Amicus Brief — Barnes & Tucker Co. v. Pennsylvania
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gs IN THE
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” Supreme Court of the Anited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1977
No. 77-44
BARNES & TUCKER COMPANY,
Appellant,
Ve
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
BRIEF AMICI CURIAE
AND
BRIEF OF THE NATIONAL COAL ASSOCIATION,
THE NATIONAL INDEPENDENT COAL OPERATORS’
ASSOCIATION, THE KEYSTONE BITUMINOUS COAL
ASSOCIATION, AND THE AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS,
AS AMICI CURIAE
FOR AMICI CURIAE THE NATIONAL
COAL ASSOCIATION, THE NATIONAL
INDEPENDENT COAL OPERATORS’
ASSOCIATION, AND THE AMERICAN
MINING CONGRESS
JOHN L. KILCULLEN
Kilcullen, Smith & Heenan
1800 M Street, N.W., Suite 600N
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 296-5700
FOR AMICUS CURIAE THE KEYSTONE
BITUMINOUS COAL ASSOCIATION
HAROLD R. SCHMIDT
Rose, Schmidt, Dixon, Hasley & Whyte
9th Floor, Oliver Building
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222
(412) 434-8600
Washington, 0.C. « CLB PUBLISHERS © LAW PRINTING CO. « (202) 393-0625
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM 1977
No. 77-44
BARNES & TUCKER COMPANY,
Appellant,
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF
The National Coal Association, the National Independent
Coal Operators’ Association, the Keystone Bituminous Coal
Association, and the American Mining Congress herewith
respectfully request leave to file their attached brief as amici
curiae in support of the Jurisdictional Statement filed by
appellant herein.
These respective associations, and their members, have a
direct and urgent interest in the issues presented here. The
decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court from which this
appeal is taken deals with new and previously uncharted areas
respecting the exercise of State power to retroactively apply
recently adopted environmental laws to inactive mine prop-
erties which were abandoned prior to enactment of such laws.
While these issues are effectively treated in appellant’s
Jurisdictional Statement, it is the purpose of this amicus brief
to convey to the Court the far-reaching consequences which
may radiate from the decision of the Court below. If the
power of a state to retroactively impose economic liability
upon an industry is not governed and controlled by
reasonable rules of due process the ability of the managers of
an enterprise to make sound and rational decisions respecting
conduct of its affairs becomes impossible. It is hardly
necessary to emphasize that the vigor of the national
economy requires an industrial climate which encourages
adequate capital investment for development of natural
resources. When a state, as in this case, by retrospective
legislation imposes unreasonable and unduly oppressive eco-
nomic burdens upon one of its most essential industries the
industry must look to this Court for a determination as to
whether the state action constitutes a taking of property
without due process of law.
Counsel for Amici has obtained the consent of the
appellant for the filing of this amicus curiae brief, but the
Assistant Attorney General of Pennsylvania has declined to
grant consent.
Respectfully submitted,
FOR AMICI CURIAE THE NATIONAL
COAL ASSOCIATION, THE NATIONAL
INDEPENDENT COAL OPERATORS’
ASSOCIATION, AND THE AMERICAN
MINING CONGRESS
JOHN L. KILCULLEN
Kilcullen, Smith & Heenan
1800 M Street, N.W., Suite 600N
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 296-5700
FOR AMICUS CURIAE THE KEYSTONE
BITUMINOUS COAL ASSOCIATION
HAROLD R. SCHMIDT
Rose, Schmidt, Dixon, Hasley & Whyte
9th Floor. Oliver Building
Pittsburgh. Pennsylvania 15222
(412) 434-8600
(i)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE
il. THE QUESTIONS ARE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO
THE MINING INDUSTRY
Ill. 1T IS IMPORTANT TO DEFINE THE PARAMETERS
WITHIN WHICH A STATE MAY, BY POST-FACTO
LEGISLATION, REQUIRE ABATEMENT AS A PUBLIC
NUISANCE THAT WHICH WAS REGARDED AS
LAWFUL AND ACCEPTABLE AT THE TIME ACTIVE
Tyee eT eee ee
IV. THE DECISION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME
COURT RAISES SERIOUS DUE PROCESS QUES-
Ch hii k sao ow Gold att 64a) eb. 4's 6604 60
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Commonwealth v. Gettysburg Battle Tower Inc., 454 Pa.
I kaa abecebes
Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 38 L.Ed. 385 (1894) ......
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A.453
i
Pennsylvania R.R. v. Sagamore Coal Co., 281 Pa. 233, 126
Pe co eee n Saeed a wwe wa e408 60500 e408 e
Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313, 315, 31 L.Ed.2d 258
eS RS ee Ree ae
Miscellaneous:
Clean Streams Law, Act of June 22, 1937. as amended, 35
Se ss eae bop Ove 6064006 608
Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977, P.L. 95-87 §401-402
Pennsylvania Surface Mine Reclamation Act, P.L. 1198,52PS.
SDI oe a a EE EE es ae
Public Law, 1075, 35 P.S. §760.1 et seq. ...............
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, /nmactive and
Abandoned Underground Mines, Water Pollution Pre-
vention and Control Table 1.01-1, p.6 (1975) .........
-
—— ome eee 6 eee ee te 68 2 & os SS
-_ i
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1977
No. 77-44
BARNES & TUCKER COMPANY,
Appellant,
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
BRIEF OF THE NATIONAL COAL ASSOCIATION,
THE NATIONAL INDEPENDENT COAL OPERATORS’
ASSOCIATION, THE KEYSTONE BITUMINOUS COAL
ASSOCIATION, AND THE AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS,
AMICI CURIAE
INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE
The National Coal Association is a voluntary nonprofit
association representing coal mining companies which produce
almost one-half of the annual coal production in the United
States. The National Independent Coal Operators Association
is a nonprofit association of small and medium-sized coal
producers located primarily in the Appalachiay coal regions of
Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Kentucky, Ohio and Virginia. The
Keystone Bituminous Coal Association is a nonprofit
association representing coal mining companies operating in
the State of Pennsylvania. The American Mining Congress is a
nonprofit association comprised of mining companies which
produce a major proportion of the nation’s minerals, including
coal, metals, and non-metallic industrial and agricultural
minerals. The basic purpose of amici is to represent the
interests of the mining industry and to cooperate with public
authorities in dealing with problems that affect mining.
The issues which are involved here have broad implications
for the mining industry as a whole. From the standpoint of
the industry it is important that the Court provide answers to
the question of whether and to what extent a state may,
under newly-adopted environmental statutes, impose upon a
mining company the obligation to abate post-mining con-
ditions which develop and manifest themselves years after
mining operations have ceased, and which are not attributable
to fault or negligence of the mine operator.
THE QUESTIONS ARE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE
TO THE MINING INDUSTRY
For well over a hundred years mining practices in
Pennsylvania, as well as in other states, were carried on in
accordance with statutory standards and social, political and
governmental policies which permitted, and, indeed affirma-
tively sanctioned the discharge of mine waters into streams
and waterways which were not the source of public water
supplies.’
'See, e.g. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Sagamore Coal Co., 281 Pa. 233, 126
A.386 (1924).
A |
In the mid 1960’s a shift in public attitudes resulted in a
rewriting of the established body of laws and enactment of
legislative changes which have imposed a multitude of new
environmental standards upon industry generally, and the
mining industry in particular. As a consequence, environ-
mental considerations are a controlling factor in every
management decision which a mining company must make in
respect to its day-to-day operations, as well as in planning for
its future activities.
This is not to say that it should not be so. But it is
important that those who have responsibility for such
management decisions should know the rules of the game, and
that they should have some assurance that a course of action
which they follow in reliance upon existing laws and
regulations will not later bring down upon them unforeseen
liabilities of disastrous proportions because the state later
changes the rules or imposes new duties by subsequent
legislative acts.
Put in another way, there has been a shifting perspective
between what was permissible and even welcome during
periods when the state was actively encouraging development
of its mineral resources, and what is permissible and welcome
in 1977. The benefits which the state and its citizens derived
from industrial development were almost universally regarded
during past periods as justifying and outweighing incidental
damage to the air, land or water, but today the conditio.’s
which followed as a consequence of these past governmental
policies are now being classified as public nuisances which a
mining company must abate at enormous and unanticipated
cost.
The question is not whether the legislatures have gone too
far or too fast in their efforts to protect the environment, it
is rather a question of whether under newly-adopted
environmental laws a state may require a company to take
action to abate conditions arising out of past industrial
4
activities which were in all respects legal and Proper at the
time they took place, where there was full compliance with
then-existing statutory requirements and standards, and where
no fault or negligence, or foreseeability can be attributed to
the company.
IT IS IMPORTANT TO DEFINE THE PARA-
METERS WITHIN WHICH A STATE MAY, BY
POST-FACTO LEGISLATION, REQUIRE ABATE-
MENT AS A PUBLIC NUISANCE THAT WHICH
WAS REGARDED AS LAWFUL AND ACCEPT-
ABLE AT THE TIME ACTIVE MINING OC-
CURRED.
There is a _ pressing need for clarification of the
constitutional limits of a state’s power to require mining
companies, or other industrial enterprises, to return to old
and abandoned facilities and, regardless of cost, abate
conditions which were theretofore not recognized or con-
sidered as public nuisances or contrary to the general welfare
of the state and its citizens.
The situation presented in this case typifies the problem.
Under the established legal and public policy considerations
which prevailed in Pennsylvania prior to the most recent
amendments to the Clean Streams Law, Act of June 22,
1937, as amended, 35 P.S. sec. 69.1 et seq., the discharge of
acid mine drainage into streams was not recognized as a
nuisance, either public or private. The controlling public
policy of the state during previous periods was expostulated
in the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal Company y.
Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A.453 (1886) in which the Court
Said:
“The right to mine coal is not a nuisance in itself. It is
a right incident to the ownership of coal property, and
when exercised in the ordinary manner and with due
av
care the owner cannot be held for permitting the natural
flow of mine water over his own land, into the water
course, by means of which the natural drainage of the
country is effected.
* = *
The discharge of this acidulated water is practically a
condition upon which the ordinary use and enjoyment of
coal lands depends; the discharge of the water is
therefore part and parcel of the process of mining, and
as it can only be effected through natural channels, the
denial of this right must inevitably produce results of a
most serious character to this, the leading industrial
interest of the state.
The defendants were engaged in a perfectly lawful
business, in which they had made large expenditures, and
in which the interests of the entire community were
concerned; they were at liberty to carry on that business
in the ordinary way, and were not, while so doing,
accountable for consequences which they could not
control; as the mining operations went on, the water by
the mere force of gravity ran out of the drifts and found
its way over the defendant’s own land to the Meadow
Brook. It is clear that for the consequence of this flow,
which by the mere force of gravity, naturally, and
without any fault of the defendants, carried the water
into the brook and thence to the plaintiff's pond, there
could be no responsibility as damages on the part of the
defendants.” 113 Pa. at 146-47, 6 A. at 457.
Only where it could be shown that the discharge ef acid mine
drainage entered into a “pure stream” which was the source
of a community’s water supply, did the Pennsylvania courts
recognize the existence of a public nuisance. Pennsylvania
Railroad v. Sagamore Coal Company, 281 Pa. 233, 126 A.
386 (1924).
In the present case there was no showing that the drainage
from Mine No. 15 entered “clean streams’’, but rather entered
waters which were already heavily polluted by sewage and
drainage from other mines. As noted by the court in the
Second Commonwealth Court Opinion (App. 65)
“The waters of the Commonwealth here in question are
and for a long period of time have been polluted by
sewage and acid mine drainage from closed or
‘abandoned’ mines. Except for some developing recrea-
tional uses there is no evidence that these waters in their
polluted state are used for public purposes. Nor do we
have in this case facts supporting concepts of negligence,
foreseeability or unlawful conduct, being elements of
seemingly persuasive force in some of the cases.
* * *
For better than one hundred years the State has
chosen to regulate mining and there is no credible
evidence in this case that Mine No. 15 was not operated
and eventually closed consistent with statutory law,
regulation or licenses issued pursuant thereto.”
The Second Commonwealth Court Opinion also presents a
review of the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions
enforced by the State of Pennsylvania during the respective
periods the mine was in active operation. (App. 32-39).
Briefly summarized, the statutes governing mine drainage are
described as follows:
The initial Pennsylvania statute dealing with pollution of
streams, which was known as the Purity of Waters Act of
1905, dealt with the discharge of sewers into the waters of
the Commonwealth, but significantly provided in section 4
that it was not to apply to “waters pumped or flowing from
coal mines.”” App. 32.
A 1923 statute which empowered the Department of
Hea'th to promulgate regulations for the protection of the
water supply and prevent pollution, specifically provided that
it was not to apply to “...any pollution or contamination
caused by or resulting from water pumped from or flowing
from coal mines or water used in the preparation of coal.”
Ibid.
The Clean Streams Law enacted in 1937 expressly excluded
from the prohibition on industrial wastes “...acid mine
drainage from coal mines...” App. 33.
In 1945 ‘the Clean Streams Law was extensively amended
so as to include coal mines within its coverage, and to
prohibit discharge of acid mine drainage into “clean waters’,
with the proviso that “...the provisions of this article shall
not apply to acid mine drainage from coal mines until such
time as, in the opinion of the Sanitary Water Board, practical
means for the removal of the polluting properties of such
drainage shall become known.” Ibid. Coal mines were
required, however, to submit a proposed drainage plan to the
Sanitary Water Board for approval.’
It is important to note that these statutory provisions dealt
only with discharge of acid mine drainage into ‘“‘clean”’ waters.
It was not until the adoption of the 1965 amendments to the
Clean Streams Law that the different treatment accorded the
discharge of acid mine drainage into “clean” and “unclean”
waters was eliminated, and the Sanitary Water Board was
given regulatory powers over all such discharges.
On July 31, 1970, a full year after Mine No. 15 was
permanently sealed in accordance with applicable law, the
Clean Streams Law was again amended to provide, in
pertinent part, that
“A discharge from a mine shall include a discharge
which occurs after mining operations have ceased,
provided that the mining operations were conducted
subsequent to January 1, 1966, under circumstances
requiring a permit from the Sanitary Water Board under
the provisions of Section 315(b) of this act as it existed
under the amendatory act of August 23, 1965. (P.L.
stay
This amendment also transferred the powers of the Sanitary
Water Board to the Department of Environmental Resources,
which agency proceeded to retroactively revoke the permits
which had been issued to Barnes and Tucker with respect to
2Barnes and Tucker fully complied with this requirement, and was
issued permits by the Sanitary Water Board. (App. 78, 79).
discharge of water from Mine No. 15, and brought suit to
compel the company to continually treat, in perpetuity, not
only the natural percolation from Mine No. 15, but also
millions of gallons of water which flow through the mine
from other active mines located at higher elevations.
THE DECISION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA
SUPREME COURT RAISES SERIOUS DUE PRO-
CESS QUESTIONS.
In holding Barnes & Tucker liable under statutes adopted
after its mining operations had ceased, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court reasoned that the 1965 amendments to the
Clean Streams Law put the company on notice that its mine
drainage permits were subject to change and that the applicable
Statutory authority for its permits might later be amended,
and, accordingly, Barnes and Tucker was forewarned that
amendments might be passed after the mine was closed which
would subject it to liability. First Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decision, App. 95.
This reasoning of the Court is deficient in at least two
respects. First, there was essentially no due process notice as
to what the amended law would be. Even a statute which is
actually on the books must be sufficiently clear so as to
provide notice of what conduct is proscribed. See, Rabe vy.
Washington, 405 U.S. 313, 315, 31 L.Ed.2d 258 (1972). It is
clearly much more offensive to due process to hold that a
litigant is bound by a statute or amendment not even in
existence when he acted.
Second, the rationale of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is
defective because it presumes that Barnes and Tucker has a
continuing Or prospective involvement in the discharge from
the mine. Such is not the case. While it is true that the
gravity discharge is continuing (and in that sense prospective),
there is no continuing activity by Barnes and Tucker. As
9
noted by the Commonwealth Court, “([F] actors of a present
activity on the part of the owner or user of the land or of a
course of conduct directly producing the deleterious result are
absent in this case.” (App. 65)
The second basis for holding Barnes and Tucker liable was
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s unusual application of
nuisance law. First the Court overruled the long-standing case
of Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Sanderson, supra, which
held that acid drainage from a coal mine did not constitute a
nuisance, (First Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion, App.
88), and passed over without consideration the finding of the
Commonwealth Court that “The mine water discharge from
Mine No. 15 after cessation of mining does not constitute a
public nuisance under Section 3 of the Clean Streams Law as
then in effect for which Barnes and Tucker is presently
responsible.” (App. 67). The Supreme Court presumed current
harm to the waterways which the Commonwealth Court
found to be already polluted by sewage and industrial waste
(App. 65), and found sufficient public interest by reference to
an Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution enacted
subsequent to the time Barnes and Tucker ceased operations
and sealed Mine No. 15—an Amendment which the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court itself has held is not “‘self-
executing” so as to allow the government to act against
individuals. Commonwealth v. Gettysburg Battle Tower Inc.,
454 Pa. 193, 311 A.2d 588 (1973). Thus, the Pennsylvania
Court held Barnes and Tucker liable forever in the future for
actions consummated prior to adoption of legislation
establishing any liability, and upon an alleged violation of a
public interest created by a constitutional amendment
adopted two years after the date Barnes and Tucker Company
discontinued its mining activities.
The rule of Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 38 L.Ed. 385
(1894) establishing the proper constitutional standard for
evaluating the propriety of a statute enacted under the police
10
power is still applicable law. To pass constitutional muster a
regulation promulgated under authority of the police power
must use “... means [that] are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.” 152 U.S. at 137. Here the imposition of
liability is unreasonable for there has been no opportunity for
Barnes and Tucker to avoid the charged violation inasmuch as
its mining activities were completed before the condition was
declared unlawful. Moreover, the State has not advanced any
sound reasons as to why a different rule of liability should be
imposed upon the former operator of this particular mine
than upon the former operators of the multitude of other
abandoned mines which are draining into the same streams,
and contribute by far the greatest part of the pollution.
Accordingly, in order to adopt the most reasonable means of
dealing with the problem, and to avoid an unduly oppressive
result, the State has authority under P.L. 1075, 35 P.S.
§760.1 et seq., to assume direct responsibility for the water
discharged from Mine No. 15 in much the same manner as it
has assumed responsibility for drainage from other abandoned
mines.?
There is no doubt that the imposition of an open-ended
liability upon Barnes and Tucker to continue to treat the
waters flowing from the mine is a “‘taking’’ of property within
31it should also be noted that Pennsylvania has dealt with the
deferred social cost of surface mining by Section 18 of the Pennsylvania
Surface Mine Reclamation Act. P.L. 1198, 52 P.S. §1396.18 which
creates a Surface Mine Conservation and Reclamation Fund funded by
monies from currently active operations to reclaim surface mines
abandoned before the date of the Reclamation Act. The new Federal
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, P.L. 95-87,
sections 401 and 402, creates a reclamation fund to be derived from
industry-wide assessments of 35 cents a ton on surface mined coal, and
15 cents a ton on deep-mined coal, to reclaim areas of abandoned coal
mines, including the abatement of mine drainage from deep mines as
well as from surface mines.
li
the meaning of the Due Process Clause. Lawton v. Steele,
supra. Its effect is to create a negative worth factor in respect
to inactive and sealed mines, and may very likely have the
effect of discouraging the future development of mines to
produce much needed energy, puiticularly where the coal
deposits are in the vicinity of abandoned mines.*
The Pennsylvania Court’s decision, if allowed to stand,
could well become a legal precedent affecting other types of
situations in which retrospective legislative action declares
unlawful or in violation of the public interest conditions
resulting from industrial activity which was in every respect
lawful and proper under the laws in effect when the activity
occurred.
The issues involved in this case are issues of the utmost
gravity, affecting hundreds, and even thousands, of companies
engaged in coal mining and other mining activities as well.
Until these questions are answered mine managers will be
unable to make operational decisions in an atmosphere
unclouded by doubt as to their ultimate legal consequences,
and each such decision will remain, in the words of the
Melancholy Prince,
“sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought;
and enterprises of great pith and moment,
with this regard, their currents turn awry.”’
*Pennsylvania and the general Appalachian coal producing areas have
thousands of abandoned underground mines. As of 1966, the United
States Environmental Protection Agency estimated that there were
approximately 67,613 abandoned coal mines in the United States which
have a discharge flowing from them. U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, /nactive and Abandoned Underground Mines, Water Pollution
Prevention and Control Table 1.01-1, p. 6 (1975).
12
For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully urged that the
Court note probable jurisdiction to review the judgement
from which this appeal is taken.
FOR AMICI CURIAE THE NATIONAL
COAL ASSOCIATION, THE NATIONAL
INDEPENDENT COAL OPERATORS’
ASSOCIATION, AND THE AMERICAN
MINING CONGRESS
JOHN L. KILCULLEN
Kilcullen, Smith & Heenan
1800 M Street, N.W., Suite 600N
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 296-5700
FOR AMICUS CURIAE THE KEYSTONE
BITUMINOUS COAL ASSOCIATION
HAROLD R. SCHMIDT
Rose, Schmidt, Dixon, Hasley & Whyte
9th Floor, Oliver Building
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222
(412) 434-8600
- ta
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