Brief for Appellant — Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City

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‘ 7 Supreme Court, U. S,

| { FILED

No. 77-444 JAN 18 1978

IN THE | MICHAEL RODAK. R.. CLERK

Supreme Court of the United States

OctoBeR TERM, 1977

Penn CENTRAL TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, THe NEW

York AND HartEM RarRoaD COMPANY THE 51st

Srreet REALTY CORPORATION, UGP PROPERTIES,

ING.,

Appellants,

Vv.

Tue Crry or New York, e¢ al.,

Appellees.

On Appeal from the Court of Appeals

of the State of New York

BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS

—_——————S|—S—sss ee

Dante. M. GRIBBON

Joun R. Bouton

Covrneton & BURLING

888 Sixteenth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 452-6118

Cart HELMETAG, JB.

F. W. Rovet

Suite 3100 IVB Building

1700 Market Street

Philadelphia, Pa. 19103

(215) 972-3053

Attorneys for Appellants

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

BONE GP BOI ccc cccccccccccccseseveecess il

BD BD occ ccecccccccodccccscssccsvececess 1

SI. ccc cdnacendeceues suhaebesbaddecdeneee 2

Ds ds Jn ccsbbedescesessbsvousecd 2

Gomewsews PRMOBWTED 2... ccc cece cccccccccccccscccs 2

Graveneene OF TMB Cage 2... ccccccccccccccccccccs 3

Bunemany OF ARGUMENT .......ccsccccccccccccccces 9

BI 6 ke cee ise cd disc cccevsvecsndseccessvedes 12

I. Penn Cernrrat’s Ricut To Construct an

Orrice Buitpinc Over Granp CentTraL TER-

MINAL Is VaLuaBLE PrivaTE Property FULLY

PROTECTED BY THE CONSTITUTION.............. 13

Il. Penn Centrav’s Property INTEREST 1n DEVEL-

OPING THE Arr Ricuts Over THE TERMINAL Was

CiearLy ‘‘TaKEN’’ FoR CoNnsTITUTIONAL PuR-

POSES BY THE OPERATION OF THE LANDMARKS

tein te teehee baad e bedaes 20

A. There Is Nothing Unique About the Preser-

vation of Landmarks That Renders Con-

stitutional Safeguards Less Applicable Than

in the Taking of Private Property for Other

Governmental Objectives.................. 20

B. The Anticipated Economic Return to Penn

Central from the Terminal and Other Near-

. Buildings Is Immaterial in Deciding

ether or Not There Has Been a Taking

of Its Terminal Air Rights by Operation

of the Landmarks Law.................... 24

C. The Court Below Erred in Holding That

the ration of the Landmarks Law Did

Not ‘‘Take’’ Property from the Penn Cen-

ii Table of Contents Continued

Page

Ill. Penn Centrat Is Entititep to Recerve Just

CoMPENSATION FOR THE TAKING or Its Am

Ricuts Asove THE Granp CentraL TERMINAL. 33

A. There Is No Constitutional Basis for

Awarding Penn Central Anythi Less

Than Just Compensation -

B. The TDRs Far Fall Short of the Constitu-

tional Requirement That Penn Central Be

Justly Compensated for What It Lost

Through Operation of the Landmarks Law. 36

C. Just Compensation Remains To Be Deter-

mined for the Taking That Has Occurred... 43

ConcLusion

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CasEs:

Aronson v. Town of Sharon, 195 N.E.2d 341 (Mass.

1964) 33

Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897) ....11, 38, ‘7 eon

1.

SPER. s sdiase sions 12

S. 564 (1972) .... 14

U.S.) 403 (1878) ag

4

38

Chicago, B. d Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) . 12

2

Table of Authorities Continued ili

Page

Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912) .......... 42

Flaccomio v. Mayor & City Counc! of Baltimore, 71

A.2d4 12 (Md. 1950) ......... cc cecccescecesvess 12

Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York,

39 N.Y. 2d 587, 385 N.Y.S. 2d 5, appeal dism’d,

499 UB. GOO (1976) .... cece ccccccccccccvcess 39

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) ........ 12

Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) 23

Griggs v. Allegheny ey 369 U.S. 84 (1962) . .9, 15, 26

Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) ............ 2

McCandless v. United States, 298 U.S. 342 (1936) . .37, 38

McCoy v. Union Elevated R.R., 247 U.S. 354 (1918) .._ 12

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) . .36, 37

ee Navigation Co. v. United States, 148

US.

ry 10, 14, 18, 22, 33, 36, 37, 38

Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405 -

TEER R Gh bce gcse cecestcsccsccecccces

Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934) ....... 12, 37

Panhandle Co. v. Highway Comm’n, 294 US. 613

DT MPUEEREERecauabgcscccsesesccccccccccs 20

Parks v. Boston, 15 Pick. (32 Mass.) 198 (1834) ..... 14, 42

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) 12,

19, 21, 29, 36

People v. Ramsey, 171 N.E. 2d 246 (App. Ct. Ill.

EGE ON ica dcccescccccscccccceccoces 21

Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) ........... 14

Pontiac Improvement Co. v. Board of Com’rs, 135

DM UI IED occ ccccccccccccesscccces 12

Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922) .16, 26

Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 166

EEN SG cas obs vege cccscccsceces 30, 36

Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 US.

EC EEi inn chs eckeceecsccecscccccece 38

Roe v. Kansas, 278 U.S. 191 (1929) ............+4+: 12

Scott v. Toledo, 36 F. 385 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1888) .... 12

Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) ........... 2

Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923) .......... \4

ae’ g v. Port of Portland, 415 P.2d 750 (Ore.

ee hn 6nd 900.cenccsceces

United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) 9, 10, 11, 15,

25, 26, 29, 30, 37

United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S.

DEN, Gab sb cedeceesadcccccccccccccccccess 36

iv Table of Authorities Continued

Page

United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325 (1949) ......... 22

United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917) ..... 10, 29, 31

26, 27,3

United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 :

BEE ihé cA sdaa anes dadeibetdeceeceeass 10, 13, 14, 30

United States v. Gettysburg Electric Ry., 160 U.S.

Ro BR Ce Rear e ae eu 12, 36

ae ou v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U.S. 645

United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903) _. |_| 29, 33

United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222

5 RAR nba e eitaE Ipinit+F ban 18

United States v. Virginia Electric Co., 365 U.S. 624

SRILA staignttinen aie ation pier: ies. 15, 37

Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365

APR Res IRA RRS TO ct of eee ale eS weligs Pater 10, 23

STaTuTEs:

Federal

I a id | 2

Municipal Statutes and Ordinances

New York City Landmarks Preservation Law, N

ny City Charter and Administrative Code, ch.

mall Te Oe ee pep ean passim

.C. Admin. Code § 205-10 .........

N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 2075.0 stapes ee

N.Y.C. Admin. Code : RR diel 4.6

N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 207-70 .....0000007 °° 4.6

N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 207-8.0a(2) ......0 6

N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 207-100 ................ 4

N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 207-160 ............ °° 4

ee eee

Table of Authorities Continued Vv

Page

MISCELLANEOUS:

Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution

CREED c.pdccccckesdedesdboesesessscccsecuennee 30

Ball, ‘‘Division into Horizontal Strata of the Land-

space Above the Surface,’ 39 Yale L.J. 616

GED n6ccccncsceucussesetnccsts consnscesons 16

Berger, ‘‘A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem,”’

49 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 165 (1974) ......... eee eeees 30

Cormack, ‘‘Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Do-

main,’’? 41 Yale L.J. 221 (1931) .............%. 22

Costonis, ‘‘Development Rights Transfer: An Ex-

ploratory Essay,’’ 83 Yale L.J.75 (1973) ........ 40

Costonis, ‘‘ ‘Fair’ Compensation and the Accommo-

dation Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse

in Land Use Controversies,’’ 75 Colum. L. Rev.

BE GUD sh cvcdawbiessccdievececenssésavens 35, 43

Costonis, ‘‘The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and

the Preservation of Urban Landmarks,’”’ 85

Harv. L. Rev. 574 (1972) ........eeeeeees 39, 40, 41

Dunham, ‘‘A Legal and Economic Basis for City Plan-

ning,’’ 58 Colum. L. Rev. 650 (1958) ............ 22

Dunham, ‘‘Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspec-

tive: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropri-

ation Law,’’ 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 63 ..........+. 33

Eckert, ‘aren of ry Rights: A Mod-

ern Land Use Tool,’’ 23 Miami L. Rev. 347

SED 06560 00 od eh Seca bebbed ehndceecensusendes 16

Freund, The Police Power (1904) ...........2-005. 32

gdedenncecacdegeereyevencoonscbopencees 14

THB CRBGB) cc ccccccvcccccsccccceccceccecococes 16

Marcus, ‘‘Air Rights Transfers in New York City,’’

36 J.L. Contemp. Prob. 372 (1971) ............ 9

vi Table of Authorities Continued

Page

Marcus, ‘‘Mandatory Development Rights Transfer

and the Taking Clause: The Case of Manhattan’s

Tudor City Parks,’’ 24 Buff. L. Rev. 77 (1974)...13, 39

Michelman, ‘‘Property, Utility, and Fairness: Com-

ments on the Ethical Foundations of ‘Just Com-

pensation’ Law,’’ 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1967) ...

29, 30, 32

Nelson, ‘‘Appraisal of Air Rights,’’ 23 Appraisal J.

a a a he i oe sa 16

Nichols on Eminent Domain (1976) ......... 16, 29, 40, 41

Note, ‘‘Landmark Preservation Laws: Compensation

for ‘Temporary Taking,’ 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 362

Note, ‘‘The Unconstitutionality of Transferable De-

velopment Rights,’’ 84 Yale L. J. 1101 (1975) 40, 42

Restatement of Property (1936) .................. 14

Sax, ‘‘Takings and the Police Power,’ 74 Yale L.J.

Ee eee eed oe 1 22, 33

Van Alstyne, ‘‘Taking or Damaging by Police Power:

The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria,’’

44 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1970) .................. 32, 33

White, ‘‘George Washington Bridge Approach: A Case

Study,’’ 34 Appraisal J. 32 (1966) ............ 16

Wright, The Law of Airspace (1968) .............. 16

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcToBER TERM, 1977

No. 77-444

PENN CENTRAL TRANSPORTATION CoMPANY, THE NEW

York anp HarteM Rairoap CoMPANy, THE 518T

Street Reatty Corporation, UGP PROPERTIES,

mm Appellants,

v.

New York, et al.,

THe CITY OF hoodies

On Appeal from the Court of Appeals

of the State of New York

BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the New York Court of Appeals 1s

reported at 42 N.Y. 2d 324, 397 N.Y.S. 2d 914, and 366

N.E. 2d 1271 (1977). It is set out in Appendix A of the

separately bound Appendix to the Jurisdictional State-

ment. The opinion of the New York Supreme Court,

Appellate Division, First Department, is reported at

50 App. Div. 2d 265 and 377 N.Y.S. 2d 20 (1975). That

opinion and the accompanying order and findings of

fact by the Appellate Division are set out in Appendix

2

B to the Jurisdictional Statement. The findings of fact

and declarations of law, memorandum decision, orders

and judgment of the Trial Term of the New York

Supreme Court are not officially reported. They are set

out in Appendix C to the Jurisdictional Statement.

JURISDICTION

The final judgment of the New York Court of Ap-

peals, the highest court of the state, was entered on

June 23, 1977. Appellants filed a Jurisdictional State-

ment on September 20, 1977, and this Court noted

probable jurisdiction on December 5, 1977. The juris-

diction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1257(2). The following cases sustain the jurisdiction

of this Court: Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 17-18

(1971); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 581-85

(1969) ; Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 414 (1943).

STATUTES INVOLVED

Pertinent portions of the New York City Landmarks

Preservation Law, New York City Charter and Admin-

istrative Code, ch. 8-A, and applicable New York zon-

ing resolutions are set forth in Appendix E to the Ju-

risdictional Statement. Pertinent provisions of the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitu-

tion of the United States are set forth in Appendix F

to the Jurisdictional Statement.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Does the social and cultural desirability of preserv-

ing aesthetic landmarks through government action

derogate from the constitutional requirement that just

compensation be paid for private property taken for

public use?

3

Is Penn Central entitled to no compensation for that

portion of the value of its rights to construct an office

building over the Grand Central Terminal that is said

to be attributable to the efforts of ‘‘society as an orga-

nized entity’’?

Does a finding that Penn Central has failed to estab-

lish that there is no possibility that it can earn a rea-

sonable return on its remaining properties in and near

the Terminal warrant the conclusion that it is not en-

titled to compensation for the taking of its air rights

above the Terminal ?

Does the possibility accorded to Penn Central of

realizing some value at some time by transferring the

Terminal development rights to other nearby buildings,

under a procedure that is conceded to be defective,

severely limited, procedurally complex and specula-

tive, and that requires ultimate discretionary approval

by governmental authorities, meet the constitutional

requirements of just compensation?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Penn Central Transportation Company * owns the

Grand Central Terminal, located in mid-town Manhat-

tan. The Terminal was opened jor operations in 1913

and serves as the terminus for a number of railroad

lines. As originally designed in the early 1900’s, the

Terminal was intended as a combined railway station

and office building, although the latter was never built.

1 Penn Central Transportation Company, certain of its affiliates

and UGP Properties, Inc., (hereafter referred to collectively as

‘‘Penn Central’’) are the appellants in this case. UGP Properties,

Inc., is a New York corporation and is not affiliated with the other

appellants. (J.A. 33-34)

4

(An artist’s conception of the combined terminal and

office building is reproduced at J.A. 90) * As the Trial

Term of the New York Supreme Court found, the Ter-

minal is physically ‘‘deteriorating at a substantial

rate.”’ (J.S.A. 53)

In August, 1967, over the objection of Penn Central,

the Landmarks Preservation Commission of the City

of New York (hereafter, the ‘‘Landmarks Commis-

sion’’) designated the Terminal and its site as a ‘‘land-

mark”’ and a ‘‘landmark site’’ respectively. (J.S.A. 53)

The Landmarks Commission acted pursuant to author-

ity conferred upon it by a municipal ordinance of New

York City, the Landmarks Preservation Law (here-

after, the “Landmarks Law”). The effect of the land-

mark designation was to bar any construction on the

site and any alteration of the exterior appearance of

the Terminal without prior approval of the Landmarks

Commission. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 207-5.0-207-7.0

(J.S.A. 90-93). Moreover, Penn Central is required to

keep the Terminal ‘‘in good repair.’ Id., § 207-10.0

(J.S.A. 104). Criminal sanctions could be imposed for

violation of the Landmarks Commission order. Id.

§ 207-16.0 (J.S.A. 108-09).

Because of Penn Central’s precarious financial con-

dition—a condition which ultimately led to its being

ordered into reorganization on June 21, 1970—Penn

* References to the Joint Appendix will be designated as ‘‘J.A.

——.’’ References to the Appendix to the Jurisdictional Statement

will be designated as ‘‘J.S.A, ——.”’

bs The stated purpose of the Landmarks Law is to prevent the

‘‘irreplaceable loss to the people of the city’’ that might be caused

by the alteration or destruction of landmarks. N.Y.C. Admin. Code

§ 205-1.0 (J.S.A. 76).

—

a ee _—

ees Ur ety

5

Central decided to develop its unused air rights above

the Terminal. It entered into arms-length negotiations

with UGP Properties, Inc., (hereafter, ‘‘UGP’’) re-

sulting in a lease agreement signed on January 22,

1968. Under the terms of the lease, UGP was to con-

struct and operate a multi-story office building over

the Terminal. The term of the lease was for fifty years,

and UGP retained an option for another twenty-five

years. (J.S.A. 53-54) The lease provided that UGP

would pay Penn Central $1,000,000 per year during

construction of the office building; after its completion,

Penn Central was guaranteed at least $3,000,000 per

year, plus additional amounts based on the total space

actually rented. UGP also agreed to assume a portion

of Penn Central’s real estate taxes, estimated to be

nearly $600,000. Some existing rental properties (net-

ting between $700,000 and $1,000,000 annually) would

be lost because of construction required for the founda-

tions of the office building. (J.S.A. 48)

UGP retained the architectural firm of Marcel

Breuer & Associates to design t#te proposed office build-

ing. In compliance with the Landmarks Law, Penn

Central and UGP submitted the Breuer design to the

Landmarks Commission and applied for a “Certificate

of No Exterior Effect.’’* Granting the Certificate

* This original design by the Breuer firm would not have change.

the facade of the Terminal. Moreover, and like the two alternative

designs later submitted, it was in conformity with the applicable

New York zoning regulations (as distinguished from the Landmarks

Law). No party to this litigation has ever disputed that the Breuer

designs conformed to the zoning law.

There are numerous other buildings in the area near Grand Cen-

tral as large as, or nearly so, as the proposed building over the

Terminal. The Pan American building, for instance, is depicted in

relation to Grand Central at J.A. 110.

6

would have permitted construction to go forward.

N.Y.C. Admin. Code §207-5.0 (J.S.A. 90-91). On

September 20, 1968, however, the Landmarks Commis-

sion denied the application. Penn Central then ap-

plied for ‘‘Certificates of Appropriateness,” N.Y.C.

Admin. Code § 207-6.0 (J.S.A. 91-93), submitting the

original Breuer plan and two revisions as alternatives.

The last of these applications was denied by the Land-

marks Commission on August 26, 1969.

Having no further possible remedies before the

Landmarks Commission,’ Penn Central and UGP in-

stituted this action on October 7, 1969. They sought

declaratory and equitable relief and money damages,

alleging, inter alia, that the actions of the Landmarks

Commission (prohibiting construction of an otherwise

lawful office building over the Terminal) constituted

a taking of private property without just compensation

in violation of due process and equal protection of the

laws.* The Trial Term of the New York Supreme Court

agreed, and declared the application of the Landmarks

* The Landmarks Law provides that after a denial of an applica-

tion either for a Certificate of No Exterior Effect or a Certificate

of Appropriateness, certain landmark owners may apply for relief

because of insufficient return (defined as less than six percent per

year of the property’s valuation). This relief was not available to

Penn Central, however, because it is not extended to railroad prop-

erty having partial real-estate tax exemption. N.Y.C, Admin. Code

§ 207-8.0a(2) (J.S.A. 95). As the dissent in the Appellate Division

points out, Grand Central is the only such property which has been

designated as a landmark. 377 N.Y.S. 2d at 32 (Lupiano, J., dis-

senting). (J.S.A. 30)

*The claims for monetary compensation were severed from the

other constitutional issues and judgment on them reserved by the

Trial Term of the New York Supreme Court. (J.S.A. 60-61)

ye ee

7

Law to Grand Central Terminal unconstitutional.

(J.S.A. 51-60, 61-73)

The City of New York and the Landmarks Commis-

sion appealed. The Supreme Court’s Appellate Divi-

sion reversed the trial court, upholding the constitu-

tional'ty of the Landmarks Law as applied and finding

that there had been no compensable taking. Two of the

five justices dissented, essentially adopting the ration-

ale of the Trial Term. (J.S.A. 16-50)

In affirming the decision of the Appellate Division,

the New York Court of Appeals accepted as a central

premise that the preservation of landmarks is so

socially and culturally desirable that private property

taken by the government to achieve such preservation

is not entitled to the same compensation as private

property taken for other public uses. (J.S.A. 2-3)

It distinguished the Landmarks Law from both

zoning and historic-district regulation (J S.A. 45),

noting that ‘‘[rJestrictions on alteration of individual

landmarks are not designed to further a general com-

munity plan’ (J.S.A. 5), and that ‘“‘the burden of

limitation is borne by a single owner’’ who ‘‘may or

may not benefit from that limitation.”’ (Id.)

The court reasoned, however, that there was no ‘‘con-

stitutional imperative’ that a property owner s eco-

nomic return ‘‘embrace all attributes, incidental influ-

ences, or contributing external factors derived from

the social complex in which the property rests.

(J.8.A. 2) In so doing, the court sought to draw a dis-

tinction between the ‘‘ingredient of property value

created by “the efforts of the property owner’” and

the ‘‘ingredient”’ created ‘‘by the accumulated indirect

8

social and direct government investment in the physi-

cal property, its functions, and its surroundings.’’

(J.S.A. 1-2, 9) For ‘‘the limited purposes of a land-

marking statute,’’ the court held that ‘‘[i]t is enough

... that the privately created ingredient of property

receive a reasonable return.’’ (J.S.A. 2-3) In applying

that criterion the court concluded that Penn Central

was not entitled to compensation for the loss of its

Terminal air rights because it had failed to prove that

it would be impossible for it to earn a reasonable re-

turn on the balance of its properties in the Terminal

area. (J.S.A. 9)" It was on the basis of this conclu-

sion that the court determined there was ‘‘no taking

for which just compensation must be paid.’’ (J.S.A. 5)

Alternatively, the court held that Penn Central had

not in any event been ‘‘wholly deprived of the develop-

ment rights above the Terminal,’’ because those rights

had been made ‘‘transferable’’ under certain condi-

tions to other nearby properties. (J.S.A. 11) While

noting the ‘‘many defects’’ of the City’s ‘‘transferable

development rights” (hereafter, “TDRs’’) program,"

"In the New York courts, Penn Central presented substantial

evidence that it could not earn, either before or after Grand Cen-

tral’s designation as a landmark, a reasonable return on the Ter-

minal. Penn Centrai does not press that claim here because this

factual question becomes immaterial once the Court of Appeals’

error of law in abandoning the just-compensation rule is reversed.

* ‘Transferable development rights’’ in theory permit a landmark

owner to convey to a limited number of nearby properties the right

to develop his own property. The rights that can, in theory, be

conveyed equal the maximum allowable floor area on the landmark

lot less the floor area actually utilized by the landmark. The trans-

feree owners, also in theory, are then permitted to build on their

properties to an extent that exceeds the otherwise applicable zoning

regulations. Under New York City’s plan, the TDRs are not created

by the Landmarks Law but by separate zoning resolutions.

Pe a ——

POPC Lh se Cette! Rent OL oS aren viet aD

9

and acknowledging that such rights ‘‘may not be equiv-

alent in value’’ to the development rights taken from

Penn Central, the court concluded that the TDRs ‘‘are

valuable’? and provide ‘‘significant, perhaps ‘fair’,

compensation for the loss of rights above the Terminal

itself.’’ (J.S.A. 13-14) Thus, for “the limited purposes

of a landmarking statute,’’ (J.S.A. 2-3) the TDRs

were considered by the court to be sufficient—even

though not “just”—compensation.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Court of Appeals, in fashioning special rules to

facilitate landmark preservation by government ac-

tion, has approved the taking of private property with-

out payment of just compensation.

The private property that has been taken consists

of the air rights to build above the Grand Central

Terminal. The court did not contest, as this Court has

held, that an owner is constitutionally entitled to com-

pensation for the taking of air space above his land.

Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 88-89 (1962) ;

United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-63 (1946).

The court erred, however, in holding ‘‘for the limited

purposes of a landmarking statute’’ that compensation

need not be paid for such portion of the value of air

rights that the court asserted to be attributable to the

‘efforts of organized society”’ or the ‘‘social complex

in which the Terminal is situated.”’ (J.S.A. 2-3) The

The transfer of development rights is permitted in any case to

any property owner holding contiguous parcels of land ; in the case

of landmark owners, the extent to which transfers are allowed is

somewhat enhanced. (J.S.A. 113-18) See Marcus, ‘‘Air Rights

Transfers in New York City,’’ 36 J.L. Contemp. Prob. 372, 373-75

(1971). See also J.A, 30-31.

10

novel distinction drawn by the court between the

‘‘social’’ and “‘private’”’ ingredients of private prop-

erty is supported by no decision of this Court, and is

inconsistent with well-established principles governing

the valuation of property for purposes of just compen-

sation. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 492-93

(1973) ; United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16-17

(1970) ; United States v. General Motors Corp., 323

U.S. 373, 378 (1945).

The Landmarks Law clearly operated to ‘‘take’’

Penn Central’s property interests in the air rights

above the Terminal. United States v. Dickinson, 331

U.S. 745, 798 (1947). A ‘‘taking’’ for constitutional

purposes does not depend upon a formal transfer of

title to the taker, United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316,

328 (1917), or physical occupation of the air space in

question by the taker. United States v. Causby, supra.

The ‘political ethics’’ reflected in the Due Process

Clause prevent the public from forcing private owners

to bear burdens which should properly be borne by the

public as a whole. Armstrong v. United States, 364

U.S. 40, 49 (1960); Monongahela Navigation Co. v.

United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893). That principle

is as applicable to landmarking statutes as it is to all

other government actions.

The Court of Appeals acknowledged that ‘‘[t]his

is not a zoning case,’”’ (J.S.A. 4) thus correctly dis-

tinguishing it from such earlier decisions of this Court

as Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.

365 (1926), and recognized that Penn Central bore the

full burden of the Landmarks Law with no compensat-

ing benefits. The court erred, however, in holding that

the taking of Penn Central’s air rights without com-

11

pensation was nonetheless permissible unless Penn

Central met the burden of proving that it was in-

capable of ever earning a reasonable return on its re-

maining properties near the Terminal. Prior decisions

of this Court make clear that an owner is entitled to

just compensation for property taken regardless of

the value of its remaining property or its prospects of

earning a reasonable return on such remaining prop-

erty. United States v. Fuller, supra; United States v.

Causby, supra, 328 U.S. at 262.

The alternative holding of the Court of Appeals that

the compensation received by Penn Central for its air

rights was constitutionally sufficient, even though not

‘‘just,’’ is also erroneous. The assertedly ‘‘fair”’ com-

pensation provided by the City was the opportunity

to transfer the air rights over the Terminal to a highly

limited number of nearby properties. The value of

these ‘‘tr insferable development rights’ (‘“‘TDRs’’),

if any, is highly speculative and uncertain. The court

recognized that the TDR program contained ‘“‘many

defects,’’ that the area of transferability was ‘‘severely

limited’? and that ‘‘complex procedures are required

to obtain a transfer permit.’’ (J.S.A. 11) Rights of

such concededly uncertain and contingent value fall

far short of established just-compensation standards.

Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 584 (1897). There is no

justification for viewing them, as the court below did,

as all that the Constitution requires ‘‘for the limited

purposes of a landmarking statute.”’ (J.S.A. 2-3)

The decision of the court below should be reversed

and the case remanded for a determination of the

appropriate level of compensation to be awarded to

Penn Central.

12

ARGUMENT

Penn Central makes no claim that the preservation

of buildings of historical or aesthetic importance is an

impermissible objective of governmental action in pur-

suit of the public welfare. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.

26 (1954) ; Roe v. Kansas, 278 U.S. 191 (1929) ; United

States v. Gettysburg Electric Ry., 160 U.S. 668 (1896).°

What is challenged is the holding of the court below

that where government seeks to achieve cultural or

aesthetic goals—through such devices as the Land-

marks Law—it can avoid the constitutional imperative

of just compensation that has long governed the taking

of private property for all other public needs.”

* In all these cases the governmental action in question was ap-

proved as an exercise of the eminent-domain power and was accom-

panied by just compensation to the property owners affected. See

also F'laccomio v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 71 A.2d 12

(Md. 1950) ; Pontiae Improvement Co. v. Board of Com’rs, 135

N.E. 635 (Ohio 1922).

*° Penn Central argues here that the City of New York’s action

violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to

the United States Constitution. While that amendment does not

contain the express language of the Fifth Amendment (‘‘nor shall

private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-

tion.’’), the constitutional protections are the same. As this Court

said in Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S, 226, 239 (1897 ),

‘* “sinee the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment compen-

sation for private property taken for public use constitutes an

essential element in ‘‘due process of law... .’’’”’ (quoting

from Mr. Justice Jackson’s opinion as Circuit Judge in Seott

v. Toledo, 36 F’, 385, 395-96 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1888).

To the same effect, see Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 254

(1934) ; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ;

McCoy v. Union Elevated R.R., 247 U.S. 354, 363 (1918). The same

result is reached under the ‘‘incorporation doctrine.’’ Gideon v.

Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341-42 (1963).

—

ee OS int ee Wt

a aed

BL Pe ee eee

13

In the first section of this brief it will be shown that

the Terminal air rights constitute Penn Central’s pri-

vate property whatever may have been the contribution

of organized society to the value of those rights. The

next section consists of a summary analysis of the

decisions of this Court that establish that Penn Cen-

tral’s property has been ‘“‘taken,’’ within the meaning

of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, by the City

of New York through the operation of the Landmarks

Law. Finally, it will be shown that the TDRs provided

by the City of New York do not constitute just com-

pensation for the property that has been taken by the

City and that the case should be remanded for a deter-

mination of the amount of compensation to which

Penn Central is entitled.

I. PENN CENTRAL'S RIGHT TO CONSTRUCT AN OFFICE BUILD-

ING OVER GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL IS VALUABLE

PRIVATE PROPERTY FULLY PROTECTED BY THE CONSTI-

TUTION.

The Court of Appeals effectively concedes, as a

matter of State law, that the right to develop the air

space above Grand Central is a valuable property in-

terest (known as “‘air rights’’). (J.8.A. 1-2, 12) * De-

cisions of this Court would permit no other conclusion ;

they have taken a broad and practical view of the con-

stitutional protection afforded private property. In

United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 378,

378 (1945), this Court defined property as

‘the group of rights inhering in the citizen’s rela-

tion to the be cw thing, as the right to possess,

1 See also Marcus, ‘‘Mandatory Development Rights Transfer

and the Taking Clause: The Case of Manhattan’s Tudor City

Parks,’’ 24 Buff. L. Rev. 77, 89-92 (1974).

14

use and dispose of it .. . . The constitutional pro-

tection is addressed to every sort of interest the

citizen may possess.’’ (emphasis added)

See also Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923);

Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74 (1917) ; Restate-

ment of Property §5, comment e (1936). See also

Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 ( 1972) ;

Perry v. Sindermamn, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972). Each

of the ‘‘bundle’’ of rights of which property consists

is entitled to constitutional protection, as the courts

long ago recognized. See, e.g., Eaton v. Boston, C. &

M. R.R., 51 N.H. 504, 511-12 (1872) ; Parks v. Boston,

15 Pick. (32 Mass.) 198, 203 (1834) ; Hohfeld, ‘“‘Some

Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial

Reasoning,”’ 23 Yale L. J. 16, 20-25 (1913). In exer-

cising his ‘“‘dominion of the physical thing,’’ 323 U.S.

at 380, the property owner may choose to exploit the

full quantum of rights available to it at one time, or it

may choose to exercise them at different points over

a longer period. The latter is what Penn Central did

with the Terminal property. It first used part of its

property rights to build the Terminal. It then decided

in 1968 to utilize the remainder of its air rights by

arranging for the construction of the office building

above the Terminal.”

**In addition to the economic factors to be considered in Due

Process Clause cases, there are also equitable considerations:

‘in any society the fulness and sufficiency of the securities

which surround the individual in the use and enjoyment of

his property constitute one of the most certain tests of the

character and value of the government.’’ Monongahela Navi-

gation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 324 (1893).

** As noted previously, p. 5 n.4, supra, the various designs for the

office tower were all within applicable New York zoning ordinances.

ies a Mois Stade OR gag S. een Pa Pata ante nt wanda he ————

15

That the ‘‘right to develop’’ above the Terminal 18

not a corporeal object is no bar to holding that it is

nonetheless property, as the court below recognized.

This Court has afforded constitutional protection to a

wide variety of intangible rights. In Armstrong v.

United States, 364 U.S. 40, 44-46 (1960), for instance,

materialmen’s liens were held to be property protected

by the Fifth Amendment. Similarly, in United States

v. Virginia Electric Co., 365 U.S. 624, 627 (1961), a

flowage easement over an owner’s land was deemed to

be a protected property interest.

Directly pertinent here are those cases that have

recognized as compensable under the Fifth Amendment

a property right to use the air space above an owner's

land. In United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946),

the government was held to have taken an easement

over the owner’s property for the flight paths of mili-

tary airplanes landing on an airstrip near the property.

Even though the planes did not actually land on or

otherwise occupy the property in question, ‘(t]he

owner’s right to possess and exploit the land—that is

to say, his beneficial ownership of it. . a id., at 262,

was limited by the noise of the flights. That limitation

was held to be a compensable taking. The Causby de-

cision was followed in Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369

U.S. 84, 88-89 (1962), where this Court said

2 f land presupposes the use of some of

the ‘dames dans it < @ . Otherwise no home

could be built, no tree planted, no fence con-

structed, no chimney erected.’’ “

%*The United States has, in other contexts, recognized that an

owner whose right to develop above his property is limited by gov-

ernmental action must be compensated. Thus, in United States v.

29.28 Acres of Land in Wayne Township, N.J., 162 F. Supp. 502

16

See also Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327

(1922) ; 2 Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 5.7811 at p.

9-300.1 (1976) ; 4 id. § 13.24. Ball, ‘‘ Division into Hori-

zontal Strata of the Landspace Above the Surface,’’ 39

Yale L.J. 616 (1930). Cf. Eckert, ‘‘ Acquisition of De-

velopment Rights: A Modern Land Use Tool,’’ 23

U. Miami L. Rev. 347 (1969).*

While the Court of Appeals did not dispute that the

air rights above the Terminal constitute a valuable

property interest, it did develop a new theory of valu-

ing property, one wholly at odds with the Due Process

Clause. As noted in the Statement of the Case, supra,

pp. 7-8, the court below attempted to separate the

‘‘ingredient of property value’”’ created by the owner’s

efforts from the ‘‘ingredient”’ created by the ‘‘accu-

mulated indirect social and government investment in

the physical property, its functions, and its surround-

ings.’”’ (J.S.A. 1-2, 9) It referred to some undefined

(D.N.J. 1958) the government brought condemnation proceedings

to secure, inter alia, a ‘‘line of sight’’ easement on lands surround-

ing a proposed Nike missile base. This easement would require that

the owners substantially restrict their rights to develop the property

in question. Just compensation was awarded.

**The Court of Appeals ignored the fact that Penn Central’s

development of the air rights over its sunken railroad tracks made

Park Avenue ‘‘one of this nation’s most prestigious residential

communities,’’ 377 N.Y.S. 2d at 25 (J.S.A. 20).

As one treatise puts it,

“‘The practice of purchasing or leasing airspace or otherwise

acquiring rights in airspace is quite common in large urban

areas today.’’ Wright, The Law of Airspace 211 (1968).

See also 4 Nichols, supra, § 13.24; Machen, ‘‘Air Rights Develop-

ment,’’ 34 Appraisal J. 288 (1966) ; White, ‘‘George Washington

Bridge Approach: A Case Study,’’ 34 Appraisal J. 32 (1966) ;

Nelson, ‘‘ Appraisal of Air Rights,’’ 23 Appraisal J. 495 (1955).

17

(and in fact undefinable) ‘‘social complex in which

property rests,’’ (id. 2) as part of the basis for its con-

clusions.

The court below, not surprisingly, offered no prece-

dent for its novel.analysis. In fact, the theory under-

lying that analysis has repeatedly been rejected by this

Court, most recently in United States vy. Fuller, 409

U.S. 488 (1973). In that case, the principal issue was

the appropriate value to be paid as just compensation

for the taking of an owner’s fee interest in certain

grazing lands. The owner used those fee lands together

with public lands under revocable permit from the

United States. In his condemnation award, he sought

compensation for the value added to the fee lands

through their actual or potential use together with the

lands available under revocable permit from the gov-

ernment. This Court disallowed the claim for the

added value, and made the following statement, highly

important for purposes of the present case:

‘‘we believe that there is a significant difference

between the value added to property by a com-

pleted public works project, for which the Govern-

ment must pay, and the value added to fee lands

by a revocable permit authorizing the use of neigh-

boring lands that the Government owns. The Gov-

ernment may not demand that a jury be arbi-

trarily precluded from considering as an element

of value the proximity of a parcel to a post office

building, simply because the Government at one

time built the post office. Id. at 492-93. (emphasis

added)

In this case, therefore, Penn Central is entitled to the

full value of its Terminal air rights at the time of

taking no matter where in the ‘‘social complex’’ the

Terminal may be located, and no matter what other

18

members of society or the government may have done

or failed to do at some time in the past to enhance or

to decrease that value.”

The decision in United States v. Fuller, supra, is

consistent with several earlier decisions of this Court.

In United States v. Reynolds, 397 US. 14, 16-17

(1970), the majority opinion states that

‘‘the development of a public project may also

lead to enhancement in the market value of neigh-

boring land that is not covered by the re it-

self. And if that land is later th Ma , whether

for an extension of the existing project or for

some other public purpose, the general rule of just

compensation requires that such enhancement in

value be wholly taken into account... .”’ (empha-

sis added)

Accord, United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350

U.S. 222, 227 (1956) ; United States v. Miller, 317 U.S.

369, 376-77 (1943); Benenson v. United States, 548

F.2d 939, 212 Ct. Cl. —— (1977).

This Court’s opinions thus make it clear that ‘*prop-

erty”’ is not to be divided artificially into “‘social” and

“‘private’’ components in instances such as that in-

volved here. All private property could be subject to

the same analysis—to attempt to do so would be to

create a principle that could not be contained. Indeed

** This Court early on took a pragmatic view of the economies of

property valuation:

‘‘Neighborhood to the centres of business and population

largely affects values. For that property which is near the

centre of a large city may command high rent, while property

of the same character, r»mote therefrom, is wanted by but a

few, and commands but a small rental.’’ Monongahela Naviga-

tion Co. v. United States, supra, 148 U.S. at 328.

19

the court below conceded that the so-called public

and private contributions were ‘‘inseparably joint.

(J.S.A. 9) The analysis undertaken by the Court

below is applicable not only to Grand Central but also

to a private residence taken for a city park or a farm

taken for an interstate highway. If it were so ex-

tended, the Due Process Clause would be rendered in-

effectual as a restriction on government taking of pri-

vate property.”

Thus, while recognizing that the air rights over the

Terminal were property within the meaning of the

Due Process Clause, the Court of Appeals severely

limited the scope of the ‘“‘property”’ rights that it con-

sidered to be at issue. In so doing, the court laid part

of the foundation for its holding that there was no

‘‘taking’’ by operation of the Landmarks Law, and its

further holding that ‘‘just compensation”’ need not be

awarded to Penn Central. Because of the fundamen-

tally erroneous appreciation of the property rights at

stake, therefore, the court below should properly be re-

versed.

aa one example of the intractable problems that would

be Penrod nan ee analysis of the court below, is the —.

ing passage from its opinion: ‘*[w] ithout people Grand as

would never have been a successful railroad terminal .... . ; re

7) There is no doubt that this statement is correct. But can t —_

any exercise more pointless than endeavoring to value Gran Je _

tral without people? The distinction proposed by the court “oa

between ‘‘social’’ and private ingredients of property thus

precipitously to a complete reductio ad absurdum.

ed ’ ice Holmes warned in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.

rs... can “te natural tendency of human nature is to extend

the [police power] . . . more and more until at last private —o

disappears. But that cannot be accomplished in this way un

Constitution of the United States.’’ 260 U.S. at 415.

20

Il. PENN CENTRAL’S PROPERTY INTEREST IN DEVELOPING

THE AIR RIGHTS OVER THE TERMINAL WAS CLEARLY

“TAKEN” FOR CONSTITUTIONAL PURPOSES BY THE

OPERATION OF THE LANDMARES LAW.

The Court of Appeals asserted that the Landmarks

Law was an application of permissible government

regulation rather than use of the power of eminent

domain.” (J.S8.A. 1) Consistently with that conclusion,

the court also ruled that there was “‘no taking for

which just compensation must be paid.” (J.S.A. 5)

These conclusory holdings appear to rest on two prem-

ises. The first is that there is a compelling reason why

landmarks should be treated differently from other

forms of private property—“the cultural, architec-

tural, historical, or social significance attached to the

affected parcel.’’ (J.S.A. 6) Secondly, the court rea-

soned that as long as the landowner has prospects of

earning a reasonable return on such property as it

continues to own, the designation of some portion of

its property as a landmark, with consequent preclu-

sion of further development, does not constitute a

taking. These premises will be examined in turn.

A. There Is Nothing Unique About the Preservation of Landmarks

That Renders Constitutional Safeguards Less Applicable Than

in the Taking of Private Property for Other Governmental

Objectives.

However praiseworthy the desire to preserve his-

torically or culturally significant buildings, the merits

of that goal do not warrant treating such structures

** As this Court has previously stated,

**A claim that action is being taken under the police power of

the State cannot justify disregard of constitutional inhibi-

(1908), Panhandle Co. v. Highway Comm'n, 294 U.S. 613, 619

21

any differently from other forms of property in the

atau t canindiana rights.” Yet the Court of

Appeals based its decision in large measure on the

distinction between landmark preservation on the one

hand and government utilization of property for all

other purposes on the other. The court said explicitly

that its holding rested on ‘‘the limited purposes of a

landmarking statute.’ (J.S.A. 2-3)

The effect of the court’s ruling is to except the

Landmarks Law from long-standing Due Process

Clause analysis. As with many of the salient points in

its opinion, the court below offers no precedential sup-

port for its holding on this issue. At least one State

court has flatly rejected this exception in similar cir-

cumstances :

“Tt is laudable to attempt to preserve a land-

mark; however, it becomes unconscionable when

an unwilling private party is required to bear the

expense.”’ People v. Ramsey, 171 N.E. 2d 246, 247

(App. Ct. Ill. 1960).

This Court should also reject a separate constitutional

framework for the landmark statute challenged here.

It is plain that

“the Fifth Spores ® fg = pos

designed to bar Governmen m forcing |

people alone to bear _— burdens which, in all

fairness and justice, should be borne by the public

2° Mr. Justice Holmes provided the appropriate warning a half

century ago:

ig are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire

Me 4 the public condition is not enough to warrant

achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional

way of paying for the change.’’ Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.

Mahon, supra, 260 U.S. at 416.

ae

22

as a whole.’’ Armstrong v. United States, supra,

364 U.S. at 49.

This view was fully supported by scholars and jurists

writing at the time the Fifth Amendment was drafted.

See, e.g., Sax, ‘‘Takings and the Police Power,’’ 74

Yale L.J., 36, 54-60 (1964); Dunham, “A Legal and

Economic Basis for City Planning,’ 58 Colum. L.

Rev. 650, 665 (1958).

In any society, the costs of government will not be

distributed totally equally. In this country, however,

the right to just compensation when property is

taken ‘“‘prevents the public from loading upon one

individual more than his just share of the burdens of

government ... .” Monongahela Navigation Co. v.

United States, supra, 148 U.S. at 325; Nashville, C. &

St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 428-30 (1935).

The Due Process Clause thus embodies a “political

ethics,” United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332

(1949), that protects private property against even

the most popular measures of confiscation. Cormack,

“Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain,” 41

Yale L.J. 221, 224 (1931).

Acknowledging that it was creating a special prin-

ciple for landmarking statutes, the court below stated

flatly that ‘‘[t]his is not a zoning case.” (J.8.A. 4)

Similarly, the court also rejected an analogy to his-

toric-district regulation. (Id. 5) Referring to zoning,

but in terms equally applicable to historic-district

laws, the court said that “‘[z]Joning restrictions oper-

ate to advance a comprehensive community plan for

the common good. Each property owner in the zone

is both benefitted and restricted from exploitation

...? (Id. 4) In fact, “both an owner and his

23

neighbors benefit to some degree and in some manner

from zoning and historic districting.’”’ (Id. 5) Land-

mark ordinances, by contrast, ‘‘are not designed to

further a general community plan.’’ (Id.) Moreover,

in the case of landmark regulation, ‘‘the burden of

limitation is borne by a single owner.” (Id.) Thus, not

only does Penn Central bear the entire burden, it

receives no benefit whatever from preserving Grand

Central as a landmark.

The Court of Appeals thus convincingly and cor-

rectly distinguished this case from such prior deci-

sions of this Court as Villaye of Euclid v. Ambler

Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), and Goldblatt v.

Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). Indeed, as

the court below agreed, the only possible resemblance

the present case has to the law of zoning is to

‘‘ ‘discriminatory’ zoning restrictions, properly

condemned, affecting properties singled out in a

zoning district for more restrictive or more lib-

eral zoning limitations.” (J.S.A. 6) (emphasis

added )

How then is the Landmarks Law to be saved by the

court below from invalidity? Only by reference again

to the special purposes of a landmarking law. (id. 6)

As just discussed, however, that fact alone cannot jus-

tify ignoring the requirement that a taking of private

property be accompanied by just compensation to the

property owner.

24

B. The Anticipated Economic Return to Penn Central from the

Terminal and Other Nearby Buildings Is Immaterial in Decid-

ing Whether or Not There Has Been a Taking of Its Terminal

Air Rights by Operation of the Landmarks Law.

The Court of Appeals held that there was no taking

in the present case because “[i]t is enough . . . that

the privately created ingredient of property receive

a reasonable return.” (J.S.A. 2-3) The court went on

to say that the Terminal

“rgay be capable of producing a reasonable return

for its owners even if it can never operate at a

profit.” (Id. 9) : e

Because Penn Central had failed to prove that the

Landmarks Law “eliminates all reasonable return” on

the Terminal and other nearby buildings owned by

Penn Central, the court held that the Law did not

violate the Constitution. (Id. 13-14) ™

The court’s analysis is replete with erroneous legal

principles. The first is the very concept of ‘‘reason-

able return.’’ That return is to be provided, under the

court’s view, only for the ‘‘privately created’’ ingre-

dient of the Terminal’s value. Yet the Court of Ap-

peals itself recognized that the so-called ‘‘publie’”’ and

“‘private’’ contributions to the Terminal were ‘‘insep-

arably joint.”” (Id. 9) See pp. 16-19, supra. The method

by which these “inseparable” elements are to be sepa-

rated is not provided by the court. Moreover, the court

agreed that the idea of “reasonable return” was “elu-

sive,” “incapable of easy definition” and involved an

"In this Court, the City of New York’s Motion to Dismiss Penn

Central 8 appeal rested in large measure on the issue of the profit-

ability of the Terminal and the sufficiency of the proof offered below.

See Motion to Dismiss 22-28.

25

“obvious”? and “inevitable circularity of reasoning.”

(J.S.A. 6)

The evidentiary obstacles inherent in the Court of

Appeals’ standard would be virtually impossible to

surmount. The speculative nature of the proofs to be

offered guarantees that proceedings under the court’s

standards will be protracted and burdensome.” Yet

the Court of Appeals provides no guidelines for fu-

ture litigants. By its own admissions, therefore, the

court below conceded that the standard it proposed

can never be sufficiently concrete for Due Process

Clause purposes. To borrow a phrase from First

Amendment case law, the ‘‘reasonable return” stand-

ard is surely “void for vagueness.’’

More importantly, the concept of reasonable return

on remaining properties is simply not sanctioned by

any prior decision of this Court. In other cases where

property rights were taken, compensation has been

required whether or not any remaining property in-

terest could still earn a reasonable return. For exam-

ple, in United States v. Causby, supra, the property

owner’s chicken-raising business was all but de-

stroyed by the taking of a flight-path easement near

his farm. The Court held that such action constituted

a taking, notwithstanding that “{s]ome value would

remain”:

“The path of glide for airplames might reduce a

valuable factory site to grazing land, an orchard

*? The court below held, for instance, that ‘‘the Terminal acts, in

effect, as a magnet for Penn Central’s other, more profitable, enter-

prises.’’ (J.S.A. 10) Proving that the Terminal is not a ‘‘magnet,’’

as the court below would require Penn Central to do, is (like at-

—— to prove any negative contention) virtually impossible

to

26

to a vegetable patch, a residential section to a

wheat field .... But the use of the airspace im-

mediately above the land would limit the utility

of the land and cause a diminution in its value.”

328 U.S. at 262 (emphasis added).

See also Griggs v. Allegheny County, supra; Ports-

mouth Co. v. United States, supra. This Court did not

consider whether Mr. Causby could still earn a “rea-

sonable return” by using his land as a vegetable patch.

In any event, in the present case, Penn Central re-

ceives no return from the unutilized air rights; that

ean hardly be deemed a reasonable return under any

circumstances.

This point can be demonstrated further by a simple

illustration. Imagizie a property owner, half of whose

land is devoted to farming, and half to cattle grazing.

Imagine further that the government expropriates the

grazing land for a public use, and the owner seeks to

receive just compensation for it. He is met by the gov-

ernment’s argument that no compensation need be

awarded because the owner is making a ‘‘reasonable

return” on his farm land. Under the rationale of the

court below, the government’s argument would pre-

vail. Similarly, if the City of New York had con-

demned for public use one of Penn Central’s other

buildings near the Terminal, the Court of Appeals’

ruling would dictate that Penn Central would be en-

titled to no compensation unless it could prove that

its remaining buildings could not earn a reasonable

return. No decision of this Court supports such a

result.

Quite to the contrary, United States v. Fuller,

supra, also demonstrates the error of the Court of Ap-

27

peals’ reasoning in this respect. In Fuller, the govern-

ment condemned 920 of 1,280 acres held in fee by the

owner and used for grazing purposes. 409 U.S. at 488-

89. Following the logic of the court below, the proper

inquiry by this Court should have been whether the

owner could have earned a “reasonable return” on the

remaining 360 acres. Obviously, no such exercise was

undertaken, nor was one required under the Due

Process Clause. The court below has once again sim-

ply developed its own unique and unprecedented

theories ‘‘for the limited purposes of a landmarking

statute.” (J.S.A. 2-3) ™

What is in fact at stake here is the property ac-

tually taken—Penn Central’s air rights over the Ter-

minal. The property left to Penn Central and the re-

turn on that property are immaterial in any consider-

ation of the loss of the air rights. It bears stressing

again that these rights are not a mere potential utili-

** It makes no constitutional difference that the present case con-

cerns several rights in the same piece of land while United States

v. Fuller, supra, involved one right in several ‘‘pieces’’ (acres) of

land. As previously discussed, ‘‘property’’ consists of a ‘‘ bundle of

rights,’’ whether considered as the range of possibilities for use or

the geographic extent of the territory involved. The Supreme Judi-

cial Court of New Hampshire long ago recognized this common-

sense view of ‘‘taking’’:

‘*(rjestricting A’s unlimited right of using one hundred acres

of land to a limited right of using the same land, may work a

far greater injury to A than to take from him the title in fee

simple to one acre, leaving him the unrestricted right of using

oo canes ree, Se pen ae

transaction would constitute a ‘ ave Why not

— Eaton v. Boston, C. & t9 H 512

In Eaton, the court held that the property owner was entitled to

recover for damages his land sustained during a freshet because of

various pieces of construction by the defendant railroad.

.

28

zation of the existing property. They are vested prop-

erty rights in and of themselves, that, as the next

subsection shows, the operation of the Landmarks

Law has extinguished.

The concept of a “reasonable return” has an ap-

pealing ring. It may properly have a useful role in

public-utility ratemaking and similar matters where

an ongoing business is subject to reasonable govern-

mental regulations. But it has nothing whatever to do

with cases under the Due Process Clause where an

owner’s property is appropriated by the government,

and it should be rejected by this Court.

C. The Court Below Erred in Holding That the Operation of the

Landmarks Law Did Not “Take” Property from the Penn

Central.

By rejecting the two premises on which the Court

of Appeals rested its conclusion that there was no

**taking’’ in the present case (1.e., a special constitu-

tional standard for landmarks and the return on re-

maining properties), it becomes clear that the opera-

tion of the Landmarks Law did in fact amount to a

taking for Due Process Clause purposes. Penn Cen-

tral’s air rights above the Terminal, within applicable

zoning regulations, were as completely extinguished

by the Landmarks Commission as if an existing tower

had been destroyed by a City demolition crew.

Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for this Court in

United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947),

elucidated the constitutional standard for deciding

when a “taking” occurs:

“Property is taken in the constitutional sense

when inroads are made upon an owner’s use of

29

it to an extent that, as between private parties, a

servitude has been acquired either by agreement

or in course of time.”’

See also Armstrong v. United States, supra, 364 U.S.

at 46; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra, 260

U.S. at 414; 2 Nichols, supra, § 6.3 at p. 6-65."

The Landmarks Commission’s actions did impose a

“‘servitude’’ on Penn Central’s property, and in a dra-

matic fashion. Penn Central is now absolutely barred

from utilizing the air rights above the Terminal to

construct the office tower UGP had agreed to build,

operate, and lease. These actions by the City constitute

a ‘‘taking’’ even though the City of New York has not

formally had title to the property transferred to it.

United States v. Causby, supra; United States v.

Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917); United States v. Lynah,

188 U.S. 445, 470 (1903) (‘‘While the government does

not directly proceed to appropriate the title, yet it takes

away the use and value; when that is done it is of little

consequence in whom the fee is vested.’’); United

States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U.S. 645, 656-69

(1884) ; 2 Nichols, supra, § 6.1[1], at p. 6-8.% Nor does

** The Supreme Court of Oregon recently held that

‘‘(t]he proper test to determine whether there has been a

compensable invasion of the individual’s property rights . . .

is whether the interference with use and enjoyment is suffi-

ciently direct, sufficiently peculiar, and of sufficient magnitude

to support a conclusion that the interference has reduced the

fair market value of the plaintiff’s land by a sum certain in

money. If so, justice as between the state and the citizen

requires the burden imposed to be borne by the public and not

by the individual alone.’’ Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 415

P.2d 750, 752 (Ore. 1966).

*5 As one commentator put it

‘*Tt]he obligation to pay compensation is not to be escaped by

simply declining to acquire title.’’ Michelman, ‘‘Property,

30

it matter that the City has not itself physically occu-

pied the air space in question. United States v. Causby,

supra, 328 U.S. at 264-65; United States v. General

Motors Corp., supra, 323 U.S. at 378 (“the deprivation

of the former owner . . . constitutes the taking.”) ;

Berger, “A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem,”’

49 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 165, 171 (1974) ; Michelman, supra,

80 Harv. L. Rev. at 1228. To reach a different result—

to hold that no taking had occurred—would allow gov-

ernment to achieve by indirection what it is forbidden

to do overtly. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall.

(80 U.S.) 166, 177-79 (1871).*

Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations

of ‘Just Compensation’ Law,’’ 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1186

(1967).

Professor Michelman goes on to point out that what the just-

compensation requirement protects against is the

‘‘eapacity of some collective actions to imply that someone may

be subjected to immediately disadvantageous or painful treat-

ment for no other apparent reason, and in accordance with no

other apparent principle than that someone else’s claim to

satisfaction has n ranked as intrinsically superior to his

own.’’ Id. at 1225.

Here, preserving the cultural significance of Grand Central was

deemed by the Landmarks Commission to be ‘‘intrinsically su-

perior’’ to the Penn Central’s desire to utilize its air rights. In

such circumstances, designating Grand Central as a landmark

constitutes a taking.

*° Professor Ackerman, noting several of the ways that the gov-

ernment can obtain control over land, has observed :

**[a]ll that is required is that a state representative effectively

assume the owner’s right to control the use of the property.’’

on Private Property and the Constitution, 242 n.26

The operation of the Landmarks Law has in fact put a ‘‘state rep-

resentative’’—the Landmarks Commission—in effective control of

the air space over Grand Central.

31

United States v. Cress, supra, provides a good illus-

tration of this Court’s practical response to takings in-

volving less than the full fee interest. In Cress, the

owner’s land was subject to periodic floodings because

of a government-built lock and dam. The trial court

found that these periodic floodings reduced the value

of the lands by one half. 243 U.S. at 318. In this Court,

the government argued that such a reduction of value

did not constitute a ‘“‘taking’’ for which the United

States was liable. This Court rejected that argument,

holding that a taking had occurred. It noted, in affirm-

ing the damages award of the trial court, that

‘*Tijf any substantial enjoyment of the land still

remains to the owner, it may be treated as a partial

instead of a total divesting of his property in the

land.’’ 243 U.S. at 328.

Much the same pattern occurred here. Penn Central

was permanently divested of its valuable air rights.

That act by the City constitutes a taking even though

the railroad Terminal remains.

Likewise, in Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78 (1911),

the private owner of land within the boundaries of

Yosemite National Park brought an action against the

Park Superintendent, who had prevented the owner

from grazing his cattle on the land in question. The

owner challenged the Department of the Interior regu-

lations under which the Superintendent allegedly

acted, and this Court declared them invalid. Noting that

the owner’s right ‘‘to pasture his cattle upon his land”’

was “the very essence of his proprietorship,”’ this

Court held that

‘‘Tt]o take it away is practically to take his prop-

erty away, and to do that is beyond the power even

32

of sovereignty, except by proper proceedings to

that end.” ‘at 86

Thus a practical restriction of a property owner’s right

is a taking for which just compensation is owed. See

also Raton v. Boston, C. & M. R.R., supra, 51 N.H, at

511-12; Benenson v. United States, supra.

The government of the City has undeniably decided

that by declaring the Terminal a landmark, it has con-

ferred benefits on the citizens of New York. (J.A. 66-

67) As the Court of Appeals said, ‘‘Grand Central Ter-

minal is no ordinary landmark’’; indeed, it rests ‘‘in

the greatest megalopolis of the western hemisphere.”’

(J.S.A. 7) Preventing alteration of the Terminal saves

part of New York’s ‘‘glorious past’’ and prevents

‘mortgaging its hopes for the future.’’ (Jd. 14) Grand

Central is frozen for the benefit of New Yorkers and

visitors to the City, and Penn Central pays the costs.

Such an enhancement of the government’s resource

position at the expense of private landholders is plainly

a “‘taking’’ for Due Process Clause purposes.” Van

** Professor Ernst Freund found the distinction between a com-

pensable taking and a noncompensable exercise of the police power

to be

‘‘that the state takes property by eminent domain because it

is useful to the public, and under the police power because

it is harmful .. . . From this results the difference between

the power of eminent domain and the police power, that the

former recognizes a right to compensation, while the latter on

principle does not.’’ Freund, The Police Power 546-47 (1904),

Obviously in the present case New York precluded alteration of

Grand Central because it believed that so doing would be ‘‘ useful

to the public,’’ That is a political decision, and one that New York

might properly make, but, under Professor Freund's test, imple-

menting that decision represents a taking for which just compensa-

tion must be paid, See Michelman, supra, 80 Harv, L. Rev, at 1196.

33

Alstyne, ‘‘Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The

Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria,”’ 44 So.

Cal, L. Rev. 1, 23-26 (1970) ; Note, ‘‘ Landmark Preser-

vation Laws: Compensation for Temporary Taking,”’

35 U. Chi. L, Rev, 362 (1968) ; Sax, supra, 74 Yale L. J.

at 61-67, Cf, Aronson v. Town of Sharon, 195 N.B.2d

341 (Mass. 1964) (large-lot zoning ordinance designed

to encourage leaving land in its natural state for recre-

ational purposes, and that provided no compensation

to property owners, held unconstitutional).

Ill PENN CENTRAL IS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE JUST COMPEN-

SATION FOR THE TAKING OF ITS AIR RIGHTS ABOVE

GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL.

Penn Central has demonstrated that its property

was in fact taken as a result of the City’s application

of the Landmarks Law to Grand Central Terminal.

By now, it is axiomatic that when government takes

private property for public use, it must pay full and

just compensation for the taking to be constitutional.

E.g., United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114,

117 (1951); United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S, 445, 465

(1903) ; Monongahela Navigation Co, v. United States,

supra, 148 U.S. at 336. The court below concluded, how-

ever, that even if there were a taking of Penn Central's

air rights by operation of the Landmarks Law, it was

not entitled to receive ‘‘the ‘just’ compensation required

in eminent domain. ...’’ (J.S.A. 12)

1201; Dunham, ‘‘ Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty

ay 4 Supreme Court Expropriation Law,’’ 1962 Sup, Ct. Rev.

34

A. There Is No Constitutional Basis for Awarding Penn Central

Anything Less Than Just Compensation.

In sustaining the Landmarks Law’s application to

Grand Central Terminal, the Court of Appeals asserted

that Penn Central had not been ‘‘wholly deprived’”’ of

its development rights over the Terminal, but rather

“Tt]hose rights have been made transferable to other

parcels of land in the vicinity .. .’’ of Grand Central.

(J.S.A. 11) However, the court did not even suggest,

much less determine, that the TDRs provided Penn

Central with just compensation for the taking it had

suffered. On the contrary, the court expressly conceded

that transferable ‘‘[d]evelopment rights . . . may not

be equivalent in value to development rights on the

original site.” (J.8.A. 12) In other words, the court

recognized that the TDRs do not afford Penn Central

the full and just compensation required by the Con-

stitution.

To avoid a ruling of unconstitutionality, the Court

of Appeals returned once more to its untenable asser-

tion (see pp. 28-33, supra) that there has been no taking

of Penn Central’s property. For this reason, the court

claimed, the compensation provided Penn Central

‘‘need not be the ‘just’ compensation required in emi-

nent domain... .’’ (J.S.A. 12) Instead, the court

deemed the TDRs sufficient here simply because they

provide “significant, perhaps ‘fair’, compensation for

the loss of rights above the Terminal itself.’’ (J.S.A.

13-14) This holding eliminates any doubt that the

Court of Appeals recognized the TDRs could satisfy

only some lesser standard than ‘‘just’’ compensation,

namely, ‘‘fair’’ compensation.

To be sure, both the words ‘‘just’’ and ‘‘fair’’ have

equitable roots, but it is clear from the decision below

35

that the Court of Appeals was not using the terms

synonymously.” It so indicated by its citation to an

article by the leading TDR theorist. Costonis, ‘‘ ‘Fair’

Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Anti-

dotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Contro-

versies,’’ 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1021 (1975). See J.S.A.

11-12. Professor Costonis states straightforwardly that

his theory of ‘‘fair’’ compensation is a standard “‘ [less

demanding than just compensation.’’ 75 Colum. L. Rev.

at 1022 (emphasis added).

In resorting to a lesser standard than ‘‘just’’ com-

pensation, the Court of Appeals apparently was again

relying on ‘‘the limited purposes of a landmarking

statute’ (J.S.A. 2-3) to avoid the constitutional im-

peratives of the Due Process Clause, Under whatever

guise, however, the rationale of the court below is in-

adequate. If property is taken by the government, just

compensation must be paid or the taking cannot con-

stitutionally be permitted. Since the Court of Appeals

conceded that just compensation was not awarded to

Penn Central here, a concession required by the record

(J.A, 31-32, 40-49, 52-60), the application of the Land-

marks Law to Grand Central Terminal should be de-

clared unconstitutional. Any other result would open a

wide breach in the protections afforded by the Due

Process Clause, and deprive property owners of the

assurance that their assets will not be expropriated

capriciously. Whatever the supposed merit of the po-

litical or economic reasons for creating such a breach,

the Constitution does not permit it.”

The court below also characterized the TDRs as ‘‘reasonable

compensation.’’ (J.S.A, 12) What is said in the text about ‘‘fair’’

compensation applies to the ‘‘reasonable’’ characterization as well.

* The explanation of the Court of Appeals’ decision may lie

largely in the well-publicized financial condition of New York City.

This Court has repeatedly stressed that the deter-

mination of just compensation for particular property

is a ‘judicial function,’’ and ‘‘no power exists in any

other department of the Government to declare what

the compensation shall be or to prescribe any binding

rule in that regard.’’ United States v. New River Col-

lieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 343-44 (1923). Accord, United

States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121,

124 (1950); Monongahela Navigation Co. Vv. United

States, supra, 148 U.S. at 327. The need for judicial

determination of ‘just’? compensation is, of course, a

result of the basic principle that ‘‘[i]t is emphatically

the province and duty of the judicial department to say

After concluding that the Landmarks Law was constitutional as

applied to the Grand Central Terminal, the court observed :

‘In times of easy affluence, preservation of historic landmarks

through use of the eminent domain power might be desirable,

or even wn ag But when a less expensive alternative is avail-

able, especially when a city is in financial distress, it should not

be forced to choose between witnessing the demolition of its

eee past and mortgaging its hopes for the future.’’ (J S.A.

Neither affluence nor penury, however, determines the reach of basic

constitutional guarantees.

To whatever extent, therefore, New York City’s financial condi-

tion may have influenced the drafters of the Landmarks Law or the

court below, the objective of such legislation may not be accom-

plished through unconstitutional means, Pumpelly v, Green Bay

Co., supra, 80 U.S, (13 Wall.) at 177-78; United States v, Gettys-

burg Electric Ry., supra, 160 U.S. at 680; Pennsylvania Coal Co.

v. Mahon, supra, 260 U.S, at 415, The City’s financial embarrass.

ment, regrettable as it may be, does not warrant the subversion of

constitutional protections.

37

what the law is.’’ Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1

Cranch) 137, 176 (1803),

In its role as constitutional arbiter, this Court has

laid down a variety of requirements with regard to

‘*just” compensation. Most fundamentally, this Court

has made clear that ‘‘just’’ compensation requires that

the owner of taken property receive as compensation

an amount equal to whatever is determined to be the

property’s value. See, e.g., Danforth v. United States,

308 U.S. 271, 283 (1939); Olson v. United States, 292

U.S. 246, 255 (1934) ; Monongahela Navigation Co. v.

United States, supra, 148 U.S. at 312. In the present

case, there should be no difficulty in ascertaining such

value. It has already been recognized in the agreement

between Penn Central and UGP. Almota Farmers Ele-

vator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470,

474 (1973). UGP and Penn Central agreed in 1968 upon

the terms of a lease by which construction and opera-

tion of the office building would be undertaken, and

that provides the best evidence of the value of the

Terminal air rights. No party to this litigation has ever

disputed that this agreement was reached after arms-

length bargaining, or that the lease price is reasonable.

In many instances where this Court has been faced

with questions of valuation, owners have claimed com-

pensation for uses to which their property might be

put, but which they had not yet been able to effect. This

Court recognized that in such instances the proposed

use had to be taken into account for valuation pur-

poses.” Moreover, in the present case, there is no need

* United States v. Fuller, supra, 409 U.S, at 490; U

v. Virginia Electric Co., supra, 365 U.S, at 630; Metendlon _

United States, 298 U.S, 342, 345 (1936); Olson v. United States,

supra, 292 U.S. at 255; Boom Co, v. Patterson, 8 Otto (98 U.S.) 403,

408 (1878) ; United States v. Causby, supra, 328 U.S, at 261.

to hypothesize about the feasibility of the project.

UGP and Penn Central had agreed to go forward with

utilizing the air rights, and only the Landmarks Law

stood in their way.

A further requirement laid down by this Court is

that ‘‘there must be at the time of the taking ‘reason~

able, certain and adequate provision for obtaining

compensation.’ ’’ Regional Rail Reorganization Act

Cases, 419 U.S, 102, 124-25 (1974), quoting from Cher-

okee Nation v. Southern Kansas R.R., 135 U.S. 641,

659 (1890). The only provision made for compensa-

tion in the Landmarks Law is in the form of the TDRs.

This Court has effectively made clear that for such non-

monetary benefits as the TDRs to constitute ** ‘reason-

able, certain and adequate’ ’’ constitutional compensa-

tion, their value must at least be “capable of present

estimate and reasonable computation.’’ Bauman Vv.

Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 584 (1897).

The TDRs simply cannot satisfy these constitutional

requirements to provide Penn Central just compensa-

tion for the taking it has suffered. The Court of Ap-

peals itself conceded that the value of the TDRs, if any,

was highly speculative and uncertain. It discussed at

length the ‘‘many defects’’ of the TDR program, not-

ing that the geographic area in which transfers are

permitted is ‘‘severely limited,’ and that ‘complex

procedures are required to obtain a transfer permit.”

(J.8.A. 11) The court’s analysis accorded with its de-

cision in an earlier case, where it described the TDRs

" See also Boom Co. v. Patterson, supra, 8 Otto (98 U.S.) at 408;

McCandless v, United States, supra, 298 U.S, at 345-46; Mononga-

hela Navigation Co. v. United States, supra, 148 U.S, at 328-29.

39

as having an ‘‘uncertain and contingent market value”’

that ‘‘did not adequately preserve’’ the value of the

rights taken by the Landmarks Law. Fred F. French

Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y. 2d 587, 591,

385 N.Y.S. 2d 5, 7, appeal dism’d, 429 U.S. 990 (1976).

Indeed, even those who are proponents of TDRs as

a device to preserve landmarks have severely criticized

the New York ordinance. Costonis, ‘‘The Chicago Plan:

Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Urban Land-

marks,”’ 85 Harv. L. Rev. 574, 586-89 (1972). Those

criticisms are worth examining in detail.

First, the applicable New York zoning regulations

already permit the transfer of development rights to

‘contiguous parcels’’ of land. Id. at 586.*% The TDRs

afforded landmark owners such as Penn Central merely

permit transfers to lots across the street from the land-

mark, or to “‘lots within a chain of common ownership

extending to the landmark lot.’’ Marcus, supra, 24 Buff.

L. Rev. at 92. It is apparent, therefore, that the TDRs

represent only a very marginal increment of flexibility

over what is available to any other real property own-

ers in the City. See, pp. 7-8, n. 8, supra. It certainly is

open to serious question whether the value of this mar-

ginal increment of flexibility is susceptible of ‘‘reason-

able computation”; and, in any event, any de minimis

additional value that is measurable can hardly suffice to

satisfy the constitutional requirement of just compen-

sation in the present case, where Penn Central has been

completely deprived of its air rights over Grand Cen-

tral Terminal itself.

* ‘Contiguous parcels’’ are viewed as one ‘‘lot’’ for zoning pur-

poses, and hence an owner could develep his single lot as he chose—

spreading the bulk of his building evenly over the lot or concen-

trating it on part of the parcel.

40

Moreover, even if the TDRs available to landmark

owners can be assumed to represent a significantly

greater amount of transferability than that available

to other property owners, the market for landmark

TDRs is extremely confined. There can hardly be a

sufficient market demand for the TDRs that would per-

mit Penn Central to receive the full compensation to

which it is entitled for loss of development rights over

the Terminal. Indeed, the Court of Appeals concedes

that the only effective way for Penn Central to use its

TDRs is to demolish such existing structures as the

Biltmore Hotel, and to build even larger office towers

in their places. (J.S.A. 11; compare J.S. 31-32, 40-49 )

By so confining the available uses of the TDRs, New

York has—as one commentator observed—further con-

tributed to rendering ‘“‘virtually worthless’’ these so-

called ‘“‘rights.”’ * Note, ‘‘The Unconstitutionality of

Transferable Development Rights,’’ 84 Yale L. J.1101,

1109 (1975).

Second, the administrative procedures which a land-

mark owner is required to follow to transfer the de-

83 By contrast, the Chicago plan for landmark preservation creates

a ‘‘transfer district’? in the downtown area of Chicago that sub-

stantially enlarges the available market within which TDRs can be

sold. Costonis, ‘‘Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory

Essay,’’ 83 Yale L. J. 75, 86-91 (1973) ; 2A Nichols, supra, § 7.519

[2] {b] at p. 7-248.19. By eliminating the ‘‘adjacency’’ requirement

of the New York Landmarks Law, the Chicago Plan is intended,

unlike the New York program, ‘‘to compensate the landmark owner

for the actual losses he suffers.’’ Costonis, supra, 85 Harv. L, Rev.

at 591.

Penn Central does not assert here that the Chicago Plan neces-

sarily satisfies the Due Process Clause requirement of just compen-

sation. The contrast between the New York and Chicago programs,

however, does graphically illustrate how seriously deficient the New

York scheme is.

41

velopment rights are truly ‘‘labyrinthine.’’ Costonis,

supra, 85 Harv. L. Rev. at 587. When the owner finds a

prospective buyer for some or all of its TDRs, the

owner must first obtain the permission of the Land-

marks Commission to make the transfer. The Commis-

sion, in its discretion, must decide whether the struc-

ture embodying the transferred rights will be ‘‘com-

patible’’ with the landmark. Then, the owner and the

potential transferee must secure the approbation of

the Planning Commission of the City of New York,

which may withhold approval for almost any number

of reasons within its almost totally discretionary judg-

ment. The prior decision of the Landmarks Commis-

sion will be considered, but it is not cogtrolling.

Finally, the New York Board of Estimate Must also

approve; again, its action is entirely discretionary. 2A

Nichols, supra, § 7.519[2] at pp. 7-248. 9-10 & n.45.

(J.A. 38-40) As a matter of common sense, it is clear

that following this tortuous path will take years of

effort, expense and travail. As Professor Costonis

aptly observes,

“(t]he maze of discretionary approvals based upon

vague aesthetic, planning and urban design cri-

teria are hardly calculated to attract the voluntary

participation of developers and landmarks own-

ers.’’ Costonis, supra, 85 Harv. L. Rev. at 587.

Thus, even if a prospective purchaser for the TDRs

could be found, fruition of the transaction must await

the unknowable decisions of political decisionmakers.

Clearly, such a procedure precludes any determination

here that there existed at the time of the taking the

‘* ‘reasonable, certain and adequate provision for ob-

taining compensation,’ ’’ required by Bawman v. Ross,

supra, 167 U.S. at 584. Nor does the present procedure

42

meet the requirement of promptness of Crozier v.

Krupp, 224 U.S. 290, 306 (1912) ; cf., Eubank v. Rich-

‘mond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912).

Third, and finally, it is Penn Central that must bear

the risk of realizing any value through the transfer

of development rights. Placing the burden of obtain-

ing ‘‘just compensation’’ on the property owner does

not satisfy the guarantee of the Due Process Clause.

When the government takes property, it is the govern-

ment that must assure payment of the compensation

owed; otherwise, ultimate receipt of compensation by

the owner would not be ‘‘certain,’’ as it plainly must

be.* As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

said in Parks v. Boston, ‘‘the true rule of justice”’ is

‘‘to pay the compensation with one hand, whilst [the

government] apply the axe with the other... .” 15

Pick. (32 Mass.) 198, 208 (1834).

In sum, as the court below effectively acknowledged,

the inadequacies of the TDRs are so great that they

* Once again, there are alternatives to forcing on the owner the

difficult task of marketing the TDRs. One such alternative would

involve a ‘‘development rights bank’’ :

‘‘fi]m such a system the landmark owner is compensated in

eash for the taking, and the city bears the burden of recouping

the cost of the landmark preservation program by selling the

development rights directly to developers.’’ Note, 84 Yale L.J.,

supra at 1113.

A development rights bank would thus ensure just compensation to

the property owner at the time of taking, the time compensation is

generally due. See, e.g., Bauman v. Ross, supra, 167 U.S. at 598.

Moreover, if the TDRs are in fact equivalent to the value of the

development rights taken from the owner, the City of New York

should have no trouble marketing them. Use of a development rights

bank, therefore, would mean equitable treatment for the property

owner and no extra burden for the City. By contrast, New York’s

TDR system imposes all of the hardships on the property owner.

43

simply cannot satisfy New York City’s constitutional

obligation to pay ‘‘just’’ compensation for the taking

of Penn Central’s property. In a phrase familiar to the

drafters of the Fifth Amendment, the TDRs are ‘‘not

worth a continental.’’ They are not in any manner

‘‘capable of present estimate and reasonable computa-

tion.’’ Bauman v. Ross, supra, 167 U.S. at 584. If any-

thing, they appear, as a practical matter, almost totally

worthless. Accordingly, Penn Central has not received

the just compensation required in order for the Land-

marks Law’s application to Grand Central Terminal

to be constitutional, and such application, therefore,

cannot be sustained.

C. Just Compensation Remains Tc Be Determined For the Taking

That Has Occurred.

It is not necessary for this Court to engage in any

estimation or computation of the appropriate level of

compensation to which Penn Central is entitled for the

taking of its air rights.” Because the decision below

rested on erroneous constitutional principles, no at-

tempt at valuation was made. It would, therefore, be

appropriate here to remand the present case to the

state courts of New York for calculation of the just

compensation owed to Penn Central.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse

the decision of the Court of Appeals of New York,

** One commentator has estimated that, as of 1975, the damages

“‘could run upwards of $15 million.’’ Costonis, supra, 75 Colum. L.

Rev. at 1076 n.229. As noted in the text, however, the present record

oo not contain sufficient evidence to make the necessary caleu-

tion.

44

declare the application of the Landmarks Law to the

Grand Central Terminal to have been unconstitutional

in violation of the Due Process Clause, and remand

this case for determination of the appropriate amount

of just compensation to be provided to Penn Central.

Respectfully submitted,

DaNIeEL M. GrIBBON

JOHN R. BoLton

CovINGTON & BURLING

888 Sixteenth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 452-6118

CarL HELMETAG, JR.

F. W. Rover

Suite 3100 IVB Building

1700 Market Street

Philadelphia, Pa. 19103

(215) 972-3053

Attorneys for Appellants

January, 1978

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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