Opposition — Lee Pharmaceuticals v. Den-Mat, Inc.

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SEP 13 1977

RODAK, JR., CLERK

" Daw-Maz, Ind., Rosuur L. Inemx, W. Biomanp Grace,

Fun H. Baocx, anv Prorsastowat Propvcrs Co.,

3 Respondents.

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W. Richard Glace, Fred H. Brock, and Professional

Products Co. in-Opposition to Petition for

Wit of Certirari to the United Sates dan of Appeal

for the Ninth Circuit.

Of Counsel:

Fung, Fan s Wonne, Fe P. Fern,

368

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Local Rules Of The United States District Court For The

Central District Of California

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Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroszz Tzem, 1977

No. 77-244

Lez PHARMACEUTICALS,

Petitioner,

vs.

Dux-Mar, Ixo., Ronnar L. Issnx, W. Rionanůðͤ Grace,

Freep H. Brock, xD ProrgssionaL Propucts Co.,

Respondents.

Brief of Respondents Den-Mat, Inc., Robert L. Ibsen,

W. Richard Glace, Fred H. Brock, and Professional

Products Oo. in Opposition to Petition for

Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit.

Respondents Den-Mat, Inc., Robert L. Ibsen, W. Richard

Glace, Fred H. Brock, and Professional Products Co. herein

oppose the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. This consoli-

dated Petition seeks review of the following actions of the

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit:

(a) denial of a petition for writ of mandamus, under

28 U.S.C. § 1651, in Court of Appeals Petition No. 76-

3628, to review and to vacate:

(1) the District Court’s patent validity severance

Order No. 17;

(2) the District Court’s discovery Order No. 24;

(3) the District Court’s clarification Order No. 28;

and

(4) the District Court’s discovery scheduling Order

No. 29;

Brief in Opposition to Petition

2

(b) dismissal, for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.. C.

§ 1292(a)(1), in Court of Appeals Appeal No. 77-1214, of

appeals from:

(1) the District Court’s patent validity severance

Order No. 17;

(2) the District Court’s trade secret discovery Order

No. 21; and

(3) the District Court’s discovery Order No. 24;

(e) dismissal, for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(a)(1), in Court of Appeals Appeal No. 77-1215,

of an appeal from the District Court’s clarification Order

No. 28;

(ldd) denial of a petition for writ of mandamus, under

28 U.S.C. § 1651, in Court of Appeals Petition No. 77-1539,

to review and to vacate, inter alia:

(1) the District Court’s patent validity severance

Order No. 17;

(2) the District Court’s trade secret discovery Order

No. 21;

(3) the District Court’s discovery Order No. 24;

(4) the District Court’s conspiracy severance Order

No. 25;

(5) the District Court’s Order No. 26, striking certain

of counterdefendants’ defenses ;

(6) the District Court’s clarification Order No. 28;

(7) the District Court’s discovery scheduling modifi-

cation Order No. 32;

(8) the District Court’s trade secret Order No. 33;

(9) the District Court’s “clean up” Order No. 34; and

(10) the District Court’s Order No. 41, assessing costs

and attorneys’ fees against petitioner’s attorneys; and

(e) denial of an “emergency” application for writ of

mandamus and prohibition, under 28 U.S.C. § 1651, in

Court of Appeals Petition No. 77-2547, to review and to

vacate the District Court’s Order No. 80.

Brief in Opposition to ™stition

3

PROCEEDINGS BELOW

I. Proceedings In The District Court.

On October 27, 1976, the District Court, in Order No. 17,

severed, for separate trial pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 42(b),

“the question of the validity of the Lee Pharmaceuticals

patents in suit”. Also on October 27, 1976, the District Court,

in Order No. 21, announced its intention “to refer discovery

in the field of trade secrets to a special master”, and out-

lined certain procedures to be followed prior to the issuance

of an order of reference. In Order No. 24, filed November 1,

1976, the District Court denied, without prejudice to their

renewal at a more appropriate time”, petitioner’s motions to

file document requests directed to respondents Den-Mat,

Inc., Glace, and Brock, and a motion to take the deposition

of respondent Brock.

On November 4, 1976, petitioner noticed an appeal from

the District Court’s Order Nos. 17, 21, and 24, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. §1292(a)(1), contending tat such orders “de

facto deny plaintiff a preliminary injunction” against re-

spondents’ alleged misappropriation of trade secrets and

trademarks, and against respondents’ alleged infringement

of petitioner’s trademarks and alleged related acts of un-

iin its Memorandum filed June 20, 1977, the District Court

its then-recent decision “that it would be more convenient if

written order was numbered for ease of reference. The court

assigned a number to every written order which ruled on the merits

addressed substantive

Brief in Opposition to Petition

4

fair competition. An application for a hearing on such a

preliminary injunction had been filed by petitioner in the

District Court on April 7, 1976. The appeal from the District

Court's Order Nos. 17, 21, and 24 was docketed in the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals as Appeal No. 77-1214.

On November 2, 1976, the District Court, in Order No. 25,

severed, pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 42(b), “the issue of whether

or not a conspiracy existed between plaintiff and its attor-

neys” to procure the patents in suit by fraud upon the

United States Patent and Trademark Office, ordered that

issue “separated from all other issues in this case” for trial

“after all other issues have been disposed of”, and, [until

that time, no discovery in this area will be allowed.”

In Order No. 26, also filed on November 26, 1976, the Dis-

trict Court struck certain affirmative defenses of the coun-

terdefendants, including petitioner herein.

In response to several motions of petitioner, the District

Court filed Order No. 28 on December 1, 1976. In this Order

the District Court noted that, in its 18 months of existence,

this litigation had “become a gigantic, grotesque monster of

procedural strife”, “generating some twenty-six file folders

of pleadings” with but “little progress toward resolution

on the merits”, with the result “that some unusual and inno-

vative procedures would have to be brought into play if any

meaningful progress was to be made.” The District Court

then reconsidered, and adhered to, the rulings set out in

Order Nos. 17 and 24.

Petitioner noticed an appeal from Order No. 28 on

December 2, 1976, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(a)(1),

contending that this order, too, “de facto denies plaintiff a

preliminary injunction.” This appeal was docketed in the

Ninth Cireuit Court of Appeals as Appeal No. 77-1215.

— — — —

Brief in Opposition to Petition

5

On December 1, 1976, the Distriet Court issued discovery

scheduling Order No. 29. On December 6, 1976, the District

Court, in Order No. 30, denied petitioner’s request for a stay

of all proceedings pending resolution of Ninth Circuit

Appeal No. 77-1214, noting (1) that a stay would not

preserve the status quo; (2) the inconsistency of a stay

with petitioner’s demand for a preliminary injunction;

(3) the requirement for “discovery which is necessary

before a fair hearing on the injunction application could

ever be had”; and (4) the District Court’s view that

“the appeal is frivolous and is merely a maneuver on the

part of the plaintiff to further delay the progress of the

lawsuit. Such a conclusion is implicit in plaintiff’s sug-

gestions that a stay might well force defendants to settle

because of their inability to further finance the litigation.”

On December 10, 1976, the District Court filed discovery

schedule modification Order No. 832, and its trade secret

discovery Order No. 33. In the latter Order, the District

Court adhered to its October 27, 1976 Order No. 17.

On December 13, 1976, petitioner filed a petition for an

extraordinary writ in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651 and F. R. App. P. 21. Docketed

below as Petition No. 76-3628, this petition requested the

Court of Appeals, inter alia, to review and to vacate the

District Court’s Order Nos. 17, 21, and 24.

In Order No. 34, filed January 6, 1977, the District Court

disposed of certain matters pending as of November 22,

1976.

On January 13, 1977, pursuant to the District Court’s

Order No. 36, petitioner was allowed “to pursue discovery

in order for it to determine what claims of its patents it

believes are being infringed by defendants.”

Brief in Opposition to Petition

6

In response to a motion filed by respondents on Decem-

ber 23, 1976, the District Court, in Order No. 41, filed

February 16, 1977, found that two motions of petitioner,

seeking “reconsideration of prior rulings of the court”,

without compliance with Local Rule 3(k) of the United

States District Court for the Central District of California,

were “frivolous and warrant sanctions”. Accordingly, peti-

tioner’s counsel, who are not parties herein, were directed

to pay to respondents’ counsel, within thirty days, the sum

of $1200 “as reimbursement for costs and attorneys’ fees

expended in opposing such motion”?.

On March 2, 1977, petitioner herein filed in the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals a petition for extraordinary writ

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651 and F. R. App. P. 21. Docketed

in the court below as Petition No. 77-1539, this petition re-

quested the Court of Appeals, inter alia, to review and to

vacate the District Court’s Order Nos. 17, 21, 24, 25, 26, 28,

32, 33, 34, and 41.

In accordance with its intentions, announced in Order

No. 17, and adhered to in Order Nos. 28 and 33, the District

Court, in Order No. 59, filed April 25, 1977, appointed

a special master to oversee “the entire issue of trade

secrets”. In response to petitioner’s objection to the

appointment of a special master for this purpose, Order

No. 59 was vacated in Order No. 66, filed May 12, 1977, and

petitioner was directed to “furnish this court, in camera,

a detailed statement of all trade secrets which it claims are

being misappropriated” by respondents. In response to

petitioner’s motion “to defer operation of Order No. 66

pending clarification at the June 6, 1977 hearing”, filed

propriety

tions, is before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in

Ne 77.19

Brief in Opposition to Petition

7

May 19, 1977, the District Court, in Order No. 72, filed

May 26, 1977, directed petitioner to file “on the record an

exact, explicit, specific, detailed, and step-by-step statement

of each and every claimed trade secret”, and set out in

minute detail the form which such “statement” was to take.

On June 2, 1977, petitioner moved to vacate Order No. 72.

This motion was denied on its day of filing, in Order No. 75,

the District Court finding that its jurisdiction had not been

ousted by then-pending Ninth Circuit Appeal Nos. 77-1214

and 77-1215, and further, that

“this motion has been filed for the sole purpose of

disrupting this court’s efforts to move this case along

toward some ultimate conclusion.”

In Order No. 80, filed June 28, 1977, the District Court

noted that

“(flor nearly fifteen months the plaintiff has been seek-

ing a preliminary injunction against alleged misappro-

priation by the defendants of plaintiff’s trade secrets.

This hearing has not gone forward because the plaintiff

has not yet identified what trade secrets it asserts are

being misappropriated. In fact, plaintiff has thus far

thwarted every effort of the court to obtain it”,

and ordered

“that the information which plaintiff is required to pro-

duce under Order No. 72 shall be furnished the court in

camera. Order No. 72 shall in all other respects remain

unchanged. Plaintiff is already in default in having failed

to produce the information requested within the time

specified in Order No. 72, but compliance with the order

will be accepted by this court provided the information

is filed not later than June 30, 1977.”

Petitioner’s statement of trade secrets was filed in camera

on June 30, 1977. Order No. 80 also required respondents to

Brief in Opposition to Petition

8

file a statement of their trade practices, similar in detail

to that required of petitioner in Order No. 72.

On July 8, 1977, respondents filed a “motion for recon-

sideration of Order No. 80”, contending that their trade

practices had twice been revealed to petitioner’s counsel

pursuant to protective orders in effect in the District Court,

in written documents previously produced or forwarded to

petitioner’s counsel. In Order No. 81, filed July 13, 1977,

petitioner was granted one week’s time

“to bring to the court’s attention any further information

which is needed concerning the defendants’ trade prac-

tices, and the reasons why plaintiff’s statement of trade

secrets should not now be released to defendants’ counsel

with the restricted information status.”

Petitioner’s response to Order No. 81 resulted in the fil-

ing, on August 5, 1977, of the District Court’s Order No. 83.

Order No. 83 directed petitioner and respondents to submit,

by September 2, 1977, all arguments and materials in sup-

port of, and in opposition to, respectively, the preliminary

injunction sought by petitioner in April 1976.

In response to Order No. 83, petitioner filed a paper on

or about August 12, 1977, in which it stated that it was

not prepared to proceed and therefore respectfully

declines to proceed in the manner defined in Order No. 83,

filed August 5, 1977.”

In Order No. 84, filed August 16, 1977, the District Court

carefully considered, and rejected, the arguments advanced

by petitioner in its response to Order No. 83. Order No. 84

concluded :

“The court expects plaintiff to comply fully with Order

No. 83.”

——————

Brief in Opposition to Petition

9

On September 2, 1977, respondents served, and on Sep-

tember 6, 1977, they filed, two memoranda, five affidavits,

12 volumes of exhibit-containing appendices, and a motion

for summary judgment of dismissal of petitioner’s trade

secret and trademark infringement/unfair competition

claims. Petitioner neither served nor filed any papers in

compliance with the mandate of Orders Nos. 83 and 84.

II. Proceedings In The Court Of Appeals.

On March 28, 1977, the Court of Appeals, over the signa-

tures of Circuit Judges Ozell M. Trask and J. Clifford Wal-

lace, issued the following Order in Ninth Circuit Appeal

Nos. 77-1214 and 77-1215, and in Ninth Circuit Petition Nos.

76-3628 and 77-1539, [u] pon due consideration“:

„(a) the petition for writ of mandamus, No. 76-3628

is denied ;

“(b) the petition for writ of mandamus, No. 77-1539

is denied ;

„e) the motion for extension of time is treated as a

motion to file late response and is granted;

“(d) the motion for stay is denied; and

“(e) appet s Nos. 77-1214 and 77-1215 are dismissed for

lack of jurisdiction, the orders appealed from not being

appealable.”

Also on March 28, 1977, the Clerk of the Court of Appeals

addressed a letter to “All Counsel”, informing them of the

dismissal of appeal Nos. 77-1214 and 77-1215 “for lack of

jurisdiction.”

On April 4, 1977, Petitioner filed a motion addressed to

the court en banc, requesting that the March 28, 1977 Order

be vacated on the basis that such Order had been issued by

“a panel or division consisting solely of two judges.”

Brief im Opposition to Petition

10

On April 28, 1977, a Revised Order, which was “Before”

Circuit Judges Trask, Wallace, and Herbert Y. C. Choy,”

albeit unsigned, provided in Ninth Circuit Appeal Nos.

77-1214 and 77-1215 and Petition Nos. 76-3628 and 77-1539:

“On April 4, 1977, Lee Pharmaceuticals filed two emer-

gency motions requesting a suspension of the periods for

seeking rehearing and issuance of the mandate and for

en banc consideration of the authority of the panel which

issued this Court’s order of March 28, 1977. Solely to

facilitate the proceedings in the district court, the court

issues the following order:

„(a) The petition for writ of mandamus, No. 76-3628

is denied ;

“(b) The petition for writ of mandamus, No. 77-1539

is denied;

„(e) The motion for extension of time is treated as

a motion to file late response and is granted;

“(d) The motion for stay is denied;

“(e) Appeal Nos. 77-1214 and 77-1215 are dismissed

for lack of jurisdiction, the orders appealed from not

being appealable;

“(f) The emergency motion addressed to the court

en banc shall be treated as a suggestion for hearing

en banc and shall be circulated to the active bench for

a vote; and

“(g) The emergency motion to suspend the periods

of time for rehearing and issuance of the mandate is

denied and new periods of time pursuant to Rules 40

and 41 Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure shall com-

mence from the date of the entry of this order.

Brief in Opposition to Petition

11

This order shall in no way be construed as a comment

on the merits, or lack thereof, of the arguments set forth

in the emergency motion addressed to the court en banc.”

On July 7, 1977, the Court of Appeals issued the following

unsigned Order in Appeal Nos. 77-1214 and 77-1215 and in

Petition Nos. 76-3628 and 77-1539:

“The emergency motion addressed to the court en banc

having been circulated to the active bench and no judges

electing to accept the suggestion for hearing en banc, the

motion is hereby denied.”

On July 11, 1977, the Court of Appeals issued the follow-

ing unsigned Order in Appeal Nos. 77-1214 and 77-1215:

“Upon due consideration, the petition for rehearing en

bane regarding the Court’s dismissal of appeal nos. 77-

1214 and 77-1215 for lack of jurisdiction is denied.”

On July 13, 1977, the Court of Appeals, in an unsigned

Order “Before” Circuit Judges Trask, Choy, and Wallace,

ruled:

„(a) the motion for extension of time to file petitions

for rehearing is granted and the petitions heretofore

received are ordered filed;

„(b) the motions to defer consideration of the petitions

for rehearing are denied;

„(e) the ‘supplementation and petition for rehearing’

filed in no. 76-3628 is denied; and

“(d) the ‘supplementation and petition for rehearing’

filed in no. 77-1539 is denied.”

On July 14, 1977, the Court of Appeals, over the signa-

tures of Circuit Judges Trask and J. Blaine Anderson, is-

sued the following Order in Ninth Circuit Petition No.

77-2547:

“Upon due consideration, the petition for writ of man-

damus is denied.“

Brief in Opposition to Petition

12

On or about August 17, 1977, Petitioner filed a Supple-

ment” to its Petition in this case, reproducing in such “Sup-

plement’s” appendix, other allegedly infirm, two-judge

orders issued by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and

presently before this Court in No. 77-4.

In a related case, No. 77-259, Petitioner herein seeks a

second Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. No. 77-259 seeks

review of such Court of Appeals’ Orders dated July 12 and

26, 1977, in Ninth Circuit Petition No. 77-1969, denying dis-

qualification of the assigned United States District Judge

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).

_o—_ id

Brief in Opposition to Petition

13

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.

1. Does 28 U.S.C. $46(d), which provides that [a]

majority of the number of judges authorized to constitute a

court or division thereof, as provided in paragraph (c),

shall constitute a quorum”, in accordance with established

legal precepts and rules of statutory construction, so modify

28 U.S. C. $§ 46(b) and (e) to permit determinations in civil

appeals and petitions for extraordinary writs, exclusive of

those emanating from three-judge trial courts or from

administrative agency determinations, to be made by only

two judges?

2. No matter whether the answer to Question 1 is affirm-

ative or negative, does any paragraph of 28 U.S.C. § 46

permit a party before a Court of Appeals to select, or par-

ticipate in the selection of, the judges who shall constitute

the panel or division assigned to hear and decide his appeal

or petition for an extraordinary writ?

Brief im Opposition to Petition

14

STATUTES INVOLVED.

This Petition nominally concerns 28 U.S.C. § 46, which

provides:

46. Assignment of judges; divisions; hearings;

quorum ,

“(a) Circuit judges shall sit on the court and its

divisions in such order and at such times as the court

directs,

„b) In each circuit the court may authorize the

hearing and determination of cases and controversies

by separate divisions, each consisting of three judges.

Such divisions shall sit at the times and places and

and hear the cases and controversies assigned as the

court directs.

„(e) Cases and controversies shall be heard and

determined by a court or division of not more than three

judges, unless a hearing or rehearing before the court

in banc is ordered by a majority of the circuit judges

of the circuit who are in regular active service. A court

in bane shall consist of all circuit judges in regular

active service. A circuit judge of the circuit who has

retired from regular active service shall also be com-

petent to sit as a judge of the court in bane in the

rehearing of a case or controversy if he sat in the

court or division at the original hearing thereof.

“(d) A majority of the number of judges authorized

to constitute a court or division thereof, as provided in

paragraph (e), shall constitute a quorum.”

Brief in Opposition to Petition

15

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The complaint in this extraordinary case, filed July 7,

1975 and naming respondents Den-Mat, Inc. (“Den-Mat”),

Ibsen, and Professional Products Co. as defendants, alleged

willful infringement of two of petitioner’s patents, mis-

appropriation of an unspecified number of petitioner’s un-

identified trade secrets, and charged such respondents with

unidentified acts of unfair competition. Respondent Den-

Mat and petitioner compete in the manufacture, sale, and

distribution of composite restorative dental materials, i. e.,

compositions designed for use by dental practitioners in

the repair and restoration of living or artificial teeth. Re-

spondent Ibsen, president of Den-Mat, formerly conducted

clinical research, without compensation, for petitioner on

its developmental products prior to their distribution to

dental practitioners. Respondent Professional Products Co.

is a distributor of Den-Mat’s products.

The presently viable Second Amended Complaint, filed

January 15, 1976, joins two of petitioner’s former employ-

ees, respondents Glace and Brock, as defendants, alleges

willful infringement of three of petitioner’s patents and of

five of its federally registered trademarks, and persists in

its allegations of misappropriation of petitioner’s trade

secrets and unspecified acts of unfair competition.

The remaining counterclaims of Den-Mat and Ibsen, filed

April 28, 1976, allege:

(a) petitioner’s violation of the Federal Antitrust

Laws, particularly 15 U.S.C. §§1, 2, 13(a), 13(¢), 13(d),

13(e), and 14;

(b) petitioner’s violation of the California Cartwright

Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 16600 and 16700 et seq.,

the California Unfair Practices Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof.

Brief in Opposition to Petition

16

Code $§ 17000 et seg., and other provisions of the Cali-

fornia Business and Professions Code,

(c) petitioner’s false marking of its products, in vio-

ation of 35 U.S.C. §4 292(a) and (b); and

(d) petitioner’s acts of unfair competition and tor-

tious interference with existing and prospective business

relationships.

Counterdefendants named in such counterclaims include

petitioner, petitioner’s president, and the wife of petitioner’s

president. Co-conspirators named in such counterclaims in-

clude, inter alia, counsel to petitioner, at least in their roles,

as alleged, in the procurement of the patents in suit by

fraud upon the United States Patent and Trademark Office,

and in filing and prosecuting this extraordinary litigation.

Indicia of the extraordinary nature of this case, to the

extent not communicated in the “Proceedings In The Dis-

trict Court”, supra, include, inter alia, the following:

(a) the holding of 18 normally noticed and ez parte

hearings by the District Court;

(b) the District Court’s issuance of 84 orders before

a trial on the merits;

(c) petitioner’s filing of at least 27 motions to compel

discovery pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 37(b);

(d) petitioner’s filing of at least 20 motions for pro-

tective orders, “deferrals”, extensions or enlargements

of time, stays, and suspensions of proceedings;

(e) petitioner’s filing of no fewer than four motions

to disqualify the Honorable Jesse W. Curtis, the assigned

District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §455(a);

Bri f in 0 iti to P titi

17

(t) the filing, by petitioner, or by its counsel, before

a trial on the merits, of nine appeals and petitions for

extraordinary writs in the Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit;

(g) the filing, on behalf of petitioner, of a psychia-

trist’s affidavit in Ninth Circuit Petition No. 77-1969",

which purports to attest, inter alia, to Judge Curtis’

disposition against petitioner and its counsel; and

(h) the assignment, on August 19, 1977, by the Honor-

able Albert Stephens, Jr., Chief Judge of the United

States District Court for the Central District of Cali-

. fornia, of the Honorable Martin Pence, United States

District Judge for the District of Hawaii, “to review

the affidavits and averments filed” in the District Court

“in support of plaintiff’s contention that Judge Curtis

should be disqualified and to determine whether there is

any basis upon which his impartiality might reasonably

be questioned.”

Such extraordinary proceedings are explained by the

extraordinary litigation philosophy of plaintiff’s trial coun-

sel, as articulated in paragraphs 3-5 of an “Affidavit of

Mary Helen Sears In Support of ‘Motion For Retraction

And Expungement From The Record Of Statements Made

By The Court On January 20 [10], 1977 Which Reflect

Adversely Upon Counsel For The Plaintiff” (Appendix,

p. Al), filed in the District Court on February 2, 1977.

Such extraordinary litigation philosophy has failed to

impress the District Court and the Court of Appeals. In the

latter forum, three petitions for extraordinary writs which

are subjects of the instant Petition, Nos. 76-3628, 77-1539,

®The affidavit is set out in the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,

No. 77-259, at p. 22a et seq.

Brief in Opposition to Petition

18

and 77-2547, were denied, and two appeals, Nos. 77-1214

and 77-1215, were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Seizing, however, upon the Court of Appeals’ apparent

assigrment of two-judge panels or divisions to hear and

decide civil appeals and petitions for extraordinary writs,

in the absence of disagreement between members of such

two-judge courts, petitioner posits a deprivation of its

right to a hearing before three judges, believed by it to be

granted by 28 U.S.C. § 46, and demands hearings, de novo,

before three-judge courts, none of whose members have

previously considered petitioner’s appeals and petitions.

Examined closely, petitioner’s contentions are totally

without merit.

Brief in Opposition to Petition

19

ARGUMENT.

A. The Procedures Of The Ninth Circuit Court Of Appeals

In Deciding Cases And Controversies Are In Accord

With Established Legal Precepts And Rules Of Statu-

tory Construction.

In the absence of contrary knowledge, respondents

accept as true, for purposes of the instant Petition for

Writ of Certiorari, the procedures of the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals as set out in the Petition’s Appendix B.

However, even if true, the such procedures provide peti-

tioner with no grievance under 28 U.S.C. § 46.

Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S.

326 (1941), definitely construed former Section 212 of

Title 28, United States Code, a predecessor to the present

28 U.S.C. § 46. Former Section 212, deriving from § 117

of the 1911 Judicial Code, provided that:

“There shall be in each circuit a circuit court of appeals,

which shall consist of three judges, of whom two shall

constitute a quorum, and which shall be a court of record,

with appellate jurisdiction, as hereinafter limited and

established”. 314 U.S. at 328.

This Court rejected any literal reading of 5 117, 314 U.S.

at 330, and emphasized that

“Though the problem of construction is beset with diffi-

culties, the conclusion that §117 provides merely the

permissible complement of judges for a circuit court of

appeals results in greater harmony [footnote omitted]

than if the language of 117 is taken too literally.”

314 U.S. at 328; emphasis supplied.

Former Section 212 of Title 28, United States Code, also

received more than passing notice in Ayrshire Collieries

Corp. v. United States, 331 U.S. 132 (1946). At issue in

Brief im Opposition to Petition

20

shire Collieries was the propriety of an order issued

by only two judges under the Urgent Deficiencies Act,

former Section 47 of Title 28, United States Code.“ This

Court concluded that

“(wjhen the framers of the Urgent Deficiencies Act

declared that these applications ‘shall be heard and

determined by three judges,’ we assume that they meant

exactly what they said.

“Tt is significant that this Act makes no provision for

a quorum of less than three judges. Two judges of a

three-judge circuit court of appeals, on the other hand,

ordinarily constitute a statutory quorum for the hearing

and determination of cases [footnote omitted]. 28 U.S.C.

212. 28 U. S. C. A. 212. The absence of such a quorum provi-

sion as to three-judge district courts is a strong cor-

roborating indication that participation by all three

judges is necessary to render a valid decision.” 331 U.S.

at 137, 138-139; emphasis supplied.

Given the foregoing comparison of procedures to be

followed by a Court of Appeals, as opposed to a three-

judge district court, coupled with the express “quorum”

provision of 28 U.S.C. § 46d), the conclusion is inescap-

able that participation by each of three circuit judges in

the hearing and determination of causes is not necessary

for the rendition of valid Circuit Court decisions.

The hearing and determination of cases and controver-

sies is the subject of both paragraphs (b) and (c) of

28 U.S. OC. § 46. Section 46(b) contains the seemingly man-

datory language:

*With to the Interstate Commerce Commission, present

statutes 28 U.S.C. §§ 2284 and 2325.

Brief in Opposition to Petition

21

“(b) In each circuit the court may authorize the hear-

ing and determination of cases and controversies by

separate divisions, each consisting of three judges.”

(Emphasis supplied.)

Such language, however, is expressly mollified by Section

46 (e):

„(e) Cases and controversies shall be heard and deter-

mined by a court or division of not more than three

jud ges.

Petitioner apparently urges your Honorable Court to

rewrite, by judicial fiat, 28 U.S.C. 5 46(c) to read:

„(e) Cases and controversies shall be heard and deter-

mined by a court or division of not less than three

judges... .”

The statute does not so read. Furthermore, when 28 U.S.C.

§$§ 46(c) and (d) are read in context, as they must be read,

the “majority” and “quorum” language of the latter

expressly authorize two judges of a Court of Appeals to

hear and decide cases and controversies.

Respondents’ Question No. 1 must be answered in the

affirmative; petitioner’s Question No. 1 must be answered

in the negative.

B. 28 U.S. O. § 46(c) Is A Grant Of Power To The Courts

Of Appeal, Precluding Any Assertion By A Litigant

Of A Right To Select, Or To Participate In The Selec-

tion Of, The Judges Who Shall Hear And Determine

His Cause.

28 U.S.C. § 46(c) was closely analyzed in Western Pacific

Railroad Corp. v. Western Pacific Railroad Co., 345 U.S.

247 (1953), in which Mr. Chief Justice Vinson framed and

responded to the issues as follows:

Brief in Opposition to Petition

22

“What particular right, if any, does it [i. e., 28 U.S. C.

§ 46(c)] give to a litigant in a Court of Appeals? To

what extent is he entitled to put the merits of his cause

before each member of the court in pressing his demand

for a hearing or a rehearing before the entire court?

“In our view, §46(c) is not addressed to litigants.

It is addressed to the Court of Appeals. It is a grant of

power. .. It neither forbids nor requires each active

member of a Court of Appeals to entertain each petition

for a hearing or rehearing en banc. The court is left

free to devise its own administrative machinery to pro-

vide the means whereby a majority may order such a

hearing.“ 345 U.S. at 250.

To reach petitioner’s second question, your Honorable -

Court would be required to rewrite 28 U.S.C. 5 46(c), as

noted above, and to ignore the express “majority” and

“quorum” language of 28 U.S.C. § 46(d). At its core, peti-

tioner’s second question asserts an unqualified right of a

disappointed Court of Appeals litigant to a second hearing

before an entirely different panel or division, or before a

Court of Appeals en banc. Western Pacific Railroad, supra,

expressly rejected any such purported right:

“Titigants are certainly given no special standing to

partake, as of right, in the court’s decisions pertaining

to the arrangement of its calendar and the assignment

of cases to divisions. Just as the statute makes no pro-

vision binding the court to entertain every request that

a particular case be assigned to a particular division, so

it should not be construed to compel the court to enter-

tain, en banc, motions for a hearing or rehearing en banc.

“A contrary reading—one which would sustain peti-

tioners—would obviously require & practice which might

— — 2 — 2 — —

Brief in Opposition to Petition

23

thrust unwarranted extra burdens on the court. It is

difficult to believe that Congress intended to give an

automatic, second appeal to each litigant in a Court of

Appeals composed of more than three judges. Yet peti-

tioners would have us hold that such a ‘horizontal’ appeal

is implicit in & 46... .” 345 U.S. at 258; emphasis supplied.

Question No. 2 of respondents, as well as of petitioner,

must be answered in the negative.

For the reasons set forth above, the Petition For A Writ

of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For

the Ninth Circuit should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Of Counsel:

Funrn, Fam m & Wona, Faepenice P. Funrn,

Auron L. Masrm

Attorneys for Respondents.

SR erence —᷑——

— ..

Brief in Opposition to Petition

25

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.

I hereby certify that on this 13th day of September, 1977,

three copies of the Brief of Respondents Den-Mat, Inc.,

Robert L. Ibsen, W. Richard Glace, Fred H. Brock, and Pro-

fessional Products Co. In Opposition To Petition For Writ

Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For

the Ninth Circuit, were served, in compliance with Supreme

Court Rules 33(1) and 33(2)(a), by air mail, postage pre-

paid, upon counsel to Petitioner, and upon the Solicitor

General of the United States, respectively. I further certify

that all parties required to be served have been served.

Freperick P. Funrn,

Forts, Fanener & Wone

Russ Building, Suite 1330

Sic

San Francisco, 94104

Attorney for Respondents.

Sas

*

NN

Ay > 5 Fis “ng

8 ar *

eee

M. H. Sears Affidavit (2/2/77)

“Al

PARAGRAPHS 3-5 OF AFFIDAVIT OF

MARY HELEN SEARS IN SUPPORT OF

“MOTION FOR RETRACTION AND EXPUNGEMENT

FROM THE RECORD OF STATEMENTS BY THE

COURT ON JANUARY 20, 1977 WHICH REFLECT

ADVERSELY UPON COUNSEL FOR THE

PLAINTIFF”

3. I am an experienced litigation lawyer, admitted to

practice in Virginia and the District of Columbia and before

numerous federal courts including seven of the eleven

United States Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court.

Since 1961, I have unremittingly spent by far the major

proportion of my time in the representative [sic] of clients

in patent, trademark and unfair competition litigation and

related antitrust matters before a plurality of courts

throughout the United States.

4. I have at all times had, and I continue to have, the

highest personal respect and regard for the judicial process,

for judicial decorum and for the office of judge or justice,

and I have at all times endeavored to conduct myself in a

manner demonstrative of that respect.

5. Ihave also at all times understood and believed, and I

still understand and believe, that it is the duty and responsi-

bility of counsel in each and every case

(a) to pursue a client’s cause, if just, with vigor and

to refuse to accede to the correctness of court orders that

are inconsistent with established law or with a client’s

legal and constitutional rights, even while respecting such

orders so long as they subsist ;

(b) even while respecting legally or factually incorrect

orders of courts, to use every available means afforded

by applicable rules and statutes for challenging such

M. H. Sears Affidavit (2/2/77)

A2

incorrect orders including motions for (i) rehearing,

(ii) vacation, (iii) clarification, (iv) reconsideration, and

(v) revocation to the same court, and appellate remedies,

including petitions for extraordinary writs where

grounds for such writs appear reasonably to exist;

(c) whenever it appears from the record that a judge

has exceeded his legal authority to bring the matter to

his attention and if he refuses to correct or modify his

apparent excess and cannot produce clear justification

based on statute, rule or precedent, to apply to an appel-

late court for review and correction;

(d) whenever a judge has made fact findings or ob-

servations contrary to or unsupported by the record, to

call the matter to his attention and seek a correction and,

if he refuses correction and fails to point to facts that

fully justify his findings, to exhaust in accordance with

the rules such appropriate remedies, including appellate

remedies, as may be available; and

(e) whenever the record suggests that an assigned

judge is not behaving in an impartial, objectively judicial

manner to bring the matter to his attention and, if a satis-

factory explanation or clarification cannot be obtained, to

file a motion for disqualification pursuant to applicable

rules and statutes which afford the right to do so, to the

end that the client may have a fair and impartial trial of

its case.

/s/ Many Hum Sa

Mary Helen Sears

WasHineTor

Disratct or Column =

Sworn to and subscribed this 31st day of January, 1977.

(Original Notarized)

Notary Public

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Opposition — Lee Pharmaceuticals v. Den-Mat, Inc. · 434 U.S. 938 | Frix