Appendix — Sims v. Western Steel Co.

Supreme Court brief1977

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Text

— ——

IN THE *

Supreme Court of the United States

OcToBER TERM, 1977

No.

ued “122°

Roya W. Srus AND THE R. W. Sims Trust,

Petitioners,

WESTERN STEEL CoMPANY,

Respondent.

APPENDIX E

Attachment to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Tenth Circuit

JouN A. YounG

Counsel for Petitioners

127 West Berry Street

Fort Wayne, Indiana 46802

(219) 424-4947

Of Counsel:

Georce H. Specrarez, Esq.

O’ConneELL & STANSFIELD

Twelve Exchange Place

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

(801) 532-5835

— oy oor

| 22 2

CHIEF JUDGE—GRANDFATHER CLAUSE

HEARING

SUBCOMMITTEE ON

IMPROVEMENTS IN JUDICIAL MACHINERY

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

S. 1130

A BILL RELATING TO CHIEF JUDGE—GRANDFATHER CLAUSE

MAY 18, 1976

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

+ tr

ivf

JAMES o. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman

JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska

EDWARD i masiinied eens

BIRCH BAYH, Indiana STROM THURMOND, South Carolina

QUENTIN x. BURDICK, North Dakota © CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, Ia, Maryland

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia WILLIAM L. SCOTT, Virginia

JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas ROMAN L. HRUSEKEA, Nebraska

PHILIP A. HART, Michigan HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania

JAMES ABOUREZE, South Dakota WILLIAM L. SCOTT, Virginia

WILIA P. WesTrHat, Chief Counsel

aq)

CONTENTS

— ae

8. 1130

A BILL RELATING TO SERVICE AS CHIEF JUDGE

OF A U.S. DISTRICT COURT

TUESDAY, “MAY 18, 1976

. '

U.S. Senate,

SuscoMMITTEE ON IxcpROVEMENTS IN JUDICIAL

MACHINERY OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

| : ‘Washington, D.C.

Zhe sabenmenities set, parsneat to.noticn, at 10 a.m., in room 6202,

Dirksen Office Building, Hon. Quentin N. Burdick (chairman of the

subcommittee ) swe .

Present : Senator Burdick Wedel.

Also present: William P. W. chief counsel; M.

Coulter, chief clerk; and Harry Dixon, staff of Senator

} 22 Mga 2 771 F a has scheduled a aa

ing on S. 1130, a o repeal the so-called grandfather clause w

exempted the existing chief judges of two-judge districts from the

statute which prohibits service as chief j beyond 70 years of age.

age limitation was enacted on August 6, 1958, there were

os n ee

t is understanding today only one e 32 chief yudyes

rer: He is Willis W. Ritter, the chief

judge ar the District of Utah. Judge Ritter was appointed to the

nch on October 21, 1949. N pot;

The subcommittee has received a number of letters on this bill,

both pro and con. These letters evidence a great interest in this legis-

lation; but because they present essentially hearsay or personal

Opinions. ee of the committee, will give them less

weight than the sworn testimony we will receive here today.

One of the letters which has been written by one Utah lawyer to

every member of the Judiciary Committee, reads as follows: “Tn all

fairness without regard to the judicial temperament or capacity or

integrity of Judge Willis W. Ritter, is there really legitimate reason

for having the only chief judge in the judiciary system over the age

e ’ Yo 2

In answer to question, a “legitimate reason” is that in 1958

a Federal statute provided that this judge, and 31 others, were ex-

empt from the ace 70 requirement. But this letter illustrates the reason

why I believe that before we receive the testimony of w ‘nesses, it

would be helpful if we can identify the specific issue ra.sed by S.

1130. ; a *

S. 1130 does not raise the issue of whether the judge should be re-

moved from judicial office; because under present law that issue can

(1)

only be decided after impeachment by the House of Representatives.

Nor does S. 1130 raise any issue concerning ible disability of the

judge, because section 372 of title 28 U.S. covers such a situation.

he issue, as I perceive it to be, is whether the judge in question, who

continues to serve as chief judge of the District of Utah by virtue of the

exception made by the Congress in 1958, is for some reason unable to

perform the duties of a chief judge in an effective and expeditious

manner, , ' aif ‘

If it can be demonstrated that he is unable to so perform, then the

subcommittee will have to make the further decision of whether re

of the grandfather clause is appropriate legislative action under all of

the circumstances, And, it seems to me, that one of those circumstances

involves the separation of powers yy trom which has grown the

phrase “independence” of members o Federal judiciary.

Cae Oe thar ee niie 08 intended ss any ruling by the Chair on

these or other issues, it has been put forth in to clarify the

matter before the subcommittee this ing.

A copy of S. 1130 will be included in the ing record at this time

without objection.

[The above referred to bill follows:]

IS. 1180, 94th Cong, Ist sess.} a

A BILL To amend the Act of A 4 72 Stat. 497 to chief

0 Anema ry BN, * relating to service as

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States

of America in Oongress assembled, That section 8 of the Act of A 6, 1958

(72 Stat. 497), is amended by changing the tirst comms o a period by striking

all of the remainder of the sentence. ‘

Fee nar Row recognises thé junior Senator froi Utah who is the

principal of bill, and at whose request this hearing was

scheduled. r Garn, you may proceed, 9

Senator Ganx. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I do have a

very lengthy statement with a la number of inclusions. I would like

to summarize the statement and ask that it be included in its entirety in

the hearing record and that all of the attachments, letters, and edito-

rials also be included in the record without me taking the time of the

subcommittee to read all of them.

r Burprcx. They will be so received without objection.

The above referred to statement with attachments follow :]

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAKE GaRN BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMPROVEMENTS

IN JUDICIAL MACHINERY or THE SENATE JupICIARY CoMMITTEE ON S. 1130

Mr. Chairman: Let me begin by expressing my personal gratitude to you for

ember greatly apprecia This hearing been sought for years

leading members of the Judicial Branch, the Bar, and concerned citizens, and

1 Some tion has arisen concerning the number of district court judges affected by

8. 1130. The Administrative Office of U tes Courts bas confirmed

that % Judge Willis Hitter of the’ dn ent, Bete tery ee be Piet 6

Utah will be the only affect

ed. Letter from R. Glenn Johnson, Chief, Division of

Personnel, to Jake Garn, 6, 1976.

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Grand Jury right

tape recorders from the entire Federal

dismissed a Federal

of what jurors called “a most important criminal investigation.”

defendants and witnesses who did not want

the panel into his courtroom and without explanation ordered

photographers and artists in his courtroom deserves further

comment because it ilustrates bis trestment of newsmen. The gap between the

City media, true to form, fearfully sidestepped any confrontation

d the press culminated in the celebrated “TV sketching case“ in 1973.

He abruptly

go home.

's ban on

ust three years ago this month when a Salt Lake City

deast sketches of a trial underway in Judge Ritter’s court,

ern drawings. A few days later

uten axa

apparently in

re obi delthin batten bravatmal obnd themadives focinn a con.

citation was not pressed. But the sketching order

no one else could misunderstand its intent.

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‘ 2 FAP - —

to 1 . . e H ien e, United States “Attorney for the District ot

PaRaNoia AND Pakapox ON THE F Bence ,

Willis W. Ritter has established a reputation as one

and frequently overturned jurists in American

“Chief Judge

of the most cantankerous

(By M.

the

Dress

21 AR

ber 3252

—

and

easily

tu-

tion’ . . . Censorship in any form—judicial censorship included—is simply in-

compatible with the dictates of the constitution and the concept of a free press.”

Judge Ritter made an interesting and humanitarian argument for his sketch-

ing ban. He suggested that people have a right to come to the court “without

being held up to degradation by grotesque representations of their physical

characteristics .. . and a constitutional right . . . to be free from being made a

public display of.” rs

His concern for the privacy and welfare of those who

may be ethically laudable, but it bardly stands as a legal right. There are neither

statutes nor case law that grant a “constitutional right” to be free of publicity

when you go before the federal courts. Even if one accepts the presumption that

all courtroom drawings are “grotesque representations” and subject a person

to “ridicule,” the laws of privacy and libel, as interpreted by the Supreme Court,

prevent recovery unless it can be shown that the statements or pictures are made

with actual malice.

The most telling argument against this order forbidding an artist from leav-

ing the courtroom, drawing the scene from memory and then having that sketch

televised is the First Amendment itself. ,

“A trial is a public event,” according to Justice William O. Douglas in a 1946

case. “What transpires in the courtroom is public property ... Those who

see and hear what transpires can report it with impunity. There is no special

perquisite of the judiciary which enables it, as distinguished from other in-

stitutions of democratic government to suppress, edit, or censor events which

transpire in proceedings before it.”

Since the person who draws in a courtroom can do so, if he desires, with little

more distraction to the participants than the person who takes pencil notes, it

is unnecessary that the physical act of drawing interfere with the proceedings.

The drawing is simply another technique for reporting court activities.

It is obvious that the gag order on sketches was not designed to protect from

to the administration of justice. It was directed at getting

privacy for the people coming to the courts and keeping the media out of the

province that the judge considered exclusively his.

That hardly justifies the prior restraint.

In contrast to the Utah media's example, one eastern newsman boldly delved

into Judge Ritter's alleged “ecumenical meanness.” Investigative reporter Joseph

Golden, formerly with the Philadelphia Inquirer and now a free-lance writer in

Washington, D.C., recently wrote a book entitled The Benchwarmers, in which

Ritter. In one chapter, Golden wondered if any of the jurists he had been

writing about would qualify for the title of “ultimate Expletive Deleted judge

of the Federal courts?”

“At one point I had decided that Judge Willis Ritter, the perpetual-fury

machine of Salt Lake City, deserved the honor,” Golden wrote. “Ritter’s bad

temper, however, seems to be fired by age and whiskey more than by innate

meanness and, as is true of any ricocheting object, he occasionally lands on the

right side of an issue. Let me say that again: Ritter sometimes makes a humani-

tarian decision, but maybe only because he is madder at the bad guys in the

case than he is at the good guys.”

And so Golden passed over Judge Ritter for the dubious “ultimate Expletive

Deleted” title and gave it instead to Judge Charles Carr of Los Angeles.

For many people in Utah, however, Judge Ritter has been in the process of

earning such a title ever since a series of heated Senate hearings in 1949 and

1950 ended in confirmation of his appointment by President Truman. Emotions

about the judge’s courtroom conduct have simmered behind the scenes for years

in the law offices in Salt Lake City, but it wasn t undi 1978 that the Utah State

Bar would publicly acknowledge there might be a problem. In that year, at the

association’s annual meeting in Provo, the public debate over Ritter's alleged

“irregular conduct” and supposed “bias” against certain lawyers began.

Calvin Behle, a well-known lawyer in Salt Lake City and then Utah delegate

to the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, introduced a resolu-

tion to ask Congress to repeal the “grandfather clause” in the Judiciary Retire-

ment Act of 1958. This clause had initially been tacked onto the Act as an

amendment in the Senate, allowing Idaho Democratic Senator Frank Church’s

father-in-law to continue to serve as chief judge after retirement age. Under the

act, federal judges must retire from chief judge status at age 70, except then

incumbent chief judges in two-judge districts. Currently, Judge Ritter is the

only one left on the bench. If the clause is repealed, he would remain as a Federal

judge, but would have to relinquish his administrative powers, including the

power to assign cases. |

Behie’s resolution was adopted by a 2-to-1 margin. But only about 100 of the

Utah Bar's 1,383 members were at the convention. Some pro-Ritter lawyers were

enraged by the move.

“The entire business was carried out in a most sheddy and illegal manner,”

declared John J. Flynn, University of Utah law professor. “Such a procedure

would do credit to those who planned Watergate and is just as unfair, illegal,

and unethical.” He also called it a “sneaky, underhanded attack on the inde-

pendence of.a ederal j 5 :

. e peedlation

had been “improperly introduced” and declared the action in Provo to be “null

and void.” '

“They left me holding the bag,” Behle said, shaking his head. “They are

afraid because they have to plead cases before Judge Ritter.”

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In view of the strong public policy expressed in the Act of August 6, 1958,

relating to the maximum permissible age for chief judges of federal district

courts, and my own experience before the United States District Court for the

District of Utah, it is my opinion and recommendation to the Subcommittee on

Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Judiciary Committee that

the interests of justice will be served by the enactment of the subject bill which

has my unqualified support.

Respect

fully youre,

Jack L. CRELLIN,

Assistant Attorney General.

CANNON AND DUFFIN,

Arronxrrs at Law,

Salt Lake City, Utah, May 10, 1976.

Re Amendment to section 3 of the Acts of August 6, 1968, (72 Stat. 497) Hearing

set for May 18, 1976.

SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE,

L. S. Senate,

Washington, D.C.

GENTLEMEN: My interest is in having the Committee act favorably on the

proposed amendment to the subject act.

It may be that my feelings might be dismissed as being biased and prejudiced.

At the hearing in Salt Lake City prior to the appointment of Judge Willis W.

Ritter, I appeared and testified that he did not have a judicious temperment and

therefore I was opposed to his appointment. Time has not change my opinion.

Noting those testifying in his behalf, one finds those who appear before him on

behalf of clients. Prudence would so dictate. Once I appeared before his court

after his appointment. I will never appear again. I feel clients of mine would not

be given judicious consideration. It is almost thirty years since he was appointed.

I have been in the federal court but once. That is a sad commentary on our

system. Not only have I felt limited, but my associates have felt it is a disadvan-

tage to be associated with me in our practice.

The law itself is unfair as it makes an exception. Everyone should play under

the same rules and especially in federal courts.

It is respectfully urged that the committee recommend passage of the pro-

posed amendment to have the law apply to all equally.

Respectfully yours,

T. QuenTIN CANNON.

MerepitH, Barner & Day,

ATTORNEYS aT Law,

Salt Lake City, Utah, May 7, 1976.

Re The Honorable Willis W. Ritter, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the District of Utah.

Hon. Jake Gaky,

Senate Office Building,

Washington, D.C.

Dran Senator Garn: I have been informed that the Senate Judiciary Com-

mittee is contemplating hearings related to the repeal of the Grandfather Clause

under which the Honorable Willis W. Ritter retains his position as Chief Judge

of our District.

Though I am philosophically opposed to congressional tampering with the

bench, I am in full agreement that the Grandfather Clause should be repealed

solely because it will effect the status of the Honorable Willis W. Ritter and

298 of justice which is dispensed by the United States District Court

n *

I have had significant experience before the Honorable Willis Ritter and

have many times witnessed the arrogant, tyrannica), arbitrary, aud insulting

manner in which Judge Ritter conducts his court and treats the individuals

who appeared therein. Of particular concern to me is the manner in which the

calendars of trials and events are conducted in that court and the fact that

Judge Ritter does not conduct either trials or rule days on a regular basis, but

seems to hold the entire legal community of the District of Utah at his beck and

call and exercises his apparent prerogative to demand immediate appearance

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d — 1 this grandfather —

and acceptable. I have also agreed with the distinguished chairman

that they ought not to be reneged except under unusual circumstances,

to see this particular clause revoked because this

enough facts to classify it as “unusual.”

The foll facts and policies have convinced me that S. 1130

S. 1130 ought to because the same organizations that supported

the original act and its amendments now support of the clause

of exception. Who were those . supported H.R. 985

in 1957 and 1958 The Judicial Conference, the American Bar Asso-

ciation, the Department of Justice: The most objective, deliberative,

and influential entities of the American judicial system. What organ

zations now 1 S. 1130 The Aale

Conference believes that this exception . . has outlived

Kirks, director, administrative office of the United States Courts to

Carl Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives, September 21,

1973— it’s added to this statement—and also a letter of confirmation

; of the American Bar Association

has taken no specific stand on repeal of the clause, it is believed that

2 has not changed from 1957 when it a bill iden-

tical to H.R. 985, as introduced, with a relinqui date at age

70 years and without a “grandfather clause.” The committee on the

Federal Judiciary said, “Your committee is of the view that this

rogue that the eworef Seisgater aiope the restate schorne

the resolution i

(the identical bill).”

The House of

leaders of the bar and bench in calling for its passage.

Chief Judge David T. Lewis of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

10th Circuit says:

ͤ——I— —— ne ek ee es Be =

——

Governor Calvin L. Rampton—whom I’m sure you know, Mr, Chair-

man—elected three times as Governor of Utah and probably the most

popular governor in the history of the State of Utah, said:

I feel IS. 1130) should be passed. If it were passed, in my opinion it would

result in improved administration and supervision of the calendar in the U.S.

District Court for the District of Utah. Whether the “grandfather” clause was

ever justified from a standpoint of principle is questionable. Undoubtedly, it

was adopted as a matter of expediency to facilitate the passage of the act.

However, if it were ever justified now that there is only one judge serving

pursuant to the “grandfather clause” and he is a substantial number of years

beyond. the cut-off age, the continuation of the “grandfather principle” can no

longer be justified.

This was a letter from Governor Rampton to me on May 10, 1976.

Erwin N, Griswold, former Solicitor General of the United States,

Says:

‘The situation with respect to the Chief Judge in the U.S. District Court in

Utah is unique, and I think, unfortunate.

The basic policy—namely, that a judge shall cease to be a Chief Judge upon

reaching the age of 70—is sound, as has been shown by a great deal of experience

in our judicial system. It is quite unwarranted, it seems to me, to have a special

provision in our statutes which makes this policy inapplicable in a single case.

The time has clearly come, in my opinion, when that exception should be re-

pealed, and the same rule should be applicable in Utah as in all of the other

States of the Union.

The Utah State Bar has gone on record twice favoring repeal of

this “grandfather clause.” On January 11, 1974, a resolution was

passed at the midwinter meeting of the bar authorizing a secret poll

of the bar ip concerning this issue—77.7 percent of those

res ing favored repeal.

imilarly, at the midwinter meeting in January 1976, the Utah

State Bar passed a resolution by a vote of 106 to 62 stating “. .. the

official action of those members of the Utah State Bar assembled

is affirmed to be in favor of S. 1130.”

S. 1130 ought to be because its would not frustrate

congressi policy intent as established in 1957 and 1958. We must

remember that H.R. 985 passed both the House and the Senate with-

out the “grandfather clause” and was apparently acceptable to both

bodies. for over a year until the bill was reconsidered and amended

for political reasons.

It is true that the bill as by both Houses (before reconsid-

eration) contained a relinquishment age of 75 years, but the *

chief judge in the Federal District Court for Utah is 77 years old,

having been born January 24, 1899, and would have had to re-

—— 2 ip nearly 2½ years ago even if the more

8 of ill had been sigaed without the “grandfather

Unfortunately, that version passed both Houses without being

signed. I caution us against assuming that S. 1130 will frustrate the

intention of the 85th Congress. It will not, as the record shows.

S. 1130 should pass because the poli

forecasts Senator

Eastland in 1958 for adoption — 2

udge

as follows. I will skip over that and have it included in

This is a minimum standard of conduct, I believe. The ideal would

be an expectation that any judge so protected and exempted would

maintain exemplary standards of conduct. Congress can reasonably

expect that when it carves out a special exemption in the law for a

certain class of persons that those persons act in a manner consistent

with their special legal status. 50 f |

If “exemplary” conduct is too high a standard. then it is reason-

judges,

it t to maintain that exem the

jude in — bahente, te —

pacity as chief judges and im their capacity as active Federal judges.

I believe the standard of conduct as to the chief judgeship is self-

r ö

— 2 — t —

ing whether a

uty to vileges N

— — 2 2 7 —

that performance in one area cannot be separated from performance

in the other.

What kind of ing is it which tat a special one-man

exemption should be continued after it has been shown that the only

— ———— -

— ee

—

and judicial sufficiency has crumbled from Willis W. Ritter.

if, indeed, they ever did—why this

| else. W. —— — *

everyone e yearn for an treatment,

ith judicial fairness.

items that fill my files from letters from

of mistreatment in his court to editorials.

Ogden, Utah Standard-Examiner editorial-

Has Come for Federal Judge Willis W. Ritter to Step

I will skip over all of these examples and not take the

time of the them.

Even books have been written about J Ritter. I will just read

rom Joseph C. Goulden, author of a recent book on Federal

judges. He said, after discussing J udge Ritter for several pages, “At

one point I had decided that Judge Willis Ritter, the perpetual-fury

machine of Salt Lake City, deserved the honor [of ultimate expletive

deleted judge of the F courts]. Ritter’s temper, however,

seems to be fired by age and whiskey more than by innate meanness

and, as is true of any ricocheting object, he occasionally lands on the

ight side of an issue.” eh

kinds of points are made over, and over, and over in

letters and in newspapers and now in books. It's time we no longer

reward such behavior with special “grandfather” protection. This is

the e ype: gpa unt age epee

Mr. irman, what more can be said? Who else needs to speak?

What further actions need to be taken? How much more time needs to

cee

l ee

He would like to say a brief comment before I start and then I have

a statement.

Senator Burpicx. Have ‘ees

The Reporter. No—Giuliani

Senator Burvicx. We want the names for the Reporter at the con-

clusion of the hearing, if you can give them then.

r 2

Senator Bunbick. Fine. Gentlemen, nae brief as possible

because we have a Joint Session today at 12:30, but proceed in any way

ou wish.

1 Mr. GrotluAxl. My name is Rudolph W. Giuliani, G-i-u-I-i-a-u-i. I

. General. Mr. Chairman, we will be

very brief. And just like to say a few things to place in context

before Mr. Child’s testimony. en

We're here from the of Justice to testify in of

S. 1130 to repeal the “grandfather clause” of Public Law . The

rationale of law is simply that, as a rule, the Congress has

determined that it is inconsistent with the public interest for a

to do double duty past the age of 70—that is, to do duty as both a dis-

trict judge handling a civil and criminal case and to preside as

an administrative judge over Federal *

In the 18 years since that statute was e

chief judge's duty namely, presiding over Federal trials and also

administering a court have become much more com licated, due,

No. 1, just to the sheer increase in the number of cases, both civil and

criminal], that have been filed in the U.S. courts, and even more impor-

tantly, because of the complexity of those cases.

Criminal law has changed significantly over that 18-year period

and has become significantly more complex. The civil cases that are

b t have also me more complex, so that the original rationale

for general rule is now underscored and emphasized by the sheer

increase In numbers and, more importantly, by the increase in com-

plexity of the kinds of cases that a Federal judge must preside over

and the kind of court he has to administer.

Mr. Child’s pare. ges will present a practica] example of the wis-

dom of this general rule enacted by Congress 18 ago. There’s

no doubt that in application a general rule like this, saying that a

judge cannot serve in both capacities past oe of 70, may, in cer-

tain circumstances, deprive Government of the effective service

* who, past the age of 70, who can, in fact, effectively do both

S les that will be

given by Mr. Child, however, show us the other side of the picture

and show us the wisdom of this rule, that in J Ritter’s

case, he has demonstrated, inly since the of statute

— coke; namely, le — A

orm roles; namely, sit as a tri complicated

Beeten Federal eee bach tivll ee

a court calendar.

So that now I will turn over to Mr. Child for him to present to

’ of Ritter cannot both roles and

why this the clause” now that

it only affects Judge Ritter. Mr. Child.

STATEMENT OF RAMON M. CHILD, US. DISTRICT ATTORNEY,

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

Mr. Cup, If it please this Committee and Honorable Chairman,

my statement is largely directed to criminal matters and is divided

four areas: one, the manner in which Judge Ritter cases

his court, I the central division of the U States Court

223 erie Chapaasp sapmareer raleset court, 1

udge Ritter uses “trailing calendar” system with very litt

advance notice to counsel of that calendar. During the last few years,

the af Salo) aplendarn ant np bythe ehiat paige coch year has

declined. consequently, ial calendar contained a large

number of cases for trial.

On Friday, December 12, 1975, late in the afternoon, my office re-

ceived notice of a criminal trial calendar to commence at 10 o’clock

a. m. on Thursday, December 18th, 6 days before Christmas. On that

calendar, 23 cases had been set for trial. Three of the first four cases

were tax cases involving approximately 100 witnesses, many of whom

resided out of the State of Utah. 1

During this period of time in December, 1975, United Airlines was

on strike. Christmas holiday traffic vated the situation. Con-

Four cases were dismissed outright because the Government did

not have its witnesses present. All four of those cases are now on

appeal. In one of those cases, the court was informed by Government

counsel that the case could be ready by the time it was reached on the

following Monday. Notwi ing the fact that this case was No.

S The case is reached now,“ and

171

115

2 285

;

Tip

sit?

spe

275

38 39 8

the cases are dismissed. Judge Ritter does not hold rule da he spent the better part of 1 year before his case was

is, days upon which arrsignimeste will be taken or motime Lean n pert i 4 +

cases on a regular or even a frequent basis. I move to poi 2 now: failure of the court to fully utilize the U.S.

The last criminal rule day in the district of Utah was January 16 istrate: In the District Court of Utah, the US. Magistrate

of this year. There are presently 32 cases involving 46 defendants has been utilized very little. Several Federal agencies have made

awaiting t in the central division. Of defendants, to the court that the U.S. Magistrate be utilized for the

Sa ee ; Ker ned or served with summons and bound over sedorcement of minor offenses, but their requests have not been

or arraignment a imi hearing before the magistrate. 0 granted N 1 3 spl

However, none of these defendants has yet been formally charged Since 1970, each U.S. Attorney has made similar requests of the

in an information or indictment. court. Recently, I also made a uest that the U.S. Magis-

No indictment has been possible during this riod because of the trate be more y utilized for the effective enforcement of minor

chief judge’s refusal to convene a grand jury. No information could : offenses. That request was su by letters of request and afli-

be filed or pleas taken during this period use of the chief judge’s davits of need from the heads of nine Federal agencies in the State of

failure to schedule court time for the conducting of such business. Utah. : is peti

Furthermore, at present 23 defendants have been formally charged Based upon past history, however, I have little that this peti-

bY T er or information and await arraignment in the central tion will be granted ——— anding 3 know that the

f second j in the iet is nen. i

ifs 90 day bine instances, the chief judge has failed to meet the Although he refuses to delegate trial authority, Chief Judge Ritter

specific 30-day time requirement of section 2(a) of the interim plan resists hearing minor offenses and abuses the government tor

for achieving prompt disposition of criminal cases in the district when such cases are filed with the court. For — nee pa of

the requirement —— judge adopted pureuant to 1975 under the tenure of William Lockhart, a man charged with the

The 8 7 — ; — of criminal procedure. offense of — entrance on a military reservation appeared

Judge's t hearing motions to dismiss ore Judge Ritter — — t. f .

or suppress until the time of trial. That means he defers a ruling on a —— excerpts the transcript of that proceeding

motion until after a jury has been picked and sworn, thereby causing demonstrate the j attitude toward | dling petty offenses in

jeopardy to attach and thus depriving the government of its right to the district court. After some preliminaries, the court says, “What

“ppeal an adverse „ kind of petty offense was it! We don't entertain those petty offenses

. chief judge m ea statement in a recent case wherein he ad- up there on the reservation. How did that one get in here?

mitted that his purpose in delaying pretrial motions until after the And again, the court said, “I don’t think this case will last very

jury was sworn was to make ce that jeopardy attached so the uick. I think it will go out the door with wheels under it. The

vernment couldn't appeal. The instance is cited in my statement. clerk then is askéd to take the plea and he says, “How do you plead

‘Upassover it, i to the information, guilty or not guilty?” And the defendant says,

uently the rights of those defendants who are in custody have “Not guilty.” And court then responds: “Good. That’s what you

been abused by the delays caused by the court. One of the more shout do. There’s a question whether I’m going to handle it or not.

serious problems faced by the U.S. Office during the term of William T may throw it out. I don’t take these petty offenses, see. The mili-

Tockhart, my predecessor was the inability to bring in custody de- ta there d to run that reservation. They ores

fendants to trial before Chief Judge Ritter within a reasonable time Wide they d out they can’t run it, at that ret mirage

2 ing three . me with respect to traffic they can’t tr he At

ollowing © cases are to onstrate the problem. 80 want me to be a traffic policeman, t examiner, an

One Rudy and one Kirkendahl were both charged with armed bank 00 J 50 fines that sort of busizess. T'm not going to do it. It looks to

robbery invol 1 incidents. Rudy was arrested on Septem- me like this thing not to be here.“

ber 23, 1974, rkendahl was arrested December 1, 1974. Kar The prosecutor then tried to explain to the court that this was a

Smith was incarcerated on August 28, 1974, after being charged compli situation where the man had been given a bar letter,

in an interstate bank fraud and he, too, was being held in custody after he had been caught selling narcotics on the military reservation,

under a high bond. n and in violation of the bar letter had come on the reservation.

ee repeated oral requests from U.S. Attorney ‘ And so the prosecutor said, “I felt, your honor, that the petty offense

Judge Ritter did not set these cases for trial until March 3, 1975. justified the court’s attention under the circumstances.”

at which time he set all three cases for trial on the same day, giving r lea is not guilty. That's a proper

. 1 working day notice é plea in this case and we'll look at your cards when we get it on the

defendant Kirkentahl nites us ee his trial, while calendar. N chances are that you won't have a big enough

- more t Smith hand to stay in the game.

Ritter iet den March 11, 1975, after waiting 7 months in jail. Judge When this case came before the court for rial, he allowed the prose-

also postponed Smith’s sentencing until July 11, 1975, and cutor to put on his case and then dismissed it. need for an effec-

tive method of ing minor offenses i cates N

readily apparent. Utah has within its l

Federal — including a veteran’s — st 11 —

In recent review of the need for better e orceme the mino

* * * enf ir

. —.— aa Utah, it was disclosed: First, 1 is —

Federal buildings ana 5 traffic and parking infractions at

of minor offenses in tribal

u occurring within Indian reservations have gone without sanc-

imated that over 250 cases in 1975 uld handled through

r if that — — and fifth

—— be — tary installations in Utah, many traffic offenses com-

—.— ctounilitary Personnel and minor offenses involving t

eos from the Government are committed —— —

Foc ment sanction because of the lack of an app — —

— or = ey roe the enforcement mechanism — in all of the

— he — — core is that of a fine or forfeiture of

assistance of the U.S. magistrate who oversees the collection af nns

At the present time, there is in the - 2

e . ’ 4 1 3

n ury sel term and to prohibit Judge Ritter 2

convened. 4 * or discharging the grand jury once it is

This action was filed with

On April with the court of ap on

8 peels Sag 20, 1976.

Government’s mandamus acti

i i ion b .

Judge Ritter issued an order for the empan Al 3 On April 22,

Cineait smpancles on May 10. The Court of Appeals f ury and

retained jurisdiction on the subject of w or 18

met to investi erim

1971, a grand jury sat for 5 da ing 1910 8 ertad e

vened onl i day. A grand jury wae ‘ — * ot alts ne 1978

During 1974, i

sat fo only 56 dpa Jury sat only 15 days. During 1975, 4 grand jury

Chief Judge Ritter has —

cember 4, if, unt the ft of the Pe, sean, Sury trom De-

and this situation existed even though du ing that period four de-

fendants refused to waive their constitutional right to indictment.

‘And in court when they are arraigned, he will try to press them to

waive that ri and criticize their attorneys for not so advising them.

Because of the lack of a grand jury in the central division of the

district of Utah, these four defendants could not be indicted nor

I On January 23 of this year, pursuant to rule 6 of the

ederal Rules of Criminal Procedure, I filed a motion requesting that

a d jury be empaneled.

ored 1 the court until finally I filed the man-

damus proceeding. Such conduct on the part of Judge Ritter is

of a long, but consistent history of actions taken by the judge which

have frustrated the d jury process.

On February 10, 1975, at the request of U.S. Attorney William Lock-

hart, the Court convened a grand jury. Shortly thereafter, the Anti-

trust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. At-

torney’s Office commenced presenting cases to that grand jury. Some-

time during the early part of April of 1975, Judge Ritter told US.

Attorney khart that the court was going to discharge the grand

jury.

4 order to salvage the work of that grand jury, which was then

ongonig, Mr. Lockhart to the entry of an order by the court

limiting the function and scope of the grand jury. On April 25, 1975,

Judge Ritter executed an order which limited the matters the Govern-

ment could present to the grand jury to four specified investigations,

including two antitrust — —

Thereafter, the judge often threatened in open court to oe the

grand jury. The antitrust investigation was halted when Judge Ritter

refused to sign immunity orders and when he ordered that other im-

munity orders, si , but not yet served, be returned to him.

The testimony of the 14 witnesses covered by the immunity orders

was essential to the grand jury continued investigation into price

fixing in the District of Utah. The grand jury had already heard over

10 days of testimony from over 20 witnesses. Gevernment attorneys

assisting the grand jury had ex nded approximately 2,000 hours

working on that 1 including analyses of more than 250,000

subpenaed documents. United States filed a petition for writ of

mandamus with the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals on November 25

seeking an order to ire J Ritter to sign the immunity orders.

By reason of the court’s declared intention to dismiss the grand jury,

on December 4, 1975, I filed a motion requesting the grand jury be

allowed to continue to sit to conclude its business.

That motion also asked the court to lift the restrictions imposed in

the April 25 limiting order. Notwithstanding the plea made by the

Government, and over the pen of the grand jury foreman, Judge

Ritter discharged the grand jury while it was still investigating fraud

we — matters and — 3 it still 1 * 8 7 to be He

convening a grand jury in , the ju qui e

U.S. Attorney to submit to the court a list of those individuals who

were to be investigated. Such conduct, together with the limitation

order of April 25, constitutes an interference with the functions of the

executive branch and with the processes of the grand jury. 2

My final point is that Chief Judge Ritter uses his powers in a

manner adverse to the legitimate interests of the Federal Govern-

rT ar rr ov vw

nd ee A

the criminal

those two would have Judge

y thank this

#97), RELATING To

COURT. ON MAY 18, 1076

— —

Distriet Cou

the authority of t

of cases in that

Company v. Ritter, 461 F. 2d 1100 (C. A. 10, 1972). But that partial solution gives

no relief at all to the remaining Division presided over by the Chief Judge.

I am acutely aware of the seriousness that does, and should, attend a recom-

lso wish your Committee to understand tha following presentation is

the Tax Division by successive United

8 Attorneys and their assistants and y attorneys of our own staff who

have either supervised or tried tax cases in the District of Utah. However, most

of the events related hereinafter happened in open court or are reported in pub-

lished cases,

Gag r „ eee eee

1) the refusal to call grand juries for extended of time, resulting in

running of the statute of limitations in tax cases and siiemp.s by

(2) a continued pattern of dismissal of indictments after the trial has com-

menced, jeopardy has attached, and the Government is without recourse by

(5) setting large numbers of cases for trial on the same date and refusing

to indicate in what order the cases will be called for actual trial, setting multiple

hearings on short notice and reaching decisions without permitting argument;

and

(6) last, but not least, for the dignity of a court and the treatment of its

officers are of prime importance to our judicial system: an extended pattern

ordered him not to

8. 470 (1971),

aa ee

(2) The Supreme Court held os States v. Jorn,

that, where the court dismissed the information after

the case could not be retried even though (page 487) the trial judge “made no

effort to exercise sound discretion.” In that criminal tax case, the Chief Justice,

in a concurring opinion, characterized the actions of the Chief Judge of the

District of Utah as representing a “plain frustration of the right to have this

case tried, attributable solely to the conduct of the trial judge.” The dissenting

Justices said (p. 488) that they could not agree that when a trial judge abuses

—— ee on his own motion that a trial on the merits

oreclosed.

Since Jorn, there has been a pattern of dismissal of indictments and infor-

mations after the commencement of trial and there is no recourse for the Govern-

ment under present law. In January 1976, in United States v. Cloyd H. Hepworth

(Cr. 75-102), the Government sought to introduce evidence of the usual type

in criminal tax cases. The court refused to admit the evidence and then dis-

missed the indictment on the ground of the Government's failure to produce

evidence. The Government, of course, had no recourse. No written order was

issued in the case, Recently, after a nontax case had been disposed of in similar

fashion, counsel for two other defendants moved for dismissal of the indict-

ments as to their clients on the grounds that the charges were similar to those

just dismissed. The United States Attorney's office advises us that the Chief

Judge then took these attorneys to task, stating, in effect, that it was the

practice of the court to dismiss the indictment after the case goes to trial so

it appears to mean, then the policy of dismissal of indictments after the com-

mencement of trial is not merely to be inferred from a pattern of events, but

is a professed policy.

(3) and (4). In addition to the Hepworth case, the court did not allow in 1973

clearly admissible evidence in United States v. Stout (Cr. 48-72) and refused

to give the standard instructions in criminal tax cases. In United States v.

Corbett (Cr. 75-75), another criminal tax case, the court refused to give the

usual instructions or, indeed, any instructions other than to tell the jury that

the defendant had appeared to rely on another person. In both cases, the lack

of the usual instructions and comments to the jury weighted toward the de-

fendants resulted, in the views of the prosecutors, in the acquittals.

(5) It is repeatedly reported to us by the Office of the United States Attorney

and attorneys of our own Division that as many as 40 cases are set for trial

on the same date without stating the order in which the cases will be tried; that

if the parties are not ready to go to trial, the case is sometimes dismissed or

the parties are forced to go to trial without key witnesses. This, of course,

takes up the time of attorneys for both sides and incurs additional costs by

having the witnesses appear and reappear. More seriously, it interferes with the

orderly administration of justice. On occasion, hearings are set with very little

notice, with resettings, then counsel is sometimes given no chance to be heard

after multiple appearances. This has been particularly burdensome on Govern-

ment attorneys travelling from Washington, D.C., to Utah.

(6) Successive United States Attorneys have reported to us that the Chief

Judge has barred certain Assistant United States Attorneys from his courtroom.

At times between the years 1967 and 1973, the then United States Attorneys re-

ported that two of their four assistants were barred at times, and that this

caused a great hardship on a small office. Successive United States Attorneys,

their Assistants, and other Government attorneys have reported that the Chief

Judge used abusive and threatening language to them in open court.

The effect of the combined course of conduct described above has been to

prevent the Government from carrying out its duty to enforce the criminal tax

laws fairly and effectively in the Central Division of the District of Utah presided

over by the Chief Judge. In connection with our supervision of criminal tax

cases, it was brought to our attention that the Chief Judge had dismissed mail

fraud charges against Thomas Dee Stoker (Cr. 86-70, USDC Utah) and issued a

restraining order against prosecution of that individual in Wyoming on similar

but different charges (Cr. 8543, USDC Wyo.) after the defendant brought a pro-

ceeding back in Utah. The United States District Court for the District of

Wyoming ordered the trial to proceed and the defendant was convicted. The

Chief Judge of the District Court for Utah then issued an order to the United

States Attorneys for Utah and Wyoming to show cause why they should not be

held in contempt. We understand the snow cause matter was not pursued.

It should be noted that this pattern of conduct has extended through several

administrations, indicating that politics and personalities have nothing at all

to do with the problem.

The Government’s difficulties before the Chief Judge of the United States

District Court for the District of Utah have by no means been limited to criminal

cases. For example, in one civil tax case, the Chief Judge was reversed five

times by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (Portland Cement Company

of Utah v. United States, 293 F. 2d 826; 315 F. 2d 169; 338 F. 2d 798; 378 F. 2d

91; 412 F. 2d 894).

The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, as shown in h-Idaho S

Company case cited above, has done what it can to limit r dpeeatiee

cally. We strongly urge the passage of S. 1130 as a solution to many of the

problems in the United States District Court for Utah. Even if this situation

did not exist, we would recommend the enactment of S. 1130 as removing an

outmoded exception to the general rule, the wisdom of which has been demon-

strated in the course of almost two decade : that judges over 70 years of age should

be relieved of the administrative burdens of the United States District Courts

and the United States Courts of A

Thank you for permitting me to submit this statement.

Mr. O’Brten. Copies have been submitted previously.

Mr. Cup. Mr. Chairman, my reading of my statement deleted many

parts and I hope the entire statement is received.

Senator Burnicx. Your full statement will be received in the record.

Mr. Cato. Thank you. .

[The above referred to statement with appendixes follows :]

STATEMENT oF RAMON M. CHILD, UnrTep States ATTORNEY FOR THE DISTRICT OF

UTAH TO THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON IMPROVEMENTS IN JUDICIAL MACHINERY, OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY OF THE UNT STATES SENATE

It is not a pleasant task to criticize the work of an important man ; however, I

have been requested to briefly outline for this sub-committee the problems the

United States Government, and in particular the Department of Justice, must

face because of the manner in which the Honorable Willis W. Ritter, Chief Judge

of the District of Utah, administers his court and cases. My statement is largely

directed to criminal matters and is divided into four areas: (1) the methods

utilized by the Chief Judge to process his cases through court and resulting de-

lays; (2) the failure of the Chief Judge to implement a magistrate system which

would permit the magistrate to try minor offenses and to establish a collateral

system; (3) a description of the way in which the Chief Judge has administered

grand juries over the last five years; and (4) a brief description of the effects of

hostility demonstrated by the Chief Judge towards cases in which the United

States is a party.

I. THE MANNER IN WHICH JUDGE RITTER PROCESSES THE CASES THROUGH HIS COUBT

A. Calendaring of Criminal Cases for Trial

In the Central Division of the United States Court for the District of Utah

there are no published Rules of Court. Chief Judge Ritter does not set criminal

cases for trial at the time of arraignment nor does he give the usual 30 to 60 days

notice. The Chief Judge rarely sets less than 20 cases for trial on any one calen-

dar. That is, he uses the “trailing calendar” system.

During the last few years the number of trial calendars set up by the Chief

Judge each year has declined. Consequently each trial calendar has contained a

large number of cases for trial. It becomes an almost impossible task to prepare

20 to 30 criminal cases for trial when the government is given only a week’s no-

tice and often only two or three days’ notice.

Because a large number of criminal cases were backlogged for trial, on Au-

gust 1, 1975, I sent a memorandum to Judge Ritter advising him that there were

36 criminal cases awaiting trial and eleven criminal cases awaiting arraignment,

including at least twoJimportant stock fraud cases (Exhibit 1). Upon inquiry

from the Chief Judge as to when the government could be ready to try the two

stock fraud cases, a subsequent memorandum was sent to the Judge on Sep-

tember 17, 1975, wherein I informed the court we could be prepared to try the

cases on October 6, 1975 (Exhibit 2). Prior to that I had informed the court that

in view of the large number of witnesses in the stock fraud cases we would need

at least two or three weeks lead time to assemble those cases for trial. There

were aproximately 130 witnesses involved in three of those stock fraud cases. On

September 22, 1975, at 5:15 p.m. I received a memorandum from Chief Judge

Ritter which stated that the two stock fraud cases would be tried commencing

September 29, 1975, at 10:00 a.m. (Exhibit 3). It is of significance that these cases

— being tried by Fraud Section attorneys who were residing in Washington,

On Friday, December 12 1975, late in the afternoon, my office received notice

of a criminal trial calendar to commence at 10:00 a.m. on Thursday, December

18, 1975 (Exhibit 4). On that calendar 23 cases had been set for trial. Three of

the first four cases were tax cases involving approximately 100 witnesses, many

of whom resided out of the state. During this period of time in December 1975,

United Air Lines was on strike, which created difficulty in getting people from

one place to the other in this country. Christmas holiday traffic aggravated the

situation as well. Consequently, on Monday, December 15, 1975, I filed a motion

with the court requesting that we be given 21 days to prepare for that trial

calendar and informing the court of the tremendous difficulty we would have in

prepa and serving subpoenas and in securing witnesses on such short

notice (Exhibit 5). Nevertheless, on Thursday, December 18 Judge Ritter held

a call of the trial calendar. We had been able to get ready on only a couple of

cases. Four cases were dismissed outright because the government did not

78-678 O-77-4

a 30-case calendar was to commence October 21, 1975 (Exhibit 10). On November

1, 1974, the government received a calendar which contained 31 criminal cases

to commence on November 4, 1974 (Exhibit 11). On May 21, 1974, the government

received a criminal calendar containing 19 cases to commence on May 28,

1974 (Exhibit 12).

Often when the cases are not ready because of the inability of the govern-

ment to secure attendance of witnesses within the time noticed, the cases are

dismissed. A typical example of this was the case of United States v. Win

Henry Savage, CR-75-26. Ihe case was noticed October 20, 1975, for trial on

October 21, 1975 (Exhibit 13). The government filed a motion for continuance,

which Chief Judge Ritter ignored (Exhibit 14). Judge Ritter dismissed the

case on October 22, 1975, because the government had not been able to locate

its witnesses (Exhibit 15). I have a staff of six assistants, but on a 20 to 30-case

calendar, often we are talking upwards of 200 to 400 witneses to be subpoenaed

and secured. Moreover, the attorneys need time to prepare their cases. Many

cases, because of their complexity, merit definite trial dates. While I recognize

that trailing calendars are used in some other courts, they are not used

such short notice. Further, most courts do not sandwich complicated stock

tax fraud cases in the middle of a trailing calendar as does Judge Ritter. You

can perhaps recognize the difficulty in trying a complicated tax fraud case

involving as many as one hundred witnesses in the mi of a calendar where

that same attorney is required to try drug cases, theft from interstate ship-

ment cases, and cases involving violence on an Indian Reservation.

B. Law and Motion Days

Judge Ritter does not hold rule days at which time defendants are arraigned,

on a regular or even frequent basis. The last criminal rule day in the District

of Utah was January 16, 1976.

It is axiomatic that effective administration of criminal justice demands

that court machinery function swiftly. The present state of the Central Divi-

sion criminal calendar is evidence of the prejudice to both the defendant and

the government caused by delays in the calendaring of cases.

There are presently 32 cases involving 46 defendants awaiting arraignment

in the Central Division. Of these defendants, 23 have either been arrested or

served with summons and bound over for arraignment after preliminary hear-

cases exceed the 60-day

the Speedy Trial Act. 18 U.S.C. § 8164 (b). However, § 3161(b) does not take

effect until July 1, 1976, and the Interim Plan for Prompt Disposition of Criminal

* ).

The Chief Judge Lad just ruled against the government in a case involving a

on an Indian Reservation

counsel, in a following and similar case, to wit: United States v. Gerald

Mountainlion and Ronnie Appawoo, CR-75-72, was observing in the court-

room. He addressed the Court and pressed to have his similar pretrial motion

heard before the jury was picked:

is litigated for the next ten years and goes up to the Supreme Court of the United

States and in the meantime the government amends, you have done your client

a very great disservice, because there is no bar to him being prosecuted.

Derense CounseL. Well, that is a possibility, Your Honor.

The Court. It is not only a possibility. That is what will happen. Now, I have

been trying to handle all these cases on this calendar by having a jury in the

bog there and not listening to your arguments about anything. You push in

here now at a time when the motion isn’t even set down for argument, and you

have got your client in a fix where he may be twice tried for this thing. Now,

that is poor legal representation from my point of view, and I am going to do

what I can to him against his counsel, and we will just keep that right

where it is and get a jury for you one of these days, and when we get the matter

up before the jury we will get far enough down the way with the evidence to

see what is involved and then we will entertain your motion. I don’t want to be

trying these cases again. I am interested in the court docket as much as I am the

Indian boy, but he ought to have the benefit of double jeopardy defense. If he

is prosecuted once that ought to be enough. That will be all.

Regarding this particular problem, the Department of Justice has filed with

the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals a petition for writ of mandamus requiring

the Chief Judge to hear pretriil motions in accordance with Rule 12 (e) of the

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 12(e) specifically provides: A motion

made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the court, for good

cause, orders that it be deferred for determination at the trial of the general

issue or until after verdict, but no such determination shall be deferred if a

party's right to appeal is adversely affected. . . The Tenth Circuit has ordered

Judge Ritter to respond to the government's petition for mandamus. To my

knowledge, the Chief Judge has not filed a response.

In the case I just cited to you the issue involved the constitutionality of an

act of Congress. Certainly the Court of Appeals should have the opportunity to

decide that. However, it was Judge Ritter's intention to deprive the government

of that opportunity.

Frequently the rights of those defendants who are in custody have been abused

by the delays caused by the court. One of the more serious problems faced by the

nited States Attorney's Office during the term of William Lockhart was the

inability to bring in-custody defendants to trial before Chief Judge Ritter within

5 if

887755

4 a

bir

Heed

. 22 5

155

U. FAILURE TO FULLY UTILIZE THE U.S. MAGISTRATE

In the District of Utah, the United States Magistrate has been utilized very

and the District of Utah such a delegation of authority is in existence.

In the District of Utah several federal agencies have made requests to the

Court that the U.S. Magistrate be utilized for the enforcement of minor

offenses, but their requests have not been granted. Since 1970 each U.S.

Attorney has made similar requests of the court. During the tenure of C. Nelson

Day, such a request was made on numerous occasions. During the tenure of

the Chief Judge’s own interim appointee, William J. Lockhart, similar requests

were made. Mr. Lockhart tried unsuccessfully to persuade the court as to the

need for trial authority in the magistrate and a bail forfeiture system.

Recently I have also made a request that the U.S. Magistrate be more fully

utilized for the effective enforcement of minor offenses. Based upon past history

I have little hope that this petition will be

Absent the use of the U.S. Magistrate the only available forum for the

enforcement of minor federal offenses is that of the U.S. District Court. How-

svat, Ses a large part of the distsict, that Serum te not realistically available

for enforcement use of Judge Ritter’s attitude toward minor offenses.

Although he refuses to delegate trial authority,

hearing minor offenses and abuses the government prosecutor when such cases

where regulations for the protection of our natural resources and the people

rests must be enforced.

A recent review of the need for better enforcement of minor offenses in the

District of Utah disclosed the following: (1) there is presently no way of

the State of Utah; (4) within the National Forests it is estimated that over

250 cases in 1975 would have been handled through a federal magistrate if

Without the effective use of the U.S. District Court as a forum for the en-

and without the appropriate delegation of authority

made to the U.S. Magistrate, violations of federal laws and regulations

raft

T MANNER WHICH JUDGE RITTER HAS ADMINISTERED GRAND JURIES IN THE

DISTRICT OF UTAH OVER THE LAST FIVE YEARS HAS GREATLY HAMPERED THE

ENFORCEMENT OF CRIMINAL LAWS IN THE DISTRICT OF UTAH

At the present time there is in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals a petition

for writ of mandamus to require Chief Judge Ritter to convene a grand jury for

terms, prohibit Judge Ri from unlawfully interfering with or

— ‘the grand jury once convened. The specific relief requested is as

follows: (1) forthwith convene a grand jury; (2) follow the procedures

epectied in Rute 6 of the Fetal 3

woe ; United States Attormey and

intervals: (5) allow said grand jury to investigate any matter it deems proper ;

(6) allow the office of the United States Attorney for the District of Utah to

present to the grand ury such matters it deems necessary in the public interest ;

and (7) sign and ‘orce all immunity orders obtained in accordance

tion over the Petition

filing of the mandamus and which are pertinent inquiry are as follows.

During the last five years a grand jury in the Central Division of the

of Utah met to investigate crime on only 57 days. During July

jury sat five days. During 1972 a grand jury was convened for

that was because a defendant had been charged with a capital offense.

jury was not convened at all during 1973. During 1974 a grand jury

Hat

1 the

petition for write of mandamus.

This situation existed even though four defendants refused to waive

lack of a

EEE e

not be indicted or prosecuted.

On January 23, 1976, pursuant to Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure, I filed a motion requesting that a grand jury be empanelled (Exhibit

22). As grounds for this motion I emphasized: (1) the public interest requires

that certain matters be inquired into and that alleged criminal offenses be in-

vestigated to determine if indictments should issue; (2) that four defendants

had refused to waive indictment and required presentment; and (8) that it

probable that the antitrust laws are being violated in the District

that such probability required an investigation. As of the date the

mandamus action was filed, Chief Judge Ritter had ignored the fact

defendants had requested presentment and that the United States Attorney

Bod

833

717117217

ge E

ili

FEF

1215

1175

177

n fi

err N

the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department in chambers on

of law

respect to issuance of immunity orders as well as an applica-

tion by the United States Attorney for orders to compel testimony of 14 wit-

— the necessary authorizations of the Assistant Attorney General

attac

On September 3, 1975, the United States was advised orally by the clerk that

Judge Ritter would not sign any orders compelling testimony. Another motion

to reconsider his decision was submitted to Judge Ritter on October 6, 1975, but

again he refused to

The testimony of the 14 witnesses was essential to the grand jury's continued

investigation into price fixing in the District of Utah. The grand jury had already

heard over ten days of testimony from over 20 witnesses. Government attorneys

the grand jury had expended approximately 2,000 hours working on this

The United States filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Tenth

Circuit Court of Appeals on November 25, 1975, seeking an order to require

Judge Ritter to sign the immunity orders.

On December 4, 1975, I filed a motion requesting the grand jury be allowed to

continue to sit to conclude its business (Exhibit 24). That motion also asked the

court to lift the restrictions imposed in the April 25, 1975, order. Notwithstand-

ing the plea made by the government and over the protest of the grand jury

foreman Judge Ritter discharged the grand jury while it was still investigating

fraud and antitrust matters.

In his report to the court, the grand jury foreman told Judge Ritter. the

Grand Jury is currently considering other matters . . but is not ready to report

on them at the present time .. . At the conclusion of the court's remarks dis-

charging the grand jury, the foreman asked if he could be heard, and stated:

“The Grand Jury would like to thank you for the opportunity that we have had

serving as federal grand jurors in representing the people of the United States

of America; but we are deeply concerned, and we have been for some time about

the fact of unfinished business.

“We haven't felt it a hardship, you know, to meet and to act in this capacity;

and we would like to at this time, with your permission, to complete the investi-

gations that still haven't completed.” (emphasis added) (Exhibit 25)

Thereafter the court instructed the foreman, “We will do as I say.“ Thus, the

one grand jury that was convened in 1975, while it still had eight months to

tions because: (1) the court refused to sign some fifteen immunity orders; (2)

the court limited the matters the grand jury could investigate; and (3) the court

prematurely discharged the grand jury.

Before convening a grand jury in 1974 the Judge required the United States

Attorney to submit to the court a list of those individuals who were to be investi-

gated (Exhibit 26). Such conduct, together with the limitation order of April 25,

1975, constitutes an interference with the functions of the Executive Branch.

The manner in which Judge Ritter has administered the grand jury system has

frustrated the enforcement of federal criminal law in the District of Utah.

IV. THE CHIEF JUDGE USES HIS POWERS IN A MANNER ADVERSE TO THE LEGITIMATE

INTERESTS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERN MENT

A review of all criminal cases coming before Judge Ritter between the dates

of November 7, 1975, and January 30, 1976, reveals the following: (1) a total

of 22 cases were listed for trial (does not include cases where pleas of guilty

were entered) ; (2) out of those 22 cases the government prevailed in only two

cases (the same staff experiences approximately 90 per cent success

in the Northern Division of the Utah District, which is more in keeping with

national averages) ; (3) in two of the remaining cases the government was able

to obtain a stay of the proceedings in the Court of Appeals so that mandamus

ee ens CO) Se ee ae eee Giammeees

; (5) m 2 cases verdicts of not guilty were returned

by juries after being erroneously or prejudicially instructed on the law by the

Aver 1, 1975.

I enclose for your information summary of 36 criminal cases awaiting trial as

of this date before the Utah District Court—Central Division.

On June 6, 1975 I supplied the Court with a similar inventory of criminal

matters awaiting trial. At that time there were 43 items on the calendar. The

Court arranged to have Judge Sherrill Halbert come to the District and as a

result of his efforts 16 matters on that calendar have been disposed of.

In addition to the 36 criminal cases now awaiting trial, there are also 11

criminal cases awaiting arraignment. A summary of those cases is also attached

hereto for the Court's information.

CR-74-99 (Buchanan) was cancelled by Judge Halbert. Forty-five witnesses

were served subpoenas and are on a standby basis. A jury was also selected.

The case could be disposed of in a two-day trial.

CR-74-52 (Rio DeOro) was also cancelled by Judge Halbert. More than sixty

witnesses were subpoenaed and are on a standby basis. This case will probably

require approximately two weeks to try.

Your advice and assistance would be appreciated.

Respectfully,

Ramon M. CHILp,

D. S. Attorney.

SEPTrMBER 17, 1975.

Hon. WIILISs W. Ritter,

Chie? Judge, U.S. District Court, District of Utah.

Ramon M. CHILD,

U.S. Attorney.

PENDING TRIAL CALENDAR: At the Court's request I have contacted the Acting

Director of the Fraud Section of the Criminal Division, Department of Justice,

regarding pending criminal cases CR-74-52 and CR-74-53. I am informed that

the prosecutors assigned to these cases by the Department of Justice will be

prepared to proceed with trial, if the Court desires, on October 6, 1975 with

CR-74-52 to be tried commencing on that date and CR-74-53 to follow in turn.

There is a possibility that pleas may enter in CR-74—53 but the possibility of

pleas in CR-74-52 is considered remote. a

If the Court directs trials to commence September 29, the prosecution will

make every attempt to be prepared. Such date would be the earliest possible

date in which prosecution could be prepared and it is felt the preparation would

be less than adequate for an efficient presentation of the Government's case. If

the Court must set trial date to commence prior to October 6, we would ap-

preciate a commencing date to be as close to October 6, as possible.

Thank you for your consideration in these matters.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM—VU.8. GOVERNMENT

To: Ramon M. Child, U.S. Attorney =

From: Willis W. Ritter, Chief Judge

Subject: Pending Trial Calendar.

Receipt is acknowledged of your memo of September 17, 1975 cases

CR-74-52 and CR-74-53. Case No. CR-74-52 (United States v. Rio. Oro

Mining Co., et al.) is set for September 29, 1975 at 10:00 a.m. in my Court-

room. Case No. CR-74-53 (United States v. Richard T. Cardall, et al.) is set

to follow upon conclusion of CR-74-52.

The Court expects all counsel to be present with witnesses and prepared to

to trial.

= WIIIISs W. RITTer,

Chief Judge.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH

CENTRAL DIVISION

JURY TRIALS BEFORE HONOWABLE WILLIS RITTER i

COMMENCING THURSDAY, DECEMBER 18, 1975

10:00 A. M.

COUNSEL ARE INSTRUCTED TO KEFP IN TOUCH WITH THE CLERK AND WITI! THE ATTORNEYS

IN THE CASES THAT PRECEDE THEM. YOUR CASE WILL SE TRIED AS SOON AS THERE IS

A DISPOSITION OF THE CASES AHEAD OF YOU. FREQUCNTLY THE CASES ARE SDITLID

RATHER THAN TRIED, AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO KEEP INFORMED AND PREPARED TO GO

TO TRIAL RESTS UPCN COUNSEL.

Cr 74-98 United States of America Max D. Wheeler

David W. Clayton J. Thomas Bowen, appt.

(Willful failure to file tax returns)

HEARING: Defendant's motion to dismiss information

Defendant's motion to suppress evidence

er 75-73 United States of America Max D. Wheeler

Ho. 2 vs

John Emery Angel Earl Dillman, ret.

(Assault)

Cr 79-75 United States of America Max D. Wheeler

Bo. 3 vs

George Boyd Corbett Orrin Hatch;

Walter Plumb, III - ret

(Willful failure to file tax returns)

HEARING: Defcndant’s motion to quash

de fend ant s motion to disqualify judge

cr 75-79 United States of America Rodney G. Snow

No. 4 vs

Thomas Warner Hoopes

(Willful failure to file income

tax returns) EXHIBIT 4

Cr 75-80 United States of America

No. 5 ve

Ray M. Ruesch and Roger F. Backus

(Illegal Hunting)

Rodney C. Snow

Sumner J. Hatch - Ruesch;

Daniel Boone - Backus

tah

Cr 75-90 United States of America

No. 6 bas

Bobby D. Bates

(Possession of Pornographic Materials wi:

Antent to distribute)

Mex D. Wheeler

Phil L. Hansen - ret.

er 75-112 United States of America

No. 12 2

Shetimn Clen Kay

(Possession of unregistered firearm)

Michael Hunter

Don Blackham; Dean R.

Mitchell - ret.

Cr 75-101 United States of America

No. 7 vs

Little Dutch Boy Bakeries, Inc. William v.

Morris, Alfred J. Taggard and Frank Sakker

(Adulteration of food held for sale after

shipment in interstate commerce: intro-

Steven Snarr

Norman 8. Johnson - Dutch

Orrin Hatch - Morris;

Bruce Findlay - aukker

Gerald R. Miller - Tag-

gard

duction of adulterated food into interstate

Commerce)

Cr 75-102 United States of America

No. 8 vs

Cloyd H. Hepworth, dba, Certified Manufacturing

and Supply, Inc.

(Willful failure to file tax returns)

Max D. Wheeler

Richard Leedy - ret.

Cr 75-109 United States of America Michael Hunter

No. 9 =

LaVar William Ferguson Gary K. Weight; Toric.

ROOM - ret.

(False statement to federally insured e

institut lon)

er 75-110 United States of America Max Wheeler

No. 10 ve

Allen D. LeMon and Cary LeMon

(Counterfeiting)

. HEARING: Redetermination of bail.

Bruce Cc. Lubeck = ret.

@ 75-111 United States of America

No. 11 ve

david Baker

(Interstate transpertation of falsely mde,

Steven W. Snarr

John R. Anderson - appt.

Cr 75-115 United States of America Max Wheeler

al Bruce E. Maw James Barber - ret.

(Wire Fraud)

Cr 75-116 United States of America Michael Hunter

No. 14

Frank Steve Brzoticky

(Unlawful tran«portation of firearm)

John H. Allen appc.

Cr 75-117 United States of America

No. 15 =

Wesley V. Calloway and Curtis Ray Green

Michael Hunter

Robert J. Schumacher;

Dale J. Craft - appt.

(Dyer Act)

’

Cr 75-118 United States of America Rodney Snow

No. 16 vs

John Helia Porter

(utter ing and Passing Counterfeit

Obligation of United States)

Richard C. Allen appt.

Cr 75-120 United States of America

ve *

Hoskie Lansing and Herman Farley

No. 17

(Rape on Indian Reservation)

HEARING: Def. Lansing's motion to dismiss

Max Wheeler

Larry J. Echohawk - Lansin:

d. Gilbert Athay - Farley

each appt.

te 75-121 United States of America

No. 18 =

Lynn D. Noren and Main Motors, Inc.

(False statements in Loan Application)

Michael Hunter

M. Byron Fisher - rec.

No. 19 ”

Craig William McLachlan

* (False Statement in Loan Application)

Gilbert Athay - rec.

Cr 75-123 Un! States of America

Bo. 20 s

Kevin W. Barney and James Scott Liddiard

(Arson in National Forest)

Max D. Wheeler

Phil L. Hansen - ret.

CONSOLIDATED

cr. 75-125 United States of America Steven Snarr

Lynn d. Lossee Phil LI. Hansen - ret

(Arson)

Cr 75-127 United States of America Max Wheeler

No. 21 we

Peter T. Lorenz

(Giving false information in acquisi-

tion of firearm; interstate transpor-

tation of firearm by felon)

HEARING: Def's motion to suppress evidence

Summer J. Hatch . rer.

Cr 75-129 United States of America Rodney Snow

No. 22 ve

James Killian Richard T. Ashton - appt.

(Dyer Act)

Cr 75-76 United States of America Ramon M. Child;

=" 9 Anthony E. Desmond

Countryside Farms, Inc.: Egg Products

Company; Olson Farms, Inc., Snow White

Egg Company; R. Kent christof ferson:

Gilbert T. Cochran

(Conspiracy in restraint of

Interstate Trade and Commerce)

HEARING:

(1) Def. Egg Product's motion for bill of particulars

(2) Def. Egg Product's motion for inspection & copying of

(3) Def. Egg Product's motion for discovery and inspection

Clitford L. Ashton «

Ricardo Ferrari = Cou:

tryside Farms «& Chris

fferson:

Herschel Saperstein -

Egg Product=;: :

Harold G. Christensen

Olson Farms „ Cochran

Robert . Grandt - sn

White

grand jury testimony

(4) Def.Olson rarms & Cochran's amended motion for discovery and inspection

In THE Unitep States Distaict Court FOR THE District or UTAH

CENTRAL DIVISION

MoTION FoR 21 Days ADVANCE NOTICE ron TRIAL CALENDAR

Comes now Roman M. Child, United States Attorne J

. Child, y for the District of

aed and on behalf of the United States of America, and — —

t 2 Honorable Court give the Government a minimum of 21 days to pre-

pose or the Court's present trial calendar, and for cause shows the Court as

1. The United States received the Court's present trial calendar, which is

scheduled to commence on December 18, 1975, during the late afternoon of

Friday, December 12, 1975.

2. There are a substantial number of witnesses that must be subpoenaed in

the first, third and fourth cases on the calendar, which are tax fraud cases,

and subpoenas cannot be prepared by the United States Attorney's office and

served by the United States Marshal's office on three working days notice.

3. A substantial ber of the cases on the Court's calendar will require the

presence of witn who reside outside the State of Utah. Most of those wit-

nesses will be unable to be present because of the inability to arrange travel

through the airlines. Due to the airline strike which has crippled United Air-

lines and due to the usual Christmas pressure placed upon the airlines, flights

in and out of Salt Lake City are already overbooked, and the Government would

be unable to secure its witnesses by reason of the airline problem.

4. The United States Marshal Service has advised the United States Attor-

ney’s office that they would need at least ten days advance notice for service

of any subpoena. The United States Attorney is desirous of honoring the re-

quest of the United States Marshal Service in assisting them in performing

their difficult task by giving them a reasonable time within which to serve

subpoenas.

5. Based on the foregoing, the United States Attorney respectfully informs

the Court that the Government cannot be ready to try any of the following

cases on the Court’s calendar earlier than January 5, 1976:

CR-74-98—U.S. v. David W. Clayton.

CR-75-75—U.S. v. George B. Corbett.

CR-75-79—U.S. v. Thomas W. Hoopes.

CR-75-101—U.S. v. Little Dutch Boy Bakeries, et al.

CR-75-102—U.S. v. Cloyd H. Hepworth.

CR-75-109—U.S. v. LaVar Wm. Ferguson.

CR-75-110—U.S. v. Allan and Gary LeMon.

CR-75-111—U.S. v. David Baker, dismissed.

CR-75-115—U.S. v. Bruce E. Maw.

CR-75-116—U.S. v. Frank S. Brzoticky, dismissed.

CR-75-117—U.S. v. Wesley V. Calloway and Curtis Ray Green.

CR-75-120—U.8. v. Hoskie Lansing and Herman Farley.

CR-75-121—-U.S. v. Lynn D. Noren & Main Motors.

CR-75-129—-U.S. v. James Killian, guilty.

CR-75-76—U.S. v. Countryside Farms, et al.

As to the remaining cases on the Court's calendar, we are not yet informed

as to the success the United States Marshal may have in serving subpoenas

and securing the attendance of both defendants and witnesses in light of trans-

portatioa problems and the holiday season. We are informed that some in-state

witnesses have left the State for the holidays.

6. For the foregoing reasons the Government respectfully requests that the

Court's criminal trial calendar not commence earlier than January 5, 1976.

Respectfully submitted this 15th day of December 1975.

RAMo M. CHILD,

U.S. Attorney.

In THE Unrrep S Ars District Court ron THE District or UTAH CENTRAL

DIvIsion

(Cr 75-111)

Unitep States or Amenica, Plaintiff,

Davip Baker, Defendant.

Sr Lake Crrr. Uran,

December 18, 1975.

Before The Honorable Willis W. Ritter, Chief Judge.

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Appearances: For the United States: Steven Snarr, Assistant U.S. Attor-

ney, 200 P.O. & Courthouse Building, Salt Lake City, Utab.

For the Defendant: John R. Anderson, Attorney at Law, Boston Building,

Salt Lake City, Utah. 10

about it. ,

Mr. ANperson. Your Honor, we think that the government has charged—well,

on in the trial. What it is, your Honor, it is a

4 our Honor. I will have an order over here.

Court. Five months and they are still not ready.

* *

transcript of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 14th day of February, 1976.

Barpara G. Anpersen, RPR.

Court Reporter.

In THE Untrep States Distaicr Court ror THE District or Uran CENTRAL

Division

(Cr 75-116)

Untrep States or America, Plaintiff,

Frank Steve Bezoricxy, Defendant.

Satt Lake City, Uran,

December 18, 1975.

Before: The Honorable Willis W. Ritter, Chief Judge.

ces: For the United States: Michael Hunter, Assistant U.S. Attorney,

200 P.O. & Courthouse Building, Salt Lake City, Utah.

For the Defendant: John H. Allen, Attorney at Law, Kennecott Building,

Salt Lake City, Utah.

DecemsBer 18, 1975.

The Court. Next is Brzoticky. This is a unlawful transportation of firearms?

Mr. Hunter. Yes, your Honor. This came from California. And the United

States, at this time, is not ready. There are two witnesses in California and

two witnesses in Colorado and two witnesses in Washington, D.C.

Mr. ALLEN. I am ready, your Honor.

— eT NI — “te

The Court. t is involved here? There is nothing involved in here to fool

around with this matter.

. Atten. I don't think so, your Honor. It is a claimed transportation of a

2 pistol across the state lines.

Mr. Hunter. Your Honor, Mr. Brzoticky was residing with his girl friend and

her brother-in-law in California, took the brother-in-law's gun, came to Utah

and pawned the gun.

He pled nolo in the case in Colorado some time ago. And therefore he had

a record. And that was the reason for pursuing the action.

Mr. ALLEN. The prior case

The Court. You are not ready?

Mr. Hunter. No, your Honor.

The Court. The case is dismissed.

* * * * * * —

CERTIFICATE

I, Barbara G. Andersen, Registered Professional Reporter and Notary Public

for the State of Utah, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct

transcript of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 14th day of February, 1976.

BAA G. ANDERSEN, RPR.

Ix THe Unrrep States Districr Court ror THE District or UTAH CENTRAL

DIVISION

(Cr 75-122)

UniTep StaTes oF AmMenica, Plaintiff, *

Craig WILLIAM McLacHuran, Defendant.

Salt Lake City, Utah, December 18, 1975.

Before: The Honorable Willis W. Ritter, Chief Judge.

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Appearances: For the United States: Michael Hunter, Assistant U.S. Attorney,

200 P.O. & Courthouse Building, Salt Lake City, Utah.

For the Defendant: Gilbert Athay, Attorney at Law, 321 South 6th East, Salt

Lake City, Utah.

DECEMBER 1975.

The Court. McLachlan. „ 8

Mr. ATHAY. He is present, ready to proceed.

Mr. Hunter. Your Honor, there are three witnesses in this. Christine, his

ex-wife, is a key witness. She lives in Midway, Utah. We have been unable

to serve a subpoena on her at this point. We have been unable to establish her

whereabouts.

The Court. This case is dismissed.

* * * * * * *

CERTIFICATE

‘I, Barbara G. Andersen, Registered Professional Reporter and Notary Public

for the State of Utah, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct

transcript of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 14th day of February, 1976.

Barsara G. ANDERSON, RPR.

Court Reporter.

In THe Unitep States District Court ron THE District

— o Uran CENTRAL

(Cr 75-123)

(Cr 75-125)

Untrep States or AMERica, Plaintiff,

Kevin W. Banxxr axDο James Scorr Llano, Defendants,

AND

Untrep States or America, Plaintiff,

Lrnw D. Lossee, Defendant.

Salt Lake City, Utah, December 18, 1975.

Before: The Honorable Willis w. Ritter, Chief Judge.

Appearances: For the United States: Steven stan

2000, & Courthouse Buldng, Salt Lake Hg, Utah.

r 2 L.

salt Lake 8 Hansen, Attorney at Law, 250 East Third South,

; e Court. Barney and Liddiard. This is

Mr. Hansen. Yes, Barney and Liddiard. — nr

tian? Court. Arson in a national forest. All right. What is the status of this

a a, Se = ready to go.

r. SNARR. Your Honor, I believe it has been consolidated with the matter of

os 1 as — 2 the calendar. The government is still attempting to

1 resence tness from Reno and would anticipate being able to

1 — 2 what?

r. SNARR. We are still attempting to secure the attendance of a wi

1 — a witness from

— pape bey would anticipate he would be present at the time this matter

pe... 4. is reached right now. Your anticipation at some time in the

ag 1— — consolidated?

r. SEN. Your Honor, they had separate preliminary hearings,

Mr. Lossess wasn’t apprehend after — caring of —

* 4 All ph. were —— 9 9

e would move to dismiss because we are ready an governm ,

The Court. Are you ready in elther of those cases? 2

q your Honor, we are ready with the exception tha

have not secured the attendance of Fe ‘ial

The ¢ "Tes Justa —1 = witness from Reno who we feel is essential

r. SNARR. We anticipate that he will be able to drive here and vaila

for trial as early as Monday. We would select a jury * *

— 11 — 8 *

Mr. Hansen. Thank you, your Honor.

I, Barbara G. Anderson, Registered Professional Reporter

for the State of Utah, do hereby certify that 348

transcript of proceedings in the above- entitled matter.

Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 14th day of February, 1976.

Barsara G. ANperson, RPR.

Court Reporter.

IN THE Untrep States Distaitct Cover ror THe District or Uran

Cxxraal Division

(Cr 75-123)

(Cr 75-125)

Unrrep States or Amenica, Plaintiff

Kevin W. BAAxxr aNp James Scott Lippiarp, Defendants,

AND

Unrrep States or Amenica, Plaintiff,

Lynn D. Losser, Defendant.

Sar Lax Crry, Utan, December 18, 1975.

Before: The Honorable Willis W. Ritter, Chief Judge.

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Appearances: For the United States: Steven Snarr, Assistant U.S. Attorney,

200 P.O. & Courthouse Building, Salt Lake City, Utah.

For the Defendants: Phil L. Hansen, Attorney at Law, 250 East Third South,

Salt Lake City, Utah.

DeceMBer 18, 1975.

The Court. Barney and Liddiard. This is Barney and Liddiard.

Mr. Hansen. Yes, Barney and Liddiard.

The Court. Arson in a national forest. All right. What is the status of this

thing?

Mr. HANnsEN. We are ready to go.

Mr. Syarr. Your Honor, I believe it has been consolidated with the matter

of Lynn Lossee as indicated on the calendar. The government is still attempting

to secure the presence of a witness from Reno and would anticipate being able

to do so and proceed.

The Court. You what?

Mr. Snake. We are still attempting to secure the attendance of a witness from

Reno, Nevada. We would anticipate he would be present at the time this matter

would be reached.

The Court. It is reached right now. Your anticipation at some time in the

future is wrong.

Why are these consolidated?

Mr. Hansew. Your Honor, they had separate preliminary hearings, your Honor.

Mr. Lossee wasn’t apprehended until after the preliminary hearing of Barney

and Liddiard. All three were together.

We would move te dismiss because we are ready and the goverment isn't.

The Court. Are you ready in either of those cases?

Mr. Snare. As I stated, your Honor, we are ready with the exception that

we have not secured the attendance of a witness from Reno who we feel is

essential.

The Court. It is just across the border.

Mr. Snare. We anticipate that he will be able to drive here and be available

for trial as early as Monday. We would like to seelct a jury and

The Court. Both cases are

Mr. Hansen. Thank you, your Honor.

* * * * * * *

CERTIFICATE

I, Barbara G. Andersen, Registered Professional Reporter and Notary Public

for the State of Utah, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct

transcript of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 14th day of February, 1976.

Barsara G. ANDERSEN, RPR.

Court Reporter.

78-678 O- 76-5

* eee

IH THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE DISTRICT 12 1075

CENTRAL DIVISTON 1

r TRIALS BEFORE W nn WILLIS RITTER ne -

COMMENCING WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 14, 1976

10:00 A.M.

COUNSEL ARE INSTRUCTED TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH THE CLERK AND WITH THE ...TORNEYS IN THE CA

THAT PRECEDE T:ICM. YOUR CASE WILL BE TRIED AS SOON AS THERE IS A DISPOSITION OF rug cA

AMEAD OF YOU. FREQUENTLY THE CASTS ARE SETTLED RATHER T

TO KEEP LYFORMTD AND PREPARED TO GO TO TRIAL RESTS UPON COUNSEL

WAN TRIED, AND THE RESPONSIBILITY

Cr 75-79 United States of America ‘

Bo. 1 vs

Thomas Warner Hoopes

Rodney G. Snow

(Willful failure to file income tax returns)

Junta BET URE MUPVRAOLE Hib dd Bisse

3 1-330

5. *

Ray Wardle

Indian Tribe, a Federal Chartered

11 — Wvasket; Homey J. Secakuku;

Freé A. Conetah; Wilbur Cuch; Irene C. Cuch

end Gary Poowegup, individurlly «nd 4s sem-

bers of Uiatah 2nd Oursy Tribe Business

Coamittec; and Michael A. Quinn, indivi-

dually and as chiirmun of Ute Tribal

Personnel Committee

(Civil Rights)

James 8. Black;

Kenneth . Kripke

Scott C. Pugsiey

David J. Knowlton ret

Cr 74-98 United States of America

Bo. 2 vs

Max D. Wheeler

david V. Clayton

(Willful failure to file tax returns)

BEARING: Defendant's motion to dismiss information

Defendant's motion to suppress evidence

c 74-342

10. 7

Pamela Marshall

Frank Hildebrand

(Personal Injury - Motor Vehicle)

S. Rex Levis

John R. Snow

Cc 6-72 Walter E. Williaas W. Brent Wilcox:

4. Wally Sandack

10. 3 vs

Otis Elevator Company, corp. Ray R. Christensen

. ve

Christiansen Brothers, Ine. and U. v.

Reed L. Martineau

Clyde and Company, joint ventures

(Damages - Personal Injury)

JURY TRIAL - Determination of Damages

c 74-382

Jerald C. Atwood

Union Pacific Railraod Company

(Violation of Federal zoloyers

Liebility Acc)

Orrin C. Hatch

3. M. Matheson;

Robert N. Weatherbee

c 74-389

Brenda McGuire Shuman

Iva Oliver (Koslowski) Hawkins and

Betbert Koslowski

(Personal Injury - Motor Vehicle)

C. Jeffrey Thompson

H. Wayne Wadsworth

c 74-105 Elizabeth Pace and Joyanna White

Bo. 4 ves

Hiroshi Tonoike

John L. McCoy

_ David k. Winder

(Personal Injury - Motor Vehicle)

C 74-394.

Wo. 10

Ricardo A. Castro

Cerro De Pasco Corporation, subsidiary

of Cerro Corporation

(Breach of Contract)

Don E. Hart!

Jawes d Lee;

Daniel NM. Allred

C 74-140 Carmen Kathleen McKell

Bo. 5 ve

Melba Lynne Jarman

Thomas R. Blonquist

. Robert Bayle

(Personal Injury - Motor Vehicle)

EXHIBIT g

c 74-397

Wo. 11

Gary d. Peterson and Thoms D. Peterson

United States of America

Provo River Water Users Association, corp.

(Wrongful beach)

John L. Slack

eon Child

J. Dennis Frederick

‘BEST COPY AVAILABLE

JURY TRIAL CALENDAR c ORAL tts RITTER

C. 75-4 Robert Rees Ban.

Bo. 12 ve

Pioneer Cen- t- tor cotoret to-

Illinois corper:tion

(Personal Injury - Lawn Mower Accident)

Pege 3

John E. Shamber,;

Bon EK. Hommill

LeRoy S$. Axland

JURY TIUALS BETORE HONORABLE WILLIS u. RITTER

COMENCING THURSDAY, NOVIMBER 20, 1975

Cr 74-354 United States of America

Bo. 13 ve

J. Milton Rich

(Bankruptcy Fraud) 0

JURY ALREADY IMPANELED

Remon M. Child

Donn E. Cassity

MONDAY, FESaraAry 2, 1976

Cr 75-76 United States of America

Bo. 14 vs

Countryside Farms, Inc.; Ege Products

Company; Olson Farms, Inc.; Snow White

Egg Company; R. Kent Christofferson;

Gilbert T. Cochran

(Conspiracy in Restraint of

Interstate Trade and Commerce)

eee tr Wasa ta Wars

FOR THE

J. Milton Rich No. CR 74-54

TAKE NOTICE that the above-entitied case has been set for

Ramon Child;

Gary Spratling

Clifford T. A-hton & Ricardo

Ferrari - Countryside Farms

and Chr istofierson;

Herschel Saperscein & Clark

Sessions - Ev: Products;

Barold C. Christensen - 0180

Parms & Cochran:

Robert . Brandt - Snow Whit

Salt Lake City „% THURSDAY, Wen 20 9 75 , at

9:00 A.M. befere

Honorable Willis . Ritter, PF. o. 4 Courthouse SI. . 350 South Main.

—

p aul. U. s. rr. 200 P.. Courthouse ide, Salt Lake City, Utah

E. Cassity, ., arts Bids., Salt Lak t

. „ fa . e City. U

J. Milton Nen, 6261 Sauié Creek Court, Florissant, —

Ske *~

10:00 A.M.

COUNSEL ARE netten TO KIT? IN TOUCH WITH ‘TE CLERK ADD WITH TUE ATTONYS IN TH CATS

TWAT PRECEDE FNM. wum CSE WIIL PE TRITD AS SOON 4S THERE TS A DICPOSTTION or NN CoS

NEAD OF YOU. FMA irt TD CASES ARE SETTLLD PATTER TH TRIDD, AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO

KEEP INTORED. NW PREPARED TO CO TO TRIAL HOTS UTON COUNSEL.

c 274-70 Donald bod Julunder ard Jeff Julander, Ken Charberlain

John Julander, lorraine Arn Julanier Clifford L. Ashton

and Bruce Julanier, minors, by their Scott Savage

quardian Mary ausn Julanicr

No. 1 vs

Ford Motor Company, A corp. Ray R. Christensen

(Motor vehicle accident - death)

C 194-73 William Taylor Newland, IV James A. McIntyre

Robert Morton, Acent for hurgau of Ramon M. Child

Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and Robert M. Ad‘ins

No. 2 Ronald R. Robinson, Sheriff of Surmit Co. Utah

(Damages - Violation Sth and 6th Arendments)

C 210-73 Flying Diatond Corp., a corp. Hardin A. Whitney

No. 3 Dan Poland, John Sutherland, Craig Johnston Richard Lec?’

Robert L. Lat, Orlard Nielson, Thovas

„ Murray Payburn, William Sayer,

American Stock Trans-er Co., 4 corp.

Jay Miller, Evelyn Mitchener, Transarericen

Securities, Inc., a corp., Duane Jenson,

John Badger aka J. J. Bagger, Phillip kK.

Gmith aka P. k. Srith aka Phyllis k. Smith,

J. M. Smith aka Jack Smith, P Skcen, O. Todd,

James Larcer, John Does 1 through 10 and

Don Anderson

(Securities Exchange Act of 1934)

Robert V. Philligfs

Glenn C. Hani

Richard C. diele

Joseph McCarthy

C 74-66

United States of Arerica

80 Acres of Land, rere or less, situated

n San Juan County, Utah, Povert Byron

ad aka fobert DB. N and Lynda Heidi Redd,

his wife, et al., and unn omers

(Land Cordemnation)

Ramon M. Child

Vernon 8. Fes cy

San Juan Councy Attorney

Paul E. Reiru ms

Robert S. Carpoell, Jr.

Cc 74-109

No. 5

Vern R. Webster, Robert B. Sheldon, Orson P.

Kesler and Gordon McClean, uslividually and

as representative msbers of 3 class

The Travelers Insurance co.. Equitable Life

Insurance Socicty of the Unita States,

Prudential Insurance Co. of America, tu

ldfe ani Casualty

(Clayton Act and the Sherman Act)

Curtis k. Qeerhonsley

Dennis F. Olun ‘

Dan L. Bermm

Ricardlo d.

Harold G. Gr ten

No. 6 Larry C. MClellan Robert Van Sciver

(Violation of Fifth Amenirent Civil Rights)

c 74-140 Carmen Kathlown McKell Thomas R. Blonmpist

No. 7 Molba Lyme Jarmmw F. Robert Bayle

(Auto Collisica - Injury)

C 74-149 Jerrold R. Morgan William G. Gibbs

No. 8 Verland T. Whipple Ralph R. Mabey

(Breach of Contract)

C 74-153 Darwin L. Stone Glen M. Rich=an

Ring-Scclcy Mera co., Inc., Stephen B. Nete<er

. 9 a@ Delaware corp.

(Breach of Warranty, Juigrpent for Personal Injuries)

C 74-166 Colorado Well Service, a Colorade corp. William G. Gitzs

Edward T. Wells

No. 10 vs

Galf Oi! Corp., G International, Inc., Stephen B. her

John doe Insurance S., or Companies Richard k. or fat

and John Doe John L. Youns

(collection of Insurance for Damages)

O 74-192 Cleon D. Tucher, Betty J. Tucker, his wife, Arthur S. Niclsen

Willard M. Pucker arc Paillis o. Zucker, David S. Cock

his wife

No. ll vs

Bugene 8. Simpson, ike Russell, Continental Richard J. ley

Account Servisins forse, . . a Utah corp., card B. Cuatto

amd Key Account Collection House, Inc., a

Utah corp.

(Violation of Securities E.change Act)

C 74-257 JoAnn Cook Donn E. Cessity

City of Price, Carton County, Utah, Walter Michael T. 0

. Meld. Mwor of tm City ef Price, Luke G. Pappas

No. 12 Harold ©. Patterack, Hel Mark Hanson,

Toy Atwood, Jares Lee Jonson. Amel Denison

@s members of the City Council

(Civil Rights)

Cc 74-272 Prank FE. and Delores Velarde, individually Stephen W. Gon:

amd on behalf of Richard Matthew Velarde, Onc'd

No. 13 vs

City of Salt ia, Glen R. Greener in his Roger F. Cutler

Capacity as Public Sai: ty Commissioner of the

City of Soit L... J. Excl Jones, in his capacity

2 Guict : Police of the City of Salt Lake and

enn Null. arcivicually and in has

Capacity as an officer of Salt Lake City Police Dept.

(rongful Ovath)

Jom T. Nici N

Harold C. qu ren

—— 2

c 74-279 John tue Hardin A. Whitmy

vs Jeffrey N. Clayton

First Security Punk of Urn, N. A.

No. 14 Jonathan A. Dibble

(Breach of Warranty)

Cc 74-285 Ronee P. Schlosser Stephen M. Cook

No. 15 Jeloco, Inc. Robert M. Yeates

(Civil Rights)

C 74-311 Phyllis Frischkncch:, by and throush H. Wayne Wadsworth

her Quardian af Litem, Gail Frischénocht

Butchinson, and Gail Friscivuecht Nutchinson

individually

No 16 vs

Charles Ross . Robert Bayle

Wallace R. Lavchnor

(Personal Injury - Motor Vehicle)

C 74-317 Clara M. Nell M. Blaine Hofeling

Verl R. Topham

vs Anthony M. Thurber

No. 17 Freeman Decorating Co., a corp.

Timothy R. Hanson

(Personal injury - fall in deferdant's display booth over electric cord)

Cc 74-319 Clayton Haight ard Kathic Haight Orrin G. Hatch

No. 18 Ether Joseph Christensen Glenn C. Hanni

(Personal Injury - Motor Vehicle)

C 74-328 Grant L. Cavalli. Orrin G. Hatch

No. 19 Union Pacific Railroed ‘ spany S. NM. Matheson

J. C. Willians

Federal Daployer’s Liability Act - Negligence)

Cc 74-332 David E. Martin Donn E. Cassity

No. 20 Marjorie folres Mdill, Administratrix

of the tete of verl k. 2.1 rl. % c.ased, ani Glenn C. Harni

V. k. Madill Asphalt Pavirg Company

(Personal Injury - Automobile Accident)

CR 75-4)! United States of America Max D. Wheeler

No. 21 vs

Carl D. #owers Summer J. Hatch

(Tax evasion ard subscribing to false return - 3 counts)

CR 75-4 United States of America Rodney Snow

No. 22 Kar! Steck Smith, David Leon rler Gilbert Athay

(Conspiracy to sieut false statements, false statements and aiding ani

abetting - 14 couits)

CR 74-54 brutal Stutes of Amwrica Ramon M. Chili

N. 23 J. Milton Rich Bonn . Cine

(Mankruptcy Fast

Nee

CENTRAL DIVISION Ren 8

* —

oS SES SSS GSS Gas ee OCT 21.1975

COMECING TUESDAY, cr 21, 1975

GED STATES S20 A. Cras

10:00 A.M.

COUNSEL ARE INSTRCTID TO KEFP Di CH WITH THE CLESK AND WITH THE ATTORVus IN TRU... HAT

PRECEDE fre. YOUR CASE WILL PO TUiED AS SOC’ AS TIERE IS A DISICSITICN OF TE CASES NW OF

WU. FREQUINTLY TIE CASS AND SOITMSD MATER THAN TRIED, AD THE RESPONSIBILITY TO KEEP DOUCHE

MO PREPARED TO GO TRIAL RESTS UPON COUNSEL.

Rs United States of Arerica Max D. Wheeler

-vs-

Steve Maycock & Eddie 5. adshaw Alvin I. Smith for Maycoock &

. 1 Bradshaw

(Theft of err: Propert;,) Coun. I on each Cy.

GR 75-10 United States of America Max D. Wheeler

Rick O. Rasmussen John Bucher

No. 2

(Illegal Entry on Military Reservation)

CR 75-20 United States of America Max D. Wheeler

-vs- *

Wayne Mrs aka Swede = Matt Biljanic

W. 3

(Receipt of Stolen Property)

CR 75-24 United States of Americ: Max D. Wheeler

Richard Speir, Vernon Black ard Gary Puffer E. Craig Stay for Puffer &

W. 4 .

(Theft of Goverment Property) Daniel E. England for Slack

CR 75-26 United States of America ao Rotrey G. Snow

-vs- - 4 Po

Will Henry Savage, Jr. ~~ 0* Stanford S. Snith

. 5

@orging and Uttering United States Treasury Check)

cR 75-29 United States of America Michael M. Hunter

-vs-

John Bail Hoctmu lier David Bown

W. 6

(Interstate Transportation amd Disposal of Stolen Motor Vehicle)

c& 75-30 United States of Aterica Max D. Wheeler

~vs-

Ronald Elden Bench & Sally Anderson Dean R. Mitchell fer Bench &

. 7 Anderson

(Receipt of Stolen Property)

CR 75-32 United States of Aterica Michwel M. Hunter

-vs-

~ John Bail Hoch licr David aon

-8

(Interstate Transportiticn amd Disposal of Stolen Motor Vehicle)

ce 75-34 United States of Awrica Rodmey G. Snow

——

Karl Stock Sun Dovid Leon ri Den R. Mitchell for ita

%. 9 ® Gilbert Athay for rico

(Conspiracy to Sutrut False Stateewrts.

False Stat net ani Audine ami Aberin!

cH 75-37 United States of Amcrica Rodney G. Snow

-vs-

Jay u. super., Terry Simper, Gary Sr r., E. Craig Sy for all Defs.

1. 10 and Danie) Allen

(Criminal Conspiracy to Defraud the b. 8. and Theft of Timber fron a

National Forest)

75-6 United States of rica

-vs-

James Bernard Fay, Jr., amd Joseph P. Robert Knight for Ticrman

. 11 John Tiernan George J. Ramey for Fay

(Conspiracy to Violate [Bank Robbery))

CR 75-39 United States of America aif Max D. Wheeler

s *

5 Charles N. Pierson * Clark W. Sessions

(Tax Evasion, Subscribing to a False Return Under Penalties of Perjury,

and Aiding and Assisting in the Preparation of False Returns)

CR 75-40 United States of America A Sint iow

. s-

Frank M. Whitney J. Jay Bullock, ©. Scott Savage

BM. 13 and Gerald R. Miller

(Tax Evasion and Sicning False Return Under Penalties of Perjury)

CR 75-41 United States of America Max D. Wheeler

, ~vs-

Carl D. Powers Sumer J. Hatch

. 14

(Tax Evasion and Subscribing to a False Return)

iT 75-42 United States of Averica Max D. Wheeler

Irving 8. Hutchinson Sumer J. Hatch

. 15

(Receipt by a Felon of Firearm shicped in Interstate Commerce; Giving

False Information in Acquisition of Firearm)

GR S43 United States of America Wb. Wheeler „ dvi

-vs-

Elvin L. Booth & Donald G. Cox d. Gilbert Athay zor Cox

. 16 Richard J. Leedy for Booth

(Interstate Transportation in Purtherance of Scheme to Defraud)

BEARING ON: Def. Booth's Motion for Bill of Particulars: Def. Booth's Motion

for Severance am Semrate Trial: and Def. Booth's Motion for

Mathorization to Cdtain Trial Transcript

cm 75-47 United States of America #Hichael N.

-vs- or

" Kris Lymn Moore aka Christy Lynn Bright Robert Stansfield

. 1

@orgery, Uttering and Possession of Stolen Mail)

2 75-31 United States of America Rodney G. Snow

~vs- °

Byuity Oil Company Prank Gustin

. ls

@nlawful Taking and Killing of Micratory Gomme Birds)

ez dutod States of America Max b. N Hunt i

-vs-

Glade Edward Jennings R. Brent Stephens, Craig 8.

2. 9 Cook

Otter ing Altcred Government Obligations)

73-64 United States of America Max b. SD

-vs-

Emmest Rabbit Casey Brant H. Wall

. 20

(Crime on Indian Country)

N 75-67 United States of America Max D. Wheel r

Austin Brent Rackhan Gilbert Ath y

. 21

(Counterfeiting)

TR 7S-68 United States of America Max D. dheeler —

1 5 * K*

Anthony Rodda Thomas P. Vuyk —

False Statement to Federally Insured Institution)

K 7S-70 ° United States of Aterica Max D. Wheeler

-vs-

- John Martin Huf gran Theodore I. Witt-wyer

».

(Theft of Govermment Property)

mR 75-72 United States of -merica Max D. Wheeler . 4.

Gerald Mountainlion ard Romie Appawoo W. Robert Wricht for

B. 24 Mountainlion

(Crime cn Indian Péservaticn — Assault with Charles C. Brown, for Appawoo

Dangerous Weapon)

mR 75-82 United States of America Max D. Wheeler

-vs-

Vincent Sireech, Sr. J. Rard Hirschi

. 25

(Crime on an Indian Reservation -- Incest)

R 75-84 United States of America Mea Dimecter <<

-vs-

Howard Daniel Newneyer, Jr. Sanford Jorgenson

D. 26

(Illegal Transfer of Destructive Devices)

A 75-88 United States of America Max D. Wheeler

-vs-

* Scott Riley Straw D. Gilbert Athay

False, Fictitious or Fraudulent Claims)

mR 74-54 United States of America Ramon M. Quld

— D —ę— —

J. Milton Rich Dom F. Cassity

». 28

(@arkruptcy Fraud)

— —

— ————

—— ene

CR 74-50 United States of America Rodney G. Snow

— -

Jay Victor Miller Sumer J. Hatch

No. 29

(Criminal Contempt)

CR 75-65 United States of America Max D. Wheeler 5 4 aw

-vs-

Dwayne Nathan ls Joseph C. Foley

Bo. 30

* 1

IN THE UNITED STATCS DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE DISTRICT or brenn My

JURY TRIAL CALINDAR BEFORE HONORABLE MILLI BTR

CENTRAL DIVISION * *

COMMENCING MONDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 1974, at 10:00 A. M. 7

880 = Z 3 x 1 . 1 Loe PN : — .

CASES TUAT PNCCODE THIM. YOUR CASE WILL BE TRIED AS SCON AS THERS IS A DISPOSITION

OF TEE casts Mas OF YOU. FREQUENTLY TIlE CASES ARE SETTLED RATHED THAN TRIED, 5

RESPONSIOLITTY TO KEEP INFOS" D AND PREPARED TO CO TO TRIAL FLOSTS UPCN COUrSi:..

Cr 74-14 United states of America Rodney G. Snow

FIRM SCTTING

Nov. 4 Tam Halling Sumner J. Hatch, ret.

mes 1 (Distribution of a Controlled Substance)

Cc 74-33 N.

butler ol Anthony M. DeFino, Esc

4 John L. Black, sq.

FIRM SETTING Ellen Clark and

Nov. 5 Herbert Michael Ri

Linden Clark

Defendant & 3rd Party P

rden Clark, and Hanson & Garrett;

Morgan, ‘‘elhuish,

yp —— MeCoie &

Spielvogel

No. 2

Pembroke Company

(Personal Injury - Motor Vehicle)

Cr 74-19 United States of America ‘Rodney G. Snow

— — Corky Lennox, aka Dicky — David M. Bown, ret.

(Enticement of a Female to Travel Interstate

Yo. 3 for Purposes of Prostitution)

Cr 74-20 United States of America Rodney G. Snow

wo. 4 Bobby Joe Moore Phil L. Hansen, ret.

(White Slave Traffic Act . Conspiracy)

Cr 74-22 United States of America Rodney G. Snow *

Kov. 8 William D. Bond Phil L. Hansen, ret.

(White Slave Traffic Act)

ne. 3

EXHIBIT 11

C 74-143 Donald C. Johnson Robert M. McPac, Foe.

H. Wayne Wadsworth, E:

FIRM SETTING vs

Nov. 11

Chevron 011 Company Raymond M. Berry, Esq.

No. 6 (Personal Injury)

Cr 74-24 United States of America Rodney G. Snow ‘

— il

——— Reuben Arthur Scott Phil L. Hansen, ret.

No. 7 (White Slave Traffic Act & Enticement)

cr 74-30 United States of America Max Wheeler

Bov. 11

Emil Clemons Sumner J. Hatch, ret.

No. 8 (Internal Revenue Code)

> 246-73 Dale Workman ‘ Ray G. Martineau, Esa

- Richard u. Ciauque, Es

Ontario Drive & Gear. Ltd.; Salsbury Ray R. Christensen,Es:

Corporation; Instrument Systems Rex J. Hanson, Esc.

H. Wayne ‘"s-svworth,fe

Mm. 9 (Breach of Warranty causing Raymond Berry, Esq.

personal injury to plaintiff)

— 7

C 343-73 Walter Martinez, a minor by Willie David K. Robinson, Es

Martinez; Jce Martinez, a minor, by Raymond S. Uno, Esa.

Walter Martinez; Kathy Jenes, a Ainor,

Donald L. Jones; Kenny Jones, a

„ by Denald L. Jones; Dennis

1d, a minor, by Michael Rinaldi

Boyd FT. Gurney, Clarke N. Johnsen, Allan L. Larson, Esc.

No. 10 Don Rowberry, Reed Russell, Billy

Bunnell, Don Kirk, Owen Cluff, and

John and Jane Does 1 to 65, and

Board of Education of Tooele School District

(Violation of First & Fourteenth Amendrents -

Civil Rights)

cr 74-48 United States of America Rodney G. Snow

Karl S. Smith and Gerald Robert Ames Sumner J. Watch, rec.

Dean R. Mitchell, ret

(Conspiracy to Misapply Bank Funds

and Misapplication of Bank Fonds and

Aiding ard Abetting in Nisapplication

of Bank Funds)

Mo. 11

Cr 74-66

United States of America

9 — Walker, Jr., aka

(Palse Personation)

mo. 13

Kk. Jay Holdsworth and Dona 8. Holdsworth

Kline D. Strong

(securities Exchange Act of 1934)

—

Harold 6. Christensen

Clifrora L. Ashton, E

¢ 139-70

W. 14

Ervin H. Stolle, Cipriano G. Alba

and Flor tan Lavoie

Arlandor Allen Jennings and Willard

Pease Company, Inc.

— —

C.R. Henriksen, Esq.

Edgar A. Brekke, Esq.

Carman E. Kipp, Esq.

' (Damages - Personal Injury (Motor Vehicle))

** 374-73

Everett E. Trees and Ruth E. Trees, a

partnership, dba Trees Treiler Sales

and Everett E. Trees & Ruth E. Trees

Johnson Livestock Co., a corporation

Johnson

and Thomas’ Floyd

* (Personal Injury - Motor Vehicle)

Brigham E. Roberts, E

. Robert Bayle, Esq.

Bo. 16

Tommy Bruce Bond

United States of America; °

ine Navy, & Capt. Frank c.

(Breach of Contract)

Wayne G. Petty, Esq.

S. Nelson Cay

Jackson Howard, Esq. .

C 354-73

No. 17

Randy F. Bishop

7 ve

Joetta Marlene Ogea

(Personal Injury - Motor Vehicle)

David E. West, Esq.

Glenn C. nannt, Esq.

Cc 377-73

No. 18

Eugene Earl Buttery ~

The Brianhead Corp., Brianhead Ltd.,

char les F. Gunnoc & Burton Nichols,

individually and as general partners of

Brian licad Ltd; Jorctta L. Gunnoe and

Sally P. Nichols

822322342 * 4

Fre

Robert FT. Orton, is.

Allan R. Earl, Esq.

Jay E. Jencen, Fag.

er 74-44 United States of Americe Max Wheeler

Laura Marian Nichols Roger D. Sandack,appt

(Willful Pailure to File Individual

10. 19 Ihcome Tax Returns) ’

Cr 74-50 United States of America Ro@ney G. Snow

Jay Victor Miller Sumner J. Hatch, ret.

wo. 20 (Criminal Contempt)

Cr 24-51 United States of America Rodney G. Snow

> vs

John J. Badcer, Jay Victor Miller, Sumner J. Hatch, ret.

and Evelyn Mitchener Richard Leecy, ret.

@Praudulent Sale of Securities; Sale of Unregistered

wo. 21 Securities; Interstate Transportation of False ly

Made Stock certificates: Interstate Transportation

- Of Implements Used in Falsely Making Stock Cercificetes)

c 74-161 Salt Laxe Valley Innkeepers Assoc., Inc. J. Thomas Greere, tse

Giftord W. rice, Esa

Dec. 16 James Lynn, individually and as Secre- B. Lloyd Poelmean, Esc

tary of Housing & Urban Development; W. Robert right, Esc

Robert Posenicim, Robert J. Matuschex, Greg R. Hains, sg.

Salt Lake City Corp., Redevelopment John P. Herscel, Esc.

Agency of Salt wake City, Danny Wall, Salt Michael Hunter, Asst.

home, €ity Corrission as Recevelopment Agency, U.S. Attorney

„ . Garn, Conrad B. Hirrison, Jennings v.

Ho. 22 Phillips, Jr., Stephen. Harmsen, Glen Greener,

Hartnett-Shaw development ., Inc.

Ce 74-56 United States of America Rodney G. Snow

Jan. 6, 1975 *

ned Millett Kofford Bruce Coke, Esq.

20. 23 Fraud by Wire)

8 363-/2 Jane Doe Richard 1. Aaron, Cac

Magy ter: ede, “2,

Evan E. Jones, er., Richard p. Vernon B. Romney

Lindsay, Douglas b. Johnson, Gerald

Burnett, Harry A. Alexander, L. R.

Roylance, Geraldine Atkinson, Sharron

WN. Bevan, Paul M. Christopherson, Clen

K. Vernon, beesie L. MNeiling, Marilyn

No. 24 Peterson and floy Taylor

(Violation of Civil Rights Under Public

Welfare Division of Family Services)

2 THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE DISTRICT or UTA?

. =

CRIMINAL JURY TRIAL CALENDAR DEFORE MONONABLE WILLIS u. RIQCER 9

* *

CENTRAL DIVISION 3

N21.

COMMENCING TUCSDAY, MAY 28, 1974 =

; +t Ven bate Tue an N 7 Peers 1

THE CASES rr PROCEDE THEM. YOUR CASI WILL E TRIED AS SOON AS THERE Te | DIS-

POSITION OF THE CASS ACAD OF YOU. FREQUENTLY THE CASES ARE SETTLED fF rer.

TRIED, AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO KELP romeo AND PREPARED TO GO TO TRIAL RLSTS

cn cou. IL.

* ., United States of America Rodney Snow

gat vs

Mo. 1

Sheldon Giles David A. Robinson, ret.

(alse & Fraudulent Withholding Statemert)

¢ 118-73 J. Bugene Robinson & Alice R. Stephens Devid K. Watkiss, Esq

— 2. etm, tom & Ste Devid E. West, Esq.

Mo. 25 (imposition of Constructive Trusts)

c 74-31 Wilma Nielson Richard Giauque, Esq.

ve chitferd 1. Ashesa,fs

Bo. 26 (Personal Injury - Judgment)

cr 74-53 United States of America + Snow

. vs

| Willian Allon, international Chenscal wallace —

Development Corporation, and Golden Dean R. Mitchell, Cg

Rule Associates Lowell Haviks, Esq.

. 27 (Conspiracy; Fraudulent — oo Stock;

Ce 74-76 United States of America Rodney G. Snow

Wallace Murphy Plum, aka Porky Plum David Bown, Esq.

Bo. 28 . (@eceipt in ICC of Stolen Silver)

er 74-11 United States of America Roéney G. Snow

* .

— David Atchley, aka Donald R. Decker Phil L. Hansen, ret.

(Theft from Interstate Shipment)

Cr 74-43 United States of America Rodney G. Snow

vs '

Grover Adelbert Sponable Jerome Mooney, Esq.

10. 30 (Tneft of Baggage From an Interstate Shipment) 0

Cr 74-34 United States of orte Rodney G. cn

John W. Rich, J. Milton Rich, William Donn E. Cassity, Freq.

No. 31 D. Rich

(Bankruptcy Fraud)

Cr 4-11 United States of America Rodney Snow

421 vs

= David Atchley, aka Donald R. Decker Phil L. Barsen, ret.

(Theft from Interstate Shipment)

Cr 74-12 United States of America Rodney Snow

$ 1 '

3s a vs

oF Jack Vanekclenburg John D. O'Connell, ret.

(Distribution cf 4 Controlled Substance)

Cr 74-13 United States of America Ro¢ney Snow

6 —

gal vs

Ko. 4 Rand Spencer Mechar. John D. O'Connc!l, ret.

(Distribution of a Controlled Substance)

EXHIBIT 12

18-678 O - 76-6

Cr 74-14 United States of America Rodney Snow

sat vs 2

wo. 3 Tam Halling Sumner J. Match, ret.

@istribution of a Controlied Substance)

cr 74-16 _ SaaS — 4 Rodney Snow

g 27 vs

mo. 6 Mack Harris Thonpson Robert Van Sciver, ret.

@White Slave Traffic Act)

cr 74-20 7 Uni tea States of America Rodney Snow

8 47 vs

wo. 7 Bobby Joe Moore and William Noies Phil L. Hansen, ret.

Sauncers

@White Slave Traffic Act & Conspiracy)

Cr 74-22 United States of america Rouney Snow

5 **

Bo. 8 William D. Bond Pnii L. Bansen, ret.

(White Slave Traffic Act)

Cr 74-23 United States of America Rodncy Snow

fe —

Ko. 8 nr Lambertus Jansen, re*.

(Procurement of Airline Tickets t Transportation

for Purpose: of Interstate Travel & Prostitution:

& Enticcwwr. of a Femcle to Travel Interstate for

Purposes of Prostitution)

Cr 7-24 Vaitec States of America Rodicy Sno-

° 8 “=

(hnite Slave Traffic Act 6 Enticemeat of a Female)

Cr 74-25 United States of America Rodney Snow

5” K vs

* Clarence Earl bredley Galen Ross, ret.

(White Slave Traffic Act)

Cr 74-26 United States of America Rodney Snow

** *

. 22 Melvin Kay Neads Thomas P. Vuyk, ret.

(Unlawful Posscssion of Unregistered Firearms)

cr 74-27 United States of America Rodney Snow

2 vs

— 7 John Earl Worthen Galen Ross, ret.

te Transportation of Stolen

Securitics; and False Statement to

Government. Agency)

Cr 74-28 United States of Amerjca Rodney Snow

ve .

Mo. 14 1 r Mienen L. Hansen, ret.

Rac here! oe

: _ (Theft of Mail)

Cr 74-29 United States of America Rocncy Snow

* N

Norvin Tod Tripple, Richard Bryan Thomas R. Rloncuist,ret

10. 15 Wolladay, and Richard Eldon bons Kenneth Rothey, ret.

. Keith Biesing:r,. ret.

(Receiving Stolen Property

Transported in Interstate Commerce)

Cr 74-30 United States of Mor lea Rodney su-

No. 16

Emil Clemons, Jr. Sumner J. "atch, ret.

{Internal Revenue Codc)

cr 74-33 United states of America Rodney Snow

No. 17 Rex E. Foustal and David v. Pack Robert Van Sciver, ret.

(Taking More Migratory Birds Than Allowed)

Cr 74-36 United stetes of America Roancy Srow

No. 18 Carmelo Santicso Cruz Phil L. Nansen, ret.

(Distribution of a Controlled Substance)

Cr 74-43 United States of America Rodney Snow

Ho. 19 Grover Adelbert Sponable Jerome Mooncy, ret.

(Theft of Baggage from an Interstate Carrier)

Unrrep States Dietaicr Court ror THe Distarc: or Uran—Cernrrat Drvision

Unt States or Amenica v. Wu Hir Savace, Jr.

Vex. C. Rrromm,

Clerk.

To: Rodney G. Snow, Asst. U.S. Attorney, 200 U.S. Post Office & Courthouse

Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101.

Comes now Rodney G. Snow, Assistant United States Attorney, for and on

behalf of the United States of America, and hereby moves this honorable Court

ä ²· ²⅛m-m Gas Sie comme chews Gis Gast

as ows:

1. The United States did not receive notice of the Court's current trial calendar,

including the trial setting for the above referenced case, until the afternoon of

October 20, 1975.

2. At approximately 3:00 P.M. on October 20, 1975, the United States Marshal

for the District of Utah had in their hands the Subpoenas for witnesses in the

above referenced case.

3. Thus far the United States Marshal for the District of Utah has been unable

to locate two witnesses in the case, including one very crucial witness. The

crucial witness is Mr. Henry Allen, who was the payee of the Treasurer’s check

which is the subject of this lawsuit.

— CSD

— — Gy Go — 9

October, 1975.

United States Attorney.

Roprex G. Snow.

Assistant United States Attorney.

Ix run Unrrep Staves Distaicr Covet ror rue Distaict or Uran C u

Number of Arrest 292

Case no.

eS Jan.

. ———— —v—Ln i a 15

— Feb. 11, —

—— .... 8 Jan. 3 1976 121

— — .. 2 3

5 ̃ —y-— —1— — 133

444 2 SESS SS SO —— OS OS SNS SOS — 4

—— H · — .

AS OF MAY 10,

Date

Number of summons Days since

Case no. defendants served service

Dec. 1 146

— ſily:—ññůñůů— — 72 1 i 2

r ee e Feb. 128 Be

— A AT 1 188 2

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Id do. There's a question whether I'm

out. I don’t take these petty offenses,

They ought to run

wr fet yonr Honor, that the petty offense justified the Court's atten-

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Janice Mrrsunaca, CSR.

CrarminaL Docker, Unrrep States Distaicr Court

CR 75-10

THE UNITED STATES VS. RICK 0. RASMUSSEN

| ATTORNEYS

For U.S.: Max D. Wheeler, Asst. U.S. Atty., 200 U.S. Post Office & Courthouse,

Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

For Defendant: John Bucher, Esq. (ret.), Suite 271 Cottonwood Mall, 4835

Highiand Drive, Holladay, Utah 84117

In THE UNirep States Dreraict Court ror tHe Distarct oF Uran CENTRAL

Drvisi0on

MOTION FOB EMPANELING OF A GRAND JURY

United States Attorney, District of Utah.

In THE UNiTep States District Court ror THE District or UTAH

CENTRAL Drivision

ORDER IN BE GRAND JURY EMPANELED FEBRUARY 10, 1975

Upon the advice of the United States Attorney that all matters originally set

for presentation to the above Grand Jury have been presented and have resulted

in — of Indictments, with certain exceptions hereafter particularly

It Is Hereby Ordered that the matters hereafter presented to the Grand Jury

empanelled in the Central Division, District of Utah, on February 10, 1975,

shall be limited exclusively to the following subject-matter, some portions of

which the Grand Jury has already commenced investigating :

1, That certain investigation of antitrust violations, consisting of price fixing

and other anticompetitive conduct in the egg industry in the District of Utah,

8 0c

2. Those certain investigations of antitrust violations, consisting of price

* other anticompetitive conduct, in the grocery and beef industries in

the riet of Utah, with respect to which an initial group of subpoenas have

heretofore been issued and initial production of documents has to date supplied

more than 200,000 documents.

3. That certain investigation of fraud in the acquisition of approximately

eight million dollars of Small Business Administration funds for the use of,

or transmitted through, a certain Small Business Investment Company, with

respect to which an initial group of seventy-three subpoenas duces tecum have

heretofore been issued and in response to which more than two thousand docu-

ments have been produced to date.

4. That certain investigation of fraud in the acquisition of moneys from the

Veterans Administration by a local corporation offering certain correspondence

courses and classes for Veterans, with respect to which an initial group of sub-

SS atts ee days of testimony heard by the

rand Jury.

5. Presentation of evidence for indictment of those persons who, while the

Grand Jury is empanelied, refuse to waive indictment.

Dated this 25th day of April, 1975.

The Court:

* WILus W.

RITTER,

Chief Judge, United States District Court, District of Utah.

In THE Unrrep States Distaicr Court ron THE District oF UTAH

REQUEST THAT GRAND JURY BE ALLOWED TO REMAIN IN SESSION, AND THAT THE

COURT'S ORDER OF APRIL 25, 1975, LIMITING THE MATTERS WHICH MAY BE PRE-

SENTED TO THE GRAND JURY BE QUASHED

Comes now Ramon M. Child, United States Attorney for the District of Utah,

and respectfully requests this Honorable Court to permit the Grand Jury em-

panelled on February 10, 1975 to continue to sit, and to conclude matters now

pending before it. :

It is also respectfully requested that this Court's Order of April 25, 1975, wistch

limits the matters which the United States Attorney’s Office may present to the

Grand Jury be vacated in order that the United States Attorney's Office may

present other matters to the Grand Jury which the public interest requires the

Grand Jury to consider.

Dated this 4th day of December, 1975.

Ramon M. CHIrp,

United States Attorney.

In tHE Unrrep States District Court For THE District or UTAH

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE WILLIS W. RITTER, CHIEF JUDGE

Report of the Grand Jury, Thursday, December 4, 1975, Salt Lake City, Utah.

For the Government: Ramon M. Child, United States Attorney, 200 U.S.

Courthouse, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101.

Podney G. Snow, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

For the Grand Jury : Lund, Foreman.

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, THURSDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1975, 2:20 P.M.

The Covrrt. I assume this grand jury has a report.

Mr. Snow. They do have a report, your Honor.

The Court. Come up here.

Mr. Cub. May I approach the bench?

The Court. Yes.

( Unreported vench conference between Court and counsel. )

The Court. I understand you have a report, Mr. Foreman.

The Foreman. Yes, I do, your Honor.

The Court. All right. Would you read it.

The Foreman. We, the grand jurors duly impaneled, sworn, and charged in

said court on the 10th day of February 1975, respectfully report as follows:

“That the Grand Jury has been in session since February 10, 1975, and at

each and every session thereof there have been in attendance all of the grand

jurors so impaneled and sworn, with the following exceptions, excused from

attendance as indicated on the report.

“That at each and every session thereof there have not been less than 16 mem-

bers in actual attendance.

“That we have considered 5 alleged violations of the statutes of the United

States; that we have found 4 true bills, which are returned herewith into court,

properly endorsed by the Foreman of the Grand Jury; and that we have de-

clined to return indictments on zero cases presented.

“In addition, the Grand Jury is currently considering other matters presented

by the United States Attorney, but is not ready to report on them at the present

time, it being the intention of the Grand Jury that as soon as the other matters

have been presented in full the Grand Jury will make a further report to the

Court.”

The Court. Well, the district attorney got his oar in on that one, didn't he.

Mr. Cur. I think not, your Honor.

The Covert. You mean you didn't draw that document?

Mr. Enns. I didn't draw it. Mr. Snow has been attending the Grand Jury.

Mr. Snow. That's the standard form we've always used, your Honor.

Mr. Cup. It's probably the same language as the last report the jury did.

The Court. I don't think so, but it doesn't make any difference now.

Thank you very much. Is there any-——

Mr. Cn. Your Honor, I have the 4 indictments that were returned by the

Grand Jury, and I move that they be received by the Clerk.

The Court. All right. They may be filed. And I suppose you want warrants

issued, do you, or not?

Mr. Cm. Yes, your Honor. We want summonses issued on 3 of them.

Mr. Snow. They're all summonses, your Honor. We request summonses.

The Court. Summonses will issue. And there are no secret indictments, I sup-

pose?

Mr. Cup. There are not.

The Court. Is there bail recommended?

Mr. Snow. No bail has been recommended.

The Court. All right. Then you report to the Clerk and take your seat; and

I'll say a few things to the Grand Jury.

You have been serving this Court since last February, as your foreman just

told me, and you have served us well, and this is much longer than I ordinarily

keep a Grand Jury. I was persuaded to keep you folks longer because of matters

that the Government wanted to present.

Now. some of those matters have not yet been presented; and on at least one

there has been some testimony before you which has not been completed that the

Government told me they would complete by December, and they have failed to

complete that They have carried on no investigations for several months, as a

matter of fact.

And so I think we should discharge the Grand Jury: and I hereby do so, and

I do it with the thanks of the Court, and I'll say to you that you have served

us real well; and I have the honor and the position that I occupy here of repre-

senting the people of the United States of America, and T want to thank you for

your assistance in the administration of justice on the criminal side of this court.

Drive carefully on your way home. This is the end of your service. Go to the

Clerk’s Office when you leave the courtroom, and be sure to give the clerks the

information necessary, so they can get your pay voucher to you. You're excused.

The Foreman. Could I take a moment of your time, please? -

The Court. Sure.

The Foreman, The Grand Jury would like to thank you for the opportunity that

we have had of serving as federal grand jurors in representing the people of the

United States of America; but we are deeply concerned, and we have been for

some time about the fact of unfinished business.

We haven't felt it a hardship, you know, to meet and to act in this capacity;

and we would like to at this time, with your permission, to complete the investi-

gations that we still haven't completed.

The Court. Well, I think I'm acquainted with that, and I've already alluded

to it.

So we will do as I say.

You're discharged. Go to the Clerk's Office. :

I, Ronald F. Hubbard, official reporter in the U.S. District Court, do hereby

certify the preceding transcript to be true and correct, set forth this 27th day of

February 1976, at Salt Lake City, Utah.

RoNALD F. HUBBARD.

JAN UART 23, 1974.

Hon. WIIns W. Rr.

Chief Judge, United States District Court.

C. Nevson Day,

United States Attorney.

Cases which need to be presented to a Grand Jury and cases which merit Grand

Jury investigation.

In response to your request, find attached a list of cases which this office needs

to present to a Grand Jury. Hopefully the list is complete; however, there may be

other cases presented to this office by the various investigative agencies which

will need Grand Jury attention.

We feel that many of the cases on the attached list merit a thorough Grand

Jury investigation, and in the White Slave Act cases we need to make firm the

testimony of the various victims. Several of these victims have been beaten and

threatened.

The stock fraud cases are complicated and involved and will take some time

to untangle. Some of the potential defendants listed may be innocent of any

wrong doing and consequently will not be indicted. However, each stock fraud

case needs to be thoroughly investigated.

In view of the complexity of the matters to be presented to the Grand Jury,

we would appreciate having the Grand Jury sit at a different time than the trial

of the criminal cases now pending and on your present calendar. If the present

criminal jury trial calendar is to follow the present civil jury calendar, as we

understand it will, may we suggest that the Grand Jury be convened in the next

two or three weeks in order that we may present these cases to the Grand Jury

while the civil calendar is in process. Due to the difficulties in locating witnesses

and getting them here, we will need at least two weeks’ notice, prior to commence-

ment of the Grand Jury proceedings.

Your attention and consideration is very much appreciated.

Senator Burpick. Just a minute. I have a question or two. Mr. Child.

much of your testimony, particularly at the point where I interrupted

and thereafter. deals with the activities or the actions of Judge Ritter

as a trial judge. And you understand that this subcommittee would

have no authority to do anything about his actions as a trial judge.

We're dealing only with his action or conduct as the judge in charge

of—as the chief judge. '

And I think the statute involved here only applies to chief judges.

Do you understand that, Mr. Child? ;

Mr. Cut. I do.

Senator Burpicx. And the misconduct, if any, as a sitting trial

judge, would not be within the jurisdiction of this Committee.

Mr. Cum. This is correct. May I respond!

Senator Burvick. Now, you first referred to the fact that you had

difficulty in setting calendars and so forth, but I want to eall your

attention to title 28, section 332, subparagraph (d): “Each judicial

council shall make all necessary orders for the effective and expedi-

tious administration of the business of the courts within its circuit.

The district judges shall promptly carry into effect all orders of the

judicial cov eil.“ a 3

Apparently he has had some problems about the trial date in crim-

inal cases. Except for appeals in individual cases and except for ap-

plications for extraordinary writs, have you asked the judicial

council of the 10th circuit for orders regulating the setting of

criminal cases for a trial under the section I just read, section 332

Mr. Cup. No; we have not.

Senator Burpicx. If S. 1130 were enacted—that’s the bill before us

the word “Chief” would be eliminated from Judge Ritter’s title and

if we were to eliminate that, would your problems in the central dis-

trict be solved!

Mr. Cup. They would not be 100 percent solved, but it would be

75 percent solved.

nator Bunbick. It wouldn't solve those cases where he acted as a

trial judge; would it!

Mr. Cut. No; those cases that were actually in his court for trial,

it would not solve. However, it would solve the situation of the grand

juries; it would solve the situation of the magistrates; it would solve

the situation of the trailing calendars without notice because rules

could be adopted.

Ile refuses to adopt rules and in a two-man district, it’s impossible

for the associate judge to stand against that. The associate judge him-

self doesn’t publish rules, but he abides by certain written rules that

were — by a predecessor.

Senator Burpicx. And that’s why this committee would like to con-

fine ourselves to those areas that have particular application to the

bill before us.

Mr. Cui. Yes.

Senator Burvick. The matters relating to the convening and func-

tioning of a grand jury in the central division of Utah are involved

in the mandamus proceedings commenced on April 21 of this year

in the Court of Appeals of the 10th Circuit.

As a result of that action, a grand jury was empaneled on May 10

and the court of appeals has retained jurisdiction over the mandamus

proceedings pending further developments. Is this correct ?

Mr. CI p. This is.

Senator Bunk. And is that matter now pending?

Mr. Cup. It is. And Judge Ritter has empaneled that grand jury

and empaneling that grand jury he gave them a charge which eut

the gronnd out from under them and told them that they were archaic

and evil and that. in truth and in fact, that the United States and the

country of Nigeria are the only countries in the world that still hang on

to the grand jury system, that it is a bad system, and that the real

system ought to be allowing trial judges to listen to these matters

and they have better expertise and experience to decide whether a

crime has been committed and the grand jury should be abolished.

And I then took the grand jury into the grand jury room and you

can imagine that they wondered why they were meeting.

_ Senator Bunbick. My point is that the Circuit Court of the 10th

Circuit still retains jurisdiction over the matter!

— 7 Yes; anew.

enator burpick. On page 20 of your statement you take excepti

to Judge Ritter’s asking for a list of persons — — ter

the grand jury. You object that this constitutes judicial interference

with the executive branch, yet you seem to suggest that this subcom-

mittee should set itself up as a body to judge the propriety of judicial

actions on his part during the subcommittee consideration of 1130.

Aren't both of these matters in violation of the separation of powers?

Mr. Cup. I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, but I didn't follow the ques-

tion. I apologize. 2

Senator Bunbick. I'll read it again. On page 20 of your statement,

you take exception to Judge Ritter's asking for a list of persons under

investigation by the grand jury. Your objection was that this con-

stituted judicial interference with the executive branch—you, as the

prosecutor. Yet you seem to suggest that this committee set itself up

as a body to judge the propriety of judicial actions as part of the sub-

committee consideration.

Mr. Cup. No. I don't ask this committee to act as a judicial body,

but I’m pointing out to this committee that the grand jury, by statute, is

supposed to have broad powers and it’s not supposed to be limited by a

judge. It’s supposed to be independent and he attempts to dictate what

it will do by asking a predisposition of what cases will be called, if he

calls a grand jury. ;

He attempts to control the function of the U.S. attorney and desires

to be the prosecutor, as well as the judge. ;

Senator Burpick. I'm sure you’re aware that this presents us with a

very difficult jurisdictional problem here, since really the conduct of a

judge is not directly involved; otherwise, it would be an impeachment ;

would it not!

Mr. Cup. That is correct. 4

Senator Burpick. Mr. Westphal, do you have any questions /

Mr. Westrrnav. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. In looking over the

material that you presented and that's been presented by other wit-

nesses, we have had a little difficulty in analyzing the precise issue here,

because if this bill passes, the exemption that was accorded to Judge

Ritter and 31 other judges back in 1958 would be removed and he

would no longer be the Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for the

District of Utah.

The other judge would, I assume, become the chief judge of that

court; is that true!

Mr. Cum. I would assume, yes.

Mr. Wesrena. Judge Ritter, however, would still remain as a judge

of the District Court of Utah in regular active service: would he not!

— — He would.

Mr. Westra. He would still be sitting as a trial judge?

Mr. Cm. He would. : —

Mr. Wesrenav. Under the Judicial Council order he would still be

the judge in charge of criminal cases and proceedings in the central]

division of Utah; would he not ?

Mr. Cup. I would — yn 9 would soon change.

„ WesreHa.. How would it change

Mr Crus. There would be a — judge and under 7 —

chief judge and the rights that he has under the statutes, — — —

them. he would have the privilege of assigning cases. He wou - _

that privilege until it was demonstrated that there was a dispu

e judges. ts

——— dispute would be resolved by the 10th 0 2 —

I assume that the 10th Cireuit would not necessarily leave the si *

tion as it was between Judge Christensen and Judge Ritter some 15

~ 1 . . .

1 2 Well. I would — 2 that we might look at sect —

137 of the statute, and assuming that the other judge — .

chief judge, section 137 of title 28 provides “that the ee ——

court having more than one judge shall be divided among — jucg ,

as provided by the rules and orders of the court. If the — — —

in any district are unable to agree on the adoption of ru “4 - or —

for that purpose“ —that is. for the purpose of, * * —

and assigning the cases—“the Judicial Council of the ( ry =

make the necessary orders.“ So that if S. 1130 1s enacted into law, —

second judge in —— the chief judge. Judge Ritter wou

j in regular, active service. ‘

1 — 58 at b> they have been unable to agree since 2 year

1958 that they would continue to be unable to agree on the — —

of the business of the court for as long as Judge Ritter v ou 0

judge in regular active service. Is that a proper — — 3

Mr. Cn. I don't believe so. I don’t accept the * 55 *

that the new judge who took Judge Christensen's place an — Ju ize

Christensen still been the judge and thus become chief judge. Y

would have seen a great difference. The new judge, a junior jude

having to work and—bends over backward to keep the peace within

istrict. hinge

a go were given the mantle of chief judge 0 oe he om

control the hiring of the court clerks, of which we —.— rave 7"

it's hard to keep them—so that he could control the hiring o —

staffs, he, with that mantle of authority, could stand up and express

what he — 1

As it is. he accepts What is there. d F

Mr. 9 chief judge in Utah cannot get what he 5 ——

in the way of division of business or the assignment of ee : —

the statute, it takes the agreement of the two 1 i he —

judges are unable to agree, it is then left up to the juc — — —

of the circuit. And vou're assuming that if the other juc 4 ——

the chief judge. then for some reason Judge Ritter — wi

to agree, when they haven't been able to agree since 1 “ cee

Mr. Cup. Mr. 8 you're assuming facts * — 45

evidence. The junior judge at the present time has only = *

approximately 4 years. As such, there is no ee — 8

will not disagree with the chief judge under any mos ge — 3

If he were the chief judge, he would express his indepe

. And. if his independent opinion differed with —

independent opinion of Judge Ritter, there would be a disagreemen

n COPY AVAILABLE |

a 2a

between the two judges on the division of business and the assignment

of cases and the judicial council would still have to exercise its powers

under the statute; would they not!

Mr. Cup. The judicial council would do so and I feel that they,

given the opportunity, would rectify the problems that we have now.

Mr. Wrsrral. Well, they have attempted to rectify that problem

beginning in 1958 with their order which assigned to the two judges

of Utah an equal and an impartial divison of civil cases and gave to

each ju the power to preside over criminal cases and roceedings,

each in his own division—Judge Ritter in the central division and

the other judge in the northern division.

Mr. Cup. And as it worked out, the central division has about

80 percent criminal load and it would have more if we could prose-

cute. Judge Ritter, at that time, was 18 years younger than he is

now. He cannot now carry the load he did 18 years ago—and he does

a marvelous job in some of the cases that he has.

Mr. Wrsrrnal. The point, Mr. Child, is this. If Judge Ritter were

not the chief judge, he would still be the resident judge in the cen-

tral division. He would still be the trial judge in that division. He

would still handle his share of the civil cases on trial. He would stil!

3 cases and proceedings in the central division; would

1e not

Mr. Cup. He would only until the then chief judge took issue

with that situation and asked for a change.

Mr. Wesrenat. The chief judge cannot take away from Judge Rit-

ter the power to sit as an active district court judge. The judicial

council of the 10th Circuit cannot take away that power. This was

determined in the Chandler case, as I understand.

Now, the point I’m trying to get at is how the situation would change

if you simply remove the word “chief” from J udge Ritter’s title. He

would still be an active judge. If the Government were not prepared

to proceed with prosecutions, he would still dismiss them. In the

absence of an order from the judicial council saying that he must

give you the 21 days’ advance notice of the setting of a calendar of

criminal cases for trial, he would still be giving you either 6 days or

3 days or no day’s notice.

ow would it change if he were not the chief judge!

Mr. Cunp. What you failed to, in my opinion, take consideration

of is that by removing the name “chief” from one judge, you don’t

just leave it out in limbo. You assign the name “chief” to another

judge and that judge, thus, given this mantle of authority, begins to

administer the problems of the district—not just the division, but the

district. And those problems, once he has that mantle of authority,

are his responsibility.

And Judge Anderson, whom I assume would then be the chief

judge, would take issue with the way these courts are run and would

require the imposition of written rules of the court. He handles his

calendar in a very different way and, as chief judge, he would have

great influence on this court.

Mr. Westpuat. I would assume that the adoption of local rules of

court is a matter that has to be voted by the court, as distinguished

from being voted by one judge of the court. So it would take the agree-

ment of the two judges—Judge Ritter and Judge Anderson, you say!

Mr. Cui. Yes.

Mr. Westruat. In order to adopt local rules of court. I don’t per-

ceive under the statute that the chief judge has the power to impose

his will upon the second judge in the district; am I wrong?

Mr. Cup. Is it not apparent that absent that agreement, the judi-

cial council of the 10th Circuit steps in!

Mr. Westrenar. Well, there has 22 been no ment on

adoption of local rules of court for these many years in Utah and u

to this point the judicial council of the 10th Cireuit has not step

in order to adopt local rules generally for Utah or even to adopt

a special rule saying how much notice they must give to the U.S. dis-

trict attorney prior to setting a group of criminal cases for trial; isn’t

that true?

Mr. Cuz. This is true.

Mr. WesteHat. You mentioned this matter of the underutilization

of magistrates. I was interested in reading some correspondence in-

cluded with Judge Lewis’ statement concerning the development of

the implementation of the Magistrate Act in the district of Utah.

And in an early letter Judge Ritter advised that he intended to

make full use of the new magistrate system in Utah, that he out-

lined the type of duties that would be assigned to the magistrate,

including the trial of petty offenses, and he also pointed out that in

his judgment he thought that Utah needed two full-time magistrates

and he expressed some reservations about the use of part-time magi-

strates for trial purposes because they would still be able to, as a part-

time magistrate, practice law. And he felt that that might lead to

conflict of interest.

Now, that correspondence also indicates that the judicial confer-

ence did not agree with his recommendation and did not, in fact, au-

thorize any full-time magistrates for Utah. It did, however, au-

thorize—and I think as agreed by Judge Ritter and the other judge—

to have a halftime or $11,000 magistrate at Salt Lake City and an

$8,500 part-time magistrate at Ogden with two minor ones, one at

Cedar City and one at Provo.

After that was authorized, the magistrates at Cedar City and Provo

were never appointed so that that authority was repealed by the judi-

cial conference in about 1973. And then the part-time magistrates

were not assigned any petty offense jurisdiction. They were assigned

very little, if any, of the discretionary duties under section 636(b) of

the statute.

And, in fact, the magistrates, such as they have had there in Utah,

have performed basically only the duties that used to be performed

by a U.S. Commissioner, except for the trial of petty offenses. Then

at some point in 1974 or so, apparently both of the Utah judges and

the judicial council of the 10th Circuit felt that the two part-time

positions at Ogden and Salt Lake City and should be combined into

a full-time magistrate and that, then, would meet Judge Ritter’s initial

feeling and would probably overcome his perception that a part-time

magistrate is subjected to a conflict of interest.

But as I understand the record. the judicial conference still did

not feel that there should be a full-time magistrate. Is that pretty

much the situation ?

— Oh OO ne

Mr. Cu. Yes. We're going backward on the magistrate situation

in Utah. We now only have one halftime. We no longer have two half-

‘times; we now have one halftime.

Mr. Westruat. Now, as I understand the statute on the petty offense

jurisdiction of a magistrate, it requires that the court designate or

specifically allot and authorize that magistrate to try these petty

offenses that are permitted under section 3401 of title 18.

Now, your objection is that Judge Ritter, as chief judge, has not

authorized that and apparently there’s been no agreement between

Judge Ritter and the other judge that the magistrate should be au-

thorized petty offense jurisdiction; is that the situation?

Mr. Cuitp. I have spoken with the other judge, who said to me

last Friday that he’s in favor of the magistrates having this

jurisdiction.

Mr. Wrsrrnal. I say, there's no agreement between the two of them.

Judge Ritter is obviously opposed to the exercise of this petty offense

jurisdiction.

Mr. Cum. Obviously. f N

Mr. Westruat. But the statute apparently does give to the judges of

the court the discretion as to whether they will or will not authorize

the magistrate to hold this petty offense jurisdiction.

Mr. Cup. Correct. It requires the chief judge to approve it.

Mr. Wrsrrnal. Are you suggesting that this committee should

determine whether Judge Ritter abused his discretion in failing to

authorize magistrates in Utah to exercise petty offense jurisdiction?

Mr. Cup. I would suggest, rather, that this committee look at the

fact that because of his age and predisposition, Judge Ritter has

merely failed to do it and that the need is present. ;

Mr. WesrrPnat. Well. some of these things date back to a time before

he was even 70 years of age. =

Mr. Cup. There we get to predisposition. Ory

Mr. Wrerr hal. Well, again, you're talking about predisposition.

You’re talking about the man’s conduct as a sitting judge and, again,

doesn’t this get us into an area where, under the constitution, the

House has initial jurisdiction ?

You're talking about grounds for removal. You're not talking about

whether a “grandfather clause” should be repealed.

Mr. Cup. Mr. Giuliani indicates that he would like to answer that,

if it would be all right. se

Mr. Wesrreuar. What is your answer, Mr Giuliani?

Mr. Grewant. Mr. Westphal, I think there is no doubt that there

may be a question here about Judge Ritter’s conduct as a judge. And

there's no doubt that an awful lot of what Mr. Child put to you in-

volved his misconduct as a judge. And I think a lot of that is relevant,

but vou have a different question. 1

The question isa question that was addressed in 1958 and is being

addressed again: Does this man or should this man serve with the dual

function of chief judge and sitting judge? There's no doubt that a

change in the law will not solve all or nearly all of the problems cre-

ated by Judge Ritter. But that doesn’t mean that it will not solve

And the issue that it seems to me is before this committee is whether

this exemption that now exists, for one man and for one man alone, is

a valid one.

For instance, Judge Ritter now presides over grand juries. Over

the last 5 years, those grand juries have sat for 57 days, which in my

2 aed extinguishes the criminal justice system in the State

0 tah.

Mr. Westruat. But that's a matter that you have now pending for

determination by the 10th circuit under your petition for preemptory

writ of mandamus over which proceeding the 10th circuit has retained

jurisdiction.

Mr. Grvuuian1. There's no question about that. I don’t cite that for

you to determine the merits or the demerits of our petition for man-

damus. I cite it as an example of why Judge Ritter cannot function

beyond the age of 70 as the chief judge of the State of Utah.

Mr. Wrsrrnal. As I understand it, his views about the functioning

of a grand jury are not something that he has just believed in in the

last year or two. This is a problem that went back before he ever

reached age 70. He has always had different views about the proper

scope of the grand jury.

Mr. Grvuiant. I don’t know whether that is true or isn’t true. Mr.

Child tells me that it isn’t. And I don’t know what his views of it

were when he was 69 and 68 and 67. I do know that we now have a

77-year-old judge presiding over the court in Utah who hasn’t con-

vened a grand jury but for 57 days in the last 5 years.

Mr. Westrnat. All right. Let me ask you: “How many times in the

last 5 years has the U.S. attorney in Utah, in cooperation with the

Justice Department, petitioned the 10th circuit for a preemptory writ

of mandamus requiring Judge Ritter to convene a grand jury?”

Mr. Gruian1. It happened on at least one other occasion; didn't it.

Mr. Child? At that point he convened a grand jury for a short period

of time; is that correct ?

Mr. Cup. That is true. There was some discussion going on, as I

recall, in the tenure of C. Nelson Day—preliminary. And it was just

being discussed in the courthouse that they were clout to go after a

mandamus, at which time he did call a grand jury for a short period.

Mr. Westpnat. Again, do you have a grand jury that sits in the

northern division? Do you convene one in the northern division!

Mr. Cup. I’m happy you asked me that. Judge Anderson and be-

fore him, Judge Christensen, have grand juries sitting in the northern

division at all times.

* A it’s a shame. We only really need one grand jury in the State of

tah.

Mr. Westpnat. If Judge Ritter is not the chief judge, he would still

be the presiding judge in the central division and he will still have the

power to either convene or not to convene a grand jury: isn’t that true

Mr. Grorrant. I think that’s a question that you have put on sev-

eral of these things and I think the difference that would be created

by Judge Ritter no longer being the chief judge would be that the new

chief judge could initiate rules to solve these problems.

Chief Judge Ritter would then be in a position of having to object

to those rules and they can be resolved by Judicial Council. And I

think that is a much better posture to be in than having a junior judge

— ee

—

—— . —— — —

objecting to the practices of a senior judge and asking him to initiate

b Mr. Westruat. Did either Judge Christensen, when he was on the

bench, or Judge Anderson, when he was on the bench, even though

they were junior, did they ever attempt to initiate local rules and, upon

the failure of the two of them to agree on local rules of court, refer

the matter to the Judicial Council under section 332? Was that ever

done, to your know Q

Mr. Cump. To my knowledge, the question of local rules was not

presented to the Judicial Council. It may have been. However, Judge

Christensen adopted his own, since he couldn't get along with Judge

Ritter. Judge Anderson has not seen fit to cross Judge Ritter in that.

Mr. Wrsrrnal. You also, in your testimony, object, Mr. Child, to

a trailing calendar practice, which I suppose another word for it is a

“general calendar.” You list the cases in order on the calendar and

yo". start trying the first one; when that’s out of the way, you tr7 the

second one, and so on.

Mr. Cup. Correct.

Mr. Westrua.. Now, apparently Judge Ritter believes in that kind

of a general trailing calendar and you would like either certain settings

or a little more un a my from the judge as to when he is going

to commence that calendar in light of your requirements for obtaining

witnesses; isn’t that corr et?

Mr. Cup. Yes. It not necessarily the trailing calendar that

bothers me. It’s the lack of notice and the inflexibility of insisting on

trying the cases in their order.

Mr. Westena.. Well, again, but he would exercise that power and,

I assume, make the same rulings if he were an active judge, as he now

does, even though he did not have the title, chief judge.

Mr. Cp. Oh, yes. He could do things like that and it would upset

our office. However, I do believe that district court rules could be

adopted, which he doesn’t adopt. He prefers not to have written rules.

Mr. Wrsrrnal. I understand that. The mere repeal of the “grand-

father clause” isn’t going to cure it unless the other judge proposes

some local rules of court, unless the Judicial Council intervenes upon

their failure to agree.

Mr. Cup. That's right.

Mr. Westpnat. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Brroicx. Thank you very much. Their statements will be

made a part of the record without objection.

Senator Buroick. Our next witness is Robert B. Hansen, deputy at-

torney general. Salt Lake City. Welcome to the committee. Mr. Hansen.

Mr. Hansen. Thank you, Chairmann Burdick and Mr. Scott and

Mr. Westphal.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT B. HANSEN, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL,

SALT LAKE CITY

Mr. Hansen. I appreciate the opportunity to testify here today. I

know the issue is repeal of the grandfather clause for chief judges. Let

me put the question in perspective. As you know, repeal of this clause

affects only one man: Judge Willis W. Ritter. In fairness to this com-

mittee and in fairness to Judge Ritter, you should know that the

amendment’s repeal to many would be a mild slap at the judge at a

time he deserves a knockout punch.

The tenth circuit court of appeals Chief Judge David T. Lewis, who

supports repeal, says that this hearing should be based on equity and

a not on “whether Judge Ritter is a good, bad, or indifferent

judge.

It would be good if we could separate the man and the issue. We can-

not. If it were not for the judge’s questionable actions, there would

have been no effort to find a legal loophole to

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

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