Petition — Ward v. Maryland

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Suprs = Court, U. 8.

i f I D

SEP 22 1977

| MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1977

™___97°458

ROBERT DAVID WARD,

Petitioner,

STATE OF MARYLAND,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND

MALCOLM W. HOUSTON

3720 Farragut Avenue

Kensington, Maryland 20795

(301) 946-3099

Attorney for Appellant.

Washington, O. C. THIEL PRESS + (202) 638-452!

(3)

Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI kk 1

CITATION TO OPINION BELOW ........ceeeceeceeees 1

JURISDICTION ..... eecccces — „60% 66 640 2

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW... 2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

INVOLVED ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccces 2

STATEMENT OF THECASE ...... — Te 5% % «6G

REASON FOR GRANTING THE WMW WPʒ— 4

CON CLV „„ 8

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Cases: ö

Allegheny Airlines u. Village of Cedarhurst, 132 F.Supp.

871, 238 F.2d 8111T[TTLL¶L¶Ls2 „eee eee eee

American Airlines u. Town of Hempstead, 272 F. Supp.

226, 398 F.2d 369, Cert. Denied 393 U.S.1017 ....... 6

City of Newark v. Eastern Amlines, 159 F.Supp. 750 6

Lockheed Air Terminal v. City of Burbank, 318 F.Supp.

914 US. District Ct. (1970) C.D. Calif. ........ ecccce ©

Lockheed di Terminal v. City of Burbank, 457 F.2d 668

(1972) U.S. Ct. of Appeals, Ninth Cir. ............. 6

Lockheed di Terminal u. City of Burbank, 411 U.S. 624

eon ee „„ 6

Statutes:

Article 1A, Annotated Code of Maryland,

Section 10-1002 and 10-1003 .......... „ese ee

49 USCA 1301 et seg. (Federal Aviation Act 1958) ....... 42a

59 USCA 171 et seq. (Air Commerce Act of 1926) .......

49 USCA 401 et seg. (Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938) ..... 5

Constitution of the United States of America,

Article 1 Section 8, Clause 3; Article 6,Clause2 ...... 2

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1977

No.

ROBERT DAVID WARD,

Petitioner,

‘STATE OF MARYLAND,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND

Petitioner, Robert D. Ward, respectfully urges this

Court to issue a writ of certiorari to review the judgment

in the above captioned case.

CITATION TO OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, is

reported as Ward v. State and cited as 374 A.2d 1118 and

is fully set out in the Appendix at la.

1

2

JURISDICTION

The opinion and order of the Court of Appeals of

Maryland, the highest court of that state was decided

June 24, 1977 and its mandate entered on the 25th day

of July, 1977. Jurisdiction is founded upon Article II,

Section 2, Constitution of the United States.

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 has pre-

empted to the Federal government control over the

operation of aircraft and pilots so as to preclude state

legislation in the same area, thus rendering the Maryland

Aviation Act (as well as similar Acts of other states)

unconstitutional, or alternatively put, whether it is the

expressed intention of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958

that the Federal government not share its regulatory power

with the states.

Whether the Maryland Aviation Act conflicts with the

Federal Aviation Act.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND

STATUTES INVOLVED

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Article I, Section 8 Clause 3

The Congress shall have the power

To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and

among the several states and with the Indian Tribes;

Article 6 Clause 2

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States

which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all treaties

made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the

United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and

the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any

3

Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the

Contrary notwithstanding.

The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Title 49, U.S. Code

Annotated Section 1301 et seq:

The Maryland Aviation Act, Article 1A Section 10

-1002 and 3; as set forth in this Appendix.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On May 19, 1975 Robert David Ward was the holder

of a valid student pilot license and medical certificate

issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

pursuant to the applicable Federal Aviation Regulations

(FAR’s).

On that day, the Petitioner engaged in low flight while

piloting an aircraft over Greenbelt, Maryland, and within

eight (8) hours of consuming alcoholic beverages.

He was charged by the State with reckless operation of

an aircraft by reason of the low flying and flying while

under the influence of alcohol, Article 1A Section 10-

1002, Annotated Code of Maryland. The latter charge

was subsequently deleted.

At both the District and Circuit Court levels the De-

fendant moved to dismiss the charge solely on the basis

of the unconstitutionality of the charging statute, in view

of the preemptive nature of the Federal Aviation Act of

1958.

The motion was denied in both instances, and the

Defendant was convicted in District Court on September

19, 1975 and in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s

County, Maryland, on July 20, 1976.

Upon conviction he was fined $500 and sentenced to

90 days. The execution of the prison sentence was sus-

pended upon the condition that he not fly an airplane in

4

the State of Maryland for one year from the date of

conviction.

Simultaneously eight charges of violations of the Fed-

eral Air Regulations were brought against Ward by the

Federal Aviation Administration resulting in the revoca-

tion of his flying license.

After an intensive investigation of Ward’s level of

aeronautical knowledge and the facts of the flight itself

the Federal Aviation Administration granted permission

to reissue his license six (6) months after surrender to it.

By the terms of this Order Ward was authorized to fly

again in June of 1976.

Upon Ward’s conviction in the highest nisi prius court

of Marytand in July of 1976 he petitioned for Certiorari in

the Cour of Appeals of Maryland, the highest appellate

Court ot that State, which writ was granted. The sole

questions raised were whether the State Aviation Act was

void because of conflict and the preemptive nature of the

Federal Act. In its opinion filed June 24, 1977 that Court

held that the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 was not pre-

emptive so as to preclude state action in the control of

pilots and ali craft and that there was no conflict between

the Maryland Act and the Federal Act.

The dissenting opinion held that there was a conflict.

REASON FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

As set forth in the opinion of the Court of Appeals of

Maryland, “The issue for decision is narrow in lineation

but sweeping in implication” (p. 2)

While the narrow issue is the validity of the Maryland

Aviation Act in the face of the Federal Aviation Act the

sweeping issue is the ity of the Aviation Acts of

some thirty-five other states.

5

A decision in this case will determine, once and for all,

whether control over the operation of aircraft will rest

solely with the Federal Government or will be shared by

the States.

The historical concept is that since aircraft do not

recognize geographic boundries these must be a single,

unifiea plan for this control which balances safety and

efficiency both on the ground and in the air. This single

plan was authorized by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,

and its predecessors, and promulgated by the Federal

Aviation Regulations.

If the present decision is left standing it will be open

season for every state to share in the control of aircraft,

destroying completely the uniformity of control which

now exists and which is imperative due to the nature of

flight.

Numerous cases have held or indicated that the Federal

Aviation Act is preemptive. Unfortunately, for clarity of

decision, the State acts were usually in conflict with the

Federal Aviation Act and were struck down on both

grounds.

The Federal Aviation Act, title 49, U.S. Code Anno-

tated, at Sec. 1508(A) says:

(A) “The United States of America is declared to

possess and exercise complete sovereignty in the

airspace of the United States.

The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 was held to be

preemptive in Alleghney Airlines v. Village of Cedar-

hurst, 132 F.Supp. 871, 1955 U.S. District Court, N.Y.

239 F.2d 812, 2nd Circuit.

There the Court said:

“The Plaintiff’s contention that the legislative action

by Congress together with the regulations, adopted

6

pursuant thereto, have regulated air traffic in the

navigable airspace in the interest of safety to such

an extent as to constitute preemption in that field

ts upheld. The States, including the Village of

Cedarhurst, are thus precluded from enacting valid

contrary or conflicting legislation.” (Emp. Supplied)

A similar result was read in City of Newark v. Eastern

Arlines, 159 F.Supp. 750, 1958 U.S. D. C., New Jersey

where the court held, referring to the Civil Aeronautics

Act of 1938:

“This legislation clearly evidenced the intent of

Congress to preempt the exclusive power of regula-

tion and control in the field of interstate air com-

merce.” page 755 and the court noted:

“It seems obvious that in the field uniformity of

regulations is essential if the maximum standards of

safety are to be maintained” page 757

The principle was again enunciated in American Air-

lines v. Town of Hempstead, 1967, 272 F.Supp. 226,

E.D.N.Y. USDC, affirmed 298 F.2d 369 (2nd Cir.) 1968,

Cert. Den. 393 U.S. 1017, 1969.

The most recent articulations of the preemption of

the 1958 act and its scope are:

Lockheed Air Terminal v. City of Burbank, 318 F.Supp.

914 US. District Court (1970) C.D. Calif.

Lockheed Air Terminal v. City of Burbank, 457 F.2d

668 (1972) U.S. Ct. of Appeals, Ninth Cir.

Lockheed Air Terminal v. City of Burbank, 411 U.S.

624 (1973) U.S. Supreme Ct.

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

seemed to set forth the rule clearly: (page 671)

“The pervasiveness of federal regulations in the filed

of air commerce, the intensity of the national in-

7

terest in this regulation, and the nature of air com-

merce itself require the conclusion that state and

local legislation in that area has been preempted.

In this case we have found the conclusion of federal

preemption unavoidable.

Therefore, the states may not exercise concomitant

or supplementary powers over the identical activity.

(Emp. Supplied.)

In the Burbank case at page 549, the first page of the

Court’s opinion, the Supreme Court disposes of the matter

on preemption grounds alone:

“The District Court found the ordinance to be un-

constitutional on both Supremacy Clause and Com-

merce Clause grounds. 318 F.Supp. 914. The Court

of Appeals affirmed on the grounds of the Supre-

macy Clause both as respects preemption and as

respects conflict.”

* In view of our disp osition of this appeal under

the doctrine of preemption, we need not reach this

question. (Emp. Supplied.)

It is now said that the Burbank case related only to the

Noise Control Act or that, at any rate, the states may

exercise complimentary controi.

What is said to be complimentary however, does not

always turn out to be as in the Ward case where a pilot

who was reissued his federal authority to pilot an aircraft

any where within the United States was specifically pro-

hibited from flying within the State of Maryland.

CONCLUSION

The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 is preemptive so as

to preclude state or municipal legislation effecting control

over the operation of aircraft, even though the statute

expresses itself as merely complimentary to the Federal

Statute.

The Maryland Statute, with its sentencing provisions

is clearly in conflict with the Federal Statute and the

FAR’s issued thereunder.

Respectfully submitted,

MALCOLM W. HOUSTON

3720 Farragut Avenue

Kensington, Maryland 20795

Attorney for Appellant.

— —

APPENDIX

[1118]

la

APPENDIX

Robert David WARD

v.

STATE of Maryland.

No. 87.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

June 24, 1977.

* * *

Malcolm W. Houston, Kensington, for ap-

pellant.

Alexander L. Cummings, Asst. Atty.

Gen., Baltimore (Francis B. Burch, Atty.

Gen. and Clarence W. Sharp, Asst. Atty.

Gen., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before SINGLEY, SMITH,

DIGGES, LEVINE, ELDRIDGE, ORTH

and ROBERT F. SWEENEY (Specially As-

signed), JJ.

ORTH, Judge.

For over a quarter of a century it has

been a crime under the laws of Maryland

“to operate an aircraft in the air, or on the

ground or water, while under the influence

of intoxicating liquor, narcotics, or other

habit-forming drug,or, . . in a care-

[1119]

2a

less or reckless manner so as to endanger

the life or property of another.” Acts 1949,

ch. 422, § 29; Acts 1974, ch. 368, § 2;

Maryland Code (1961) and (1957) Art. 1A,

§ 29; Maryland Code (1957, 1968 Repl. Vol.,

1974 Cum.Supp.) Art. 1A, 6 20-1002! See

Maryland Code (1967, 1971 Repl Vel, 1974

Cum.Supp.) Art. 38,§ 1. The. statute has

never been before the appellate courts of

this State. Robert David Ward presents it

to us in this appeal. In challenging the

judgment entered against him upon being

found guilty of operating an aireraft in a

reckless manner, he does not dispute the

accuracy of the facts and circumstances re-

sulting in his arrest and prosecution by the

State. Nor does he present any question as

Acts 1974, ch. 363 repealed former article 1A,

“Aeronautics”, and enacted present article LA,

“Aviation,” to take effect 1 July 1974. The

identical l of former § 29 appears in me

present § 10-

2. As initially executed, the Statement of

Charges under which Ward was prosecuted by

Maryland, in addition to the charge that he

operated an aircraft “in a reckless and unsafe

manner,” alleged that he operated an aircraft

“while under the influence of intoxicating li-

quor.” For reasons not disclosed in the record

before us, the charging document was amended

by deleting the latter charge.

3a

to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt the corpus de-

licti of the offense and his criminal agency.

And he offers no claim that the penalties

imposed were in any way at variance with

the sanctions authorized. The issue he rais-

es is that Maryland was precluded from

prosecuting him because the statute pro-

scribing the conduct was preempted by fed-

eral law. He therefore, claims error in the

denial by the trial court of his motion to

dismiss the charges.

The issue for decision is narrow in linea-

tion bet sweeping in implication. The

great majority of the states have enacted

legislation similar to the Maryland statute,

some in identical language, making it a

crime to operate an aireraft so as to endan-

ger the person or property of another.’ If

oes wa )

| BEST. COPY. Mn

3. Most of the state statutes speak in terms of

operating an aircraft recklessly or while under

the influence of intoxicating liquor or habit-

forming drugs. See, for example:

Alabama-Ala. Code, tit. 4, § 20 (30) 5 (1958);

Alaska-Alas. Stat. § 02.30.030 (1962);

_ Arizona-Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 28-1744 (1976);

Arkansas-Ark. Stat. Ann. § 74-109 (1957);

California-Cal. Pub. Utilities Code § 21407

(West 1965);

Connecticut-Conn. Genl. Stat. § 15-72 (1977);

Deiaware-Del. Code Ann. tit. 2, § 304 (1974);

[footnote continued

4a

Ward's view that the state statutes are

preempted prevails there could be no crimi-

nal prosecution, under existing laws, by any

state, or, as we shall see, by the federal

Florida-Fla. Stat. Ann. 5 860.13(1)(b) (1976);

Georgia-Ga. Code Ann. § 11-101 (1973);

Hawaii-Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 263-11 (1968);

Idaho-Idaho Code § 21-112 (1947);

Indiana-Ind. Stat. Ann. § 8-21-4—8 [14-109]

(Burns 1973);

lowa-lowa Code Ann. § 328.41 (Supp. 1976);

Maine-Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 6 § 202(9)

(idee; |

Michigga-Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 259.180

(2887), a |

Mtgneseta-Minn. Stat. Aan. § 360.07§ (1965);

Mississippi-Miss. Code, § 61-—11-—1 (1972);

Missouri-Mo. Rev. Stat. § 305.030 (1969);

Montana-Mont. Rev. Code § 1-603 (1968);

Nevada-Nev. Rev. Stat. § 493.130 (1973);

New York-N.Y. Genl. Bus. Law § 245 (L.C.P.

Tum. Supp. 1976);

North Carolina-N.C. Genl. Stat. § 63-18

(1975 Repl. Vol.);

Ohio-Ohio Rev. Code § 4561.15 (Anderson

1967);

Oregon-Ore. Rev. Stat. § 493.160 (1973);

South Carolina-S.C. Code, ch. 1, § 2-10

(1962);

South Dakota-S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 50

13-16 (1967);

Tennessee-Tenn. Code Anno. 5 42-113 (1964

Repl. Vol.);

Virginia-Va. Code § 5.1—13 (1973 Repl. Vol.);

Wisconsin-Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 114.09 (1974).

footnote continued]

[1120]

5a

government, for operating an aircraft in a

careless or reckless manner or while under

the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcot-

ics, or other habit-forming drug, no matter

how flagrant the conduct proscribed and

regardless of the seriousness of the danger

to life and property occasioned by that con-

duct. We have not been referred to a deci-

sion of another jurisdiction, state or federal,

which addresses the matter of preemption

of a statute prohibiting such operation of

an aircraft. There being no decision pre-

cisely on point to bind or persuade wi, we

shall follow the path laid out by the dexi-

sions of the Supreme Court of the United

States concerning the doctrine of preemp-

tion to determine whether the Maryland

statute is enforceable.

There are other state statutes which speak only

in terms of operating an aircraft while under

the influence of intoxicating liquor or habit-

forming drugs. See, for example:

Illinois-Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 15's, § 22.43d

(Smith-Hurd, Cum. Supp. 1977);

Massachusetts-Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 90, § 44

(1975);

New Jersey-N.J. Stat. Ann. § 6:1—18 (1973);

Pennsyivania-Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 2, § 1475(a)

(Purdon 1963),

Texas-Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat., art. 46f-3 (1977);

Wyomhing-Wy. Stat. § 10-13 (1959).

6a

I

To put the issue for decision in perspec-

tive we recount what Ward did and what

happened as a result. Ward was the hold-

er of a valid student aircraft pilot license

and medical certificate issued by the Feder-

al Aviation Administration (FAA), pursuant

to the applicable Federal Aviation Regula-

tions (FAR). On the late afternoon of 18

May 1975 he made an instructional flight

from Hyde’s Airfield in Clinton, Prince

George’s County, Maryland. Thereafter, he

and his instructor pilot enjoyed a quiet din-

ner complete with pre- and post prandial

liquid refreshment in an amount sufficient,

when Ward was examined some hours later,

to show a blood alcohol level of 0.17 per-

cent.“ Later that evening, after a visit

with Ward’s parents, Ward and his instruc-

tor returned to the airport. Ward slept in

submitted on “stipulation of facts.” That stip-

ulation is not in the record before us, but the

facts are presented to us on an agreed state-

ment pursuant to Maryland Rule 828 g.

evidence of intoxication. Maryland Code

(1974, 1975 Cum.Supp.) Courts and Judicial

Proceedings Article § 10-307(e).

7a

his car for some hours. On awakening in

the early morning he decided to practice

some “touch and gos”—taking off and land-

ing without leaving the airport pattern.

Inadvertently entering clouds, he chmbed

above the cloud layer and circled what he

assumed to be the Chesapeake Bay area,

until breaks were visible in the overcast. It

was about 6:00 A. M. when he descended

through a hole in the clouds. He estab-

lished that his position was over Greenbelt,

State Police officer in a helicopter who fol-

lowed the plane back to the airport. Ward

was arrested upon landing.

1975.”* Upon Ward’s petition we issued a

writ of certiorari to review the judgment of

the Circuit Court for Prince George’s Coun-

ty.

In a civil proceeding, the Federal Avia-

tion Administration determined that Ward

had violated seven Federal Aviation Regu-

lations in his operation of the aircraft on 19

May 1975, including FAR 91.9, prohibiting

the careless or reckless operation of an air-

craft so as to the life or property

of another. It ordered that his airman cer-

tificate be revoked. Subsequently, how-

ever, “after a thorough investigation of Mr.

Ward, his instructor, his level of aeronauti-

cal knowledge and the flight leading to his

prosecution, FAA granted permission to

reissue his license six (6) months after sur-

render to it.”

II

The opinion of the Court in Knapp v.

Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 78 S.Ct. 1302, 2

L.Ed.2d 1393 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.), re-

minded, at 375, 78 S.Ct. at 1805, that the

Constitution of the United States “is one of

[1121}

is under our system the responsibility of the

Constitution alone does not deny Maryland

—

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10a

the power to enact the challenged statute.

“While federal pre-emption of state stat-

utes is, of course, ultimately a question

under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const.,

Art. VI, cl. 2° analysis of pre-emption is-

sues depends primarily on statutory and not

constitutional interpretation.” City of Phil-

adelphia v. New Jersey, —— U.S. ——,

——, 97 S.Ct. 987, 988, 51 L. Ed.2d 224

(1977). Thus, we are required to decide

only whether federal laws in the field of

aviation preclude Maryland from enforcing

its statute.

The Supreme Court of the "Jnited States

traced the path, “clearly laid out” by its

prior decisions, which must be followed to

answer this question. Jones v. Rath Pack-

ing Co., —— U.S. N , 97 S.Ct. 1305,

1309, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977). We summarize

lla

what was said. The first inquiry is whether

Congress, pursuant to its power to regulate

commerce, has prohibited state regulation

in the area. That is, has Congress occupied

the field to the exclusion of state action.

Where, as here, the field which Congress is

said to have preempted has been tradition-

ally occupied by the States . ‘[wle

start with the assumption that the historic

police powers of the States were not to be

superseded by the Federal Act unless that

was the clear and manifest purpose of Con-

gress. Id. It is when Congress has un-

mistakably . . . ordained,” either ex-

plicitly by command in the statute’s lan-

guage, or implicitly by the statute’s struc-

ture and purpose, that its enactments alone

are to regulate a part of commerce, that

state laws regulating that aspect of com-

merce must fall.

If Congress has not so occupied the field

as to exclude all state action, inquiry turns

to whether the federal and state laws con-

flict. “Congressional enactmenfs that do

not exclude all state legislation in the same

field nevertheless overrule state laws with

which they conflict.” Id. State and feder-

al laws are so inconsistent that state law

must give way when, under the circum-

stances of the particular case, the state’s

NTT Oo), EE ooo

[1122]

12a

law “stands as an obstacle to the accom-

plishment and execution of the full pur-

poses and objectives of Congress.” In this

determination, there is considered “the rela-

tionship between state and federal laws as

they are interpreted and applied, not mere-

ly as they are written.” Id.

[1] It seems, in the final analysis, that a

federal statute preempts a state statute

when such was the Congressional intent.

Even when Congress exercises its para-

mount authority it may determine how far

its regulation shall go. “There is no consti-

tutional rule which compels Congress to

occupy the whole field. Congress may cir-

cumscribe its regulation and occupy only a

limited field. When it does, state regula-

tion outside that limited field and otherwise

admissible is not forbidden or displaced.”

Kelly v. State of Washington, 302 US. i,

10, 58 S.Ct. 87, 92, 82 L.Ed. 3 (1987). The

Court said in DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351,

360, n. 8, 96 S.Ct. 933, 938, 47 L. Ed. 2d 43

(1976), quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312

U.S. 52, 78-79, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581

(1941) (Stone, J. dissenting):

Every Act of Congress occupies some

field, but we must know the boundaries

of that field before we can say that it has

— 2 —— 4 —

13a

precluded a state from the exercise of

any power reserved to it by the Constitu-

tion. To discover the boundaries we look

to the federal statute itself, read in the

light of its constitutional setting anJ its

legislative history.

The intent to supersede the exercise by a

state of its police power as to matters not

covered by federal legislation is not to be

inferred from the mere fact that Congress

has seen fit to circumscribe its regulation

and to occupy a limited field. Such intent

is not to be implied unless the act of Con-

gress is in actual conflict with the law of

the state, and, as the Supreme Court has

said, Jones v. Rath Packing Co., supra, 97

S.Ct. at 1309, an “actual conflict” occurs

only when the state’s law ‘stands as an

obstacle to accomplishment and execution

of the full purposes and objectives of Con-

gress’.” See Governor of Maryland v. Exx-

on Corp., 279 Md. 410, 370 A.2d 1102, 1125.

Furthermore, It ſhe application of the prin-

ciple is strongly fortified where the state

exercises its power to protect the lives and

health of its people.” Kelly v. State of

Washington, supra, 302 U.S. at 13, 58 S.Ct.

at 93.

l4a

III

The federal law which Ward urges

preempts the Maryland statute is the Fed-

eral Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 749, 49

U.S.C.A. (1970) § 1301 et seg. which had its

roots in the Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44

Stat. 568, and the Civil Aeronauties Act of

1938, 52 Stat. 973. It has been said that the

main stimulus for the enactment of the

1958 Act was the undesirable state into

which the quality of safety regulation of

aeronautics had fallen. See 1958 U.S.Code

Cong. & Admin. News, pp. 3741, 3742;

Comment, 39 J.Air § Com. 521, 526-527

(1973). The 1958 Act created the Federal

Aviation Program, 49 U.S.C.A. (1970) ch. 20.

It is apparent that the Federal Aviation

Program established a comprehensive

scheme for the safe and efficient use of the

nation’s airspace. 1958 U.S.Code Cong. &

Admin. News, p. 3741. See Arney v. Unit-

ed States, 479 F.2d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 1973);

United States v. Christensen, 419 F.2d 1401,

1404 (9th Cir. 1969); Pike v. C. A. B., 303

F.2d 353, 355 (8th Cir. 1962); Air Line

Pilots Association, International v. Quesada,

276 F.2d 892, 894 (2nd Cir. 1960); South-

eastern Aviation, Inc. v. Hurd, 209 Tenn.

639, 355 S.W.2d 436, 439 (1962). That

15a

scheme, however, did not inelude the erimi-

nal prosecution of a person who operated an

aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so

as to endanger the life or property of an-

other.

Subchapter III of the Federal Aviation

Program sets out the organization of the

Federal Aviation Administration and the

powers and duties of its Administrator.

Section 1348(a) of subchapter III authorizes

and directs the Administrator to develop

plans for and formulate policy with respect

to the use of navigable airspace and assign

by rule, regulation or order the use of navi-

gable airspace under such terms, conditions,

and limitations as he may deem necessary

in order to insure the safety of aircraft and

the efficient utilization of such airspace.

Section 1348(c) authorizes and directs him

to prescribe air traffic rules and regulations

governing the flight of aircraft, for the

navigation, protection and identification of

aircraft, for the protection of persons and

property on the ground, and for the effi-

cient utilization of the navigable airspace,

including rules as to safe altitudes of flight

and rules for the prevention of collision

or water vehicles, and between aircraft and

16a

[1123] airborne objects. Section 135. a) of sub-

chapter III empowers the Administrator to

make rules and regulations as he deems

necessary to carry out the program and to

perform his powers and duties.

Subchapter VI of the Federal Aviation

Program deals with safety regulation of

civil aeronautics. Section 1421 of subchap-

ter VI empowers the Administrator, and

makes it his duty, to promote safety of

flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by

prescribing and revising from time to time,

among other things, such reasonable rules

and regulations as he finds necessary to

provide adequately for safety in air com-

merce.

A Federal Aviation Regulation, 14 Code

of Federal Regulations (1976) § 91.9, pro-

hibits the reckless operation of an aircraft:

No person may operate an aircraft in a

careless or reckless manner so as to en-

danger the life or property of another.“

It is clear that FAR 91.9 was made under

the authority of subchapter III and sub-

chapter VI. See 14 CFR at page 105.

9. There is also a Federal Aviation Regulation

pertathing to alcoholic beverages and drugs

and the operation of an aircraft. See 14 Code

of Federal Regulations (1976) § 91.11.

17a

Violation of FAR 91.9 is not a crime; no

criminal sanctions are authorized. Section

1472(a) of 49 U.S.C.A. (1970), under the

heading “Criminal Penalties,” provides gen-

erally:

Any person who knowingly and willful-

ly violates any provision of this chapter

(except subchapters III, V, VI, VII, and

XII of this chapter), or any order, rule, or

regulation issued by the Administrator or

by the Board under any such provision or

any term, condition, or limitation of any

certificate or permit issued under sub-

chapter IV of this chapter, for which no

penalty is otherwise provided in this sec-

tion or in section 1474 of this title, shall

be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and

upon conviction thereof shall be subject

for the first offense to a fine of not more

than $500, and for any subsequent of-

fense to a fine of not more than $2,000.

If such violation is a continuing one, each

day of such violation shall constitute a

separate offense. (emphasis added).

Subsections (b) through (p) provide penal-

ties for specific acts, none of which includes

careless or reckless operation of an aircraft.

Subchapter IV and § 1474 of Title 49 do not

concern FAR 91.9 See 14 CFR § 13.23. On

18a

the other hand, § 1471 of Title 49 specifical-

ly provides that any person who violates the

provisions of subchapters III and VI, or any

rule, regulation, or order issued thereunder,

shall be subject to a civil penalty of not

more than $1,000 for each violation. See 14

CFR § 13.15. Also, the Administrator may,

from time to time, reexamine any airman,

and if, as a result of any such reexamina-

tion or as a result of any other investigation

made by him, he determines that safety in

air commerce or air transportation and the

public interest requires, he may issue an

order suspending or revoking an airman

certificate. 49 U.S.C.A. (1970) § 1429. See

14 CFR § 13.19.

As we have indicated, the conduct pro-

scribed by FAR 91.9 is a crime under Mary-

land law. Penalties authorized by Mary-

land Code (1957, 1968 Repl. Vol., 1974 Cum.

Supp.) Art. 1A, § 10-1003(a) are a fine of

not more than $500 or imprisonment of not

more than 90 days or both. Section 10

1003(b) provides that “in addition to or in

lieu of [those penalties] or as a condition to

the suspension of a sentence which may be

imposed . the court in its discre-

tion may prohibit the violator from operat-

ing an aircraft within the State for such

[1124]

19a

period as it may determine but not to ex-

ceed one year.”

IV

[2] We have do difficulty whatever in

deciding that Congress has not occupied the

entire field of aeronautics by the Federal

Aviation Act of 1958. There is no such

command explicitly stated in the language

of the Act, and we do not find it implicitly

contained in the statute’s structure and

purpose. Generally accepted, for example,

is that in the economic area of aeronautics

all state legislation is not excluded. See

Calkins, Federal-State Regulation of Avia-

tion, 5. Va.L.Rev. 1386, 13991402 (1964);

Comment, 39 J.Air L. & Com. 521, 529-531

(1973); Means & Chasnoff, State Regula-

tion of Air Transportation: The Texas Aer-

onautics Commission, 53 Tex.L.Rev. 653,

656-659 (1975). The Supreme Court has

10. Maryland Code (1957, 1968 Repl. Vol., 1974

Cum.Supp.) Art. 1A, § 10-1002 provides: Pen-

alties for the violation of this section shall be as

prescribed by § 10-1003(a) of this article. As

we have indicated, § 10-1003(a) authorizes a

fine and imprisonment. Neuber § 10-10@2 nor

§ 10-1003(a) refers to § 10-1003(b) and its

additional sanctions.

20a

held that the Federal Aviation Administra-

tor in conjunction with the Environmental

Protection Agency “has full control over

aircraft noise, preempting state and local

control.” City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air

Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 688, 93 S.Ct.

1854, 1859, 36 L.Ed.2d 547 (1973). But that

conclusion was not because Congress had

“unmistakably ordained” that its enact-

ments alone were to regulate air commerce

in its entirety, but because the 1968 amend-

ment (82 Stat. 395) and the 1972 amend-

ment (The Noise Control Act, 86 Stat. 1234)

to the 1958 Act established “the pervasive

nature of the scheme of federal regulation

of aircraft noise.” We construe the holding

as limited to that aspect of aeronautics.

Id., 411 U.S. at 683, 93 S.Ct. 1854, at 1859.

Maryland has expressly retained its police

powers with respect to crimes related to

aeronautics. It declared in its Aviation

Act, § 3-307 that “{ajll crimes

committed by or against an airman or pas-

senger while in flight over this State shall

be governed by the laws of this State.

Congress has recognized the

right of a state to do 80. In 1961 the

Federal Aviation Act of 1968 was amended

by designating criminal penalties for specif-

ic crimes. 49 U.S. C. A. (1970) § 1472{i)-{p).

— —

21a

See 14 CFR 5 13.28. House Report 968 on

the case of crimes committed in the

airspace over States of the United States,

most of the acts with which this legislation

deals would be violations of the laws of one

or more of such States.” 1961 U.S. Code

Cong. & Adm. News p. 2563. It declared:

“The offenses punishable under this legisla-

tion would not replace any State jurisdic-

tion but would, where both Federal and

State law provided for punishment for the

same act, be in addition to the State crimi-

nal Law.” Id., at 2564. In discussing the

need for the legislation, the report stated,

id., at 2565:

As is well known, the Federal Govern-

ment does not provide a general criminal

code for all crimes committed in the Unit-

ed States. That is the province of the

various ates. However, criminal codes

of the States are at times supplemented

by Federal Law in fields where the Fed-

eral Government has responsibilities.

We wish to emphasize that it is not our

intent to divest the States of any jurisdic-

tion they now have. This legislation

merely seeks to give the Federal Govern-

[1125]

22a

ment coseurrent jurisdiction with the

States in certain areas where it is felt

that concurrent jurisdiction will contrib-

ute to the administration of justice and

protect air commerce.

The Report asserted:

This, we want to make clear, does not

preempt any State jurisdiction but would

only supplement it. Id., at 2565.

We reject Ward’s suggestion that the en-

tire [Maryland Aviation] Act should be

struck down.”

Having determined that Congress has not

excluded all state action in the field of

aeronautics or even in the more limited

field of air safety, we center on § 10-1002

of the Maryland Aviation Act to ascertain

whether it conflicts with the federal law in

the field. Although the Maryland Statute

and the federal regulation prescribe. identi-

cal conduct with respect to the careless or

reckless operation of an aircraft," the two

11. Section 10-1002, Art. 1A of the Maryland

Act requires that “{ijn any proceeding charging

careless or reckless . of aircraft in

violation of this section, the court determining |

whether the operation was careless or reckless

shall consider the standards for safe operation

of aircraft prescribed by federal statutes or

regulations governing seronautics.”

23a

laws are not coterminous because of the

sanctions prescribed. When the relation-

ship between the Maryland and federal

laws as they are written, as they are inter-

preted and as they are applied, is con-

sidered, it is manifest that the Maryland

law does not stand as an obstacle to the

accomplishment and execution of the full

purposes and objectives of Congress, name-

ly, “to provide for the regulation and pro-

motion of civil aviation in such manner as

to best foster its development and safety,

and to provide for the safe and efficient use

of the airspace by both civil and military

aircraft.” 1958 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.

News, p. 3741. On the contrary, the Mary-

land law enhances the Congressional pur-

poses and objectives by deterring through

criminal sanctions the operation of an air-

craft in such manner as to endanger the life

and property of others. It would be incon-

gruous indeed, in light of the federal pur-

poses and objectives, if Maryland were to

be constitutionally precluded from the crim-

inal prosecution of a person for such con-

duct because a federal regulation authoriz-

ed civil penalties.

We are not persuaded that there is a

conflict of constitutional dimension simply

24a

because the State court may prohibit a vio-

lator of its statute from operating an air-

craft within Maryland for up to one year

even though the violator holds a federal

airman certificate which would permit him

to operate an aircraft. Section 10-1008 of

the State Statute expressly provides:

In no event shall this subsection be

construed as warrant for the court or any

other agency or person to take away,

impound, hold or mark any federal air-

man or aircraft certificate, permit, rating

or licen ne

In amy event, we do not see how prohibit-

ing, for a limited time, the operation of an

aircraft within Maryland by a person who

has been found guilty in a court of law of

operating an aircraft in a careless or reck-

less manner so as to endanger the life or

property of another could be said to stand

as an obstacle to the-Congressional purposes

and objectives.

[3] In short, it was the clear intent of

Congress that criminal prosecution of the

proscribed conduct be left with the states,

and there is no conflict within the contem-

plation of the doctrine of preemption be-

tween the State and federal laws.

25a

[4,5] Ward suggests that the declara-

tion in § 10—1002 of the Maryland Aviation

Act that the court in determining whether

the operation of an aircraft was careless or

reckless, shall consider the standards for

safe operation of an aircraft prescribed by

federal statutes or regulations governing

aeronautics (see footnote 11 supra) would

seem to be an unconstitutional delegation

of power” if the federal statutes and regu-

lations must be followed. He refers only to

a decision of the Court of Oyer and Termin-

er of New Jersey, State v. Larson, 10 N.J.

Misc. 384, 160 A. 556 (1932), which invalida-

ted a New Jersey statute. Larson is inap-

_ posite. There the question was whether the

New Jersey Legislature was constitutional-

ly permitted to authorize the conviction of a

crime “when it has fixed no standard of

conduct to be conformed to by the citizen

but has left that standard to be fixed by the

regulations of a subordinate administrative

authority, either in its untrammeled discre-

tion, or to conform substantially to the leg-

islation of another sovereignty, such legisla-

tion being referred to in the act, but not

incorporated therein.” Id., 160 A. at 557.

Furthermore, there was a provision of the

26a

[1126] New Jersey Constitution, Art. 4, § 7, par. 4,

expressly forbidding the latter. Here the

standard of conduct was fixed by the stat-

ute—an aircraft shall not be operated care-

lessly or recklessly so as to endanger the

life or property of another—and the trial

court was merely directed to look for guid-

ance to federal standards with regard to

such operation, ostensibly to promote uni-

formity. Larson observed, 160 A. at 558:

“It may well be a sound exercise of legisla-

tive discretion to have the regulations for

the conduct of a matter, so oblivious of

artificial land boundaries as aviation, sub-

stantially identical for both intrastate and

interstate commerce. Nor is there any-

thing unconstitutional in the state’s adopt-

ing as its own the federal policy.“ Ward

does not claim, and it is clear, that the

“careless or reckless” standard is not so

vague and indefinite as to offend due proc-

ess of law. See Lashley v. State, 10 Md.

App. 136, 142, 268 A.2d 502, cert. den. 259

Md. 733, appeal dism., cert. den. 402 U.S.

991, 91 S.Ct. 2169, 29 L.Ed.2d 158 (1970).

And see Samson v. State, 27 Md.App. 326,

335, 341 A.2d 817 (1975) giving at least tacit

approval to a legislative provision regarding

control of dangerous substances, Maryland

Code (1957, 1971 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27,

§ 278(c), that any new substance which is

27a

designated as controlled under federal law

shall be similarly controlled under Maryland

law absent objection by the Department of

Health and Mental Hygiene.

We find that Maryland Code (1957, 1968

Repl. Vol., 1974 Cum.Supp.) Art. 1A, §§ 10-

1002 and 10-1003 are not preempted by

federal law. We hold, therefore, that the

Circuit Court for Prince George’s County

did not err in denying the motion to dismiss

the charges.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; COSTS TO

BE PAID BY APPELLANT.

ELDRIDGE, Judge, concurring in

and dissenting in part: “ay

Section 10-1002 of Maryland Code (1957,

1976 Repl. Vol.), Art. 1A, makes it unlawful

“for any person to operate an aircraft

while under the influence of in-

toxicating liquor or to operate

an aircraft in a careless or reck-

less manner A violation of this

section is generally punishable by fine or

imprisonment under subsection (a) of § 10

1003. However, subsection (b) of § 10—1003

also provides for special sanctions for reck-

less operation of aircraft in addition to

28a

those provided for in ‘subsection (a). It

states, in part:

“(b) Special—For any violation of

§ 10 1002 of this article, in addition to, or

in lieu of, the penalties provided by sub-

section (a) of this section, or as a condi-

tion to the suspension of a sentence which

may be imposed pursuant thereto, the

court in its discretion may prohibit the

violator from operating an aircraft with-

in the State for such period as it may

determine but not to exceed one year.

Violation of the duly imposed prohibition

of the court may be treated as a separate

offense under this section or as a con-

tempt of court. 8

I agree with the majority that, in light of

the absence of federal criminal penalties for

reckless operation of aircraft, the sanctions

of fine and imprisonment provided in sub-

section (a) would not appear to be preempt-

ed by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49

U.S.C. § 1301 et seg. However, I cannot

agree with the majority that there is no

“conflict of constitutional dimension” be-

tween the federal act and subsection (b) of

the State law which authorizes the court to

prohibit an individual from operating an

[1127]

29a

aircraft within the state even though that

person may hold a valid federal airman’s

certificate entitling him to operate an air-

craft. This prohibition, which apparently

would extend to both interstate as well as

intrastate operations, is, in effect, a suspen-

sion of a federally issued airman’s certifi-

cate. As the issuance and suspension and

revocation of a pilot’s license is a matter

subject solely to federal regulation, I be-

lieve that § 10—1003%(b) is invalid by virtue

of the Supremacy Clause, United States

Constitution Art. VI, Cl. 2. See Rice v.

Santa Fe Elevator Corporation, 331 U.S.

218, 236, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947).

The Administrator of the Federal Avia-

tion Administration (F.A.A.) is authorized

to “issue airman certificates specifying the

capacity in which the holders thereof are

authorized to serve as airmen in connection

with aircraft.” 49 U.S.C. § 1422. An air-

man’s certificate is required for operation

of a civil aircraft in air commerce. 49

U.S.C. § 148Q(aX2). Air commerce is broad-

ly defined as “interstate . . air com-

merce . or navigation of aircraft

within the limits of any Federal airway or

any operation or navigation of aircraft

which directly affects, or which may endan-

30a

ger safety in, interstate, overseas, or for-

eign air commerce.” 49 U.S.C. § 1301(4).

The F.A.A. is empowered to reexamine any

civil airman and, if, as a result of any

such reexamination, or if, as a

result of any other investigation made by

the Administrator, he determines that safe-

ty inaircommerce . . and the pub-

lic interest requires, the Administrator may

issue an order . suspending, or

revoking . . ay . . airman

certificate ..” 49 U.S.C. § 142%a).

It has been held that Congress has sought

to insure the safety of civil aviation by

extending federal safety regulations to vir-

tually all civil aviation, including wholly

intrastate flights. See Rosenhan v. United

States, 131 F.2d 982 (10th Cir. 1942), cert.

denied, 318 U.S. 790, 68 S.Ct. 998, 87 L.Ed.

1156 (1943); United States v. Drumm, 55

F.Supp. 151 (D. Nev. 1944); see also Cal-

kins, Federal-State Regulation of Aviation,

50 Va. L. Rev. 1386, 1395-1398 (1964). And

in order to insure safety in civil aviation,

Congress has delegated to the F. A. A. the

responsibility of certifying pilots as compe-

tent to operate aireraft and has provided

that the Administrator should revoke or

suspend such certification when necessary

in the interest of safety in air commerce.

31a

Despite the fact that the F. A. A. has been

delegated the authority by Congress to is-

sue airman’s certificates necessary to oper-

ate aircraft in civil aviation, the majority

holds that a state may prohibit a holder of

such a license to operate an aircraft. In my

view, the conclusion is inescapable that a

state statute which would prohibit that

which is expressly permitted by a federal

license, issued pursuant to federal law with-

out qualification, is in direct and irreconcil-

able conflict with the federal law and there-

fore invalid under the supremacy clause.

This was the conclusion reached by the Su-

preme Court in Sperry v. State of Florida,

373 U.S. 379, 83 S.Ct. 1322, 10 L.Ed.2d 428

(1963). There, the state of Florida sought

to enjoin a non-lawyer, registered to prac-

tice before the United States Patent Office

by the Commissioner of Patents, from coun-

seling clients and preparing patent applica-

tions in Florida on the ground that such

activities constituted the unauthorized prac-

tice of law in violation of state law. The

Supreme Court noted that the states have

“a substantial interest in regulating the

practice of law within the State” and could,

in the absence of federal legislation, prohib-

it nonlawyers from engaging in the type of

[1128]

32a

activities necessary for the preparation of

patent applications. Id. at 383, 83 S.Ct. at

1325. However, Congress had by statute

specifically authorized the Commissioner of

Patents to prescribe regulations governing

the representation of applicants before the

Patent Office by “ ‘agents, attorneys, or

other persons, id. at 384, 83 S.Ct. 1322.

Pursuant to regulations promulgated by the

Commissioner, the petitioner was duly reg-

istered to represent applicants before the

Patent Office. In holding that the state

could not enjoin the petitioner from engag-

ing in activities expressly authorized by

federal law, the Supreme Court stated (373

U.S. at 385, 83 S.Ct. at 1326):

“The statute thus expreasly permits the

Commissioner to authorize practice be-

fore the Patent Office by non-lawyers,

and the Commissioner has explicitly

granted such authority. If the authoriza-

tion is unqualified, then, by virtue of the

Supremacy Clause, Florida may not deny

to those failing to meet its own qualifica-

tions the right to perform the functions

within the scope of the federal authority.

No State law can hinder or

obstruct the free use of a license granted

33a

under an act of Congress.’ Pennsylvania

v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 13

How. 518, 566, 14 L.Ed. 249.”

Cf. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit,

362 U.S. 440, 447, 80 S.Ct. 813, 4 L.Ed.2d

852 (1960).

The fact that a state limitation on the

exercise of the federally granted right is

imposed only as a sanction incident to a

conviction under an otherwise valid crimi-

nal statute does not alter this result under

the Supremacy Clause. In Castle v. Hayes

Freight Lines, 348 U.S. 61, 75 S.Ct. 191, 99

L.Ed. 68 (1954), an interstate motor carrier

doing business under a certificate of conve-

nience and necessity issued by the Inter-

state Commerce Commission pursuant to

the Federal Motor Carrier Act, 49 U.S.C.

§ 301 et seq., instituted an action to restrain

Illinois officials from enforcing a statute

providing for the suspension of the carrier’s

right to use state highways for a period of

one year for repeated violations of state

imposed weight limitations. The Illinois

Supreme Court had held that the statute

was invalid insofar as it applied to the

carrier’s interstate operations, conducted

pursuant to its federal certificate, on the

ground that it conflicted with the Federal

Motor Carrier Act. The Supreme Court

affirmed this decision.

34a

The Supreme Court in Castle, in an opin-

ion by Mr. Justice Black, reasoned that the

Federal Motor Carrier Act was a “compre-

hensive plan for regulating the carriage of

goods by motor truck in interstate com-

meree greatly reducing the power of the

states to regulate interstate carriers. 348

U.S. at 68, 75 S.Ct. at 192 The Court

pointed out that, although the states were

free under the federal act to regulate the

weight and distribution of loads carried in

interstate trucks, nevertheless the federal

government had the exelusive power to de-

termine which carriers could operate in in-

terstate commerte. Evidence of this exclu-

sive power was found in the extensive con-

ditions set forth in the act governing the

issuance and revocation or suspension of

certificates of necessity and convenience by

the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Noting that the suspension of a carrier’s

right to use state highways “is the equiva-

lent of a partial suspension of its federally

granted certificate,” and given the compre-

hensive federal procedures governing the

issuance of certificates of convenience and

necessity, the Supreme Court said that “it

would be odd if a state could take action

amounting to a suspension or revocation of

an interstate carriers commission-granted

35a

right to operate.” Id. at 64, 75 S.Ct. at 193.

In response to the contention that without

the power to suspend a carrier’s right to use

state highways, the state could not effec-

tively enforce otherwise valid regulatory

statutes, the Supreme Court stated (id. at

64-65, 75 S.Ct. at 193):

“It is urged that without power to im-

pose punishment by suspension states will

be without appropriate remedies to en-

force their laws against recalcitrant mo-

tor carriers. We are not persuaded, how-

ever, that the conventional forms of pun-

ishment are inadequate to protect states

from overweighted or improperly loaded

motor trucks. Moreover, a Commission

regulation requires motor carriers to

abide by valid state highway regulations.

And as previously pointed out, the Com-

mission can revoke in whole or in part

certificates of motor carriers which will-

fully refuse to comply with any lawful

regulation of the Commission. If, there-

fore, motor carriers persistently and re-

peatedly violate the laws of a state, we

know of no reason why the Commission

may not protect the state’s interest, ei-

ther on the Commission’s own initiative

or on complaint of the state.”

36a

I believe that Castle v. Hayes Freight

Lines, supra, is controlling. The regulation

[1129] of safety along highways has traditionally

been viewed as an area of local concern,

with the states being permitted great lati-

tude in the absence of federal regulations.

See South Carolina State Highway Dept. v.

Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 58 S.Ct. 510,

82 L.Ed. 734 (1988). However, even in this

area, the state cannot interfere with the

exercise of a federal right. Aviation safe-

ty, on the other hand, is an area which,

because of its nature, can only be adequate-

ly regulated through national control. As

Mr. Justice Jackson said in Northwest Air-

lines v. State of Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292,

308, 64 S.Ct. 950, 956, 88 L.Ed. 1283 (1944)

(concurring opinion):

“Air as an element in which to navigate

is even more inevitably federalized by the

commerce clause than is navigable water.

Local exactions and barriers to free tran-

‘sit in the air would neutralize its indiffer-

ence to space and its conquest of time.

“Congress has recognized the national

responsibility for regulating air com-

merce. Federal control is intensive and

exclusive. Planes do not wander about in

the sky like vagrant clouds. They move

37a

only by federal permission, subject to fed-

eral inspection, in the hands of federally

certified personnel and under an intricate

system of federal commands. The mo-

ment a ship taxis onto a runway it is

caught up in an elaborate and detailed

system of controls. It takes off only by

instruction from the control tower, it

travels on prescribed beams, it may be

diverted from its intended landing, and it

obeys signals and orders. Its privileges,

rights, and protection, so far as transit is

concerned, it owes to the Federal Govern-

ment alone and not to any state govern-

ment.”

If the states are precluded from effectively

revoking or suspending a federal license

through enforcement of criminal statutes in

an area such as highway safety, where ex-

tensive state regulation has historically

been permitted, then surely they may not

do so in an area requiring almost exclusive

federal control. —

The Federal Aviation Act, like the statu-

tory scheme considered in Castle v. Hayes

Freight Lines, supra, provides for a compre-

hensive federal licensing procedure govern-

ing the issuance and the revocation or sus-

pension of the federal license. As there,

38a

because of its comprehensive nature, this

regulation is exclusive. And as discussed

above, this regulation extends to intrastate

as well as interstate activities, unlike the

regulatory scheme involved in Castle v.

Hayes Freight Lines, supra. Given this ex-

clusive and even more comprehensive feder-

al regulation, I do not believe that the

state, either directly, or indirectly, as an

incident to enforcement of valid regulatory

statutes as in Castle v. Hayes Freight

Lines, supra, may hinder the exercise of a

right granted pursuant to a federal statute.

Although the state does have an interest in

protecting its citizens from the reckless op-

eration of aircraft, this interest can be pro-

tected through the more traditional sane-

tions of fines and imprisonment as provided

for in § 10—-1008(a). Moreover, as the re-

ord in this case demonstrates, the Federal

Aviation Administration can revoke or sus-

pend an airman’s certificate if necessary to

protect the public. The conduct prohibited

by § 10-1002 is the same as that prohibited

by the Federal Aviation Regulations. I

cannot see why this is not sufficient to

protect the state’s interest without interfer-

ence in the comprehensive and otherwise

uniform federal regulatory seheme.

[1130]

39a

For these reasons, I would hold that sub-

section (b) of § 10-1003 of the Maryland act

is invalid under the Supremacy Clause and

that, therefore, the circuit court had no

authority to prohibit the defendant from

operating an aircraft in this state for one

year.!

SMITH, J., has authorized me to state

that he joins in the views expressed herein.

1. An additional question would be presented in

this case if we were reviewing the sentence

originally imposed by the District Court rather

than the sentence imposed by the circuit court.

The circuit court did not place the defendant on

probation but directly imposed the prohibition

_ ‘against flying pursuant to the purported au-

. thority set forth in subsection (b) of § 10—1003.

As explained above, I believe that this statuto-

ry provision is unconstitutional. However, the

District Court had made the prohibition against

operation of an aircraft a condition of proba-

tion. While it is true that criminal courts gen-

erally have wide discretion in imposing reason-

able conditions of probation, it is recognized

that the imposition of certain conditions is be-

yond the power of the courts. See Bird v.

State, 231 Md. 432, 190 A.2d 804 (1963); Unit-

ed States v. Pastore, 537 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1976)

(Lumberd, J., concurring); Best and Birzon,

Conditions of Probation, 51 Geo. L. J. 809

(1963); Note, Judicial Review of Probation

Conditions, 67 Colum.L.Rev. 181 (1967). It is

doubtful whether a state imposed prohibition

[footnote continued]

40a

against operating an aircraft pursuant to a fed-

eral license, which could not be imposed direct-

ly as a sanction for violation of a criminal

statute, could be imposed indirectly as a condi-

tion of probation. However, because we are

‘reviewing the sentence of the circuit court fol-

lowing a de novo appeal instead of the sentence

of the District Court, the question of whether

or not a prohibition against operation of an

aircraft could be imposed as a condition of

probation is not presented.

4la

Article 1A

ANNOTATED CODE OF MARYLAND

Section 10-1002

It shall be unlawful for any person to operate an air-

craft in the air, or on the ground or water, while under

the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotics, or other

habit-forming drug, or to operate an aircraft in the air or

on the ground or water, in a careless or reckless manner

so as to endanger the life or property of another. In any

proceeding charging careless or reckless operation of air-

craft in violation of this section, the court determining

whether the operation was careless or reckless shall con-

sider the standards for safe operation of aircraft pre-

scribed by federal statutes or regulations governing aero-

nautics. Penalties for the violation of this section shall

be as prescribed by § 10-1003 (a) of this article.

Section 10-1003

(a) General. - Any person violating any of the provi-

sions of this article, unless otherwise specified, and any

person violating any of the rules, regulations or orders

issued pursuant to this article, shall be punishable by a

fine of not more than $500.00 or by imprisonment of

not more than 60 days, or both, in the discretion of the

court.

(b) Special. - For any violation of § 10-1002 of this

article, in addition to, or in lieu of, the penalties pro-

vided by subsection (a) of this section, or as a condition

to the suspension of a sentence which may be imposed

pursuant thereto, the court in its discretion may prohibit

the violator from operating an aircraft within the State

for such period as it may determine but not to exceed

one year. Violation of the duly imposed prohibition of

the court may be treated as a separate offense under this

section or as a contempt of court. Upon a plea of guilty

or conviction under § 10-1002 of this article in any case

42a

involving a registrant under § 6-602 of this article, the

court shall cause a notation of such plea or conviction

and of the sentence imposed to be marked upon the pilot

certificate or other evidence of pilot registration or receipt

provided by the Administration under § 6-602. In no

event shall this subsection be construed as warrant for

the court or any other agency or person to take away,

impojmd or hold any State registration certificate or

other evidence of registration or payment of fees.

UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED

Title 49, Section 1508(A)

Declaration of National Sovereignty in airspace;

operation of foreign aircraft

(a) The United States of America is declared to

possess and exercise complete and exclusive national

sovereignty in the airspace of the United States, includ-

the airspace above all inland waters and the airspace

above those portions of the adjacent marginal high seas,

bays, and loakes, over which by international law or

treaty or convention the United States exercises national

jurisdiction. Aircraft of the armed forces of any foreign

nation shall not be navigated in the United States, in-

cluding the Canal Zone, except in accordance with an

authorization granted by the Secretary of State.

Title 49, Section 1348 (a) (c)

Airspace control and facilities

(a) The administrator is authorized and directed to

develop plans for the formulate policy with respect to the

use of the navigable airspace; and assign by rule, regula-

tion, or order the use of the navigable airspace under such

terms, conditions, and limitations as he may deem neces-

43a

sary in order to insure the safety of aircraft and the

efficient utilization of such airspace. He may modify or

revoke such assignment when required in the public in-

terest.

(c) The administrator is further authorized and di-

rected to prescribe airtraffic rules and regulations govern-

ing the flight of aircraft, for the navigation, protection,

and identification of aircraft, for the protection of per-

sons and property on the ground, and for the efficient

utilization of the navigable airspace, including rules as to

safe altitudes of flight and rules for the prevention of

collision between aircraft, and land and/or water vehicles,

and between aircraft and airborne objects.

Title 49, Section 1341 (a)

Federal Aviation Administration

(a) There is established the Federal Aviation Admin-

istration, referred to in this chapter as the “‘Administra-

tion.” The Administration shall be headed by an Admin-

istrator who shall be appointed by the President, by and

with the advice and consent of the Senate. The adminis-

trator shall be responsible for the exercise of all powers

and the discharge of all duties of the Administrator, and

shall have authority and control over all personnel and

activities thereof. In the exercise of his duties and the

discharge of his responsibilities under this chapter, the

Administrator shall not submit his decisions for the

approval of, nor be bound by the decisions or recom-

mendations of, any committee, board, or other organiza-

tion created by Executive order.

Title 49, Section 1304

Public Right of Transit

There is recognized and declared to exist in behalf of

any citizen of the United States a public right of freedom

44a

of transit through the navigable airspace of the United

States.

Title 49, Section 1422 (a)

Airman Certificates

(a) The Administrator is empowered to issue airman

certificates specifying the capacity in which the holders

thereof are authorized to serve as airmen in connection

with aircraft.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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