Petition — Riniolo v. United States
Supreme Court brief1977
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Supreme Court, U. §,
° FILED
JUL 5S )977
IN THE ¥
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1976
No. 77-20
SALVATORE S. RINLOLO,
Petitioner,
Vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
PHILIP B. ABRAMOWTTZ, Esq.,
IRVING M. SIIUMAN, Ese.,
Attorneys for Petitioner,
2600 Main Place Tower,
Buffalo, New York 14202.
(716) 854-4300.
(Girnoss, Sauman, Laup & Davin,
of Counsel.
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BATAVIA TIMES, APPELLATE COURT PHINTERe ~~
&. GERALD ELEPS, BF PRERERTATiVE
20 CRATER OT.. Batavia, BH. ¥. tecne
Fee bas-oaer
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
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Reasons for Granting the Writ... 0.0.0... .06. 6600 5
I. Petitioner's conviction cannot be con-
stitutionally sustained where the only evidence in
the affidavit used to support the search warrant
which established Federal jurisdiction was based on
the uncorroborated triple hearsay statement of a
prostitute known to be prone to lying who admitted
in court under oath that the statement she gave to
secure the search warrant was in fact false ...... 5
Il. This case should be remanded to a different
judge for sentencing because Judge Brieant allowed
his sentencing to be influenced by erroneous mat-
ters totally outside the record ............00c0es 8
SE icon cas cnecdeeashesbinncesecsanedsensas 10
Appendix
“A"—Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit .........cccecssensecnees Al
“B"—Opinion of the United States District Court for
iY.
the Western District of New York ..............
TABLE OF CASES.
Mapp v. Warden, New York State Correctional In-
stitutional, 531 Fed 2nd 1167, 1171 ...............
Townsend v. Burke, 334 US 736.........ccceceeeees
United States v. Brouillette, 478 Fed 2nd 1171 (Sth Cir-
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U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
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. Karathanos, 531 Fed 2nd 26, 31 (2nd cir 1976)
. Lollins, 522 Fed 2nd 160, 162 (2nd cir 1975).
. Perry, 385th 2nd 356 at 358 (2nd circuit 1967)
Page
6,8
6
7
7
Preliminary Statement
Petitioner is a married man and the father of four children
who prior to his conviction had never been convicted of a
crime, At sentencing the trial Judge himself stated that the
sentence report prepared by the Probation Department stated
that the Petitioner had “been a good father to your own
children and the daughter of the co-defendant”.
Petitioner stood trial on four substantive counts and one
count of conspiring to transport women in interstate com-
merce for the purpose of prostitution. The trial Judge
dismissed one of the substantive counts before the case went
to the jury and said about the remaining counts". . . I will
let them go to the jury, but I think they are awfully thin...”
(309, emphasis applied).
Petitioner was acquitted of the remaining subsiantive
counts and was convicted only of the conspiracy count. The
trial Judge, after noting that the Petitioner had had no prior
criminal conviction and had been a good father, sentenced
the Petitioner to two and one-half years in prison. The Court
commented about this case which had been prosecuted by the
Organized Crime Task Force:
“and here there is this tremendous income, and where
did it go? That suggests an air of mystery and suggests
that an organization exists with respect to this business
oo.
There was, however, no proof whatsoever of organized crime
in this case and at best there was speculation on the Judge's
part to support the trial Judge’s theory about organized
crime.
Further the only proof in the case that established the
Federal element to secure the crucial search warrant was ad-
mitted to be a lie by the key government informer when she
took the witness stand and was put under oath.
—r Ee
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1976
SALVATORE S. RINIOLO,
Petitioner,
VS.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit
Petitioner, Salvatore S. Riniolo, prays that a writ of cer-
tiorari issue to review the judgment of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit entered in May, 1977.
Opinions Below
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is as yet, unreported.
It is printed in Appendix A.
The opinion of the District Court in denying the sup-
pression motion has not been reported. It is printed in Ap-
pendix B.
Jurisdiction
Following a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty in the
United States District Court for the Western District of New
2
York (Brieant J sitting by designation) of conspiring to trans-
port women in interstate commerce for the purpose of
prostitution in violation of 18 USC 371.
Petitioner appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit and his conviction was affirmed.
Petition for a writ of certiorari is filed within sixty days of
the decision of the Second Circuit, an extension of time
having been granted by Mr. Justice Marshall in an Order
dated May 25, 1977. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
Constitutional Provision Involved
AMENDMENT IV
Statute Involved
18 U.S.C. 371
Questions Presented
1. Whether Petitioner’s conviction can be constitutionally
sustained where the crucial element of Federal jurisdiction in
the Affidavit in support of the search warrant was based on
admittedly perjured testimony, and where no attempt what-
soever was made to corroborate the truthfulness of the
Statement.
2. Whether the trial court’s comments concerning
“organized crime” at the time of the sentencing, despite the
fact that there was not even a hint of organized crime,
requires that this case be remanded to a different Judge for
resentencing.
3
Statement of Facts
The Petitioner, who has no prior criminal record who has
admittedly “been a good father to your own children and to
the daughter of the co-defendant” (23) (refers to pages of the
sentencing transcript dated 10/28/76) was convicted for
conspiring to transport women in interstate commerce for the
purpose of prostitution, after having been acquitted of the
four substantive counts in the indictment. He was sentenced
to a term of imprisonment of two and one-half years.
This case originated when a search warrant was issued
giving agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation the right
to search two residences where they believed that the
Petitioner was living. In order to establish the Federal
element—the interstate aspect of the crime—the Magistrate
who issued the warrant relied on a triple hearsay statement of
a prostitute who had allegedly stated that Linda Ferguson, a
madam of a house of ill repute in Buffalo, New York, had
contacted her by telephone in Boston, Massachusetts and told
her to take a bus to Buffalo for the purpose of engaging in
prostitution. The information as received by the Magistrate
was that the prostitute who was believed to be “Joyce
Williams” (but who also used the name of Darlene Bagetta)
told a Buffalo Police officer, who told an FBI agent, who told
the Magistrate in an affidavit that “Joyce Williams” or
“Darlene Bagetta” had stated that Linda Ferguson had
telephoned her in Boston, Massachusetts and asked her to
come to Buffalo to engage in prostitution. There was no
corroboration of this triple hearsay statement of a prostitute
whose name could not even be verified.
At trial, however, under oath, Joyce Williams testified that
the arrangements for her to come to Buffalo to work as a
4
prostitute were made through her pimp in Albany, New York,
and that consequently, the statement used in her affidavit to
secure the search warrant was admitted to be perjury (trial
transcript p. 145).
Despite the fact that the police officer, Detective Sergeant
Dayka testified that prostitutes are people who do have no
qualms about telling the truth and specifically “do give dif-
ferent names and different addresses” as a style of their life,
the search warrant was upheld at a suppression hearing.
At the trial there was absolutely no evidence to show that
the defendant had ever crossed state lines to transport any
woman for the purpose of prostitution, that he had ever
crossed a state line in an attempt to induce someone to engage
in prostitution, that he had ever made a telephone call out of
state (or for that matter in state) in order to lure anyone into
prostitution. Further, no one had ever called him from out of
state in an attempt to secure his assistance to have a woman
engage in prostitution.
It is undisputed that all the arrangements of the business, of
getting the girls in, of setting up house rules, of splitting the
money with the girls, and of running the house were handled
by Linda Ferguson. Linda called Betty Grand (another
madam) at times to obtain girls (56-59). She called Flora
Majusick several times to get her to work for her (72-77). She
arranged with Raymond Pandelli for Rita Burchill (108, 109)
and with Harold Nelson for Darlene Bagetta to come to Buf-
falo (145, 146). She called Ellen Cameo in Boston to work for
her (133-135).
Although there was evidence at the trial for the jury to con-
clude that the Petitioner was aware of Linda Ferguson’s
business, that is a far cry from making the Petitioner a pimp
of an interstate organized crime prostitution ring. In fact,
0
ea
5
Linda Ferguson testified that she had no pimp and she felt
that all pimps were leeches (223) and Rita Burchill testitied
that Linda Ferguson had told her that she was crazy to work
for a pimp, “that I would do better by myseif” (130).
Far from being the pimp who headed an interstate organized
crime prostitution ring, Salvatore Riniolo is in fact a middle
class gentleman of Italian descent who lives together with his
wife of 17 years and their children in a rented $185 a month
apartment, who was unable to pay for his younger childrens
parochial tuition because of financial hardship and who
owned a 5 year old car on which there was a loan outstanding
(291-292).
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I.
Petitioner’s conviction cannot be constitutionally sus-
tained where the only evidence in the affidavit used to
support the search warrant which established Federal
jurisdiction was based on the uncorroborated triple hear-
say statement of a prostitute known to be prone to lying
who admitted in court under oath that the statement she
gave to secure the search warrant was in fact false.
It is clear that a Federal officer in seeking a search warrant
must “present evidence ample to establish probable cause that
a Federal crime has been committed” (emphasis added) (U.S.
v. Brouillette, 478 Fed. 2nd 1171 (Sth circuit 1973).
In Brouillette supra, the Fifth Circuit said
“to establish the probability of a crime under 18 USC
Section 1952 it seems necessary to present facts concern-
ing the state law being violated and the manner in which
interstate commerce is involved in the violation”’
Brouillette, supra at 1176 (emphasis added).
6
With respect to the case at bar, the only information sub-
mitted to the Magistrate in support of the government’s ap-
plication for warrant authorizing the search at two residences
where it was believed that the Petitioner resided was contain-
ed in an Affidavit authored by Special Agent Ronald Hawley
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Agent Hawley’s affidavit which he used to support the
Federal jurisdictional element of interstate commerce was
based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of an admitted
prostitute who told a Buffalo Police officer who told the FBI
agent who told the Magistrate that Linda Ferguson had called
her long distance in Boston, Massachusetts to ask her to come
to work in Buffalo.
The District Court in denying Petitioner’s motion to sup-
press found that the Brouillette requirement of showing the
existence of a Federal crime had been fulfilled by Joyce
Williams’ statement that Linda had told her to take a bus to
Buffalo to engage in prostitution.
What the question boils down to is whether the issuing
Magistrate had a “substantial basis for crediting this hearsay”
United States v. Harris, 403 US 573, 581, United States v.
Karathanos, 531 Fed 2nd 26, 31 (2D cir 1976).
Although in one sense the prostitute who referred to herself
both as Joyce Williams and Darlene Bagetta was an informant
admitting her own commission of a crime, this does not
elevate her statement to a “substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay” United States v. Harris, 403 US 573, 581.
This is particularly so because the police officer who had
received the original information indicated that prostitutes
because of the nature of their business often times tend to
lead a life of deceit and often “do give different names and
different addresses” than really exist (hearing page 52).
>
Most significantly in this regard, at trial Joyce Williams
a/k/a Darlene Bagetta testified that the arrangements for her
to come to Buffalo to work as a prostitute were made through
her pimp in Albany, New York, Harold Nelson (trial tran-
script page 145). Furthermore, she stated that she herself was
in Albany when she first learned that she was going to work
for Linda Ferguson (trial transcript page 146). Consequently
she admitted under oath that she had lied in giving the state-
ment used to secure the search warrant.
While the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has properly
stated the law that—
“the accuracy of the information provided by the in-
formant is not relevant. Probable cause is established if
the facts alleged by the informant, if true, establish
illegality and the affiant has reasonable grounds for
believing in the truth of the allegations.”” U.S. v. Perry,
385th 2nd 356 at 358. (2nd Circuit 1967, emphasis add-
ed).
—it is submitted that particularly in dealing with a person
whose whole life is deceit, and who frequently gives “dif-
ferent names and different addresses” (hearing page 52),
more than the mere fact that she admitted a crime should be
required, to support a federal search warrant.
It would for example have been very simpie to have re-
quired the government to obtain relevant telephone company
records. Such records are a common, corroborative device.
See U.S. v. Lollins, 522 Fed 2nd 160, 162 (2D cir 1975) and
Mapp v. Warden, New York State Correctional Institutional, 531
Fed 2nd 1167, 1171.
It is submitted that with the Federal courts already over-
crowded and with ir*ormant testimony subject to great
scrutiny, this court sto © —xquire strict observance of the
principal that to establish the federal element necessary to
secure a warrant, strict observance must be given to the re-
quirement that there must be a “substantial basis” for
crediting the hearsay. U.S. v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 581.
This court should not let that standard of proof sink to the
level of accepting at face value whatever a prostitute says to a
police officer—again particularly in this case where the
prostitute was shown to have actually lied and where the
policeman testified at the suppression hearing that he knows
that prostitutes do “give different names and different ad-
dresses” (hearing page 52).
This case should be remanded to a different judge for
sentencing because Judge Brieant allowed his sentencing
to be influenced by erroneous matters totally outside the
record.
This Court has said that a sentence based upon erroneous
information requires that the sentence be set aside. Townsend
v. Burke, 334 US 736.
Petitioner is a man who has been married and who has lived
with his wife for 17 years, who has 4 children and who the
Court stated had “been a good father to your own children”.
(page 23 of sentencing). Many people of substance and stand-
ing in the community, according to the record, sent letters of
recommendation to the Court on Appellant's behalf.
Aside from the fact this case was prosecuted by the
Organized Crime Strike Force and aside from the fact that the
defendant is of Italian ancestry there is not one iota of proof
in the case to in any way indicate that “organized crime” was
involved in this case. Yet the judge at sentencing said
— tts thy
9
“and here there is this tremendous income, and where
did it go? That suggests an air of mystery and suggests
that an organization exists with respect to this business
_o. Oe
The Petitioner stands before this Court as a man without a
prior conviction, an admittedly good father and husband,
(albeit somewhat errant), a man who worked honestly most of
his life to support himself and those who depended upon him
and a man whose ties in the community were such that many
people wrote the court on his behalf.
Linda Ferguson, who is the admitted madam of the house
who had run the business by her own admission for 8 or 9
years received a sentence of probation. Linda Ferguson was
the one who admitted receiving the proceeds of the business,
and whom the girls had to split their earnings with. There was
not one iota of testimony to prove that Petitioner received
anything from the business. Not one witness ever saw, or
heard of him receiving any of the proceeds.
It is submitted that where the “organized crime” stigma has
been identified as one of the major reasons for a particular
sentence, it is incumbent upon a court to justify that sentence
by relating it to specific facts found either in the trial or the
presentence report. In this case it was found in neither place.
In this case the suspicion can only be figments of a judge's
imagination.
10 Al
Conclusion APPENDIX “A”
’ For all these reasons the Court should grant this Petition Opinion of the United States Court of
it of jorari.
or a writ of Certiorari Appeals for the Second Circuit
Respectfully submitted, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PHILIP B. ABRAMOWITZ, Esq. and For the Second Circuit
IRVING M. SHUMAN, Esq.,
Attorneys for Petitioner,
2600 Main Place Tower,
Buffalo, New York 14202,
(716) 854-4300.
Gross, Shuman, Laub & David,
of Counsel.
—,
—
a a,
No. 1112—September Term, 1976
Docket No. 76-1583
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Vv.
SALVATORE S&S. RINIOLO,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before:
Waterman and Gurfein) Circuit Judges,
and Blumenfeld, District Judge.*
Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction in the United
. States District Court for the Western District of New York af-
ter a jury trial, Brieant, U. S. District Judge, $.D.N.Y., sitting
by designation, convicting appellant of having conspired with
a co-defendant to violate federal prostitution laws. He
presents three claims for appellate consideration.
* Of the District of Connecticut, sitting by designation.
A2
Appendix ‘‘A’'—Opinion of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Philip B. Abramowitz, Buffalo, New York (Gross,
Shuman, Laub & David, of counsel) for Defendant-
Appellant.
Henry Walker, Attorney, Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C. (Richard J. Arcara, U.S. Attorney,
W.D.N.Y., Dennis P. O’Keefe and William G. Otis, At-
torneys, Department of Justice, of counsel), for Plaintiff-
Appellee.
Per Curiam:
After a trial by jury in the Western District of New York
appellant was convicted of having ccenspired with one Linda
Ferguson to violate the federal laws relative to prostitution,
18 U.S.C, §$§ 2421, 2422, 2423, and 1952. The
18 U.S.C. § 371 conspiracy count was one of five counts con-
tained in the indictment, the other four alleging the com-
mission of specific substantive offenses by the two defen-
dants. Linda Ferguson pled guilty before trial. Appellant
stood trial. At the conclusion of the government's case one of
these counts charging substantive offenses was dismissed by
the court, and the jury acquitted appellant on the other sub-
stantive counts. Upon appeal from his conviction on the con-
spiracy count appellant claims that the evidence adduced at
the trial was insufficient to support his conviction, that an af-
fidavit executed by a government officer in support of two
search warrants did not establish probable cause to believe
that federal crimes were being committed at the addresses set
forth in the warrants, and that the sentence appellant re-
ceived of 2'/2 years of imprisonment was excessive.
A3
Appendix ‘‘A’’—Opinion of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
We affirm the conviction and do not disturb the challenged
sentence.
We have carefully examined the transcript of the trial; and,
as we must, we consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the governmen’ Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60, 80 (1942), and fine ‘vat it was sufficient to support
appellant’s conviction on the conspiracy charge.
As to the claim that the affidavit in support of the motion
for the issuance of the two search warrants was inadequate to
support their issuance, we concur with Chief Judge Curtin
who, after holding a suppression hearing, wrote a lengthy
reasoned opinion that there was indeed probable cause to
issue the warrants.
Lastly, we point out that the sentence claimed to be ex-
cessive was well within the permissible statutory maximum of
five years’ imprisonment and a $10,000 fine, and we find no
impermissible factors which would justify our disturbing the
sentence imposed by the trial judge.
a ¢
APPENDIX “B”
Opinion of the United States District Court for
the Western District of New York
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Western District of New York
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SALVATORE A. (“Sam’’) RINIOLO,
Defendant.
CR-74-53
The defendant is charged in a five-count indictment with
various violations of 18 U.S.C. §$371, 1952, and 2421 et seq.
The defendant has moved to suppress the fruits of searches at
829 Elmwood Avenue (lower) and Apartment 401, 200
Niagara Street in the City of Buffalo, conducted pursuant to
two search warrants issued on the same day as the searches,
January 21, 1974, by the United States Magistrate, Edmund
Maxwell. The suppression hearing was held before this court
on November 3, 1975, and the following constitutes the
court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.
by. of the search warrants issued in this case were based
or .‘«ntical affidavits executed by Special Agent Ronald Lee
Hawiey of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The af-
B2
Appendix ‘‘B’’—Opinion of the United States District Court
for the Western District of New York.
fidavit relies on information obtained from three different
informers (hereafter referred to as Sources I, II and III).
Agent Hawley was personally familiar with Source I, but not
Sources II and III, whose information was relayed to him by
Sergeant Dayka of the Buffalo Police Department and Agent
Taylor of the FBI.
The defendant argues that the search warrants were invalid
because there was not a sufficient showing made for the
Magistrate to find probable cause. To answer this argument,
the court must analyze the affidavit to determine whether
there was sufficient information presented as to the reliability
of the three sources, and as to the underlying circumstances
set forth by each source. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964);
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
SOURCE I
The affidavit for the search warrants in question provided
the following information relative to Source I:
Source I is known to Special Agent John F. McAuliffe,
who is working with Your Affiant in this matter, to be a
gainfully employed citizen who has no criminal involve-
ment other than the apparent violation of Section 230.05
(N. Y. P. L.—Patronizing a Prostitute) as described
herein. Source I has been a customer of the prostitution
operation carried on by Linda Ferguson from her
residence, 829 Elmwood Avenue (Lower), Buffalo, for
approximately two years. Your Affiant believes Source I
to be legally reliable because of his declarations against
a te Ne ee ORD ee eet Hee ~
D ~ -nenst eons ee as Ne te te
B3
Appendix “B’—Opinion of the United States District Court
for the Western District of New York.
penal interest as described herein, his otherwise respec-
table position in the community and the fact that Source I
has provided information in the past concerning other
prostitution operations which have been consistently cor-
roborated by independent investigation conducted by
Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
During the second week of October, 1973, Source I, in
the presence of Your Affiant and Special Agent John F.
McAuliffe, telephoned Linda Ferguson at 829 Elmwood
Avenue, Buffalo. Source I, who used a code name, was
instructed by Ferguson to wait thirty minutes then go to
200 Niagara Street, Apartment 401, Buffalo, New York.
At the specified time on that date, Source I went to the
above-mentioned address and was admitted by the
prostitute in residence. Source I had sexual intercourse
with the prostitute and paid her forty dollars.
Subsequently, within the past ten days, Source I made
similar arrangements with Ferguson and was directed
again to the same apartment at 200 Niagara Street. Then
Source I had sexual intercourse with a prostitute who
identified herself as “Darlene,” who said she was from
Albany and had previously worked as a prostitute in
Boston. Your Affiant believes that this is ‘Joyce
Williams” described below because she had sutures down
the center of her forehead as did Williams when arrested
on January 18, 1974. Source I paid “Darlene” more than
$20 dollars. (RLH EFM}.
It is clear from paragraph one above, that there was a suf-
ficient statement made as to the reliability of Source I. The
B4
Appendix ‘‘B’’—Opinion of the United States District Court
for the Western District of New York.
fact that Source I provided information in the past which was
consistently corroborated by independent investigation is
controlling. United States v. Rollins, 522 F.2d 160, 164 (2d Cir.
1975), United States v. Sultan, 463 F.2d 1066 (2d Cir. 1972).
It is also clear from paragraphs two, three and four above,
that there were sufficient underlying facts set forth to indicate
how Source I came by his information. Both Agents Hawley
and McAuliffe were working with Source I when he contacted
and patronized a prostitute through Linda Ferguson in Oc-
tober, 1973, and this information was updated by additional
first-hand information provided by Source I only 10 days
before the search. Such information is clearly a basis for a
finding of probable cause.
SOURCE II
Source II is identified in the affidavit as Joyce Williams,
also known as “Darlene,” with Agent Hawley believed was
the same prostitute Source I patronized 10 days before the
search. The affidavit states:
On or about January 18, 1974, at approximately 11:37
PM, Officer Anthony Gawron of the Buffalo Police De-
partment (who has since provided Your Affiant with the
information contained herein) arrested a female who
identified herself as “Joyce Williams” (W/F/8- 15-54) and
gave a home address of 75 St. Alphunsus, Boston,
Massachusetts. At the time of arrest, this female had
sutures running down the center of her forehead. The
arrest was predicated upon an offer by the said Joyce
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a
BS
Appendix *‘B’’—Opinion of the United States District Court
for the Western District of New York.
Williams to engage in sexual intercourse and fellatio with
Officer Gawron (who was then and there operating in
civilian clothing) for the sum of $25.00. She was charged
with Prostitution in violation of Section 230.00 of the
Penal Law of the State of New York.
Subsequently, at the station house, Detective Sergeant
Raymond Dayka (who is working with Your Affiant on
this matter) took the following statement from Joyce
Williams, who was completely advised of her Miranda
Rights:
Williams identified a photograph of the said Linda
Ferguson and stated that she had been contacted by
Ferguson in Boston, Massachusetts by telephone and was
directed by Ferguson to come to Buffalo, New York by
bus for purposes of engaging in prostitution, which
Williams did, on or about January 16, 1974. Williams
further stated that Ferguson arranged for her (Williams)
to stay in Apartment 401 at 200 Niagara Street and to
engage in prostitution by appointment at that location.
Williams agreed to split the profits on a 50/50 basis with
Ferguson. Williams stated that she had worked as a
prostitute in both Albany and Boston. Williams further
identified a police department photograph of Salvatore
Riniolo as having been present with Linda Ferguson
during conversation when some of the arrangements were
finalized. After Williams had given the statement, which
incriminated Riniolo and Ferguson, Williams placed a
call by dialing Ferguson’s telephone number of 883-9186
(which Your Affiant known/from New York Telephone
B6
Appendix ‘‘B’’—Opinion of the United States District Court
for the Western District of New York.
Co. Records [RLH EFM] to be listed to Ferguson at 829
Elmwood Avenue (Lower), Buffalo, New York) and
talked to the party on the other end. After that Williams
returned and refused to give any further statement. She
advised the officers that a lawyer was being obtained for
her.
The person who provided information in this statement is a
confessed participant in the crime charged. In such a
situation, the usual rules of reliability do not apply. As stated
by the Second Circuit in United States v. Miley, 513 F.2d 1191,
1204 (2d Cir. 1975):
To require a showing of previous reliability by such a
person would, as in the case of a victim or a witness,
make his information totally unavailable, despite the
peculiar likelihood of its accuracy. Such information is
toto coelo removed from a “meager report” that “could
easily have been obtained from an offhand remark heard
at a neighborhood bar”, as to which prior history of
providing accurate information is required, Spinelli v.
~ United States, . . . (Citations omitted).
Source II admitted to engaging in acts of prostitution in both
Albany and Boston. In the affiant’s report of the statement
made to Sergeant Dayka, Source II identified defendants
Ferguson and Riniolo by photograph, stated that she arrived
in Buffalo on or about January 16, 1974, and that it was ar-
ranged for her to stay at 200 Niagara Street, Apartment 401 and
to engage in prostitution there. The officer further indicated
that Source II called Linda Ferguson’s phone number after
her arrest. Her date of arrival in Buffalo and the location of
heey: 6 wSen ee eetos ees
Senet a en
B7
Appendix “‘B’—Opinion of the United States District Court
for the Western District of New York.
the premises at which she was to stay are corroborated by the
information provided by Source I. The phone number she
called was known by the affiant’s corroboration to belong to
Linda Ferguson. The declaration against interest and the
degree of corroboration between the information provided by
Sources I and II, as well as the independent corroboration
provided by the affiant, are sufficient to establish a basis for
crediting the report of Source II. United States v. Harris, 403
U.S. 573 (1971), United States v. Miley, supra.' Finally, the in-
formation regarding Ferguson’s phone cail to Source II, while
Source II was still in Massachusetts, provides the federal ele-
ment of the offenses under investigation. United States v.
Brouillette, 478 F.2d 1177 (Sth Cir. 1973).
' At the suppression hearing, the Government informed the defense that
statements made by Source II subsequent to the execution of the search
warrants were in conflict with the earlier statement she gave to Detective
Sergeant Dayka. These subsequent statements were not introduced at the
hearing nor was Source II called to testify. In United States v. Sultan, 463
F.2d 1066, 1070 (2d Cir. 1972), the court dealt with this issue and resolved
it by stating: “. . . probable cause is not to be defeated because an in-
formart is later proved to have lied, as long as the affiant accurately
represented what was told to him.”
The defense called Detective Sergeant Dayka as a witness at the sup-
pression hearing and introduced his written report of his conversation with
Source II. Sergeant Dayka stated that his written report was the basis for
the information he conveyed to affiant Hawley. Affiant Hawley testified
that everything he had put in the affidavit regarding Source II came from
his conversation with Detective Sergeant Dayka and/or Dayka’s written
report of the arrest. While the written police report of the conversation
with Source II is not reproduced in the affidavit, the two documents are not
inconsistent. There was no showing at the hearing that the affiant made a
reckless or intentional misstatement, or that either the affiant or Dayka
knew that any of the information was false. The conflicts in Source II's
statements, therefore, have no bearing on the finding of probable cause.
Appendix “B''—Opinion of the United States District Court
for the Western District of New York.
The information provided by Source III was related to the
affiant by a Special Agent of the FBI. The affidavit states:
During late 1972, Source III was brought to Buffalo from
another state for purposes of engaging in prostitution.
Source III was taken to Linda Ferguson and Salvatore
Riniolo (whose photographs she identified sub-
sequently), both of whom were then living together at 829
Elmwood Ave., Buffalo. Source ITI remained in Buffalo
approximately one week working as a prostitute for
Ferguson and Riniolo. From conversations and first-
hand observations during this period, Source III was able
to report that Riniolo acts as Linda Ferguson's pimp and
is the manager of the Ferguson operation, actually
having contact with the prostitute in residence,
This information, standing alone, could not provide a basis
for a finding of probable cause because it refers to a period of
time more than a year prior to the date of the affidavit.
Schoeneman vy. United States, 317 F.2d 173 (D.C.Cir. 1963).
However, this information was corroborated and updated by
Sources I and II. Among other things, Source I said that he
had been a customer of the Ferguson operation for two years.
The address given as the residence of Riniolo and Ferguson
by Source III is corroborated by the independent in-
vestigation of the FBI by surveillance as late as November,
1973. Moreover, Source III's information provides general
background about the criminal activity of the defendants, and
this may be considered by the Magistrate as one important
element of probable cause. United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d
1087, 1101, n.19 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832
(citing United States v. Harris, supra, 403 U.S. at 583).
RN A
he A A A
BY
Appendix ‘‘B’’—Opinion of the United States District Court
for the Western District of New York.
Source III's reliability is based on the fact that her in-
formation was corroborated, as set forth above, that her
statements were a declaration against interest, and that she
testified to the same facts before a federal grand jury. In the
affidavit, she is said to have admitted working as a prostitute
for one week late in 1972. This declaration against interest
carries its own indicia of credibility sufficient for a finding of
probable cause. Harris, supra, at 853. The fact that Source III
testified under oath before a federal grand jury may not of it-
self be a basis for credibility but, when her information is
corroborated as it has been here, it may at least be considered
as an indicia of credibility. See James v. United States, 416
F.2d 467, 473 (Sth Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 907 (1970).
All of the above leads to the conclusion that the Magistrate
was correct in finding Source III was reliable.
The defendant argues that even if there was probable cause,
the warrants are defective because there was no connection
shown between the items sought and the premises to be search-
ed. This argument relies on the fact that none of the sources
of information made reference to any personal observation of
the items on the premises to be searched. This argument is
without merit. Depending on the nature of the crime and the
items being sought, the connection may be made on grounds
other than personal observation. United States v. Lucarz, 430
F.2d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1970). it was entirely reasonable,
under the circumstances of this case, for the Magistrate to
conclude that the items sought were being utilized to carry
out the illegal activity. United States v. Scherfman, 442 F.2d
1352, 1355 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 919. Ad-
ditionally, the description of the items was particular enough
because
B10
Appendix “B’’—Opinion of the United States District Court
for the Western District of New York.
{[wjhen circumstances make an exact description of in-
strumentalities [of a crime], a virtual impossibility, the
searching officer can only be expected to describe the
generic class of items he is seeking.
James, supra, at 473, United States v. Auterbridge, 375
F.Supp. 418, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Similarly, the defendant's argument that the warrants
failed to adequately describe the premises must be rejected.
The descriptions of the premises as Apartment 401, 200
Niagara Street, Buffalo, New York, and 829 Elmwood
Avenue (Lower), Buffalo, New York, are sufficiently par-
ticular to meet the standard set forth in United States v. Steele,
No. |, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1935), that it is sufficient if the
description is such that officers with a search warrant can
with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place in-
tended. Furthermore, a de cription similar to the ones in this
case was upheld in United States v. Gomes, 42 F.R.D. 347
(S.D.N.¥. 1967).
Therefore, for all of the aforesaid reasons, the court finds
that probable cause for the search existed, and that the items
were seized properly. The defendant's motion to suppress is
denied.
So ordered.
JOHN T. CURTIN,
John T. Curtin,
United States District Judge.
Dated: August 18, 1976.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.