Petition — Britt v. San Diego Unified Port District

Supreme Court brief1977

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF .THE ov Fn eee JR., CLERK

OCTOBER TERM 197

No.

77-148

ROGER A. BRITT, et al.,

Petiti

vs. t oners,

SAN DIEGO UNIFIED PORT DISTRICT, and

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL,

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION ONE

JERROLD A. FADEM

MICHAEL M. BERGER

of FADEM, BERGER, MCINTIRE

& NORTON

A Professional Corporation

501 Santa Monica Boulevard

Suite 600

P. O. Box 2148

Santa Monica, CA 90406

(213) 451-9951

Attorneys for Petitioners

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM 1977

No.

ROGER A. BRITT, et al.,

Petitioners,

vs.

SAN DIEGO UNIFIED PORT DISTRICT, and

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL,

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION ONE

JERROLD A. FADEM

MICHAEL M. BERGER

of FADEM, BERGER, MCINTIRE

& NORTON

A Professional Corporation

501 Santa Monica Boulevard

Suite 600

P. O. Box 2148

Santa Monica, CA 90406

(213) 451-9951

Attorneys for Petitioners

~~ ower

a od

Oe 8 ee,

me

TOPICAL INDEX

Page

Table of Authorities iii

Opinion Below 2

Jurisdiction 2

Questions Presented for Review 2

Constitutional, Statutory and

Regulatory Provisions 4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 5

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT | 8

1

FEDERAL STATUTES EXPRESSLY AUTH-

ORIZE THE TYPE OF COMMON LAW

ACTIONS FORECLOSED BY THE COURT

OF APPEAL 14

2

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS EXPRESS-

LY REJECTED THE COURT OF APPEAL'S

IDEA THAT, ". . . FEDERAL PREEMPTION

OF THE FIELD OF AIRPORT NOISE REGULA-

TION LEAVES NO ROOM FOR LOCAL CONTROLS

- « « «" (67 Cal App.3d at 368) 20

i

3

THE COURT OF APPEAL MISREADS

FEDERAL AUTHORITY AND ERRONEOUSLY

CONCLUDES THAT THE PORT DISTRICT

(AS AIRPORT OPERATOR) HAS NO POWER

TO CONTROL THE NOXIOUS BY-PRODUCTS

OF THE JET AGE EMITTED BY THE PORT

DISTRICT'S TENANTS

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX A

Opinion of the Court of Appeal,

Fourth Appellate District,

filed February 18, 1977

APPENDIX B

Constitutional, Statutory and

Regulatory Provisions

ii

29

36

a ae ee —

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Air Transport Assn. v. Crotti

(N.D. Cal. 1975)

389 F. Supp. 58 12,

Allegheny Airlines v. Village

of Cedarhurst

(E.D. N.Y. 1955)

132 F. Supp. 871, aff'd.,

(2d Cir. 1956)

238 F.2d 812

American Airlines, Inc. v. City

of Audubon Park

(W.D. Ky. 1968)

297 F. Supp. 207, aff'd.

(6th Cir. 1969)

407 F.2d 1306

American Airlines, Inc. v. Town

of Hempstead

(E.D. N.Y. 1967)

272 F. Supp. 226, aff'd.

(2nd Cir. 1968)

398 F.2d 369

British Airways Board and

Compagnie Nationale Air

France v. Port Authority of

New York & New Jersey

(2nd Cir. 1977)

Docket No. 77-7237 12, 32,

iii

31

31

31

33

Cases Page

City of Burbank v. Lockheed

Air Terminal (1973)

411 U.S. 624 29, 31, 32

Farmer v. United Brotherhood

of Carpenters (1977)

ae © ps

51 L.Ed.2d 33 18

Florida Lime and Avocado Growers,

Inc. v. Paul (1963)

sees G8. 35a 19

Griggs v. Allegheny County (1962)

369 U.S. 84 13

City of Inglewood v. City of

Los Angeles (9th Cir. 1971)

451 F.2d 948 6, 16

Nader v. Allegheny Airlines,

Inc. (1976)

426 U.S. 290 17

National Aviation v. City of

Hayward (N.D. Cal. 1976)

418 F. Supp. 417 32

Port of New York Authority v.

Eastern Airlines, Inc.

(E.D. N.Y. 1966)

259 F. Supp. 745 32

iv

Cases Page

San Diego Bldg. Trades Council

v. Garmon (1959)

359 U.S. 236 20

San Diego Unified Port Dist. v.

Superior Court (1977)

67 Cal.App.3d 361,

136 Cal.Rptr. 557 2

Schwartz v. Texas (1952)

344 U.S. 199 14

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) 2

Clear Air Amendments of 1970

42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 et seq. 16

42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(e) 4, 16

49 U.S.C. Chapter 20 16, 17

Federal Aviation Act

49 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. 8

49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 15

Noise Control Act of 1972

49 U.S.C. § 1431 17

49 U.S.C. § 1506 2, 4, 8, 16, 17

Statutes Page

Airport and Airway Development

Act of 1970

49 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1742 -16

Constitution

United States Constitution

Article VI, Clause 2 4

Regulations

se C.F RR. § 36.5 4, 10

vi

POF ME FIRS OS TE oe

f

:

'

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM 1977

No.

ROGER A. BRITT, et al.,

Petitioners,

vs.

SAN DIEGO UNIFIED PORT DISTRICT, and

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL,

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION ONE

Petitioners Roger A. Britt, et al.,

(hereafter Homeowners) respectfully pray

that a writ of certiorari issue to review

the decision of the California Court of

Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Divi-

sion One, in the case at bench and, upon

such review, a decision issue which makes

it clear that "federal pre-emption" of

airspace management does not bar state

court suits for damages by neighbors of

airports against airport operators.

1.

Opinion Below

The opinion of the California Court of

Appeal presented for review by this peti-

tion is reported as San Diego Unified

Port Dist. v. Superior Court (1977) 67

Cal.App.3d 361, 136 Cal.Rptr. 557. A

copy of the opinion is attached hereto as

an Appendix.

Jurisdiction

The judgment of the California Court

of Appeal sought to be reviewed was filed

and entered on February 18, 1977. A

timely Petition for Rehearing was denied

by that Court on March 15, 1977. A

timely Petition for Hearing in the Cali-

fornia Supreme Court was denied (after

the Court extended its time to consider

the Petition) on April 28, 1977.

This Court's jurisdiction is invoked

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3).

Questions Presented for Review

1. Assuming arguendo that Congress in-

tended to preempt local regulation of

commercial aviation, does the "saving

clause" contained in 49 U.S.C. § 1506

2.

ee oe te 2 So oe oe en

Or" eg NL ePyeeD ot eel ee

. ay PhP

permit private citizens to maintain com-

mon law tort actions in state courts for

the adverse consequences of the regulated

activity?

2. In light of the consistent - and

recent - expressions by the FAA as well

as the Federal judiciary, that airport

operators have power to control the use

of their airports in order to prevent the

infliction of jet noise injuries on neigh-

boring people and properties, is it con-

trary to Federal law for a state court to

deprive airport neighbors of the right to

sue an airport on common law tort causes

of action on the ground that

@ local regulation is prohibited;

@e an award of damages is the same

as regulation;

@ therefore an award of damages is

prohibited?

3. Are damage actions brought due to

jet aircraft noise around airports (where

the aircraft, operating conditions, geo-

graphical conditions, etc. are different

for each airport) on tort theories based

on failure of the airport operator to

3.

take steps to protect airport neighbors

from the noise, more appropriately

brought against the individual airport

operators (who each have the authority

to determine where the airport is located

and what kind of aircraft are permitted

to use it) in state courts, rather than

against the United States (on the theory

that the entire field has been "federally

pre-empted" and any fault therefore

resides in the United States) in U.S,

District Courts?

Constitutional, Statutory and

Regulatory Provisions

The following constitutional, statu-

tory and regulatory provisions are

involved in this Petition. Each is repro-

duced in full in Appendix "B" attached

hereto:

United States Constitution, Article VI,

Clause 2;

42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(e) ;

49 U.S.C. § 1506;

14 C.F.R. § 36.5.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an action brought by more than

260 families (more than 900 people) to

recover damages from the San Diego Uni-

fied Port District (the operator of

Lindbergh Field in San Diego, California)

for damage to person and property cased

by the noise, fumes, smoke and vibrations

created by jet aircraft operating to and

from Lindbergh Field.

The Homeowners seek damages to their

property and their person on the follow-

ing legal theories:

@ inverse condemnation;

® nuisance;

@ negligence;

® trespass;

@ operating without a valid permit

from the California Department of

Aeronautics;

® breach of grant agreements with the

FAA which require protection of the

interests of airport neighbors as a

.-

pre-condition to obtaining Federal s In a capsule, the Court of Appeal held:

funds (see City of Inglewood v.

City of Los Angeles [9th Cir. 1971]

451 F.2d 948).

@® the Federal government has

preempted all control of

aircraft; and

The Port District demurred to the

@® as a consequence, the Port

counts sounding in nuisance, negligence,

; District (as airport operator)

trespass, and operating without a valid

state airport permit. The ground of the

demurrer was that "federal pre-emption"

somehow immunized the Port District from @ since the Port District can-

has no control over aircraft;

and therefore,

the consequences of any of its actions. not control the source of

The Superior Court overruled the the noise (i.e., the air-

demurrer. craft), it cannot be liable

1° in tort for the noise pro-

Thereafter, the Port District sought

duced by aircraft beyond the

an extraordinary writ, commanding the

Superior Court to sustain the demurrers. , TORS Sere e es

Although the Court of Appeal purported | This holding is contrary to Federal

to deny the issuance of a peremptory writ statutory and case law, as well as the

(67 Cal.App.3d at 378), it instructed most recent expressions of the FAA as to

the trial court not to permit the recov- the power of local airport operators to

ery of any tort damages based on noise, control aircraft which use their facili-

fumes, vibrations and soot created by ties.

aircraft in flight. That instruction is

legally erroneous (as discussed hereafter)

and is tantamount to the issuance of a

writ.

Ve

inn ee.

REASONS FOR GRANTING

THE WRIT

INTRODUCTION

First. Assuming, arguendo, that the

Federal Government has preempted the

regulation of aircraft in flight, Con-

gress EXPRESSLY stated that common law

suits for damages are permitted.

The Homeowners have not asked the

Superior Court to issue any orders to

the Port District to control its method

of operations. While such action might

be appropriate, all that is sought is

money damages. Nonetheless, the Court

of Appeal concluded that:

e local regulation is prohibited;

e an award of damages is the same

as regulation;

e therefore an award of damages is

prohibited.

The Court of Appeal is wrong.

When Congress passed the Federal Avia-

tion Act (49 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.), it

included the following (49 U.S.C. § 1506):

[ —-—— uo © «+

‘

.

-

"Nothing contained in this chap-

ter shall in any way abridge or

alter the remedies now existing

at common law or by statute, but

the provisions of this chapter

are in addition to such remedies."

Thus, even if Congress intended to pre-

empt regulation, it also intended to per-

mit actions for damages for the adverse

consequences of the regulated activity.

Second. The Federal Government did

NOT intend to completely preempt the

field of aircraft regulation so as to pre-

vent airport proprietors from controlling

the noise nuisances created by aircraft

using their facilities.

The United States government has

repeatedly taken the position that the

proprietor of an airport - such as the

Port District at bench - has the power

to regulate the use of its airport in

order to protect its neighbors from jet

aircraft nuisances. Indeed, the airport

proprietor has the ultimate control: the

power to decide whether specific types of

9.

aircraft may operate from its airport

(see 14 C.F.R. § 36.5).

The most recent expression of this

position was on November 18, 1976, ina

document issued by the Federal Aviation

Administration, entitled Aviation Noise

Abatement Policy. There, the FAA states:

"Our concept of the legal frame-

work underlying this policy state-

ment is that proprietors retain

the flexibility to impose such

restrictions if they do not vio-

late any Constitutional proscrip-

tion. We have been urged to

undertake - and have considered

carefully and rejected - full

and complete federal preemption

of the field of aviation noise

abatement. In our judgment the

control and reduction of air-

port noise must remain a shared

responsibility among airport

proprietors, users, and govern-

ments." (p. 34; emphasis added.)

10.

+

>

~~

"The primary obligation to address

the airport noise problem always

has been and remains a local

responsibility." (p. 2)

Thus, in light of the FAA's recent,

explicit comment that it has ". .. con-

sidered carefully and rejected - full and

complete federal preemption of the field

of aviation noise abatement ...", it is

hard to understand how the Court of

Appeal could characterize as "correct"

(67 Cal.App.3d at 369) the conclusion

that:

". . . federal preemption of the

field of airport noise regulation

leaves no room for local controls

-- including civil tort actions

for money damages." (67 Cal.App.3d

at 368)

Third. The decision conflicts with

earlier decisions of federal courts on an

issue of federal law.

Federal courts have recently and

repeatedly held that an airport operator

has power to regulate aircraft to

ll.

control noise (Air Transport Assn. v.

Crotti [N.D. Cal. 1975] 389 F.Supp. 58,

63-64 [three judge District Court];

National Aviation v. City of Hayward

([N.D. Cal. 1976] 418 F.Supp. 417, 424;

British Airways Board and Compagnie

Nationale Air France v. Port Authority

of New York & New Jersey [2d Cir. 1977]

Docket no. 77-7237).

The Court of Appeal expressly chose

to disregard these holdings of Federal

courts on issues of Federal law (67 Cal.

App.3d at 368, 374).2/

Finally. The decision of the Court of

Appeal conflicts with the clear policy of

this Court that the airport operator is

responsible for injuries inflicted on

airport neighbors by airport users.

2/ Air Transport and National Aviation

~ were expressly considered and disre-

garded by the Court of Appeal. British

Airways Board, the most recent expression

of this rule by a Federal Court, was de-

cided after the Court of Appeal's deci-

sion herein.

12.

This policy was announced in 1962 in

Griggs v. Allegheny County (1962) 369

U.S. 84. The Court made it plain that

since it is the individual airport opera-

tor that decides where its airport is to

be located, how much land is to be

acquired for buffer zones and what type

of aircraft service is desired, the air-

port operator is liable for injuries

inflicted on neighbors. This Court had

before it in Griggs all potentially

liable defendants, the airport operator,

the airlines and the United States.

This Court held that liability for

damages caused by aircraft flight rested

with the airport operator.

13.

1

FEDERAL STATUTES EXPRESSLY AUTH-

ORIZE THE TYPE OF COMMON LAW

ACTIONS FORECLOSED BY THE COURT

OF APPEAL

The Court of Appeal's conclusion that

tort actions for damages are somehow

"federally pre-empted" is puzzling. It

is all the more so when the argument is

viewed in light of the very statutes to

which the Port District and the Court of

Appeal attribute this "pre-emptive"

effect.

A study of these statutes is funda-

mental to determine congressional intent.

This Court has repeatedly held that pre-

emption rests on Congressional intent to

preempt. For example, in Schwartz v.

Texas (1952) 344 U.S. 199, 202, 203, the

Court stated:

"If Congress is authorized to

act ina field, it should manifest

its intention clearly. It will

not be presumed that a federal

statute was intended to supersede

the exercise of the power of the

14.

state unless there is a clear man-

ifestation of intention to do so.

The exercise of federal supremacy

is not lightly to be presumed.

"The principle thus appli-

cable has been frequently stated.

It is that the Congress may cir-

cumscribe its regulation and

occupy a limited field, and that

the intention to supersede the

exercise by the State of its

authority as to matters not

covered by the federal legisla-

tion is not to be implied unless

the Act of Congress fairly inter-

preted is in conflict with the

law of the State. [citations]"

(Emphasis added.)

Well, then, what's the situation at

bench? Did Congress intend a total pre-

emption? Or, was its goa. more limited?

Congress has enacted four groups of

statutes regulating the field of aviation.

Each of them permits damage actions.

The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49

U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 is the most pervasive.

15.

It occupies chapter 20 of Title 49 of the

United States Code, and governs the CAB

as well as the FAA, and economic as well

as safety and noise regulation of civil

aviation.

Notwithstanding this extensive regu-

lation, 49 U.S.C. § 1506 expressly permits

common law suits such as those at bench:

"Nothing contained in this

chapter shall in any way abridge

or alter the remedies now exist-

ing at common law or by statute,

but the provisions of this chap-

ter are in addition to such reme-

dies."

The Airport and Airway Development

Act of 1970 (49 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1742) has

been held expressly enforceable by air-

port neighbors in suits against airport

operators. City of Inglewood v. City of

Los Angeles (9th Cir. 1971) 451 F.2d 948,

955-956.

The Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42

U.S.C. § 1857 et seq., also expressly

permits suits by private citizens, in

§ 1857h-2(e):

16.

;

"Nothing in this section shall

restrict any right which any per-

son (or class of persons) may

have under any statute or common

law to seek enforcement of any

emission standard or limitation

or to seek any other relief

(including relief against the

Administrator or a State agency)."

The Noise Control Act of 1972, 49

U.S.C. § 1431, is codified as part of

chapter 20 of Title 49 U.S.C. it is thus

subject to 49 U.S.C. § 1506 quoted above.

Indeed, this Court recently confirmed

the propriety of private, common law

actions in areas subject to exclusive

federal (CAB) regulation. See Nader v.

Allegheny Airlines, Inc. (1976) 426 U.S.

290, 298-300.

Thus, assuming arguendo that Congress

had an intent that local regulation be

"pre-empted", private actions for damages

are permitted for any adverse consequences

of the regulated activity.

This Court recently dealt with a sim-

ilar problem (also arising in California)

17.

under the National Labor Relations Act.

In Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Car-

penters (1977) _—_—>U«.S. __,:~- S51 L.Ed.2d

338, this Court vacated the judgment of

a California Court of Appeal and held that

the National Labor Relations Act did not

preempt the right of a union member to

sue a union for tort in state court. In

upholding the individual's right to main-

tain common law, state court suits ina

Federally regulated area, this Court em-

phasized the state's interest in protect-

ing its citizens from tortious injury,

and the concurrent lack of Federal inter-

est in protecting tortious conduct (___

U.S. at _, 51 L.Ed.2d at 349-352).

The same is true here. California

has a legitimate interest in protecting

its citizens from tortious injury in-

flicted by jet noise. Likewise, though

Congress has sought to foster aviation,

it does not condone nor require operation

of jet aircraft in such a manner or loca-

tion that injury is inflicted on airport

neighbors. Quite the contrary. As dis-

cussed hereafter, the position of the

Federal government has been consistent

and clear: it is the responsibility of

18.

ee ——

each airport operator to ensure that its

airport is operated under such regula-

tions as will avoid injury to nearby

people and property - even if that means

excluding noisy aircraft.

As this Court expressed it in Florida

Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul

(1963) 373 U.S. 132, 146-147:

» « « we are not to conclude

that Congress legislated the

ouster of this California stat-

ute by the marketing orders in

the absence of an unambiguous con-

gressional mandate to that effect.

We search in vain for such a

mandate."

The same is true in the case at bench.

One would indeed ". . . search in vain for

+ « « @ Mandate” that common law tort ac-

tions are barred by "federal pre-emption".

The search would be as futile as Ponce de

Leon's quest for the "fountain of youth",

because Congress expressly said the con-

trary: common law actions are permitted.

19.

2

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS EXPRESS-

LY REJECTED THE COURT OF APPEAL'S

IDEA THAT, ". . . FEDERAL PREEMP-

TION OF THE FIELD OF AIRPORT NOISE

REGULATION LEAVES NO ROOM FOR LOCAL

CONTROLS . . ." (67 Cal.App.3d at

368)

The Court of Appeal's conclusion that

the FAA has preemptive power to issue

regulations to control jet noise is ex-

pressly disavowed by the FAA itself. In

fact, the FAA says that significant auth-

ority and responsibility properly and

necessarily remain with the airport oper-

ator. Since preemption cannot exist

without an intent to preempt, the FAA's

views are important. (See San Diego Bldg.

Trades Council v. Garmon [1959] 359 U.S.

236, 243, 247.)

The views of the Federal government

are most recently expressed in a document

issued by the FAA on November 18, 1976,

entitled Aviation Noise Abatement Policy.

The Aviation Noise Abatement Policy

makes it clear that the FAA does not

believe it has the preemptive power at-

tributed to it by the Court of Appeal,

20.

or that the State of California (operat-

ing through the Port District) is impo-

tent to issue regulations to control jet

noise for the protection of Californians.

The following passages from the FAA

policy statement are revealing:

"Our concept of the legal frame-

work underlying this policy

statement is that proprietors

retain the flexibility to impose

such restrictions if they do not

violate any Constitutional pro-

scription. We have been urged

to undertake - and have con-

sidered carefully and rejected -

full and complete federal pre-

emption of the field of aviation

noise abatement. In our judg-

ment the control and reduction

of airport noise must remain a

shared responsibility among air-

port proprietors, users, and

governments." (p. 34, emphasis

added. )

"The primary obligation to address

the airport noise problem always

has been and remains a local re-

sponsibility." (p. 2)

21.

Thus, in light of the FAA's recent,

explicit comment that it has ". . . con-

sidered carefully and rejected - full and

complete federal preemption of the field

of aviation noise abatement .. ." (Policy

Statement, p. 34), it causes wonder as to

how the Court of Appeal could character-

ize as "correct" (67 Cal.App.3d at 369)

the conclusion that:

". . . federal preemption of the

field of airport noise regulation

leave no room for local controls

-- including civil tort actions

for money damages." (67 Cal.App.3d

at 368)

There are sound policy reasons for

the FAA's rejection of total preemption.

These are discussed in the FAA policy

statement (p. 50):

"The Airport Proprietor's Respons-

ibility

"Substantial benefits will be

achieved through federal actions

to abate source noise and control

operational flight procedure and

airspace, but much of the noise

22.

problem is airport-specific and

must be addressed by individual

proprietors. Noise impact at

any airport is in part due to

local decisions on airport loca-

tion, continuation of airport

operations on a particular site,

the layout and size of an air-

port and the purchase of buffer

areas for noise abatement pur-

poses. It is local decision-

making that permits residential

development near an airport.

For these reasons, the Supreme

Court concluded that proprie-

tors are liable for aircraft

noise damages. In addition,

airport proprietors, particu-

larly those that are public

agencies, generally encourage

more service to their airports

in Civil Aeronautics Board

route proceedings.

* * *

"The airport proprietor is closest

to the noise problem, with the

best understanding of both con-

ditions, needs and desires, and

23.

the requirements of the air car-

riers and others that use his

airport. The proprietor must

weigh the costs the airport and

the community must pay for failure

to act, and consider those costs

against any economic penalties

that may result from a decision

to limit the use of the airport

through curfews or other restric-

tions for noise abatement pur-

poses." (Emphasis added.)

The injuries alleged in the complaint

(though obviously caused by noise emitted

[in part] by jet aircraft in flight) are

the result of the failure by the Port

District to face its responsibilities.

While the FAA retains control of aircraft

in flight, the injuries inflicted on the

Homeowners are the result of what the FAA

referred to as “airport-specific" problems.

In fact, the “airport-specific” problems

noted above by the FAA are all involved

at bench.

® curfew;

@ airport location;

24,

i

x

¥

e continuation of airport opera-

tions on a particular site;

e the layout and size of the air-

port; and

e the [non-] purchase of buffer

areas.

If - as the FAA concludes - the Port

District has the power to act, why should

the Court of Appeal immunize the Port

District from the consequences of its

failure to act?

The consequences of permitting the

precedent to stand will be widespread.

Airport neighbors, seeking recompense for

airport noise damage, will go to the

Federal courts - as they will be the only

courts which can give damages for injury

to person as well as property. There are

thousands of such cases pending in Cali-

fornia courts now. And others across the

Nation. Their shift to Federal courts

will not serve the ends of justice. The

financial consequences for airport opera-

tors’ mismanagement of their airports

will fall on the United States. It hardly

seems to require argument to point out

25.

the psychological effect on airport oper- ee This conclusion conforms to the FAA's

ators if the financial consequence of rejection of total federal preemption.

their indifference to airport noise is Note particularly that airport operators

borne by someone else. Too little atten- May restrict airport use even though the

tion is already paid to the plight of air- restrictions may discriminate against

port neighbors under the existing liabil- some airport users and interfere with

ity burden. interstate and foreign commerce, so long

The kind of control which the FAA as the discrimination is not “unjust",

believes that airport proprietors have and the interference with commerce is not

. . . . " "

is likewise revealing: unreasonable".

"Airport Proprietors are primar- Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeal's

ily responsible for planning and conclusion, the FAA believes that ". ..

the reasonableness of the operation of

airports . . ." (67 Cal.App.3d at 369) is

subject to examination. How else could

implementing action designed to

reduce the effect of noise on

residents of the surrounding

area. Such actions include one determine whether discrimination is

optimal site location, improve- "unjust", or interference with commerce

. . . . ° Hy " "

ments in airport design, noise is “unreasonable”?

abatement ground procedures, land

acquisition, and restrictions on

airport use that do not unjustly

discriminate against any user,

In its most recent policy statement,

the FAA has forcefully and repeatedly

told airport operators, like the Port

District, that they not only have the

impede the federal interest in power to so act, but they must exercise

safety and management of the air that power. (See Policy Statement, pp.

navigation system, or unreasonably 5, 33, 34, 50, 47.)

interfere with interstate or foreign

In short, the very federal agency for

mmerce." Policy Statement ‘

vi ' d ‘ which the Court of Appeal says Congress

p. 5; emphasis added.) 27

26.

preempted the field, has expressly con-

cluded that:

Re

Be

Congress did no such thing; and

neither Congress nor the courts

should do so; because

"The primary obligation to address

the airport noise problem always

has been and remains a local

responsibility." (Policy State-

ment, p. 2)

"Our concept of the legal frame-

work underlying this policy state-

ment is that proprietors retain

the flexibility to impose such

restrictions if they do not

violate any Constitutional pro-

scription. We have been urged

to undertake - and have consid-

ered carefully and rejected -

full and complete federal pre-

emption of the field of aviation

noise abatement. In our judgment

the control and reduction of air-

port noise must remain a shared

responsibility among airport

28.

proprietors, users, and govern-

ments." (Policy Statement,

p. 34; emphasis added.)

3

THE COURT OF APPEAL MISREADS

FEDERAL AUTHORITY AND ERRONEOUSLY

CONCLUDES THAT THE PORT DISTRICT

(AS AIRPORT OPERATOR) HAS NO POWER

TO CONTROL THE NOXIOUS BY-PRODUCTS

OF THE JET AGE EMITTED BY THE PORT

DISTRICT'S TENANTS

The Court of Appeal adopted the Port

District's fervent argument that this

Court, in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air

Terminal (1973) 411 U.S. 624, held that

airport operators can exert no control

over jet noise.

This Court held no such thing.

In Burbank, the municipality which

sought to regulate the airport was not

the airport operator. All that was de-

cided in Burbank was that municipalities

cannot use their police powers to regu-

late airports which they do not operate.

The power of an airport operator - as

29.

landlora2/ - to control what goes on at

its own airport was expressly not decided:

". . . But, we are concerned

here not with an ordinance imposed

by the City of Burbank as 'pro-

prietor' of the airport, but with

the exercise of police power.

While the Hollywood-Burbank Air-

port may be the only major air-

port which is privately owned,

many airports are owned by one

municipality yet physically

located in another. For example,

the principal airport serving

Cincinnati is located in Kentucky.

Thus, authority that a munici-

pality may have as a landlord is

not necessarily congruent with

its police power. We do not con-

sider here what limits, if any,

apply to a municipality as a

2/ The conventional tool airport pro-

prietors use to control noise is

their lease to the airline users. By

agreement, the airline is limited as to

hours, Class of aircraft, number of

flights, etc.

30.

proprietor." (City of Burbank

v. Lockheed Air Terminal [1973]

411 U.S. 624, 636, fn. 14.)

The problem with the Court of

Appeal's analysis in this case, is that

it confuses two separate (but peacefully

co-existing) lines of federal authority.

One line deals with the power of airport

proprietors. The other deals with the

power (or more properly, lack of power)

of local governments in or near which

airports are located, but which are not

the airport proprietor.

Burbank is simply the latest ina

line of cases initiated by the Cedarhurst,

Hempstead and Audubon Park litigation,2/

in which the courts have consistently

held that a government agency other than

the airport operator has no power to

3/ Allegheny Airlines v. Village of

Cedarhurst (E.D.N.Y. 1955) 132 F.

Supp. 871, aff'd (2d Cir. 1956) 238 F.2d

812; American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of

Hempstead (E.D.N.Y. 1967) 272 F. Supp.

226, aff'd (2d Cir. 1968) 398 F.2d 369;

American can Airlines, Inc. v. City of Audu-

n Park (W.D. Ky. 1968) 297 F. Su 207,

aff'd (6th Cir. 1969) 407 F.2d "1306,

31.

issue regulations dealing with aircraft

control the use of the airport

noise. , .

1s a necessary concomitant,

On the other hand, no court - before whether it be directed by state

I

:

{

the opinion brought to this Court for police power or his own initia-

review - has ever held that an airport tive. . . . That correlating

operator itself lacked the power to so right of proprietorship control

regulate. Quite the contrary. See, e.g., is recognized and exempted from

Port of New York Authority v. Eastern judicially declared preemption

Airlines, Inc. (E.D.N.Y. 1966) 259 F. by footnote 14." (Emphasis

Supp. 745; Burbank, supra, 41l U.S. at added; footnote omitted.)

636, fn. 14; National Aviation v. City of

Hayward (N.D. Cal. 1976) 418 F. Supp. 417;

Air Transport Assn. v. Crotti (N.D. Cal.

1975) 389 F. Supp. 58, 63-64 (three judge

District Court); British Airways Board

The most recent expression occurred

in the Concorde case (British Airways

Board, supra), where the Court of Appeals

rejected the notion that the Port Auth-

ority of New York and New Jersey lacked

and Compagnie Nationale Air France v.

Port Authority of New York & New Jersey

(2d Cir. 1977) Docket No. 77-7237.

the power to establish the conditions and

regulations under which the Concorde

might be allowed to use its airport

This consistent position of the Fed- Seat Riches

eral judiciary was perhaps best summed

up by the three judge District Court in

Crotti, supra, 389 F. Supp. at 63-64:

"We need not tarry long over

the issue that heretofore has

occupied center stage in this

It is now firmly established litigation. We believe the

that the airport proprietor is grounds for Judge Pollack's

responsible for the consequences grant of summary judgment, that

which attend his operation of a Secretary Coleman's order pre-

public airport; his right to empted the conflicting exercise

32. fi 33.

of power by the Port Authority,

is simply untenable and erroneous.

Accordingly, we will reverse.

"In response to our request,

the United States filed an amicus

brief in which it urged that

Secretary Coleman's order was

never intended to deprive the

Port Authority of the right to

condition utilization of the

facilities at JFK on the Con-

corde's compliance with reason-

able noise regulations. The

Government, indeed, went further,

and denied that existing legis-

lation authorized the Executive

under any circumstances to pre-

empt airport proprietors from

promulgating their own noise

regulations.

"This conclusive statement of

the United States position con-

firms our independent assessment

of the public record." (slip

opinion, p. 12; emphasis added.)

34.

Neither Congress nor the Federal

judiciary intended to bar airport owner-

operators from regulating their own air-

ports.

Quite the contrary.

The Port District's misreading of the

federal authorities has caused much grief

for the neighbors of Lindbergh Field, as

the Port District has for many years re-

fused to take action to protect them. If

the Port District's lawyers have told

their client what they tell the courts,

it then becomes understandable why the

Port District has seemed so arrogant in

its indifference to its neighbors' plight.

Sadly, the Court of Appeal has now

put into mischief-making precedent this

erroneous, self-abnegating reasoning.

It is time the Port District ceased

its self-imposed regulatory celibacy and

acted to abate the problems. That would

be a constuctive way to rid itself of the

prospect of litigation such as this,

rather than putting its resources toward

efforts to muddy the law, such as the one

presented to this Court.

35.

CONCLUSION

With respect, the premise of the

Court of Appeal (i.e. that awarding dam-

ages is tantamount to regulation, and

regulation is "federally preempted") is

doubly flawed:

first, as the FAA recently noted,

the field of regulation is not

preempted; and

second, regardless of regulatory

preemption, Congress expressed

its intent that common law actions

be allowed to proceed.

WHEREFORE, the Homeowners pray that

a writ of certiorari issue, so that all

are made aware of who is responsible for

evolving a solution to jet noise problems.

Respectfully submitted,

JERROLD A. FADEM

MICHAEL M. BERGER

of FADEM, BERGER, MCINTIRE

& NORTON

A Professional Corporation

By: MICHAEL M. BERGER

Attorneys for Petitioners

36.

APPENDIX A

A Oe RN ae a

er

.

re ~~ wee ee ee

'

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE

DISTRICT, DIVISION ONE, STATE OF

CALIFORNIA

COURT OF APPEAL - FOURTH

DIST. FILED FEB 18, 1977

ERVIN J. TUSZYNSKI, Clerk

R. J. Smith, Deputy Clerk

4 Civ. No. 16142

(Sup. Ct. No. 367963)

THE SAN DIEGO UNIFIED PORT DISTRICT, et al,

Petitioners,

Vv.

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO,

Respondent.

ROGER A. BRITT, et al,

and

EVERETT SINCLAIR BANKS, et al.

Real Parties in Interest.

PROCEEDING in prohibition/mandate.

Order to show cause discharged. Petition

for peremptory writ denied.

Luce, Forward, Hami'ton & Scripps, by

Louis E. Goebel, Michael S. Gatzke, Ronald

W. Rouse and Walter J. Cummings, III, for

Petitioners.

-l-

No appearance for Respondent,

Fadem, Berger, McIntire & Norton, by

Michael M. Berger and Patsy Mumiston Car

Carter, for Real Parties in Interest.

INTRODUCTION

A group of homeowner-plaintiffs

(Britt) tis seeking damages on various

theories from the San Diego Unified Port

District (Port District), the operator is

San Diego International Airport (Lind-

bergh Field). Before this Court, the par-

ties are engaged in two theaters of liti-

gation. This proceeding (4 Civ. No.

16142) is a challenge to an order over-

ruling a general demurrer to causes of

action in nuisance, negligence, trespass

and failure to obtain a state operating

permit. The other proceeding (4 Civ. No.

FOOTNOTE 1: Plaintiffs are 936 individ-

uals and one church. They

brought two actions, Britt, et al, v.

San Diego Unified Port Dist., San Diego

Superior Court No. 367963, and Banks, et

al, v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., San

Diego Superior Court No. 379755, which

were consolidated by the superior court.

;

:

:

7

—

16053), retransferred to this Court by

the Supreme Court for hearing, challenges

on First Amendment grounds the denial of

an order protecting Britt from discovery.

Except for the possibility the sustain-

ing of demurrers to the tort causes of

action might render moot the discovery

question, the two proceedings are unre-

lated.

THE ACTION

Plaintiffs allege in Count 1 the op-

eration of Lindbergh Field by the Port

District has so interfered with their

ownership rights as to constitute a take

ing of their property for public use

within the meaning of the Federal and

State Constitutions. They claim such

interference, usually referred to as in-

verse condemnation, entitles them to just

compensation. The Port District does not

contest the overruling of its demurrer to

this count, accepting for the purposes of

these proceedings that if a taking has

occurred the Port District is the

responsible entity.”

In addition, plaintiffs seek recovery

for both property damage and personal in-

jury on theories of nuisance (Counts 3

and 4), negligence (Counts 5 and 6),

trespass (Counts 7 and 8), and failure

of the Port District to obtain a proper

state operating permit (Counts 9 and 10).

The respondent court overruled a general

demurrer to these Counts (3 through 10)

and it is that action which is contested

in this petition by the Port District.

Other remaining Counts (13 and 14), for

breach of contractual obligations to a

third party beneficiary under contracts

between the Port District and the FAA,

are not at issue.

ISSUE

The issue presented is whether fed-

eral law in the field of aircraft noise

regulation preempts all state and local

FOOTNOTE 2: See Griggs v. County of Alle

Allegheny, Pennsylvania,

369 U.S. 34 [82 S. Ct. 531]. But see

Note, "Shifting Aircraft Noise Liability

to the Federal Government," 61 Va. L.

Rev. 1299.

age

{tary

a,

controls and therefore precludes civil

actions against airport operators based

upon common law or statutory causes of

action.

DISCUSSION

A. Propriety of reviewing the ques-

tion on petition for prerogative writ.

Only with "extreme reluctance" are

prerogative writs employed to afford in-

termediate review of rulings on pleadings

(Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.3d 84l,

851).

""'In most .. . cases, as is true of

most other interim orders, the par-

ties must be relegated to a review

of the order on appeal from the

final judgment.'" (Id., quoting

Oceanside Union School Dist. v.

Superior Court, 58 Cal.2d 180, 185,

fn. 4.)

Nevertheless, in circumstances of a "grave

nature" or of "significant legal impact,"

appellate courts may be compelled to in-

tervene through the issuance of an extra-

ordinary writ (Babb v. Superior Court,

supra, 3 Cal.3d 841, 851).

The issue presented is a significant

question of law. If the respondent court

erroneously permitted tort causes of

-5-

action to be pursued, substantial discov-

ery and trial expenses are needlessly im-

posed on the Port District (directly) and

the public (indirectly). The difference

between the action as it stands, requir-

ing discovery of the medical histories

of hundreds of individual plaintiffs,

and the action as the Port District con-

tends it should stand, requiring "merely"

appraisal of about 200 parcels of prop-

erty, is spacious. In the memorandum of

points and authorities in opposition to

the petition, Britt argues only that the

respondent court correctly decided the

issue on its merits and nowhere suggests

review should be deferred until appeal

from Suhqnent< Pec these reasons our in-

tervention by issuance of an order to

show cause was justified.

B. Merits.

1. Contentions.

The Port District summarizes its

argument as follows:

FOOTNOTE 3: See 5 Witkin, Cal. Proc.2d

(1971), Extraordinary Writs,

§43, p. 3817.

-6-

OR rae

"1. Federal legislation and au-

thorized agency regulation in the

field of aircraft and airport

noise is so pervasive that it has

preempted all state and local con-

trols. City of Burbank v. Lock-

heed Air Terminal (1973) 411 U.S.

624, 638, 93 S.Ct. 1854 ....

The multitude of interrelated con-

siderations in this field permits

only a uniform and exclusive sys-

tem of Federal regulation. Id.,

411 U.S. at 639. al

"2. This preemption precludes not

only local regulation by legisla-

tive action, but regulation by

local judicial action as well. E.

$: Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee,

71 F.Supp. 1040, 1044 (E.D. Wis.

1974), aff'd, 521 F.2d 387, 390-

391.

"3. The tort counts (Counts 3-10)

of plaintiffs' complaint require

adjudication of the 'reasonableness'

of conduct in the operation of

Lindbergh Field. These counts re-

quire the respondent Court to adju-

dicate questions of whether or not

noise impact on plaintiffs resulting

from jet aircraft operations at

Lindbergh Field, if any, could be

reduced by changes in specific oper-

tional procedures.

"4. The awarding of money damages

is every bit as much a regulation

of conduct by a court as the exer-

cise of its equitable jurisdiction

to regulate by injunction. E.g.,

~

San Diego Blgd. Trades Council v.

Garmon (1959) 359 0-5. 236, 246-

247, 79 S.Ct. 773. . . . Indeed,

plaintiffs' request for money dama-

ges under the tort counts is merely

a back door approach to placing

airport operational procedures un-

der judicial direction.

"5. The inverse condemnation count

is not directly affected by this

federal preemption because:

"a. If there is judicial determi-

nation that the level of interfer-

ence with plaintiffs' properties

is sufficiently great to consti-

ture a ‘'taking' under the Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendments, (United

States v. Causby (1945) 328 U.S.

256, 66 S.Ct. 1062 .. .) they are

entitled to 'just compensation'

because Congressional or agency

action may not operate to deprive

citizens of constitutionai rights;

and,

"b. Inverse condemnation as a

legal theory of recovery does not

require adjudication of the con-

duct of airport operational pro-

cedures. Essentially, it only re-

quires findings of a substantial

interference with private property

for public purposes and a diminu-

tion in the market value of the

property."

Britt responds in essence the duty of

an airport proprietor, as land occupier,

=§-

to operate airport facilities nontor-

tiously is unaffected by cases recogniz-

ing federal preemption in the field of

noise regulation. Distinction is drawn

between the exercise of police power by a

municipality to control airport noise and

the exercise of proprietary power by the

owner-operator of an airport.

2. Discussion.

a. Federal Law.

The seminal case in the area of fed-

eral preemption of airport noise regula-

tion is City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air

Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624 [93 S.Ct.

1854]. Both parties rely on this case in

support of their positions and claim it

disposes of the issue at bar.

In Burbank the owner-operator of the

Hollywood-Burbank Airport brought suit in

federal court against the City of Burbank

to enjoin enforcement of a city ordinance

forbidding any pure jet aircraft from tak-

ing off from the airport getween 11 p.m.

of one day and 7 a.m. of the next, and

forbidding the airport operator from per-

mitting any such takeoffs. The District

=~

Court enjoined enforcement of the ordi-

nance, and the Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit affirmed. In a five-to-

four decision, the United States Supreme

Court affirmed, holding "FAA, now in con-

junction with EPA, has full control over

aircraft noise, pre-empting state and

local control." (Id. p. 633 [93 S.Ct.

p. 1859].)

The United States Supreme Court ex-

pressly left open what limits, if any,

apply to the exercise of proprietary

rights by a municipality which owns and

operates an airport. In a controversial

footnote the Court explained:

"The letter from the Secretary of

Transportation also expressed the

view that 'the proposed legisla-

tion will not affect the rights

of a State or local public agency,

as the proprietor of an airport,

from issuing regulations or estab-

lishing requirements as to the per-

missible level of noise which can

be created by aircraft using the

airport. Airport owners acting as

proprietors can presently deny the

use of their airports to aircraft

on the basis of noise considera-

tions so long as such exclusion is

nondiscriminatory.' (Emphasis added.)

This portion as well was quoted with

approval in the Senate Report. Ibid.

-10-

=

oe

> om,

"Appellants and the Solicitor General

submit that this indicates that a munic-

ipality with jurisdiction over an air-

port has the power to impose a curfew on

the airport, notwithstanding federal re-

sponsibility in the area. But, we are

concerned here not with an ordinance im-

posed by the City of Burbank as 'proprie-

tor' of the airport, but with the exercise

of police power. While the Hollywood-

Burbank Airport may be the only major

airport which is privately owned, many

airports are owned by one municipality

yet physically located in another. For

example, the principal airport serving

Cincinnati is located in Kentucky. Thus,

authority that a municipality may have

as a landlord is not necessarily congru-

ent with its police power. We do not

consider here what limits, if any, apply

to a municipality as a proprietor." (Id.

p. 635, fn. 14 [93 S.Ct. p. 1861, fn. 14].)

Britt contends the Court in Burbank

expressly “acknowledged that the operator

of an airport does have the power to is-

sue regulations." Since this is so, the

conduct of the Port District as operator

of Lindbergh Field is not shielded by

federal preemption; its alleged impotence

to impose reasonable noise controls is

illusory, and it should be held responsi-

ble for its tortious conduct. Such an

interpretation of footnote 14 ignores

the rationale of the text of the opinion.

elie

A majority of the Supreme Court

reasoned in Burbank the interdevendence

of such concerns as safety, efficiency

and noise control “requires a uniform

and exclusive system of federal regula-

tion if the congressional objectives

underlying the Federal Aviation Act are

to be fulfilled." (Id. pp. 638-639 [93

S.Ct. p. 1862].) If a curfew interferes

with this perceived requirement of uni-

formity, it should make no difference

whether the curfew is imposed on the au-

thority of local police power or the

owner's proprietary power. The impact

of the curfew remains the same -- inter-

ference with flight schedules at other

airports and local flight congestion im-

mediately before and after the hours of

curfew.

Britt thus offers an anomaly: a mu-

nicipality or governmental agency may

impose noise regulations in its capacity

as airport proprietor which it could not

impose under its police power. Even

though the District Court for the Nor-

thern District of California has very

recently reached such a conclusion in

=12=

National Aviation v. City of Hayward, Cal.

418 F.Supp. 417, we doubt the Supreme

Court intended such a result.

The Burbank Court acknowledged "the

Hollywood-Burbank Airport may be the only

major airport which is privately owned."

(City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal

Inc., supra, 41l U.S. 624, 635, fn. 14

[93 S.Ct. 1854, 1861, ‘nm. 14].) The vast

majority of national airports are operated

by municipalities or governmental entities

such as the Port District. If the limita-

tion of footnote 14 is construed as Britt

suggests, local regulation by municipal

airport "proprietors" would not be pre-

empted by federal law, and "Burbank be-

comes a decision of nearly unique appli-

cation" (Warren, "Airport Noise Regula-

tion: Burbank, Aaron, and Air Transport,"

5 Environmental Affairs 97, 106, fn. 56).

"If the great bulk of airport noise cases

are not to be affected. ... the ratio-

nale of Burbank is defeated" (Id. p.

106).

The Port District focuses on the rea-

soning of the Burbank case. Counsel con-

tends federal preemption of the field of

o}) 3e

airport noise regulation leaves no room

for local controls -- including civil

tort actions for money damages. Relying

primarily upon San Diego Building Trades

Council, etc., v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236

{79 S.Ct. 773], the Port District urges

the awarding of money damages is as much

a regulation of conduct as an injunction

or legislative activity. In San Diego

Building Trades Council, the United States

Supreme Court stated:

"Our concern is with delimiting

areas of conduct which must be free

from state regulation if national

policy is to be left unhampered.

Such regulation can be as effectively

exerted through an award of damages

as through some form of preventive

relief. The obligation to pay com-

pensation can be, indeed is designed

to be, a potent method of governing

conduct and controlling policy.

Even the States' salutary effort to

redress private wrongs or grant com-

pensation for past harm cannot be

exerted to regulate activities that

are potentially subject to the ex-

clusive federal regulatory scheme."

(Id. pp. 246-247 [79 S.Ct. 780].)

The Port District urges if money damages

were to be awarded in this action, it

would be punished for conduct which is

=yY=

essentially within federal jurisdiction.

If juries in 50 states are permitted to

assess the reasonableness of the opera-

tion of airports, it would be impossible

to attain a national uniform scheme of

airport noise regulation. This conclu-

sion seems correct.

The Port District adamantly urges

Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee, 521] F.2d

387, is indistinguishable from this ac-

tion. In that post-Burbank case, prop-

erty owners were suing the County of

Milwaukee, as owner and operator of Gen-

eral Mitchell Field, the major Milwaukee

airport, and five federally certified

airlines which utilized the airport fa-

cilities. The plaintiffs charged that

aircraft, in taking off and landing at

Mitchell Field, flew over their property

at low altitudes, causing noise, vibra-

tion, fumes and the dropping of dust and

noxious substances on their property.

The plaintiffs claimed the defendants

deprived them of their property without

just compensation in violation of the

Constitution. In addition, they claimed

the defendants created a nuisance in

violation o: state law.

-15-

"As relief, the plaintiffs [sought]

actual and punitive damages, a man-

datory injunction directing the

County to initiate condemnation

proceedings against their property,

and a promulgation, by the district

court, of rules and regulations to

govern the aircraft and airport

operations at Mitchell Field." (Id.

p. 389.)

The District Court granted defen-

dant's motion to dismiss the complaint.

On appeal the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit acknowl-

edged the right of the plaintiffs to

seek inverse condemnation damages, but

rejected their claims for injunctive

relief and tort damages. The Court

stated:

"The district court properly held

that relief in the form of judicially-

made rules and regulations to govern

the airport and airline operations

at Mitchell Field was not available

to the plaintiffs. In City of Bur-

bank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.,

411 U.S. 624, 93 S.Ct. 1854, 36 L.

Ed.2d 547 (1973), the Supreme Court

held that the Federal Aviation Ad-

ministration (FAA), in conjunction

with the Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA), ‘has full control over

aircraft noise, pre-empting state

and local control.' 411 U.S. at 633,

93 S.Ct. at 1859. ‘'[T]he pervasive

-16-

control vested in EPA and in FAA

under the [Noise Control Act of

1972] leave[s] no room for local

curfews or other local controls.'

411 U.S. at 638, 93 S.Ct. at 1862.

The Court has similarly noted that

in the area of aircraft emissions,

Congress ‘has also pre-empted the

field.' Washington v. General

Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109, 114,

92 S.Ct. i396, 31 L.Ed.2d 727 (1972).

See Virginians for Dulles and Volpe

344 F.Supp. 573, 579 (E.D. Va. 1972).

As the court below recognized, it is

irrelevant that the plaintiffs here

are asking a federal district court,

rather than a state body, to promul-

gate the rules governing Mitchell

Field. The rules and regulations

which the plaintiffs seek would,

nonetheless, result in the type of

local control which the Supreme

Court in Burbank found to be invalid.

"The remainder of the plaintiffs'

claims charge both defendants with

common law nuisance and negligence

and violation of § 114.04 of the

Wisconsin Statutes, which makes it

unlawful, inter alia, for an air-

craft to fly ‘at such a low altitude

as to interfere with the then exist-

ing use to which the land or water,

or the space over the land or water,

is put by the owner.' These claims

are apparently based on pendent

jurisdiction. The district court

held that even if it were to con-

sider these allegations, see United

“17

Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,

725-726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d

218 (1966), the plaintiffs' action

on these counts could not be main-

tained. We agree.

"Since the federal laws and regula-

tions have preempted local control

of aircraft flights, Burbank, supra,

the defendants may not, to the ex-

tent they comply with such federal

laws and regulations, be charged

with negligence or creating a nui-

sance. Similarly, § 114.04 of the

Wisconsin Statutes cannot be invoked

to make unlawful flights which are

in accordance with federal laws and

regulations. If, as the plaintiffs

allege, the aircraft flights have

resulted in the 'taking' of their

property, the plaintiffs have actions

at law to recover just compensation

from the County. Griggs, supra;

- « « - To the extent that the

County may be violating the federal

laws or regulations, the plaintiffs

should, as explained. .. , exhaust

their administrative remedies."

Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee, 521

F.2d 387, 390-391.)

Since the tort causes of action were dis-

missed against the County of Milwaukee,

as owner and operator of General Mitchell

Field, as well as against the airline

defendants, the case is factually on

point. Britt's attempt to distinguish

Luedtke is disingenuous.

oie

Sak 2 il aay

The Port District correctly points

out a decision of a lower federal court

on a federal question, though not bind-

ing, is "persuasive and entitled to

great weight" (People v. Bradley, 1 Cal.

3d 80, 86; see also 16 Cal.Jur.3d,

Courts, §157, p. 288). The persuasive-

ness of the Luedtke decision is some-

what diminished, however, by the Court's

use of the Burbank case to dismiss

causes of action against two different

types of defendants, the airport oper-

ator and the airlines, without distinc-

tion. In fact, the Burbank case in-

volved an attempted exercise of police

power by a nonproprietary city, and the

Supreme Court expressly declined to con-

sider what controls might be imposed by

the owner-operator of an airport.

Two other recent federal decisions,

Air Transport Association of America v.

Crotti, 389 F.Supp. 58, and National

Aviation v. City of Hayward, Cal., supra,

418 F.Supp. 417, bear on the issue of

preemption. In Crotti an association

of air carriers sued the managing offi-

cials of major California airports

-19-

seeking a declaratory judgment that state

noise regulations adopted pursuant to

the state Public Utilities Code were

invalid. The challenged regulations

were of two types: (1) Community Noise

Equivalent Level (CNEL) standards, which

prescribed for continued operation of

airports with monitoring requirements

aimed at achieving a future maximum

noise level, and (2) Single Event Noise

Exposure Level (SENEL) standards, which

were prohibitions applied to the insep-

arable feature of noise generated by an

aircraft engaged in flight.

The Association's position narrowed

"to the simple contention that any con-

trol and regulation of the levels of

noise generated by aircraft in direct

flight is preempted by the federal gov-

ernment" (Air Transport Association of

America v. Crotti, supra, 389 F.Supp. 58,

62), and the CNEL standards and related

monitoring requirements and SNEL prohi-

bitions were therefore void.

The District Court found this argu-

ment to be overbroad:

-20.

vay

"We believe that the Airlines' total

reliance upon Burbank is misplaced.

The factual picture supporting Bur-

bank is of narrow focus, a single

police power ordinance of a munici-

pality -- not an airport proprietor

-- intending to abate aircraft noise

by forbidding aircraft flight at cer-

tain night hours. The holding in

Burbank is limited to that proscrip-

tion as constituting an unlawful

exercise of police power in a field

pre-empted by the federal government,

and we take as gospel the words in

footnote 14 in Burbank: ‘' [A]uthority

that a municipality may have as a

landlord is not necessarily congruent

with its police power. We do not

consider here what limits, if any,

apply to a municipality as a propri-

etor.' (Emphasis supplied.)

"It is now firmly established that

the airport proprietor is responsi-

ble for the consequences which at-

tend his operation of a public air-

port; his right to control the use

of the airport is a necessary con-

comitant, whether it be directed by

state police power or his own initi-

ative." (Id. pp. 63-64.)

The Court then concluded the CNEL

monitoring procedures, which were "a

passive function" "innocuous to aircraft

traffic" and not in direct conflict with

federal regulations, were not affected

by the Burbank case. The Court ruled.

a2ie

"The State dictated employment of

shielding and ground level facility

configurations, as well as develop-

ment of compatible land uses under

the provisions of CNEL, is so patent-

ly within local police power control

and beyond the intent of Congress in

the federal legislation that further

discussion would be wasteful." (Id.

p. 65.)

not on whether police or proprietary

power was being exercised, but rather on

the activity regulated. The CNEL regu-

lations, which dealt with ground noise

level management through land use plan-

ning, were not preempted; the SENEL regu-

lations, which sanctioned the noise levels

However the Court held: of aircraft themselves, were preempted.

“The SENEL provisions and regula- Airport land and facilities use (proprie-

tions are not so favored. We are

satisfied and conclude that the

SENEL provisions and regulations

of noise levels which occur when

an aircraft is in direct flight,

and for the levying of criminal

fines for violation, are a per se

tary functions) were subject to local

regulation, but noise emanating from air-

craft in flight (federally regulated)

was not.

unlawful exercise of police power

into the exclusive federal domain

of control over aircraft flights

and operation, and air space man-

agement and utilization in inter-

In National Aviation v. City of Hay-

ward, Cal., supra, 418 F.Supp. 417, four

related commercial airlines sought to

have a City of Hayward ordinance declared

state and foreign commerce. The :

thrust of the alenka Event Noise unconstitutional. The challenged ordi-

Exposure Levels is clear and direct

and collides head-on with the fed-

eral regulatory scheme for air-

craft flights delineated by and

central to the Burbank decision."

(Id. p. 65.)

nance, expressly enacted pursuant to the

City's authority as owner, operator and

proprietor of its local airport, prohibi-

ted all aircraft in excess of a fixed

decibel level from landing or taking off

from the Hayward Air Terminal between the

hours of 11:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. The

District Court defined its task at the

This application of the "proprietor

exception" of the Burbank case achieves

some accomodation between state and

federal interests. The Court focused outset:

-22- -23-

"(T]he Burbank court's finding of

preemption was made only with regard

to a nonproprietor municipality's

attempt to regulate aircraft noise

pursuant to its police power. Indeed,

in footnote 14 of the majority opin-

ion, Mr. Justice Douglas expressly

acknowledges that the court 'do[es]

not consider here what limits, if

any, apply to a municipality as a

proprietor.' 411 U.S. at 635-36 n.

14. As a result, this court must now

attempt to do so." (Id. p. 421.)

There was no doubt if the ordinance had

been passed by a local government not the

proprietor of the airport, it would run

afoul of Burbank and would constitute an

impermissible exercise of police power in

an area preempted by Congress.

The Court found itself

" ~ . . caught on the horns of a

particularly sharp dilemma: If on

one hand, we follow the dicta in

footnote 14 of the Burbank opinion,

which is intended to comport with

the court's holding in Griggs, we

will severely undercut the rationale

of Burbank's finding of preemption.

If on the other hand, we disregard

the proprietor exception as dicta in

order to fully effecuate the Burbank

rationale, we impose upon airport

proprietors the responsibility under

Griaqs for obtaining the requisite

noise easements, yet deny them the

authority to control the level of

athe

o> Eiht

noise produced at their airports."

(Id. Pp. 424.) F

The dilemma was resolved in favor of the

ordinance for two reasons. First, the

Court interpreted Air Transport Associa-

tion of America v. Crotti, supra, 389 F.

Supp. 58, 63-64, as holding "proprietor-

ship control is recognized and exempted

from judicially declared preemption by

[Burbank's] footnote 14." The language

quoted does not comport precisely either

with footnote 14 or with what the court

deciding Crotti, actually did. The

Court in Burbank said merely: "We do not

consider here what limits, if any, apply

to a municipality as a proprietor."

(Emphasis added.) That is a far cry

from, "No limits apply to a municipality

as a proprietor." Furthermore, both the

CNEL and SENEL regulations considered in

Crotti were exercises of state police

power, rather than proprietary power. If

the category of power exercised were dis-

positive, as the National Aviation court

implies, both types of regulation should

have fallen. Instead, the Crotti court

focused on the nature of the regulation,

i.e., land management v. air space

-25-

management.

The second basis for upholding the

ordinance was the clear expression of

Congressional intent not to "'prevent

airport proprietors from excluding any

aircraft on the basis of noise considera-

tions.'" (National Aviation v. City of

Hayward, Cal., supra, 418 F.Supp. 417,

424, quoting Sen. Rpt. No. 1353, 90th

Cong., 2d Sess., 7.)

The result reached in National Avia-

tion v. City of Hayward, Cal., supra,

severely undercuts the Burbank decision.

Five members of the Supreme Court found

the Burbank ordinance incompatible with a

perceived need for a uniform and exclusive

system of federal aircraft noise regula-

tion. The City of Hayward ordinance

seems equally incompatible; yet it was

permitted to stand as an exercise of pro-

prietary power.

b. State Law.

Britt adduces several California

cases in support of the respondent court's

overruling of the demurrers. For diverse

reasons, reliance upon these cases is

misplaced.

-26-

In Loma Portal Civic Club v, American

Airlines, Inc., 61 Cal.2d 582, Britt con-

tends, the Supreme Court held that while

airlines could not be prohibited from

flying, damages could be sought from the

airport's owner-operator on a nuisance

ecey.” Although the California

Supreme Court did reject the airlines'

claim of federal preemption, the short

answer to Loma Portal, the Port Dis-

trict retorts, is that the case was

decided nine years before Burbank. In

rejecting federal preemption the Cali-

fornia Court noted:

FOOTNOTE 4: In fact the holding was

more narrow. The operator

of the field was not a party to the

action. The Court stated merely:

"Nothing herein is intended

to be a determination of the

rights of landowners who suffer

from airplane annoyances to ek

damages from the owners or oper-

ators of aircraft or to seek

compensation from the owner or

operator of an airport." (Id.

pp. 590-591.)

«27

"A holding of federal preemption

would have the effect of disabling

the state from any action in the

entire field, and placing in the

federal government complete and

sole responsibility for regulation

of all aspects of that field. Such

a holding by a single state court

would have, of course, no effect on

the conduct of other states with

respect to regulation of that field,

and unless Congress had in fact in-

tended such preclusion of state regu-

lation and were to carry out its

responsibilities, there would result

within that state a lacuna which the

state would be powerless to fill.

As was said in Charles Dowd Box Co.

v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 505 [82

S. Ct. 519, 7 L.Ed.2d 483], quoting

from the opinion of the Massachusetts

Supreme Judicial Court: ‘In the

absence of a clear holding by the

Supreme Court of the United States

that Federal jurisdiction has been

made exclusive, we shall not make

what would be tantamount to an

abdication of the hitherto undoubted

jurisdiction of our own courts.'"

(Loma Portal Civic Club v. American

Airlines, iInc., 61 Cal.2d 582, 591.)

Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 6 Cal.

3d 920, Britt notes, was a case brought

by hundreds of individual plaintiffs

against the City of Santa Monica as

operator of the Santa Monica Airport.

The plaintiffs were permitted to go

=28e

_

my * G

forward on four theories: inverse con-

demnation, nuisance, negligence and zon-

ing violations. The Port District cor-

rectly responds (1) Nestle was decided

approximately one year before Burbank,

and (2) governmental immunity under

state law, and not federal preemption,

was at issue.

In City of San Jose v. Superior Court,

12 Cal.3d 447, Britt claims, the Supreme

Court noted that a nuisance action can be

maintained against a public airport. In

fact, the Court nowhere addressed federal

preemption in that case and was concerned

solely with class action issues. Although

San Jose was decided after Burbank, it

cannot fairly be said to be, as Britt

argues, the “current law of California"

on issues not contested.

In Aaron v. City of Los Angeles,

40 Cal.App.3d 471, homeowner plaintiffs

successfully sought inverse condemnation

damages for harm caused by air traffic

at Los Angeles International Airport.

The court rejected the City's contention

that federal preemption precluded local

regulation of airport noise and absolved

~29e

the City of responsibility for the inter-

ference with plaintiffs’ use and enjoy-

ment of their property caused by air

traffic. The court noted nothing in

Burbank relieved airports of the duty

to appropriate necessary land and air

easements (id. p. 489; see Griggs v.

County of Allegheny, Pennsylvania, supra,

369 U.S. 84 [82 S.Ct. 531]). The Port

District accurately replies:

“What is significant about Aaron is

that the case was tried, and dis-

cussed on appeal, solely upon an in-

verse condemnation theory of recov-

ery. The Court of Appeal, commenc—

ing at page 487 of its opinion, —

pointed out that Federal preemption

would not obviate the responsibility

of the airport operator to compen-

sate private property owners (as re-

quired by the Constitution) for any

taking of their property for airport

operations, citing Griggs Vv. Alle-

gheny County, supra. That is, of”

course, consistent with the posi-

tion which has been taken by the

Port District in this petition.

Aaron did not discuss the effect of

Federal preemption on tort theories

of recovery requiring adjudication

of airport operational procedures."

CONCLUSION

We conclude the plaintiffs may not

recover tort damages from the Port

District for harm caused by aircraft in

flight. Of the federal decisions which

have dealt with the authority of airport

proprietors after Burbank, we accept the

reasoning of the court in Air Transport

Association of America v. Crotti, supra,

389 F. Supp. 58, which distinguished

between airport land and facility use

(held subject to local regulation) and

aircraft in flight (held subject to

federal regulation only). To authorize

recovery from the proprietor of an air-

port for injuries caused by aircraft in

flight would permit local liability for

conduct within exclusive federal control.

FOOTNOTE 5: "'Federal control is inten-

Sive and exclusive. vlanes

do not wander abovt in the sky like

vagrant clouds. -ney move only by fed-

eral permission, subject to federal in-

spection, in the hands of federally cer-

tified personnel and under an intricate

system of federal commands. The moment

a ship taxis onto a runway it is caught

up in an elaborate and detailed system

of controls.'" (City of Burbank v. Lock-

heed Air Terminal Inc., supra, 41l U.S.

Continued)

=~3l1-

5

It is no rebuttal to this reality to

argue that the Port District could reduce

or avoid its tort liability by selec-

tively or entirely excluding aircraft

from Lindbergh Field. Such regulations

to avoid tort liability would have the

same deleterious effect on interstate

air traffic flow as the Burbank ordi-

6 . . .

nance. In our view, civil damages for

FOOTNOTE 5 Continued:

624, 633-634 [93 S. Ct. 1854, 1860],

quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.

Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 [Jackson,

J., concurring].)

FOOTNOTE 6: "If we were to uphold the

Burbank ordinance and a sig-

nificant number of municipalities

followed suit, it is obvious that

fractionalized control of the time

of take-offs and landings would

severely limit the flexibility of

the FAA in controlling air traffic

flow. The difficulties of schedul-

ing flights to avoid congestion and

the concomitant decrease in safety

would be compounded. In 1960 the

FAA rejected a proposed restriction

on jet operations at the Los Angeles

airport between 10 p.m. and 7 a.m.

because such restrictions could

‘create critically serious problems

to all air transportation patterns. '

25 Fed Reg 1764-1765. The complete

FAA statement said:

(Continued)

«32

the noxious by-products of aircraft in

flight, like the Burbank ordinance and

like the SENEL regulations invalidated

FOOTNOTE 6 Continued:

"'The proposed restriction on the

use of the airport by jet aircraft

between the hours of 10 p.m. and

7 a.m. under certain surface wind

conditions has also been reevaluated

and this provision has been omitted

from the rule. The practice of pro-

hibiting the use of various airports

during certain specific hours could

create critically serious problems

to all air transportation patterns.

The network of airports throughout

the United States and the constant

availability of these airports are

essential to the maintenance of a

sound air transportation system.

The continuing growth of public ac-

ceptance of aviation as a major

force in passenger transportation

and the increasingly significant

role of commercial aviation in the

nation's economy are accomplishments

which cannot be inhibited if the

best interest of the public is to be

served. It was concluded therefore

that the extent of relief from the

noise problem which this provision

might have achieved would not have

compensated the degree of restric-

tion it would have imposed on domes-

tic and foreign Air Commerce.'

"This decision, announced in 1960,

remains peculiarly within the

(Continued)

-33<

in Crotti, are a form of state regulation ’ flights may have resulted in the "taking"

in an area which must remain free of such of their property, plaintiffs are rele-

regulation if national air safety, traf- gated to a recovery of just compensation

fic and noise policy are to be left un- in inverse condemnation against the Port

District (Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee,

hampered.

Plaintiffs have not alleged that the Supra, 521 F.2d 387, 391; see also Griggs

flying aircraft about which they complain

did not comply with federal laws and re-

v. County of Allegheny, Pennsylvania,

supra, 369 U.S. 84 [82 S. Ct. 531].)

gulations. Since federal laws and regu- However, nothing in the Burbank deci-

lations have preempted local control of sion suggests an airport operator is

aircraft in flight, flights which comply relieved by federal law of the common

with such laws and regulations may not law duty to act nontortiously as a pro-

be classified as negligent, nuisances or prietor. If the Port District has tor-

trespasses, and the Port District cannot tiously managed and maintained the facil-

be held liable for tort damages alleged : ities at Lindbergh Field to the harm of

to arise from them. To the extent such some or all of the plaintiffs, the action

is not precluded by the doctrine of fed-

eral preemption.

FOOTNOTE 6 Continued: Pp ption

"This decision, announced in 1960, Since the allegations in the com-

remains peculiarly within the com- tates

petence of the FAA, supplemented now p ne seek ee for harm caused by

by the input of the EPA. We are not proprietary actions and omissions as

at liberty to diffuse the powers well as for hare : ;

given by Congress to FAA and EPA by s for harm caused by aircraft in

letting the States or municipalities flight, they are broad enough to state a

in on the planning. If that change couse of , n

is to be made, Congress alone must oie bssaretaney and the general demur

do it." (City of Burbank v. Lockheed rers at issue were properly overruled.

Air Terminal Inc., supra, 411i U.S. meverthe}

= S. Ct. 1854, 1862- eless, recovery for tort damages

1863) .) . at trial should be limited to those

-34- -35-

to

damages, if any, which arise out of the ,

operation of the airport itself and

should not include damages caused by

aircraft in flight.

The order to show cause is dis-

charged, and the petition for a peremp-

tory writ is denied.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

Ault

J.

> APPENDIX B

WE CONCUR;

Brown

P.J.

Cologne

J.

-36-

20 See, ere RAE OMe ©

0

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY

AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS

United States Constitution, Article VI,

Clause 2:

This Constitution, and the laws

of the United States which shall be

made in pursuance thereof; and all

treaties made, or which shall be

made, under the authority of the

United States, shall be the supreme

law of the land; and the Judges in

every State shall be bound thereby,

anything in the Constitution or laws

of any State to the contrary not-

withstanding.

42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(e):

Nothing in this section shal!

restrict any right which any person

(or class of persons) may have under

any statute or common law to seek

enforcement of any emission standard

or limitation or to seek any other

relief (including relief against the

Administrator or a State agency).

49 U.S.C. § 1506:

Nothing contained in this chapter

shall in any way abridge or alter

the remedies now existing at common

law or by statute, but the provisions

of this chapter are in addition to

such remedies.

B-1.

14 C.F.R. § 36.5: .

Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 1421(b)

(4), the noise levels in this part

have been determined to be as low

as is economically reasonable,

technologically practicable, and

appropriate to the type of aircraft

to which they apply. No determina-

tion is made, under this part, that

these noise levels are or should be

acceptable or unacceptable for

Operation at, into, or out of any

airport.

= =

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LEGAL & COMM. PRINTING (213) 877-8620 763-2965

B-2.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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