Opposition — Tiger International, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board

Supreme Court brief1977

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In the Supreme Court of the mae as na B

OCTOBER TERM, 1977

TIGER INTERNATIONAL, INC. and THE FLYING

TIGER LINE INC., PETITIONERS

Vv.

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

IN OPPOSITION

WADE H. McCREE, JR.,

Solicitor General,

JoHN H. SHENEFIELD,

Assistant Attorney General,

JAMES C. SCHULTZ, JOHN J. POWERS, III,

General Counsel, FREDERIC FREILICHER,

Attorneys

Gary J. EDLES .

. Department of Justice,

Deputy General Counsel, Washington, D.C. 20530.

GLEN M. BENDIXSEN,

Associate General Counsel,

THOMAS L. Ray,

Attorney,

Civil Aeronautics Board,

Washington, D.C. 20428.

a

Page

ae 1

Jurisdiction ___. RAEN RO Oe OOS Re Te OM Ee 1

Questions presented 2

TTT AAPA 2

patent ‘ csteitdlaanihltiieilodaeibaaien 2

FEE Perens 7

Conclusion ‘ 18

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ERE SUN ee aa eee ae ve lla

CITATIONS

Cases:

Air Carrier Reorganization Investigation,

CAB Orders 75-10-65/66 (October 17,

1975) and 75-1-121 (January 30,

a EE aS EES 5. 6

Associated Industries of New York State,

Inc. v. United States Department of

Labor, 487 F.2d 342 —.................. 15

Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-

Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S.

Sgt ot RD San _ 15, 16

Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S.99 ss 8, 10

Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 - ——_

Dan-Air Services, Ltd. v. Civil Aeronau-

tics Board, 475 F.2d 408 - 9

Federal Power Commission v. Colorado In

terstate Gas Co., 348 U.S. 492 S

II

. II

Cases—Continued | Page Statutes—Continued —_—

"a ioe wimventen™ Section 1006(a), 49 US.C. 1486(a). 2,6

pany nion Department, AF L-CIO - Section 1006(e), 49 U.S.C. 1486(e) 12, 16

Island Airlines, Incorporated v. Civil IIIT <iivrnciccibictes Schctsednbcieuiindechigieamaines 13

Aeronautics Board, 363 F.2d 120 - 15 REARS ee eee al 3

Law Motor Freight, Inc. v. Civil Aeronau- Be TIT isiessstinceeniasccirnotensehactianelaternabehcses 9

tics Board, 364 F.2d 139, certiorari

denied, 387 U.S. 905 _......... 16

Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184... s- 9, 10

Morris v. Gressette, No. 75-1583, decided

hance ecescsnrncresiniosig 10

Nebraska Department of Aeronautics v.

Civil Aeronautics Board, 298 F.2d 286 16

Pillai v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 485 F.2d

IIE acl ctcesiinediedindelaiatla slide Sia cieikcacesnsasbcssitaien a 16

Statutes :

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.

551 et seq.:

5 U.S.C. 556 PoE ORR 12

5 U.S.C. 557 _ Dadietscte 12

5 U.S.C. 706(2) (A) - 12

5 U.S.C. 706(2)(E) .... ... 12

Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat.

731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. 1301 et seq. 2

Section 401(h), 49 U.S.C. 1371(h) 3

Section 408(a), 49 U.S.C. 1378(a) 2

Section 408(a)(5), 49 U.S.C. 1378

(a) (5) | 3

Section 408(b), 49 U. S. C. 1378(b) 13

Section 1005(f), 49 U.S.C. 1485(f) 12,16

Iu the Suprene Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1977

No. 77-256

TIGER INTERNATIONAL, INC. and THE FLYING

TIGER LINE INC., PETITIONERS

Vv.

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. A)

is reported at 554 F.2d 926. Civil Aeronautics Board

Order 70-6-119 is reported at 54 CAB 700. Board

Orders 73-12-106 and 75-2-1 (App. A and B, infra,

pp. la-22a) are not yet officially reported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered

on May 18, 1977. The petition for a writ of certio-

rari was filed on August 15, 1977. The jurisdiction

of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

(1)

2

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the court of appeals correctly held un-

timely, under the 60-day limitation period for seeking

direct review of orders of the Civil Aeronautics Board

(49 U.S.C. 1486(a)), petitioners’ 1975 challenge to

a 1970 Board order.

2. Whether the court of appeals correctly applied

the “arbitrary or capricious” standard of review, in-

stead of the “substantial evidence” standard, to orders

of the Civil Aeronautics Board, made in proceedings

where no evidentiary hearings were required or held,

imposing conditions on a tax allocation agreement be-

tween a holding company and its air-carrier subsidi-

ary to prevent impairment of the carrier’s financial

welfare and ability to perform its certificate obliga-

tions.

STATUTE INVOLVED

The relevant provisions of the Federal Aviation Act

of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. 1301

et seqg., are set forth at Pet. 2-4.

STATEMENT

In July 1969, petitioners’ predecessor, The Flying

Tiger Line Inc. (“Flying Tiger”), a certificated all-

cargo air carrier, requested the Civil Aeronautics

Board to disclaim jurisdiction over a proposed reor-

ganization under Section 408(a) of the Federal Avia-

tion Act, 49 U.S.C. 1378(a), and to approve the

transfer of the currier’s certificates of public con-

venience and necessity to the new operating company

to be formed under the reorganization plan.’ Flying

Tiger proposed to form a holding company, now Tiger

International (“TI’’), which would assume control of

a new corporation, The Flying Tiger Line (“FTL”),

which would continue the air carrier operation under

the transferred certificates of the original carrier. The

primary purpose of the reorganization was to facili-

tate diversification into businesses other than air

transportation (Pet. App. 2a).

The Board declined to disclaim jurisdiction over the

reorganization, inasmuch as a 1969 amendment to

Section 408(a)(5) of the Federal Aviation Act (83

Stat. 103) made it unlawful for “any person” to ac-

quire control of a certificated air carrier without

Board approval.*? Order 69-12-121 (December 29,

1969), 53 CAB 776. On May 5, 1970, by Order 70-6-

119 (the “1970 Order”), the Board approved the re-

organization subject to certain conditions (54 CAB

700). One condition required Board approval of inter-

company transactions affecting FTL, the air carrier,

which exceeded $100,000 in value.’ The Board im-

posed this condition “in order to protect the public

1Section 401(h) of the Act, 49 U.S.C. 1371(h), requires

Board approval before any certificate may be transferred.

2 Prior to the amendment, Board approval of acquisition of

control of a carrier was required only if the acquiring person

was an air carrier or other common carrier or was engaged

in a phase of aeronautics. The amendment required Board

approval for an acquisition of control by “any other person”

as well. See 49 U.S.C. 1378(a) (5).

’ The Board subsequently raised the limit to $1,000,000 (Pet.

App. 3a, n. 5).

4

against any impairment of the air carrier’s certifi-

cate obligations which might arise by reason of

the relationships or transactions among [TI] and its

subsidiaries and affiliates * * *.” 54 CAB at 703.

On June 24, 1970, Flying Tiger notified the Board

that it accepted the terms and conditions of the 1970

Order (R. 100). Accordingly, the Board thereupon

approved the transfer of the certificates from the

original carrier to the new corporation, FTL. Order

70-6-153 (June 29, 1970), 54 CAB 699. TI then

commenced its diversification program (Pet. App. 3a).

In 1973, pursuant to the condition concerning inter-

company transactions, petitioners TI and FTL re-

quested Board approval of a tax allocation agreement.

Under the agreement, TI, the holding corapany, would

file a consolidated tax return for all its subsidiaries.

The subsidiaries would pay TI any tax that would

have been due had the subsidiary filed a separate tax

return, and each subsidiary would receive from TI

the same refund it would have received had it filed a

separate return. When a subsidiary’s net operating

loss, investment tax credits, or other tax credits re-

duced the group’s consolidated tax liability, TI would

credit the subsidiary for such tax savings. However,

if the carrier subsidiary, FTL, provided such tax sav-

ings, its credit would be paid in cash. Petitioners

sought approval of the agreement for the past tax

years 1971 and 1972 as well as for the future. They

did not request a hearing (Pet. App. 3a-5a).

The Board, by its “1973 Order,” approved the agree-

ment but added two requirements: (1) that the car-

5

rier could pay to the holding company only its pro-

portionate share of the group’s actual tax liability,

and (2) that the carrier would issue its own credits

to the other members of the group whose losses and

tax credits sheltered the carrier’s income from tax

liability (Pet. App. 5a). Order 73-12-106 (December

27,1973) (App. A, infra, pp. la-10a). Without these

conditions, the agreement would have required FTL

to pay TI $7.6 million for the 1971 and 1972 tax

years, even though TI paid no consolidated tax in

1971 and only $1.2 million in 1972 (App. A, infra,

p. 2a, n. 3). Thus, the Board explained, the holding

company would have the use of such cash payments

generated by the carrier “until the generation of

operating profits by the other subsidiaries requires

expenditure of the funds in payment of tax liabili-

ties attributable to those subsidiaries” (id. at 4a).

The Board’s conditions were designed to “provide

that the air carrier—rather than the holding company

—benefit from the use of the air carrier’s sheltered

income pending any required expenditure of_ such

funds on behalf of the other affiliates” (ibid.).

TI and FTL petitioned for reconsideration, again

not requesting a hearing. They contended that the

Board’s order was inconsistent with the Board’s prior

decisions and that it would prevent them from effec-

tively and efficiently operating as a holding company

group (R. 182). By its “1975 Order,” the Board

denied reconsideration. Order 75-2-1 (February 3,

1975) (App. B, infra, pp. 1la-22a).

The Board’s 1973 Order modifying petitioners’ tax

allocation agreement was, by its own terms, “a tempo-

6

rary measure,” adopted pending completion of a

thorough investigation of the benefits and risks in-

herent in air carrier reorganizations such as petition-

ers’. Pet. App. 5a; Order 73-12-106 (App. A, infra,

p. 5a, n. 4). In that investigation, the Air Carrier

Reorganization Investigation (“ACRI’), the Board

ultimately concluded, after hearings, that the public

interest requires that transactions between air car-

riers and their holding companies be subjected to a

regulatory plan. Orders 75-10-65/66 (October 17,

1975) and 75-1-121 (January 30, 1976) ; see Pet. App.

5a-6a.* That plan deals specifically with tax allocation

agreements and includes, with respect to such agree-

ments, the same requirements that were attached by

the Board to petitioners’ tax allocation agreement in

the 1973 and 1975 Orders. Ibid.

In 1975 FTL and TI petitioned for review in the

court of appeals, challenging both the Board’s modifi-

cation of their tax allocation agreement in the 1973

and 1975 Orders and the Board’s exercise of jurisdic-

- tion in the 1970 Order over their original reorganiza-

tion. The court of appeals dismissed the challenge to

the 1970 Order on the ground that petitioners had

failed to challenge that order within the 60-day time

limit set forth in Section 1006(a) of the Federal Avi-

ation Act, 49 U.S.C. 1486(a) (Pet. App. 6a-10a).

Then, holding that the timely challenge to the 1973

‘ Petitioners and other carriers have sought judicial review

of the ACRI orders. United Air Lines, et al. v. Civil Aeronau-

tics Board, C.A.D.C., Nos. 75-2165 et al. (argued February 18,

1977).

7

and 1975 Orders should be considered under the “arbi-

trary or capricious” standard of judicial review, not

the “substantial evidence” standard (Pet. App. 14a-

19a), the court upheld those orders. It found that

they “reflect rational decision making and, in par-

ticular, a not unreasonable evaluation of the tax-

allocation agreement’s potentially adverse impact on

FTL’s performance of its certificate obligations”

(Pet. App. 19a).

ARGUMENT

Petitioners contend that the court of appeals erred

because it (1) held untimely petitioners’ challenge in

1975 to the 1970 Order asserting jurisdiction over the

reorganization and requiring Board approval for

inter-company transactions; and (2) ruled that the

Board’s 1973 and 1975 Orders were subjeci to the

“arbitrary or capricious” standard of review rather

than the “substantial evidence” standard. Neither

issue merits this Court’s review on this record.

1. The court of appeals was correct in declining

to review the 1970 Order. Section 1006(a) of the

Act, 49 U.S.C. 1486(a), is the sole basis for the court

of appeals’ jurisdiction. It provides that Board orders

are subject to review “upon petition, filed within sixty

days after the entry of such order * * *,” and that

“{a]fter the expiration of said sixty days a petition

may be filed only by leave of court upon a showing of

reasonable grounds for failure to file the petition

theretofore.”

8

The statute plainly allows only sixty days within

which to challenge an order; it includes no exception,

such as petitioners propose (Pet. 14), for an order

related to subsequent orders of which timely review is

sought. To allow judicial review in the court of ap-

peals after the statutory time limit has expired “would

frustrate the congressional purpose, plainly evidenced

* * * to impose a 60-day limitation upon judicial re-

view * * *.” Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 108.

Petitioners can obtain no benefit from the statute’s

provision that an untimely petition for review may be

filed “by leave of court upon a showing of reasonable

grounds for failure to file the petition theretofore.”

They failed to show any reasonable ground for their

delay in attacking the Board’s 1970 Order. As the

court of appeals noted (Pet. App. 8a), petitioners

chose in 1970 to accept the Board’s conditional ap-

proval of their reorganization, with “full acceptance

of the conditions” (ibid., n. 12), and to forego

seeking review in the court of appeals. For five years

following that choice they accepted and enjoyed the

benefits of the Board-approved reorganization. This

Court has held that a firm whose merger was ap-

proved by a regulatory agency on specified conditions

“cannot now be allowed to attack an officially ap-

proved condition of the merger while retaining at the

same time all of its benefits. The impropriety of the

attack is rendered twofold because it is not made in

the merger proceeding but is attempted in a separate

* * * proceeding.” Federal Power Commission v.

Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 348 U.S. 492, 502. Ac-

9

cord, Dan-Air Services, Ltd. vy. Civil Aeronautics

Board, 475 F. 2d 408, 412 (C.A.D.C.). Having chosen

in 1970 not to challenge the Board’s order but to ac-

cept its benefits, petitioners cannot now claim that

their failure to make a timely challenge was based on

reasonable grounds.°

Petitioners also err in contending (Pet. 13) that

the court of appeals should have asserted jurisdiction

under Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184. That case in-

volved a certification order of the National Labor

Relations Board which, because it was not a final

order, was not reviewable in the court of appeals by

any available statutory procedure. Because there was

“no other means, within their control * * *, to protect

and enforce that right” (id. at 190; citation omitted),

the Court held that employees challenging the order

could do so in a district court under that court’s gen-

eral jurisdiction, conferred by 28 U.S.C. 1337, over

suits arising under acts uf Congress regulating com-

merce. Here, in contrast, the court.of appeals had no

such independent basis for exercising jurisdiction over

petitioners’ 1975 challenge to the 1970 Order. Its

jurisdiction for direct review of orders of the Civil

Aeronautics Board is both created and limited by

Section 1006(a) of the Federal Aviation Act (49

U.S.C. 1486(a)). And petitioners here, unlike the

° Petitioners claim (Pet. 15) that their conduct in “fore-

going timely review as prescribed by § 1006(a)” was justi.

fied by the “economic benefits” of the reorganization. Business

convenience, however, is not a reasonable ground for choosing

not to seek review within the statutory period.

10

plaintiffs in Leedom v. Kyne, had available to them

a means to protect and enforce their asserted right

in the court of appeals on timely petition for review

of the 1970 Order, a means they chose not to invoke.

Similarly unsound is petitioners’ contention (Pet.

14-15) that the court of appeals should have enter-

tained their challenge to the 1970 Order because they

alleged that the order was beyond the Board’s “juris-

diction.” Acceptance of this claim would all but elim-

inate the statute’s 60-day limit (and comparable lim-

its in other statutes), denying it force whenever the

Board’s action is alleged to exceed its statutory au-

thority. Petitioners cite no case countenancing disre-

gard of an express statutory time limit on such a

ground. In contrast to petitioners’ argument, this

Court has recently held that a 60-day statutory limit

on judicial review would be impermissibly undercut

if a claimant for disability benefits could seek review

from the denial of a petition to reopen his claim

(Califano v..Sanders, supra, 430 U.S. at 108), and

that the failure of the Attorney General of the United

States to object to a voting law change within the

statutory period of sixty days barred his subsequent

objection even when authorized by court order (Mor-

ris v. Gressette, No. 75-1583, decided June 20, 1977,

slip op. 11-12).

2. Petitioners also contend (Pet. 8-12) that the

court of appeals applied an erroneous standard of

review by examining the 1973 and 1975 Orders under

the “arbitrary or capricious” standard instead of the

“substantial evidence” test. We submit that as ap-

11

plied to these rulings of the Board, which did not

turn on findings of fact, the two standards are not

significantly different. Especially since the rulings in

this case have now been superseded by an industry-

wide regulation imposing similar conditions on tax

allocation agreements, there is no need for this Court

to review the standard that was applied in this case.

No hearing was requested by petitioners when they

submitted their tax allocation agreement to the Board

for its approval. No hearing was required by the

statute.° Under the Administrative Procedure Act,

reviewing courts are directed to determine whether

agency action is supported by substantial evidence

only in cases “subject to sections 556 and 557 of this

title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency

* As the court of appeals noted (Pet. App. 18a, n. 18):

TI and FTL do not contend that the CAB was statu-

torily required to hold a hearing on their application for

approval of the tax allocation agreement or on their

petition for reconsideration. Indeed, the record here pre-

cludes such an argument. In 1960, Congress amended

section 408 of the Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1378, to permit the

CAB, in certain circumstances and pursuant to certain

procedures, to dispense with a hearing in cases arising

under that section. Act of Sept. 13, 1960, Pub. L. No.

86-758, § 1, 74 Stat. 901, amending 49 U.S.C. § 18784b).

In the proceedings leading to the 1970 Order, the CAB,

after fully complying with that amendment, dispensed

with a hearing. In that Order, the CAB retained juris-

diction to impose, without a hearing, further conditions.

FlyingTiger accepted this provision, along with all others

in the Order. Under authority of this provision, the CAB

then conducted, without a hearing, the proceedings lead-

ing to the 1973 and 1975 Orders.

12

hearing provided by statute” (5 U.S.C. 706(2) (E)).’

The Administrative Procedure Act thus recognizes a

dichotomy between review of agency findings made on

a hearing record, where the “substantial evidence”

standard applies, and review of agency rulings that

do not turn on findings of fact, where the “arbitrary

or capricious” standard is applicable (see 5 U.S.C. 706

(2)(A)). This Court has also recognized that di-

chotomy. In Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, which in-

volved a determination by the Comptroller of the

Currency that was not required to be made after a

hearing on the record, the Court held that “the proper

standard for judicial review of the Comptroller’s ad-

judications is not the ‘substantial evidence’ test which

is appropriate when reviewing findings made on a

hearing record,” but “[t]he appropriate standard for

review was * * * whether the Comptroller’s adjudica-

tion was ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-

tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law’ * * *.”

411 U.S. at 141-142.

Petitioners contend, however, that this dichotomy

does not apply to judicial review under the Federal

Aviation Act. Because Section 1005(f) of the Act

(49 U.S.C. 1485(f)) provides that “[e]very order

of * * * the Board shall set forth the findings of fact

upon which it is based,” and because Section 1006(e)

of the Act (49 U.S.C. 1486(e)) provides that “[t]he

findings of fact by the Board * * * if supported by

’ Sections 556 and 557 of 5 U.S.C. concern proceedings

required by statute to be determined on the record after an

opportunity for an agency hearing.

13

substantial evidence, shall be conclusive,” petitioners

argue that the “substantial evidence” test applies

whether or not a hearing is conducted on the record

and whether or not a ruling of the Board turns on

findings of fact. In a case such as this one, peti-

tioners’ argument not only would put the Federal

Aviation Act at odds with the principles of judicial

review recognized by the Administrative Procedure

Act and by this Court in Camp v. Pitts but, as the

court of appeals noted (Pet. App. 18a-19a), it would

also require evidentiary proceedings where there were

no issues of fact to be resolved, where no hearing

was requested or held, and where Congress has ex-

pressly dispensed with a hearing requirement."

* In 1960, Congress amended Section 408(b) of the Federal

Aviation Act to permit the Board to dispense with hearings

where none had been requested and certain conditions were

met. 74 Stat. 901, 49 U.S.C. 1378(b), states:

Provided further, That, in any case in which the Board

determines that the transaction which is the subject of

the application does not affect the control of an air car-

rier directly engaged in the operation of aircraft in air

transportation, does not result in creating a monopoly,

and does not tend to restrain competition, and deter-

mines that no person disclosing a substantial interest then

currently is requesting a hearing, the Board, after publi-

cation in the Federal Register of notice of the Board’s

intention to dispose of such application without a hearing

(a copy of which notice shall be furnished by the Board

to the Attorney Generali not later than the day following

the date of such publication), may determine that the

public interest does not require a hearing and by order

approve or disapprove such transaction.

As the court of appeals noted, “(t]he primary purpose of

the 1960 amendment permitting the CAB to dispense with a

14

In any event, in the context of this case, where the

Board’s rulings of 1973 and 1975 did not turn on

findings of fact, the two standards of judicial review

are not significantly different. By its original 1970

Order subjecting inter-company transactions to Board

approval, the Board sought to insure fair treatment

for the carrier in the new corporate regime so as to

protect against impairment of its financial position

and its ability to provide air services (54 CAB

at 703). When petitioners in 1973 requested the

Board to approve their tax allocation agreement, the

Board was required to make a predictive and policy

judgment concerning the benefits and risks of the

agreement as they affected the carrier’s ability to

perform its certificate obligations. In making that

assessment the Board noted—a fact based on peti-

tioners’ own submission and apparently uncontested—

that under the agreement the carrier would pay to

the holding company, for the years 1971 and 1972,

amounts of cash far in excess of the holding com-

pany’s actual tax liability (Order 73-12-106, App. A,

infra, p. 2a, n. 3). Given the terms of the agreement,

the Board made the judgment that, “[c]onsidering the

holding company’s interlocking relationships with and

its effective control of the air carrier and the other

affiliates, it is, in our view, altogether unrealistic to

expect that the air carrier or the other affiliates

would not be completely responsive to the holding

hearing in some cases * * * was to facilitate CAB disposition

of section 408 cases, not to hinder that process.” Pet. App. 19a,

n. 20.

15

company’s bidding” (Order 75-2-1, App. B, infra,

p. 21a). The Board therefore concluded that, “inas-

much as FTL may continue in the foreseeable future

to be a principal, if not the primary, source of shelter-

able income” (Order 73-12-106, App. A, infra, p. 4a),

it was justified in imposing conditions designed to

protect the carrier’s ability to perform.

Such a ruling turned essentially on a predictive

judgment concerning the benefits and risks of the

agreement. Cf. Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aero-

nautics Board, 439 F. 2d 634, 640 (C.A.D.C.). The

Board’s decision concerning the conditions necessary

to protect the carrier rested “in the final analysis

on an essentially legislative policy judgment, rather

than a factual determination, concerning the rela-

tive risks of underprotection as compared to over-

protection.” Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO

v. Hodgson, 499 F. 2d 467, 475 (C.A.D.C.). When

a court reviews an administrative determination of

this kind, the concepts of “substantial evidence” and

not “arbitrary or capricious” tend to converge (As-

sociated Industries of New York State, Inc. v. United

States Department of Labor, 487 F. 2d 342, 349-350

(C.A. 2)), just as they do when general rules adopted

after informal rule-making are subject to review.

See Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodg-

son, supra. Cf. Island Airlines, Incorporated v. Civil

Aeronautics Board, 363 F. 2d 120, 125-126 (C.A. 9).

While the two tests are statutorily separate under

the Administrative Procedure Act (Bowman Trans-

portation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc.,

16

419 U.S. 281, 284),° whether they are actually coter-

minous in a given case depends on the nature of the

determination under review. Some Board actions rest

on factual predicates that require support by substan-

tial evidence; other actions involve the kind of policy

prediction presented by this case. In the latter situa-

tion the only “substantial evidence” that can be

examined on review is the presence or absence of a

rational basis for the administrative decision.

For these reasons, petitioners err in contending

that the ruling below conflicts with decisions of other

circuits purporting to apply the substantial evidence

test in Board nonhearing cases. See, e.g., Law Motor

Freight, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 364 F. 2d

139 (C.A. 1), certiorari denied, 387 U.S. 905; Ne-

braska Department of Aeronautics v. Civil Aero-

nautics Board, 298 F. 2d 286 (C.A. 8); Pillai v.

Civil Aeronautics Board, 485 F. 2d 1018 (C.A.D.C.).

Unlike this case, those decisions did not involve

Board action consisting essentially of a predictive

policy choice.”

*In Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight

System, Inc., supra, the Court applied the “arbitrary or capri-

cious” test to so much of an Interstate Commerce Commission

decision, made after a record hearing, as involved a prediction

of the burdens and benefits of new competitive service. The

supporting factual predicates were concededly sustained by

substantial evidence.

% As Bowman Transportation, Inc., supra, demonstrates

(see n. 9, supra, pp. 15-16), predictive policy choices must be

judged under the “arbitrary or capricious” standard. The lan-

guage of Sections 1005(f) and 1006(e) of the Act, 49 U.S.C.

17

Finally, tue conditions imposed by the Board’s

1973 and 1975 Orders on petitioners’ tax allocation

agreement have been superseded by similar conditions

in the ACRI decision which the Board adopted in 1976.

See pp. 5-6, supra. Since petitioners, with other

holding companies and their carrier subsidiaries, are

challenging the ACRI orders before the Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (ibid.;

see Pet. App. 6a, n. 9)," there is no need for the Court

to consider this case now.

1485(f) and 1486(e}, quoted supra, pp. 12-13, does not compel

use of the substantial evidence test in cases to which it would

not apply under the Administrative Procedure Act, i.e., cases

not involving disputed facts found after a record hearing. It

simply means what it says: that the Board’s findings of fact

shall be conclusive if they are supported by substantial evi-

dence.

" As the court of appeals noted (Pet. App. 6a, n. 9), the

ACRI orders do not moot the instant case. The ACRI orders

were adopted in May 1976 and are prospective only. Therefore,

they do not control petitioners’ tax allocation practices for

the two and one-half year period between adoption of the 1973

conditions and the ACRI orders.

18 la

CONCLUSION APPENDIX A

For the reasons stated, the petition for a writ of Order 78-12-106

certiorari should be denied. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

; CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

Respectfully submitted. WASHINGTON, D.C.

| Adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Board

at its office in Washington, D.C. on

WADE H. MCCREE, Jr., the 26th day of December, 1973

Solicitor General.

JOHN H. SHENEFIELD,

Assistant Attorney General.

JOHN J. PowErs, III,

FREDERIC FREILICHER,

Docket 21223

[Served Dec. 27, 1973]

Application of

Attorneys.

JAMEs C. SCHULTZ, THE FLYING TIGER LINE INC. AND

General Counsel, THE FLYING TIGER CORPORATION

Gary J. EDLEs, for approval of a tax allocation agreement

Deputy General Counsel, under paragraph 3 of Order 70-6-119.

GLEN M. BENDIXSEN,

Associate General Counsel, ORDER APPROVING AGREEMENT

THOMAS L. Ray, , . . 1.3

Attorney, The Flying Tiger Line Inc. (FTL) and The Flying

Civil Aeronautics Board. Tiger Corporation, (FTC) request modification of

Novesenen 1977, paragraph 3 of Order 70-6-119,’ adopted May 5, 1970,

to the extent necessary to permit implementation of a

tax allocation agreement effective with respect to

taxable years 1971 and 1972, as well as prospectively.

—- —_.

1 Order 70-6-119, May 5, 1970, approved the initial reor-

ganization resulting in the formation of FTL’s holding com-

pany parent, FTC. Ordering paragraph 3 thereof prohibited

transactions between FTL and FTC aggregately amounting

to $100,000 or more, absent prior Board approval.

2a

The agreement would treat the air carrier, for tax

purposes, as if it were otherwise unaffiliated. Thus,

the airline would pay to the holding company any

tax that would have been due were it filing returns

as an independent company, and would receive a re-

fund were it so entitled to one as a separate company.

Under circumstances where net operating losses,

investment tax credits or other tax credits generated

by FTL’s operations are applied in computing pay-

ment of taxes otherwise due from operations of its

affiliates FTL will immediately receive in cash the

value of the taxes saved.’ Other subsidiaries of FTC

are only entitled to receive a credit rather than cash

under circumstances where they have contributed tax

credits or operating losses to reduce or eliminate over-

all tax liability.’

No comments have been received.

After consideration, we have determined to approve

the tax plan, subject to exceptions and conditions.

Generally, we are satisfied that certain possibilities

otherwise adverse to the carrier’s interests are ab-

sent: no penalties will accrue to the air carrier by

virtue of its inclusion in the consolidated tax agree-

ment; the carrier will receive fair treatment with

2 Applicants reserve the right to adopt a different standard

at a later date should it then appear that FTL would have

tax credits or operating losses which it otherwise would not

be able to use.

* Upon approval of this agreement, FTL would pay to the

holding company $7.61 million representing its 1971 and 1972

independent tax liability. The group as a whole paid no taxes

in 1971 and only $1.2 million in 1972.

3a

respect to the use of its tax credits and loss carry-

forwards and carrybacks; and the implementation of

the agreement will have no direct adverse impact on

the carrier, inasmuch as Flying Tiger Line will in

no event pay more to the holding company than it

would pay to the government as an independent en-

tity. Additionally, the agreement should in fact re-

sult in certain benefits by allowing the air carrier

to realize an immediate cash payment for any tax

credits or net operating loss used by the holding

company which would not otherwise have accrued to

the air carrier until some future year.

As submitted, the agreement would provide a fur-

ther benefit to the air carrier, inasmuch as tax bene-

fits generated by any member would not be lost

through that member’s inability to utilize them with-

in a given statutory period to the extent that such

benefits had been previously applied by the holding

company parent in computing the consolidated re-

turn. However, inasmuch as applicants specifically

reserve the right to modify the agreement should

Flying Tiger Line be in a position to so benefit, this

advantage will not likely accrue to the air carrier.

On the other hand, one aspect of the agreement

poses some difficulty. Under the agreement, the air

carrier will be required to pay the amount of its

independent tax liability to the holding company

parent regardless of whether the holding company’s

consolidated tax return requires the payment of taxes

to the Government. To the extent cash payments by

the air carrier exceed the group’s consolidated tax

4a

liability, the holding company would have the use of

such funds until the generation of operating profits

by the other subsidiaries requires expenditure of the

funds in payment of tax liabilities attributable to

those subsidiaries, and payable on their behalf by the

holding company pursuant to the agreement.

In this respect, we will impose an alternative for-

mat, which would effect no different impact on other

subsidiaries of the holding company, but which would

provide that the air carrier—rather than the holding

company—benefit from the use of the air carrier’s

sheltered income pending any required expenditure

of such funds on behalf of the other affiliates. Par-

ticularly, we will require that the air carrier itself

retain possession of its sheltered profits, rather than

turning them over to the holding company; the air

carrier might allow a credit to affiliates contributing

to the shelter, as would the holding company pur-

suant to the instant agreement, and might subse-

quently pay tax contributions on behalf of contrib-

uting affiliates should any such affiliate subsequently

be in a position to have applied its contributed tax

benefits as an independent entity.

We believe such an alternative plan to be more in

the interests of the air carrier than the instant one,

and to be equitable to the holding company and to

each affiliate. This is especially true inasmuch as

FTL may continue in the foreseeable future to be a

principal, if not the primary, source of shelterable

income.

5a

The effect of our modification will be to permit

FTL to contribute, with other affiliates, a proportion-

ate share of the group’s consolidated tax liability,

and to issue credits to the affiliates whose losses and

tax credits were utilized to shelter the air carrier’s

taxable income. Contributions by the air carrier to

the group’s consolidated tax liability should be no

more than the sum of (a) an amount proportionate

to the air carrier’s independent tax liability in rela-

tion to the independent tax liability of all members

of the group showing a taxable income, and (b) an

amount required to redeem credits given by the air

carrier to other subsidiaries in prior years.*'"' The

tax proposal should be modified accordingly and the re-

vised tax plan should be forwarded to the Board in

this docket.*

To insure the Board’s ability to monitor the subse-

quent action of applicants pursuant to approval here-

in granted, we will require applicants to file with the

Board a copy of their consolidated tax return for ev-

ery year in which this proposal is effectively em-

ployed, as well as workpapers for each such year

s{sie) The Appendix provides an illustration of the proper ap-

plication of this formula.

* Approval of the tax plan pursuant to condition 3 of Order

70-6-119 is necessarily a temporary measure, to be superceded

by our decision in the Air Carrier Reorganization Investiga-

tion and any resulting implementation of tax review stand-

ards. Approval herein granted will extend to years 1971,

1972 and to any subsequent year for which a consolidated

return is filed prior to our final action in the Air Carrier

Reorganization Investigation.

6a

indicating the steps employed to reach the ultimate

allocation of cash payment and credits given.’ The

workpapers should at minimum set forth—for the

holding company and for each subsidiary—separate

taxable income (or losses) both before and after

adjustments, total tax credits (by type) and losses

generated for the year, total credits and losses car-

ried forward from the prior year, estimated inde-

pendent tax liability, total credits given by one sub-

sidiary to another, total cash contribution with re-

spect to the group’s consolidated tax liability, and

the manner of application of the foregoing items in

the computation of the current consolidated tax re-

turn. The Board should be promptly apprised of sub-

sequent adjustments of the consolidated return.*

The current tax proposal, as written, will in most

cases adequately protect the air carrier in the event

the holding company parent opts to revert to filing

of individual tax returns. However, inasmuch as the

agreement does not purport to provide for every con-

tingency which might arise in the event of such re-

version, we will require prior Board approval of any

termination of the agreement. Moreover, to insure

continued fair treatment to the air carrier respecting

* The filing of a consolidated tax return for calendar 1971

will not be required to the extent it is currently on file with

the Board, provided that any adjustments in the 1971 con-

solidated returns be brought to the Board’s attention. How-

ever, workpapers for 1971 will be required.

* Of course, the applicants will be given confidential treat-

ment with respect to this information.

Ta

tax returns, we will require prior Board approval of

any subsequent modification of the tax agreement,’

provided, however, that such prior approval shall

not be required with respect to specific changes to be

made pursuant to the modifications imposed herein.*

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

The subject tax proposal be and it hereby is ap-

proved pursuant to ordering paragraph 3 of Order

70-6-119, subject to the following: *

a. the terms of the agreement shall be modified

to provide that the air carrier shall retain the use

of its sheltered income, subject to (a) proportionate

contributions to the group’s consolidated tax lia-

bility, and (b) redemption of credits issued in prior

years by the air carrier to its affiliates, both as dis-

cussed in the body of this order;

? This condition is particularly required since the holding

company parent reserves the right to adopt a different stand-

ard at a later date should FTL appear unable to utilize, as an

independent entity, the tax benefits it generates. At the time

of any such modification, it will be necessary to assure that

Flying Tiger Line participates in any tax savings from its

inclusion in the consolidated return.

* Payment and credit transactions hereby approved shall

not be included in calculating the $100,000 figure which trig-

gers the prior-approval requirement of Order 70-6-119, or-

dering paragraph 3.

*The payment and credit transactions authorized by this

paragraph shall not be included in calculating the $100,000

figure which triggers the prior approval requirement of Order

70-6-119, ordering paragraph 3.

8a

b. the parties shall neither terminate nor modify

the terms of the tax agreement without prior Board

approval, provided, however, that such prior Board

approval shall not be required with respect to changes

required in accordance with paragraph (a) above;

ec. for each year in which this proposal is ap-

plicable, including 1971 and 1972, applicants shall

file workpapers described in the body of this order;

and for each year during which the agreement is ap-

plicable, beginning 1972, applicants shall file a copy

of their consolidated tax return;

d. The approval granted herein shall be subject to

modification, revocation, or attachment of further or

different conditions as the Board may, without hear-

ing, find appropriate in the public interest; and

e. The approval granted herein shall not in any

manner be relied upon by FTL for ratemaking or

other regulatory purposes not specifically considered

herein.

By the Civil Aeronautics Board:

EDWIN Z. HOLLAND

Secretary

9a

Consolidated

Year 1 Air Carrier Co. A Co. B Co. C Return

Income 1,000 2,000 8,000 4,000 10,000

Tax Liability * 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 5,000

Contributed to 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 5,000

Consolidated tax

liability

Year 2

Income 1,000 (4,000) 8,000 4,000 4,000

Tax Liability * 600 (2,000) ** 1,500 2,000 2,000

Contributed to

Consolidated tax

liability:

Independent tax 500 _ 1,600 2,000

liability

Less Credit to (260) 2,000 (750) (1,000)

Co. A

Total contribution 250 —o-— 760 1,000 2,000

Year 3

Income 1,000 2,000 8,000 4,000 10,000

Tax Liability * 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 5,000

Contribution to

Consolidated tax

liabiltiy:

Independent tax 500 1,000 1,500 2,000

liability

Redeem credits 126 (1,000) $75 500

given in prior year

—0-- 1,875 2,506 5,000

In Years 1 and 2, the air carrier contributions to

the group’s consolidated tax liability are in an amount

proportionate to the air carrier’s independent tax lia-

bility in relation to the independent tax liability of

all members of the group showing a taxable income.

In Year 2, however, the air carrier also credits Co. A

for the use of Co. A’s tax losses, the amount of the

credit given being calculated in the same ratio used

* Assumes a tax rate of 50%

** Tax effect of loss

10a

to determine the air carrier’s contribution to consoli-

dated tax liability.

In Year 3, the air carrier again contributes its pro-

portionate share of consolidated tax liability, as cal-

culated on the total taxable income of all members

showing a profit. However, it makes an additional

cash payment on behalf of Co. A to redeem a propor-

tionate share of credits given to Co. A in the prior

year, relative to the amount of total available credits

which Co. A can utilize to offset its income for the

year.

At the end of Year 3, the air carrier would still

have outstanding $125 in credits due Co. A, to be

proportionately contributed on that company’s behalf

to the extent that Co. A is able to call upon them in

future years.

lla

APPENDIX B

Docket 21223 Order 75-2-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C.

[Emblem ]

THE FLYING TIGER LINE INC.

CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS: INTERCOMPANY

TAX ALLOCATION

Docket 21223

[Served February 4, 1975]

Order 75-2-1

Adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Board

at its office in Washington, D.C.

on the 3rd day of February, 1975

Application of The Flying Tiger Line Inc. and Tiger

International, Inc. (formerly The Flying Tiger

Corporation), for approval of a tax allocation agree-

ment under paragraph 3 of order 70-6-119, as

amended

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION

By order 73-12-106, December 26, 1973, the Board

approved, subject to various conditions and modifica-

tions, a tax allocation agreement among The Flying

12a

Tiger Line Inc. (FTL), The Flying Tiger Corpora-

tion (FTC), now known as Tiger International, Inc.

(TI), and their affiliates, filed pursuant to paragraph

3 of order 70-6-119, dated May 5, 1970, as amended.’

The proposed agreement * was approved subject, inter

alia, to a condition modifying the proposed utilization

of tax savings resulting from the filing of a consoli-

dated tax return by the TI system of affiliated com-

panies.°

1Order 70-6-119, amended by order 71-7-6, July 1, 1971

and order 72-2-6, Feb. 2, 1972, inter alia, prohibited inter-

company transactions within the TI system of subsidiaries

and affiliated companies which amount in the aggregate to

$100,000 or more in any calendar year without prior Board

approval. Subsequent to its decision in this proceeding, the

Board by order 74-5-90, May 17, 1974 increased the dollar

limitation to $1 million.

* The agreement treated the air carrier, FTL, for tax pur-

poses as if it were otherwise unaffiliated. It provided that

the air carrier would pay to TI, the holding company, any

tax that would have been due were it filing returns as an

independent company, and would receive a refund were it

entitled to one as a separate company. It further provided

that under circumstances where net operating losses, invest-

ment tax credits, or other tax credits generated by FTL’s

operations are applied in computing payment of taxes other-

wise due from operations of the TI group, FTL would im-

mediately receive in cash the value of the taxes saved. Under

comparable circumstances, other subsidiaries of TI would

be entitled to receive redeemable credits from TI.

*The Board stated that contributions by the air carrier to

the group’s consolidated tax liability should be no more than

the sum of (a) an amount proportionate to the air carrier’s

independent tax liability in relation to the independent tax

liability of all members of the group showing a taxable income,

and (b) an amount required to redeem credits given by the

13a

TI and its wholly owned subsidiary, FTL, filed a

timely petition for reconsideration of order 73-12-106,

containing a request to present oral argument before

the Board.*

Petitioners contend, in effect, that the modification

of the original tax allocation agreement is inconsistent

with the Board’s policy and practice and would pre-

vent petitioners and their affiliates from conducting

business effectively and efficiently as a holding com-

pany group.

In support of their contentions, petitioners state,

inter alia, that the Board has consistently recognized

that tax allocation is a necessary concomitant of con-

solidated tax reporting, and generally has had only

two concerns: (1) that an air carrier within a cor-

porate group not be assessed an amount greater than

its independent tax liability would have been had it

reported on a separate basis, and (2) that an air

carrier be given immediate credit for the utilization

by affiliates of its losses, credits, and deductions in

lowering overall taxes. As a basis for their position

that the Board’s concern is so limited, petitioners

refer to Part 241 of the Board’s Economic Regulations,

to order 69-7-102, July 15, 1969, involving the acquisi-

tion of Air West by Hughes Tool Company, and to

the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (Au-

air carrier to other subsidiaries in prior years, and ordered

that, subject to these conditions, FTL shall retain the use of

its sheltered income.

* Petitioners’ contentions are set forth and amply discussed

in their filing, and we find that no useful purpose would be

served by oral argument.

l4a

gust 27, 1973) in the Air Carrier Reorganization In-

vestigation (docket 24283 et al.).°

Petitioners cite and appear to rely, at least in part,

upon Part 241 of the Board’s Economic Regulations *

as amended by ER-707 on September 22, 1971, effec-

tive on January 1, 1972." We find no inconsistency

between the recordkeeping and reporting require-

ments of Part 241 and our decision in order 73-12-

106.

Part 241 was designed to provide for a uniform

system of accounts and reports, requiring that all

certificated air carriers record their accounts and

make reports to the Board uniformly in accordance

with this system. ER-707 was designed to provide

more complete disclosures of transactions within af-

filiated groups of companies, and to set forth stand-

ards in accounting for such transactions. Applying

the general objectives of this amendment, section

2-18(d) prescribes a method for recording income

taxes of a regulated air carrier holding a certificate

of public convenience and necessity and of companies

affiliated with it.*

5’ The Reorganization Investigation is presently before the

Board for review.

* Part 241—Uniform System of Accounts and Reports for

Certificated Air Carriers (14 CFR 241).

* The Board gave notice that it had the amendment under

consideration by circulation of EDR-187, dated Sept. 9, 1970

(docket 22546) and published at 35 F.R. 14464.

® Sec. 2-18(d) provides as follows:

“(d) Income taxes shall be allocated among the transport

entities of the air carrier, its nontransport divisions, and mem-

l5a

The language of section 2-18(d), together with the

history of its promulgation, like that of Part 241 in

its entirety, clearly indicates that the rule and its

amendments merely establish recordkeeping and re-

porting procedures and methods in order to provide

the Board with more complete disclosures of transac-

tions within affiliated groups of companies. The

method prescribed by section 2-18(d) for recording

income taxes on a consolidated basis requires only

that the income tax expense to be recorded by the air

carrier shall be the same as would result if determined

for the air carrier separately for all time periods, and

that the tax effect of carryback, carryforward oper-

ating losses, investment tax credits, and other tax

credits generated by the air carrier shall be recorded

by the air carrier during the period in which applied

in settlement of the consolidated tax liability. The

recordkeeping and reporting requirements of section

bers of an affiliated group. Under circumstances in which

income taxes are determined on a consolidated basis by an

air carrier and other mmebers of an affiliated group, the

income tax expense to be recorded by the air carrier shall

be the same as would result if determined for the air carrier

separately for all time periods, except that the tax effect of

carryback and carryforward operating losses, investment tax

credits, or other tax credits generated by operations of the air

carrier shall be recorded by the air carrier during the period

in which applied in settlement of the taxes othewise attribut-

able to any member, or combination of mmebers, of the

affiliated group. Any difference between the income tax so

recorded and the amount at which settlement is to be made

shall be recorded in subaccount 88.1 Intercompany Transac-

tions Adjustment—Credit or in subaccount 89.1 Intercompany

Transactions Adjustment—Debit, as is appropriate.”

16a

2-18(d) are by no means declaratory of Board policy

with respect to particular intercompany agreements

relating to the subject matter of the reporting, and

in our view do not pertain to or focus upon the issue

raised in this petition, viz, the allocation of tax sav-

ings pursuant to an agreement between a certificated

air carrier and its affiliates. Moreover, to the extent

that section 2-18(d) may be considered as bearing,

however remotely, upon any Board policy or practice

with respect to such issues, we find no inconsistency

with our decision in order 73-12-106. Further, we are

unable to conclude that our decision in order 73-12-

106 is harmful to the financial integrity of the air

carrier, FTL, or more disadvantageous to the air

carrier than the tax allocation guidelines contained

in the decision of the Administrative Law Judge in

the Air Carrier Reorganization Investigation referred

to by petitioners.”

Petitioners also suggest that the continued adher-

ence to Board order 73-12-106 would not be in accord

with Board policy and practice as established by

Board precedent. However, petitioners acknowledge

that, about 1 month prior to order 73-12-106, pres-

ently under reconsideration, the Board had adopted,

in order 73-11-8, October 23, 1973” a similar tax

* However, we wish to stress that our action herein should

not be regarded as prejudging in any way our final determina-

tion on the merits of any issue in the Reorganization In-

vestigation.

1° This order involved an application filed by Braniff Air-

ways, Incorporated, and Braniff International Corporation in

docket 24048.

17a

allocation policy. The tax allocation requirement in

that case, which permitted no retention of consoli-

dated income tax savings by the parent holding com-

pany, Braniff International Corporation (BIC), was

imposed as a condition to the Board’s approval of a

reorganization plan involving Braniff Airways’ for-

mation of BIC, similar to FTL’s formation of FTC.”

Other cases cited by petitioners do not involve in-

stances of Board approval of an air carrier’s forma-

tion of a holding company,” and are not otherwise

inconsistent with the tax allocation determination in

the Braniff case or in order 73-12-106, under recon-

sideration herein.

In Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., Control of Braniff,

order E-25989, November 17, 1967, the issue of in-

come tax allocation was neither presented to nor de-

termined by the Board. We are not disposed to view

the Board’s inaction with respect to this issue at that

time as a determination of Board policy with respect

thereto.

In the Acquisition of Air West, Inc., by Hughes

Tool Company, order 69-7-102, July 15, 1969, the

Board imposed a condition on its approval of the ac-

11 Order 70-6-119, supra.

12 United Air Lines, Inc., order 69-4-67, Feb. 17, 1969, also

involved an air carrier’s formation of a holding company,

UAL, Inc. However, that proceeding antedated P.L. 91-62

(Aug. 20, 1969, effective on Aug. 5, 1969), which amended,

inter alia, sec. 408 of the Act (see order 70-6-119, supra).

Since the Board was then not empowered to assert jurisdic-

tion over the reorganization, and did in fact disclaim juris-

diction, it imposed no conditions.

18a

quisition which provided, inter alia, that “In no event

shall the tax burden or relief related to the air car-

rier division (Air West Division of Hughes Tool Com-

pany) be less favorable to that division as part of

Hughes Tool Company than would have been the case

had the division been taxed as a separate corporation.”

Thus, the Board expressly established at once both a

ceiling of tax burden and a floor of tax relief for an

air carrier division of an operating company, and

implicitly recognized the same parameters for an air

carrier subsidiary of such company (order 69-12-66,

November 26, 1969). Not inconsistently therewith,

by order 73-12-106 we made a determintaion which

focused on the intervening area with respect to a con-

solidated income tax allocation agreement between an

air carrier-formed holding company and the air car-

rier subsidiary. In these circumstances, we do not

find that determination, even though it may result

in tax relief to the air carrier above the minimum

requirement, to be contrary to established Board

precedent, disadvantageous to the air carrier, or as

imposing an undue tax burden on the air carrier-

formed holding company.”

Petitioners advance several contentions aimed at

demonstrating adverse consequences of the Board’s

18 We reiterate, as stated in footnote 9 supra, that our action

herein should not be regarded as prejudging in any way our

final determination on the merits of the issues in the Air

Carrier Reorganization Investigation, the scope of which is

limited to air carrier-formed holding companies (order 74-6-

18, June 4, 1974) and includes United Air Lines, Inc., as

well as Braniff and FTL as parties.

19a

decision in order 73-12-106. First, petitioners state

that this decision frustrates national tax policy in

that petitioners and their affiliates, North American

Car Corporation (NAC), are deprived of tax bene-

fits, such as accelerated depreciation and investment

tax credits. It is perfectly obvious that insofar as

the petitioner, FTL, is concerned order 73-12-106

deprives the air carrier of no tax beuefits whatso-

ever. Inde.d, it appears that the thrust of petitioners’

complaint is that FTL is acquiring more than its

share of combined group tax savings. With regard to

NAC and other subsidiaries of TI, we believe that

the availability to them of redeemable tax credits,

as provided in order 73-12-196, implements rather

than frustrates national tax policy.“ As to TI, there

is no contention that the parent holding company

generated any part of the total tax savings, and for

this reason, as in the Braniff case, we perceive no in-

equity to the holding company parent of FTL. To

the contrary, as a consequence of our decision in order

73-12-106, TI could share in the total tax benefits

arising from the combined tax reporting through the

availability of FTL’s immediate tax benefits (and

other tax savings lodged with FTL) for the payment

of dividends in accordance with paragraph 3(b) of

order 74-5-90, May 17, 1974.”

4% TI’s subsidiary, NAC, for example, will have available

to it no lesser tax benefits than it would have received had it

filed its income tax return as a separate entity.

This paragraph, further amending order 70-6-119, as

previously amended by orders 71-7-6 and 72-2-6, provides as

follows:

20a

Second, petitioners contend that order 73-12-106

makes it impossible for TI to function as a holding

company. However, petitioners acknowledge that the

holding company does not rely exclusively upon the

utilization of tax savings from consolidated tax re-

turns as a means of assuring the availability of funds

for investment in its nonairline subsidiaries. In-

deed, as discussed above, the tax savings lodged with

FTL could in some circumstances make available

to the holding company an increased dividend dis-

tribution with which to further its investment poli-

cies.

Third, petitioners contend that tax savings, if

lodged with the holding company, could be better

utilized in the latter’s discretion for investment in its

subsidiaries “as needed” than by FTL. We regard

this contention as highly speculative, and it may en-

tail a distribution of tax savings to affiliates without

“3(b). FTL shall make no payment of dividends on its

common stock without prior Board approval, except with

respect to dividend payments for any given calendar year

which are paid out of retained earnings in an aggregate

amount not in excess of 50 percent of its net income after

special items (line 9799 on CAB Form 41 Schedule P-1.2),

as determined in accordance with Part 241 of the Board’s

Economic Regulations (the Uniform System of Accounts), for

the calendar year immediately prior thereto, provided that

verification of compliance with this requirement, in a manner

acceptable to the Bureau of Accounts and Statistics, is made

by FTL within 90 days of the end of the calendar year for

which such dividend payments have been made, setting forth,

inter alia, the amount of retained earnings, net income, and

percentage basis for the payment of such dividends; * * *”

2la

any relationship to their respective contributions to

the combined tax savings.

Petitioners have offered, as an alternative to our

decision in order 73-12-106, to accept an allocation

agreement which would provide that tax allocation

payments by FTL or other affiliates to TI be made

discretionary, rather than mandatory as originally

agreed upon. This proposal is entirely illusory. Con-

sidering the holding company’s interlocking relation-

ships with and its effective control of the air carrier

and the other affiliates, it is, in our view, altogether

unrealistic to expect that the air carrier or the other

affiliates will not be completely responsive to the hold-

ing company’s bidding.

In view of the foregoing and in light of the counter-

vailing considerations for preserving the integrity

of the air carrier against inroads by TI in favor

of nonair carrier investments, we find, on balance,

that any alteration of our decision in order 73-12-

106 would not be warranted.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. Petitioners’ request for reconsideration of order

73-12-106 be and it hereby is denied;** and

1° The payment and credit transactions authorized by order

73-12-106 shall not be included in calculating the monetary

limitation figure which triggers the prior-approval require-

ment of order 70-6-119, ordering paragraph 3, as amended.

However, it is expected that within 90 days after the filing

of any consolidated Federal income tax return by TI which

includes FTL, FTL shall file with the Bureau of Operating

Rights a statement setting forth (a) the amount of tax paid

22a

2. All other motions and requests herein be and

they hereby are denied.

By the Civil Aeronautics Board:

EDWIN Z. HOLLAND

Secretary

[SEAL]

by FTL in connection with the filing of such consolidated

Federal income tax return and (b) the amount of tax that

would have been paid by FTL if it had filed separate tax re-

turns for the periods it was included in the consolidated Fed-

eral income tax return of TI. (See order 73-11-8).

ov. &. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFicE; 1977 249544 867

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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