Petition — Kenny v. Sanfilippo

Supreme Court brief1977

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[LED

SEP 20 1977

in The | MICHAEL RODAK. JR. OUR

——ů— —

1 Court, U. 8.

—

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1977

„ 77445

JOHN KENNY and ROBERT KENNY,

Executors of the Estate of

JOHN J. KENNY, Decd.,

Petitioners,

.

LOUIS SANFILIPPO, et al.,

Respondents

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE THIRD CIRCUIT AND APPENDIX

Harry Alan Sherman,

Counsel for Petitioners

1709 Blvd. of the Allies,

Pittsburgh, Pa. 15219

412 471 7777

Petition for Writ of Certiorari....

Opinions BelOW.......eeeceveceveees

JUPISEICE es. 6 6 600%

Questions presented..

Constitutional Provisions Involved.

Statement of the Case.

INDEX TO PETITION

Page

— — DS PUD —

Reasons Rel fed on for Allowance of

the Writ of Certiorari:.......... 12

I,

II.

The Judgment of the Court of

Appeals affirming the District

Court's plain error in failing to

award damages for the entire ten-

year term of the plaintiff's

breached employment contract, is

in conflict with applicable deci-

sions of this Honorable Court... 12

The Judgment of the Court of Appeals

affirming the District Court's un-

warranted failure to award damages

for the unexpired full term of the

plaintiff's breached employment con-

tract conflicts with decisions of

Index to Petition

Reasons Relied on Continued Page

other Courts of Appeals....... 16

III. The Judgment of the Court of

IV.

Appeals affirming the District

Court's unwarranted failure to

award damages for the full unexpired

term of the plaintiff's breached

employment contract conflicts with de-

cisions of the Supreme Court of

e 18

The Judgment of the Court of

Appeals affirming the erroneous

denial of damages for the second half

of plaintiff's breached employment

contract conflicts with established

and applicable principles in the law

of damages, discriminatorily denying

plaintiff below equal protection of

K 19

Index to Petition

3

Reasons Rel ſed on Continued page

V.

The Judgment of the Court of

Appeals sanctions departure by the

District Court from the accepted

and usual course of judicial pro-

ceedings so as to call for exer-

cise of this Court's power of

supervision relative to disregard

of uncontradicted record proof

of exercise of the contract

option to renew so as to avoid

award of damages for the full term

of the unexpired, breached

eee 6866 2

Argument amplifying Reasons Rel ſed on for

Allowance of the Writ......... 21

INDEX TO APPENDIX

Judgment of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Third Circuit

30

Index to Appendix

Page

Opinion of the District Court..... 33

Judgment of the District Court.... 44

Stipulation of Facts below........ 45

Employment contract as amended.... 48

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES

Page

Ashe v. Swenson, 399 F2d 40, revd.

397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189......... 27

Benjamin v. Hillard, 64 U.S. 149, 167,

c 14, 18

Cross v. Bruning, 413 F2d678, cert.

den. 396 U.S. 970, 90 S.Ct.455,

reh. den. 396 U.S. 1063, 90 S.Ct.

„„ 26

Duncan v. Carter, 289 Fed 179, cert.

den. 370 U.S. 952, 82 S.Ct. 1602. 27

Ferina v. U.S., 340 F2d 837, cert. den.

381 U.S. 902, 85 S.Ct. 1446. 26

Grubbs v. General Electric Credit

Corp., 405 U.S. 699,700 10

Herzog v. U.S., 226 F2d 561 (Cir.9);

cert. den 352 U.S. 8444.

Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 95

3.88. . e. eee ee eee en ee 26

Hinckley v. Pittsburgh Bessemer Steel

CO.» 121 U.S. 266 „„ 14

Holland v. General Motors Corp., 75

F. Supp. 274; affd. 169 F2d 254; cert.

den. 335 U.S. 68776 12

Kibby v. U.S., 372 F2d 598, cert. den.

387 U.S. 931, 87 S.Ct. 2055......... 26

Table of Authorities

Marchese v. U.S., 378 F2d, 16, cert.

den. 389 U.S. 930, 88 S. Ct. 294, reh.

den. 389 U.S. 1025, 88 S.Ct. 585.... 26

Page

McCray v. Burrell, 516 F2d 357, cert.

granted 423 U.S. 923, 96 S.Ct. 264.. 27

New York Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas, 297

ZS 15

Pierce v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.

e ̃ AAA a cee essence 14

Russell v. Barnes Foundation, 52 F.

Supp. 827 (E.D.Pa.) 1943; affd. 143

F2d 871 (Cir. 3); cert. den. 323

eee ese eee eee 13,15,

17

Sykes v. U. S., 373 F2d 607 (Cir. 5);

cert. den. 386 U.S. 977............ . 24

U.S. v. Behan, 110 U.S. 338........... 14

U.S. v. Guest, 246 F. Supp. 475, revd.

333 U.S. 746, GB 8. ee. 11700 26

U.S. v. Killough, 218 F. Supp.339,

Z 26

U.S. v. Vida, 370 F2d 759, cert. den.

ae? U.S. FiO, 8. et. 7166606 26

U.S. Gypsum Co. v. United Steelwkrs.

of Am., 384 F2d 38, cert. den.

389 U.S. 1042, 88 S.Ct. 783......... 26

John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston,

eee es eee 13

Table of Authorities

Page

U.S. Circuit Court Cases

Elmor, Inc. v. Cyprus Mines Corp., 467

„L 25

Eng ine Specialities, Inc. v. Bom-

88 Ltd. 454 F2d 527 (Cir. I); 0

Lloyd v. Grinberg, 464 F2d 622 (Cir. 10);

P aan 18

0 ̃ ei os sunken 25

Riggs v. Island Creek Coal Co., 542

L 10

Ring v. The Dimitrios Chandris, 43 F.

Supp. 829 (pa.); affd. 133 F2d 124

... 17

U.S. ex rel Paxon v. Rundle, 491 F2d

5 SE 8 eps 24

U.S. v. State of Florida, 482 F2d 205 (Cir.

e 25

Wright v. Disabled American Veterans,

271 F2d 827 (Cir. D.C.); 1959....... 18

RULES AND DECISIONS

Rule 103 (d), Federal Rules of

tens 27

Looney v. Great American Ins. Co., 71

renne. eee eee eee ee 22

Table of Authorities

page

U.S. CONSTITUTION

Art. 1, sec.10, cl. 1, Contract Clause.20

PURE RINE. oc cncccecseccecnedéonss 20

Fourteenth Amendment 20

U.S. STATUTES

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,

Sec.502 (e) (1), 29 U.S.C. 1001

ö ͤ „ 8,9

Labor-Management Relations, Act 29

0.3.6. Wi, GOR. TE Dbceccccespedss 9

PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT CASES

Coates v. Allegheny Steel Co., 234

Pa. Wi cccococccedons ebe eee ssen 19

Douglas v. Hustead, 216 Pa.292......... 19

Horvat v. Jenkins School Dist., 337

1 ͤ g?uñ———. seesaw eenis 19

Weaver v. Maryland Cas. Co., 295

.es sees ee ese eee 19

Weinglass v. Gibson, 304 pa. 2033. 19

NEW YORK STATE CASE

Carder Realty Corp. v. State, 23 N.Y.S.2d

395; 260 App. Div. 459; affd. 285

.es ess eee eee 12

Table of Authorities

Page

TEXTS

Restatement of Contracts, sec. 236

SOU i oc kdbdens edness eens Socncasacees 22

Restatement, Conflict of Laws,

Oe We ˙§˙§˙§˙§⅛²Bꝰ! ] ˙¹.A eee 21

6 Williston, Contracts, sec. 1344..... 21

13 Appleman, Insurance Law and Prac-

tice, sec. 7383 (19706)))) . 22

In The

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1977

JOHN KENNY and ROBERT KENNY,

Executors of the Estate of

JOHN J. KENNY, Decd.,

Petitioners,

V.

LOUIS SANFILIPPO, FRANK PRINCE, ROBERT KERN,

RENALD ROSSA, JOSEPH CICARDINI, NORMAN HOWARD,

UMBERTO GUIDOTTI, ARTHUR TATANGELO, GORDON

FLAGG, FRANK BLANDI, W. B. SETTLE, LEO WHITE,

DANIEL DUBANIEWICZ, ADOLPH DONADEO, H. J.

GUEMRICH and FRANCIS KEENAN, All as Trustees

ad litem of THE WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA HOTEL,

CLUB, MOTEL, AND RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES PENSION

FUND, and/or SUCCESSOR TO TRUSTEES OF THE HOTEL

AND RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES ALLIANCE LOCAL UNION

237 INSURANCE AND WELFARE TRUST FUND AND

TRUSTEES OF THE HOTEL AND RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES

ALLIANCE LOCAL UNION 237 PENSION TRUST FUND,

and

Petition for Writ

LOUIS SANFILIPPO, FRANK PRINCE, ROBERT KERN,

RENALD ROSSA, JOSEPH CICARDINI, NORMAN HOWARD,

UMBERTO GUIDOTTI, ARTHUR TATANGELO, GORDON

FLAGG, FRANK BLANDI, W. B. SETTLE, LEO WHITE,

DANIEL DUBANIEWICZ, NICHOLAS ALWINE, H. J.

HUEMRICH and FRANCES KEENAN, all as Trustees ad

litem of THE WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA HOTEL,CLUB,

MOTEL and RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES WELFARE FUND,

and/or SUCCESSOR TO TRUSTEES OF THE HOTEL AND

RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES ALLIANCE LOCAL UNION 237

INSURANCE AND WELFARE TRUST FUND AND TRUSTEES OF

THE HOTEL AND RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES, ALLIANCE

LOCAL UNION 237 PENSION TRUST FUND,

and

HOTEL AND RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES AND BARTENDERS

INTERNATIONAL UNION WELFARE FUND and WILLIAM L.

MEYERS, Individually and trading as WILLIAM L.

MEYERS COMPANY,

Respondents

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

To The Honorable, the Chief Justice of the

United States and the Associate Justices of

the Supreme Court of the United States:

Petition for Writ

The petitioners, John Kenny and Robert

Kenny, Executors of the Estate of John J. Kenny,

Decd., respectfully pray that a writ of

certiorari issue in the above captioned case

directed to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit to review its Judgment

(App.1) in so far as it affirms the District

Court's failure to award to the plaintiff damages

for the full unexpired term of his breached em-

ployment contract in Appeal No. 76-2475 dated

and entered June 23, 1977.

Opinions Below

The opinion of the United States District

Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania

at Civil Action No. 75-40 has not been reported.

A copy thereof and Judgment thereon are appended

hereto (App. 33). The Judgment of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

was not accompanied by an opinion, but affirms

on the Opinion and Judgment of the District

Court. A copy of the Judgment is appended here-

to at (App. 30).

Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is

invoked pursuant to the Act of June 25, 1940,

c. 646, 62 Stat. 928, Title 28 U.S.C. Sec.

1254(1); Supreme Court Rule 19(1)(b); and this

Honorable Court's power of supervision over

Courts of Appeal and District Courts. The

Judgment sought to be reviewed was dated and

entered June 23, 1977. The Opinion and Judgment

of the District Court (App. 33) were dated and

entered on August 2, 1976. The last day for pre-

sentation of the within Petition is September

21, 1977.

Questions Presented for Review

1. In an action for damages for totally

unwarranted breach of plaintiff's written em-

ployment contract, tried without jury, where

the District Court found that the contract was

valid, clear and unambiguous, and that the

“unilateral rescission" thereof and the dis-

continuance of plaintiff's salary thereunder

were without cause, and no asserted affirmative

Questions Presented for Review

defense proven, may the District Court deny

plaintiff damages for the renewal term thereof,

the option for which was plainly exercised of

record without contradiction or contest?

2. May a District Court, without any

stated reason therefor, disregard the unques-

tioned and uncontradicted record exercise by

plaintiff of his undenied right to renew his

employment contract for a second five-year term,

and disallow damages for such future period upon

a completely unsupported conclusion “that it is

not probable that Mr. Kenny would have exercised

his option to renew the contract.." in view of

his age (74 years) and his history of a heart

"attack" 5 years before judgment and 2 years

before assuming employment under the contract?

3. May a District Court deny plaintiff

damages for the second five-year term of his val-

id employment contract found to have been un-

warrantedly unilaterally breached, contrary to

the historic holdings of this Honorable Court

as well as of the decisions of the Court of

Questions Presented for Review

Appeals, the decisions of the Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania, and the established principles of

the law of damages?

4. Where a Court of Appeals, by affir-

mance of the Opinion and Judgment of the District

Court which is clearly erroneous and based on

plain error of record, sanctions departure by

the District Court from the accepted and usual

course of judicial proceedings and denies dam-

ages for unwarranted unilateral breach of an em-

ployment contract's renewed five year term, con-

trary to the holdings of this Honorable Court

and of established policy and principles of law,

effectively depriving the plaintiff of his pro-

perty in the contract without compensation,

should not this Honorable Court exercise its

supervisory power to review and reverse that

portion of the Judgment below denying plaintiff

damages for the second five year term in accor-

dance with the terms of the contract and remand

with directions for allowance thereof?

Constitutional Provisions Involved

Art. 1, sec. 10, cl. 1, Contract Clause

Fifth Amendment...providing against de-

privation of property without due process of

law.

Fourteenth Amendment, providing against

deprivation of property without due process of

law and guaranteeing equal protection of the

law.

Statement of the Case

The original action in the within litiga-

tion was brought in early December, 1974, in the

Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,

Pennsylvania. Plaintiff was the Director of

local union employer-employee pension and wel-

fare funds under written contract of employment,

beginning May 1, 1973. He continued in office

and received his contract salary until August

31, 1974, when, without any stated oral or

written reason for so doing, salary payments

were discontinued. At Civil Action No. 75-0040

in the United States District Court for the

Statement of the Case

Western District of Pennsylvania, defendants-

respondents caused the action to be removed from

the State court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 144]

asserting jurisdiction under Section 502 (e) (1)

of the Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,

29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq, effective December 31,

1974, which states:

„. . . „the District Courts of the

United States shall have exclusive

jurisdiction of civil actions under this

title brought by the secretary or by a

participant, beneficiary or fiduciary

.... against such pension or welfare

trust funds.

After amendments of the complaint and

answers, a non-jury trial was held before the

Chief District Judge, and, on August 3, 1976,

his Findings, Conclusions and Judgment were

filed and served. |

On August 26, 1976, defendants-respondents

filed their notice of appeal; and on August 30,

1976, the cross-appeal was filed by plaintiff.

Both of said appeals were from the final judg-

ment of the District Court in accordance with

Statement of the Case

28 U.S.C. 1291; the plaintiff's appeal being

limited to damages.

The United States Court of Appeals for

the Third Circuit entered a Judgment affirm-

ing on the Opinion and Judgment of the District

Court on June 23, 1977.

At the time of filing the original action

in the Allegheny County Common Pleas the Com-

plaint made reference to the employment con-

tract attached as an exhibit thereto, wherein

authorization for such contract was based upon

employer-employee pension and welfare trust

declarations. Federal jurisdiction warranting

removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1441 actually

arose under Section 301 of the Labor-Management

Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185,

which states:

"Suits for violation of contracts be-

tween an employer and a labor organi-

zation representing employees in an

industry affecting commerce as defined

in this chapter or .... may be brought

in any District Court of the United

States...."

When the Retirement Income Security Act of

1974 became effective on December 31, 1974,

9

Statement of the Case

federal jurisdiction became exclusive, as

aforestated.

The United States Court of Appeals raised

a question and required briefing on federal

jurisdiction; and, after argument, limited to

such question, held that federal jurisdiction

existed by reason of: Grubbs v. General Elec-

tric Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 700 and Riggs

v. Island Creek Coal Co., 542 Fed. 334, 343

(Cir. 6).

Although the original complaint was

twice amended after removal by leave of the

District Court, and such amendments added new

causes of action and new parties raising issues

clearly within the purview of the provisions of

ERISA, such issues were barred by ruling of the

trial Judge in holding that since counsel for

respondents agreed that the International Funds

would be treated as constructive trustees below,

the sole issues for trial were the validity of

the contract ab initio and whether any ground

existed for breach or rescission therefor.

10

Statement of the Case

The District Court found: “The con-

tract of employment providing compensation to

Mr. Kenny for his services as Director of

the Funds violated neither the terms of

the trust agreement nor the provisions of

29 U.S.C.A. 1001 et seq. Nor does the evid-

ence disclose just cause for the discon-

tinuance of Mr. Kenny's salary or for the

unilateral rescission of his employment con-

tract.“ In these findings the District

Court is amply supported by the record.

In awarding damages for the unwarran-

ted breach, the learned District Court lim-

ited plaintiff's loss to the unexpired por-

tion of the first five years of the con-

tract, concludingly “that it is not prob-

able that Mr. Kenny would have exercised

his option to renew the contract for an ad-

ditional five-year term." In the latter

conclusion, the District Court was plainly

in error, in view of the unquestioned re-

cord exercise of plaintiff's option.

11

Statement of the Case

The plain error of the District Court

was raised on appeal to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,

without relief.

Reasons Relied on for Allowance of the Writ

of Certiorari

I. The Judgment of the Court of Appeals

affirming the District Court's plain error

in failing to award damages for the entire

ten-year term of the plaintiff's breached

employment contract is tn conflict with ap-

plicable decisions of this Honorable Court

One of the oldest and soundest princi-

ples in our law recognizes the obligation of

contracts; Art. 1 sec. 10, cl. 1, U.S. Con-

stitution; by which “obligation” is meant

the legally binding power requiring the parties

to adhere to an agreement which at the time

of contracting the law recognizes as legally

enforceable; Carder Realty Corp. v. State,

23 N.Y.S. 2d 395; 260 App. Div. 459; affd.

285 N.Y. 803; Holland v. General Motors

Corp., 75 F. Supp. 274; affd. 169 F2d 254;

cert. den. 335 U.S. 887.

12

Reasons Relied on for Allowance of the Writ

for Certiorari

Even the provisions of the contract

setting out conditions for its termination

must be followed; John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543.

Where, as here, the contract has been

wrongfully breached and unilaterally rescind-

ed contrary to the express provision set out

in paragraph 1 thereof that the plaintiff

as Director "shall not be subject to dis-

charge or removal for said period of time

(ten years) unless by mutual agreement of

the said John J. Kenny and the majority of

the trustees", the breach constitutes such

repudiation of defendants’ obligations there-

under as to entitle plaintiff to full damages

for the entire period of the contract, both

past and prospective, under the time-honored

principle established in the Pennsylvania

State and Federal Courts; Russell v Barnes

Foundation, 52 F. Supp. 827 (E.D.Pa.) 1943;

affd. 143 F2d 871 (Cir. 3); cert. den. 323

U.S. 771; 65 S. Ct. 122.

13

Ressons Relied on for Allowance of the Writ

for Certiorari

In 1859 this Honorable Court, in the

case of Benjamin v. Hillard, 23 How. 149,

167, considered and "reaffirmed" the "rule"

“that the amount that would have been re-

ceived, if the contract had been kept, is

the measure of damages if the contract is

br-ken." "This rule", added the Court, "was

reaffirmed in Hadley v. Baxendale, 10 Exch.

341.“ The rule“ was honored in United

States v. Behan, 110 U.S. 338 and in Hinckley

v. Bessemer Steel Co. 121 U.S. 264.

Forty years following Benjamin, in

the classic decision which has been followed

to this day, this Honorable Court in Pierce

v. Tennessee Coal & Railroad Co., 173 U.S.1,

observed that the rule“ had been widely

accepted and was being firmly written into

the law of contracts, noting:

"But the recent tendency of judicial

decisions in this country, in actions of

contract, as well as in actions of tort,

has been toward allowing entire damages

to be recovered, once for all, in a single

action......This especially appears by well

considered opinions in cases of agreements

. . . to pay wages.

14

Reasons Relied on for Allowance of the Writ

of Certiorari

The learned District Court cited a ref-

erence to the Pierce decision in the Third

Circuit Court of Appeals decision of Russell

v Barnes Foundation, 52 F. Supp. 827, 830;

but the quotation from Barnes in the lower

Court's decision takes something away from

the ſolding in Pierce. Moreover, in later

decisions handed down in this Honorable

Court, the "rule" has been consistently re-

affirmed that where the contract spells out

specifically the monetary obligations of the

obligor, such obligations become the damages

chargeable in case ofunlawful rescission,

breach or repudiation of the contract before

completion of the employee's services there-

under; New York Life Insurance Co. v. Viglas,

297 U.S. 672.

The salary to be paid plaintiff below

for the second five-year term was clearly

spelled out in the contract, just as clearly,

in fact, as it was for the first five years;

but the learned trial Judge, determined to

15

Reasons Relied on for Allowance of the Writ

of Certiorari

disallow the damages for the second five-

year term, "concluded" that “it is not prob-

able that Mr. Kenny would have exercised his

option to renew the contract", overlooking

the undisputed fact that such option had in-

deed been exercised on the record at the very

start of the case, in paragraph 8 of the

Complaint which averred:

"8. Plaintiff has demanded payment

from the Defendants of the sum of $262,209,

being the sum owing under the terms of

the contract and the option of Plaintiff

to renew same, which renewal option is

hereby exercised by Plaintiff..... i

Throughout the entire pleadings below

the claim of the plaintiff was without con-

text or question recognized as having been

asserted on the full ten-year term--except

in the erroneous "conclusion" of the trial

Judge.

II. The Judgment of the Court of

Appeals affirming the District Court's un-

warranted failure to aware damages for the

unexpired full term of the plaintiff's breach-

ed employment contract conflicts with deci-

sions of its own and of other Courts of

Appeals

16

Reasons Relied on for Allowance of the Writ

of Certiorari

Cited by the District Court as basis

for the "full" award for the first five-

year term of the employment contract, is the

leading case of Russell v. Barnes Foundation,

52 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Pa.) 1943, affd. 143

F2d 871 (Cir. 3); cert. den. 323 U.S. 771,

65 S. Ct. 122. Professor Bertrand Russell,

then aged 71 years, was a leading writer

in the fields of philosophy, mathematics

and social sciences, and was, seven years

later, in 1950, to become the winner of a

Nobel Prize in Literature; yet, though his

ongoing earnings were far greater than his

Salary as a professor under contract to the

Barnes Foundation, he was awarded the full

past and future amounts called for therein,

without credit for his other remunerative

sources of income. The "rule" was followed

and affirmed, as it had been in Ring » The

Dimitrios Chandris, 43 F. Supp. 829; affd.

133 F2d 124 (Cir. 3).

17

Reasons Relied on for Allowance of the Writ Reasons Relied on for Allowance of the Writ

of Certiorari of Certiorari

The United States Court of Appeals, in The Pennsylvania courts have been fol-

Lloyd v. Grinberg, 464 F2d 622 (Cir. 10) like- lowing the rule made so clear in Benjamin

wise followed the historic "rule", as did the without exception; Weinglass v. Gibson,

District of Columbia Court of Appeals in 504 Pa. 203; Douglas v. Hustead, 216 Pa. 292;

Wright y. Disabled American Veterans, 271 Weaver v. Maryland Casualty Co., 295 Pa. 486;

F2d 827. Coates v. Allegheny Steel Co., 234 Pa. 199;

Horvat v. Jenkins School District, 337 Pa. 193.

While the stated “law of the case" in

this within matter appears to honor the rule“,

it is in fact frustrated by the clearly err-

oneous “conclusion” of the District Court

as to the “unexercised" option to renew.

Were it not for the erroneous "conclus-

ion” contrary to the unquestioned, record

fact of plaintiff's exercise of his option

to renew his contract, the rule would like-

ly have been respected herein as well.

III. The Judgment of the Court of

Appeals affirming the District Court's un- IV. The Judgment of the Court of

warranted failure to award damages for the Appeals affirming the erroneous denial of

full unexpired term of the plaintiff's breach- damages for the second half of plaintiff's

ed employment contract conflicts with deci- breached employment contract conflicts with

sions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania the established and applicable principles in

the law of damages, discriminatorily denying

The employment contract here invovied plaintiff below equal protection of the law

was drawn and entered into in Pittsburgh,

Pennsylvania, where it was also breached. Obviously the five year term of plain-

Significantly, the contract in Benjamin v. tiff's employment contract for which no com

Hillard. 23 How. 149, 64 U.S. 149, was en- pensation was awarded below is a substantial

tered into in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. : property amounting to over $150,000.00. The

18 19

Reasons Relied on for Allowance of the Writ

of Certiorari

Constitution, in Art. I sec. 10(1) prohibits

Congress and the States from passing any law

"impairing the obligation of contract".

The Fourteenth Admendment, enjoining leg-

islative action that would take a person's

"life, liberty or property without due process

of law" also prohibits adoption of laws that

would “deny to any person within its juris-

diction the equal protection of the laws".

The Fifth Admendment is broader than the

Fourteenth and broader even than Art. I sec. 10

(1) in that it simple declares: "..... nor shall

any person de deprived of life,

liberty or porperty, without due process of

law". The Fifth Amendment addresses itself

not only to the Legislative bodies, but to

all who administer law, including our Courts.

Due process assuredly does not allude

to the mere appearance of conformity with

justice; and where, as here, a District Court

has totally ignored the plain, admitted

and uncontested fact of record that the plain-

tiff exercised his option which renewed his

20

Reasons Relied on for Allowance of the Writ

of Certiorari

contract for an additional five-year term,

a judicial “conclusion” that “it is not prob-

able" that he “would have exercised his option

to renew" as a means of justifying denial of

damages therefor is a patent denial of due

process and an evasion of the established

principles and rules of law; 6 Williston,

Contracts, sec. 1344; Restatement, Conflict

of Laws, sec. 372.

V. The Judgment of the Court of Appeals

sanctions departure by the District Court

from the accepted and usual course of judi-

cial proceedings so as to call for exercise

of this Honorable Court's power for super-

vision relative to disregard of uncontra-

dicted record proof of exercise of the con-

tract option to renew so as to avoid award

of damages for the full term of the unex-

pired, breached contract

"It is well settled that meaning and

effect should be given if possible to every

part of a contract, and that a construction

which neutralizes any provision of a con-

tract should never be adopted if the contract

21

Reasons Relied on for Allowance of the Writ

of Certiorari

can be construed so as to give effect to al!

the provisions”; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, sec.

236 (1932); 13 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND

PRACTICE, sec. 7383 (1976); Looney v. Great

American Ins. Co., 71 F.R.D. 211 (1976).

It is respectfully submitted that the

learned Chief District Judge disregarded the

record fact that the plaintiff had “exercised

his option to renew the contract for an addi-

tional five year term", as evidenced in his

Complaint, the Petition for Removal, the

Answer, the Amended Answer, Plaintiff's Reply

to the Counterclaim and the Amended Complaint,

without objection, contradiction or dis-

pute. Plaintiff's right to exercise his re-

newal option was at no time questioned by the

defendants in the pleadings or upon trial.

The option clause was clear, unambiguous and

specific; nor was it construed to be other-

wise by the learned Trial Judge. Neverthe-

less, despite its substantial value to plain-

tiff, the Court simply “neutralized” the option

by disregarding the plaintiff's exercise

22

Reasons Relied on for Allowance of the Writ

of Certiorari

thereof on the record, and discounting the

"probability" that plaintiff "would have

exercised" same, upon assumed, and unproved

present or future incapacity to carry out his

contract duties. Such disregard for the value

of the option clause (exercised) in the con-

tract, is most respectfully urged, is clearly

erroneous.

Reference by footnote to plaintiff's

present age 74, and his heart attacks in 197

by the learned Trial Judge as justification

for the presumpcion that he would probably

not exercise his renewal option, moreover,

disregards the record proof that he did not

begin his contract term as director of the

trust funds until May 1, 1973; and that he

would have continued to carry out his dutie.,

eccept for the illegal and unwarranted breach

and rescission as of August 31, 1974. No

evidence whatever supports the finding by

implication that although the plaintiff was

able to carry out his duties while permitted

23

Reasons Relied on for Allowance of the Writ

of Certiorari

so to do, his physical condition did or could

be expected to worsen so as to limit his

future ability so to do.

It is respectfully submitted that in

the circumstances, the "plain error“ in the

District Court should be noticed herein

pursuant to Rule 103(d) of the Federal Rules

of Evidence; and especially since the error

results in substantial deprivation of anti-

cipated salary for the second and renewed

five year contract term to April 30, 1983,

it is prejudicial to plaintiff below; and

even though not brought to the attention of

the District Court, requires exercise of

the plenary powers of this Honorable Court;

Sykes y. U.S., 373 F2d 607 (Cir. 5); cert.

den. 386 U.S. 977; Herzog v. U.S. 226 Fd

561 (Cir. 9); 235 F2d 664; cert. den. 352

U.S. 844; U.S. ex rel. Paxon v. Rundle, 491

F2d 447 (Cir. 3), 1974; especially since the

District Court's unsupportable inference is

drawn not from testimony, but from documents

24

Reasons Relied on for Allowance of the Writ

of Certiorari

or undisputed facts, does the clearly erron-

eous rule here apply; U.S. v. State of Florida,

482 F2d 205 (Cir. 5) 1973; Engine Specialties,

Inc. v. Bombardier Ltd., 454 F2d 527 (Cir.

1) 1972; and review of the whole record will

support the contention of plaintiff that the

learned District Court was clearly erroneous

and mistaken both in its inference and con-

clusion that plaintiff had not yet exercised

his option to renew the contract, and that by

reason of his age and health that he would

probably not do so, requiring correction here-

in; O'Neill v U.S., 450 F2d 1012 (Cir. 3)

1971; and since the contract, including the

option clause, was found to be valid, it is

respectfully submitted that this Honorable

Court's powers of review are not limited by

the clearly erroneous rule; Elmor, Inc., v.

Cyprus Mines Corp., 467 F2d 770 (Cir. 3) 1972.

It is “Hornbook" jaw that as a federal

District Court must ascertain and follow

the view of a majority opinion and judgment

25

Reasons Relied on for Allowance of the Writ

of Certiorari

of the United States Court of Appeals in

whose Circuit the District Court sits, where

such view does not conflict with decisions of

the United States Supreme Court; U.S. v.

Killough, 218 F. Supp. 339, revd. 336 F2d

929; U.S. v. Guest, 246 F. Supp. 475, revd.

383 U.S. 745; so a Court of Appeals must

follow the last views expressed by a majority

decision of the Supreme Court; Marchese v.

U.S., 378 F2d16, cert. den. 389 U.S. 930, 88

S. Ct. 294; reh, den. 389 U.S. 1025, 88 S.Ct.

585; U.S. v. Vida, 370 F2d 759, cert. den.

387 U.S. 910, 87 S.Ct. 1695, Kibby v. U.S.,

372 F2d 598, cert. den. 387 U.S. 931, 87 S.

Ct. 2055; Ferina v. U.S. 340 F2d 837, cert.

den. 381 U.S. 902, 85 S.Ct. 1446; Hicks v.

Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 95 S.Ct. 2281; U.S.

Gypsum Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am.,

384 F2d 38, cert. den. 389 U.S. 1042, 88

S.Ct. 783; Cross v. Bruning, 413 F2d 678,

cert. den. 396 U.S. 970, 90 S.Ct. 455, reh.

den. 396 U.S. 1063, 90 S. Ct. 760.

26

Reasons Relied on for Allowance of the Writ

of Certiorari

Even where a lower court feels that any

Supreme Court decision or rationale may result

in a “seeming inequity" in a specific case, it

is nevertheless bound by such decision and

rationale; Duncan v. Carter, 289 F2d 179,

cert. den. 370 U.S. 952, 82 S.Ct. 1602;

McCray v. Burrell, 516 F2d 359, cert. grant-

ed, 423 U.S. 923, 96 S.Ct. 264; Ashe v.

Swenson, 399 F2d 40, revd. 397 U.S. 436,

90 S.Ct. 1189.

It is most respectfully submitted that

the lower courts failed to follow the rules

and principles set forth in the clear man-

date of the long line of decisions herein;

and that the unsupported "conclusion" of the

District Court was in effect an evasion there-

of, sO as to warrant exercise of the super-

visory power reposed in this Honorable Court

to reinforce Rule 103(d) of the Federal Rules

of Evidence, and to prevent manifest in-

justice by departure from the accepted and

usual course of judicial proceedings.

27

Conclusion

In view of the amply supported Findings

and Conclusions of the learned Chief District

Judge, who tried the case without jury, that

the defendants failed to establish any cause

for the unilateral rescission of the valid

employment contract, it is respectfully sub-

mitted that the monetary award of damages

should have included the entire ten year

term, especially since the plaintiff has in

fact exercised his option to renew for the

second five year period, contrary to the

District Court's erroneous implication that

he had not done so and that his age and health

would “probably” prevent him from so doing,

which latter finding was not supported by

evidence. Accordingly, it is respectfully

submitted that the plaintiff is entitled to

a total judgment in the sum of $278,773.65,

being the salary which plaintiff would have

earned from September, 1974 to April 30,

1983, in addition to $16,500.00 severance

pay set by the contract; plus the costs of

the within case.

28

Conclusion

WHEREFORE it is respectfully prayed that

this Honorable Court issue a Writ of Certiorari

in the within case directed to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,

to review its Judgment, and that to the extent

that it affirms the denial of compensation for

the second five year term of the employment

contract of the plaintiff below, to reverse

same, and to remand with directions that such

award be added to that for the unexpired

first five year term of the breached employment

contract, together with the costs of these

proceedings.

Respectfully submitted,

HARRY ALAN SHERMAN

Attorney for petitioner

1709 Blvd. of the Allies

_ Pittsburgh, Pa. 15219

412/471-7777

29

Appendix

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

THIRD CIRCUIT

NOS. 76-2475 and 76-2476

JOHN J. KENNY,

Appellant in No. 76-2475

V.

LOUIS SANFILIPPO, FRANK PRINCE, ROBERT KERN,

RENALD ROSSA, JOSEPH CICARDINI, NORMAN HOWARD,

UMBERTO GUIDOTTI, ARTHUR TATANGELO, GORDON

FLAGG, FRANK BLANDI, W. B. SETTLE, LEO WHITE,

DANIEL DUBANEWICZ, ADOLPH DONADEO, H. J.

HUMERICK AND FRANCIS KEENAN, All as Trustees

ad litem of the WEXTERN PENNSYLVANIA HOTEL,

CLUB, MOTEL AND RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES PENSION

FUND, (and/or SUCCESSOR TO TRUSTEES OF THE

HOTEL AND RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES ALLIANCE LOCAL

UNION 237 INSURANCE AND WELFARE TRUST FUND

AND TRUSTEES OF THE HOTEL AND RESTAURANT

EMPLOYEES ALLIANCE LOCAL UNION 237 PENSION

TRUST FUND),

AND

LOUIS SANFILIPPO, FRANK PRINCE, ROBERT KERN,

RENALD ROSSA, JOSEPH CICARDIANI, NORMAN HOWARD,

UMBERTO GUIDOTTO, ARTHUR TATANGELO, GORDON

FLASS, FRANK BLANDI, W. B. SETTLE, LEO WHITE,

DANIEL DUBANEWICZ, NICHOLAS ALWINE, H. J.

HUMERICK and FRANCIS KEENAN, all as Trustees

ad litem of THE WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA HOTEL,

CLUB MOTEL AND RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES WELFARE

FUND, (and/or SUCCESSOR TO TRUSTEES OF THE

30

Appendix

HOTEL AND RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES ALLIANCE LOCAL

UNION 237 INSURANCE AND WELFARE TRUST FUND AND

TRUSTEES OF THE HOTEL AND RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES

ALLIANCE LOCAL UNION 237 PENSION TRUST FUND),

AND

HOTEL & RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES & BARTENDERS

INTERNATIONAL UNION WELFARE FUND & WILLIAM

L. MEYERS

AND

INTERNATIONAL UNION PENSION FUND

Louis Sanfillippo, et al., Appellants in

No. 76-2476

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

Civil No. 75-40

Argued June 14, 1977

Before: ADAMS, VAN DUSEN AND GIBBONS, Circuit

Judges.

JUDGMENT ORDER

After consideration of the contentions

raised by appellant, | it is

31

:

5 >

Appendix

ADJUDGED AND ORDERED that the judgment : —

of the district court be and is hereby .

affirmed. : IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

7 FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Each side to bear its own costs. ö

wan JOHN J. KENNY,

PLAINTIFF,

v.

LOUSI SANFILIPPO, FRANK PRINCE, )

Circuit Judge ROBERT NERN, RENALD ROSSA,

JOSEPH CICARDINI, NORMAN HOWARD,

UMBERTO GUIDOTTI, ARTHUR TAT- )

ATTEST: ANGELO, GORDON FLASS, FRANK

. BLANDI, W.B. SETTLE, LEO WHITE,

DANIEL DUBANIEWICZ, ADOLPH )

DONADEO, H.J. HUEMRICH and )

Th b 5 . FRANCIS KEENAN, all as Trustees

9 * nn and litem of THE WESTERN PENNSYL-

* VANIA HOTEL, CLUB, MOTEL AND Civil Action

Dated: * EMPLOYEES PENSION

FUND, and/or SUCCESSOR TO

Certified as a true copy and issued in lieu TRUSTEES 8 THE HOTEL AND fected No. 75-40

of a formal mandate on July 15, 1977 RANT EMPLOYEES ALLIANCE LOCAL i+)

UNION 237 INSURANCE AND WELFARE )

Test: TRUST FUND TRUSTEES OF THE HOTEL )

Clerk, United States Court ofAppeals AND RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES ALLIANCE)

for the Third Circuit LOCAL UNION 237 PENSION TRUST ö

T. A question regarding jurisdiction over the *. and

cause of action was raised in this Court.

It would appear, however, that the district LOUIS SANFILIPPO, FRANK PRINCE, )

court had jurisdiction at the time it en- ROBERT KERN, RENALD ROSS,

tered judgment. See, e.g., Grubbs v. General : JOSEPH CICARDINI, NORMAN HOWARD,

Electric Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 700 UMBERTO GUIDOTTI, ARTHUR TAT- )

(1972); Riggs v. Island Creek Coal Co., 542 ANGELO, GORDON FLAGG, FRANK

F.2d 339, 343 (6th Cir. 1967). : BLANDI, W.B. STEELE, LEO WHITE,

32

33

Appendix

DANIEL DUBANIEWICZ, NICHOLAS

ALWINE, H. J. HUEMRICH and

FRANCIS KEENAN, all as Trustees

ad Litem of the WESTERN PENNSYL-

VANIA HOTEL, CLUB, MOTEL AND

RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES WELFARE FUND,

and/or SUCCESSOR TO TRUSTEES OF

THE HOTEL AND RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES

ALLIANCE LOCAL UNION 237 INSURANCE

AND WELFARE TRUST FUND AND TRUSTEES

OF THE HOTEL AND RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES

ALLIANCE LOCAL UNION 237 PENSION

TRUST FUND,

and

HOTEL AND RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES AND

BART’ NDERS INTERNATIONAL UNION

„ ARE FUND,

and

INTERNATIONAL UNION PENSION FUND,

Defendants.

— i i i ie —— — — — —ũͤ—ũ— tO ttl tl — tl tl el

The above entitled action, tried to this court

without a jury, was commenced by the plaintiff,

John J. Kenny, in the court of Common Pleas of

Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, Civil Division,

to recover damages for the wrongful termination

by the defendants of his imployment as Chairman

of the Board of Trustees and Director of the

34

Appendix

Hotel and Restaurant Employees Alliance Local

Union 237 Pension Trust Fund and Welfare Trust

Fund (Local 237 Trust Funds), which funds were

accumulated largely through the efforts of

Mr. Kenny as President of Local 237.

The defendants, trustees of the Western

Pennsylvania Hotel, Club, Motel and Restaurant

Employees Pension Fund and Welfare Fund (Western

Pennsylvania Trust Funds) and the Hotel and

Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International

Union Pension Fund and Welfare Fund (Interna-

tional Trust Funds), removed the action to this

court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. #1441 (a)!

128 U. S. C. A. #1441 (a) provides:

„. . any civil action brought in a State

Court of which the district courts of the

United States have original jurisdiction,

may be removed by the defendant or the de-

fendants, to the district court of the

United States for the district and division

embracing the place where such action is

pending."

35

Appendix

. Pursuant to the declaration of trust,

Appendix

on October 21, 1971, the trustees of the Local

and 29 U.S.C.A. #1001 et seg. applicable to 237 Trust Funds signed a formal contract of

employee welfare and pension benefit plans, and employment which named John J. Kenny as Chair-

asserted a counterclaim for compensation man of the Board of Trustees and Director of

paid to the plaintiff between May 1, 1973 and the Local 237 Trust Funds. On May 1, 1973,

August 31, 1974. Mr. Kenny accepted the terms of the contract

as amended June 14, 1972, agreeing to devote

whatever time he felt was necessary in the per-

formance of his duties and accepting compen-

sation of $18,000.00 per year, subject to

a yearly increase of ten percent during the

term of the contract or any renewal thereof.

The trustees agreed to reimburse Mr. Kenny for

FINDINGS OF FACT

From the inception of the Local 237

Trust Funds, two funds administered by boards

of trustees of identical composition, John J.

Kenny acted as unsalaried chairman of both

boards of trustees in addition to performing

his duties as President of Local 237, an ,

tented üer expenses incurred in supervis ing the Funds

r Vv —

— * ‘ * and in operating the automobile with which

* he was to be provided.

229 U. S. C. A. #1132(e)(1) provides: 3

The Agreement and Declaration of Trust of the

„ the district courts of the United Local 237 Trust Funds, as amended, provided:

States shall have exclusive jurisdiction

of civil actions under this sub-chapter Section 5. -- Compensation --

brought by the Secretary or by a partici- No Trustee shall receive any compensation for

pant, beneficiary, or fiduciary. the services rendered by him as Trustee.

However, in those instances wherein the

Trustee is also designated to act in a dual

i capacity as Director of the Fund, compens a-

tion shall be permitted to be paid to sa id

Trustee in the capacity as Director.

36 ; 37

Appendix

Under the terms of the contract, Mr.

Kenny was not subject to discharge and, upon

termination of his employment, was entitled

to severance pay in the amount of $16,500.00.

The contract could be renewed at his option

for an additional five years under the same

terms and conditions.

After May 1, 1973, Mr. Kenny did not

receive compensation as President of Local

237 and, on September 7, 1973, he resigned

that position.

In September, 1973, William L. Meyers

Co., with the approval of the trustees, con-

ducted a study of the administration of the

Local 237 Trust Funds and submitted a report,

dated October 5, 1973. which contained sugges-

tions for the Funds' improved efficiency. Mr.

Meyers found no improprieties in the admin-

istration of the Trust Funds.

In March, 1974, Local 237 merged with

the Bartenders Local Union 188 to form Local

57 Western Pennsylvania Hotel, Club, Motel

and Restaurant Employees and Bartend-rs Union,

38

Appendix

and direction and control of the assets of the

Local 237 Trust Funds were transferred to the

trustees of the Western Pennsylvania Trust

Funds. On March 7, 1974, the trustees voted

to remove Mr. Kenny from the board of

trustees and to hire William L. Meyers Co.

as administrator of the Trust Funds. Mr.

Kenny continued to receive his salary as

Director of the newly-named Trust Funds until

August 19, 1974, when the trustees voted to

discontinue his salary. During his employment,

Mr. Kenny received $24,600.00 under the terms

of the contract and continues to have

possession and use of an automobile owned by

the Trust Funds.

On April 1, 1975, the Western Pennsyl-

vania Trust Funds were merged with the Inter-

national Trust Funds. There is no evidence

that the transfer of the funds was made for

any purpose other than to discharge the

fiduciary duty of the trustees to administer

the Trust Funds in the interest of the

39

Appendix

participants and beneficiaries and with the

care, skill, prudence, and diligence required

by statute.”

Although the defendants content that Mr.

Kenny was unwilling or unable to perform his

duties as Director of the Trust Funds and that

he was therefore terminated for just cause,

the report of the study conducted by the

William L. Meyers Co. does not establish that

Mr. Kenny's performance was unsatisfactory.

Mr. Meyers further dispelled any such in-

ference by his testimony that the recommended

improvements could have been implemented under

Mr. Kenny's administration.

The court finds no evidence of support

the contention that Mr. Kenny used improper

means to secure the contract or that the

compensation provided in exchange for his

services was not reasonable.

4 29 b. S. C. A. #1104

40

Appendix

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The court has jurisdiction over the per-

and subject matter of this action pursuant

to 28 U.S.C.A. #1441(a).

The contract of employment providing

compensation to Mr. Kenny for his services

as Director of the Funds violated neither the

terms of the trust agreement nor the pro-

visions of 29 U. S. C. A. #1001 et seq. Nor

does the evidence disclose just cause for

the discontinuance of Mr. Kenny's salary or

for the unilateral rescission of his employ-

ment contract. The subsequent transfer of

the Trust Funds does not cure the breach.

The measure of damages recoverable by

an employee for the breach of an employment

contract for a specific term is:

„.. the amount of his salary for the

unexpired term less any sums which he

has earned following his discharge and

which he may thereafter earn during the

unexpired term of the contract."

4]

Appendix

Russell v. Barnes Foundation, 52 F. Supp. 827,

830 (E. D. Pa. 1943), aff'd 143 F.2d 871

(3d Cir.), cert. denied 323 U.S. 771 (1944).

citing Pierce v. Tennessee Cola, Iron and

Railroad Company, 173 U.S. 1 (1899).

In view of Mr. Kenny's limited formal

education (four years of elementary school),

his 73 years of age, and the fact that he

has sustained two severe heart attacks in recent

years, (Tr. 97-100), it is not likely that

he would find employment elsewhere. It is

therefore concluded that, as to the first five-

year period of the contract, Mr. Kenny may

recover $128,290.30, the sum of the following:

$67,468.00, the compensation which he would

have received to date, and $16,500.00,

severance pay under the terms of the contract,

plus $44,322,30, compensation for the re-

maining twenty-one months of the five-year

term. Future losses are not reduced to present

worth because it is believed that the differ-

ential is off-set by non-inclusion of interest

on plaintiff's losses to date,

42

Appendix

The above considerations, in addition to

those contained in Mr. Kenny's motion for

advancement of the trial date,” lead this court

to conclude that it is not probably that Mr.

Kenny would have exercised his option to renew

the contract for an additional five-year term.

The defendants' counterclaim for salary

paid under the terms of the contract until May,

1973, will be denied.

An appropriate Order will be entered.

C. D. d.

Herbert P. Sorg

Dated: Aug. 2, 1976

>The plaintiff's Motion to Advance Trial, grant-

ed on January 1, 1976, set forth the follow-

ing:

7. Plaintiff is 74 years of age, is

suffering from hypertension and

heart ailment necessitating constant

cardiological care and requiring that

he avoid stress. Delay in the with-

in trial aggravate his ailments, as

counsel for plaintiff is advised by

Dr. Julian Levinson, plaintiff's

physician.

43

Appendix Appendix

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA THE PRE-TRIAL STIPULATION ADMITTED FACTS

(Vol II jt. App.p.117a)

JOHN J. KENNY, Plaintiff, Civil Action Among the stipulations of fact agreed upon

v. are:

LOUIS SANFILIPPO, et al., No. 75-40 "10. The employment contract, and amend-

Defendants. ) ments thereto, which are the basis of the

plaintiff's complaint, and are attached as

Exhibits "A" and "B" thereto, were entered

ORDER into during the separate existence of Local

237 and the Local 237 welfare and pension

AND NOW, this 2nd day of Aug. „ 1976, trusts."

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that judgment be ; "20. In the July, 1971 meeting of the

3 j trustees of Local 237 Pension and Welfare

entered in favor of the Plaintiff and against Trusts, a resolution was adopted offering

the Defendants in the amount of $128,290.30, to plaintiff directorship of both Local

237 trusts under written contract. Plain-

together with costs. tiff did not accept the offer, but was

IT IF FURTHER ORDERED that the automobile granted time to do so."

assigned to John J. Kenny be returned to the „21. At the October, 1971 Local 237

International Trust Funds. trustee m-etings of the pension and welfare

trusts a formal contract of employemnt of

C. D. J. plaintiff as director of the trusts was

Herbert P. Sorg presented for re of the trustees

and was signed by all of the trustees.

ce ae 9 Plaintiff did not, however, enter into the

+ . V 5.5% 15219 employment as director at that time. He

Tetsburgn, ra. continued as the present of Local 237 and

Gerald Schilian Esq. as chairman of both local 237 trusts."

540 Madison Avenue 8

New York, N. Y. 10022

44 45

Appendix

"22. At the June, 1972 meetings of

the local 237 trusts, a formal amendment to

the July, 1971 contract (Exhibit 2) was

presented for adoption and signature of the

trustees, all of whom signed same. Plain-

tiff still did not accept the position

as director of the trusts."

"23. Following intervening correspon-

dence with International Union President

Ed. S. Miller concerning same, on April

26, 1973 the plaintiff elected to comply

with the provisions of the profferred employ-

ment contract as amended, accepting the

Salary provisions therunder, and simultan-

eously foregoing any salary as president

of Local 237."

"24. Following the merger of Local 237

and Local 188 into Local 57, as of Marhc 1,

1974 and the establishment of the Western

Pennsylvania trusts, plaintiff continued

receiving his salary as director of the

newly named trusts until the end of

August, 1974, since which time he has not

been paid.”

"25. Direction and control of the trust

assets of Local 237 pension and welfare

trusts were transferred to the trustees of

the Western Pennsylvania Hotel, Club, Motel

and Restaurant Employees Pension and Wel-

fare Funds in March, 1974."

46

Appendix

"26. Plaintiff's employment contract

as amended was in effect as of the date

of transfer referred in to 25."

47

CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT

This agreement made and entered into this

2lst day of October, 1971, by and between

the undersigned trustees of the Hotel and

Restaurant Employees Alliance Local Union

Insurance and Welfare Trust Fund and Trus-

tees of the Hotel and Restaurant Employ-

ees Alliance Local Union 237 Pension Trust

Fund hereinafter referred to as the ‘Trust-

ees" and John J. Kenny,

WHEREAS, under and by virtue of resoluti-

ons by the Trustees, adopted as a result

of motions passed on the 13th day of July

1971 at meetings of the Trustees wherein

they indicated that the said John J. Ken-

ny may at his option take the job as

Chairman of the Board of Trustees and

Director of the Funds,

NOW THEREFORE, In consideration of the

mutual promises herein contained, and fa

other good and valuable consideration,

the receipt of which is hereby acknowled-

ged, it is herewith and hereby agreed as

follows:

1. That John J. Kenny is the Chair-

man of the Board of Trustees for the

term herein stated and is hereby appoint-

ed and employed as Director of the Hotel

and Restaurant Employees Alliance Local

48

Contract of Employment

237 Insurance and Welfare Trust Fund and

for the Hotel and Restaurant Employees A.

liance Local 237 Pension Trust Fund for a

period of five (5) years effective with

the date of commencement of duties as Dir-

ector of the Funds. He shall not be sub-

ject to discharge or removal for said per-

iod of time unless by mutual agreement of

the said John J. Kenny and the majority

of the Trustees,

2. The said John J. Kenny shall have

full authority to direct the administra-

tion of the Trust Funds, subject only to

the paramount authority of the Trustees

as set forth under the terms of the Trust

Agreements, to be operated in accordance

with past operating practices,

3. That pursuant to the amendments to

the Trust Agreements the said John J. Ken-

ny is herewith and hereby authoriged to

continue to act as Chairman of the Board

of Trustees of both Funds as well as Dir-

ector thereof,

4. AS compensation for his services,

49

Contract of Employment

the said John J. Kenny shall be paid by the

Trustees out of the Trust Funds the sum of

$18,000.00 per year payable weekly. Each

year thereafter he shall receive a ten (10%)

per cent increase during the term of this

contract or any renewal thereof. In additi-

on thereto the Director shall be furnished

with an automobile and reimbursed all ex-

penses incurred by him in the maintenance

and operation of that autom?bile. He shall

also receive and be reimbursed for any and

all expenses incurred by him in connection

with the operation of the aforesaid funds.

>. The said John J. Kenny herewith and

hereby agrees to devote full time and eff-

orts to the performance of his duties as

Director of the said Funds and shall have

the right to retire at any time within his

discretion.

6. Payment for the salary and all exp-

enses for the said John J. Kenny shall be

divided equally by and between the two

Funds specified as hereinabove,

7. As part of his compensation as Dir-

ector of the Funds, the said John J. Kenny

50

Contract of Employment

Shall be entitled to severance pay upon ter-

mination of employment in accordance with

the following terms and conditions:

(a)

The amount of severance pay shall be

516, 500. 00.

(b) The severance pay shall be paid in

(E)

)

three equal yearly installments of

$5,500.00, the first installment

to be due and payable thirty-one days

after the termination of John J. Ken-

ny's employment as Director of the

Funds and the second and third inst-

allment payments shall be due and

payable on the yearly anniversary

dates of the first payment,

In the event that John J. Kenny pre-

decease the receipt of the entire

$16,500.00 and be survived by Rosa

Kenny, his wife, then such install-

ment payment or payments shall be

paid to Rosa Kenny in the place of

John J. Kenny as they become due,

In the event that both John J. Kenny

and Rosa Kenny predecease receipt of

51

Contract of Employment

all or any of such installment payments,

the obligation of the Health and Pension

and Welfare Trust Funds to make such in-

Stallment payments shall cease and termi-

nate in such manner and fashion that in no

event shall such installment payments be

due to the estate or heirs of either John

J. Kenny or Rosa Kenny,

() In the event that John J. Kenny

7.

should be deceased prior to receipt

of any amount of severance pay,

payment in the sum of $16,500.00

should be made to Rosa Kenny in

three equal annual installments.

Said John J. Kenny shall have the

option to renew and extend the

terms of this contract for an addi-

tional five years subsequent to the

termination thereof under the same

terms and conditions as hereinabove

specified except as may be modified

by agreement between the parties.

52

Contract of Employment

Hotel and Restaurant

Employees Alliance

Local 237 Pension

Trust Fund

{/s/ Frank Blandi

s/ W,B,Settle

s/ White

/s/ Henry J. Huemrich

/s/ Daniel Dubaniewicz

/s/ Frank E. Prince

s/ Louis Sanfili

7s/ Robert V. Kern

/s/ Aug. Z. Sommers

2s/ Banald S. Rossa

get Gurdon F, Flagg

s/

CONSENTED TO:

John J. Kenny

53

Hotel and Restau-

rant Employees

Alliance Local

237 Insurance and

Welfare Trust

Fund

/s/_ Frank Blandi

s/ W,B,Settle

s/ Leo White

/s/ 122122 Duban-

Js R RNA · Jac-

/s/ Frank E,.Prince

/s/ s Sanfil-

7s/Robert.V.Kern

s /Aug .Z.Sommers

/s/Ranald S,Rossa

/s/ Gurdon F.Flagg

Contract of Employment

HOTEL AND RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES ALLIANCE LO-

CAL #237 PENSION TRUST FUND

RESOLUTION

AMEND ING CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT OF

JOHN J. KENNY AS DIRSCTOR OF FUNDS

WHEREAS, on the l4th day of June, 1972 at

a duly called, convened and conducted meet-

ing of the Board of Trustees of the Hotel

and Restaurant Employees Alliance Local 237

Pension Trust Fund a motion was made and car-

to the effect that the contract of employ-

ment concerning the employment of Mr. John

J. Kenny as Director of the Fund should be

amended, and

WHEREAS, the original contract of en-

ployment contained a provision which set

forth that Mr. Kenny shall devote full tim

to his job as Director of the Fund, and

WHEREAS, The Board of Trustees desire to

amend the contract of employment to state

that with respect to the time required to

do the job as Director of the Fund, Mx.

John J. Kenny shall devote whatever time

he feels is necessary to perform his duties

54

Contract of Employment

as Director, and

NOW THEREFORE, be it resolved that the

contract of employment employing John J.

Kenny as the Director of the Hotel and Res-

taurant Employees Alliance Local #237 Pen-

Sion Trust Fund is hereby amended to state

that Mr. John J. Kenny as Director of the

Fund shall devote as much time as he deems

necessary to perform his duties as Direc-

tor of the Fund.

HOTEL and RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES

ALLIANCE LOCAL 237 PENSION

TRUST FUND

(SL Daniel Dubaniewicz

Renald Rossa

{/s/ Robert . Kern

/s/_ Louis Sanfilippo

/s/ Umberto Guidotti

55

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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