Opposition — National Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board

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Text

Supreme Court, U. S,

FILED

—_ —_——_——— SEP 211977

[MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1977

No YY" 448

DELTA AIR LINES, INC., ET AL., Petitioners,

V.

CrviL AERONAUTICS BOARD, Respondent.

APPENDICES TO THE

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BERT W. REIN

JON PAUGH

ROBERT K. HUFFMAN

1776 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

EDWIN O. BAILEY, Esq.

1025 Connecticut Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

Counsel for

National Airlines, Inc.

September 1977

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

APPENDIX A

Delta Air Lines v. CAB, et al., Nos. 76-1241,

et al. (D.C. Cir., June 23, 1977) (Slip Op.) A-1

APPENDIX B

» CAB Order 76-3-93 (March 15, 1976) B-1

APPENDIX C

CAB Order 76-6-120 (June 16, 1976) C-1

APPENDIX D

Order Amending Opinion of June 23, 1977

(D.C. Cir., August 2, 1977) D-1

APPENDIX E

Order Amending Judgment of June 23, 1977

(D.C. Cir., August 2, 1977) E-1

APPENDIX F

Order Denying National’s Petition for Rehear-

ing (D.C. Cir., August 2, 1977) F-1

APPENDIX G

Order Denying National's Petition for Rehear-

ing En Bane (D.C. Cir., August 2, 1977) G-1

APPENDIX H

Order Denying National’s Motion for Stay of

Mandate (D.C. Cir., August 2, 1977) H-1

APPENDIX I

Judgment (D.C. Cir., June 23, 1977) I-1

APPENDIX J

Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. $$ 1371(d)

(2), 1386, and 1486; Administrative Proce-

dure Act, 5 U.S.C. $ 706(2)(D) J-1

re

APPENDIX A

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication

in the Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested

to notify the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be

made before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 76-1241

DELTA AIR LINES, INC., PETITIONER

Vv.

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, RESPONDENT *

WESTERN AIR LINES, INC.

NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.

PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC., INTERVENORS

No. 76-1309

PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC., PETITIONER

Vv.

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, RESPONDENT

WESTERN AIR LINES, INC.

NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., INTERVENORS

* In order to distinguish this case from others of the same

name, readers are encouraged to cite it as: Delta Air Lines

v. CAB [Miami-Los Angeles route].

App. A-2

No. 76-1429

NATIONAL AIRLINES, INC., PETITIONER

v.

CrvIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, RESPONDENT

WESTERN AIR LINES, INC.

PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC.

NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., INTERVENORS

No. 76-1602

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., PETITIONER

v.

CrviL AERONAUTICS BOARD, RESPONDENT

PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC.

WESTERN AIR LINES, INC., INTERVENORS

Petitions for Review of Order of

the Civil Aeronautics Board

Argued September 23, 1976

Decided June 23, 1977

Robert Reed Gray, with whom James W. Callison and

Louis Hayner Kurrelmeyer were on the brief, for peti-

tioner in No. 76-1241.

Wie eae -

App. A-3

James F. Bell, with whom Richard D. Mathias and

Joseph M. Oliver, Jr. were on the brief, for petitioner in

No. 76-1309 also entered appearances for intervenor,

Pan American World Airways, Inc.

Bert W. Rein, with whom Jon Paugh and Edwin O.

Batley were on the brief, for petitioner in No. 76-1429.

J. William Doolittle, Jr., for petitioner in No. 76-1602.

Alfred V. J. Prather, Ky P. Ewing, Jr. and Carl B.

Nelson, Jr., were on the brief for petitioner in No. 76-

1602.

Alan R. Demby, Attorney, Civil Aeronautics Board,

with whom James C. Schultz, General Counsel, Jerome

Nelson, Deputy General Counsel, Glen M. Bendixsen,

Associate General Counsel, Robert L. Toomey, Thomas

L. Ray, Attorneys, Civil Aeronautics Board, Carl D. Law-

son and Lee I. Weintraub, Attorneys, Department of

Justice, were on the brief, for respondent. B. Barry

Grossman, Edward E. Lawson, Attorneys, Department

of Justice, and Michael Stempler, Attorney, Civil Aero-

nautics Board, also entered appearances for respondent.

Emory N. Ellis, Jr., with whom Gerald P. O’Grady

was on the brief, for intervenor, Western Air Lines, Inc.

Ronald D. Eastman entered an appearance for inter-

venor, Northwest Airlines, Inc.

Before MCGOWAN, LEVENTHAL and Ross, Circuit

Judges.

McGowAN, Circuit Judge: These consolidated cases

present the first occasion for judicial review of a matter

which has already occupied the attention of the Civil Aero-

nautics Board for nearly ten years—the award of com-

petitive nonstop authority on the Miami-Los Angeles

route. Of the various contentions pressed upon us by

the several contending parties, only three warrant discus-

sion in some detail:

App. A-4

1. The claim by Delta Air Lines, Inc., that it was

entitled to priority by reason of its 1972 merger with

Northeast Airlines, Inc.

2. The challenge by National Airlines, Inc., the

incumbent monopoly carrier on the route, to the

Board’s alleged failure to comply with the Energy

Policy and Conservation Act of 1975.

3. The contention (echoed by National) of Pan

American World Airways, Inc., the carrier recom-

mended for the route by the Administrative Law

Judge but displaced at the Board level by Western

Air Lines, Inc., that the Board unfairly took into

account events occurring during the three-year in-

terval between the closing of the record and the

Board’s decision.

We find no basis in either of the first two for dis-

turbing the Board’s action. The third, however, presents

procedural problems which cause us to conclude that the

case should be remanded to the Board for reconsideration

after opportunity is afforded for adversarial inquiry into

matters occurring after the closing of the record in 1973.

I

On March 10, 1967 the Board initiated the Southern

Tier Competitive Nonstop Investigation. The Miami-Los

Angeles route was among the eighteen markets under con-

sideration in that proceeding. Single carrier nonstop serv-

ice between the two cities had originally been authorized

in the Southern Transcontinental Service Case, 33 C.A.B.

701 (1961) (see also 14 C.F.R. § 202.11 (1976)), and

from 1961 until 1969 National enjoyed monopoly certifi-

cation over the route.

The Board, in July, 1969, awarded competitive nonstop

authority in the Miami-Los Angeles market to North-

east Airlines, Inc. “for route strengthening purposes.”

On petition for reconsideration, Eastern Airlines, Inc.,

App. A-5

a competing applicant, suggested that, given Northeast’s

comparatively weak financial posture, Northeast might

be a likely candidate for a merger, and that, under such

circumstances, the Board’s solicitude for the welfare of

Northeast’s route structure might be ill-advised. In re-

sponse, Northeast categorically assured the Board that

no merger was contemplated. Apparently in reliance

on this representation, the Board, without discussion, af-

firmed its award to Northeast in an order issued Septem-

ber 18, 1969. Six days later, Northeast decided to seek a

merger. Meanwhile, on October 1, 1969, Northeast com-

menced nonstop service under its new authority.

Northeast’s first prospective merger partner was North-

west Airlines, Inc. In August, 1970, after a public hear-

ing, the Board’s Examiner recommended that the proposed

merger be approved, and that all of Northeast’s certifi-

cates, including that which covered the Miami-Los An-

geles route, be transferred to Northwest. The Examiner

reached this result over the objections of Delta and an-

other carrier, and despite his recognition that Miami-Los

Angeles authority had only been granted to Northeast in

an effort to counterbalance existing limitations in North-

east’s route system. The Board itself was not quite so

accommodating in its review of the proposed merger. Al-

though conceding that the transaction would prove econ-

omically beneficial to both parties, and would entail no

monopoly dangers, a three-member majority of the Board

was unwilling to accept transfer of the Miami-Los An-

geles authority without an opportunity to reconsider the

route award in the light of post-merger circumstances.

The December, 1970 order accompanying the Board’s

opinion approved the merger subject to the conditions

(a) that the authorization of Northwest Airlines to

operate segment 7 of Northeast’s certificate for Route

27 (Miami-Los Angeles) be stayed pending final

decision in a proceeding for the purpose of reexami-

nation of such authorization to be institued upon

App. A-6

transfer of the certificate, and (b) that the trans-

ferred certificate for Route 27 shall be subject to

whatever determinations are made regarding segment

7 in such proceeding... .

Some of the Board’s pertinent remarks are set forth in

the margin.’

» The Board is fully aware that Northwest may with-

draw from the merger unless it receives the Miami-Los

Angeles route outright. Nonetheless, the Board has re-

luctantly concluded that the public interest and the in-

tegrity of the Board processes can be vindicated only if

the Board retains the power to reconsider that route

award in later section 401(g) proceedings. Otherwise,

we would find that the merger would be inconsistent with

the public interest. Thus, the Board finds itself com-

pelled to stay the authorization for Northwest to operate

the Miami-Los Angeles route pending completion of the

subsequent proceedings.

Acceptance of the examiner’s view can only encourage

the formulation of merger plans, intentionaily or other-

wise, based upon the outcome of pending route proceed-

ings. In order to avoid that result, the Board believes

that it must reexamine the pre-merger route award in

the light of the circumstances as they exist following the

merger. nae

The Board hopes that Northwest will reconsider its

threat to withdraw from the merger if the Miami-Los

Angeles route is stayed. The Board has not rejected

Northwest’s claim to the route; it has simply concluded

that the question must be decided in a new evidentiary

proceeding. If Northwest consummates the merger, it

will have full opportunity in the section 401(g) proceed-

ing to justify its retention of the route. In this connec-

tion, Northwest will be free to argue that (as the exam-

iner concluded) the Northeast system should be regarded

as an integrated whole, with the profitable routes needed

to offset the marginal ones. And Northwest can repeat

its assertions that the Miami-Los Angeles route inte-

grates well with its present authority beyond California

to Hawaii and the Orient.

App. A-7

Northwest petitioned for reconsideration, but, in an

opinion dated March, 1971, the Board remained stead-

fast in its refusal to permit transfer of the Miami-Los

Angeles route. One factor influential in stiffening the

Board’s resolve was Delta’s expressed willingness to merge

with Northeast “whether or not the Miami-Los Angeles

segment is transferred to Delta as part of the merger.”

Rather than proceed in accordance with the restrict-

tions imposed by the Board, Northwest withdrew from

the prospective merger. In May, 1971, Northeast and

Delta entered into a merger agreement, and another

hearing was held by the Board; and, in October, 1971,

the Examiner recommended that the merger be approved

subject to certain conditions, including a stay of author-

ity to operate the Miami-Los Angeles route pending com-

pletion of a section 401(g) proceeding.* With minor

variations not relevant here, the Board in May of 1972

concurred in the Examiner’s recommendations. The lang-

uage in that order referring to the Board’s treatment of

the Miami-Los Angeles route was essentially identical to

that employed on the same subject in connection with the

proposed Northwest merger. See text accompanying note

1 supra. Petitions for reconsideration raising issues un-

related to the present controversy were denied, and the

Delta-Northeast merger finally approved, in July, 1972.

? Section 401(g) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as

amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1871(g) (1970), provides, in pertinent

part:

The Board upon petition or complaint or upon its own

initiative, after notice and hearings, may alter, amend,

modify, or suspend any such certificate, in whole or in

part, if the public convenience and necessity so require,

or may revoke any such certificate in whole or in part,

for intentional failure to comply with any provision of

this subchapter or any order, rule, or regulation issued

hereunder or any term, condition, or limitation of such

certificate ....

App. A-8

On July 31, Northeast terminated its Miami-Los Angeles

service, and National once again became a monopoly car-

rier between the two cities.

Approximately three weeks later, the Board, honoring

its commitment to undertake a post-merger reevaluation

of the Miami-Los Angeles market, instituted an investi-

gation designated as the Miami-Los Angeles Competitive

Nonstop Case. The stated purpose of this investigation

was

to determine whether the public convenience and

necessity require (a) the alteration, amendment, or

modification of any carrier certificates so as to au-

thorize nonstop service . . . between Miami-Fort

Lauderdale, Fla., and Los Angeles-Ontario-Long

Beach, Calif., and (b) the alteration, amendment, or

modification of Delta Air Lines’ certificate for route

27 so as to suspend, terminate, or otherwise modify

authority to operate over segment 7.

An expedited hearing was scheduled, and on June 13,

1973, the ALJ issued his decision, finding a continuing

need for nonstop competition on the Miami-Los Angeles

route, and authorizing Pan American to provide the neces-

sary service. On June 19, 1973, the Board, on its own

initiative, granted discretionary review of the ALJ’s

determination.

The first delay encountered was precipitated by Nation-

al’s contention that certification of a nonstop competitive

carrier “would constitute a major Federal action signi-

ficantly affecting the quality of the environment,” and

would therefore require a detailed environmental state-

ment under the National Environmental Policy Act of

1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seg. (1970). The ALJ re-

jected this position, and the Board purportedly followed

suit in an order dated September 27, 1973. However, de-

spite its belief that further formal exploration of en-

vironmental questions was not statutorily required, the

App. A-9

Board announced its intention to accord such matters a

thorough airing, and therefore instructed the Director of

the Board’s Bureau of Operating Rights “to prepare a

statement with respect to the environment for consider-

ation and comment by the parties, other environmentally

concerned Federal agencies, and other interested per-

sons.” A preliminary draft of this environmental assess-

ment was not completed until August, 1974, and the

final version did not become available until the following

December. Meanwhile, all other proceedings in the Miami-

Los Angeles Competitive Nonstop Case were deferred

pending completion of the environmental study. The

Bureau’s ultimate conclusion matched that reached eight-

een months earlier by the ALJ, namely, that

the award of a certificate of public convenience and

necessity authorizing nonstop air transportation

between Miami-Ft. Lauderdale and Los Angeles-

Ontario-Long Beach to one of the nine applicants, and

the commencement of operations by the carrier

selected, would not constitute a “major Federal ac-

tion significantly affecting quality of the human en-

vironment” within the meaning of section 102 (2) (c)

of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.

J.A. 717. No party has challenged this conclusion before

either the Board or this court.*

*For a detailed treatment of the NEPA aspect of the

Miami-Los Angeles route proceeding, see Burger, Miami-Los

Angeles and NEPA: The Use of the National Environmental

Policy Act of 1969 as an Anticompetitive Weapon, 42 J. Air

L. & Com. 529 (1976). The author observes that economic

regulatory agencies such as the CAB generally lack the tech-

nical expertise necessary for the analysis of environmental

issues, and that the difficulties are compounded when such

analysis must take place in the context of a licensing proceed-

ing. In the aftermath of the lengthy delay occasioned by

NEPA considerations in the Miami-Los Angeles case, the

CAB has adopted a set of regulations, instituting a regular-

ized NEPA compliance system. See id. at 567-73; 40 Fed.

Reg. 37,184-203 (1975); and 14 C.F.R. Part 312 (1976).

Se ee?

App. A-10

Oral argument was finally heard by the Board on April

16, 1975. Eleven months passed before the Board, on

March 15, 1976, issued its decision, affirming the ALJ’s

finding of a need for competition on the Miami-Los

Angeles route, but reversing his award of operating

authority to Pan American, and certifying Western in-

stead. At the same time, the Board denied a January,

1976 motion by National to postpone further action until

after preparation of a statement under the EPCA estimat-

ing “the probable impact on energy efficiency and energy

conservation of nonstop competitive authority in the

Miami-Los Angeles market.” Also denied in March, 1976

was a November, 1974 motion by Continental to reopen

the record on the ground that changes in circumstances

occurring since the close of economic hearings undermined

the evidentiary basis for the ALJ’s selection of Pan

American, and made profitable operation of the Miami-

Los Angeles route by Pan American unlikely.

Pan American had opposed the motions of both National

and Continental. However, on the morning of March 15,

1976, only hours before the Board’s decision was released,

Pan American itself filed a motion to reopen the record

for further evidentiary presentations. This motion to

reopen was denied, and, on June 16, the Board promul-

gated an order rejecting various petitions for reconsider-

ation and denying requests for a stay of the award pend-

ing judicial review. Such a stay was similarly denied

by a motions panel of this court on July 2, 1976, but

with directions for expedited hearing on the merits.

II

Delta has attempted to persuade us of its entitlement

to preferential treatment. Unimpressed by any of the

theories advanced, and convinced that Delta had agreed,

as one of the conditions of Board approval of the Delta-

Northeast merger, to compete on an equal footing with

nc

App. A-11

other applicants for Miami-Los Angeles authority, we

affirm the Board in its rejection of Delta’s claims to

special status.

During the Examiner’s review of the proposed North-

west-Northeast merger in 1970, Delta urged that, what-

ever the Board’s conclusion as to the overall advisability

of the merger, in no event should the Miami-Los Angeles

segment of Northeast’s Route 27 be transferred to North-

west as part of the deal.‘ Criticizing what it characterized

as Northeast’s “emotional plea” for route strengthening

in the Southern Tier investigation, the success of which

was followed immediately by Northeast’s initiation of

merger negotiations, Delta argued that, if transfer of

Miami-Los Angeles authority were permitted, other fi-

nancially weak carriers would be encouraged to seek

route awards for use as merger “bait.” Technical prob-

lems with respect to effectuating the nontransfer could

be solved, Delta suggested, by inclusion of the following

statement in the Board’s order concerning the pro-

posed merger:

Segment 7 of Northeast’s Route 27 shall not be

transferred to the surviving carrier. ... [T]he

actual amendment of the certificate for Route 27

to incorporate the restriction specified above cannot

be accomplished until the outcome of a Section 401

(g) proceeding to alter, amend, or modify the cer-

tificate with respect to the above-certificated au-

* Apparently, CAB grants of additional operating authority

are ordinarily implemented through the tacking of a new seg-

ment, embodying the newly-awarded route, onto an existing

route certificate held by the carrier and involving at least one

of the terminal points of the new route. See CAB Brief at 76

n.37 and 80 n.39. While the reason for this practice has not

been explained to us, we cannot discern any indication in the

record that the Board has deliberately employed this device

to facilitate subsequent route structure manipulation, and to

permit evasion of statutory procedural requirements.

App. A-12

thority. At the time of the transfer of the certificate

for Route 27 to Northwest, however, we will stay

those portions of Northeast’s certificated authoriza-

tions which we have found would be inconsistent with

the public interest to transfer to Northwest.

This language, although somewhat opaque, appears to

contemplate transfer of the entire Route 27 certificate

to Northwest, accompanied by an annotation to the effect

that segment 7 itself would not be transferred and that

authority to operate segment 7 would be stayed pending

completion of the described § 401(g) proceeding.

The actual wording adopted by the Board (see text ac-

companying note 1 supra) omitted any express declaration

that segment 7 would not be transferred. Nevertheless,

the intention of the Board to proceed substantially in

the manner proposed by Delta was clear. Equally clear

was the fact that Delta fully appreciated the import of

the Board’s formulation. As noted previously, Delta, in

opposition to Northwest’s petition for reconsideration,

sought to dispel potential Board fears that the perceived

benefits of merger might be lost due to the conditions im-

posed by the Board. To this end, Delta announced its

own desire to merge with Northeast “whether or not

the Miami-Los Angeles segment is transferred to Delta

as part of the merger.” Moreover, Delta represented that,

in the event the latter merger materialized, Delta would

be “amenable to participating in a Section 401 proceeding

vying for the [Miami-Los Angeles] authority along with

other interested applicants.”* In rejecting Northwest’s

petition, the Board declared its hope that Northwest

* At the same time, Delta purported to have detected in the

Board’s original opinion an implication that “if Northwest

did go ahead with the merger on the basis stipulated, North-

west might have some advantage over the other applicants in

the 401(g) proceeding ....” We find no such implication in

our reading of the relevant portion of the Board’s opinion.

App. A-13

would nevertheless proceed with the merger, but in no

way suggested that, should the transaction go forward,

Northwest would receive preferential treatment in the

subsequent Miami-Los Angeles proceeding. Contrarily, the

Board reminded Northwest of “the possibility of persuad-

ing the Board in the section 401(g) proceeding that the

Miami-Los Angeles route should be permanently awarded

to Northwest,” but quickly cautioned that “[w]Je intimate

no views as to the outcome of that proceeding.” Respond-

ing to a point raised by another carrier, the Board stated:

Braniff expresses concern that the Board’s opinion

might be construed as limited to modifications of the

Northeast permit, without considering applications by

other carriers for such route authority under section

401(b) of the Act. It was not our intention to so con-

fine the contemplated proceeding.*

Thus, in March, 1971, at the close of the Board’s examina-

tion of the proposed Northeast-Northwest merger, Delta

had no reason whatever to believe that Northwest could

assert any special claim to Northeast’s Miami-Los Angeles

authority if that merger actually took place.

Nothing occurred in the course of the Board’s investiga-

tion of the proposed Delta-Northeast merger that can

justify Delta in the conclusion that, after merger, Delta’s

status regarding the Miami-Los Angeles route is different

* Subsections 401(a) and (b) of the Federal Aviation Act

of 1958, as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1371(a), (b) (1970), pro-

vide:

(a) No air carrier shall engage in any air transporta-

tion unless there is in force a certificate issued by the

Board authorizing such air carrier to engage in such

transportation.

(b) Application for a certificate shall be made in writ-

ing to the Board and shall be so verified, shall be in such

form and contain such information, and shall be accom-

panied by such proof of service upon such interested

persons, as the Board shall by regulation require.

App. A-14

from that which Northwest might have enjoyed had it

pursued the Northeast deal to completion. Indeed, Delta

has conceded on two separate occasions in its brief that

the relevant conditions imposed by the Board on the

Delta-Northeast merger are “in all significant respects

identical to the conditions earlier imposed upon the

Northwest-Northeast merger.” Delta Brief at 15, 24.

Furthermore, during its consideration of the Delta-

Northeast agreement, the Board plainly apprised Delta

of the character of the planned proceeding on Miami-

Los Angeles authority. First, in November, 1971, just

a week after release of the Examiner’s initial decision

recommending approval of the Delta-Northeast merger

subject to the restrictions outlined above, the Board is-

sued an order in the Houston-Miami Phase of the South-

ern Tier Competitive Nonstop Investigation. Responding

to this court’s partial remand of the Board’s original

Southern Tier order (see Continental Air Lines v. CAB,

443 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir 1971)), the Board directed that

further evidentiary hearings be held on an expedited

basis “on the issue of whether the public convenience

and necessity require competitive nonstop service be-

tween Houston and Miami, and which carrier or car-

riers, if any, should be selected for such authority.” In

a footnote, the Board announced that it

reserve[d] the right at a later time to consolidate

into the present proceeding the issue of competitive

nonstop service in the closely related Miami-Los An-

geles market, in the event that we approve the pend-

ing merger agreement between Delta and Northeast

Airlines but find that the public interest requires

that we stay the transfer of Northeast’s Miami-Los

Angeles route, also granted in the Southern Tier

case, pending a section 401(g) proceeding to deter-

mine whether the route should be so transferred,

should be awarded to a different applicant, or should

be allowed to lapse. (Emphasis added.)

el

App. A-15

This description of the issues which might be con-

sidered in a proceeding subsequent to conditional ap-

proval of the Delta-Northeast merger was removed from

the realm of speculation and formally repeated by the

Board in its April, 1972 order and opinion ruling on the

Delta merger. When proceedings in the current docket

were instituted, the Board specifically identified the pos-

sibility that authority to operate the Miami-Los Angeles

route would be deleted from the certificate transferred

from Northeast to Delta. See text at 3 supra. At no

point in all this did the Board even remotely suggest

that, if Delta executed the merger with Northeast, Delta

could expect primary ranking among applicants for

Miami-Los Angeles authority.

Despite the foregoing, Delta has advanced a two-

pronged argument drawn from the language of § 401 (g)

(see note 2 supra) and supposedly supporting Delta’s

claim to a preferred position.’ First, the carrier main-

tains that, regardless of the segment 7 designation em-

ployed by the Board in 1969 when appending Miami-Los

Angeles authority to Northeast’s existing Route 27 cer-

tificate, the award of such authority in reality consti-

tuted the grant of a new and separate certificate which,

whether held by Northeast or Delta, could not be revoked

absent a showing of “intentional failure to comply” with

applicable statutes, rules, or regulations. Secondly, Delta

contends that the Board’s power under § 401(g) to alter,

amend, or modify airline certificates has not historically

been exercised to eliminate an entire major route over

carrier objection, and that, even if the Board’s power

does extend far enough to permit such a termination,

the requisite “public convenience and necessity” finding

was not and could not have been made in this case.

‘In the absence of such an entitlement, Delta does not

quarrel with the Board’s finding that the selection of Western

for the Miami-Los Angeles route will produce greater public

benefits than the selection of Delta.

App. A-16

We reject both parts of Delta’s argument for essen-

tially the same reason. The Miami-Los Angeles Competi-

tive Nonstop Case was not an ordinary § 401(g) pro-

ceeding. Rather, it was convened in accordance with the

Board’s decision in the Delta-Northeast merger case. The

Board’s order instituting the Miami-Los Angeles investi-

gation relied specifically not only on § 401(g), but also

on §408(b) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C.

§ 1378(b) (1970). The latter provision states that

Any person seeking approval of a consolidation,

merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or acqui-

sition of control, specified in subsection (a) of this

section, shall present an application to the Board, and

thereupon the Board shall notify the persons involved

in the consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, oper-

ating contract, or acquisition of control, and other

persons known to have a substantial interest in the

proceeding, of the time and place of a public hearing.

Unless, after such hearing, the Board finds that the

consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating con-

tract, or acquisition of control will not be consistent

with the public interest or that the conditions of this

section will not be fulfilled, it shall by order ap-

prove such consolidation, merger, purchase, lease,

operating contract, or acquisition of control, upon

such terms and conditions as it shall find to be just

and reasonable and with such modifications as it

may prescribe....

(Emphasis added. )

The factual context in which the Delta-Northeast

merger occurred plainly demonstrates that Board ap-

proval was conditioned upon a stay of authority to oper-

ate the Miami-Los Angeles route, pending a fresh as-

sessment of the need for competition in the Miami-Los

Angeles market and of the relative merits of the various

applicants for authority to serve that market. Thus, we

find it unnecessary to consider the propriety of the

App. A-17

Board’s characterization of the Miami-Los Angeles route

as a segment of a previously-existing certificate rather

than as a new and separate certificate unto itself.*

Similarly, we need not evaluate Delta’s contention that

the Board’s § 401(g) power to alter, amend, or modify

certificates does not embrace the prerogative to eliminate

an entire major route from a carrier’s authority. Even

if Delta’s points were well taken with respect to § 401

(g) proceedings generally, they completely ignore the

fact that, under §$ 408(b), the Board may approve a

merger “upon such terms and conditions as it shall find

*On the other hand, we also express no opinion as to the

correctness of the Board's interpretation of the term “certifi-

cate” as used in § 401(g). The Board insists that, properly

read,

the “certificate” to which Congress had reference in

Section 401(g) is the carrier’s overall operating author-

ity rather than each of the particular routes awarded the

carrier. .. . Any other interpretation of the Act would

be entirely illogical, as some carriers’ route authoriza-

tions are contained in one certificate while other car-

riers have a number of certificates covering one or more

routes. Whether a carrier’s route authorizations are con-

tained in one or more documents turns upon such mat-

ters as historical accident, distinctions between author-

izations which require Presidential approval and those

which do not, and administrative convenience... .

While appealing in some respects, the Board’s construction is

surely not obligatory, and, in fact, directly contradicts the

District Court’s holding in Pan American World Airways v.

Boyd, 207 F. Supp. 152, 158 (D.D.C. 1962), rev’d on other

grounds sub nom. Alaska Airlines v. Pan American World

Airways, 321 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1963). The Board asserts

that the latter case is not “persuasive precedent,” apparently

for no reason other than that it did not conform to the prior

position of the Board. Finding resolution of the issue un-

necessary to our decision herein, we leave to another day the

precise definition of “certificate” as used in § 401(g).

App. A-18

to be just and reasonable ... .”° In this case, one of

the terms imposed was a de novo consideration of the

Miami-Los Angeles route award originally made to

Northeast in 1969. If such a proceeding does not fall

neatly within the mold of the ordinary § 401(g) pro-

ceeding, perhaps the Board should have been more cir-

cumspect about its use of the §401(g) label. Since we

can discern no obvious interrelationship between § 401

(g) and § 408(b) in the statutory scheme of the Federal

Aviation Act, we see no reason why the Board could not

have omitted mention of § 401(g) altogether, and simply

provided a brief description of the proceeding it pro-

posed to conduct, pursuant to § 408(b), in connection

with the Delta-Northeast merger.’"® While this may con-

* Delta’s citation of the Supreme Court’s stress on “route

security” as an element of Congressional concern underlying

§ 401(g) is inapposite. No merger was involved in CAB v.

Delta Air Lines, 367 U.S. 316 (1961). and, accordingly, no

question of the Board’s broad powers under § 408(b) arose

in that case.

Likewise, Delta’s reliance on Western Air Lines v. CAB,

495 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1974), is misplaced. Because the

court in Western was dealing with a non-merger situation,

its comments related solely to § 401(g) viewed independently

of § 408(b). However, even accepting the court’s language in

Western at face value, we find no merit in Delta’s position.

In § 401(g), the court said, “[t]he Board was given the power

to respond to changed economic conditions and redefinitions

of ‘the public convenience and necessity’ by adjusting the

operating authority of carriers.” 495 F.2d at 156. Surely an

important transaction like the merger of Delta and North-

east may present an appropriate occasion for a redefinition

of “the public convenience and necessity” to which the Board

may respond under § 401(g).

* The Board’s dependence upon § 401(g) appears to be

traceable to a footnote in the United-Capital Merger Case,

33 C.A.B. 307 (1961), aff'd sub nom. Northwest Airlines v.

CAB, 302 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The facts in that pro-

ceeding were significantly different from those now before

App. A-19

ceivably have been the preferable course for the Board

to follow, its failure to do so did not prejudice Delta.

Ill

We turn now to National’s contention that the Board

has not produced the energy impact statement contem-

us. Capital Airlines, Inc. was in dire financial] straits. The

Board found, and this court agreed, that Capital would not

have survived if the merger with United had been disap-

proved. Two carriers, Delta and Eastern,

requested that the Board condition approval of the

merger on United’s acceptance of the nontransfer of

certain portions of Capital’s route authority. ... At the

oral argument before the Board, Eastern proposed an

alternative procedure; i.e., that the Board approve the

merger conditioned upon (1) the simultaneous institu-

tion of an investigation under section 401(g) of the

Act to determine whether the alteration, amendment,

modification, or suspension in whole or in part, of any

or all of the certificates of public convenience and neces-

sity of Capital is required by the public convenience and

necessity; and (2) the maintenance of the status quo

with respect to Capital’s nonstop operations during the

investigation.

The Board, concerned that any attempt to impose major

route authority restrictions might jeopardize the impending

merger, rejected both suggestions, and this court upheld that

decision, on both practical and legal grounds. See especially

303 F.2d at 397-98, 400-01.

In the course of its opinion, the Board ventured the follow-

ing aside, describing the mechanism by which Eastern’s pro-

posal could have been implemented, if its substance had been

accepted by the Board:

As a procedural matter, any withholding of Capital’s

route authority from United would have to be accom-

plished through staying the appropriate portions of the

Capital certificates transferred to United and instituting

a sec. 401(g) proceeding to alter, amend, modify, or

suspend the portions of the certificates in question. While

we could, within the scope of this proceeding, place limi-

App. A-20

plated by § 382(b) of the Energy Policy and Conserva-

tion Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6362(b) (Supp. V 1976).

Section 382(b) declares that five federal agencies, among

them the CAB,

shall, where practicable and consistent with the eXx-

ercise of their authority under law, include in any

major regulatory action (as defined by rule by each

such agency) taken by each such agency, a statement

of the probable impact of such major regulatory

action on energy efficiency and energy conservation.

In considering the application of this language to the

Miami-Los Angeles route case, a brief comparison with

relevant portions of the National Environmental Policy

Act of 1969 (NEPA) may prove useful. As indicated

above, the Board’s Bureau of Operating Rights concluded,

after a lengthy investigation, that NEPA did not require

a formal environmental impact statement (EIS) in con-

nection with the current proceedings, and that finding

has not been questioned by the parties. This background

is especially significant in view of NEPA’s relatively

rigid statutory scheme. Although § 382(b) of EPCA is

reminiscent of NEPA’s EIS requirement, at least two

distinctions between the statutes are immediately evi-

dent. First, the statement required by EPCA is not

described in the detail which Congress employed in pre-

scribing the content of a formal EIS under NEPA. Sec-

tion 102(2)(C) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C)

tations upon United’s use of the authority received by

transfer to United, action upon the certificates them-

selves, to alter, or terminate, the routes involved would

require a public convenience and necessity inquiry under

sec. 401(g) of the Act.

33 C.A.B. at 318 n.52. The Board cited no authority for the

proposition that certificates could not be amended, even in

the merger context, without resort to a § 401(g) proceeding.

The Board’s power to impose merger conditions under § 408

(b) was not discussed at this juncture.

[Continued]

App. A-21

(1970), lists five subjects which must be specifically

treated in every such environmental statement, and also

admonishes that no such statement shall be prepared

prior to consultation with other appropriate federal

agencies. Secondly, under EPCA, the affected agencies

enjoy greater flexibility, not just because of the less-

structured format of the energy impact statement, but

also because of the incorporation of a statutory safety

valve making such a statement mandatory only where

“practicable and consistent” with the exercise of agency

authority under existing law.

Preliminarily, we note an important administrative

development occcurring since oral argument. On Decem-

ber 22, 1976, the Board published in the Federal Regis-

ter proposed regulations implementing EPCA’s command

that the phrase “major regulatory action” be defined by

each agency covered by Section 382.% 41 Fed. Reg.

56669-73 (1976) (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. § 313). We

mention four salient features of these proposed regula-

tions.

Although recognizing the arbitrary character of a

quantitative standard (see id. at 56671), the Board, em-

phasizing ease of administration, has determined that

(Continued ]

However, the Board did find that unrestricted approval of

the merger would result in excessive diversion from two car-

riers already partially supported by government subsidy,

Allegheny and Mohawk. Therefore, the Board determined

to make certain comparatively minor route adjustments in the

authority transferred from Capital to United. Despite its

earlier indication that § 401(g) proceedings would have been

required in connection with the restrictions proposed by

Eastern and Delta, the Board accomplished the modifications

it deemed desirable in a rather informal fashion with no

mention of § 401(g).

“ Before taking final action on the proposed regulations,

the Board will consider all comments received by February

14, 1977.

App. A-22

particular conduct should qualify as “major regulatory

action” if it a

m]jay cause a near-term net annual change in air-

pose. yee consumption of 10 million (10,000,000)

gallons or more, compared to the probable consump-

tion of fuel were the action not to be taken;

if it is “speci i Board.” *

or if it is “specifically so designated by the

We observe in passing that the Board’s Bureau of Operat-

ing Rights has calculated that, on an annual basis,

Western’s twice daily nonstop round-trip service between

Miami and Los Angeles would consume 16.5 million gal-

ons of fuel.

The second noteworthy aspect of the Board's proposed

regulations is their extremely imprecise definition of

“energy efficiency” as that term is used in § 382 (b) of

EPCA. If finally enacted, § 313.3(b) of the regulations

would provide that

i i ful

“Energy efficiency” means the ratio of the use

output of services in air transportation to the energy

consumption of such services.

In commenting upon this proposed definition, the Board

has sketched a variety of methods for measuring fuel

efficiency, and has suggested, on the basis of recent ex-

perience, that none constitutes an entirely satisfactory

approach under all circumstances. Therefore, the Board

has declined “to be more specific or to render the defini-

tion in quantifiable terms at this time.” Highly relevant

in the present context are the Board’s remarks with re-

12 The ten million gallon figure represents approximately

one-tenth of one percent of

rtificated route carriers’ total consumption of aviation

pose and jet fuel in calendar year 1972, which is the

last full year not reflecting the effects of the Arab oil

embargo and OPEC price escalation, and the resultant

petroleum conservation measures.

41 Fed. Reg. at 56671 (footnote omitted).

App. A-23

spect to the difficulties encountered in the use of com-

parative load factors as a means for assessing the impact

of Board actions on energy efficiency :

(S]ome Board actions which on their face may be per-

ceived to have detrimental impact on energy ef-

ficiency in the short run may in fact be intrinsically

neutral or even beneficial. An example, in our view,

is the certification of first competitive service. His-

torically, load factors in competitive markets have on

the whole been lower than in monopoly markets.

Moreover, it is generally—although not universally—

the case that one consequence of the certification of a

competitor in a monopoly market is to depress load

factors in the short term, since neither normal traf-

fic growth nor the new traffic often stimulated by

new service is usually able to absorb the additional

capacity introduced in the market in the first year of

operations. In such an instance, it would appear that

energy efficiency has suffered. However, over time

there is no intrinsic reason why, at any given fare

level, a competitive market cannot reach an equilib-

rium of demand and supply whereby market load

factor returns to a reasonable level. Thus, reliance

on forecast year comparisons of fuel efficiency may

well be meaningless or even substantially misleading

in the typical competitive route case.

Id, at 56672 (emphasis added).

Thirdly, the proposed regulations, together with the

Board’s explanatory statement, demonstrate the Board’s

conviction that the burdens imposed by EPCA are not so

severe as their NEPA counterparts. In the Board’s view,

EPCA does not demand extensive new procedures designed

to produce detailed energy statements in advance of ordi-

nary Board hearings:

In the absence of any specific requirements of

EPCA to the contrary, and we perceive none, we be-

lieve it preferable as a general matter to integrate

the Board’s EPCA procedures in hearing cases with-

App. A-24

in our normal hearing process rather than the unique

NEPA procedures. Thus, we will provide that the

initial or recommended decision integrate findings

and conclusions with respect to the energy conserva-

tion and efficiency consequences of the various alter-

native actions in issue in the case, including where

appropriate a brief analysis of such consequences

in light of the other public convenience and neces-

sity factors relevant to the decision. These findings

and conclusions shall constitute the energy “state-

ment” required by EPCA. This is the procedure we

have in essence followed on an ad hoc basis since

enactment of EPCA [citing, inter alia, the Miami-

Los Angeles Competitive Nonstop Case]... . As is

the case with all other aspects of an initial or recom-

mended decision, the adequacy of the energy state-

ment is subject to Board review under our usual dis-

cretionary review procedures.

Id. at 56670.

Finally, the Board has taken advantage of the oppor-

tunity provided by publication of its proposed regula-

tions to inform interested parties that practicality may

require limitation of the scope of the Board’s energy

impact statements. For example, while the Board fore-

sees little problem in evaluating the effects of particular

actions on aviation fuel consumption, it expresses con-

cern that so-called secondary effects, such as variations

in automobile fuel consumption, may prove impossible

to determine. See id. at 56670 n.2. The commentary

does not reveal whether feasible EPCA inquiries, as con-

ceived by the Board, would entail consideration of in-

creasing American reliance on foreign fuel, or potential

peculiarities of local and regional fuel demands, two fac-

tors the importance of which is stressed by National.

While the proposed regulations have not yet received

final approval, we have canvassed them in some detail

because they inevitably color our perception of the argu-

App. A-25

ments made herein pertaining to EPCA. National has

maintained since January 7, 1976, less than one month

after passage of EPCA, that the Board is obligated to

issue a formal energy impact statement in connection

with the Miami-Los Angeles route proceeding. One of

the Board’s responses in its March, 1976 order was that

the award of competitive authority in the Miami-Los

Angeles market did not constitute a “major regulatory

action” within the meaning of § 382(b) of EPCA. At

the time, some credence might have attached to this

stance, especially in light of the earlier unchallenged

conclusion that Docket 24694 did not involve “major

Federal action significantly affecting quality of the hu-

man environment” under NEPA. However, after exam-

ining the Board’s newly-proposed EPCA regulations, we

believe that the Board cannot, in good faith, continue

to assert that its decision in this case was not a “major

regulatory action.” ** Given the predicted levels of fuel

consumption for Western’s Miami-Los Angeles operation,

the present route proceeding would clearly qualify as a

major action under the new rules, if adopted.

**In its brief to this court, submitted several months be-

fore publication of the proposed regulations, National flirted

with the argument that the Board, since it had not yet estab-

lished a formal definition of “major regulatory action,” could

not legitimately exclude the Miami-Los Angeles case from

the “major action” category. We do not believe that as a

consequence of EPCA’s enactment, five federal agencies be-

came obligated either to treat future administrative matters

as “major regulatory actions” or else to suspend further pro-

ceedings pending the outcome of rulemaking on the appro-

priate definition of the statutory phrase. Of course, the agen-

cies were duty-bound to proceed in a responsible and speedy

fashion toward the adoption of the statutorily prescribed

regulations. However, they were not thereby precluded from

making reasonable interim determinations that particular

agency decisions did not rise to the level of “major regula-

tory actions.”

App. A-26

Assuming, then, that major regulatory action is in-

volved herein, the question becomes whether the Board

has complied with the terms of EPCA’s § 382(b). We

believe that it has. We agree, at the outset, that the

energy impact statement required under EPCA need not

be as elaborate or as formal as the environmental state-

ment demanded by § 102(2)(C) of NEPA. The Board’s

opinion in this case leaves no doubt that energy factors

did receive timely consideration (see J.A. 159-64), and

that the public benefit to be derived from competition in

the Miami-Los Angeles market was found to justify the

additional fuel consumption which competitive service

would entail.’* Moreover, as disclosed by the Bureau of

Operating Rights study, Western’s predicted fuel needs

were virtually identical to those of Northwest, and less

than those of any other applicant for Miami-Los Angeles

authority. J.A. 561. Thus, the Board appears to have

chosen a carrier which will provide competition on the

Miami-Los Angeles route at a minimal expenditure of

fuel.

While we do not suggest that the “practicable and con:

sistent’”’ terminology of § 382(b) confers upon the Board

carte blanche to ignore energy considerations whenever

it finds it convenient to do so, we do express sympathy

for the Board’s position that this already much-delayed

proceeding should not have been further postponed to

permit preparation of a detailed energy statement which

* National’s admirable concern for fuel economy is com-

promised somewhat by the carrier’s representation to the

ALJ in Docket 24694 that, if National retained its monopoly

status on the Miami-Los Angeles route, it planned to com-

mence operation of a third daily round trip by 1974, the fore-

cast year employed by the ALJ. J.A. 133-34. National never

did, in fact, initiate such service, even though it continued to

enjoy monopoly authority through the summer of 1976. Nev-

ertheless, the mere promise of a third flight reveals National’s

judgment that additional fuel consumption might be neces-

sary to adequately serve the Miami-Los Angeles market.

App. A-27

would have been highly unlikely to affect the outcome.

Indeed, although future experience may not conform en-

tirely to the Board’s expectations, load factors forecast

for the Miami-Los Angeles route after the initiation of

competitive nonstop service compare favorably with those

actually achieved by National during 1972. J.A. 163.

At least according to this yardstick, therefore, the Board’s

award of Miami-Los Angeles authority to Western

should yield not a decline, but an improvement, in over-

all energy efficiency. Of course, National contends that

the Board’s figures reflect an inflated estimate of the

stimulative effect which the introduction of competition

may be expected to produce in the Miami-Los Angeles

market. But, even if discounted te allow for possible

overoptimism, the Board’s projections are impressive in

light of the Board’s own observation that “generally .. .

one consequence of the certification of a competitor in

a monopoly market is to depress load factors in the short

term....” 41 Fed. Reg. at 56672.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we agree with

the Board that, as applied to individual route proceed-

ings, § 382(b) is primarily intended to ensure that car-

rier selection is not accomplished in such a manner as

to disregard energy conservation considerations. We do

not read § 382(b) to impose on the Board an obligation

to review all aspects of the airline industry’s fuel poli-

cies in each route proceeding. As the Board stated in

its March, 1976 order,

fuel consumption should be properly considered on

an industrywide basis. . . . [N]ational fuel conser-

vation efforts as they pertain to air transportation

should, to the extent feasible, be borne equally by

all segments of the air transportation system. Fuel

conservation efforts should not deprive particular

communities of needed service simply because that

service has not been operated before.

App. A-28

J.A. 162. Finding ourselves in basic accord with the

sentiments thus expressed, we conclude that the Board

has committed no violation of EPCA in this case.

IV

There remain those complaints emanating from the

Board’s action in shaping its decision by reference to a

forecast year different from that used by the ALJ. Both

Pan American and National assert that the Board erred

in shifting from calendar year 1974 to fiscal year 1977

without affording petitioners an opportunity to participate

in supplementing the record to reflect intervening eco-

nomic developments.

We recognize the difficult and recurring problems

faced by administrative agencies trying to cope with the

inevitable time lag between the creation of an eviden-

tiary record and the announcement of final agency action.

We also acknowledge that, as the Board here contends,

necessary updating may on occasion be accomplished by

an agency acting independently and informally, without

resort to adversarial procedures. However, in the present

case, we are persuaded by a combination of factors that

fundamental fairness required the Board to give Pan

American a chance to submit its own version of changes

in circumstances occurring between 1973 and 1976 and to

comment upon the relevance of those changes to the

award of Miami-Los Angeles route authority.

The factors which, when considered together, impel

us to this conclusion are as follows:

(1) the delay involved was substantial, and covered

a period peculiarly characterized by new circum-

stances affecting air transportation:

(2) the record adjustments made by the Board

operated significantly to the detriment of a

particular carrier;

App. A-29

(3) that carrier has presented plausible arguments

refuting the Board’s interpretation of certain

facts and challenging the Board’s alleged fail-

ure to take account of other newly available in-

formation; and

(4) by attaching such great weight to diminished

estimates of Pan American’s beyond segment

traffic potential, the Board has at least argu-

ably departed from its earlier position concern-

ing the importance of beyond segment service

as a carrier selection criterion in transcontin-

ental route cases.

Given all the elements of the situation, we believe the

Board was obligated to seek the benefit of Pan American’s

views regarding the impact of the passage of time upon

the record evaluated by the ALJ.”

In several cases, the vast majority of them involving

the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Supreme Court

has addressed itself to the closely related subjects of

agency rehearings and reopenings of administrative rec-

ords. The basic rule, repeatedly endorsed, is that recon-

sideration or supplementation, in whatever form, is a

matter entrusted to agency discretion. The classic state-

ment of this general principle, recently reiterated with

approval in both Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best

Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 294-95 (1974), and

United States v. ICC (Northern Lines Merger Cases), 396

Ss As noted above, National also challenged the Board’s in-

dependent updating of the record. We do not believe, how-

ever, that National was injured in any way by the Board’s

refusal to permit participation by the parties. In its 1976

orders, the Board reaffirmed the ALJ’s conclusion that the

public convenience and necessity required competition on the

Miami-Los Angeles route. National has not drawn our atten-

tion to any factors which indicate that procedural shortcom-

ings caused the Board to ignore evidence suggesting a con-

trary outcome on the need for competition issue.

App. A-30

U.S. 491, 520-21 (1970), may be found in JCC v. Jersey

City, 322 U.S. 508, 514-15 (1944). There, Justice Jack-

son wrote, in an opinion for the Court:

One of the grounds of resistance to administrative

orders throughout federal experience with the ad-

ministrative process has been the claims of private

litigants to be entitled to rehearings to bring the

record up to date and meanwhile to stall the enforce-

ment of the administrative order. Administrative

consideration of evidence—particularly where the

evidence is taken by an examiner, his report sub-

mitted to the parties, and a hearing held on their

exceptions to it—always creates a gap between the

time the record is closed and the time the administra-

tive decision is promulgated. This is especially true

if the issues are difficult, the evidence intricate, and

the consideration of the case deliberate and careful.

If upon the coming down of the order litigants might

demand rehearings as a matter of law because some

new circumstance has arisen, some new trend has

been observed, or some new fact discovered, there

would be little hope that the administrative process

could ever be consummated in an order that would

not be subject to reopening. It has been almost a

rule of necessity that rehearings were not matters of

right, but were pleas to discretion. And likewise it

has been considered that the discretion to be invoked

was that of the body making the order, and not that

of a reviewing body.

Justice Jackson observed that only once had the Court

reversed an agency “for refusing to grant a rehearing on

the contention that the record was ‘stale.’” Jd. at 515.

That case, Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. United States, 284

U.S. 248 (1932), was soon limited to its special facts,

and has had little precedential influence. See, e.g., United

States v. Northern Pac. Ry., 288 U.S. 490 (1933) ; Balti-

more & O. R.R. v. United States, 298 U.S. 349, 389

(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ; and 1 K. Davis, Ap-

MINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 8.18 at 603 (1958).

App. A-31

We note in passing that the facts in the current liti-

gation are far more similar to those presented in Atchison

than to those confronted by the Court in either Jersey

City or Northern Lines.** We also note that on scattered

‘*In Atchison, the ICC had entered an order prescribing

maximum rates for the shipment of grain in the western part

of the United States. The evidentiary record had been closed

in September, 1928, but the Commission’s final order was

only issued in April, 1931, after two applications for rehear-

ing had been denied. The Supreme Court held unanimously

that the existing record in the case pertained to a different

economic era, and that it was incumbent upon the Commis-

sion to conduct a new hearing to determine the effects of the

Great Depression, “the outstanding contemporary fact, domi-

nating thought and action throughout the country.” 284 U.S.

at 260.

By contrast, in Jersey City, the ICC’s order granting a

fare increase on the so-called Hudson Tubes was issued less

than nine months after the conclusion of extensive eviden-

tiary hearings. Two months later, in August, 1943, a limited

rehearing was held, confined to the issue of the most prac-

ticable means of collecting a nine-cent fare, given the war-

time coin scarcity. The Supreme Court decided, not surpris-

ingly, that opponents of the fare increase had no right to

relitigate the propriety of the increase in the 1943 rehearing.

Northern Lines was a railroad merger case in which terms

were negotiated between the parties by 1961, approved by an

ICC Hearing Examiner in 1964, and finally accepted by the

Commission in 1967. Throughout the proceedings, the North-

ern Pacific Stockholders’ Protective Committee objected to

the agreed-upon exchange ratio governing transfers of stock

between shareholders of the two principal parties to the

merger, Great Northern and Northern Pacific. In reviewing

the Commission’s endorsement of the merger, the Supreme

Court rejected the Committee’s contention that the ICC should

have reopened the record in 1967 for the taking of new evi-

dence on the exchange ratio. The Court was obviously im-

pressed by the fact that the exchange ratio was the product

of hard bargaining between the parties, and had twice been

approved by overwhelming majorities of Northern Pacific

shareholders.

[Continued]

App. A-32

occasions, the Board itself has agreed to reopening of the

record for reasons hardly more compelling than those

raised by petitioners here. See, e.g., Service to Omaha and

Des Moines Case, Order 72-8-72 (August 16, 1972); At-

lanta-Detroit/Cleveland/Cincinnati Investigation, Order

72-7-98 (July 28, 1972); and Additional Service to San

Diego Case, Order 71-4-112 (April 16, 1971).*” On the

% [Continued]

Although the changed economic conditions present in Atchi-

son were clearly more acute than those involved here, the

earliest of the three cases described above still seems to re-

semble the current situation more closely than do either Jer-

sey City or Northern Lines. One further point remains to

be made. Both Atchison and Jersey City were rate-making

cases, and Northern Lines involved a merger, presumably

desirable to the primary participants therein. Here, by con-

trast, we are concerned with competing applicants for author-

ity to operate air service over a given route. Arguably, at

least, the impetus toward reopening an administrative record

is greater where an agency’s task is to choose between

similarly-situated private parties, all of whom are doubtless

capable of providing the service at issue.

17 In Omaha and Des Moines, the Board had deferred action

on petitions for reconsideration filed shortly after issuance of

a 1970 order. When, almost two years later, the Board fi-

nally began to review the petitions, it decided to reopen the

record saying

[t]he existing record—with 1967 as the base year and

1970 as the forecast year—is clearly too stale to permit

a decision on the merits without further evidentiary pro-

ceedings. In addition, the normal growth rates adopted

by the examiner on the basis of 1964-1967 historical ex-

perience appear to be too optimistic in light of more re-

cent traffic trends. New record evidence is therefore

desirable.

In Atlanta-Detroit, reopening was ordered to consider pos-

sible effects of the Allegheny-Mohawk and Delta-Northeast

mergers on various carrier selection criteria. Conceding that

the record, with 1968 as the base year and 1971 as the fore-

cast year, was “somewhat stale” by July, 1972, the Board

also expressed a desire to take account of “recent traffic

eT ee er - .

App. A-33

other hand, in Bowman a unanimous Court concluded

that there was “sound basis for adhering to [the] prac-

tice of declining to require reopening of the record, ex-

cept in the most extraordinary circumstances,” despite

the fact that “the evidentiary material [in the record]

pertained to service conditions which were dated by five

years at the time the Commission rendered its de-

cision.” * 419 U.S. at 294, 296.

The most important point for our purposes, however,

is that petitioners here do not seek reopening merely on

the ground of delay. As Pan American has emphasized,

the complaint focuses not so much on staleness as on the

selective character of the updating voluntarily undertaken

by the Board. Pan American objects first of al! to the

Board’s adjustment of the beyond-segment traffic figures

generated by the ALJ. In his 1973 decision, the ALJ con-

cluded that a primary reason for certification of Pan

American on the Miami-Los Angeles route was the car-

rier’s projected ability to serve over 132,000 beyond-

trends” which indicated that the growth ratio adopted by the

examiner had been too high.

In San Diego, the Board erroneously used fiscal 1971 rather

than calendar 1971 traffic estimates in attempting to deter-

mine whether Western could continue to operate profitably

if competition were certificated on the San Diego-Denver

route. The revised figures made an already close question

even closer, and the Board decided to reopen the record to

get the benefit of the most recent traffic and cost data.

a8 Why the Bowman Court felt constrained to discuss the

reopening issue is something of a mystery. Justice Douglas’s

opinion purports to respond to concerns expressed by the

three-judge District Court, but the cited portion of the Dis-

trict Court’s lengthy opinion contains virtually no reference

to the undesirable consequences of administrative delay. The

private appellants in the Supreme Court suggested that the

District Court had invalidated the ICC order under review at

least partially because that order was based on a stale record.

See Brief for Private Appellants at 54. This position finds

App. A-34

segment passengers during calendar year 1974. This

figure was far greater than the beyond-segment benefits

claimed by other applicants; it was even further in ex-

cess of the beyond-segment traffic which the ALJ believed

other applicants had a legitimate possibility of carrying.”

Nevertheless, in March, 1976, when the Board issued its

first opinion in the Miami-Los Angeles proceeding, that

opinion declared that “on a relative basis, the record

shows that Western will be able to provide more sig-

nificant beyond benefits than any other applicant.” *

no support in the District Court’s opinion. Indeed, the lower

court’s only direct reference to the age of the record appeared

not in its opinion on the merits but in its opinion three weeks

later, denying the Commission’s motion to amend the judg-

ment and remand for further proceedings. See Arkansas-

Best Freight System, Inc. v. United States, 364 F. Supp. 1239,

1266-72 (W.D. Ark. 1973). See also Appellees’ Brief to the

Supreme Court at 61. Given this background, the preceden-

tial value of the reopening aspect of Bowman seems highly

dubious.

**® A beyond-segment passenger is one who must utilize

Miami-Los Angeles service in connection with a longer trip

whose point of or‘zin or destination or both is neither Miami

nor Los Angeles.

20 Western offered the second largest beyond-segment poten-

tial, t.e., nearly 57,000 beyond-segment passengers in 1974.

The ALJ reduced this estimate to a figure just below 44,000.

71 In a footnote, the Board delivered its appraisal of the

statistics upon which its comments were based:

The traffic estimates are those set out by the administra-

tive law judge, which are not seriously challenged by the

other applicants. However, Western’s exhibits show far

more beyond traffic, and the Board agrees that in view

of market growth since the conclusion of the evidentiary

hearing and the use of a later forecast year, it is likely

that the estimates reflected in the initial decision under-

state Western’s total support traffic. Nevertheless, for

present purposes we shall assume that the administra-

tive law judge’s estimates are reasonable, since the use

of Western’s higher figures would not materially affect

our conclusions in this case.

App. A-35

Addressing itself to the greatly superior beyond-

segment potential attributed to Pan American by the

ALJ, the Board announced that

we share the uniform judgment of all of the other

applicants that Judge Dapper’s estimates . . . ser-

iously overstate the support traffic that Pan Amer-

ican is in any way likely to obtain. It is our con-

clusion that as a result of the cumulative effect of

the overstatements that we have found extant in

traffic forecasts for Pan American and the changes

to its beyond-terminal services since the conclusion

of the evidentiary proceedings, Pan American will not

be able to realize, at the outside, more than 50

percent of the beyond-segment traffic support pre-

dicted by Judge Dapper, or about 65,000 passengers

annually. Even this figure, in our judgment, is in

all likelihood too optimistic by an appreciable margin,

but we accept it for present purposes.

Three explanations were advanced for the Board’s re-

duction of Pan American’s predicted beyond-segment

traffic. In the first place, actual experience in the wake

of the ALJ’s decision had revealed that the growth es-

timates employed were too high, and that therefore traf-

fic in many contributory markets had not reached expected

levels. Secondly, the Board cautioned that

the value of Pan American’s proposed single-plane

flights will be compromised to a far greater extent

than anticipated in the initial decision by the extreme-

ly long-haul nature of the carrier’s proposed service

in many markets. ... These considerations signifi-

cantly reduce the stimulative value of Pan American’s

proposed service. At the same time, they increase

the possibility that Pan American will lose Miami

passengers to other carriers for at least a portion

of the complete trip.

Finally, “substantial alterations in Pan American’s route

structure and service patterns” occurring since the close

App. A-36

of economic hearings in 1973 were said to have “fatally

undermine[d] Pan American’s asserted ability to flow

enough traffic over the Miami-Los Angeles segment to

support its proposed level of service.” In particular, the

Board feared that Pan American’s suspension of service

at “many important Caribbean points” would render the

carrier incapable of meeting its beyond-segment traffic

goals.

In its petition for reconsideration before the Board

and in its brief to this court, Pan American has responded

to the Board’s new calculations by accusing the Board of

selectively ignoring certain factors, some of them favor-

able to Pan American, other adverse to Western. For

example, Pan American contends that its termination of

service to various Caribbean markets occurred as a result

of Board-approved agreements with Trans World Airlines

and American Airlines, pursuant to which Pan American

obtained increased access to trans-pacific traffic. Accord-

ing to Pan American, its augmented beyond-segment po-

tential in the Pacific would largely, if not completely, off-

set any diminution of beyond-segment traffic originating

in or destined for the Caribbean. Pan American also

objected to the Board’s uncritical acceptance of Western’s

beyond-segment traffic as projected by the ALJ in 1973.

Since that date, Miami-Las Vegas and Miami-San Fran-

cisco service by other carriers had improved significantly,

according to Official Airline Guide schedules, thereby

casting doubt on the estimated numbers of beyond-segment

passengers Western could hope to carry in those markets.

In addition, Pan American challenged the Board’s convic-

tion that Western would benefit 7,000 beyond-segment pas-

sengers with single-plane service between Miami and

Seattle. The unadjusted ALJ figure was seriously jeop-

ardized, Pan American argued, by the Board’s 1976 in-

vitation to Braniff, Continental, and Eastern to apply for

removal of restrictions which, if granted, would permit

the latter airlines to offer single-plane Miami-Seattle serv-

App. A-37

ice via shorter and faster routings through Texas and

St. Louis.

The Board’s alleged shortcomings with respect to beyond-

segment traffic estimates were exacerbated in Pan Ameri-

can’s view by the Board’s failure to modify Pan Ameri-

can’s proposed service frequency in order to approximate

a rational carrier reaction to reduced levels of available

traffic. Pan American notes that the Board, in attempting

to demonstrate that National could continue to operate

profitably after certification of a competitor on the

Miami-Los Angeles route, assumed that National would

provide only two daily round trips, despite the carrier’s

representation during the economic hearings that three

such trips would be offered. The Board justified this

assumption on the ground that twice daily round trip

service would constitute a “rational response’ by Na-

tional to Western’s entry into the Miami-Los Angeles

market. Yet, in assessing the merits of Pan American’s

application, the Board first drastically cut the amount of

traffic which the applicant could be expected to carry, and

then left undisturbed the applicant’s service proposal of

three round trips daily. As a consequence, the Board con-

cluded that

[t]he nearly 300,000 additional seats per year pro-

posed by Pan American are. . . not needed for the

local market. ... The loss of . . . forecast support

[i.e., beyond-segment] traffic would fatally impair

Pan American’s ability to operate its proposed three

daily round trips on a profitable basis, and conse-

quently vitiates any basis for selecting Pan American

in preference to Western.”

In rebuttal, Pan American submitted a revised service

proposal, designed to illustrate that, even with the reduced

numbers of passengers predicted by the Board, the car-

rier could still operate two daily round trips profitably.

See Appendix A to Pan American’s Petition for Recon-

sideration, J.A. 510-11.

App. A-38

The above summary describes Pan American’s most

serious criticisms of the Board’s performance in the cur-

rent route proceeding.” Although not specifically raised

by the parties, one further facet of the Board’s treatment

of beyond-segment traffic deserves attention here. In

1969, when competitive authority on the Miami-Los

Angeles route was originally awarded to Northeast, the

Board casually dismissed beyond-segment service as an

important carrier selection criterion in transcontinental

markets:

*2 Two other grievances should be mentioned briefly. The

first relates to the Board’s fear that Pan American’s lengthy

flights to overseas destinations would detract from the car-

rier’s ability to serve the local Miami-Los Angeles market.

By contrast, the Board praised Western’s service proposal

because one of the two daily round trips would be devoted

exclusively to the Miami-Los Angeles run and the other would

serve only a single beyond destination, Seattle. In actual

operation, however, Western’s flights have originated each

day in Honolulu and Anchorage, and the latter flight has

served Seattle as well. Not surprisingly, Pan American ques-

tions whether the Board could legitimately have preferred

Western on the basis of superior attention to the Miami-Los

Angeles route.

Secondly, Pan American notes that, with respect to at

least one flight daily, Western has not fulfilled its promise of

“convenient morning and late afternoon departures from both

Miami and Los Angeles and convenient arrivals at both

points.”” Western has in fact been operating a so-called “red-

eye” flight departing Los Angeles each evening at 10:20 P.M.

and arriving in Miami the following morning at 6:15 A.M.

Western and the Board explain that the scheduling dis-

crepancies stressed by Pan American are attributable to

Western’s current need for a new DC-10 aircraft which has

already been ordered. The Board expresses confidence that

Western “will shortly be able to institute schedules that are

consistent with its service proposal.” Given our disposition

of this case, we would, of course, anticipate that the likeli-

hood of Western’s adherence to its original proposal will be

considered by the Board after suppleinentation of the record.

———

App. A-39

[Wje do not believe that beyond-segment benefits

should be accorded significant weight in the trans-

continental route awards. By their very nature

transcontinental markets afford little opportunity for

substantial traffic development beyond the terminals.

Notwithstanding these earlier comments, the ALJ in 1973

obviously assigned considerable weight to what he per-

ceived as Pan American’s markedly superior beyond-

segment potential. In reversing the ALJ three years

later, the Board did not rely upon its previously an-

nounced disregard for beyond-segment benefits in trans-

continental cases. Rather, the Board appeared to con-

cede that beyond-segment traffic was a significant fac-

tor, but differed with the ALJ in his estimates of the

amount cf such traffic which Pan American would carry,

and of the impact such traffic would have on Pan Ameri-

ean’s ability to serve the Miami-Los Angeles market.

Inconsistency in agency application of policy guidelines

has long posed a problem for reviewing courts. On the

one hand, it is clear that administrative agencies require

a broad flexibility in order to accomplish their statutorily

conferred tasks, and that therefore court-developed prin-

ciples of res judicata and stare decisis cannot be mechan-

ically applied in the administrative process. See, e.g.,

Outagamie Cointy v. CAB, 355 F.2d 900, 906 (7th Cir.

1966) (“the Board is not required in every case to weigh

in the balance all of the possible factors that may be

considered .... [A] circumstance may weigh heavily

in the balance in one case but be missing from the scales

completely in another baiance.’’). See also Note, Devel-

opments in the Law—Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L. REV.

818, 865-74 (1950).

On the other hand, the probability of frustration is

plainly high when interested parties are told in 1969

that beyond-segment benefits are essentially irrelevant

App. A-40

to transcontinental route awards, only to find in 1976

that the Board, when examining the very same route,

behaves as if the prior statement had never been made.

Respected commentators have frequently deplored agency

decision-making which fails to adhere to promulgated

policy choices, at least where such departures are not

accompanied by explicit articulation of the reasons there-

for. See, e.g., Friendly, The Federal Administrative

Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards

(pt. 2), 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1055, 1096 n. 329 (1960)

(“the Board ought [to] be able to say something as to

how {earrier selection] factors are weighed—which are

more important and which less—and to develop some use-

ful quantitative tests of these . . . factors through care-

ful economic study”) (emphasis in original) ; Robinson,

The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at

Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Proce-

dure Reform, 118 U. Pa. L. REv. 485, 529 n. 173 (1970) ;

and Westwood, The Davis Treatise: Meaning to the Prac-

titioner, 43 MINN. L. REV. 607, 613 (1959). And courts

have upset agency action for unexplained departures

from earlier reasoning. See, e.g., City of Lawrence v.

CAB, 343 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1965). In this case, where

the Board’s seemingly inconsistent policy posture is com-

bined with Pan American’s credible attacks on the

Board’s selective updating technique, we are convinced

that supplementation of the record is necessary to assure

fairness to the competing applicants.

In advocating the result we reach, Pan American has

referred us to two cases which it claims support such

an outcome. See Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 442 F.2d

730 (D.C. Cir. 1970); and Northeast Airlines, Inc. v.

CAB, 345 F.2d 484 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 845

(1965). Intervenor Western has replied by maintaining

that both Delta and Northeast are distinguishable on

App. A-41

their facts from the present situation. Indeed, the for-

mer case certainly does present a more egregious exam-

ple of the type of abuse which we confront here.” But

* In Delta the Board addressed itself to the award of new

authority on several routes connecting major markets in the

southeastern United States. In granting such authority to

Southern Airways, the Board twice strayed from the correct

procedural path. In the first place, the Board, while retaining

and continuing to use 1969 estimates of Southern’s annual

costs, simultaneously factored into its profitability calcula-

tions a 1970 forecast of the airline’s operating revenues. This

forecast was independently developed by the Board after the

close of economic hearings. More pertinent for our purposes,

Southern was the only applicant for which such a 1970 fore-

cast was made. This court held that “updating can only be

justified if done on a comparative basis, i.e., updating the

forecasts for all parties.” 442 F.2d at 736. Judge Wilkey’s

opinion listed several procedural alternatives which might

allow updating to be accomplished without the necessity for

a new formal hearing. Jd. In a footnote, the opinion warned,

but did not decide, that some form of adversarial device might

be required.

Even if the parties had had opportunity to update their

own forecast data to the year 1970, we are not saying

that required administrative procedure would have been

satisfied without an opportunity for the adverse parties

to subject the various caiculations to cross-examination

and analysis.

Id. at 736 n.25.

The precise facts in Northeast are a bit murky, but the

basic point is clearly the same. On remand after an earlier

First Circuit ruling, the Board elected to take notice of some

recent operating statistics without affording Northeast an

opportunity to rebut or explain the figures. The carrier ap-

parently wished to submit additional figures as well as certain

“expert testimony of an interpretive and prognostic variety.”

The court agreed that Northeast should have that chance.

[A]s soon as [the Board] elected to look at matters

[beyond the record as it originally existed,] it could not

pick and choose, at least to the extent of denying an ob-

jecting party the rights . . . to rebut not only those mat-

App. A-42

even if the errors committed in past cases are conceded

to be more flagrant than any involved here, the opinions

of this court and the First Circuit still support the gen-

eral proposition which we now apply, namely, that when

an agency chooses to update an administrative record,

it must proceed in a manner fair to all concerned. Under

certain circumstances, especially where the delay is long,

the case close, and the intervening events significant,

participation by interested parties may well be indis-

pensable. Thus, we remand this case for adversarial ex-

ploration of the recent developments considered by the

Board in reaching its decision to prefer Western over

Pan American. We direct the Board to reexamine that

decision in light of the updated record so produced. In

the interim, the Board’s 1976 orders will not be vacated,

and service by Western on the Miami-Los Angeles route

will not be suspended.

ters it looked to, but also the inferences which were

sought to be drawn therefrom. Due process could permit

no less. ...

Having opened the door to new data, the Board was

obliged to take a full look.

345 F.2d at 486-87. It is impossible to tell from the court’s

intentionaily limited opinion exactly how grievous the Board’s

indiscretion was.

Cee ee —

APPENDIX B

tt

App. B-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C.

DOCKET 24694

MIAMI-LOs ANGELES COMPETITIVE NONSTOP CASE

Decided: March 15, 1976

Western Air Lines, Inc.’s certificate for Route 35

amended to authorize nonstop service between

Miami-Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., on the one hand, and

Los Angeles-Ontario, Cal., on the other.

Delta Air Lines, Inc.’s certificate for Route 27 amended

to remove segment 7 therefrom.

All other applications are denied, and the proceeding

terminated.

This decision does not constitute a major Federal ac-

tion significantly affecting the quality of the human

environment (See p. 33).

APPEARANCES:

Same as in the initial decision, and, in addition, the

following:

John Ferraro, for the Los Angeles Area Chamber of

Commerce, and the Department of

Airports, City of Los Angeles, Cali-

fornia.

App. B-2

OPINION

By THE BOARD

This proceeding involves a determination of the need

for competitive nonstop service between Miami-Ft.

Lauderdale, Florida, and Los Angeles-Ontario-Long

Beach, California. The long and complicated history

of the Board’s efforts to resolve this question is de-

tailed in the following section. For present purposes

we note that this case was set for hearing as a result

of the Board’s decision in the Delta-Northeast Merger

Case to reexamine the authority it had previously

granted Northeast Airlines to compete in the Miami-

Los Angeles nonstop market with National Airlines,

the only other carrier certificated to provide nonstop

service in that market. Following a public hearing,

Administrative Law Judge William H. Dapper issued

an initial decision in which he determined that the

public convenience and necessity continue to require

the authorization of competitive nonstop service, and

that Pan American World Airways should be selected

to provide that service. The Board has exercised its

right of discretionary review, briefs to the Board have

been filed, and oral argument has been heard.

Upon consideration of the matters presented, the

Board has decided to affirm Judge Dapper’s finding

of need for competitive service in the market at issue.

On the other hand, we have determined that the pub-

lic convenience and necessity would best be served by

selecting Western Air Lines as National’s nonstop

competitor. Accordingly, except to the extent modi-

fied herein, we adopt as our own the findings and con-

clusions of the administrative law judge, whose initial

decision is attached as an appendix.

We now turn to a detailed discussion of findings and

conclusions.

App. B-3

l. Background

An appreciation of the long and complicated his-

tory of this case is necessary to an understanding of

our decision in this proceeding. That history may be

divided into two phases: the first phase involves the

Board’s decision to reexamine Northeast’s Miami-Los-

Angeles nonstop route award; the second phase in-

volves a number of important procedural events oc-

curring subsequent to the issuance of Judge Dapper’s

initial decision.

A. Northeast’s Miami-Los Angeles Nonstop Authority

National Airlines was authorized to serve the

Miami-Los Angeles nonstop market in the Southern

Transcontinental Service Case, 33 C.A.B. 726 (1961),

and that carrier had a monopoly for approximately

eight years, until six years ago, when the Board found

that competitive service was required by the public

convenience and necessity. Northeast Airlines was

awarded competitive nonstop authority, based upon a

finding that the route would strengthen the financially

beleaguered carrier, and upon assurance from the car-

rier that it was not seeking the route simply to make

itself more attractive to prospective merger partners.

See Orders 69-7-135 and 69-9-111. As it turned out,

shortly after Northeast’s authority became effective,

the carrier’s management made a firm decision to seek

a merger with Northwest Airlines.

The two carriers submitted the resulting merger

agreement to the Board for approval, but the Board

found that the proposed merger vitiated the basis of

the Board’s earlier award to Northeast and that, in

such circumstances, the proposed merger would be

consistent with the public interest only if the authority

of the surviving carrier—Northwest—to operate the

Miami-Los Angeles route was stayed and reexamined

App. B-4

in a separate investigation. Order 70-12-162. It is

Significant to point out at this juncture that in the

Northwest-Northeast Merger Case Delta Air Lines,

which now claims that Northeast’s Miami-Los Angeles

authority must be transferred to it as a matter of law

(infra, at 11), opposed the transfer of the Miami-Los

Angeles segment to Northeast on the grounds that

such transfer would permit Northeast to “traffic” in

certificates. More importantly, Delta stated to the

Board in that proceeding that it “stands ready and

willing to merge with Northeast under terms and

conditions agreeable to both parties whether or not

the Miami-Los Angeles segment is transferred to

Delta as part of the merger,” and that Delta “is amen-

able to participating in a Section 401 proceeding vying

for the [Miami-Los Angeles] authority along with

other interested applicants.” Order 71-3-8, p. 6, fn. 16.

The Northwest-Northeast merger collapsed, princi-

pally because Northwest was unwilling to accept the

conditions the Board attached to Northeast’s Miami-

Los Angeles authority. Shortly thereafter, Northeast

entered into a merger with Delta. The Board approved

the merger, again subject to the condition that any

authority to operate over the Miami-Los Angeles seg-

ment should be stayed pending completion of an an-

cillary investigation to determine “whether the route

should be transferred to Delta, awarded to a different

applicant, or allowed to lapse.” Delta-Northeast Mer-

ger Case, Orders 72-5-73/74, at pp. 27-29. The Board

emphasized that “all of the essential! factors that led

us to our stay of the Miami-Los Angeles route in

Northwest-Northeast are present here virtually un-

changed and we cannot apply a different test to North-

east in this case.””’ Moreover, the Board noted that

“both Delta and Northeast were fuliy aware of the

Board’s position on the Miami-Los Angeles route at

App. B-5

the time they concluded their merger discussions, and

thus neither can contend that transfer and stay will

occasion an unforeseen financial impact on it.’’ Order

72-5-73 at pp. 27-28. Delta accepted the terms and

conditions which the Board attached to its approval

of the merger. Pursuant to the stay, competitive ser-

vice in the Miami-Los Angeles market was terminated

in July, 1972, and, by Order 72-8-95 (August 23, 1972).

the instant Miami-Los Angeles Competitive Nonstop

Investigation was instituted. The instituting order

advised that the investigation was being conducted

pursuant to the Board’s general powers under Section

204 of the Act, and insofar as Delta’s claim to the

Miami-Los Angeles segment is concerned, pursuant

to the Board’s power to (1) alter, amend, or modify

certificates under Section 401(g), and (2) impose

terms and conditions on mergers approved pursuant

to Section 408(b).

B. Subsequent Procedural History

Evidentiary proceedings were held in early 1973,

and, on June 13, 1973, Judge Dapper issued his initial

decision. The Board granted discretionary review of

the initial decision and briefs were submitted to the

Board. However, in response to a contention raised

by National Airlines in its brief, further review pro-

ceedings were then deferred to consider the environ-

mental impact of a possible award in this case. In

response to the Board’s order, the Bureau of Operating

Rights prepared and circulated an assessment of the

environmental consequences of competitive service.

The assessment was not completed until December

1974. The Bureau concluded that the certification and

implementation of any of the service proposals pre-

sented by the applicants would not constitute a “major

federal action significantly affecting the quality of the

human environment” within the meaning of section

App. B-6

102(2)(c) of the National Environmental Policy Act

of 1969. Having determined that a draft environ-

mental impact statement was unnecessary, the Bu-

reau presented its findings in the form of an Environ-

mental Negative Declaration.

Two other matters of procedural importance war-

rant comment here. First, by motion filed on Novem-

ber 27, 1974, Continental Air Lines seeks a reopening

of the record in this case and a remand of this pro-

ceeding on the matter of carrier selection. Continen-

tal argues, inter alia, that in view of substantially

changed circumstances since the close of the eviden-

tiary hearings, it is unlikely that Pan American could

profitably operate the service which the administrative

law judge found it could provide. Second, by motion

filed on January 6, 1976, National seeks to defer all

further procedural steps in this proceeding “pending

an investigation and statement of the probable impact

on energy efficiency and energy conservation of non-

stop competitive authority in the Miami-Los Angeles

market.”

By Order 75-1-114 (January 28, 1975) the Board

decided to defer consideration of Continental’s motion

pending oral argument. That order also reopened the

record to permit BOR to file its environmental assess-

ment and to allow interested persons the opportunity

to file comments.

Oral argument, the final procedural step, was held

on April 16, 1975.

2. The Need for Competitive Nonstop Service

As noted, the Board has previously determined that

the public convenience and necessity require competi-

*The motions of Continental and National will be denied. See

pp. 32-38 infra.

App. B-7

tive nonstop service in the Miami-Los Angeles market.

Judge Dapper concluded that the record in this pro-

ceeding confirms the Board’s prior determination. He

found that the Miami-Los Angeles market, the largest

monopoly market in the country in terms of revenue

passenger-miles, was large enough to support competi-

tive service, and that competitive service was required

because of historic and existing service deficiencies and

the public benefits that competition may be expected

to bring in assuring the future development of the mar-

ket. LD. 16-31.

On review, all parties, except National, support his

decision that there is a need for competitive nonstop

service between Miami and Los Angeles.* National

contends that its services have been excellent; that its

moderate load factors demonstrate that there is no

need for additional capacity; that the market cannot

sustain competitive operations; that even if the mar-

ket could support such operations, a competitive award

would be inconsistent with Board decisional standards ;

and that competition would result in excessive “iver-

sion from National.

The Board agrees with Judge Dapper’s conclusions.

In deciding to authorize competition in 1969, the

Board found the basic deficiency in National’s Miami-

Los Angeles service to be the carrier’s failure to de-

velop its monopoly market aggressively, and, in pa’-

*The City of Long Beach, which is not a formal party to this

proceeding, has filed a statement with the Board indicating that

it neither seeks nor desires additional air service to Long Beach

in this proceeding. It requests that the Board not include Long

Beach as a hyphenated point as recommended by the administrative

law judge. The City’s request will be granted. There is no evidence

in the record that the traveling public would be adversely affected

by a granting of the City’s request. In fact, no carrier applicant

proposes to provide Miami-Los Angeles service via the Long Beach

airport.

App. B-8

ticular, to provide a sufficient level of nonstop frequen-

cies. At that time, National was providing two daily

nonstop round trips, which translated into 1.4 nonstop

flights per 100 passengers. The administrative law

judge concluded in this proceeding that National has

continued to neglect the service needs of the Miami-

Los Angeles market. He found, inter alia, that Na-

tional still provides only two daily nonstop round trips

and, more significantly, that it provides fewer nonstop

flights per 100 passengers than it did in 1969 when the

Board first found its service to be deficient.* Our re-

view of the evidence discloses that National’s monop-

oly service continues to be characterized by a prepon-

derance of multistop flights. In fact, notwithstanding

National’s exclusive nonstop authorization, the record

reveals that two-thirds of the carrier’s Miami-Los An-

geles flights have consisted of one-, two-, or three-stop

frequencies. Our review of the carrier’s schedules since

the conclusion of the evidentiary hearings also discloses

that National has not upgraded the quality of its mo-

nopoly nonstop service. The carrier continues to op-

erate a basic pattern of two daily nonstop round trips,

with some additional service on the weekends. One of

its westbound flights does not arrive in Los Angeles

until almost 1 a.m.‘ As a result, the record discloses

that only slightly over 80 percent of the Miami-Los

Angeles local passengers today utilize nonstop sched-

ules, despite the substantial inherent advantages such

schedules offer in terms of shorter flight times and

fewer occasions for delays. For a long-haul market of

*Judge Dapper found that based upon the most recent figures

available National was offering the Miami-Los Angeles market only

0.76 nonstop frequencies per 100 passengers. He noted that al-

though National had switched operations with wide-bodied aircraft,

a weighing of National’s nonstop frequencies to account for Na-

tional’s increased capacity produced a figure of only 1.27 nonstop

flights per 100 passengers. I.D. at 22.

*See O.A.G. March 1, 1976.

2 eee a wee

App. B-9

such density, the percentage of travelers not using non-

stop service in this market appears to us relatively

high, reflecting the relative paucity of nonstop sched-

ules by National; with the stimulus of competition, we

would expect this percentage to diminish materially.

The quality of National’s nonstop service in the

Miami-Los Angeles market is in striking contrast to

the quality of service in other southern tier markets

where it must compete. Thus, for example, although

Miami-Los Angeles accounted for more than 50 per-

cent of National’s total Miami-Los Angeles/Houston/

New Orleans passengers in 1974, it accounted for only

25 percent of National’s Miami-Los Angeles/Houston/

New Orleans nonstop flights in that year. In these cir-

cumstances, we are concerned that without the spur of

competition, National will continue to focus its atten-

tion on southern tier competitive markets to the detri-

ment of the needs of Miami-Los Angeles travelers for

improved service. Viewed from this perspective, it is

clear that competition is the best guarantee that good

service will be provided in the Miami-Los Angeles mar-

ket, and that the market will be developed in a manner

commensurate with its travel requirements.

National is correct in its assertion that its Miami-

Los Angeles load factors are not high. We do not, how-

ever, share its contention that its load factors obviate

the need for a competitive award. To begin with, the

market is quite large and does not receive the atten-

tion which National accords its competitive markets.

There is no evidence that National has aggressively

promoted its Miami-Los Angeles nonstop operations.

Indeed, although National was required by the terms

of Judge Dapper’s Prehearing Conference Report to

submit evidence of its Miami-Los Angeles promotional

efforts, it provided none, stating that it “does not have

App. B-10

the requested information available.’ In short the

Board cannot attach significant weight to load-factor

data where, as here, it is likely that the carrier’s mod-

est load factors on the nonstop flights are attributable,

at least in part, to National’s focus on multistop flights,

casual promotional efforts, or both. In any case, we do

not believe that this market should be deprived of the

benefits of competition even if we assume for present

purposes that National’s load factors support its asser-

tion that it has provided ample service, and that the

carrier will (as it claims) add additional nonstop

flights as the growth of the market requires. In this

connection, we have already stated that “[ajs the Board

has often observed and as the courts have recently em-

phasized, the Act required the Board to foster compe-

tition as a means of enhancing the development of air

transportation on routes which can support competing

carriers—except where the benefits of competition are

outweighed by other public interest considerations.

See Continental Air Lines v. CAB, No. 74-1651, Sep-

tember 22, 1975.’ Thus, the mere fact that an incum-

bent claims to be ready to meet growing traffic demand

does not foreclose a competitive award.

As discussed, we share Judge Dapper’s conclusion

that the record establishes that, at the very least, com-

petition is necessary to assure the continued growth

and development of the market. Further, as we shall

now discuss, the record also shows that the Miami-Los

Angeles market is sufficiently large and strong to sup-

port competition.

The administrative law judge in the proceeding be-

low estimated that O&D plus interline connecting traf-

*See National’s cross-reference list to Information Exhibits.

*Remanded Reno-Portland/Seattle Nonstop Service Investiga-

tion, Order 75-11-45, November 12, 1975. See, also Philadelphia-

Rochester/Syracuse Case, Order 76-1-119, January 30, 1976.

App. B-11

fic in the Miami-Los Angeles market would total

261,000 O&D and interline connecting passengers in

the forecast year, CY 1974, before competition. After

competition, he projected a total market of 313,000

local O&D and interline connecting passengers. I.D.

16-21. The Board’s O&D Survey indicates, however,

that traffic did not reach the predicted level in CY 1974.

National uses the difference between forecast and sur-

vey traffic levels as a springboard for arguing that the

market will not be able to support competition. In

doing so, however, it does not give due consideration to

two important and interrelated considerations. First,

the market’s failure to reach predicted levels reflects

in part the effects of the economic recession and related

lag in traffic growth, National’s own service deficien-

cies, and, more recently, a prolonged strike by Nation-

al’s employees which eliminated nonstop service in the

market for about three and one-half months. Second,

notwithstanding the foregoing problems, the market

continues to grow—although not at the rate forecast

by the administrative law judge. Thus, between 1972

and 1973, traffic increased by about 7 percent on an

annual basis. Traffic growth dipped to about 3 percent

during 1974, and, according to figures provided by

National, continued at this rate of growth during the

first six months of 1975. We note, however, that traffic

increased by more than 8 percent in the second quarter

of 1975 when compared to a similar period in the pre-

ceding year.

In any case, it is likely that the year ending June 30,

1977, will be the first full year of service, rather than

the forecast year used by the parties and adopted by

the administrative law judge. To compute traffic in

the forecast year, we have applied growth and stimula-

tion factors of 7 percent and 20 percent, respectively,

to 1974 O&D plus interline connecting traffic reported

App. B-12

in the Board’s Survey.’ The resulting traffic estimate

of 269,403 annual passengers before competition, and

323,000 passengers after competition, approximates

the figures predicted by Judge Dapper, and therefore

eorroborates his finding that there is ample traffic

available to support competitive service.

Our assumed growth rate reflects our judgment that

traffic growth in the market will neither rebound to

historic levels reflected in the record and used by Judge

Dapper (11 percent), nor continue at its present low

rate (3 percent), but, rather, will level off at a rate

falling between these two figures. As noted, the evi-

dence is that traffic in the market has been unusually

depressed in recent years by the combined effects of

substandard service, no service during National’s

strike periods, and the nation’s general economic ma-

laise, which has depressed the industry’s growth rate.

In these circumstances, we are confident that the forces

of competition will eliminate the service-related de-

pressants, and, based on recent indications, that eco-

nomic conditions in general and in the industry will

improve sufficiently to permit realization of the modest

rate of growth here predicted for the Miami-Los An-

geles market.* Furthermore, we find no basis in the

record to question the administrative law judge’s use

of the 20 percent stimulation figure in view of existing

service deficiencies and the benefits that first effective

competition should provide.

* Traffic estimate:

Forecast Year Forecast Year

Annaal Market Without Market With

1974 Market* Growth Competition Stimulation Competition

227,350 7% 269,403 20°. 323,284

* Local O&D plus interline connecting traffic, from C.A.B. Traffic

Survey Tables 8 & 10.

*Cf. Reopened Service to Omaha and Des Moines Case, Order

75-9-19, dated September 8, 1975, at 5.

eee eee ee

App. B-13

Our conclusion that the Miami-Los Angeles route

can support competition is confirmed by evidence show-

ing that National and Western, the applicant that we

have selected as National’s new competitor, can both

operate at substantial profits. We discuss Western’s

prospects for viable operations in greater detail at pp.

20-21 of this opinion. At this point, we focus pri-

marily on our conclusion that National can operate

profitably in competition with Western. National’s

contrary view is based essentially on its representation

during the economic hearings that it would operate

three daily round trips in the forecast year of record,

i.e. 1974, with or without competition. Two years have

passed since the conclusion of the economic hearings

and National has failed to provide three daily round

trips as predicted. Assuming, therefore, that Western

operates in proposed nonstop frequencies, and assum-

ing a rational response by National, it is unlikely that

National will operate three round trips in competition

with Western in the forecast year.

In all these circumstances, we have projected what

we believe to be a reasonable estimate of National’s

prospects for competitive nonstop operations.’ Based

upon evidence of record and other officially noticeable

data, it is our judgment that National will carry a total

of about 167,000 annual nonstop passengers over the

Miami-Los Angeles route, or more than 450 passengers

a day. This traffic figure translates into an average

* Traffic projection for National and Western:

Forecast Year*

Competition Yen Cache Bewent _ Sout

Lecal O&D plus Traffic Share Segment Nonstop

Interline Con- at at Traffic Segment Annual* Lead

necting trafic 90% 50% Support Traffic Seats Factors

National 145,478 21,822 167,300 356,269 47%

Western 523,284 290,956 145,478 43,800 189,278 342,248 55%

* See p. 7, supra.

** Source, Exs. NAL-200-R and 378-R.

App. B-14

al load factor of about 47 percent on National's

ate flights for the first full year of competitive

service—an average which is considerably above its

break-even load factors for the route and aircraft in

question.” This traffic projection warrants three ex-

planatory comments here. First, we have assumed

that since both National and Western will each pro-

vide two daily nonstop round trips, they will divide

the nonstop market equally. We point out, ge

that National may in fact carry a greater share of the

nonstop traffic, at least imtially, in view of its en-

trenched position and the greater capacity that it

proposes to offer. Second, we agree with Judge Dap-

per that at least 90 percent of the total passengers in

the market should be carried on nonstop flights, as-

suming that National and Western each offers at least

two well-timed daily nonstop frequencies. National,

however, argues that historic experience in the mar-

ket indicates that only 81 percent of total market

passengers will use nonstop services. In our judgment,

National’s figure supports, rather than refutes, our

finding, since the first truly effective competitive non-

stop operations should be able to increase nonstop par-

ticipation by at least 10 percent to reach the 90 percent

figure that we have found reasonable. Third, consis-

tent with Board precedent, we have included support

traffic that is likely to be available to National, but

not its competitor, and vice versa. National has not

provided evidence that would permit a definitive esti-

mate of the level of such traffic. Nevertheless, as

pointed out by a number of parties, and as recognized

by the administrative law judge," there is a substan-

tial discrepancy between the O&D plus interline con-

necting traffic reported in the Board’s surveys for the

Miami-Los Angeles route and the traffic actually car-

* See Oral Argument Tr. at 169.

“1D. at 21.

App. B-15

ried over the route by National, and the difference be-

tween the two figures represents, in significant part,

National’s on-line beyond-segment traffic support.

For example, National’s exhibits. show that in CY 1971

it carried 22 percent more traffic over the segment

than is reported as local O&D and interline connecting

passengers in the Board’s Survey data. Other discrep-

ancies range as high as 26 percent. Giving due con-

sideration to the possibility of statistical error, and to

flow traffic which Western may intercept, we may

reasonably conclude that the O&D plus interline con-

necting traffic projected in the table above for Na-

tional should be conservatively increased by at least

15 percent to reflect beyond-segment traffic support

that National is likely to carry on its Miami-Los An-

geles nonstop flights in the forecast year.

National argues that even if the Miami-Los Angeles

route can support competition, competition should not

be authorized unless the Board determines that both

National and its competitor can achieve load factors

in the 52.5-55 percent range. National asserts that a

contrary conclusion would be inconsistent with the

Domestie Passenger-Fare Investigation, Phase 6B,

Order 71-4-54, April 9, 1971. Alternatively, National

maintains that if the Board determines that the mar-

ket requires competition, competiticn should be au-

thorized on a “contingent basis,” with its competitor’s

new route authority effective only if National’s load

factors reach a certain level for a specified period of

time, e.g., 65 percent for nine consecutive months.”

The administrative law judge properly rejected Na-

tional’s last-ditch efforts to avoid competition over the

Miami-Los Angeles route.

We perceive two fundamental and interrelated de-

fects in National’s contentions. First, they are based

* See Transcript of Oral Argument at 186.

App. B-16

upon the unsupported assumption that load factors

are the sole criterion for determining the need for

competitive service, and, second, they seriously ignore

the needs of the traveling public. Although load fac-

tors are evidence of the relationship between supply

and demand, the Board has repeatedly stated that the

load-factor standards established in the DPFI were

never intended to replace all evidence in route pro-

ceedings with respect to the need for competition in

particular markets. Those standards merely remain

overall industry averages for the purpose of establish-

ing reasonable fares on an industry-wide basis. See

Order 71-4-54 at 27-28 and 34-35. Furthermore, adop-

tion of either of National’s load factor-related argu-

ments could serve to deprive the traveling public of

the benefits of competition under circumstances that

would provide a monopolist with considerable incen-

tive to secure windfall profits. Given the fact that the

monopolist could manipulate seats offered in a par-

ticular market to influence ultimate load factors—as,

for example, by scheduling a few flights at unattrac-

tive times for one or two months of the year—it is

questionable whether competition would ever see the

light of day under either of National’s hypotheses

even if service deficiencies were to develop.

Finally, National argues that competition will re-

sult in excessive diversion regardless of the carrier

selected. It estimates that Western will divert between

$4.7 and 6.7 million in the first year. On a relative

basis, however, it indicates that Western will divert

less revenue from it than most of the other appli-

cants."* Western estimates that it will divert only

* National estimates that only Northwest and TWA wouid divert

less revenues from it in the primary market than Western, with

Northwest diverting the least (between $4.5 and $6.6 million in the

first year). However, according to National’s figures it is apparent

that the difference in diversionary impact resulting from the selec-

tion of either Western or Northwest is very little.

App. B-17

$1.2 million from National in all markets.

The forecasts of National and Western are based

on traffic and revenue projections which have been

largely outstripped by the passage of time and changed

circumstances. Nevertheless, on the basis of more re-

cent officially noticeable data, we find that the range

of diversion resulting from Western’s competition pre-

dicted by National is reasonable.

To compute the diversionary effects of Western’s

competition we have first estimated what National’s

share of local O&D traffic plus interline connecting

passengers would have been in 1974 had it operated

for a full year by applying its historic share (90 per-

cent) to 1974 market figures. We have then increased

National’s share by 7 percent annually to arrive at

its forecast-year traffic (year ending June 30, 1977).

We have thereafter compared these totals to Nation-

al’s traffic and RPMs in the same year with the addi-

tion of competition by Western. National should re-

tain 50 percent of the total (including stimulated)

O&D plus interline connecting traffic in the market.

Our computations produce a gross diversion figure of

about $11 million."* However, we agree with the ad-

ministrative law judge that it is appropriate to offset

this figure by normal traffic growth between the base

and forecast years in view of the public benefits that

should result from the selection of Western and the

fortuitous profits that National has enjoyed as a re-

sult of the absence of effective competition in the

market since it was first authorized by the Board in

1969. Accordingly, application of “growth-offset” re-

duces the Miami-Los Angeles passenger revenues that

a Based upon National’s average 1975 yield per RPM in the

Miami-LosAngeles market of about $.058, as reported in updated

Exhibit NA-302-I.

App. B-18

Western will divert from National in the first year to

approximately $5.8 million. In addition, Western’s

exhibits show that, at National’s current domestic

system yield, Western will divert about $750,000 from

National in other markets, producing a total diversion

of about $6.5 million in passenger revenues.

To be sure, our estimate of diversion is substantial

on an absolute basis. We cannot find, however, that

the diversionary effect of our award represents a con-

vincing ground for depriving the traveling public of

the long-overdue benefits of improved service. In the

first place, the evidence is that competition should pro-

duce public benefits far outweighing the diversionary

impact on National.’* National is a financially healthy

carrier and the operating revenues that may be di-

verted amount to only a small percentage of its total

system operating revenues. There is, in this connec-

tion, no evidence that the operations of Western will

either significantly impair National’s overall financial

position or its public service. Furthermore, our esti-

mate of diversion overstates the actual harm to Na-

tional, because it does not include cost savings that

should accompany the loss in revenues, and because

* We have assumed for present purposes that $750,000 is a rea-

sonable approximation of the revenue that Western will divert from

National in other markets. However, we point out that our review

of Western’s forecast in light of more recent officially noticeable

data and our accepiance of Judge Dapper’s downward adjustment

of Western’s beyond-segment traffic potential, establishes that it

is likely that Western will divert less revenues from National in

other markets.

* We have reached similar conclusions with respect to the diver-

sionary effect of our awards on other carriers. Although Western’s

operations will have their greatest impact on National, they will

also, to varying degrees, divert some additional revenue from other

carriers. However, as in the case of National, there is no evidence

that such operations will seriously harm any other airline. Overall,

the Board finds that the public benefits of the award we make

today far outweigh the detrimental impact resulting from the

diversion of revenues from other carriers.

App. B-19

it is based only on short-term considerations. Put

another way, the record shows that, in the long run,

competition should contribute to the further growth

and development of the market, and therefore to the

economic benefit of both competing carriers. More-

over, in deciding the weight to be attached to the di-

version issue, the Board believes that it is important

to consider that, although the Board first authorized

competition in the market in 1969, none has been effec-

tively provided. As a result, National has been the

beneficiary of a market monopoly for more than six

years.

3. Standing of the Applicants

Delta argues that it stands in a preferred position

vis-a-vis the other applicants in this proceeding. It

contends that, if the Board determines that there is

a need for competitive nonstop service in the Miami-

Los Angeles market, Delta must, as a matter of law,

be permitted to provide that service. It argues that,

aside from what the Boad may have intended with

respect to the ultimate disposition of Northeast’s

Miami-Los Angeles authority, the technical language

of condition(13) of its certificate’ and the technical

language framing the issues in the Miami-Los Angeles

proceeding establish that the segment in question has

been transferred to Delta, subject only to a stay of

its operations pending completion of a subsequent

proceeding to determine whether there is still a need

* The literal language of segment 7 of Delta’s Route 27 authorizes

the carrier to engage in air transportation with respect to persons,

property, and mail “[{bJetween the terminal point Miami-Fort

Lauderdale, Fla., and the terminal point Los Angeles-Ontario-Long

Beach, Calif.” Condition (11) of Delta’s Route 27 states that “[t])he

authority of the holder to operate segment 7 is stayed pending final

decision in a proceeding to be hereafter instituted for the purpose

of reexamination of such authorization, and this certificate shall

be subject to whatever determinations are made regarding segment

7 in such proceeding.”

App. B-20

for competitive service in the Miami-Los Angeles

market. Therefore, in Delta’s view, if the Board re-

affirms its previous finding in this regard, Delta must

be selected to provide that service, unless the carrier

is “decertificated” pursuant to section 401(g) of the

Act. However, Delta argues that no such determina-

tion can be made on the basis of the present record.

Judge Dapper found that Delta’s contentions are

without merit. The Board agrees. In our judgment,

there is no basis for concluding that Delta retains

either a paramount legal or equitable right to, or any

other priority claim in, the Miami-Los Angeles non-

stop route segment.

To begin with, Delta’s current argument ignores

relevant decisional criteria, is inconsistent with the

positions previously advanced by the carrier, and

otherwise disregards fundamental standards of fair

play in administrative proceedings. As discussed in

great detail above, the Northeast-Northwest and the

Northeast-Delta merger cases were conducted and de-

cided in significant part on the basis of the important

principle that since a merger of Northeast would viti-

ate the basis for Northeast’s award of Miami-Los An-

geles authority, the segment could not be uncondition-

ally transferred to the merged carrier without further

evidentiary proceedings to determine whether the

route should be so transferred, awarded to a different

carrier, or allowed to lapse. In other words, all inter-

ested persons were fully advised that the surviving

carrier would have no legal! or priority claim to the

segment, but would have to compete for the authority

with other applicants in a subsequent proceeding.

Now, after having received the many other benefits of

a merger with Northeast, Delta would have the Board

declare that the carrier has a paramount legal right

to the segment in question. However, Delta’s attempts

App. B-21

to secure reconsideraiion and reversal of a principle

established by the Board to govern Northeast’s at-

tempts at merger should not now be countenanced

after administrative proceedings have been conducted

and decided on the basis of such principle. Indeed, as

noted, Delta was a strong supporter of the Board’s

approach to Northeast’s Miami-Los Angeles authority

in Northeast-Northwest, and later accepted the cer-

tificate transferred in the order approving its merger

with Northeast.

As previously discussed, Delta’s excuse for its self-

serving position rests principally on technical language

contained in its certificate and in the order instituting

this proceeding. Delta also suggests that this language

represents a reversal of the Board’s position with re-

spect to the ultimate disposition of the Miami-Los An-

geles segment. The short answer to Delta’s contention

is that the referenced language was not intended as

such a reversal and does not, even by its terms, consti-

tute such a reversal. In any event, the language must

be read in context with the Board’s various opinions in

the Northeast merger proceeding. To repeat, those

opinions clearly establish that the surviving carrier of

a Northeast merger would not have priority claim to

the Miami-Los Angeles segment, that it would have to

compete for this authority with other applicants in a

subsequent proceeding, and that any Miami-Los An-

geles authority conditionally transferred to the surviv-

ing carrier might be finally terminated in such a pro-

ceeding.

In any case, the Board has ample power under Sec-

tions 401 (g) and 408 (b) of the Act to terminate the

Miami-Los Angeles authority that now conditionally

appears in Delta’s certificate for Route 27. Section

401(g) authorizes the Board, after notice and hearing,

to discontinue existing carrier authority (in whole or

App. B-22

in part) by altering, amending, modifying, or suspend-

ing existing certificates where the public convenience

and necessity so require.’* The Board has previously

explained the nature of its authority under Section

401(g), and the courts have agreed with the Board’s

views. The Board's ability to alter, amend, modify, cr

suspend existing certificates is designed to permit the

Board to respond to changed economic conditions and

circumstances in air transportation by adjusting the

operating authority of air carriers. It depends for its

exercise upon the requirement of the public convenience

and necessity—the same standards under which the

Board may grant certificate rights under Section 401

(d) of the Act. See Southwest Renewal-United Sus-

pension Case, 15 C.A.B. 61 (1952), aff'd. United Air

Lines v. C.A.B., 198 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1952); Jntra-

Alaska Case, 28 C.A.B 57 (1958), aff'd. Alaska Air-

lines v. C.A.B., 285 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1960); and

Alaska Service Investigation, Order 71-12-45, aff'd.

Western Air Lines v. C.A.B., 495 F.2d 145 (D.c. Cir.

1974). The Board, however, has recognized that its

powers under section 401(g) are not unlimited. Thus,

it has held that in a situation where it is proposing to

alter, amend, or modify a route without a carrier’s con-

sent, the alteration must not be such as to transform

the essential character of the carrier’s operations, and

that such alteration should be measured in terms of

overall system operations, and not on the basis of the

particular route which is involved. See Alaska Route

Modification Case, 17 C.A.B. 943 (1953) ; Inter-Alaska

Case, supra; and Alaska Service Investigation, supra.

In our judgment, a Board decision to alter, amend,

or modify Delta's certificate for Route 27 so as to re-

“Section 401(g) also authorizes the Board to “revoke” existing

certificates for intentional violations of the Act, or of the Board's

regulations or orders.

App. B-23

move the Miami-Los Angeles authority that now ap-

pears therein is consistent with the above-detailed ju-

dicially approved administrative standards."* For one

thing, no party to this proceeding either argues or has

shown that the Miami-Los Angeles market either needs

or can support more competition than we have author-

ized herein. In these circumstances, those elements of

the public convenience and necessity upon which the

Board has relied to select Western as National's new

competitor concomitantly support the removal of the

Miami-Los Angeles authority that now conditionally

appears in Delta's certificate. In addition, such action

would not effect a basic transformation of Delta’s sys-

tem by virtually any measure. Indeed, as a practical

matter, removal of the segment would have no appre-

ciable economic impact on the carrier’s existing opera-

tions, since it has never provided service over the seg-

ment. Further, it is noted that Delta is a large domes-

tic trunkline primarily serving the eastern and south-

ern parts of the United States, as well as points in

Canada, South America and the Caribbean. Conse-

quently, assuming for purposes of argument that Delta

was operating over the segment, an examination of its

system indicates that the Miami-Los Angeles route

mileage forms only a small portion of its total system

mileage. Similarly, the 1974 revenues predicted by

Delta for the market in question would amount to

merely 1.2 percent of its total 1974 revenues.

Finally, aside from the foregoing, Section 408(b)

of the Act provides an alternate basis for removing the

Miami-Los Angeles segment that now conditionally ap-

“ Delta contends that the record will not support a “revocation”

of its Miami-Los Angeles authority for intentional violations of

the Board's regulatory requirements. We agree. However, Delta's

contention is beside the point, since, as discussed in the text, the

authority in question may be terminated pursuant to other pro-

visions of 401(g).

App. B-24

pears in Delta’s certificate. Section 408(b) broadly

empowers the Board to approve mergers “upon such

terms and conditions as it shall find to be just and rea-

sonable and with such modification as it may pre-

scribe.” The Board’s decision in the Northeast-Delta

Merger Case and its order instituting the Miami-Los

Angeles Competitive Nonstop Investigation specifically

preserved the Board’s power to terminate the Miami-

Los Angeles segment in a subsequent proceeding as a

further condition to Board approval of the merger

agreement. Delta accepted the certificate as condi-

tioned. The Board shall exercise that power. As shall

be discussed shortly, the record in this proceeding es-

tablishes that, on balance, the selection of Western

would result in greater public benefits than the selec-

tion of Delta. The significance of the superiority of

these benefits is not, in our judgment, outweighed by

other considerations advanced by Delta on brief as

relevant to the exercise of the Board’s powers under

section 408. Further, Delta neither argues nor has

shown that any convincing public purpose would be

served by continuing in effect subject to a stay the

Miami-Los Angeles segment that now conditionally

appears in its certificate. In all of these circumstances

we have determined that the public interest requires

the amendment of Delta’s certificate for Route 27 so

as to remove segment 7.

In reaching this conclusion, the Board has carefully

considered Delta’s contention that, if the Board does

have authority to deal with the segment in question in

a subsequent proceeding pursuant to Section 498, the

Board’s decis onal process must afford Delta’s applica-

tion priority consideration. In support of its argument

Delta maintains that Section 408 requires the Board

to pass upon the merits of Delta’s application before,

and independently of, any of the other applications for

App. B-25

Miami-Los Angeles route authority. We do not agree

with Delta’s reading of Section 408. To begin with, the

carrier has provided no precedent for its novel propo-

sition, and we can find none. Moreover, it is clear that

it would be inconsistent with the public interest to as-

sess the merits of Delta’s application in a vacuum, that

is, without granting the applications of the other car-

riers equal consideration. Thus, for example, the selec-

tion of Delta on this basis would, as noted above, de-

prive the traveling public of benefits that they would

otherwise receive by virtue of the selection of other car-

riers who have presented superior operating proposals.

In sum, the Board has concluded that Delta neither

retains a paramount legal right, nor any other priority

claim, to the Miami-Los Angeles route segment, and

that in these circumstances the merits of its applica-

tion must be considered on an equal footing with the

merits of the other applications now before the Board.

Since we have further determined that another carrier

should be selected in preference to Delta, and since no

convincing reason has been advanced to warrant con-

tinuation of its stayed authority to operate the segment

in question, we shall remove segment 7 from its Route

27 pursuant to our authority under Section 401(g)

and 408(b) of the Act.

4. Carrier Selection

The administrative law judge’s selection of Pan

American to provide the needed competitive service

was premised essentially on two findings: first, he con-

cluded that the carrier’s strong international route sys-

tem would permit it to provide more public benefits

than any other applicant; second, he found that Pan

American had demonstrated the greatest need for

“route strengthening.” We agree with Judge Dapper

App. B-26

that the public benefits that each of the applicants can

provide is of paramount decisional significance in this

case. However, in our judgment, the record establishes

that, on balance, Western’s selection would provide the

traveling public with the most meaningful benefits, and

concomitantly, would provide National with the most

effective competition.

In comparatively evaluating the presentations of the

applicants, we recognize that the choice of a carrier

to compete with National is close. We find, as did the

administrative law judge, that no carrier has a signifi-

cant advantage in terms of an historic stake in the

market.” Furthermore, as we have already explained,

the administrative law judge correctly rejected Delta’s

claim that it acquired an economic stake in the market

when it acquired Northeast. An examination of the

carrier’s exhibits also reveals that no applicant has a

significant edge on the basis of equipment to be used

or proposed promotional efforts. It also appears that

with the exception of Pan American, and to a certain

extent Delta, each of the candidates can operate their

proposals at a profit. The relative profitability of their

various operations is therefore not nearly as important

a decisional factor as the public benefits they can pro-

vide. For similar reasons, we are in accord with the

administrative law judge that the fare proposals of the

” Continental is the only applicant authorized to provide single-

plane Miami-Los Angeles service. However, according weight to

Continental's presence would contravene the Board's determination

in the Southern Tier Case (Houston-Miami Phase), Order 73-2-89,

P. 4. In any case, the historic participation of any of the applicants

in Miami-Los Angeles traffic is very small, and, therefore, not of

significant decisional importance. See I.D. at 73. It is true that

in 1974 the participation of a number of carriers in Miami-Los

Angeles traffic increased. However, it is apparent that these in-

creases are due primarily to transitory traffic gains during Na-

tional’s strike, rather than any fundamental increases in the car-

riers’ economic stake in the Miami-Los Angeles market.

App. B-27

applicants are not controlling under the circumstances

of this case.”"

In these circumstances, our carrier selection de-

cision turns essentially on the public benefits that the

applicants can provide, and we are persuaded that

Western’s service potential is superior to that of the

other candidates. As detailed below, the superior bene-

fits resulting from Western’s selection are principally

the product of the carrier’s existing route structure,

including its preeminent position at Los Angeles, and

the special needs of the Miami-Los Angeles market.

To begin with, the record shows that nearly two-

thirds of the traffic in the market originates at Los

Angeles or other West Coast cities. National, how-

ever, which is the incumbent carrier, has its major

strength at Miami. It has only limited route authority

at Los Angeles, and no authority beyond Los An-

geles.” It is significant, therefore, that Los Angeles is

Western’s largest traffic-generating city and that West-

ern is the most active carrier at Los Angeles. Like

National, Western is a financially sound and profitable

carrier. Furthermore, the location of Western’s main

operations base and crew domicile at Los Angeles af-

fords the carrier a high degree of operational flex-

“1.D. at 68-70. Judge Dapper found that Continental's proposed

economy fare (the lowest basic fare offered by any of the appli-

cants) gives the carrier an edge over the fare proposals of the

other applicants. On the other hand, he concluded that Continental's

fare proposal is the only advantage of any significance that it has

over the other applicants is not decisive in this case. We

agree, and have concluded that on a comparative basis Continental's

advantage in this area of carrier selection is outweighed by West-

ern’s advantages in service benefits and overall ability to develop

the Miami-Los Angeles market.

“ Western, in contrast, carries more Los Angeles passengers and

serves more West Coast cities than any other applicant.

App. B-28

ibility and, coupled with its traffic resources, will per-

mit it to match National’s corresponding advantages

at Miami. Although Western has little identity in the

east and must open a new station at Miami, it should

be able to overcome National’s initial advantage in

this regard without much difficulty, in view of its

own competitive strength in the west and its willing-

ness and ability to devote considerable resources to-

ward marketing its service in the east.

Western’s position at Los Angeles, and its authority

beyond Los Angeles will permit it to provide superior

beyond-segment benefits from the outset and, even

more important, superior local-market and beyond-

segment service in the years to come. As Judge Dap-

per correctly observed, “with the exception of the

benefits Western could confer, the beyond-segment

benefits of the other applicants are quite insignificant,

at least when measured in relation to the total number

of passengers in the principal market herein...” I. D.

60.° From the outset Western will bring improved

single-plane service to approximately 7,000 passengers

in the Miami-Seattle market,” and single-carrier ser-

vice to approximately 37,000 Miami-Honolulu/Las

Vegas/Portland/Reno,Sacramento/San Diego and

“J udge Dapper’s reference did not include Pan American which,

at the time of the issuance of the initial decision, had proposed,

and could probab!, have provided, even more beyond-segment bene-

fits than Western. However, as we shal! explain in detail, Pan

American's then apparent advantage in this regard has been eroded

by the diminution of its Caribbean operations and, in any event,

at no time outweighed Western's overall superiority.

“Service in the Seattle market has been characterized by in-

frequent multistop frequencies. For example, at the present time,

Northwest provides a daily two-stop round trip via Chicago and

Atlanta. Eastern also offers a tour-stop eastbound flight daily and

a three-stop westbound flight which departs Miami at 10 PM and

arrives in Seattle at 4:30 AM. O.A.G. February 1, 1976.

App. B-29

San Francisco passengers.” Although the Board gen-

erally attaches more weight to improved single-plane

service than to single-carrier service, Western’s sin-

gle-carrier service is an important public-interest fac-

tor in the circumstances of this case in view of the

high percentage of connecting traffic in the foregoing

beyond markets, the absence of single-plane service

in the Miami-Honolulu market, and the absence of

single-carrier service in the Miami-Sacramento and

Miami-Reno markets. Moreover, on a relative basis,

the record shows that Western will be able to provide

more significant beyond benefits than any other ap-

plicant. Indeed, if the administrative law judge’s con-

servative estimate of the level of Western’s beyond

support traffic is accepted, Western’s service proposal

offers beyond-segment benefits to nearly twice as many

passengers as any other trunk applicant.

Western’s advantages in this connection are re-

flected in its service proposal. In the primary market

Western proposes to offer, at the outset, two daily

nonstop round trips with wide-bodied DC-10 aircraft.

Western’s operations are extremely well-tailored to

the needs of the Miami-Los Angeles market. One

flight will be devoted solely to the needs of traffic be-

tween Miami and Los Angeles and will serve no be-

yond destinations. The other flight will serve only a

single beyond destination, Seattle, Both flights are

™ The traffic estimates are those set out by the administrative law

judge, which are not seriously challenged by the other applicants.

However, Western’s exhibits show far more beyond traffic, and the

Board agrees that in view of market growth since the conclusion

of the Prigeniar hearing and the use of a later forecast year, it

is likely that the estimates reflected in the initial decision under-

state Western’s total support traffic. Nevertheless, for present pur-

poses we shall assume that the administrative law judge’s estimates

are reasonable, since the use of Western’s higher figures would not

materially affect out conclusions in this case.

App. B-30

timed to provide convenient morning and late after-

noon departures from both Miami and Los Angeles

and convenient arrivals at both points. The latter per-

mit travelers to make optimum use of connecting

flights to points beyond Miami and Los Angeles. In

our judgment, Western’s proposed primary-market

services are comparable or superior to the likely initial

operations of the other applicants.

American, Braniff, Delta, and Pan American all

propose more daily schedules in the primary Miami-

Los Angeles market than the two daily round trips

with wide-bodied aircraft proposed by Western. Amer-

ican, Delta, and Pan American each proposes three

daily round trips, employing mixture of narrow-bod-

ied and wide-bodied aircraft; Braniff proposes three

round trips three days a week and two round trips

the other four days.” Under other circumstances, this

might be a factor favoring these other applicants over

Western. We do not find it so here, for several rea-

sons.

First, the more ambitious schedules of the other ap-

plicants are to some extent a product of more sanguine

forecasts of the growth of the Miami-Los Angeles

market. Thus, Delta stated at oral argument” that

it would probably operate two, rather than three,

daily round trips in the forecast year, in view of the

* American proposed to operate two of its daily rou i i

narrow-bodied aircraft and one with wide-bodied : nelte one Pan

American propose one narrow-bodied plus two wide-bodied round-

trip flights, Delta with DC-10’s and Pan American with the con-

siderably larger B-747’s. The differences in proposed scheduling

and equipment are reflected in the differences in the number of

seats the several applicants propose to the operate annually:

American 328,500 Pan American 633

. 640

Branift 331,906 Western 3

, 4 ’

Delta 463,550 mati

* Oral Argument Tr. at 75, 76, 78.

App. B-31

market’s failure to reach the traffic levels that Delta

originally predicted would support three daily round

trips. We share Delta’s evident conclusion. No doubt

traffic will in time grow to the point where it will sup-

port three daily round trips by the second carrier in

the market; but when that happens, Western should

certainly be as able as Delta to increase its service

offering.

Experience has taught the Board not to place undue

reliance on the schedules proposed by applicant car-

riers for a new route—such schedule promises being

essentially unenforceable after the route has been

awarded— except where they are solidly backed up

by the strength of the applicant’s beyond-segment

support traffic. Western’s strength in this regard is

decisively greater than Delta’s, and in the long run

will insure its ability to provide a greater quantum of

service than Delta in the primary market, as well as

greater beyond-market benefits.

The same considerations give Western a long-term

advantage over both American and Braniff. Although

each of these carriers proposes to operate a slightly

smaller number of Miami-Los Angeles seats annually

than does Western,” this fact is more than offset by

Western’s greater beyond-segment traffic support.”

We find Braniff’s initial operating plan, on the

whole, less attractive than Western’s, notwithstand-

ing the additional round trip Braniff proposes three

* See supra, note 26.

* Nevertheless we are prepared to assume that American and

Braniff could both operate their initial schedule proposals at a

profit. As is evident, our decision herein does not turn on com-

parative profitability to any major extent, although we do assume,

as always, that markedly unprofitable schedule proposals either will

not in fact be inaugurated or, if inaugurated, will not long be

continued.

App. B-32

days a week. For example, while Western offers con-

veniently timed morning and afternoon departures

from both terminals, Braniff, by contrast, offers no

morning departures from Los Angeles and only three

morning departures from Miami each week. More-

over, as in the case of Pan American’s proposal (dis-

cussed hereinafter), Braniff’s proposal to extend Los

Angeles-Miami flights to a distant international point

(Bogota, Colombia, in this case) may well compromise

the carrier’s ability in comparison to Western to re-

spond to the requirements of the principal market.

On the other hand, American’s service proposal does

not suffer from the same deficiencies as Braniff’s and

its schedules appear well-timed for the needs of the

local market. Consequently, the greater frequencies

it proposes stand as an undeniable point in its favor,

to which we have given careful attention. Our ulti-

mate judgment, however, is that this factor favoring

American is essentially transitory and is outweighed

by the factors which support the selection of Western

including: the latter’s greater beyond-segment ser-

vice benefits; its greater traffic support with the long-

run advantage this support will inevitably give it in

competing with National and serving the local mar-

ket; the policy of strengthening the smaller carriers

in the industry; and, finally, the greater diversion of

traffic and revenues which American’s greater pro-

—_— initial frequencies would probably inflict on Na-

ional.

In many past decisions the Board has awarded com-

petitive authority in a market, not to the carrier which

proposed the greatest immediate number of new

flights in the market, but to the carrier whose service

would satisfactorily meet the previously unmet needs

of the market and would provide other benefits as

well. We have found that National’s existing service

App. B-33

pattern of two daily nonstop round trips does not fully

meet the market’s requirements, but it does not follow

that five daily round trips are essential.

Given the present size of the. Miami-Los Angeles

market, the relative predominance of local O&D traf-

fic over beyond-segment flow and interline connecting

traffic, the distance and flight time involved, and the

excellent suitability of the market for the employment

of wide-bodied aircraft, we have concluded that a total

of four daily round trips—assuming good coverage

of the most desirable departure times, which Na-

tional’s and Western’s combined schedules should pro-

vide—will in this case represent fully adequate ser-

vice to the local market for the immediate future.”

A fifth round trip would be of some benefit to the

traveling public, but is by no means essential.

Accordingly, the Board can appropriately give

greater weight to the other factors mentioned above,

including the negative factor that American’s greater

initial frequencies would have a greater adverse im-

pact upon the incumbent, National, in terms of di-

verting revenues and lowering its load factors. In our

judgment, an unneeded fifth flight in the Miami-Los

Angeles market—and one which, in American’s case,

would not significantly benefit travelers in other mar-

kets— does not justify the sacrifice of the other public

benefits and policy objectives which would he entailed

in the selection of American. The same considerations

apply a fortiori to the selection of Braniff or Delta.

We also find that our award to Western is consis-

tent with the Board’s historic policy favoring awards

to smaller carriers on route-strengthening grounds in

“In the long run, as previously pointed out, Western’s greater

pool of beyond-segment traffic support will enable it to surpass the

other applicants in competing with National and service the needs

of the market.

App. B-34

close cases. This policy affords the smaller

in the case—Braniff, Continental, and seh <p

advantage over the larger trunk applicants, i.e., Amer-

ican, Delta, Eastern, Northwest, Pan American, and

Trans World. However, in the circumstances pre-

sented, route strengthening, although favoring a

smaller carrier in general, is not decisive in choosing

among the smaller applicants." Each of the three

smaller carriers argues that it has the greatest need

for Miami-Los Angeles authority, and each persua-

sively relies upon various carrier-strengthening cri-

teria in support of its contention. Consequently, it is

not surprising that the record shows that it is a close

question as to which of these carriers would benefit

most from route strengthening. Thus, to the extent, if

any, that either Braniff or Continental may benefit

from strengthening more than Western, we cannot find

that the benefit is of sufficient magnitude to outweigh

Western’s advantage in terms of public-service benefits.

Having determined that Western wi

traveling public substantial service Bh goon Ren

consider whether Western can operate profitably —

not necessarily more profitably than any other appli-

cant, but profitably enough to sustain the service it

“Judge Dapper f j iteri

te Pan America's selection, yd reasons principally relating te

as traditionally perceived ~~ the te ge Bi & tek

Ler eenloing mals carrer fo grow at fanter ‘rate than

rb mgt - transportation system 0 oom. en baet

ip at aa at ce ea veneer, th

Panera be Tasted ot retrenchment efor. Ths,

_ on the grounds of the “route stemaihening” oo

for “new prott opportunities’ cotta pe se american's weight than

the superior service benefi ; -

Angeles-Miami market efits that Western will bring to the Los

App. B-35

proposes and to strengthen the carrier. Western esti-

mates that its proposed Miami-Los Angeles operations

will produce operating profits ranging between $2.4

and $4.5 million, depending upon various costing as-

sumptions. Western’s forecasts, like the forecasts of

other applicants, are somewhat outdated due to

changes in both the revenue and cost elements since

the close of economic hearings. Nevertheless, it is

clear that the Miami-Los Angeles route will be profit-

able for Western. In this connection, we have esti-

mated that Western will transport approximately

189,300 Miami-Los Angeles passengers in the first

year. Of these, approximately 145,480 will be local and

interline connecting passengers and 43,800 will be be-

yond-segment passengers. Assuming, therefore, that

Western offers 342,248 annual seats as reflected in

National’s exhibits, Western should be able to operate

its flight at average load factors of about 55 percent.

There can be no dispute that this figure is substan-

tially above the carrier’s break-even estimate for its

proposed Miami-Los Angeles operations, and hence,

demonstrative of the profitability of Western’s service.

In sum, we have determined that Western should

be selected on the basis of those carrier-selection cri-

teria which we have found to be the most significant

in the circumstances of this case. In reaching this

conclusion, we have given careful consideration to the

administrative law judge’s conclusion that Pan Ameri-

can should be selected as the preferred candidate, and

_we appreciate that on the surface Pan American’s

selection might seem warranted on the basis of some

of the same factors that have led us to select Western.

Thus, the initial decision indicates that Pan American

would provide more service in the primary market

(three daily nonstop round trips to Western’s two),

would provide more capacity (633,640 annual seats to

Western’s 342,248), and would convenience nearly

App. B-36

three times as many beyond-segment passengers as

Western, although this final consideration has been

weakened considerably by subsequent events. Never-

theless, we have concluded that, on balance, Western

is the superior choice,

To begin with, the principal focus of this proceeding

is on the need to provide the Miami-Los Angeles mar-

ket with improved air transportation. In this setting,

and after weighing the merits of each carrier's ser-

Vice proposal, we believe that Western's is superior

to Pan American's in this regard. In the first place,

as already noted, we have concluded that Western's

two daily round trips, when added to National's pres-

ent two, will adequately meet the needs of the local

market, and that a fifth round trip is not required.

The nearly 300,000 additional seats per year proposed

by Pan American are likewise not needed for the local

market,

Moreover, the facts are that Pan American pro-

poses to use the Miami-Los Angeles segment, in sig-

nificant part, as a transcontinental bridge, linking

points as far as 10,000 miles apart. In fact, pursuant

to Pan American's service proposal, Miami-Los An-

geles would be only one leg of extremely long trans-

oceanic flights originating at Honolulu and the Orient

and terminating at Miami or points east of Miami.”

“Pan American's proposed single-plane service via the Miami-

Los Angeles segment, and the approximate airport-to-airport mil-

ages involved here, are as follows:

Market wy Market yoy

Miami-Honolulu 5000 Los Angeles-Bahamas — 2400

Hong Kong 9600 San Juan 3400

Auckland S800 Lisbon - 6500

Melborne 10300 Madrid - 8800

Papeete - 6400 Rome 7500

Sydney - HS800

Tokyo 7800

App. B-37

Because of the great distances and numbers of stops

involved, Pan American's schedules realistically in-

vite on-route flight delays and operational disrup-

tions, which could compromise the value of its service

in the local market. Pan American's own experience

in providing time Honolulu-Los Angeles service is

illustrative of this point. Pan American serves the

market largely by flights originating and/or termi-

nating in Japan or the South Pacific. In 1975, only 43

percent of these flights arrived at Los Angeles on

time. Its overall on-time performance in the market

was only 60 percent.” Indeed, because of the great

number of beyond-terminal points which Pan Amer-

ican claims would feed and support its high-capacity

service, Pan American's proposal runs an even greater

risk of subordinating the needs of Miami-Los Angeles

passengers to the dictates of its international beyond

markets. This risk is increased by the fact that Pan

American must unavoidably be attentive to the needs

of its beyond markets since, as the carrier concedes,

the economic feasibility of its service proposal de-

pends wholly upon its ability to attract massive beyond

traffic over the Miami-Los Angeles “bridge.” By con-

trast, Western's proposed combination of turnaround

and through-plane flights serving a single beyond point

(Seattle) poses none of these problems and demon-

strates that Western is in a far better position than

Pan American to attend to the developing travel re-

quirements of the local market.

Pan American's long-haul operations also reduce

the carrier's ability to provide National with as effec-

tive a competitive catalyst as Western’s operations

should provide. It is reasonable to assume that Na-

tional will continue to operate turnaround service in

© From figures reported to the Board by Pan American on CAB

Form 438, “Monthly Report of Schedule Arrival Performance on

Designated Passenger Flights.”

App. B-38

the Miami-Los Angeles market. Consequently, Na-

tional will be in an excellent position to adjust sched-

ules and capacity to the changing demands of the mar-

ket, and for that matter, to offer service that closely

conforms with posted arrival and departure times.

On the other hand, Pan American’s long-haul flights,

which, as noted, all originate at points beyond the

local market, deprive the carrier of National’s opera-

tional flexibility and ability to insure reliable sched-

ules, thereby reducing somewhat the carrier’s com-

petitive effectiveness. Again by contrast, Western’s

service proposal does not suffer from Pan American’s

operational impediments, and, as discussed, Western

is otherwise in a paramount position to compete with

National.

In short, we have concluded that Western will be

able to provide service that is both more responsive

to the needs of the local market and better able to

provide National with a long over-due competitive

stimulus. In view of the importance that we attach

to these considerations in this case, we must find that

Western’s strong points outweigh Pan American’s

ostensible advantage in providing more primary-mar-

ket service.

Additionally, our examination of the record and

more recent officially noticeable data establishes that

Pan American will not be able to capture enough be-

yond-segment traffic support to operate its proposed

three daily round trips on a profitable basis. In these

circumstances, Pan American’s advantage in propos-

ing more initial service appears to be largely academic.

More specifically, Pan American estimated that it

would be able to flow 163,100 beyond-terminal passen-

gers over the Miami-Los Angeles segment. The defi-

ciencies in Pan American’s beyond-segment forecasts

were recognized in part by Judge Dapper, who re-

me

App. B-39

duced Pan American’s estimates by 19 percent, to

132,250 passengers. However, we share the uniform

judgment of all of the other applicants that Judge

Dapper’s estimates still seriously overstate the sup-

port traffic that Pan American is in any way likely

to obtain.

In the first place, actual experience since the initial

decision was issued demonstrates that the growth

estimates used by the administrative law judge were

generally too high, and that traffic in many contrib-

utory markets has not reached predicted levels. In

this connection, the Board’s O&D Surveys indicate

that the shortfall between the actual overall size of

the affected markets in 1974 and the administrative

law judge’s estimates for that year is 20 percent.

Thus, even giving due consideration to the markets’

potential for future growth, it is apparent that the

substantial pool of traffic that the administrative law

judge found would exist to support Pan American’s

service must be significantly reduced. Secondly, we

must conclude that his stimulation and participation

estimates were also excessive in relation to the nature

of Pan American’s proposed single-plane beyond-

terminal operations. Our difference with the admin-

istrative law judge in this connection stems principally

from our firm belief that the value of Pan American’s

proposed single-plane flights will be compromised to

a far greater extent than anticipated in the initial de-

cision by the extremely long-haul nature of the car-

rier’s pro service in many markets. For exam-

ple, Pan American has proposed single-plane or single-

carrier service between Miami and a number of points

in the Orient, including Tokyo and Hong Kong. Judge

Dapper found that Pan American’s flights would stim-

ulate the Miami-Orient markets by 50 percent; that

Pan American would capture 75 percent of the total

App. B-40

traffic; and that, as a result, Pan American would be

able to flow approximately 12,000 annual Miami-Ori-

ent passengers over the Miami-Los Angeles segment.

However, a Miami-Hong Kong flight would have an

elapsed time of about 23 hours, and a Miami-Tokyo

flight one of about 17 hours. Realistically, few travel-

ers can be expected to endure continuous journeys of

this magnitude. Rather, it is much more likely that

they would choose to break their journeys at such at-

tractive stopover points as Honolulu, Los Angeles, or

San Francisco. These considerations significantly re-

duce the stimulative value of Pan American's proposed

service, At the same time, they increase the possibility

that Pan American will lose Miami passengers to other

carriers for at least a portion of the complete trip. Con-

sequently, a significant downward adjustment must be

made to the administrative law judge’s stimulation and

participation estimates in these markets, and hence to

the Miami-Orient traffic that Pan American would ac-

tually be able to flow over the Miami-Los Angeles seg-

ment. Similar considerations apply to the Pacific-

South American “bridge” markets, the Miami-South

Pacific markets and, to a lesser extent, to the Los An-

geles-Iberian Peninsula markets and the Honolulu-

Miami market.

Moreover, many circumstances have changed since

the close of the economic hearings in 1973, including

su

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Opposition — National Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board · 434 U.S. 1045 | Frix