intervernors brief — Greene County Planning Board v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Supreme Court brief1978

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On Petilicn for a Writ of Ceriiorari to the

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BRIEF FOR INTERVENOR, POWER AUTHORITY

OF Trit STATE OF NEW YORK, IN OPPOSITION

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Opinions Below ee Sn Ons He Ae 1

Question Presented FL LO ON 2

Statutes Involved 0 covets 2

Statement of the Case RR LT oe 3

Argument g

I—The court of appeals correctly held that the

FPC cannot reimburse petitioners for their at-

torney’s fees absent explicit statutory authori-

zation | eae CES ee

I1—The decision of the court of appeals was not an

imperniissive invasion of the province of the

legislative braned .....................0:.ccccsssccccsssecesseceeseors 16

Conclusion ....._ | PAP Rem ND ae 19

,*

aa

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PAGE

Cases:

Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,

21 U.S. 240 (1975) .. ; Lo cess POSSI

Fischer v. United States Department of Transporta-

tion, 450 F.Supp. 1549 (D.Mass. 1977)... 13

Fitzgerald v. United States Civi! Service Commission,

dot Pitd iisG (D.C.Cir. W77) oo... ee

Greene County Planning Board v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412

(2nd Cir.) (Greene County I); cert. denied, 409

U.S. 849 (1972) | passim

Greene County Planning Board v. FPC, 490 ¥ F.2d 256

(2d Cir. 1973) (Greene County I) 3

Greene County Planning Board v. FPC, 559 F. 2d

4227 (2d Cir, 1977) 000. ee. —————

Lythe v. Commissioners of Eleciious of Union County,

o41 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1976) 0 on... .

Trapp v. United States (10th Cir. No. 76-1801, wi-

reported opinion decided January 26,1977)... 12

Turner v. FCC, 514 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1975) .. 12

United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (1976) . 13

Wright v. Jackson, 522 F.2d 955 (4ih Cir. 1975) 14

Statutes:

Aci of August 15, 1953, Section 3 (16 U.S.C. 828) 3,15

Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §15) .................... Parlor we 11

Clean Air Act, §304(d) 0.00 occ coeceeee. —_ 12

Communications Act (47 U S. C. $206) . 11

Department of Energy cananenn Act, PL. 95-91,

91 Stat. 565

PAGE

™~ - rt. sey ° ,oe qc (For 197‘ »

I edera! Power Act, Section 5( i) (lo v S.C. ys JO( ‘ )) é

. = ; ; - ren

Federal Power Act, Section W(e) (lO USC.

“803(e)) 2,8, 12, 15, 14, 16

r : ‘ a . ‘ . a Fy)

[Inierstate Conimerce Act (40) U.S.C. 16,(2)) 12

‘ a . oa stZTTe MN £0980 ; »

Toxie Subsiance Conirol Act (15 U.S.C. §2620(4)(¢)) = 12

Regulation:

is U.P.R. §11.20(D) (2), (3) lo, 16

Other Authorities:

DOK Delegation Order No. 0204-1, 10 C.PLR. $1001 2

re Opinion No. 751 3

EPC Opinion No. 7ol-A )

The Compiroller Generali of the United States,

Matier of Costs of Intervention, Nuclear Regwa-

iory Conunission, B-92z88 passin

New York Public Authorities Law, Section 1002 (Me-

KNKinney) : 3

IN THE

Siuprenve Court of the United States

October Term, 1977

No. 77-481

lg Gm ff

Greene County Pxianninc Boarp, Town or GREENVILLE,

Town or Dunnam, New York and AssocisTION FOB THE

PrREseRVATION OF Dunnam VALLEY,

Petitioners,

against

FreperaL Power ComMIssion,

Respondent,

Power AvutTuority or THE State or Now Yor, ef ano.,

Intervenors

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

BRIEF FOR INTERVENOR, POWER AUTHORITY

OF THE STATE CF NEW YORK, IN OPPOSITION

Opinions Below

The opinion of the panel of the Second Circuit, which

preceded en banc review (App. C of Pet.),* and the opinion

of the Second Cireuit en banc are both reported at 559 F.2d

i. References to material in the Appendix to the Petition herein

will be made in this manner.

o7 ) :

22 The portions of the Federal Power Commission

(the **FPC’’) orders which are relevant to this action are

aunexed to the Petition as Appendices E and F.

Question Presented

Is ithe Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’ (Com-

missien or FERC) authorized by law to reimburse inter-

venors in a licensing proceeding under Part I of the Fed-

eral Power Act for counsel fees and expenses!

Statutes Involved

oa

Section 3 (7) of the Federal Power Act (lt U.S.C.

)796 (7)) provides:

‘*The words defined in this seciton shall have the

following meanings for the purposes of this act, to wit:

‘*(7) municipality means a city, county. irriga-

tion district, drainage district, or other political sub-

Civision or ageney of a State competent under the laws

thereof to carry on the business of developing, trans-

mitting, utilizing, or distributing power * * *”’

Section 10 (e) of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C.

‘S03 (e)) provides, in pertinent part:

‘All licenses issued under this Part [Part 1} shall

ve on the following conditions—

2. The licensing jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission

over hydroelectric projects under Part I of the Federal Power Act

was delegated to tne Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (the

“FERC”), an independent comniission in the new Department of

Energy (the “DOE”) effective October 1. 1977. Departnient of

Eneregy Organization Act, P.L. 93-91, 91 Stat. 565, DOE Delega-

tion Order No. 0204-1, 10 C.F.R. 1001. To avoid conf: sion and for

the sake of consistency with prior proceedings in this liugation most

references herein will be to the Federal Power Commission (the

“FPC” or “Commission”) rather than to FERC.

3

‘‘(e) That the licensee shall pay to the United

Staies reasonable annual charges in an amount to be

fixed by the Commission for the purpose of reimburs-

ing the Uniied States for the costs of administration

of this Part * * *”’

Section 3 of the Act of August 15, 1953 (16 U.S.C.

6828 (b)) provides, in pertinent part:

‘‘The Federal Power Commission in determining

the amounts of annual charges applicable to any such

project [owned by a State or municipality] may de-

termine the annual charges with reference to the actual

ccst of services incurred by the Commission with re-

spect to the project.”’

Statement of the Case

Power Authority of the State of New York (‘*Authori-

ty’’) is a political subdivision of the State of New York

(New York Public Authorities Law §1002, McKinney)

which qualifies it as a ‘‘municipality’’ under Section 3(7) of

the Federal Power Act. On August 15, 1968 the Authority

fled an application with the Federal Power Commission

for a license under Part I of the Federal Power Act to

construct, operate and maintain a pumped storage power

plant to be located in the Towns of Blenheim and Gilboa

in Schoharie County, New York (the Blenheim-Gilboa

Project) including three transmission lines connecting the

project to the inter-connected grid in New York State.

The Commission on June 6, 1969 issued a license for

the Blenheim-Gilboa Project (Power Authority of the

State of New York, Project No. 2685) bnt requested more

detailed information on the transmission lines. There-

after on November 24, 1960 the Authority filed with the

Conunission an application for approval of exhibits ce-

victing the lovations of the three transmission lines,

Inu May 1970 leave to intervene in the proceeding with

respect to the line from the Blenheim-Gilboa Project to

Leeds (a substation located near Catskill, New York) ap-

proximately JO miles from the project, was granted to pe-

titioner herein, Town of Durham, Association for the Pres-

ervation of Durham Vailey and Greene County VPii-

ning Board. A year later the Town of Greenville was

vranted intervention,

Several of the intervenors, including the Town of Dur:

ham and the Association for the Preservation of Dur-

ham Valley, fled motions with the Administrative Law

Judge and subsequently with the Commission asking that

the Commission, or alternatively the Authority pay inter-

venora’ OND elses including counsel's fe Cs in the proceeding.

The motions were denied by the examiner and by the Com-

Milssloh,

In 1971 lLearings on the location and design of the trans-

by petitions by petitioners

iission line were interrupted

herein, Greene County Planning Board, Town of Durlam

’

and Association for the Preservation of Durham Valley

to the Court of Appeals for the Second Cireuit to review

orders of the Commission, ‘hese petitions resulted in the

decision in Greene County Planning Board v. FPC, 455

2d 412 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 409 U.S, 849 (1972) (Greene

County I) which, among other things, denied the instant

petitioner’s request for an order requiring the Commis-

sion or in the alternative the Authority to pay their reason-

eee eee aa

able fees and expenses, The court denied the request

noting that it could not make such an award ‘without a

clearer congressional mandate’’, 450 F.2d 412, 426,

A further interlocutory petition for review to the Sec-

oud Cireuit by tiouers, again secking reimbursement

for iees, among other tuiligs, Was denied in 1978, Greene

County Planning Board v. FP’C, 490 F.2d 256 (2d Cir, 1978)

(Gre Cie County Il).

On January 29, 1976 the F PC in Opinion No, 751, Power

Authority of the State of New York Project No, 2685, ap-

proved the transmission line and found on the basis of

Grecie County | (ely :) aud this Court’s decision in

Alyesia Piper Service Co, v. Wilderness Society, 421

U.S, 240 (1975) that it had uo authority to award counsel

fees and expenses to intervenors, The Coumission stated

that while the intervenors had:

every right to present their case as have count-

less other intervenors in cases before the Commission

** * it}hese intervenors are protecting their own in-

teresis, and We see no reason to grant them fees and

expenses, If they were generally allowed, a large fi-

nancial burden would be imposed on this Commission

aud the taxpayer or upon the utility involved and in-

evilably upon its ratepayers, In the absence of a man-

date in the statute we are loath to attempt such an

expensive departure from past practice’? FPO Opin-

ion No, 751, p. 21, App. EF of Pet. at 41a.

In denying petitions for rehearing the lederal Power

Commission again rejected the argument that the Com-

mission or applicant should reimburse the intervenors for

fees and expenses, PC Opinion No, 751-A, April 27, 1976,

App. F of Pet. at 42a.

iF

On September 27, 1976 the intervenors petitioned tue

Court of Appeals for the Secoud Cireuit for review of the

January 29, 1976 FPC decision including the issue of re-

imbursement for counsel fees and expenses of the inter-

venors.

On December 8, 1976 a panel of the court unanimously

afimmed the determination of the FPC permitting con-

struction, operation and maintenance of the transmission

line, but by a two to one vote remanded the fee issue to

the Comiuission for reconsideration in the light of a re-

cent decision of the Comptroller General that the General

Accounting Office would not disallow payment of inter-

venors’ expenses in Nuclear Regulatory Commission pro-

ceedings even though Congress had not specilically au-

thorized it.

Judze Van Graafeiland in a vigorous dissent from the

decision as it applied to the fee issue, stated;

‘*T can fad no statute which empowers the Comptroller

General to issue what is in effect a declaratory judg-

ment clothing the Federal Power Conmission with

authority to disburse public funds, in the face of the

Comimission’s own determination that it has no such

power and this Court's fading in support thereof.”

559 I, 2d 1227, 1296; App. C of Pet. at dla,

Petition for rehearing ev banc was wade by the instant

petitioners, Greene County Planning Board and Town of

Greenville, on the issue of construction and operation of

the transmission line wud a petition for rehearing en bane

on the question of fee and expense reimbursement was

made by the FPC, The petition of the FPC was granted

and that of Greene County Planning Board and Town of

Greenville was denied on February 15, 1977. By a vote of

five to three (iwo judges not participating) the court of

appeals reversed the retire i's decision and denied the peti

tion for review on the issue of fees, 559 Pitd 1227, 1288;

App. A of Pet. at la,

The court, per Judge Graafeiland, based its decision

on the Greene County J decision which held that the Federal

Power Act did not authorize the award of counsel fees

(Jd, at 1239, App. A of Pet. at Sa) aud this Court's clear

language in Alyesha Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness

Suciety, 421 U.S, 240, 207 that *Sabsent statute or enforee-

able contract, aha pay their own attorneys’ fees’’.

559 F.2d 1227, 1240; App. A of Pet. at Ga, That the Comp-

troller General opined otherwise Was not cousidered con-

troliing by the couri, which held that given the relevant

statutes and the liaited scope of the Comptroller's legis-

lative mandate, the court's and not the Comptroller's in-

terpretation of the law must control, Jd, at 1208-9; App.

A of Pet. at 4a & Sa. Judge Van Graafeiland, summed

uy for the majority;

“The authority of a Commission to disburse funds

must come from Congress, * * * and it is for Congress,

not the Comptroller General, to set the conditions

under which payments, if any, should be made, No

officer or awent of the United States may disburse

pubiie money unless authorized by Congress to do so."

Id, at 1239, App. A of Pet. at Ga,

Argument

The issue as to whether the FPC is authorized to re-

iunburse intervenors in Commission proceedings under Part

I of the Federal Power Act for their counsel fees and ex-

penses is not novel, unique or worthy of the grant of the

extraordinary writ of certiorari, The question is econ-

trolled by this Court’s 1975 decision in Alyeska Pipe Linc

Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S, 240 (1975) and

the earlier holding of the Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit in Greene County I, Greene Cowniy Planning Board

v. #PC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S, 549

(1972). Petitioner’s analysis of the statutes and decision

attempis to create an issue worthy of review by the Court,

The analysis is fureed and strained and no worthy issues

have been developed. Nor is there any conflict in decisions

among the courts of appeals. To the contrary, recent de-

cisions of the courts of appeals for the Tenth Circuit and

the District of Columbia Circuit are in complete agree-

ment with the decision below.

Petitioners have drawn an illusory distinction between

‘*foe reimbursement,’’ said by the Comptroller General to

be permissible, and ‘‘fee shifting,’’ condemned by this

Court in Alyeska by arguing that the fee will be paid by

the FPPC, not by the applicant in the proceeding. But by

reason of Section 10(e) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C,

§803(e), which requires licensees to pay the cost of ad-

ministering proceedings under Part I, the cost of funding

intervenors’ expenses in the instant case would be borne

directly, in large part, by the Power Authority. This is

precisely the type of congressionally unauthorized fee shift-

ing so explicitly condemned by this Court in dAlyesha,

The requirements of the statutes aroclear and thus upon

these facts the decision of the Second Cireuit was mani-

festly correct and indeed compelled by that court’s prior

holding in Greene County I, Therefore the ‘tissue’? by

which intervenors attempt to establish their right to a

writ of certiorari has been in fact fuily resolved by previous

decisions of this and other courts,

Petitioners also assert that certiorari should be granted

to resolve ‘‘confusion’’ among Executive agencies on the

issue of intervenor financing. Pet. at 15. Review of this

case must turn on the specific legislation governing the

FPC in such licensing proceedings, and can shed no light

on whether Congress has legislatively mandated reim-

bursement or shifting of fees in proceedings before other

agencies, And, in fact, Congress has before it at least

three bills on intervenors’ costs in administrative proceed-

ings. See 8S, 270; H.R. 336 and H.R. 3362. As the Second

Cireuit en bane providently held in the case at bar, ‘** * *

a finding that the Federal Power Cominission is empowered

tv reimburse intervenors for their legal expenses must

await appropriate Congressional action.’’ 559 F.2d 1227,

1240; App. A of Pet. at Ga.

10

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT

THE FPC CANNOT REIMBURSE PETITIONERS FOR

THEIR ATTORNEY'S FEES ASSENT EXPLICIT STATU-

TORY AUTHORIZATION.

The court of appeals en Lave correetly held that the FPC

has no authority to award capenses and fees to intervenors

in proceedings under Part i of the Federal Power Act and

that the Comptroller General's determination iat it would

not disallow such payments does not provide such author-

ity.

Contrary to the position of petitioners and the minority

of the Second Cireuit ew Lanc, the Comptroller General’s

February 19, 1976 letter, Matler of Costs of Intervention,

Nuclear Regulatory Cominissiou, B-Y2288 (App. G of Pet.)

and a subsequent letter from the Comptroller to the Over-

sight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House of

Representatives Committee on Iiterstate and Foreign Com-

merce (App. H of Pet.) do not provide the necessary Con-

gressional determination that tue award of counsel fees by

the Federal Power Commission would be justified. The

Comptrolier’s opinion merely states that in reviewing the

accounts of the NRC he will not question such payments if

they were awarded to an iniervenor who was found by

that agency to have rendered assistance in the proceeding

and who was determined to have been indigent.

The letter to the Subcommittee expands the application

of the NRC letter to other agencies including the FPC

despite the fact that the Comptroller did not solicit the

views of the agencies concerned and that he rendered the

1]

opinion only on the basis of ‘‘* * * some of the statutory

and/or regulatory authorities which authorize or direet that

public hearings be held for a variety of purposes related

to accomplishment of the agency mission’’ (App. Hl of Pet.

at 77a). This cursory review by the Comptroller is cer-

tainly not, nor could it be, the clear congressional mandate

which would authorize the FPC to make awards to iuter-

venors with impunity. That the Comptroller would not

object does not clothe the payment with legislative author-

ity which the FPC would require to make the payments in

the iirst instance.

In Greene County I the court of appeals rejected peti-

tioners’ prayer for financial assistance and upheld the

Commission’s ruling that the Federal Power Act contained

no authority to award such funds, stating:

‘*{ We find ourselves in agreement with the Commis-

sion’s position that at this posture of the proceedings

aud under current circumstances, without a clearer

congressional mandate we should not order the Com-

mission or PASNY to pay the expenses and fees of

petitioners, either as they are incurred or at the close

of the proceedings. * * * We would need a far clearer

congressional mandate to afford the relief requested,

espec ally in dealing with counsel fees, when Congress

has not hesitated in other circumstances explicitly to

provide for them when to do so was in the public in-

terest.”” 455 F. 2d 412 at 426

Farther the court explained that when Congress has

found it to be in the express public interest to authorize

administrative agencies to pay counsel fees it has not

hesitated to do so with an explicit direction, as in the

Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §15; the Communications Act of

12

1934, 47 U.S.C. §206; and tie Iniersiate Commerce Act, 49

U.S.C. 416 (2).

Since the decision in Greene Couuty 1, Congress lias en-

acted statutes speciiically authorizing some agencies to

pay counsel fees. See Toxie Subsiance Control Act, lo

U.S.C. $2620 (4) (ce); Clean Air Act, $004 (dj. No similar

legisiation enabling the FPC to make such payments has

been enacted.’

Subsequent to Greene Covnty I this Court decided

Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soctety, 421

US. 240 (1975) which, wiih Greene County I was relied

upou by the FVC in rendering its order. Tue Alyesw + case,

which involved environmental chaiienges to tue issuance

of permits for the construction of the trans-Alaska oil pipe

line, restated the basic ‘‘Ameriean Rule’’ applicable to

judicial proceedings in the United States that absent a

statute or entorceable contract litigants must pay their own

counsel fees. 421 U.S. 240, 257.

Alyeska has been held fully applicable to proceedings

before federal administrative agencies. In Turner v. FCC,

514 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the court held that the

Federal Communications Commission (FCC) could not

properly order a licensee to reimburse the legal fees of a

complainant without a grant of ‘‘clear statutory power’’

by Congress. 514 F.2d 1354, 1356. As discussed, infra, the

effect of Section 19(e) of the Federal Power Act is to shit

an award of attorney’s fees onto licensees.

3. Three bills dealing with the subject of federal agency inter-

yenors’ costs collectively known as tue “Public Participation in Fed-

eral Agency Procedures Act of 1977", 5.270, H.R. 3361 and H.R.

3362, are now beiore the Congress.

15

But even apart from Section 10(e), it is established that

ageney reimbursement of iegal expenses is equally pre-

eluded, absent plain statutory authorization. In Fitzgerald

v. United States Civili Service Commission, 554 F.2d 1186

(D.C. Cir. 1877), the court reversed a distriet court judg-

ment holding that the Civil Service Commission had author-

ity to reimburse a participant for legal fees in proceedings

before it. Relying on A/yeska, supra, and United States v.

Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (1976), the court concluded:

‘The import of Alyeska and Testan, we believe, 1s

that a general waiver of sovereign immunity should

not be construed to extend to attorney’s fees unless

Congress has clearly indicated that it should.’’? (954

F.2d 1186, 11389).

The court of appeals for the Tenth Cireuit reached the

same conclusion in Trapp v. Uiviied States (10th Cir. No. 76-

1801, unreported opinion decided January 26, 1977) which

emphasized that where Congress has authorized an agency

/ award attorney's fees it has done so ‘*in no uncertain

terms’’ (sl. op. at 4). See also Fischer v. United States

Dep’t. of Transportaiion, 480 F.Supp. 1549, 13852 (D. Mass.

1977) declining to do ‘‘by forced construction what Con-

gress could have done in a speciiic statute.’

As pointed out in Luthe v. Commission of Elections of

Union County, 541 F.2d 421, 424 (4th Cir., 1976) the Su-

preme Court in Alyeske ‘specifically recognized that it was

for the Congress to select, by statutory authorization, those

types of actions in which attorney’s fees should be

awarded.’’

14

In view of Alyeska and its progeny, the decision of the

court of appeals below was indisputably correct and in

accord with decisions of the other cireuit courts of appeals.

Accordingly, petitioners’ request for certiorari Las no basis.

That a litigant has in some fashion provided a ‘*oublic

benefit’? provides no valid basis for an award of counsel

fees. As stated in Wright v. Jackson, 522 F.2d 955 (4th

Cir., 1975) **so far as the award of counsel fees on a public

benefit basis is concerned: it is not to be done’’ 522 F.2c

at 997.4

Petitioners argue that the ease at bar inve.ves a novel

guestion of law upon which this Court has not yet but

should rule (Pet. at 19). This proposition relies on an

asserted distinction between ‘‘fee shifting’’ as conclusively

treated in Alyeska, and fee ‘‘reimbursement”’, as condoned

by the Comptroller Genera..

Petitioners attempt to distinguish Alyesla hy citation

of the opinion of the Comptroller General which held that

an administrative ageney can reimburse a prevailing liti-

gant for his expenses on the ground that such ‘‘reimburse-

ment” is distinguishable from ‘‘fee shifting’’ because it in-

volves no exercise of compulsion against a private party

(App. G of Pet. at Gza). Even assuming arguendo that the

suggested dichotomy has merit with respect to agencies

such as the NRC, it has no application in the FPC’s statu-

tory context. Section 10(e) of the Federal Power Act

shifts the cost of administering Part 1 of that Act squarely

‘

4. The alleged benefit here is the selection of a possible better

route than might have been chosen absent the intervenors. Petitioner,

Greene County. provided no input to route selection, being concerned

entirely with preventing the construction of any line.

1)

on licensees thereunder, such as Power Authority,’ by the

imposition of annual charges. Therefore, if payments to

intervenors are authorized, such payments would result in

increased costs of administration and consequently in-

creased license fees. Thus, payments to intervenors would

involve ‘*fee shifting’? which was specifically proscribed

by the Supreme Court in sAlyeska.

Licensees and applicants are compelled to pay annual

charges to the United States Treasury and it matters not

that the FPC would make the payments to intervenors

rather than licensees or applicants paying them directly.

The exercise of a compulsion aguinst a private person oF

against the FPC has the same result, the funds vf one

litigant are paid to his oppouenuts in an adjudicated matter.

The fee is shifted no matter what the route and this is

not allowed under A/yeska. ;

Petitioners argue that if fee shifting would occur in

Part I proceedings such shifiing would be de minimis with

respect to ‘fall taxpayers or all agency licensees’’ (Pet. at

20 1.17). The facts in the instant case belie this analysis.

Power Authority with three major hydroelecirie projects

licensed under Part I is tue largest single state or mu-

uicipal jieensee under that Part in terms of authorized

5. Pursuant to Section 3 of the Act of August 15, 1953 (16

U.S.C. §828b, Pawer Authority along with ail other State and munic-

ipal licensees under Part 1 of the Act pays annual charges to the Com-

mission to cover the cosis of aiministration of that Part with respect

to such licensees in the proportion that the total authorized instalied

capacity in horsepower of each licensee's facilities bears to the aggre-

gate installed capacity of all prejects owned by ali State and municipal

licensees. 18 C.F.R. $11.20(b) 12), (3) (1976).

16

capacity in horsepower. The annual charges assessed

against the Authority for the year 1976 will total $709,004,

which represenis approximately 27.5 percent of the total

$2,582,528 assessed against all state and municipal h-

censees under Part I pursuant to Section 10(e) thereof and

the Commission’s regulations, 18 C.F.R. $11.20 et seg. To

be sure, in light of this, Authority’s financial stake in the

award of fees to the petitioners is not miniscule. In any

event, .t/yeska does not turn on the amount of fees claimed.

There are no exceptions to the American Rule for de

minimis situations.

The matter is controlled by this Court’s recent ruling

in Alyeska and by the Second Cireuit’s holding in Greene

County I, for which this Court denied certiorari in 1972

(409 U.S. $49).

THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS

NOT AN IMPERMISSIVE INVASION OF THE PROVINCE

OF THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH.

The petitioners treat the Comptroller General’s opinion

as dispositive of the issue thereby ascribing to him a role

as a judicial interpreter of statutes and argue that the

6. St. Lawrence Power Project

EG, DOOD, cccrsseresancsens aunenen 1,250,000 authorized horsepower

Niagara Power Project No.

SEB, comemen (aabitaieeneheitanechinds 2,920,000 authorized horsepower

lenheim - Gilboa Pumped

Storage Project No. 2085

(oi which the Gilboa

Leeds Transmission line,

the subject of the instant

liugation, is a part) ........ 1,333,000 authorized horsepower

lf

Second Cireuit impermissibly invaded tle province of the

legislative branch. Petitioners’ contention would mean that

the Comptroller General would be the final arbiter of legis-

lative interpretations rather than the courts. As pointed

out by Judge Van Graafeiland in the majority opinion

below, the impact of a Comptroller General’s opinion is

much more limited and is certainly not final:

31 U.S.C. 674 [Section 6 of the Dockery Act of

is!4 as amended, Pet. at 3] permits the head of an

executive departinent, in his discretion, to apply to the

Comptroller General for a commitment in advanee that

the General Accounting Office will not question the

vahdity of a specifie disbursenieut in passing upon the

account of that department [footnote omitted]. A com-

mitment given int respouse to such a request operates as

a fori of estoppel against subsequent challenge by the

GAO, It is not, however, a binding legal opinion, but

one which may be contested in the courts.* * * It is

for the courts to deterimine the intent of Congress as

expressed in its legislative enactments. In maxing this

determination, as wedo in this ease, we interfere in no

way with the authority of the Comptroller General to

approve or disapprove disbursements made by the ex-

ecutive agencies. We simply hold that the Federal

Power Commission has no statutory authority to make

the disbursements in question.’’ (Emphasis added)

509 F. 2d 1227, 1289; App. A of Pet. at 4a; da.

The practical effect of petitioners’ argument that the

Coniptroller’s opinion authorizes the FPC to fund inter-

venor expenses would be to elevate such opinion to a status

superior to the courts’ interpretations of Congressional

enactments.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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