Opposition — Lee Pharmaceuticals v. Den-Mat, Inc.
Supreme Court brief1977
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SEP 13 1977
RODAK, JR., CLERK
" Daw-Maz, Ind., Rosuur L. Inemx, W. Biomanp Grace,
Fun H. Baocx, anv Prorsastowat Propvcrs Co.,
3 Respondents.
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W. Richard Glace, Fred H. Brock, and Professional
Products Co. in-Opposition to Petition for
Wit of Certirari to the United Sates dan of Appeal
for the Ninth Circuit.
Of Counsel:
Fung, Fan s Wonne, Fe P. Fern,
368
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Local Rules Of The United States District Court For The
Central District Of California
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Supreme Court of the United States
Ocroszz Tzem, 1977
No. 77-244
Lez PHARMACEUTICALS,
Petitioner,
vs.
Dux-Mar, Ixo., Ronnar L. Issnx, W. Rionanůðͤ Grace,
Freep H. Brock, xD ProrgssionaL Propucts Co.,
Respondents.
Brief of Respondents Den-Mat, Inc., Robert L. Ibsen,
W. Richard Glace, Fred H. Brock, and Professional
Products Oo. in Opposition to Petition for
Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit.
Respondents Den-Mat, Inc., Robert L. Ibsen, W. Richard
Glace, Fred H. Brock, and Professional Products Co. herein
oppose the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. This consoli-
dated Petition seeks review of the following actions of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit:
(a) denial of a petition for writ of mandamus, under
28 U.S.C. § 1651, in Court of Appeals Petition No. 76-
3628, to review and to vacate:
(1) the District Court’s patent validity severance
Order No. 17;
(2) the District Court’s discovery Order No. 24;
(3) the District Court’s clarification Order No. 28;
and
(4) the District Court’s discovery scheduling Order
No. 29;
Brief in Opposition to Petition
2
(b) dismissal, for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.. C.
§ 1292(a)(1), in Court of Appeals Appeal No. 77-1214, of
appeals from:
(1) the District Court’s patent validity severance
Order No. 17;
(2) the District Court’s trade secret discovery Order
No. 21; and
(3) the District Court’s discovery Order No. 24;
(e) dismissal, for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1), in Court of Appeals Appeal No. 77-1215,
of an appeal from the District Court’s clarification Order
No. 28;
(ldd) denial of a petition for writ of mandamus, under
28 U.S.C. § 1651, in Court of Appeals Petition No. 77-1539,
to review and to vacate, inter alia:
(1) the District Court’s patent validity severance
Order No. 17;
(2) the District Court’s trade secret discovery Order
No. 21;
(3) the District Court’s discovery Order No. 24;
(4) the District Court’s conspiracy severance Order
No. 25;
(5) the District Court’s Order No. 26, striking certain
of counterdefendants’ defenses ;
(6) the District Court’s clarification Order No. 28;
(7) the District Court’s discovery scheduling modifi-
cation Order No. 32;
(8) the District Court’s trade secret Order No. 33;
(9) the District Court’s “clean up” Order No. 34; and
(10) the District Court’s Order No. 41, assessing costs
and attorneys’ fees against petitioner’s attorneys; and
(e) denial of an “emergency” application for writ of
mandamus and prohibition, under 28 U.S.C. § 1651, in
Court of Appeals Petition No. 77-2547, to review and to
vacate the District Court’s Order No. 80.
Brief in Opposition to ™stition
3
PROCEEDINGS BELOW
I. Proceedings In The District Court.
On October 27, 1976, the District Court, in Order No. 17,
severed, for separate trial pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 42(b),
“the question of the validity of the Lee Pharmaceuticals
patents in suit”. Also on October 27, 1976, the District Court,
in Order No. 21, announced its intention “to refer discovery
in the field of trade secrets to a special master”, and out-
lined certain procedures to be followed prior to the issuance
of an order of reference. In Order No. 24, filed November 1,
1976, the District Court denied, without prejudice to their
renewal at a more appropriate time”, petitioner’s motions to
file document requests directed to respondents Den-Mat,
Inc., Glace, and Brock, and a motion to take the deposition
of respondent Brock.
On November 4, 1976, petitioner noticed an appeal from
the District Court’s Order Nos. 17, 21, and 24, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §1292(a)(1), contending tat such orders “de
facto deny plaintiff a preliminary injunction” against re-
spondents’ alleged misappropriation of trade secrets and
trademarks, and against respondents’ alleged infringement
of petitioner’s trademarks and alleged related acts of un-
iin its Memorandum filed June 20, 1977, the District Court
its then-recent decision “that it would be more convenient if
written order was numbered for ease of reference. The court
assigned a number to every written order which ruled on the merits
addressed substantive
Brief in Opposition to Petition
4
fair competition. An application for a hearing on such a
preliminary injunction had been filed by petitioner in the
District Court on April 7, 1976. The appeal from the District
Court's Order Nos. 17, 21, and 24 was docketed in the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals as Appeal No. 77-1214.
On November 2, 1976, the District Court, in Order No. 25,
severed, pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 42(b), “the issue of whether
or not a conspiracy existed between plaintiff and its attor-
neys” to procure the patents in suit by fraud upon the
United States Patent and Trademark Office, ordered that
issue “separated from all other issues in this case” for trial
“after all other issues have been disposed of”, and, [until
that time, no discovery in this area will be allowed.”
In Order No. 26, also filed on November 26, 1976, the Dis-
trict Court struck certain affirmative defenses of the coun-
terdefendants, including petitioner herein.
In response to several motions of petitioner, the District
Court filed Order No. 28 on December 1, 1976. In this Order
the District Court noted that, in its 18 months of existence,
this litigation had “become a gigantic, grotesque monster of
procedural strife”, “generating some twenty-six file folders
of pleadings” with but “little progress toward resolution
on the merits”, with the result “that some unusual and inno-
vative procedures would have to be brought into play if any
meaningful progress was to be made.” The District Court
then reconsidered, and adhered to, the rulings set out in
Order Nos. 17 and 24.
Petitioner noticed an appeal from Order No. 28 on
December 2, 1976, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(a)(1),
contending that this order, too, “de facto denies plaintiff a
preliminary injunction.” This appeal was docketed in the
Ninth Cireuit Court of Appeals as Appeal No. 77-1215.
— — — —
Brief in Opposition to Petition
5
On December 1, 1976, the Distriet Court issued discovery
scheduling Order No. 29. On December 6, 1976, the District
Court, in Order No. 30, denied petitioner’s request for a stay
of all proceedings pending resolution of Ninth Circuit
Appeal No. 77-1214, noting (1) that a stay would not
preserve the status quo; (2) the inconsistency of a stay
with petitioner’s demand for a preliminary injunction;
(3) the requirement for “discovery which is necessary
before a fair hearing on the injunction application could
ever be had”; and (4) the District Court’s view that
“the appeal is frivolous and is merely a maneuver on the
part of the plaintiff to further delay the progress of the
lawsuit. Such a conclusion is implicit in plaintiff’s sug-
gestions that a stay might well force defendants to settle
because of their inability to further finance the litigation.”
On December 10, 1976, the District Court filed discovery
schedule modification Order No. 832, and its trade secret
discovery Order No. 33. In the latter Order, the District
Court adhered to its October 27, 1976 Order No. 17.
On December 13, 1976, petitioner filed a petition for an
extraordinary writ in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651 and F. R. App. P. 21. Docketed
below as Petition No. 76-3628, this petition requested the
Court of Appeals, inter alia, to review and to vacate the
District Court’s Order Nos. 17, 21, and 24.
In Order No. 34, filed January 6, 1977, the District Court
disposed of certain matters pending as of November 22,
1976.
On January 13, 1977, pursuant to the District Court’s
Order No. 36, petitioner was allowed “to pursue discovery
in order for it to determine what claims of its patents it
believes are being infringed by defendants.”
Brief in Opposition to Petition
6
In response to a motion filed by respondents on Decem-
ber 23, 1976, the District Court, in Order No. 41, filed
February 16, 1977, found that two motions of petitioner,
seeking “reconsideration of prior rulings of the court”,
without compliance with Local Rule 3(k) of the United
States District Court for the Central District of California,
were “frivolous and warrant sanctions”. Accordingly, peti-
tioner’s counsel, who are not parties herein, were directed
to pay to respondents’ counsel, within thirty days, the sum
of $1200 “as reimbursement for costs and attorneys’ fees
expended in opposing such motion”?.
On March 2, 1977, petitioner herein filed in the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals a petition for extraordinary writ
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651 and F. R. App. P. 21. Docketed
in the court below as Petition No. 77-1539, this petition re-
quested the Court of Appeals, inter alia, to review and to
vacate the District Court’s Order Nos. 17, 21, 24, 25, 26, 28,
32, 33, 34, and 41.
In accordance with its intentions, announced in Order
No. 17, and adhered to in Order Nos. 28 and 33, the District
Court, in Order No. 59, filed April 25, 1977, appointed
a special master to oversee “the entire issue of trade
secrets”. In response to petitioner’s objection to the
appointment of a special master for this purpose, Order
No. 59 was vacated in Order No. 66, filed May 12, 1977, and
petitioner was directed to “furnish this court, in camera,
a detailed statement of all trade secrets which it claims are
being misappropriated” by respondents. In response to
petitioner’s motion “to defer operation of Order No. 66
pending clarification at the June 6, 1977 hearing”, filed
propriety
tions, is before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Ne 77.19
Brief in Opposition to Petition
7
May 19, 1977, the District Court, in Order No. 72, filed
May 26, 1977, directed petitioner to file “on the record an
exact, explicit, specific, detailed, and step-by-step statement
of each and every claimed trade secret”, and set out in
minute detail the form which such “statement” was to take.
On June 2, 1977, petitioner moved to vacate Order No. 72.
This motion was denied on its day of filing, in Order No. 75,
the District Court finding that its jurisdiction had not been
ousted by then-pending Ninth Circuit Appeal Nos. 77-1214
and 77-1215, and further, that
“this motion has been filed for the sole purpose of
disrupting this court’s efforts to move this case along
toward some ultimate conclusion.”
In Order No. 80, filed June 28, 1977, the District Court
noted that
“(flor nearly fifteen months the plaintiff has been seek-
ing a preliminary injunction against alleged misappro-
priation by the defendants of plaintiff’s trade secrets.
This hearing has not gone forward because the plaintiff
has not yet identified what trade secrets it asserts are
being misappropriated. In fact, plaintiff has thus far
thwarted every effort of the court to obtain it”,
and ordered
“that the information which plaintiff is required to pro-
duce under Order No. 72 shall be furnished the court in
camera. Order No. 72 shall in all other respects remain
unchanged. Plaintiff is already in default in having failed
to produce the information requested within the time
specified in Order No. 72, but compliance with the order
will be accepted by this court provided the information
is filed not later than June 30, 1977.”
Petitioner’s statement of trade secrets was filed in camera
on June 30, 1977. Order No. 80 also required respondents to
Brief in Opposition to Petition
8
file a statement of their trade practices, similar in detail
to that required of petitioner in Order No. 72.
On July 8, 1977, respondents filed a “motion for recon-
sideration of Order No. 80”, contending that their trade
practices had twice been revealed to petitioner’s counsel
pursuant to protective orders in effect in the District Court,
in written documents previously produced or forwarded to
petitioner’s counsel. In Order No. 81, filed July 13, 1977,
petitioner was granted one week’s time
“to bring to the court’s attention any further information
which is needed concerning the defendants’ trade prac-
tices, and the reasons why plaintiff’s statement of trade
secrets should not now be released to defendants’ counsel
with the restricted information status.”
Petitioner’s response to Order No. 81 resulted in the fil-
ing, on August 5, 1977, of the District Court’s Order No. 83.
Order No. 83 directed petitioner and respondents to submit,
by September 2, 1977, all arguments and materials in sup-
port of, and in opposition to, respectively, the preliminary
injunction sought by petitioner in April 1976.
In response to Order No. 83, petitioner filed a paper on
or about August 12, 1977, in which it stated that it was
not prepared to proceed and therefore respectfully
declines to proceed in the manner defined in Order No. 83,
filed August 5, 1977.”
In Order No. 84, filed August 16, 1977, the District Court
carefully considered, and rejected, the arguments advanced
by petitioner in its response to Order No. 83. Order No. 84
concluded :
“The court expects plaintiff to comply fully with Order
No. 83.”
——————
Brief in Opposition to Petition
9
On September 2, 1977, respondents served, and on Sep-
tember 6, 1977, they filed, two memoranda, five affidavits,
12 volumes of exhibit-containing appendices, and a motion
for summary judgment of dismissal of petitioner’s trade
secret and trademark infringement/unfair competition
claims. Petitioner neither served nor filed any papers in
compliance with the mandate of Orders Nos. 83 and 84.
II. Proceedings In The Court Of Appeals.
On March 28, 1977, the Court of Appeals, over the signa-
tures of Circuit Judges Ozell M. Trask and J. Clifford Wal-
lace, issued the following Order in Ninth Circuit Appeal
Nos. 77-1214 and 77-1215, and in Ninth Circuit Petition Nos.
76-3628 and 77-1539, [u] pon due consideration“:
„(a) the petition for writ of mandamus, No. 76-3628
is denied ;
“(b) the petition for writ of mandamus, No. 77-1539
is denied ;
„e) the motion for extension of time is treated as a
motion to file late response and is granted;
“(d) the motion for stay is denied; and
“(e) appet s Nos. 77-1214 and 77-1215 are dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction, the orders appealed from not being
appealable.”
Also on March 28, 1977, the Clerk of the Court of Appeals
addressed a letter to “All Counsel”, informing them of the
dismissal of appeal Nos. 77-1214 and 77-1215 “for lack of
jurisdiction.”
On April 4, 1977, Petitioner filed a motion addressed to
the court en banc, requesting that the March 28, 1977 Order
be vacated on the basis that such Order had been issued by
“a panel or division consisting solely of two judges.”
Brief im Opposition to Petition
10
On April 28, 1977, a Revised Order, which was “Before”
Circuit Judges Trask, Wallace, and Herbert Y. C. Choy,”
albeit unsigned, provided in Ninth Circuit Appeal Nos.
77-1214 and 77-1215 and Petition Nos. 76-3628 and 77-1539:
“On April 4, 1977, Lee Pharmaceuticals filed two emer-
gency motions requesting a suspension of the periods for
seeking rehearing and issuance of the mandate and for
en banc consideration of the authority of the panel which
issued this Court’s order of March 28, 1977. Solely to
facilitate the proceedings in the district court, the court
issues the following order:
„(a) The petition for writ of mandamus, No. 76-3628
is denied ;
“(b) The petition for writ of mandamus, No. 77-1539
is denied;
„(e) The motion for extension of time is treated as
a motion to file late response and is granted;
“(d) The motion for stay is denied;
“(e) Appeal Nos. 77-1214 and 77-1215 are dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction, the orders appealed from not
being appealable;
“(f) The emergency motion addressed to the court
en banc shall be treated as a suggestion for hearing
en banc and shall be circulated to the active bench for
a vote; and
“(g) The emergency motion to suspend the periods
of time for rehearing and issuance of the mandate is
denied and new periods of time pursuant to Rules 40
and 41 Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure shall com-
mence from the date of the entry of this order.
Brief in Opposition to Petition
11
This order shall in no way be construed as a comment
on the merits, or lack thereof, of the arguments set forth
in the emergency motion addressed to the court en banc.”
On July 7, 1977, the Court of Appeals issued the following
unsigned Order in Appeal Nos. 77-1214 and 77-1215 and in
Petition Nos. 76-3628 and 77-1539:
“The emergency motion addressed to the court en banc
having been circulated to the active bench and no judges
electing to accept the suggestion for hearing en banc, the
motion is hereby denied.”
On July 11, 1977, the Court of Appeals issued the follow-
ing unsigned Order in Appeal Nos. 77-1214 and 77-1215:
“Upon due consideration, the petition for rehearing en
bane regarding the Court’s dismissal of appeal nos. 77-
1214 and 77-1215 for lack of jurisdiction is denied.”
On July 13, 1977, the Court of Appeals, in an unsigned
Order “Before” Circuit Judges Trask, Choy, and Wallace,
ruled:
„(a) the motion for extension of time to file petitions
for rehearing is granted and the petitions heretofore
received are ordered filed;
„(b) the motions to defer consideration of the petitions
for rehearing are denied;
„(e) the ‘supplementation and petition for rehearing’
filed in no. 76-3628 is denied; and
“(d) the ‘supplementation and petition for rehearing’
filed in no. 77-1539 is denied.”
On July 14, 1977, the Court of Appeals, over the signa-
tures of Circuit Judges Trask and J. Blaine Anderson, is-
sued the following Order in Ninth Circuit Petition No.
77-2547:
“Upon due consideration, the petition for writ of man-
damus is denied.“
Brief in Opposition to Petition
12
On or about August 17, 1977, Petitioner filed a Supple-
ment” to its Petition in this case, reproducing in such “Sup-
plement’s” appendix, other allegedly infirm, two-judge
orders issued by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and
presently before this Court in No. 77-4.
In a related case, No. 77-259, Petitioner herein seeks a
second Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. No. 77-259 seeks
review of such Court of Appeals’ Orders dated July 12 and
26, 1977, in Ninth Circuit Petition No. 77-1969, denying dis-
qualification of the assigned United States District Judge
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
_o—_ id
Brief in Opposition to Petition
13
QUESTIONS PRESENTED.
1. Does 28 U.S.C. $46(d), which provides that [a]
majority of the number of judges authorized to constitute a
court or division thereof, as provided in paragraph (c),
shall constitute a quorum”, in accordance with established
legal precepts and rules of statutory construction, so modify
28 U.S. C. $§ 46(b) and (e) to permit determinations in civil
appeals and petitions for extraordinary writs, exclusive of
those emanating from three-judge trial courts or from
administrative agency determinations, to be made by only
two judges?
2. No matter whether the answer to Question 1 is affirm-
ative or negative, does any paragraph of 28 U.S.C. § 46
permit a party before a Court of Appeals to select, or par-
ticipate in the selection of, the judges who shall constitute
the panel or division assigned to hear and decide his appeal
or petition for an extraordinary writ?
Brief im Opposition to Petition
14
STATUTES INVOLVED.
This Petition nominally concerns 28 U.S.C. § 46, which
provides:
46. Assignment of judges; divisions; hearings;
quorum ,
“(a) Circuit judges shall sit on the court and its
divisions in such order and at such times as the court
directs,
„b) In each circuit the court may authorize the
hearing and determination of cases and controversies
by separate divisions, each consisting of three judges.
Such divisions shall sit at the times and places and
and hear the cases and controversies assigned as the
court directs.
„(e) Cases and controversies shall be heard and
determined by a court or division of not more than three
judges, unless a hearing or rehearing before the court
in banc is ordered by a majority of the circuit judges
of the circuit who are in regular active service. A court
in bane shall consist of all circuit judges in regular
active service. A circuit judge of the circuit who has
retired from regular active service shall also be com-
petent to sit as a judge of the court in bane in the
rehearing of a case or controversy if he sat in the
court or division at the original hearing thereof.
“(d) A majority of the number of judges authorized
to constitute a court or division thereof, as provided in
paragraph (e), shall constitute a quorum.”
Brief in Opposition to Petition
15
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The complaint in this extraordinary case, filed July 7,
1975 and naming respondents Den-Mat, Inc. (“Den-Mat”),
Ibsen, and Professional Products Co. as defendants, alleged
willful infringement of two of petitioner’s patents, mis-
appropriation of an unspecified number of petitioner’s un-
identified trade secrets, and charged such respondents with
unidentified acts of unfair competition. Respondent Den-
Mat and petitioner compete in the manufacture, sale, and
distribution of composite restorative dental materials, i. e.,
compositions designed for use by dental practitioners in
the repair and restoration of living or artificial teeth. Re-
spondent Ibsen, president of Den-Mat, formerly conducted
clinical research, without compensation, for petitioner on
its developmental products prior to their distribution to
dental practitioners. Respondent Professional Products Co.
is a distributor of Den-Mat’s products.
The presently viable Second Amended Complaint, filed
January 15, 1976, joins two of petitioner’s former employ-
ees, respondents Glace and Brock, as defendants, alleges
willful infringement of three of petitioner’s patents and of
five of its federally registered trademarks, and persists in
its allegations of misappropriation of petitioner’s trade
secrets and unspecified acts of unfair competition.
The remaining counterclaims of Den-Mat and Ibsen, filed
April 28, 1976, allege:
(a) petitioner’s violation of the Federal Antitrust
Laws, particularly 15 U.S.C. §§1, 2, 13(a), 13(¢), 13(d),
13(e), and 14;
(b) petitioner’s violation of the California Cartwright
Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 16600 and 16700 et seq.,
the California Unfair Practices Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof.
Brief in Opposition to Petition
16
Code $§ 17000 et seg., and other provisions of the Cali-
fornia Business and Professions Code,
(c) petitioner’s false marking of its products, in vio-
ation of 35 U.S.C. §4 292(a) and (b); and
(d) petitioner’s acts of unfair competition and tor-
tious interference with existing and prospective business
relationships.
Counterdefendants named in such counterclaims include
petitioner, petitioner’s president, and the wife of petitioner’s
president. Co-conspirators named in such counterclaims in-
clude, inter alia, counsel to petitioner, at least in their roles,
as alleged, in the procurement of the patents in suit by
fraud upon the United States Patent and Trademark Office,
and in filing and prosecuting this extraordinary litigation.
Indicia of the extraordinary nature of this case, to the
extent not communicated in the “Proceedings In The Dis-
trict Court”, supra, include, inter alia, the following:
(a) the holding of 18 normally noticed and ez parte
hearings by the District Court;
(b) the District Court’s issuance of 84 orders before
a trial on the merits;
(c) petitioner’s filing of at least 27 motions to compel
discovery pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 37(b);
(d) petitioner’s filing of at least 20 motions for pro-
tective orders, “deferrals”, extensions or enlargements
of time, stays, and suspensions of proceedings;
(e) petitioner’s filing of no fewer than four motions
to disqualify the Honorable Jesse W. Curtis, the assigned
District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §455(a);
Bri f in 0 iti to P titi
17
(t) the filing, by petitioner, or by its counsel, before
a trial on the merits, of nine appeals and petitions for
extraordinary writs in the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit;
(g) the filing, on behalf of petitioner, of a psychia-
trist’s affidavit in Ninth Circuit Petition No. 77-1969",
which purports to attest, inter alia, to Judge Curtis’
disposition against petitioner and its counsel; and
(h) the assignment, on August 19, 1977, by the Honor-
able Albert Stephens, Jr., Chief Judge of the United
States District Court for the Central District of Cali-
. fornia, of the Honorable Martin Pence, United States
District Judge for the District of Hawaii, “to review
the affidavits and averments filed” in the District Court
“in support of plaintiff’s contention that Judge Curtis
should be disqualified and to determine whether there is
any basis upon which his impartiality might reasonably
be questioned.”
Such extraordinary proceedings are explained by the
extraordinary litigation philosophy of plaintiff’s trial coun-
sel, as articulated in paragraphs 3-5 of an “Affidavit of
Mary Helen Sears In Support of ‘Motion For Retraction
And Expungement From The Record Of Statements Made
By The Court On January 20 [10], 1977 Which Reflect
Adversely Upon Counsel For The Plaintiff” (Appendix,
p. Al), filed in the District Court on February 2, 1977.
Such extraordinary litigation philosophy has failed to
impress the District Court and the Court of Appeals. In the
latter forum, three petitions for extraordinary writs which
are subjects of the instant Petition, Nos. 76-3628, 77-1539,
®The affidavit is set out in the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
No. 77-259, at p. 22a et seq.
Brief in Opposition to Petition
18
and 77-2547, were denied, and two appeals, Nos. 77-1214
and 77-1215, were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Seizing, however, upon the Court of Appeals’ apparent
assigrment of two-judge panels or divisions to hear and
decide civil appeals and petitions for extraordinary writs,
in the absence of disagreement between members of such
two-judge courts, petitioner posits a deprivation of its
right to a hearing before three judges, believed by it to be
granted by 28 U.S.C. § 46, and demands hearings, de novo,
before three-judge courts, none of whose members have
previously considered petitioner’s appeals and petitions.
Examined closely, petitioner’s contentions are totally
without merit.
Brief in Opposition to Petition
19
ARGUMENT.
A. The Procedures Of The Ninth Circuit Court Of Appeals
In Deciding Cases And Controversies Are In Accord
With Established Legal Precepts And Rules Of Statu-
tory Construction.
In the absence of contrary knowledge, respondents
accept as true, for purposes of the instant Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, the procedures of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals as set out in the Petition’s Appendix B.
However, even if true, the such procedures provide peti-
tioner with no grievance under 28 U.S.C. § 46.
Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S.
326 (1941), definitely construed former Section 212 of
Title 28, United States Code, a predecessor to the present
28 U.S.C. § 46. Former Section 212, deriving from § 117
of the 1911 Judicial Code, provided that:
“There shall be in each circuit a circuit court of appeals,
which shall consist of three judges, of whom two shall
constitute a quorum, and which shall be a court of record,
with appellate jurisdiction, as hereinafter limited and
established”. 314 U.S. at 328.
This Court rejected any literal reading of 5 117, 314 U.S.
at 330, and emphasized that
“Though the problem of construction is beset with diffi-
culties, the conclusion that §117 provides merely the
permissible complement of judges for a circuit court of
appeals results in greater harmony [footnote omitted]
than if the language of 117 is taken too literally.”
314 U.S. at 328; emphasis supplied.
Former Section 212 of Title 28, United States Code, also
received more than passing notice in Ayrshire Collieries
Corp. v. United States, 331 U.S. 132 (1946). At issue in
Brief im Opposition to Petition
20
shire Collieries was the propriety of an order issued
by only two judges under the Urgent Deficiencies Act,
former Section 47 of Title 28, United States Code.“ This
Court concluded that
“(wjhen the framers of the Urgent Deficiencies Act
declared that these applications ‘shall be heard and
determined by three judges,’ we assume that they meant
exactly what they said.
“Tt is significant that this Act makes no provision for
a quorum of less than three judges. Two judges of a
three-judge circuit court of appeals, on the other hand,
ordinarily constitute a statutory quorum for the hearing
and determination of cases [footnote omitted]. 28 U.S.C.
212. 28 U. S. C. A. 212. The absence of such a quorum provi-
sion as to three-judge district courts is a strong cor-
roborating indication that participation by all three
judges is necessary to render a valid decision.” 331 U.S.
at 137, 138-139; emphasis supplied.
Given the foregoing comparison of procedures to be
followed by a Court of Appeals, as opposed to a three-
judge district court, coupled with the express “quorum”
provision of 28 U.S.C. § 46d), the conclusion is inescap-
able that participation by each of three circuit judges in
the hearing and determination of causes is not necessary
for the rendition of valid Circuit Court decisions.
The hearing and determination of cases and controver-
sies is the subject of both paragraphs (b) and (c) of
28 U.S. OC. § 46. Section 46(b) contains the seemingly man-
datory language:
*With to the Interstate Commerce Commission, present
statutes 28 U.S.C. §§ 2284 and 2325.
Brief in Opposition to Petition
21
“(b) In each circuit the court may authorize the hear-
ing and determination of cases and controversies by
separate divisions, each consisting of three judges.”
(Emphasis supplied.)
Such language, however, is expressly mollified by Section
46 (e):
„(e) Cases and controversies shall be heard and deter-
mined by a court or division of not more than three
jud ges.
Petitioner apparently urges your Honorable Court to
rewrite, by judicial fiat, 28 U.S.C. 5 46(c) to read:
„(e) Cases and controversies shall be heard and deter-
mined by a court or division of not less than three
judges... .”
The statute does not so read. Furthermore, when 28 U.S.C.
§$§ 46(c) and (d) are read in context, as they must be read,
the “majority” and “quorum” language of the latter
expressly authorize two judges of a Court of Appeals to
hear and decide cases and controversies.
Respondents’ Question No. 1 must be answered in the
affirmative; petitioner’s Question No. 1 must be answered
in the negative.
B. 28 U.S. O. § 46(c) Is A Grant Of Power To The Courts
Of Appeal, Precluding Any Assertion By A Litigant
Of A Right To Select, Or To Participate In The Selec-
tion Of, The Judges Who Shall Hear And Determine
His Cause.
28 U.S.C. § 46(c) was closely analyzed in Western Pacific
Railroad Corp. v. Western Pacific Railroad Co., 345 U.S.
247 (1953), in which Mr. Chief Justice Vinson framed and
responded to the issues as follows:
Brief in Opposition to Petition
22
“What particular right, if any, does it [i. e., 28 U.S. C.
§ 46(c)] give to a litigant in a Court of Appeals? To
what extent is he entitled to put the merits of his cause
before each member of the court in pressing his demand
for a hearing or a rehearing before the entire court?
“In our view, §46(c) is not addressed to litigants.
It is addressed to the Court of Appeals. It is a grant of
power. .. It neither forbids nor requires each active
member of a Court of Appeals to entertain each petition
for a hearing or rehearing en banc. The court is left
free to devise its own administrative machinery to pro-
vide the means whereby a majority may order such a
hearing.“ 345 U.S. at 250.
To reach petitioner’s second question, your Honorable -
Court would be required to rewrite 28 U.S.C. 5 46(c), as
noted above, and to ignore the express “majority” and
“quorum” language of 28 U.S.C. § 46(d). At its core, peti-
tioner’s second question asserts an unqualified right of a
disappointed Court of Appeals litigant to a second hearing
before an entirely different panel or division, or before a
Court of Appeals en banc. Western Pacific Railroad, supra,
expressly rejected any such purported right:
“Titigants are certainly given no special standing to
partake, as of right, in the court’s decisions pertaining
to the arrangement of its calendar and the assignment
of cases to divisions. Just as the statute makes no pro-
vision binding the court to entertain every request that
a particular case be assigned to a particular division, so
it should not be construed to compel the court to enter-
tain, en banc, motions for a hearing or rehearing en banc.
“A contrary reading—one which would sustain peti-
tioners—would obviously require & practice which might
— — 2 — 2 — —
Brief in Opposition to Petition
23
thrust unwarranted extra burdens on the court. It is
difficult to believe that Congress intended to give an
automatic, second appeal to each litigant in a Court of
Appeals composed of more than three judges. Yet peti-
tioners would have us hold that such a ‘horizontal’ appeal
is implicit in & 46... .” 345 U.S. at 258; emphasis supplied.
Question No. 2 of respondents, as well as of petitioner,
must be answered in the negative.
For the reasons set forth above, the Petition For A Writ
of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For
the Ninth Circuit should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
Of Counsel:
Funrn, Fam m & Wona, Faepenice P. Funrn,
Auron L. Masrm
Attorneys for Respondents.
SR erence —᷑——
— ..
Brief in Opposition to Petition
25
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of September, 1977,
three copies of the Brief of Respondents Den-Mat, Inc.,
Robert L. Ibsen, W. Richard Glace, Fred H. Brock, and Pro-
fessional Products Co. In Opposition To Petition For Writ
Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For
the Ninth Circuit, were served, in compliance with Supreme
Court Rules 33(1) and 33(2)(a), by air mail, postage pre-
paid, upon counsel to Petitioner, and upon the Solicitor
General of the United States, respectively. I further certify
that all parties required to be served have been served.
Freperick P. Funrn,
Forts, Fanener & Wone
Russ Building, Suite 1330
Sic
San Francisco, 94104
Attorney for Respondents.
Sas
*
NN
Ay > 5 Fis “ng
8 ar *
eee
M. H. Sears Affidavit (2/2/77)
“Al
PARAGRAPHS 3-5 OF AFFIDAVIT OF
MARY HELEN SEARS IN SUPPORT OF
“MOTION FOR RETRACTION AND EXPUNGEMENT
FROM THE RECORD OF STATEMENTS BY THE
COURT ON JANUARY 20, 1977 WHICH REFLECT
ADVERSELY UPON COUNSEL FOR THE
PLAINTIFF”
3. I am an experienced litigation lawyer, admitted to
practice in Virginia and the District of Columbia and before
numerous federal courts including seven of the eleven
United States Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
Since 1961, I have unremittingly spent by far the major
proportion of my time in the representative [sic] of clients
in patent, trademark and unfair competition litigation and
related antitrust matters before a plurality of courts
throughout the United States.
4. I have at all times had, and I continue to have, the
highest personal respect and regard for the judicial process,
for judicial decorum and for the office of judge or justice,
and I have at all times endeavored to conduct myself in a
manner demonstrative of that respect.
5. Ihave also at all times understood and believed, and I
still understand and believe, that it is the duty and responsi-
bility of counsel in each and every case
(a) to pursue a client’s cause, if just, with vigor and
to refuse to accede to the correctness of court orders that
are inconsistent with established law or with a client’s
legal and constitutional rights, even while respecting such
orders so long as they subsist ;
(b) even while respecting legally or factually incorrect
orders of courts, to use every available means afforded
by applicable rules and statutes for challenging such
M. H. Sears Affidavit (2/2/77)
A2
incorrect orders including motions for (i) rehearing,
(ii) vacation, (iii) clarification, (iv) reconsideration, and
(v) revocation to the same court, and appellate remedies,
including petitions for extraordinary writs where
grounds for such writs appear reasonably to exist;
(c) whenever it appears from the record that a judge
has exceeded his legal authority to bring the matter to
his attention and if he refuses to correct or modify his
apparent excess and cannot produce clear justification
based on statute, rule or precedent, to apply to an appel-
late court for review and correction;
(d) whenever a judge has made fact findings or ob-
servations contrary to or unsupported by the record, to
call the matter to his attention and seek a correction and,
if he refuses correction and fails to point to facts that
fully justify his findings, to exhaust in accordance with
the rules such appropriate remedies, including appellate
remedies, as may be available; and
(e) whenever the record suggests that an assigned
judge is not behaving in an impartial, objectively judicial
manner to bring the matter to his attention and, if a satis-
factory explanation or clarification cannot be obtained, to
file a motion for disqualification pursuant to applicable
rules and statutes which afford the right to do so, to the
end that the client may have a fair and impartial trial of
its case.
/s/ Many Hum Sa
Mary Helen Sears
WasHineTor
Disratct or Column =
Sworn to and subscribed this 31st day of January, 1977.
(Original Notarized)
Notary Public
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.