE, Clerk

By: /s/ Robert A. Bonner

Robert A. Bonner

Chief Deputy Clerk

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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