Amicus Brief — Barnes & Tucker Co. v. Pennsylvania

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” Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1977

No. 77-44

BARNES & TUCKER COMPANY,

Appellant,

Ve

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE

BRIEF AMICI CURIAE

AND

BRIEF OF THE NATIONAL COAL ASSOCIATION,

THE NATIONAL INDEPENDENT COAL OPERATORS’

ASSOCIATION, THE KEYSTONE BITUMINOUS COAL

ASSOCIATION, AND THE AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS,

AS AMICI CURIAE

FOR AMICI CURIAE THE NATIONAL

COAL ASSOCIATION, THE NATIONAL

INDEPENDENT COAL OPERATORS’

ASSOCIATION, AND THE AMERICAN

MINING CONGRESS

JOHN L. KILCULLEN

Kilcullen, Smith & Heenan

1800 M Street, N.W., Suite 600N

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 296-5700

FOR AMICUS CURIAE THE KEYSTONE

BITUMINOUS COAL ASSOCIATION

HAROLD R. SCHMIDT

Rose, Schmidt, Dixon, Hasley & Whyte

9th Floor, Oliver Building

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222

(412) 434-8600

Washington, 0.C. « CLB PUBLISHERS © LAW PRINTING CO. « (202) 393-0625

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM 1977

No. 77-44

BARNES & TUCKER COMPANY,

Appellant,

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF

The National Coal Association, the National Independent

Coal Operators’ Association, the Keystone Bituminous Coal

Association, and the American Mining Congress herewith

respectfully request leave to file their attached brief as amici

curiae in support of the Jurisdictional Statement filed by

appellant herein.

These respective associations, and their members, have a

direct and urgent interest in the issues presented here. The

decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court from which this

appeal is taken deals with new and previously uncharted areas

respecting the exercise of State power to retroactively apply

recently adopted environmental laws to inactive mine prop-

erties which were abandoned prior to enactment of such laws.

While these issues are effectively treated in appellant’s

Jurisdictional Statement, it is the purpose of this amicus brief

to convey to the Court the far-reaching consequences which

may radiate from the decision of the Court below. If the

power of a state to retroactively impose economic liability

upon an industry is not governed and controlled by

reasonable rules of due process the ability of the managers of

an enterprise to make sound and rational decisions respecting

conduct of its affairs becomes impossible. It is hardly

necessary to emphasize that the vigor of the national

economy requires an industrial climate which encourages

adequate capital investment for development of natural

resources. When a state, as in this case, by retrospective

legislation imposes unreasonable and unduly oppressive eco-

nomic burdens upon one of its most essential industries the

industry must look to this Court for a determination as to

whether the state action constitutes a taking of property

without due process of law.

Counsel for Amici has obtained the consent of the

appellant for the filing of this amicus curiae brief, but the

Assistant Attorney General of Pennsylvania has declined to

grant consent.

Respectfully submitted,

FOR AMICI CURIAE THE NATIONAL

COAL ASSOCIATION, THE NATIONAL

INDEPENDENT COAL OPERATORS’

ASSOCIATION, AND THE AMERICAN

MINING CONGRESS

JOHN L. KILCULLEN

Kilcullen, Smith & Heenan

1800 M Street, N.W., Suite 600N

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 296-5700

FOR AMICUS CURIAE THE KEYSTONE

BITUMINOUS COAL ASSOCIATION

HAROLD R. SCHMIDT

Rose, Schmidt, Dixon, Hasley & Whyte

9th Floor. Oliver Building

Pittsburgh. Pennsylvania 15222

(412) 434-8600

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE

il. THE QUESTIONS ARE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO

THE MINING INDUSTRY

Ill. 1T IS IMPORTANT TO DEFINE THE PARAMETERS

WITHIN WHICH A STATE MAY, BY POST-FACTO

LEGISLATION, REQUIRE ABATEMENT AS A PUBLIC

NUISANCE THAT WHICH WAS REGARDED AS

LAWFUL AND ACCEPTABLE AT THE TIME ACTIVE

Tyee eT eee ee

IV. THE DECISION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME

COURT RAISES SERIOUS DUE PROCESS QUES-

Ch hii k sao ow Gold att 64a) eb. 4's 6604 60

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Commonwealth v. Gettysburg Battle Tower Inc., 454 Pa.

I kaa abecebes

Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 38 L.Ed. 385 (1894) ......

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A.453

i

Pennsylvania R.R. v. Sagamore Coal Co., 281 Pa. 233, 126

Pe co eee n Saeed a wwe wa e408 60500 e408 e

Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313, 315, 31 L.Ed.2d 258

eS RS ee Ree ae

Miscellaneous:

Clean Streams Law, Act of June 22, 1937. as amended, 35

Se ss eae bop Ove 6064006 608

Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of

1977, P.L. 95-87 §401-402

Pennsylvania Surface Mine Reclamation Act, P.L. 1198,52PS.

SDI oe a a EE EE es ae

Public Law, 1075, 35 P.S. §760.1 et seq. ...............

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, /nmactive and

Abandoned Underground Mines, Water Pollution Pre-

vention and Control Table 1.01-1, p.6 (1975) .........

-

—— ome eee 6 eee ee te 68 2 & os SS

-_ i

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1977

No. 77-44

BARNES & TUCKER COMPANY,

Appellant,

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

BRIEF OF THE NATIONAL COAL ASSOCIATION,

THE NATIONAL INDEPENDENT COAL OPERATORS’

ASSOCIATION, THE KEYSTONE BITUMINOUS COAL

ASSOCIATION, AND THE AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS,

AMICI CURIAE

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE

The National Coal Association is a voluntary nonprofit

association representing coal mining companies which produce

almost one-half of the annual coal production in the United

States. The National Independent Coal Operators Association

is a nonprofit association of small and medium-sized coal

producers located primarily in the Appalachiay coal regions of

Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Kentucky, Ohio and Virginia. The

Keystone Bituminous Coal Association is a nonprofit

association representing coal mining companies operating in

the State of Pennsylvania. The American Mining Congress is a

nonprofit association comprised of mining companies which

produce a major proportion of the nation’s minerals, including

coal, metals, and non-metallic industrial and agricultural

minerals. The basic purpose of amici is to represent the

interests of the mining industry and to cooperate with public

authorities in dealing with problems that affect mining.

The issues which are involved here have broad implications

for the mining industry as a whole. From the standpoint of

the industry it is important that the Court provide answers to

the question of whether and to what extent a state may,

under newly-adopted environmental statutes, impose upon a

mining company the obligation to abate post-mining con-

ditions which develop and manifest themselves years after

mining operations have ceased, and which are not attributable

to fault or negligence of the mine operator.

THE QUESTIONS ARE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE

TO THE MINING INDUSTRY

For well over a hundred years mining practices in

Pennsylvania, as well as in other states, were carried on in

accordance with statutory standards and social, political and

governmental policies which permitted, and, indeed affirma-

tively sanctioned the discharge of mine waters into streams

and waterways which were not the source of public water

supplies.’

'See, e.g. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Sagamore Coal Co., 281 Pa. 233, 126

A.386 (1924).

A |

In the mid 1960’s a shift in public attitudes resulted in a

rewriting of the established body of laws and enactment of

legislative changes which have imposed a multitude of new

environmental standards upon industry generally, and the

mining industry in particular. As a consequence, environ-

mental considerations are a controlling factor in every

management decision which a mining company must make in

respect to its day-to-day operations, as well as in planning for

its future activities.

This is not to say that it should not be so. But it is

important that those who have responsibility for such

management decisions should know the rules of the game, and

that they should have some assurance that a course of action

which they follow in reliance upon existing laws and

regulations will not later bring down upon them unforeseen

liabilities of disastrous proportions because the state later

changes the rules or imposes new duties by subsequent

legislative acts.

Put in another way, there has been a shifting perspective

between what was permissible and even welcome during

periods when the state was actively encouraging development

of its mineral resources, and what is permissible and welcome

in 1977. The benefits which the state and its citizens derived

from industrial development were almost universally regarded

during past periods as justifying and outweighing incidental

damage to the air, land or water, but today the conditio.’s

which followed as a consequence of these past governmental

policies are now being classified as public nuisances which a

mining company must abate at enormous and unanticipated

cost.

The question is not whether the legislatures have gone too

far or too fast in their efforts to protect the environment, it

is rather a question of whether under newly-adopted

environmental laws a state may require a company to take

action to abate conditions arising out of past industrial

4

activities which were in all respects legal and Proper at the

time they took place, where there was full compliance with

then-existing statutory requirements and standards, and where

no fault or negligence, or foreseeability can be attributed to

the company.

IT IS IMPORTANT TO DEFINE THE PARA-

METERS WITHIN WHICH A STATE MAY, BY

POST-FACTO LEGISLATION, REQUIRE ABATE-

MENT AS A PUBLIC NUISANCE THAT WHICH

WAS REGARDED AS LAWFUL AND ACCEPT-

ABLE AT THE TIME ACTIVE MINING OC-

CURRED.

There is a _ pressing need for clarification of the

constitutional limits of a state’s power to require mining

companies, or other industrial enterprises, to return to old

and abandoned facilities and, regardless of cost, abate

conditions which were theretofore not recognized or con-

sidered as public nuisances or contrary to the general welfare

of the state and its citizens.

The situation presented in this case typifies the problem.

Under the established legal and public policy considerations

which prevailed in Pennsylvania prior to the most recent

amendments to the Clean Streams Law, Act of June 22,

1937, as amended, 35 P.S. sec. 69.1 et seq., the discharge of

acid mine drainage into streams was not recognized as a

nuisance, either public or private. The controlling public

policy of the state during previous periods was expostulated

in the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal Company y.

Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A.453 (1886) in which the Court

Said:

“The right to mine coal is not a nuisance in itself. It is

a right incident to the ownership of coal property, and

when exercised in the ordinary manner and with due

av

care the owner cannot be held for permitting the natural

flow of mine water over his own land, into the water

course, by means of which the natural drainage of the

country is effected.

* = *

The discharge of this acidulated water is practically a

condition upon which the ordinary use and enjoyment of

coal lands depends; the discharge of the water is

therefore part and parcel of the process of mining, and

as it can only be effected through natural channels, the

denial of this right must inevitably produce results of a

most serious character to this, the leading industrial

interest of the state.

The defendants were engaged in a perfectly lawful

business, in which they had made large expenditures, and

in which the interests of the entire community were

concerned; they were at liberty to carry on that business

in the ordinary way, and were not, while so doing,

accountable for consequences which they could not

control; as the mining operations went on, the water by

the mere force of gravity ran out of the drifts and found

its way over the defendant’s own land to the Meadow

Brook. It is clear that for the consequence of this flow,

which by the mere force of gravity, naturally, and

without any fault of the defendants, carried the water

into the brook and thence to the plaintiff's pond, there

could be no responsibility as damages on the part of the

defendants.” 113 Pa. at 146-47, 6 A. at 457.

Only where it could be shown that the discharge ef acid mine

drainage entered into a “pure stream” which was the source

of a community’s water supply, did the Pennsylvania courts

recognize the existence of a public nuisance. Pennsylvania

Railroad v. Sagamore Coal Company, 281 Pa. 233, 126 A.

386 (1924).

In the present case there was no showing that the drainage

from Mine No. 15 entered “clean streams’’, but rather entered

waters which were already heavily polluted by sewage and

drainage from other mines. As noted by the court in the

Second Commonwealth Court Opinion (App. 65)

“The waters of the Commonwealth here in question are

and for a long period of time have been polluted by

sewage and acid mine drainage from closed or

‘abandoned’ mines. Except for some developing recrea-

tional uses there is no evidence that these waters in their

polluted state are used for public purposes. Nor do we

have in this case facts supporting concepts of negligence,

foreseeability or unlawful conduct, being elements of

seemingly persuasive force in some of the cases.

* * *

For better than one hundred years the State has

chosen to regulate mining and there is no credible

evidence in this case that Mine No. 15 was not operated

and eventually closed consistent with statutory law,

regulation or licenses issued pursuant thereto.”

The Second Commonwealth Court Opinion also presents a

review of the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions

enforced by the State of Pennsylvania during the respective

periods the mine was in active operation. (App. 32-39).

Briefly summarized, the statutes governing mine drainage are

described as follows:

The initial Pennsylvania statute dealing with pollution of

streams, which was known as the Purity of Waters Act of

1905, dealt with the discharge of sewers into the waters of

the Commonwealth, but significantly provided in section 4

that it was not to apply to “waters pumped or flowing from

coal mines.”” App. 32.

A 1923 statute which empowered the Department of

Hea'th to promulgate regulations for the protection of the

water supply and prevent pollution, specifically provided that

it was not to apply to “...any pollution or contamination

caused by or resulting from water pumped from or flowing

from coal mines or water used in the preparation of coal.”

Ibid.

The Clean Streams Law enacted in 1937 expressly excluded

from the prohibition on industrial wastes “...acid mine

drainage from coal mines...” App. 33.

In 1945 ‘the Clean Streams Law was extensively amended

so as to include coal mines within its coverage, and to

prohibit discharge of acid mine drainage into “clean waters’,

with the proviso that “...the provisions of this article shall

not apply to acid mine drainage from coal mines until such

time as, in the opinion of the Sanitary Water Board, practical

means for the removal of the polluting properties of such

drainage shall become known.” Ibid. Coal mines were

required, however, to submit a proposed drainage plan to the

Sanitary Water Board for approval.’

It is important to note that these statutory provisions dealt

only with discharge of acid mine drainage into ‘“‘clean”’ waters.

It was not until the adoption of the 1965 amendments to the

Clean Streams Law that the different treatment accorded the

discharge of acid mine drainage into “clean” and “unclean”

waters was eliminated, and the Sanitary Water Board was

given regulatory powers over all such discharges.

On July 31, 1970, a full year after Mine No. 15 was

permanently sealed in accordance with applicable law, the

Clean Streams Law was again amended to provide, in

pertinent part, that

“A discharge from a mine shall include a discharge

which occurs after mining operations have ceased,

provided that the mining operations were conducted

subsequent to January 1, 1966, under circumstances

requiring a permit from the Sanitary Water Board under

the provisions of Section 315(b) of this act as it existed

under the amendatory act of August 23, 1965. (P.L.

stay

This amendment also transferred the powers of the Sanitary

Water Board to the Department of Environmental Resources,

which agency proceeded to retroactively revoke the permits

which had been issued to Barnes and Tucker with respect to

2Barnes and Tucker fully complied with this requirement, and was

issued permits by the Sanitary Water Board. (App. 78, 79).

discharge of water from Mine No. 15, and brought suit to

compel the company to continually treat, in perpetuity, not

only the natural percolation from Mine No. 15, but also

millions of gallons of water which flow through the mine

from other active mines located at higher elevations.

THE DECISION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA

SUPREME COURT RAISES SERIOUS DUE PRO-

CESS QUESTIONS.

In holding Barnes & Tucker liable under statutes adopted

after its mining operations had ceased, the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court reasoned that the 1965 amendments to the

Clean Streams Law put the company on notice that its mine

drainage permits were subject to change and that the applicable

Statutory authority for its permits might later be amended,

and, accordingly, Barnes and Tucker was forewarned that

amendments might be passed after the mine was closed which

would subject it to liability. First Pennsylvania Supreme Court

decision, App. 95.

This reasoning of the Court is deficient in at least two

respects. First, there was essentially no due process notice as

to what the amended law would be. Even a statute which is

actually on the books must be sufficiently clear so as to

provide notice of what conduct is proscribed. See, Rabe vy.

Washington, 405 U.S. 313, 315, 31 L.Ed.2d 258 (1972). It is

clearly much more offensive to due process to hold that a

litigant is bound by a statute or amendment not even in

existence when he acted.

Second, the rationale of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is

defective because it presumes that Barnes and Tucker has a

continuing Or prospective involvement in the discharge from

the mine. Such is not the case. While it is true that the

gravity discharge is continuing (and in that sense prospective),

there is no continuing activity by Barnes and Tucker. As

9

noted by the Commonwealth Court, “([F] actors of a present

activity on the part of the owner or user of the land or of a

course of conduct directly producing the deleterious result are

absent in this case.” (App. 65)

The second basis for holding Barnes and Tucker liable was

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s unusual application of

nuisance law. First the Court overruled the long-standing case

of Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Sanderson, supra, which

held that acid drainage from a coal mine did not constitute a

nuisance, (First Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion, App.

88), and passed over without consideration the finding of the

Commonwealth Court that “The mine water discharge from

Mine No. 15 after cessation of mining does not constitute a

public nuisance under Section 3 of the Clean Streams Law as

then in effect for which Barnes and Tucker is presently

responsible.” (App. 67). The Supreme Court presumed current

harm to the waterways which the Commonwealth Court

found to be already polluted by sewage and industrial waste

(App. 65), and found sufficient public interest by reference to

an Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution enacted

subsequent to the time Barnes and Tucker ceased operations

and sealed Mine No. 15—an Amendment which the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court itself has held is not “‘self-

executing” so as to allow the government to act against

individuals. Commonwealth v. Gettysburg Battle Tower Inc.,

454 Pa. 193, 311 A.2d 588 (1973). Thus, the Pennsylvania

Court held Barnes and Tucker liable forever in the future for

actions consummated prior to adoption of legislation

establishing any liability, and upon an alleged violation of a

public interest created by a constitutional amendment

adopted two years after the date Barnes and Tucker Company

discontinued its mining activities.

The rule of Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 38 L.Ed. 385

(1894) establishing the proper constitutional standard for

evaluating the propriety of a statute enacted under the police

10

power is still applicable law. To pass constitutional muster a

regulation promulgated under authority of the police power

must use “... means [that] are reasonably necessary for the

accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive

upon individuals.” 152 U.S. at 137. Here the imposition of

liability is unreasonable for there has been no opportunity for

Barnes and Tucker to avoid the charged violation inasmuch as

its mining activities were completed before the condition was

declared unlawful. Moreover, the State has not advanced any

sound reasons as to why a different rule of liability should be

imposed upon the former operator of this particular mine

than upon the former operators of the multitude of other

abandoned mines which are draining into the same streams,

and contribute by far the greatest part of the pollution.

Accordingly, in order to adopt the most reasonable means of

dealing with the problem, and to avoid an unduly oppressive

result, the State has authority under P.L. 1075, 35 P.S.

§760.1 et seq., to assume direct responsibility for the water

discharged from Mine No. 15 in much the same manner as it

has assumed responsibility for drainage from other abandoned

mines.?

There is no doubt that the imposition of an open-ended

liability upon Barnes and Tucker to continue to treat the

waters flowing from the mine is a “‘taking’’ of property within

31it should also be noted that Pennsylvania has dealt with the

deferred social cost of surface mining by Section 18 of the Pennsylvania

Surface Mine Reclamation Act. P.L. 1198, 52 P.S. §1396.18 which

creates a Surface Mine Conservation and Reclamation Fund funded by

monies from currently active operations to reclaim surface mines

abandoned before the date of the Reclamation Act. The new Federal

Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, P.L. 95-87,

sections 401 and 402, creates a reclamation fund to be derived from

industry-wide assessments of 35 cents a ton on surface mined coal, and

15 cents a ton on deep-mined coal, to reclaim areas of abandoned coal

mines, including the abatement of mine drainage from deep mines as

well as from surface mines.

li

the meaning of the Due Process Clause. Lawton v. Steele,

supra. Its effect is to create a negative worth factor in respect

to inactive and sealed mines, and may very likely have the

effect of discouraging the future development of mines to

produce much needed energy, puiticularly where the coal

deposits are in the vicinity of abandoned mines.*

The Pennsylvania Court’s decision, if allowed to stand,

could well become a legal precedent affecting other types of

situations in which retrospective legislative action declares

unlawful or in violation of the public interest conditions

resulting from industrial activity which was in every respect

lawful and proper under the laws in effect when the activity

occurred.

The issues involved in this case are issues of the utmost

gravity, affecting hundreds, and even thousands, of companies

engaged in coal mining and other mining activities as well.

Until these questions are answered mine managers will be

unable to make operational decisions in an atmosphere

unclouded by doubt as to their ultimate legal consequences,

and each such decision will remain, in the words of the

Melancholy Prince,

“sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought;

and enterprises of great pith and moment,

with this regard, their currents turn awry.”’

*Pennsylvania and the general Appalachian coal producing areas have

thousands of abandoned underground mines. As of 1966, the United

States Environmental Protection Agency estimated that there were

approximately 67,613 abandoned coal mines in the United States which

have a discharge flowing from them. U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency, /nactive and Abandoned Underground Mines, Water Pollution

Prevention and Control Table 1.01-1, p. 6 (1975).

12

For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully urged that the

Court note probable jurisdiction to review the judgement

from which this appeal is taken.

FOR AMICI CURIAE THE NATIONAL

COAL ASSOCIATION, THE NATIONAL

INDEPENDENT COAL OPERATORS’

ASSOCIATION, AND THE AMERICAN

MINING CONGRESS

JOHN L. KILCULLEN

Kilcullen, Smith & Heenan

1800 M Street, N.W., Suite 600N

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 296-5700

FOR AMICUS CURIAE THE KEYSTONE

BITUMINOUS COAL ASSOCIATION

HAROLD R. SCHMIDT

Rose, Schmidt, Dixon, Hasley & Whyte

9th Floor, Oliver Building

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222

(412) 434-8600

- ta

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