Opposition — Tiger International, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board
Supreme Court brief1977
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In the Supreme Court of the mae as na B
OCTOBER TERM, 1977
TIGER INTERNATIONAL, INC. and THE FLYING
TIGER LINE INC., PETITIONERS
Vv.
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
IN OPPOSITION
WADE H. McCREE, JR.,
Solicitor General,
JoHN H. SHENEFIELD,
Assistant Attorney General,
JAMES C. SCHULTZ, JOHN J. POWERS, III,
General Counsel, FREDERIC FREILICHER,
Attorneys
Gary J. EDLES .
. Department of Justice,
Deputy General Counsel, Washington, D.C. 20530.
GLEN M. BENDIXSEN,
Associate General Counsel,
THOMAS L. Ray,
Attorney,
Civil Aeronautics Board,
Washington, D.C. 20428.
a
Page
ae 1
Jurisdiction ___. RAEN RO Oe OOS Re Te OM Ee 1
Questions presented 2
TTT AAPA 2
patent ‘ csteitdlaanihltiieilodaeibaaien 2
FEE Perens 7
Conclusion ‘ 18
I siesta. ensciecamartguaenesinieeinat la
ERE SUN ee aa eee ae ve lla
CITATIONS
Cases:
Air Carrier Reorganization Investigation,
CAB Orders 75-10-65/66 (October 17,
1975) and 75-1-121 (January 30,
a EE aS EES 5. 6
Associated Industries of New York State,
Inc. v. United States Department of
Labor, 487 F.2d 342 —.................. 15
Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-
Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S.
Sgt ot RD San _ 15, 16
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S.99 ss 8, 10
Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 - ——_
Dan-Air Services, Ltd. v. Civil Aeronau-
tics Board, 475 F.2d 408 - 9
Federal Power Commission v. Colorado In
terstate Gas Co., 348 U.S. 492 S
II
. II
Cases—Continued | Page Statutes—Continued —_—
"a ioe wimventen™ Section 1006(a), 49 US.C. 1486(a). 2,6
pany nion Department, AF L-CIO - Section 1006(e), 49 U.S.C. 1486(e) 12, 16
Island Airlines, Incorporated v. Civil IIIT <iivrnciccibictes Schctsednbcieuiindechigieamaines 13
Aeronautics Board, 363 F.2d 120 - 15 REARS ee eee al 3
Law Motor Freight, Inc. v. Civil Aeronau- Be TIT isiessstinceeniasccirnotensehactianelaternabehcses 9
tics Board, 364 F.2d 139, certiorari
denied, 387 U.S. 905 _......... 16
Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184... s- 9, 10
Morris v. Gressette, No. 75-1583, decided
hance ecescsnrncresiniosig 10
Nebraska Department of Aeronautics v.
Civil Aeronautics Board, 298 F.2d 286 16
Pillai v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 485 F.2d
IIE acl ctcesiinediedindelaiatla slide Sia cieikcacesnsasbcssitaien a 16
Statutes :
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
551 et seq.:
5 U.S.C. 556 PoE ORR 12
5 U.S.C. 557 _ Dadietscte 12
5 U.S.C. 706(2) (A) - 12
5 U.S.C. 706(2)(E) .... ... 12
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat.
731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. 1301 et seq. 2
Section 401(h), 49 U.S.C. 1371(h) 3
Section 408(a), 49 U.S.C. 1378(a) 2
Section 408(a)(5), 49 U.S.C. 1378
(a) (5) | 3
Section 408(b), 49 U. S. C. 1378(b) 13
Section 1005(f), 49 U.S.C. 1485(f) 12,16
Iu the Suprene Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1977
No. 77-256
TIGER INTERNATIONAL, INC. and THE FLYING
TIGER LINE INC., PETITIONERS
Vv.
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. A)
is reported at 554 F.2d 926. Civil Aeronautics Board
Order 70-6-119 is reported at 54 CAB 700. Board
Orders 73-12-106 and 75-2-1 (App. A and B, infra,
pp. la-22a) are not yet officially reported.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered
on May 18, 1977. The petition for a writ of certio-
rari was filed on August 15, 1977. The jurisdiction
of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
(1)
2
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the court of appeals correctly held un-
timely, under the 60-day limitation period for seeking
direct review of orders of the Civil Aeronautics Board
(49 U.S.C. 1486(a)), petitioners’ 1975 challenge to
a 1970 Board order.
2. Whether the court of appeals correctly applied
the “arbitrary or capricious” standard of review, in-
stead of the “substantial evidence” standard, to orders
of the Civil Aeronautics Board, made in proceedings
where no evidentiary hearings were required or held,
imposing conditions on a tax allocation agreement be-
tween a holding company and its air-carrier subsidi-
ary to prevent impairment of the carrier’s financial
welfare and ability to perform its certificate obliga-
tions.
STATUTE INVOLVED
The relevant provisions of the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. 1301
et seqg., are set forth at Pet. 2-4.
STATEMENT
In July 1969, petitioners’ predecessor, The Flying
Tiger Line Inc. (“Flying Tiger”), a certificated all-
cargo air carrier, requested the Civil Aeronautics
Board to disclaim jurisdiction over a proposed reor-
ganization under Section 408(a) of the Federal Avia-
tion Act, 49 U.S.C. 1378(a), and to approve the
transfer of the currier’s certificates of public con-
venience and necessity to the new operating company
to be formed under the reorganization plan.’ Flying
Tiger proposed to form a holding company, now Tiger
International (“TI’’), which would assume control of
a new corporation, The Flying Tiger Line (“FTL”),
which would continue the air carrier operation under
the transferred certificates of the original carrier. The
primary purpose of the reorganization was to facili-
tate diversification into businesses other than air
transportation (Pet. App. 2a).
The Board declined to disclaim jurisdiction over the
reorganization, inasmuch as a 1969 amendment to
Section 408(a)(5) of the Federal Aviation Act (83
Stat. 103) made it unlawful for “any person” to ac-
quire control of a certificated air carrier without
Board approval.*? Order 69-12-121 (December 29,
1969), 53 CAB 776. On May 5, 1970, by Order 70-6-
119 (the “1970 Order”), the Board approved the re-
organization subject to certain conditions (54 CAB
700). One condition required Board approval of inter-
company transactions affecting FTL, the air carrier,
which exceeded $100,000 in value.’ The Board im-
posed this condition “in order to protect the public
1Section 401(h) of the Act, 49 U.S.C. 1371(h), requires
Board approval before any certificate may be transferred.
2 Prior to the amendment, Board approval of acquisition of
control of a carrier was required only if the acquiring person
was an air carrier or other common carrier or was engaged
in a phase of aeronautics. The amendment required Board
approval for an acquisition of control by “any other person”
as well. See 49 U.S.C. 1378(a) (5).
’ The Board subsequently raised the limit to $1,000,000 (Pet.
App. 3a, n. 5).
4
against any impairment of the air carrier’s certifi-
cate obligations which might arise by reason of
the relationships or transactions among [TI] and its
subsidiaries and affiliates * * *.” 54 CAB at 703.
On June 24, 1970, Flying Tiger notified the Board
that it accepted the terms and conditions of the 1970
Order (R. 100). Accordingly, the Board thereupon
approved the transfer of the certificates from the
original carrier to the new corporation, FTL. Order
70-6-153 (June 29, 1970), 54 CAB 699. TI then
commenced its diversification program (Pet. App. 3a).
In 1973, pursuant to the condition concerning inter-
company transactions, petitioners TI and FTL re-
quested Board approval of a tax allocation agreement.
Under the agreement, TI, the holding corapany, would
file a consolidated tax return for all its subsidiaries.
The subsidiaries would pay TI any tax that would
have been due had the subsidiary filed a separate tax
return, and each subsidiary would receive from TI
the same refund it would have received had it filed a
separate return. When a subsidiary’s net operating
loss, investment tax credits, or other tax credits re-
duced the group’s consolidated tax liability, TI would
credit the subsidiary for such tax savings. However,
if the carrier subsidiary, FTL, provided such tax sav-
ings, its credit would be paid in cash. Petitioners
sought approval of the agreement for the past tax
years 1971 and 1972 as well as for the future. They
did not request a hearing (Pet. App. 3a-5a).
The Board, by its “1973 Order,” approved the agree-
ment but added two requirements: (1) that the car-
5
rier could pay to the holding company only its pro-
portionate share of the group’s actual tax liability,
and (2) that the carrier would issue its own credits
to the other members of the group whose losses and
tax credits sheltered the carrier’s income from tax
liability (Pet. App. 5a). Order 73-12-106 (December
27,1973) (App. A, infra, pp. la-10a). Without these
conditions, the agreement would have required FTL
to pay TI $7.6 million for the 1971 and 1972 tax
years, even though TI paid no consolidated tax in
1971 and only $1.2 million in 1972 (App. A, infra,
p. 2a, n. 3). Thus, the Board explained, the holding
company would have the use of such cash payments
generated by the carrier “until the generation of
operating profits by the other subsidiaries requires
expenditure of the funds in payment of tax liabili-
ties attributable to those subsidiaries” (id. at 4a).
The Board’s conditions were designed to “provide
that the air carrier—rather than the holding company
—benefit from the use of the air carrier’s sheltered
income pending any required expenditure of_ such
funds on behalf of the other affiliates” (ibid.).
TI and FTL petitioned for reconsideration, again
not requesting a hearing. They contended that the
Board’s order was inconsistent with the Board’s prior
decisions and that it would prevent them from effec-
tively and efficiently operating as a holding company
group (R. 182). By its “1975 Order,” the Board
denied reconsideration. Order 75-2-1 (February 3,
1975) (App. B, infra, pp. 1la-22a).
The Board’s 1973 Order modifying petitioners’ tax
allocation agreement was, by its own terms, “a tempo-
6
rary measure,” adopted pending completion of a
thorough investigation of the benefits and risks in-
herent in air carrier reorganizations such as petition-
ers’. Pet. App. 5a; Order 73-12-106 (App. A, infra,
p. 5a, n. 4). In that investigation, the Air Carrier
Reorganization Investigation (“ACRI’), the Board
ultimately concluded, after hearings, that the public
interest requires that transactions between air car-
riers and their holding companies be subjected to a
regulatory plan. Orders 75-10-65/66 (October 17,
1975) and 75-1-121 (January 30, 1976) ; see Pet. App.
5a-6a.* That plan deals specifically with tax allocation
agreements and includes, with respect to such agree-
ments, the same requirements that were attached by
the Board to petitioners’ tax allocation agreement in
the 1973 and 1975 Orders. Ibid.
In 1975 FTL and TI petitioned for review in the
court of appeals, challenging both the Board’s modifi-
cation of their tax allocation agreement in the 1973
and 1975 Orders and the Board’s exercise of jurisdic-
- tion in the 1970 Order over their original reorganiza-
tion. The court of appeals dismissed the challenge to
the 1970 Order on the ground that petitioners had
failed to challenge that order within the 60-day time
limit set forth in Section 1006(a) of the Federal Avi-
ation Act, 49 U.S.C. 1486(a) (Pet. App. 6a-10a).
Then, holding that the timely challenge to the 1973
‘ Petitioners and other carriers have sought judicial review
of the ACRI orders. United Air Lines, et al. v. Civil Aeronau-
tics Board, C.A.D.C., Nos. 75-2165 et al. (argued February 18,
1977).
7
and 1975 Orders should be considered under the “arbi-
trary or capricious” standard of judicial review, not
the “substantial evidence” standard (Pet. App. 14a-
19a), the court upheld those orders. It found that
they “reflect rational decision making and, in par-
ticular, a not unreasonable evaluation of the tax-
allocation agreement’s potentially adverse impact on
FTL’s performance of its certificate obligations”
(Pet. App. 19a).
ARGUMENT
Petitioners contend that the court of appeals erred
because it (1) held untimely petitioners’ challenge in
1975 to the 1970 Order asserting jurisdiction over the
reorganization and requiring Board approval for
inter-company transactions; and (2) ruled that the
Board’s 1973 and 1975 Orders were subjeci to the
“arbitrary or capricious” standard of review rather
than the “substantial evidence” standard. Neither
issue merits this Court’s review on this record.
1. The court of appeals was correct in declining
to review the 1970 Order. Section 1006(a) of the
Act, 49 U.S.C. 1486(a), is the sole basis for the court
of appeals’ jurisdiction. It provides that Board orders
are subject to review “upon petition, filed within sixty
days after the entry of such order * * *,” and that
“{a]fter the expiration of said sixty days a petition
may be filed only by leave of court upon a showing of
reasonable grounds for failure to file the petition
theretofore.”
8
The statute plainly allows only sixty days within
which to challenge an order; it includes no exception,
such as petitioners propose (Pet. 14), for an order
related to subsequent orders of which timely review is
sought. To allow judicial review in the court of ap-
peals after the statutory time limit has expired “would
frustrate the congressional purpose, plainly evidenced
* * * to impose a 60-day limitation upon judicial re-
view * * *.” Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 108.
Petitioners can obtain no benefit from the statute’s
provision that an untimely petition for review may be
filed “by leave of court upon a showing of reasonable
grounds for failure to file the petition theretofore.”
They failed to show any reasonable ground for their
delay in attacking the Board’s 1970 Order. As the
court of appeals noted (Pet. App. 8a), petitioners
chose in 1970 to accept the Board’s conditional ap-
proval of their reorganization, with “full acceptance
of the conditions” (ibid., n. 12), and to forego
seeking review in the court of appeals. For five years
following that choice they accepted and enjoyed the
benefits of the Board-approved reorganization. This
Court has held that a firm whose merger was ap-
proved by a regulatory agency on specified conditions
“cannot now be allowed to attack an officially ap-
proved condition of the merger while retaining at the
same time all of its benefits. The impropriety of the
attack is rendered twofold because it is not made in
the merger proceeding but is attempted in a separate
* * * proceeding.” Federal Power Commission v.
Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 348 U.S. 492, 502. Ac-
9
cord, Dan-Air Services, Ltd. vy. Civil Aeronautics
Board, 475 F. 2d 408, 412 (C.A.D.C.). Having chosen
in 1970 not to challenge the Board’s order but to ac-
cept its benefits, petitioners cannot now claim that
their failure to make a timely challenge was based on
reasonable grounds.°
Petitioners also err in contending (Pet. 13) that
the court of appeals should have asserted jurisdiction
under Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184. That case in-
volved a certification order of the National Labor
Relations Board which, because it was not a final
order, was not reviewable in the court of appeals by
any available statutory procedure. Because there was
“no other means, within their control * * *, to protect
and enforce that right” (id. at 190; citation omitted),
the Court held that employees challenging the order
could do so in a district court under that court’s gen-
eral jurisdiction, conferred by 28 U.S.C. 1337, over
suits arising under acts uf Congress regulating com-
merce. Here, in contrast, the court.of appeals had no
such independent basis for exercising jurisdiction over
petitioners’ 1975 challenge to the 1970 Order. Its
jurisdiction for direct review of orders of the Civil
Aeronautics Board is both created and limited by
Section 1006(a) of the Federal Aviation Act (49
U.S.C. 1486(a)). And petitioners here, unlike the
° Petitioners claim (Pet. 15) that their conduct in “fore-
going timely review as prescribed by § 1006(a)” was justi.
fied by the “economic benefits” of the reorganization. Business
convenience, however, is not a reasonable ground for choosing
not to seek review within the statutory period.
10
plaintiffs in Leedom v. Kyne, had available to them
a means to protect and enforce their asserted right
in the court of appeals on timely petition for review
of the 1970 Order, a means they chose not to invoke.
Similarly unsound is petitioners’ contention (Pet.
14-15) that the court of appeals should have enter-
tained their challenge to the 1970 Order because they
alleged that the order was beyond the Board’s “juris-
diction.” Acceptance of this claim would all but elim-
inate the statute’s 60-day limit (and comparable lim-
its in other statutes), denying it force whenever the
Board’s action is alleged to exceed its statutory au-
thority. Petitioners cite no case countenancing disre-
gard of an express statutory time limit on such a
ground. In contrast to petitioners’ argument, this
Court has recently held that a 60-day statutory limit
on judicial review would be impermissibly undercut
if a claimant for disability benefits could seek review
from the denial of a petition to reopen his claim
(Califano v..Sanders, supra, 430 U.S. at 108), and
that the failure of the Attorney General of the United
States to object to a voting law change within the
statutory period of sixty days barred his subsequent
objection even when authorized by court order (Mor-
ris v. Gressette, No. 75-1583, decided June 20, 1977,
slip op. 11-12).
2. Petitioners also contend (Pet. 8-12) that the
court of appeals applied an erroneous standard of
review by examining the 1973 and 1975 Orders under
the “arbitrary or capricious” standard instead of the
“substantial evidence” test. We submit that as ap-
11
plied to these rulings of the Board, which did not
turn on findings of fact, the two standards are not
significantly different. Especially since the rulings in
this case have now been superseded by an industry-
wide regulation imposing similar conditions on tax
allocation agreements, there is no need for this Court
to review the standard that was applied in this case.
No hearing was requested by petitioners when they
submitted their tax allocation agreement to the Board
for its approval. No hearing was required by the
statute.° Under the Administrative Procedure Act,
reviewing courts are directed to determine whether
agency action is supported by substantial evidence
only in cases “subject to sections 556 and 557 of this
title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency
* As the court of appeals noted (Pet. App. 18a, n. 18):
TI and FTL do not contend that the CAB was statu-
torily required to hold a hearing on their application for
approval of the tax allocation agreement or on their
petition for reconsideration. Indeed, the record here pre-
cludes such an argument. In 1960, Congress amended
section 408 of the Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1378, to permit the
CAB, in certain circumstances and pursuant to certain
procedures, to dispense with a hearing in cases arising
under that section. Act of Sept. 13, 1960, Pub. L. No.
86-758, § 1, 74 Stat. 901, amending 49 U.S.C. § 18784b).
In the proceedings leading to the 1970 Order, the CAB,
after fully complying with that amendment, dispensed
with a hearing. In that Order, the CAB retained juris-
diction to impose, without a hearing, further conditions.
FlyingTiger accepted this provision, along with all others
in the Order. Under authority of this provision, the CAB
then conducted, without a hearing, the proceedings lead-
ing to the 1973 and 1975 Orders.
12
hearing provided by statute” (5 U.S.C. 706(2) (E)).’
The Administrative Procedure Act thus recognizes a
dichotomy between review of agency findings made on
a hearing record, where the “substantial evidence”
standard applies, and review of agency rulings that
do not turn on findings of fact, where the “arbitrary
or capricious” standard is applicable (see 5 U.S.C. 706
(2)(A)). This Court has also recognized that di-
chotomy. In Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, which in-
volved a determination by the Comptroller of the
Currency that was not required to be made after a
hearing on the record, the Court held that “the proper
standard for judicial review of the Comptroller’s ad-
judications is not the ‘substantial evidence’ test which
is appropriate when reviewing findings made on a
hearing record,” but “[t]he appropriate standard for
review was * * * whether the Comptroller’s adjudica-
tion was ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law’ * * *.”
411 U.S. at 141-142.
Petitioners contend, however, that this dichotomy
does not apply to judicial review under the Federal
Aviation Act. Because Section 1005(f) of the Act
(49 U.S.C. 1485(f)) provides that “[e]very order
of * * * the Board shall set forth the findings of fact
upon which it is based,” and because Section 1006(e)
of the Act (49 U.S.C. 1486(e)) provides that “[t]he
findings of fact by the Board * * * if supported by
’ Sections 556 and 557 of 5 U.S.C. concern proceedings
required by statute to be determined on the record after an
opportunity for an agency hearing.
13
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive,” petitioners
argue that the “substantial evidence” test applies
whether or not a hearing is conducted on the record
and whether or not a ruling of the Board turns on
findings of fact. In a case such as this one, peti-
tioners’ argument not only would put the Federal
Aviation Act at odds with the principles of judicial
review recognized by the Administrative Procedure
Act and by this Court in Camp v. Pitts but, as the
court of appeals noted (Pet. App. 18a-19a), it would
also require evidentiary proceedings where there were
no issues of fact to be resolved, where no hearing
was requested or held, and where Congress has ex-
pressly dispensed with a hearing requirement."
* In 1960, Congress amended Section 408(b) of the Federal
Aviation Act to permit the Board to dispense with hearings
where none had been requested and certain conditions were
met. 74 Stat. 901, 49 U.S.C. 1378(b), states:
Provided further, That, in any case in which the Board
determines that the transaction which is the subject of
the application does not affect the control of an air car-
rier directly engaged in the operation of aircraft in air
transportation, does not result in creating a monopoly,
and does not tend to restrain competition, and deter-
mines that no person disclosing a substantial interest then
currently is requesting a hearing, the Board, after publi-
cation in the Federal Register of notice of the Board’s
intention to dispose of such application without a hearing
(a copy of which notice shall be furnished by the Board
to the Attorney Generali not later than the day following
the date of such publication), may determine that the
public interest does not require a hearing and by order
approve or disapprove such transaction.
As the court of appeals noted, “(t]he primary purpose of
the 1960 amendment permitting the CAB to dispense with a
14
In any event, in the context of this case, where the
Board’s rulings of 1973 and 1975 did not turn on
findings of fact, the two standards of judicial review
are not significantly different. By its original 1970
Order subjecting inter-company transactions to Board
approval, the Board sought to insure fair treatment
for the carrier in the new corporate regime so as to
protect against impairment of its financial position
and its ability to provide air services (54 CAB
at 703). When petitioners in 1973 requested the
Board to approve their tax allocation agreement, the
Board was required to make a predictive and policy
judgment concerning the benefits and risks of the
agreement as they affected the carrier’s ability to
perform its certificate obligations. In making that
assessment the Board noted—a fact based on peti-
tioners’ own submission and apparently uncontested—
that under the agreement the carrier would pay to
the holding company, for the years 1971 and 1972,
amounts of cash far in excess of the holding com-
pany’s actual tax liability (Order 73-12-106, App. A,
infra, p. 2a, n. 3). Given the terms of the agreement,
the Board made the judgment that, “[c]onsidering the
holding company’s interlocking relationships with and
its effective control of the air carrier and the other
affiliates, it is, in our view, altogether unrealistic to
expect that the air carrier or the other affiliates
would not be completely responsive to the holding
hearing in some cases * * * was to facilitate CAB disposition
of section 408 cases, not to hinder that process.” Pet. App. 19a,
n. 20.
15
company’s bidding” (Order 75-2-1, App. B, infra,
p. 21a). The Board therefore concluded that, “inas-
much as FTL may continue in the foreseeable future
to be a principal, if not the primary, source of shelter-
able income” (Order 73-12-106, App. A, infra, p. 4a),
it was justified in imposing conditions designed to
protect the carrier’s ability to perform.
Such a ruling turned essentially on a predictive
judgment concerning the benefits and risks of the
agreement. Cf. Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aero-
nautics Board, 439 F. 2d 634, 640 (C.A.D.C.). The
Board’s decision concerning the conditions necessary
to protect the carrier rested “in the final analysis
on an essentially legislative policy judgment, rather
than a factual determination, concerning the rela-
tive risks of underprotection as compared to over-
protection.” Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO
v. Hodgson, 499 F. 2d 467, 475 (C.A.D.C.). When
a court reviews an administrative determination of
this kind, the concepts of “substantial evidence” and
not “arbitrary or capricious” tend to converge (As-
sociated Industries of New York State, Inc. v. United
States Department of Labor, 487 F. 2d 342, 349-350
(C.A. 2)), just as they do when general rules adopted
after informal rule-making are subject to review.
See Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodg-
son, supra. Cf. Island Airlines, Incorporated v. Civil
Aeronautics Board, 363 F. 2d 120, 125-126 (C.A. 9).
While the two tests are statutorily separate under
the Administrative Procedure Act (Bowman Trans-
portation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc.,
16
419 U.S. 281, 284),° whether they are actually coter-
minous in a given case depends on the nature of the
determination under review. Some Board actions rest
on factual predicates that require support by substan-
tial evidence; other actions involve the kind of policy
prediction presented by this case. In the latter situa-
tion the only “substantial evidence” that can be
examined on review is the presence or absence of a
rational basis for the administrative decision.
For these reasons, petitioners err in contending
that the ruling below conflicts with decisions of other
circuits purporting to apply the substantial evidence
test in Board nonhearing cases. See, e.g., Law Motor
Freight, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 364 F. 2d
139 (C.A. 1), certiorari denied, 387 U.S. 905; Ne-
braska Department of Aeronautics v. Civil Aero-
nautics Board, 298 F. 2d 286 (C.A. 8); Pillai v.
Civil Aeronautics Board, 485 F. 2d 1018 (C.A.D.C.).
Unlike this case, those decisions did not involve
Board action consisting essentially of a predictive
policy choice.”
*In Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight
System, Inc., supra, the Court applied the “arbitrary or capri-
cious” test to so much of an Interstate Commerce Commission
decision, made after a record hearing, as involved a prediction
of the burdens and benefits of new competitive service. The
supporting factual predicates were concededly sustained by
substantial evidence.
% As Bowman Transportation, Inc., supra, demonstrates
(see n. 9, supra, pp. 15-16), predictive policy choices must be
judged under the “arbitrary or capricious” standard. The lan-
guage of Sections 1005(f) and 1006(e) of the Act, 49 U.S.C.
17
Finally, tue conditions imposed by the Board’s
1973 and 1975 Orders on petitioners’ tax allocation
agreement have been superseded by similar conditions
in the ACRI decision which the Board adopted in 1976.
See pp. 5-6, supra. Since petitioners, with other
holding companies and their carrier subsidiaries, are
challenging the ACRI orders before the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (ibid.;
see Pet. App. 6a, n. 9)," there is no need for the Court
to consider this case now.
1485(f) and 1486(e}, quoted supra, pp. 12-13, does not compel
use of the substantial evidence test in cases to which it would
not apply under the Administrative Procedure Act, i.e., cases
not involving disputed facts found after a record hearing. It
simply means what it says: that the Board’s findings of fact
shall be conclusive if they are supported by substantial evi-
dence.
" As the court of appeals noted (Pet. App. 6a, n. 9), the
ACRI orders do not moot the instant case. The ACRI orders
were adopted in May 1976 and are prospective only. Therefore,
they do not control petitioners’ tax allocation practices for
the two and one-half year period between adoption of the 1973
conditions and the ACRI orders.
18 la
CONCLUSION APPENDIX A
For the reasons stated, the petition for a writ of Order 78-12-106
certiorari should be denied. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
; CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
Respectfully submitted. WASHINGTON, D.C.
| Adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Board
at its office in Washington, D.C. on
WADE H. MCCREE, Jr., the 26th day of December, 1973
Solicitor General.
JOHN H. SHENEFIELD,
Assistant Attorney General.
JOHN J. PowErs, III,
FREDERIC FREILICHER,
Docket 21223
[Served Dec. 27, 1973]
Application of
Attorneys.
JAMEs C. SCHULTZ, THE FLYING TIGER LINE INC. AND
General Counsel, THE FLYING TIGER CORPORATION
Gary J. EDLEs, for approval of a tax allocation agreement
Deputy General Counsel, under paragraph 3 of Order 70-6-119.
GLEN M. BENDIXSEN,
Associate General Counsel, ORDER APPROVING AGREEMENT
THOMAS L. Ray, , . . 1.3
Attorney, The Flying Tiger Line Inc. (FTL) and The Flying
Civil Aeronautics Board. Tiger Corporation, (FTC) request modification of
Novesenen 1977, paragraph 3 of Order 70-6-119,’ adopted May 5, 1970,
to the extent necessary to permit implementation of a
tax allocation agreement effective with respect to
taxable years 1971 and 1972, as well as prospectively.
—- —_.
1 Order 70-6-119, May 5, 1970, approved the initial reor-
ganization resulting in the formation of FTL’s holding com-
pany parent, FTC. Ordering paragraph 3 thereof prohibited
transactions between FTL and FTC aggregately amounting
to $100,000 or more, absent prior Board approval.
2a
The agreement would treat the air carrier, for tax
purposes, as if it were otherwise unaffiliated. Thus,
the airline would pay to the holding company any
tax that would have been due were it filing returns
as an independent company, and would receive a re-
fund were it so entitled to one as a separate company.
Under circumstances where net operating losses,
investment tax credits or other tax credits generated
by FTL’s operations are applied in computing pay-
ment of taxes otherwise due from operations of its
affiliates FTL will immediately receive in cash the
value of the taxes saved.’ Other subsidiaries of FTC
are only entitled to receive a credit rather than cash
under circumstances where they have contributed tax
credits or operating losses to reduce or eliminate over-
all tax liability.’
No comments have been received.
After consideration, we have determined to approve
the tax plan, subject to exceptions and conditions.
Generally, we are satisfied that certain possibilities
otherwise adverse to the carrier’s interests are ab-
sent: no penalties will accrue to the air carrier by
virtue of its inclusion in the consolidated tax agree-
ment; the carrier will receive fair treatment with
2 Applicants reserve the right to adopt a different standard
at a later date should it then appear that FTL would have
tax credits or operating losses which it otherwise would not
be able to use.
* Upon approval of this agreement, FTL would pay to the
holding company $7.61 million representing its 1971 and 1972
independent tax liability. The group as a whole paid no taxes
in 1971 and only $1.2 million in 1972.
3a
respect to the use of its tax credits and loss carry-
forwards and carrybacks; and the implementation of
the agreement will have no direct adverse impact on
the carrier, inasmuch as Flying Tiger Line will in
no event pay more to the holding company than it
would pay to the government as an independent en-
tity. Additionally, the agreement should in fact re-
sult in certain benefits by allowing the air carrier
to realize an immediate cash payment for any tax
credits or net operating loss used by the holding
company which would not otherwise have accrued to
the air carrier until some future year.
As submitted, the agreement would provide a fur-
ther benefit to the air carrier, inasmuch as tax bene-
fits generated by any member would not be lost
through that member’s inability to utilize them with-
in a given statutory period to the extent that such
benefits had been previously applied by the holding
company parent in computing the consolidated re-
turn. However, inasmuch as applicants specifically
reserve the right to modify the agreement should
Flying Tiger Line be in a position to so benefit, this
advantage will not likely accrue to the air carrier.
On the other hand, one aspect of the agreement
poses some difficulty. Under the agreement, the air
carrier will be required to pay the amount of its
independent tax liability to the holding company
parent regardless of whether the holding company’s
consolidated tax return requires the payment of taxes
to the Government. To the extent cash payments by
the air carrier exceed the group’s consolidated tax
4a
liability, the holding company would have the use of
such funds until the generation of operating profits
by the other subsidiaries requires expenditure of the
funds in payment of tax liabilities attributable to
those subsidiaries, and payable on their behalf by the
holding company pursuant to the agreement.
In this respect, we will impose an alternative for-
mat, which would effect no different impact on other
subsidiaries of the holding company, but which would
provide that the air carrier—rather than the holding
company—benefit from the use of the air carrier’s
sheltered income pending any required expenditure
of such funds on behalf of the other affiliates. Par-
ticularly, we will require that the air carrier itself
retain possession of its sheltered profits, rather than
turning them over to the holding company; the air
carrier might allow a credit to affiliates contributing
to the shelter, as would the holding company pur-
suant to the instant agreement, and might subse-
quently pay tax contributions on behalf of contrib-
uting affiliates should any such affiliate subsequently
be in a position to have applied its contributed tax
benefits as an independent entity.
We believe such an alternative plan to be more in
the interests of the air carrier than the instant one,
and to be equitable to the holding company and to
each affiliate. This is especially true inasmuch as
FTL may continue in the foreseeable future to be a
principal, if not the primary, source of shelterable
income.
5a
The effect of our modification will be to permit
FTL to contribute, with other affiliates, a proportion-
ate share of the group’s consolidated tax liability,
and to issue credits to the affiliates whose losses and
tax credits were utilized to shelter the air carrier’s
taxable income. Contributions by the air carrier to
the group’s consolidated tax liability should be no
more than the sum of (a) an amount proportionate
to the air carrier’s independent tax liability in rela-
tion to the independent tax liability of all members
of the group showing a taxable income, and (b) an
amount required to redeem credits given by the air
carrier to other subsidiaries in prior years.*'"' The
tax proposal should be modified accordingly and the re-
vised tax plan should be forwarded to the Board in
this docket.*
To insure the Board’s ability to monitor the subse-
quent action of applicants pursuant to approval here-
in granted, we will require applicants to file with the
Board a copy of their consolidated tax return for ev-
ery year in which this proposal is effectively em-
ployed, as well as workpapers for each such year
s{sie) The Appendix provides an illustration of the proper ap-
plication of this formula.
* Approval of the tax plan pursuant to condition 3 of Order
70-6-119 is necessarily a temporary measure, to be superceded
by our decision in the Air Carrier Reorganization Investiga-
tion and any resulting implementation of tax review stand-
ards. Approval herein granted will extend to years 1971,
1972 and to any subsequent year for which a consolidated
return is filed prior to our final action in the Air Carrier
Reorganization Investigation.
6a
indicating the steps employed to reach the ultimate
allocation of cash payment and credits given.’ The
workpapers should at minimum set forth—for the
holding company and for each subsidiary—separate
taxable income (or losses) both before and after
adjustments, total tax credits (by type) and losses
generated for the year, total credits and losses car-
ried forward from the prior year, estimated inde-
pendent tax liability, total credits given by one sub-
sidiary to another, total cash contribution with re-
spect to the group’s consolidated tax liability, and
the manner of application of the foregoing items in
the computation of the current consolidated tax re-
turn. The Board should be promptly apprised of sub-
sequent adjustments of the consolidated return.*
The current tax proposal, as written, will in most
cases adequately protect the air carrier in the event
the holding company parent opts to revert to filing
of individual tax returns. However, inasmuch as the
agreement does not purport to provide for every con-
tingency which might arise in the event of such re-
version, we will require prior Board approval of any
termination of the agreement. Moreover, to insure
continued fair treatment to the air carrier respecting
* The filing of a consolidated tax return for calendar 1971
will not be required to the extent it is currently on file with
the Board, provided that any adjustments in the 1971 con-
solidated returns be brought to the Board’s attention. How-
ever, workpapers for 1971 will be required.
* Of course, the applicants will be given confidential treat-
ment with respect to this information.
Ta
tax returns, we will require prior Board approval of
any subsequent modification of the tax agreement,’
provided, however, that such prior approval shall
not be required with respect to specific changes to be
made pursuant to the modifications imposed herein.*
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
The subject tax proposal be and it hereby is ap-
proved pursuant to ordering paragraph 3 of Order
70-6-119, subject to the following: *
a. the terms of the agreement shall be modified
to provide that the air carrier shall retain the use
of its sheltered income, subject to (a) proportionate
contributions to the group’s consolidated tax lia-
bility, and (b) redemption of credits issued in prior
years by the air carrier to its affiliates, both as dis-
cussed in the body of this order;
? This condition is particularly required since the holding
company parent reserves the right to adopt a different stand-
ard at a later date should FTL appear unable to utilize, as an
independent entity, the tax benefits it generates. At the time
of any such modification, it will be necessary to assure that
Flying Tiger Line participates in any tax savings from its
inclusion in the consolidated return.
* Payment and credit transactions hereby approved shall
not be included in calculating the $100,000 figure which trig-
gers the prior-approval requirement of Order 70-6-119, or-
dering paragraph 3.
*The payment and credit transactions authorized by this
paragraph shall not be included in calculating the $100,000
figure which triggers the prior approval requirement of Order
70-6-119, ordering paragraph 3.
8a
b. the parties shall neither terminate nor modify
the terms of the tax agreement without prior Board
approval, provided, however, that such prior Board
approval shall not be required with respect to changes
required in accordance with paragraph (a) above;
ec. for each year in which this proposal is ap-
plicable, including 1971 and 1972, applicants shall
file workpapers described in the body of this order;
and for each year during which the agreement is ap-
plicable, beginning 1972, applicants shall file a copy
of their consolidated tax return;
d. The approval granted herein shall be subject to
modification, revocation, or attachment of further or
different conditions as the Board may, without hear-
ing, find appropriate in the public interest; and
e. The approval granted herein shall not in any
manner be relied upon by FTL for ratemaking or
other regulatory purposes not specifically considered
herein.
By the Civil Aeronautics Board:
EDWIN Z. HOLLAND
Secretary
9a
Consolidated
Year 1 Air Carrier Co. A Co. B Co. C Return
Income 1,000 2,000 8,000 4,000 10,000
Tax Liability * 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 5,000
Contributed to 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 5,000
Consolidated tax
liability
Year 2
Income 1,000 (4,000) 8,000 4,000 4,000
Tax Liability * 600 (2,000) ** 1,500 2,000 2,000
Contributed to
Consolidated tax
liability:
Independent tax 500 _ 1,600 2,000
liability
Less Credit to (260) 2,000 (750) (1,000)
Co. A
Total contribution 250 —o-— 760 1,000 2,000
Year 3
Income 1,000 2,000 8,000 4,000 10,000
Tax Liability * 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 5,000
Contribution to
Consolidated tax
liabiltiy:
Independent tax 500 1,000 1,500 2,000
liability
Redeem credits 126 (1,000) $75 500
given in prior year
—0-- 1,875 2,506 5,000
In Years 1 and 2, the air carrier contributions to
the group’s consolidated tax liability are in an amount
proportionate to the air carrier’s independent tax lia-
bility in relation to the independent tax liability of
all members of the group showing a taxable income.
In Year 2, however, the air carrier also credits Co. A
for the use of Co. A’s tax losses, the amount of the
credit given being calculated in the same ratio used
* Assumes a tax rate of 50%
** Tax effect of loss
10a
to determine the air carrier’s contribution to consoli-
dated tax liability.
In Year 3, the air carrier again contributes its pro-
portionate share of consolidated tax liability, as cal-
culated on the total taxable income of all members
showing a profit. However, it makes an additional
cash payment on behalf of Co. A to redeem a propor-
tionate share of credits given to Co. A in the prior
year, relative to the amount of total available credits
which Co. A can utilize to offset its income for the
year.
At the end of Year 3, the air carrier would still
have outstanding $125 in credits due Co. A, to be
proportionately contributed on that company’s behalf
to the extent that Co. A is able to call upon them in
future years.
lla
APPENDIX B
Docket 21223 Order 75-2-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C.
[Emblem ]
THE FLYING TIGER LINE INC.
CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS: INTERCOMPANY
TAX ALLOCATION
Docket 21223
[Served February 4, 1975]
Order 75-2-1
Adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Board
at its office in Washington, D.C.
on the 3rd day of February, 1975
Application of The Flying Tiger Line Inc. and Tiger
International, Inc. (formerly The Flying Tiger
Corporation), for approval of a tax allocation agree-
ment under paragraph 3 of order 70-6-119, as
amended
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION
By order 73-12-106, December 26, 1973, the Board
approved, subject to various conditions and modifica-
tions, a tax allocation agreement among The Flying
12a
Tiger Line Inc. (FTL), The Flying Tiger Corpora-
tion (FTC), now known as Tiger International, Inc.
(TI), and their affiliates, filed pursuant to paragraph
3 of order 70-6-119, dated May 5, 1970, as amended.’
The proposed agreement * was approved subject, inter
alia, to a condition modifying the proposed utilization
of tax savings resulting from the filing of a consoli-
dated tax return by the TI system of affiliated com-
panies.°
1Order 70-6-119, amended by order 71-7-6, July 1, 1971
and order 72-2-6, Feb. 2, 1972, inter alia, prohibited inter-
company transactions within the TI system of subsidiaries
and affiliated companies which amount in the aggregate to
$100,000 or more in any calendar year without prior Board
approval. Subsequent to its decision in this proceeding, the
Board by order 74-5-90, May 17, 1974 increased the dollar
limitation to $1 million.
* The agreement treated the air carrier, FTL, for tax pur-
poses as if it were otherwise unaffiliated. It provided that
the air carrier would pay to TI, the holding company, any
tax that would have been due were it filing returns as an
independent company, and would receive a refund were it
entitled to one as a separate company. It further provided
that under circumstances where net operating losses, invest-
ment tax credits, or other tax credits generated by FTL’s
operations are applied in computing payment of taxes other-
wise due from operations of the TI group, FTL would im-
mediately receive in cash the value of the taxes saved. Under
comparable circumstances, other subsidiaries of TI would
be entitled to receive redeemable credits from TI.
*The Board stated that contributions by the air carrier to
the group’s consolidated tax liability should be no more than
the sum of (a) an amount proportionate to the air carrier’s
independent tax liability in relation to the independent tax
liability of all members of the group showing a taxable income,
and (b) an amount required to redeem credits given by the
13a
TI and its wholly owned subsidiary, FTL, filed a
timely petition for reconsideration of order 73-12-106,
containing a request to present oral argument before
the Board.*
Petitioners contend, in effect, that the modification
of the original tax allocation agreement is inconsistent
with the Board’s policy and practice and would pre-
vent petitioners and their affiliates from conducting
business effectively and efficiently as a holding com-
pany group.
In support of their contentions, petitioners state,
inter alia, that the Board has consistently recognized
that tax allocation is a necessary concomitant of con-
solidated tax reporting, and generally has had only
two concerns: (1) that an air carrier within a cor-
porate group not be assessed an amount greater than
its independent tax liability would have been had it
reported on a separate basis, and (2) that an air
carrier be given immediate credit for the utilization
by affiliates of its losses, credits, and deductions in
lowering overall taxes. As a basis for their position
that the Board’s concern is so limited, petitioners
refer to Part 241 of the Board’s Economic Regulations,
to order 69-7-102, July 15, 1969, involving the acquisi-
tion of Air West by Hughes Tool Company, and to
the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (Au-
air carrier to other subsidiaries in prior years, and ordered
that, subject to these conditions, FTL shall retain the use of
its sheltered income.
* Petitioners’ contentions are set forth and amply discussed
in their filing, and we find that no useful purpose would be
served by oral argument.
l4a
gust 27, 1973) in the Air Carrier Reorganization In-
vestigation (docket 24283 et al.).°
Petitioners cite and appear to rely, at least in part,
upon Part 241 of the Board’s Economic Regulations *
as amended by ER-707 on September 22, 1971, effec-
tive on January 1, 1972." We find no inconsistency
between the recordkeeping and reporting require-
ments of Part 241 and our decision in order 73-12-
106.
Part 241 was designed to provide for a uniform
system of accounts and reports, requiring that all
certificated air carriers record their accounts and
make reports to the Board uniformly in accordance
with this system. ER-707 was designed to provide
more complete disclosures of transactions within af-
filiated groups of companies, and to set forth stand-
ards in accounting for such transactions. Applying
the general objectives of this amendment, section
2-18(d) prescribes a method for recording income
taxes of a regulated air carrier holding a certificate
of public convenience and necessity and of companies
affiliated with it.*
5’ The Reorganization Investigation is presently before the
Board for review.
* Part 241—Uniform System of Accounts and Reports for
Certificated Air Carriers (14 CFR 241).
* The Board gave notice that it had the amendment under
consideration by circulation of EDR-187, dated Sept. 9, 1970
(docket 22546) and published at 35 F.R. 14464.
® Sec. 2-18(d) provides as follows:
“(d) Income taxes shall be allocated among the transport
entities of the air carrier, its nontransport divisions, and mem-
l5a
The language of section 2-18(d), together with the
history of its promulgation, like that of Part 241 in
its entirety, clearly indicates that the rule and its
amendments merely establish recordkeeping and re-
porting procedures and methods in order to provide
the Board with more complete disclosures of transac-
tions within affiliated groups of companies. The
method prescribed by section 2-18(d) for recording
income taxes on a consolidated basis requires only
that the income tax expense to be recorded by the air
carrier shall be the same as would result if determined
for the air carrier separately for all time periods, and
that the tax effect of carryback, carryforward oper-
ating losses, investment tax credits, and other tax
credits generated by the air carrier shall be recorded
by the air carrier during the period in which applied
in settlement of the consolidated tax liability. The
recordkeeping and reporting requirements of section
bers of an affiliated group. Under circumstances in which
income taxes are determined on a consolidated basis by an
air carrier and other mmebers of an affiliated group, the
income tax expense to be recorded by the air carrier shall
be the same as would result if determined for the air carrier
separately for all time periods, except that the tax effect of
carryback and carryforward operating losses, investment tax
credits, or other tax credits generated by operations of the air
carrier shall be recorded by the air carrier during the period
in which applied in settlement of the taxes othewise attribut-
able to any member, or combination of mmebers, of the
affiliated group. Any difference between the income tax so
recorded and the amount at which settlement is to be made
shall be recorded in subaccount 88.1 Intercompany Transac-
tions Adjustment—Credit or in subaccount 89.1 Intercompany
Transactions Adjustment—Debit, as is appropriate.”
16a
2-18(d) are by no means declaratory of Board policy
with respect to particular intercompany agreements
relating to the subject matter of the reporting, and
in our view do not pertain to or focus upon the issue
raised in this petition, viz, the allocation of tax sav-
ings pursuant to an agreement between a certificated
air carrier and its affiliates. Moreover, to the extent
that section 2-18(d) may be considered as bearing,
however remotely, upon any Board policy or practice
with respect to such issues, we find no inconsistency
with our decision in order 73-12-106. Further, we are
unable to conclude that our decision in order 73-12-
106 is harmful to the financial integrity of the air
carrier, FTL, or more disadvantageous to the air
carrier than the tax allocation guidelines contained
in the decision of the Administrative Law Judge in
the Air Carrier Reorganization Investigation referred
to by petitioners.”
Petitioners also suggest that the continued adher-
ence to Board order 73-12-106 would not be in accord
with Board policy and practice as established by
Board precedent. However, petitioners acknowledge
that, about 1 month prior to order 73-12-106, pres-
ently under reconsideration, the Board had adopted,
in order 73-11-8, October 23, 1973” a similar tax
* However, we wish to stress that our action herein should
not be regarded as prejudging in any way our final determina-
tion on the merits of any issue in the Reorganization In-
vestigation.
1° This order involved an application filed by Braniff Air-
ways, Incorporated, and Braniff International Corporation in
docket 24048.
17a
allocation policy. The tax allocation requirement in
that case, which permitted no retention of consoli-
dated income tax savings by the parent holding com-
pany, Braniff International Corporation (BIC), was
imposed as a condition to the Board’s approval of a
reorganization plan involving Braniff Airways’ for-
mation of BIC, similar to FTL’s formation of FTC.”
Other cases cited by petitioners do not involve in-
stances of Board approval of an air carrier’s forma-
tion of a holding company,” and are not otherwise
inconsistent with the tax allocation determination in
the Braniff case or in order 73-12-106, under recon-
sideration herein.
In Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., Control of Braniff,
order E-25989, November 17, 1967, the issue of in-
come tax allocation was neither presented to nor de-
termined by the Board. We are not disposed to view
the Board’s inaction with respect to this issue at that
time as a determination of Board policy with respect
thereto.
In the Acquisition of Air West, Inc., by Hughes
Tool Company, order 69-7-102, July 15, 1969, the
Board imposed a condition on its approval of the ac-
11 Order 70-6-119, supra.
12 United Air Lines, Inc., order 69-4-67, Feb. 17, 1969, also
involved an air carrier’s formation of a holding company,
UAL, Inc. However, that proceeding antedated P.L. 91-62
(Aug. 20, 1969, effective on Aug. 5, 1969), which amended,
inter alia, sec. 408 of the Act (see order 70-6-119, supra).
Since the Board was then not empowered to assert jurisdic-
tion over the reorganization, and did in fact disclaim juris-
diction, it imposed no conditions.
18a
quisition which provided, inter alia, that “In no event
shall the tax burden or relief related to the air car-
rier division (Air West Division of Hughes Tool Com-
pany) be less favorable to that division as part of
Hughes Tool Company than would have been the case
had the division been taxed as a separate corporation.”
Thus, the Board expressly established at once both a
ceiling of tax burden and a floor of tax relief for an
air carrier division of an operating company, and
implicitly recognized the same parameters for an air
carrier subsidiary of such company (order 69-12-66,
November 26, 1969). Not inconsistently therewith,
by order 73-12-106 we made a determintaion which
focused on the intervening area with respect to a con-
solidated income tax allocation agreement between an
air carrier-formed holding company and the air car-
rier subsidiary. In these circumstances, we do not
find that determination, even though it may result
in tax relief to the air carrier above the minimum
requirement, to be contrary to established Board
precedent, disadvantageous to the air carrier, or as
imposing an undue tax burden on the air carrier-
formed holding company.”
Petitioners advance several contentions aimed at
demonstrating adverse consequences of the Board’s
18 We reiterate, as stated in footnote 9 supra, that our action
herein should not be regarded as prejudging in any way our
final determination on the merits of the issues in the Air
Carrier Reorganization Investigation, the scope of which is
limited to air carrier-formed holding companies (order 74-6-
18, June 4, 1974) and includes United Air Lines, Inc., as
well as Braniff and FTL as parties.
19a
decision in order 73-12-106. First, petitioners state
that this decision frustrates national tax policy in
that petitioners and their affiliates, North American
Car Corporation (NAC), are deprived of tax bene-
fits, such as accelerated depreciation and investment
tax credits. It is perfectly obvious that insofar as
the petitioner, FTL, is concerned order 73-12-106
deprives the air carrier of no tax beuefits whatso-
ever. Inde.d, it appears that the thrust of petitioners’
complaint is that FTL is acquiring more than its
share of combined group tax savings. With regard to
NAC and other subsidiaries of TI, we believe that
the availability to them of redeemable tax credits,
as provided in order 73-12-196, implements rather
than frustrates national tax policy.“ As to TI, there
is no contention that the parent holding company
generated any part of the total tax savings, and for
this reason, as in the Braniff case, we perceive no in-
equity to the holding company parent of FTL. To
the contrary, as a consequence of our decision in order
73-12-106, TI could share in the total tax benefits
arising from the combined tax reporting through the
availability of FTL’s immediate tax benefits (and
other tax savings lodged with FTL) for the payment
of dividends in accordance with paragraph 3(b) of
order 74-5-90, May 17, 1974.”
4% TI’s subsidiary, NAC, for example, will have available
to it no lesser tax benefits than it would have received had it
filed its income tax return as a separate entity.
This paragraph, further amending order 70-6-119, as
previously amended by orders 71-7-6 and 72-2-6, provides as
follows:
20a
Second, petitioners contend that order 73-12-106
makes it impossible for TI to function as a holding
company. However, petitioners acknowledge that the
holding company does not rely exclusively upon the
utilization of tax savings from consolidated tax re-
turns as a means of assuring the availability of funds
for investment in its nonairline subsidiaries. In-
deed, as discussed above, the tax savings lodged with
FTL could in some circumstances make available
to the holding company an increased dividend dis-
tribution with which to further its investment poli-
cies.
Third, petitioners contend that tax savings, if
lodged with the holding company, could be better
utilized in the latter’s discretion for investment in its
subsidiaries “as needed” than by FTL. We regard
this contention as highly speculative, and it may en-
tail a distribution of tax savings to affiliates without
“3(b). FTL shall make no payment of dividends on its
common stock without prior Board approval, except with
respect to dividend payments for any given calendar year
which are paid out of retained earnings in an aggregate
amount not in excess of 50 percent of its net income after
special items (line 9799 on CAB Form 41 Schedule P-1.2),
as determined in accordance with Part 241 of the Board’s
Economic Regulations (the Uniform System of Accounts), for
the calendar year immediately prior thereto, provided that
verification of compliance with this requirement, in a manner
acceptable to the Bureau of Accounts and Statistics, is made
by FTL within 90 days of the end of the calendar year for
which such dividend payments have been made, setting forth,
inter alia, the amount of retained earnings, net income, and
percentage basis for the payment of such dividends; * * *”
2la
any relationship to their respective contributions to
the combined tax savings.
Petitioners have offered, as an alternative to our
decision in order 73-12-106, to accept an allocation
agreement which would provide that tax allocation
payments by FTL or other affiliates to TI be made
discretionary, rather than mandatory as originally
agreed upon. This proposal is entirely illusory. Con-
sidering the holding company’s interlocking relation-
ships with and its effective control of the air carrier
and the other affiliates, it is, in our view, altogether
unrealistic to expect that the air carrier or the other
affiliates will not be completely responsive to the hold-
ing company’s bidding.
In view of the foregoing and in light of the counter-
vailing considerations for preserving the integrity
of the air carrier against inroads by TI in favor
of nonair carrier investments, we find, on balance,
that any alteration of our decision in order 73-12-
106 would not be warranted.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Petitioners’ request for reconsideration of order
73-12-106 be and it hereby is denied;** and
1° The payment and credit transactions authorized by order
73-12-106 shall not be included in calculating the monetary
limitation figure which triggers the prior-approval require-
ment of order 70-6-119, ordering paragraph 3, as amended.
However, it is expected that within 90 days after the filing
of any consolidated Federal income tax return by TI which
includes FTL, FTL shall file with the Bureau of Operating
Rights a statement setting forth (a) the amount of tax paid
22a
2. All other motions and requests herein be and
they hereby are denied.
By the Civil Aeronautics Board:
EDWIN Z. HOLLAND
Secretary
[SEAL]
by FTL in connection with the filing of such consolidated
Federal income tax return and (b) the amount of tax that
would have been paid by FTL if it had filed separate tax re-
turns for the periods it was included in the consolidated Fed-
eral income tax return of TI. (See order 73-11-8).
ov. &. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFicE; 1977 249544 867
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