Petition — Keyes v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Supreme Court brief1978
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
Supreme Court, U. S.
FILED
OCT 27 1977
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OcToBER TERM, 977
™ = 6 1 5
ARTHUR H. Keyes and LUCILLE KEYEs,
On behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,
Petitioners
V.
THE District or CoLUMBIA CouRT OF APPEALS, et ul.,
Respondents
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PETITION FOR
WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND PETITION FOR
WRIT OF MANDAMUS
GILBERT HAHN, JR., Esq.
11th Floor
1150 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
Attorney for Petitioners
DENNIS OAKES
Mary KATHLEEN HITE
Wo tr, BLock, ScHoRR AND
So.is-CoHEN
11th Floor
1150 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
Of Counsel
Press or Byron 8S. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WasHINGTON, D. C.
INDEX
Motion for Leave to File Peti-
tion for Writ of Mandamus. .... 1
Petition for Writ of Mandamus to
the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals, Particularly to the
Honorable Kelly and the Honor-
able Gallagher, Associate Judges
and the Honorable Pair, Asso-
ciate Judge, Retired, of said
Court of Appeals ...+«-e«eee-s.
Opinions Below. ..«<«sexeecvees
eee. 6s. 6 6 en © ate 6 8 4
qo uu ellUWwW
Question Presented ....+.-+«. -«
Constitutional Provisions In-
Ul 6 6 6 «oe ete 6 6 lw] 8 6
Statement of the Case .....s. - 6
Reasons for Granting the Writ... 9
Gaomeewesegm scescceceveuxuvctenvse
Appendix
Order of the Court of Appeals
dated October 11, 1977. ..... A-l
Order of the Court of Appeals
dated October 13, 1977. . .. . . A-3
Petitioners’ “Motion to the
Court En Banc to Withdraw the
Mandate of This Court In Order
to Prevent Injustice and Grant
Hearing En Banc in No. 8790
Because Of District of Colum-
bia v. Burlington, Decided |
Tone is 1577 : _ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
PETITION FOR
WRIT OF MANDAMUS
ii
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1977
NO.
ARTHUR H. KEYES and
LUCILLE KEYES,
On behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated,
Petitioners
Ve.
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
COURT OF APPEALS, e* al.,
Respondents
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PETITION FOR
WRIT OF MANDAMUS
Petitioners respectfully move this Court
for leave to file the petition for writ of
mandamus, hereto annexed, under Section 16°1
of Title 28 of the United States Code, direct-
ed to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,
=2<
and particularly the Honorable Catherine B.
Kelly, the Honorable George R. Gallagher,
and the Honorable Hubert B. Pair, Judges of
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Respectfully submitted,
Gilbert Hahn, Jr., Esq.
Wolf, Block, Schorr and
Solis-Cohen
llth Floor
1150 Conn. Ave., N. W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
783-3344
Attorney for Petitioners
PETITION FOR
WRIT OF MANDAMUS
=-3-
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1977
NO.
ARTHUR H. KEYES and
LUCILLE KEYES,
On behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated,
Petitioners
Vv.
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
COURT OF APPEALS, et al.,
Respondents
PETITION
FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS, AND
PARTICULARLY TO THE HONORABLE KELLY
AND THE HONORABLE GALLAGHER, ASSOCIATE
JUDGES AND THE HONORABLE PAIR, ASSO-
CIATE JUDGE, RETIRED, OF SAID COURT
OF APPEALS
Petitioners, Arthur and Lucille Keyes,
-4-
et al., pray that a writ of mandamus issue
to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
and particularly to the Honorable Catherine
B. Kelly and the Honorable George R. Gallag-
her and the Honorable Hubert B. Pair, Judges
of said Court of Appeals, directing and com-
manding the aforesaid judges and the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals to withdraw and
stay the Court's mandate in the District of
Columbia v. Keyes, 362 A.2d 729 (1976), sole-
ly to allow petitioners to apply for a writ
of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the
United States.
OPINIONS BELOW
The per curiam order of the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals in the instant case
denying petitioners' Motion to Withdraw and
Stay the Court's Mandate Pending Application
-5-
The per curiam order of the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals denying peti-
tioners' "Motion to The Court En Banc to
Withdraw the Mandate of This Court in No.
8790 Issued April 26, 1977 During this
Same Term in Order to Prevent Injustice
and Grant Hearing En Banc in No. 8790 Be-
cause of District of Columbia v. Burling-
ton Decided June 13, 1977" is unreported
and is reprinted in the Appendix, infra,
p.A-3.
JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of this Court is
invoked under Section 165l(a) of Title
28, United States Code.
Petitioners have sought the relief
requested here from the highest court in
the District of Columbia and have been
to the Supreme Court of the United States denied. Therefore, this Court is the only
for a Writ of Certiorari is unreported and is court that can now grant the relief sought.
reprinted in the Appendix, infra, p. A-l.
-6-
QUESTION PRESENTED
If the Petitioners ultimately prevail
in the Supreme Court through the writ of
certiorari process and the result is an
order to the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals to withdraw its mandate and to
grant petitioners a hearing en banc would
‘not petitioners be denied their constitu-
tional right to a hearing if that relief
were rendered worthless for the reason that
the current term of the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals had by then expired?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED
The Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides in part:
No person shall. . .be deprived
of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law. . .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioners seek a withdrawal and stay
of mandate in order to file a timely peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari from an order
~Jo=
of the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals of September 13, 1977 denying Peti-
tioners "Motion to the Court En Banc to
Withdraw the Mandate of This Court in No.
8790 Issued April 26, 1977 During this
Same Term In Order to Prevent Injustice
and Grant Hearing En Banc in No. 8790
Because of District of Columbia v. Bur-
lington, Decided June 13, 1977". (Appen-
dix, infra, p. A-5)
On September 22, 1977 petitioners
moved the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals to withdraw and stay its mandate
in District of Columbia v. Keyes, pend-
ing application to the Supreme Court for
a writ of certiorari. Petitioners'
Motion was denied, per curiam, on October
li, 1977.
The mandate in this case issued April
26, 1977 during the present term of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals,
on
and petitioners’ "Motion to the Court En
Banc to Withdraw the Mandate, etc." was
timely filed during the present term of
Court. Petitioners intend to file a peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari within the
time allowed by law. However, pursuant
to Rule 2 of the Rules of the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals, the current
term of the Court of Appeals will expire
on December 31, 1977. Petitioners cannot
predict that the writ of certiorari pro-
cess will be completed before December 31,
1977. It can, however, be assumed that
should the writ be granted, any further
proceedings in the Supreme Court will not
be completed during the current term of
the Court of Appeals. (January 1 to Decem-
ber 31, 1977.)
Petitioners are simply asking this
Court to order the Court of Appeals to with-
draw and stay its mandate during the pen-
ae ed
dency in this Court of the petitioners’
petition for a writ of certiorari.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
Petitioners’ petition for a writ of
certiorari will be irreparably prejudiced
if the mandate of the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals is not withdrawn and
stayed pending the preparation, filing,
consideration and decision on the peti-
tion and any further proceedings in the
Supreme Court of the United States.
Petitioners will suffer irreparable
harm if the mandate is not withdrawn and
stayed while petitioners seek Supreme
Court review of their serious due process
claims set forth in the "Motion to The
Court En Banc to Withdraw the Mandate,
etc." denied by the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals on September 13, 1977.
There can be no prejudice to respondents
from the granting of this motion. The
2 1 0-
granting of the motion will, however, safe-
guard petitioners’ due process rights to an
effective remedy should petitioners prevail
in the Supreme Court during the next term
of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
CONCLUSION
In the absence of the issuance of a
writ of mandamus by this Court, the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals will have suc-
cessfully deprived petitioners of due pro-
cess of law.
Petitioners respectfully urge that the
Writ of Mandamus issue.
Respectfully submitted,
GILBERT HAHN, JR., ESQ.
Wolf, Block, Schorr and
Solis-Cohen
llth Floor
1150 Conn. Ave., N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
783-3344
Attorney for Petitioners
APPENDIX
A-1
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
COURT OF APPEALS
FILED Oct 11 1977
Alexander L. Stevas
Clerk
NO. 8790 January Term, 1977
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
a Municipal Corporation, and
WALTER E. WASHINGTON, and
KENNETH BACK,
Appellant
Vv. Tax Div.No. 2214
ARTHUR H. KEYES, JR., and
LUCILLE KEYES,
On behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated,
Appellees.
BEFORE: Kelly and Gallagher, Associate
Judges, and Pair, Associate
Judge, Retired.
ORDER
On consideration of appellees’ motion
to withdraw and stay this Court's mandate
pending application to the Supreme Court
of the United States for a writ of certio-
rari, it is
A-2
ORDERED that appellees’ motion is
denied.
PER CURIAM
Copies to:
Honorable Joyce Hens Green
Associate Judge, Superior Court
of the District of Columbia
Clerk, Superior Court of the
District of Columbia
Louis P. Robbins, Esquire
Principal Deputy Corporation Counsel
Gilbert Hahn, Jr., Esquire
1150 Connecticut Avenue NW,
20036
—- -—-~
A-3
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
COURT OF APPEALS
FILED Sep 13 1977
Alexander L. Stevas
Clerk
NO. 8790 January Term, 1977
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
a Municipal Corporation, and
WALTER E. WASHINGTON, and
KENNETH BACK,
Appellants,
Vv. Tax Div.No. 2214
ARTHUR H. KEYES, JR., and
LUCILLE KEYES,
On behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated,
Appellees.
BEFORE: Newman, Chief Judge; Kelly, Kern,
Gallagher, Nebeker, Yeagley, Harris
and Mack, Associate Judges; Pair,
Associate Judge, Retired.
On consideration of appellees' "Motion
to the Court En Banc to Withdraw the Man-
date of this Court in No. 8790 Issued April
26, 1977 During This Same Term in Order to
Prevent Injustice and Grant Hearing En Banc
in No. 8790 Because of District of Columbia
v. Burlington Decided June 13, 1977" and of
responsive pleadings filed with respect
A-5
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
thereto, it is COURT OF APPEALS
ORDERED by the Court en banc that REC'D JUL 7 1977
appellees’ aforesaid motion is denied.
Alexander L. Stevas
others similarly situated
Gilbert Hahn, Jr., Esquire
1150 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Appellees
llth Floor (36)
PER CURIAM Clerk
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, a :
Copies to: | Municipal Corporation, and =:
WALTER E. WASHINGTON and :
Honorable Joyce Hens Green KENNETH BACK :
Judge, Superior Court of the District ;
of Columbia Appellants :
Clerk, Superior Court of the District v. : NO. 8790
of Columbia :
ARTHUR H. KEYES, JR., and :
Louis P. Robbins, Esquire LUCILLE KEYES, :
Principal Deputy Corporation Counsel On behalf of themselves and :
MOTION TO THE COURT EN BANC TO WITHDRAW
THE MANDATE OF THIS COURT IN NO. 8790
ISSUED APRIL 26, 1977 DURING THIS SAME
TERM IN ORDER TO PREVENT INJUSTICE AND
GRANT HEARING EN BANC IN NO. 8790 BE-
CAUSE OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. BUR-
LINGTON DECIDED JUNE 13, 1977
Come now Appellees in the above-entit-
led case, through counsel, and pray to the
entire bench of this Court that it withdraw
the mandate of this Court in No. 8790 issued
A-6
April 26, 1977 in order to prevent injus-
tice and, following the withdrawal of the
mandate, grant a hearing en banc. As
grounds therefor appellees state the fol-
lowing:
1. Relief Requested: Appellees move
the Court for the following relief:
(a) Withdrawal of the mandate in
No. 8790 issued April 26, 1977, and
(b) Granting a hearing en banc.
2. Grounds for Relief.
The panel of the Court which adjudi-
cated the Keyes matter created two basic
"due process" problems.
(i) The panel specifically re-
quested the parties to comment on the
applicability of Burlington I which
had been drafted by a panel contain-
ing two of the judges who were con-
sidering Keyes. The full Court later
vacated Burlington I prior to the
A-7
Keyes decision. Nevertheless, the
panel decided Keyes on the vacated
principle of Burlington I asserting
an absence of subject-matter juris-
diction.
(ii) The vacating of Burling-
ton I was communicated to the Dis-
trict but never communicated to coun-
sel for the Keyes taxpayers. This
gave the District a one-sided advan-
tage over the Keyes taxpayers and pre-
vented counsel for the taxpayers from
taking advantage of the vacating of
Burlington I. Only a hearing can re-
dress that damage. At that hearing,
counsel can reargue the appeal based
on the non-existence of the Burling-
ton I principle.
3. What happened.
District of Columbia v. Keyes, 362 A.
2d 729 (1976) was argued December 5, 1974.
A-8
Following briefing and argument, on Febr-
uary 27, 1976, the panel (Judges Kelly,
Gallagher and Pair) issued an Order as
follows:
This cause came on for considera-
tion on the record on appeal and
the court heard argument of coun-
sel. A question has arisen which
the parties did not cover in their
briefs, and accordingly, the
Court desires the parties to sub-
mit supplemental memoranda addres-
sed to the following question:
Bearing in mind (a) that this
Court in District of Columbia v.
Green, (310 A.2d 848 (1973)) speci-
fically approved the trial court's
finding that an injunctive remedy
was available in that case due to
the “exceptional and extraordi-
nary” circumstances there present-
ed (at 853) and (b) that this Court
recently reiterated that proposi-
tion in District of Columbia v.
Burlington Apartment House Co.
T7A The Burlington Hotel, D.C.App.,
. (No. 7986, January 29,
1576) at pages 4-5 of the slip
opinion, are the a llees in this
case barred from the relier sought
by reason of their failure to pur-
sue their statutory remedies in
seeking refunds for the fiscal
year here involved? in addressing
themselves to the question, the par-
ties should discuss District of
A-9
Columbia v. Berenter, 151 U.S.
App. 196, 466 F.2d 367 (1972).
(Emphasis supplied.)
Counsel for appellants shall
cause their supplemental memor-
andum to be filed on or before
March 8, 1976, and counsel for
appellees shail cause their
memorandum to be filed on or be-
fore March 15, 1976, and coun-
sel shall cause their respec-
tive pleadings to be personally
served on opposing counsel.
Per Curiam
The District filed its memorandum on
March 15, 1976. Taxpayers filed thei:
memorandum on March 24, 1976. On April 23,
1976 this Court vacated the January 29,
1976 Burlington I opinion. See page 2
slip opinion in D.C. v. Burlington decided
June 13, 1977 (Burlington II).
On April 23, 1976, counsel for the
District of Columbia was notified that
Burlington I had been vacated. Counsel
for the Keyes taxpayers was never so noti-
fied.
A-10
Keyes was decided on July 23, 1976
specifically on the Burlington I princi-
ple, but without mentioning Burlington I
by name. Taxpayers moved timely on Sep-
tember 16, 1976 for rehearing and hearing
en banc. Of course, taxpayers did not in-
clude in that motion the overwhelming
argument that Keyes had been decided on
the Burlington I principle after Burling-
ton I had been vacated. They could not
have included this argument because only
the District was informed that Burling-
ton I had been vacated.
4. What harm did this do?
What happened caused two kinds of
harm: substantive and procedural.
(A) The substantive harm. The key
holding in Keyes was to some extent fore-
cast in the February 27, 1976 question to
counsel: viz: "Are the Appellees in this
case barred from relief sought by reason
A-11
of their failure to pursue their statutory
remedies in seeking refunds for the fiscal
year here involved?" In other words, were
the Keyes taxpayers barred from all juris-
diction in the Superior Court to have a tax
refund because they had not first taken
their case to the Board of Equalization and
Review?
The only case in the District of Colum-
bia that had ever supported such a principle
was Burlington
But, before Keyes was decided, Burling-
ton I was vacated by the full Court without
notice to cc insel for taxpayers. Keyes was
then decided on the Burlington I principle
of "failure to pursue their statutory reme-
dies.”
Let us look at this Court's opinion in
Keyes.
Recovery of taxes illegally or
erroneously assessed and volun-
tarily paid was not permitted at
common law and is a matter with-
great peril."
A-12
in the purview of the legisia-
tive branch. Therefore, refunds
of taxes so assessed and paid
will not be made absent an
authorizing statute. District
of Columbia v. McFall, 88 U.S.
App.D.C. 217, 188 F.2d 991 (1951);
Lindner v. District of Columbia,
D.C.Mun.App., 32 A.2da 540 (1943).
Under the statutory procedure
applicable to this case, the re-
covery of refunds through appeal
to the Superior Court requires,
as a first step, a complaint to
the Board of Equalization and Re-
view. Subject matter urisdiction
of the Superior Court does not
attach until that prerequisite has
been satisfied, ict cata Faluad based
on a final de Scomtnahian of the
Superior Court presupposes that
the taxpayer has complied with the
procedure mandated by the legisla-
ture. m, "aggrieved" for any rea-
son, taxpayer must a al with
ae in the Sormitted time to to
zation and Review. D.c.
of Es 1573-5 47-709. This was not
done in this case. The taxpayers
failed to follow their administra-
tive remedies for fiscal year 1973.
(Keyes, 362 A.2d 732-3) (Emphasis
supplied.)
Further, the Court issued a warning
that taxpayers would "bypass the Board at
2d, supra at 734)
(Keyes, Footnote ll, 362 A.
A-13
ll. We note that the fiscal
year 1974 taxpayers who resorted
to the Board of Equalization and
Review and raised the issue of un-
equal debasement factors found
the Board unresponsive to their
arguments. Hence, in Green, where
only injunctive relief was sought,
we stated that a taxpayer in that
case had “no meaningful ability to
challenge his assessment at all"
because the Board declined to in-
quire into the non-judgmental as-
pects of the assessment process.
District of Columbia v. Green,
Supra at 856. This was one of the
extraordinary circumstances upon
which the grant of injunctive re-
lief in Green was based. However,
the fact that an administrative
body may wrongly perceive the
nature or scope of its powers or
responsibilities in a given in-
stance is not a justification for
bypassing that body in all in-
stances when it is an essential
element in a procedure of purely
statutory origin. In fact, it
would be a rare instance when tax-
payers would not bypass the Board
at great peril.
The substantive harm in all this is
that not one word of this was the decided
law of the District of Columbia on the date
the Keyes decision came down. Burlington
I, which had said exactly this, had been
withdrawn and vacated. There was no hoid-
A-14
ing in any other decision in the District
that bypassing the Board excluded all
jurisdiction in the Superior Court to hear
a tax refund case.
Nothing sustained the key sentence in
Keyes: "Subject matter jurisdiction does
not attach until that prerequisite (com-
plaint to the Board) has been satisfied."
When the Burlington case was ulti-
mately decided in 1977, following reargu-
ment en banc, (Burlington II) the princi-
ple of Burlington I was specifically re-
pudiated.
We begin by clarifying what is
not at issue in this case. Unques-
tionably there are jurisdictional
prerequisites to the Superior
Court's consideration of a tax-
payer's challenge. See D.C. Code
1973, §§ 47-709, -2403, and
-~2404; D.C. Code 1976 Supp.,
§ 47-646(i). See also George Hy-
man Construction Co. v. District
of Columbia, D.C.App., 3 "
; District of Columbia
v. Berenter, 151 U. S.App.D.C. 156,
466 F.2d 367 (1972). Prior pay-
ment of the tax assessed and due
A-15
at the time of the filing of a
petition in the Tax Division of
the trial court is one such pre-
requisite. Under certain cir-
cumstances, the taxpayer first
must complain to the Board of
Equalization and Review before
seeking relief in the trial court.
(Emphasis supplied.)
What are the “certain circumstances"
which reguire prior complaint to the Board?
The answer is more obviously defined
by stating the circumstances where prior
complaint is not required.
As this Court said: (Burlington II,
Slip opinion, pp. 9-10)
If we were to accept the Dis-
trict's argument, Burlington
would be compelled to contest
a particular assessment-~al-
ready in the process of being
shown to be unlawful--through
the Board to the Superior Court
in every successive fiscal year.
Such a multiplicity of litiga-
tion on a single issue not only
would be impractical and fname A
able, but also has been deemed
unwarranted by this court. In
pistrict of Columbia v. Green,
48 (1973),
we held. that when taxpayers can
A-16
show that in reality they had
no effective administrative reme-
dy, the fact that they have “by-
pass[(ed] the useless administra-
tive procedure” will not deprive
the trial court of the power to
grant equitable relief. It is
plain that any appeal to the Board
concerning the 1974 assessment,
based as it inevitably would have
been on the identical arguments
which the Board already had reject-
ed in connection with the 1973
assessment, would have been a
futile procedure which the tax-
payer should not be penalized for
bypassing. (Emphasis supplied.)
This is exactly the situation in Keyes,
a class action for 33,000 taxpayers on exac-
tly the same single issue, where there can
be no denial of "multiplicity of litigation",
"useless administrative procedure" and “futile
procedure”.
Even more striking is the effect of the
dissenting opinion in Burlington II, which
was signed by the two judges who had writ-
ten the majority opinion in Keyes. +/ It
says:
The statutory scheme for re-
17 Judge Pair, now retired, was also on the
Keyes panel.
A-17
lief from allegedly inaccurate
fiscal year assessments is found
in D.C. Code 47-709 et al. and
the administrative remedies out-
lined there must be exhausted. ..
Appellee had an adequate remedy
at law to contest his 1974
assessment but failed to invoke
the jurisdiction of the Superior
Court. . .D.C. v. Keyes. (slip
opinion, pp.13-17)
How can all this be summarized?
Keyes was decided by two judges!/
based on a legal principle of subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction contained in a vacated
preliminary Burlington opinion, which was
followed by a final Burlington opinion de-
claring exactly the opposite principle of
subject-matter jurisdiction. And the two
judges who decided Keyes filed a dissent in
the final Burlington opinion citing Keyes
as the support for their dissent.
Here is the ultimate bootstrap on
which 33,000 taxpayers are deprived of
their just recovery on the basis of an
ln me agg , was on
A-18
asserted absence of subject-matter juris-
diction.
(B) The Procedural Harm. The Corpora-
tion Counsel as counsel in Burlington, was
notified in the Burlington case on April
23, 1976 that Burlington had been withdrawn
and vacated and that the case had been set
for argument en banc. Counsel for the
Keyes taxpayers who were not counsel in
Burlington was never notified of this
either by the Court or by the Corporation
Counsel.
The slip opinion in Burlington I was
printed and distributed prior to its being
withdrawn and vacated. However, the order
withdrawing and vacating the opinion in
Burlington I was never published anywhere.
27 We have verified with the Clerk’s Office that
|
|
:
2/
A-19
How would anyone know the opinion had
been vacated? Up to the date the final
opinion was issued in Burlington II, only
by checking this Court's docket in Bur-
lington would any lawyer know that the
preliminary opinion in Burlington I had
been withdrawn and vacated.
Even more striking is the fact that
the vacating of Burlington I was apparent-
ly not fully circulated in the Corpora-
tion Counsel's office.
A series of cases was tried before
Judge John G. Penn in the Tax Division
of Superior Court, during the period
March 1, 1976 to June 1, 1977 in each of
which Burlington I was cited to Judge
Penn by the Assistants Corporation Coun-
sel with no disclosure that Burlington I
had been vacated. It is clear that the
particular Assistants Corporation Counsel
who were handling those cases were not
A-20
aware of the vacating of Burlington I and,
obviously, Judge Penn and opposing counsel
in these cases were not aware of it.2/
37 (a) D.C.R.L.A. and L'Enfant Plaza Properties,
Inc. v. D.C., Tax Docket Trial Court's
Memorandum Order and Trial Findings, citing Bur-
lington I, was entered March 23, 1976 and the Final
order was signed 4/14/76. District of Columbia's
Notice of Appeal was filed 5/14/76 but was subse-
quently withdrawn by stipulation.
(b) D.C.R.L.A. and Bresler and Reiner, Inc.
v. D.C., Tax Docket 2288: Trial Court"s opinion and
order was dated April 30, 1976 and it cited Bur
ton I. Final Order was signed May 26, 1976. No
appeal was taken by the District of Columbia.
(c) D.C.R.L.A. and Bresler and Reiner, Inc.
v. D.C., Tax x Docket 2289. Trial Court Opinion and
Order was dated September 30, 1976 and cited
on - Final Order was signed October 20,
ict of Columbia filed a notice of
appeal and then dismissed the appeal.
(a) D.C.R.L.A. and Trilon Plaza Co. v. D.C.,
Tax Dockets 2311 and 2374 were tried in February
and March, 1976 and are awaiting decision in the
Trial Court. There were repeated citations to
the Burlington I opinion during the course of the
trial.
(e) D.C.R.L.A. and Trilon Plaza Co. v. D.C.,
Tax Docket 2372: The case was tried May 17 and 18,
1977 and during the trial there were repeated
cetations ae I. The case was settled by
stipulation between the parties.
Burl I was also cited by counsel in
Peti for Judgment filed in October,
A-21
The lack of procedural due process is
obvious.
Before the panel decided Keyes it
specifically asked for comment on Burling-
ton I on February 27, 1976. The comments
were filed March 15, 1976 and March 24,
1976. Burlington I was then withdrawn and
vacated April 23, 1976 without notice to
counsel for taxpayers. Keyes was decided
on July 23, 1976 squarely based on the
Burlington I principle, but with no refer-
ence to the fact that the Court had vaca-
ted Burlington I.
Counsel for Keyes were deprived of
the powerful value of the vacating of
37 (cont'd)
976 in Tax Dockets 2369, 2370, 2375, and 2374.
A-22
Burlington I and the substantial doubt
thereby cast on the validity of the
Burlington principle.
Counsel for Keyes, in preparing the
petition for reargument in Keyes filed
September 16, 1976, did not include the
overwhelming argument that Keyes had been
decided on the Burlington I principle
after Burlington I had been vacated, with
notice only to one side in the case.
If we had been told that Burlington
I had been vacated, our petition for re-
hearing en banc filed September 16, 1976
would have contained a paragraph something
like the following:
"This opinion is identical
with the opinion in Burlington
handed down on Janua 29, 1976.
Like Burlington, it finds that
the failure to follow the adminis-
trative path annuls the subject-
matter jurisdiction of the Supe-
rior Court. Burlington has been
vacated by this Court and has been
set down for rehearing en banc
before the full Court.
A-23
This case should receive
identical treatment, since it
raises the identical issue of
subject-matter jurisdiction.
We respectfully request that
the opinion in Keyes be similar-
ly vacated, and e appeal held
in abeyance until the decision in
Burlington, or preferably listed
for argument en banc on the same
day that Burlington will be heard."
We are confident that this Court in
September, 1976 would without question have
granted us the same treatment as Burlington.
The demands of equal treatment for both
sides and due process require that the
appellees have a fair hearing before this
Court. In the words of Justice Frankfurter,
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v.
44 (1951) (concurring opinion):
. « «"due process,” unlike some
legal rules, is not a technical
conception with a fixed content
unrelated to time, place and cir-
cumstances. Expressing as it
does in its ultimate analysis
respect enforced by law for that
feeling of just treatment which
A-24
has been evolved through cen-
turies of Anglo-American consti-
tutional history and civiliza-
tion, "due process” cannot be
imprisoned within the treache-
rous limits of any formula. Re-
presenting a profound attitude
of fairness between man and man,
and more particularly between
the individual and government,
"due process" is compounded of
history, past course cof deci-
sions, and stout confidence in
the strength of the democratic
faith which we profess. It is
not a yardstick. It is a pro-
cess. It is a delicate process
of adjustment inescapably invol-
ving the exercise of judgment by
those whom the Constitution en-
trusted with the unfolding of the
process.
Taxpayers respectfully ask the Court
for the "just treatment" required by the
due process guarantee.
5. Withdrawal of Mandate.
(a) Grounds. The mandate in
No. 8790 issued April 26, 1977. This is in
the January 1977 term. See Rule 2 of the
Rules of this Court. It is within the
power of this Court to withdraw the mandate
A-25
for "good cause". See Greater Boston
Television Corp. v. FCC, 149 U.S.App.D.C.
322, 463 F.2d 268, 276-79 (D.C.Cir. 1971)
(Leventhal, Tamm and MacKinnon J.J.).
Decision to recall mandate by an
appellate court will be granted for "good
cause" shown. "Good cause” is the show-
ing of a need to avoid injustice. It has
a foundation in the inherent power of the
4/
court— and may be done during the term
the mandate issued. >/
The basic principle authorizing an
appellate court to vacate any judgment
is as may be just under the circumstances.
In courts the power is also statu-
tory. 28 USCA §2106.
5/ In federal courts the mandate may issue
outside the term. 28 USCA §452.
A-26
Greater Boston Television Corp., supra.~
(b) Effect. No one is hurt by
the withdrawal of the mandate. The posi-
tion of the District has not changed. No
money has been spent by the District in
reliance on the mandate. The parties are
in exactly the same position they were in
in 1973.
67 We do not think the District will object
On procedural grounds in any case. In the
U. S. Court of Appeals in No. 74-1482, Met.
March 13, 1975 to - A
copy of the District's motion is a
(Exhibit A). As will appear, the Court on
March 31, 1976 granted the motion, which
had been opposed. As a result, the District
was ultimately able to reverse the result,
the closing of the Incinerator.
A copy of the Court's Order recalling man-
date is attached (Exhibit B).
A-27
Conclusion
This case, in essence, raises a de-
ceptively simple issue. The panel which
wrote the Keyes opinion in July, 1976
squarely decided that the Superior Court
had no subject-matter jurisdiction over
the controversy (everything else said in
the opinion is the rankest dictum). That
decision was based on an earlier Burling-
ton I opinion in January, 1976 signed by
the same two judges who wrote the majority
opinion in Keyes. That earlier opinion
had been vacated by the full court in
April, 1976 before Keyes was written.
The two judges, however, repeated in Keyes
in July what had been vacated in April
by the full court. Counsel for Keyes was
never informed directly or indirectly,
that the earlier Burlington I opinion
had been vacated by the full Court and
based all of his subsequent actions in
A-28 A-29
the case on the assumption that this ear- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
lier Burlington I opinion was still in
I hereby certify that a copy of the
full force and effect. foregoing Motion to the Court En Banc to
Promptly upon learning the true fact Withdraw the Mandate of this Court in No.
that the full Court had vacated that opi- 8790 Issued April 26, 1977 During this Same
nion before Keyes was decided, counsel for Term in Order to Prevent Injustice and
Keyes filed this motion. Grant Hearing En Banc in No. 8790 Because
It is rather hard to think of a series of District of Columbia v. Burlington De-
of events which more effectively could deny cided June 13, 1977, was mailed, postage
the 33,000 Keyes taxpayers equal protec- prepaid, this 7th day of July, 1977, to
tion of the laws and the right to a full Louis Robbins, Esq., Assistant Corpora-
and fair hearing. tion Counsel, D.C., District Building,
Respectfully submitted, 14th and E Streets, N. W., Washington,
— D. C. 20004, Counsel for Appellants.
GILBERT HAHN, JR., ESO. ’ -
PHILIP W. AMRAM, ESQ.
MARY KATHLEEN HITE, ESQ. GILBERT HAHN, JR., ESQ.
Wolf _sck, Schorr and
Sc chen
llth . oor
1150 Connecticut Avenue,N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
(202) 783-3344
Counsel for Appellees
A-30 Exhibit A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 74-1482
Metropolitan Washington Coali
tion for Clean Air, et al.
Civil Ac-
tion 1424-73
Vv.
District of Columbia, et al.
Appellants
No. 74-1507
Metropolitan Washington Coali
tion for Clean Air, et al.
Appellants
Civil Ac-
tion 1424-73
Vv.
District of Columbia
)
)
=)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
-)
)
)
)
)
)
A Municipal Corporation )
MOTION TO RECALL MANDATE
On the grounds and for the reasons set
forth below, appellee-appellants in the
above-entitled cause move the Court to re-
call the mandate issued on March 1l, 1975.
The order issued by the Court granting
the motion of the Metropolitan Washington
Coalition for Clean Air for summary reversal
A-31
in No. 74-1507, dismissing the appeal in
74-1482, and directing the Clerk to
promptly certify the order to the District
Court has left the appellee-appellants
without an opportunity to move the Court
for reconsideration of its order. The
order states that an opinion of Court
will be filed at a later date. Until
the appellee-appellants have had the
opportunity to study the opinion of this
Court, they will have no way of deter-
mining the grounds upon which the Court
has entered the order.
The Court is therefore requested to
recall its mandate in order to give the
appellee-appellants the opportunity to
move this Court for reconsideration
should that be advisable after the
opinion has issued.
A-32
/c/ C. Francis Murphy
C. FRANCIS MURPHY
Corporation Counsel, D. C.
/s/ Louis P. Robbins
LOUIS P. ROBBINS
Principal Assistant Cor-
poration Counsel, D.C.
/s/ John C. Salyer
JOHN C. SALYER
Assistant Corporation
Counsel, D. C.
Attorneys for District
of Columbia
District Building
Washington, D.C. 20004
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the
foregoing motion to recall mandate was
mailed, postage prepaid, to Gilbert Hahn,
Jr., Esquire, Amram, Hahn & Sandground,
700 Colorado Building, Washington, D.C.
20005, this 13th day of March, 1975.
/s/ John C. Salyer
Assistant Corporation
Counsel, D. C.
A-33
Exhibit B
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
NO. 74-1482 SEPTEMBER TERM, 1974
Civil Action 1488-73
Metropolitan Washington Coalition
for Clean Air, et al.
Vv. FILED MAR 31 1975
District of Columbia, HUGH E. KLINE
et al., Clerk
Ap. liants
NO. 74-1507 Civil Action 1424-73
Metropolitan Washington Coalition
for Clean Air, et al.,
Appellants
Vv.
District of Columbia,
a municipal corporation
Before: Wright and Leventhal, Circuit
Judges
On consideration of appellees-appel-
lants' motions for extension of time for re-
consideration and to recall mandate, and of
the oppositions thereto, it is
A-34
ORDERED by the Court that the afore-
said motions are granted and the Clerk of
the District Court is requested to return
forthwith the certified copy of this
Court's order of March 11, 1975, and, it
is
FURTHER ORDERED by the Court that
the time for filing a motion for recon-
sideration is extended for a period of 10
days from the issuance of this Court's
opinion.
Per Curiam
For the Court:
HUGH E. KLINE, Clerk
By: /s/ Robert A. Bonner
Robert A. Bonner
Chief Deputy Clerk
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.