Appendix — Greene v. Massey
Supreme Court brief1978
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
Supreme
— FIL
aug 1
APPENDIX
—
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM 1977
No. 76-6617
RICHARD AUSTIN GREENE,
Petitioner,
—=
RAYMOND D. MASSEY
Superintendent, Union Correctional Institution,
Respondent,
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED APRIL 23, 1977
CERTIORARI GRANTED JUNE 20, 1977
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM 1977
No. 76-6617
RICHARD AUSTIN GREENE,
Petitioner,
—
RAYMOND D. MASSEY
Superintendent, Union Correctional Institution,
Respondent,
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
INDEX
, 1
Order of the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida, dated February 24, 1977, ordering
that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be dismissed.. 3
. Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, dated January 26, 1977, affirming the
erer le etaleeetenssonecs 6
. Order of the Supreme Court of the United States grant-
ing motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and
granting petition for writ of certiorari ............0................ 16
RELEVANT DOCKET ENTRIES
DOCKET ENTRIES: United States District Court for the
PP
13.
14.
Middle District of Florida
May 15, 1975: Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
June 11, 1975: Order to Show Cause issued.
July 7, 1975: Response to Order to Show Cause.
July 21, 1975: Petitioner's Response to Respondent's
Response to Order to Show Cause, (filed pro se).
October 7, 1975: Petitioner's Memorandum in Support
of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, (filed pro se).
November 3, 1975: Notice of Appearance of Attorney
Chandler for Petitioner.
November 4, 1975: Order directing clerk to furnish to
Attorney for Petitioner copy of Respondent’s Response,
Directing Petitioner to file his reply thereto showing
cause why this cause should not be dismissed within
20 days.
November 24, 1975: Traverse in compliance with
Court’s Order of November 3, 1975.
November 26, 1975: Brief of Petitioner in Support of
his Traverse.
December 30, 1975: Order setting hearing and allowing
counsel to submit further memoranda.
. January 16, 1976: Respondent’s Memorandum of Law.
February 9, 1976: Petitioner’s Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus.
February 19, 1976: Proceedings and Arguments on
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
February 19, 1976: Court denies Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus.
(1)
2 |
15. February 24, 1976: Order, dismissing with prejudice
the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
16. March 4, 1976: Notice of Appeal filed by Petitioner.
17. March 5, 1976: Certificate of Probable Cause issued by |
the Court.
DOCKET ENTRIES: United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit
March 18, 1976: Appeal Docketed. '
May 4, 1976: Brief for Appellant filed.
May 12, 1976: Brief for Appellee filed.
May 21, 1976: Reply Brief for Appellant filed.
August 23, 1976: Supplemental Brief for Appellee filed.
September 3, 1976: Supplemental Reply Brief for Ap-
pellant filed.
7. October 5, 1976: Oral Argument.
8. January 26, 1977: Opinion Rendered.
9. February 17, 1977: Mandate Issued to Clerk.
PF PF PP &
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
No. 75-140-ORL-CIV-Y
RICHARD AUSTIN GREENE, PETITIONER-APPELLANT
versus
RAYMOND D. Massey, Superintendent,
Union Correctional Institution, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE
ORDER
This cause came before the Court on a petition for
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Petitioner was initially convicted of first degree murder
on November 25, 1965, along with co-defendant Jose
Manuel Sosa. The death sentence was imposed upon
both defendants. On November 5, 1968, the Florida
Supreme Court reversed that conviction in a per curiam
decision which recited:
“After a careful review of the voluminous evidence
here we are of the view that the evidence was
definitely lacking in establishing beyond a reason-
able doubt that the defendants committed murder in
the first degree, and that the interests of justice re-
quire a new trial. The judgments are accordingly
reversed and remanded for a new trial. Sosa v.
State 215 So. 2d 736, 737.”
Petitioner moved successfully to transfer the retrial
to the Circuit Court of Orange County, Florida. He
then sought a writ of prohibition in the Second District
Court of Appeal on the ground that a retrial for first
degree murder would constitute double jeopardy. The
Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court
and refused to issue the writ. Sosa v. Maxwell, 234 So.
2d 690 (2d DCA Fla. 1970).
4
Upon retrial, defendant was again convicted of first
degree murder, but this time with a recommendation for
mercy and a life sentence. An appeal to the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal in which petitioner again raised
the ground of double jeopardy, was taken and the appel-
late court affirmed on the strength of the previous opin-
ion of he Second District Court of Appeal in refusing
to issue a writ of prohibition. Greene vs. State, 302 So.
2d 202 (4th DCA, Fla. 1974). A petition for certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court reiterating the dou-
ble jeopardy claim was subsequently denied by that Court.
This Court has previously found that petitioner has
exhausted his state remedies) (Order of December 30,
1975).
The contention of petitioner has never specifically been
ruled upon by the United States Supreme Court. See
Bryan v. U.S., 388 U.S. 552 (1950); Sapir v. U.S., 348
U.S. 373 (1955) (concurring opinion of Douglas, J.);
Forman v. U.S., 361 U.S. 427 (1960). If this were a
question of first impression in the Fifth Circuit, this
Court might be inclined to grant the petition. Regard-
less of whether an appellate court or a trial jury makes
the determination that the evidence is insufficient to sus-
tain a finding of guilt as to a particular charge, and
regardless of whether a petitioner moves for a new trial
on other grounds in addition to asserting the ground of
insufficiency of evidence, it would seem that the double
jeopardy clause would preclude giving the prosecution a
second chance. See Green vs. U.S., 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
However, as petitioner has conceded, this is not the law
in the Fifth Cireuit. See, U.S. vs. Bass, 490 F.2d 846
(5th Cir. 1974). Furthermore, the situation of peti-
tioner is not as compelling as that in which the hung“
jury fails to convict but does not render a verdict of
acquittal. In the “hung” jury situation, a line of cases
stemming from the 1824 decision in United States vs.
Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, has held retrial proper.
Here petitioner has in fact been found guilty by a jury.
Since this Court is bound by the present law of the
Fifth Cireuit and the United States Supreme Court, the
petition for writ of habeas corpus must be denied. Ac-
cordingly, it is
5
ORDERED that the petition for writ of habeas corpus
be and is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Orlando,
Florida this 24th day of February, 1976.
/8/ George C. Young
Chief Judge
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 76-1719
RICHARD AUSTIN GREENE, PETITIONER-APPELLANT
versus
RAYMOND D. MAssey, Superintendent,
Union Correctional Institution, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE
Jan, 26, 1977
Appeal From The United States District Court
For The Middle District Of Florida
Before BROWN, Chief Judge, and TUTTLE and
TJOFLAT, Cireuit Judges.
JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge:
Richard Austin Greene (Petitioner) appeals from de-
nial of a writ of habeas corpus. In the initial 1965
Florida state jury trial, Petitioner along with Joseph
Manuel Sosa was found guilty of first degree murder.
During that proceeding, counsel for Petitioner made,
among other motions, a motion for acquittal and a mo-
tion for new trial. Both were denied and the death sen-
tence was imposed on both Petitioner and Sosa. Subse-
quently, on November 5, 1968, the Florida Supreme Court
reversed that conviction. In its per curiam decision, the
Florida Supreme Court concluded that
[Alfter a careful review of the voluminous evidence
here we are of the view that the evidence was defi-
nitely lacking in establishing beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendants committed murder in the
first degree, and that the interests of justice require
a new trial. The judgments are accordingly reversed
and remanded for a new trial. Sosa v. State, Fla.,
1968, 215 So.2d 736, 737.
7
Because of this Circuit’s consistent policy from our deci-
sion in United States v. Musquiz, 5 Cir., 1971, 445 F.2d
963, forward, the denial of the writ of habeas corpus
based on a double jeopardy claim is affirmed.
History Repeated—Or Almost So
On remand from the Florida Supreme Court’s reversal,
Petitioner obtained the transfer of his retrial to the Cir-
cuit Court of Orange County, Florida, However, Peti-
tioner’s request for a writ of prohibition based on the
contention that his retrial for fi t degree murder would
constitute double jeo was denied by the state trial
court. The denial of this writ based on the double
jeopardy claim was affirmed by the Second District Court
of Appeal.'
Upon retrial, Petitioner was again convicted of first
degree murder, but this time with a recommendation for
mercy. Consequently, Prisoner is now serving a life
sentence. In an appeal to the Fourth District Court of
Appeal in which Petitioner again urged the double jeop-
ardy issue, his second conviction was affirmed.’ Ulti-
mately, a petition for a writ of certiorari which reiter-
ated the double jeopardy claim was denied by the Su-
preme Court of the United States.’
Perhaps weary yet undaunted and asserting that the
Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial once a conviction
is reversed because of insufficient evidence, Petitioner
sought a writ of habeas corpus from the federal court.
In its February 1976 order, the District Court intimated
that absent prior precedent from this Court it might
1 Sosa v. Maxwell, 2 DCA Fla., 1970, 234 So.2d 690.
* The Fourth District Court of Appeal determined that the ruling
on the Second District Court of Appeal on the double jeopardy claim
precluded their making a redetermination because of res judicata.
Sosa and Greene v. State, 4 DCA Fla., 1974, 302 So.2d 202.
Greene v. Florida, 1976, 421 U.S. 932, 96 S.Ct. 1660, 44 L.Ed.2d
89.
„The Fifth Amendment states nor shall any person be sub-
=f for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
li ceee
have granted Petitioner’s request. However, the District
Court felt constrained by our decisions in a line of cases
beginning with United States v. Musquiz, 5 Cir., 1971,
445 F.2d 963.“
Twice No, Two Maybe
[1,2] Only one outcome determinative issue is before
this Court.“ After a full-fledged jury trial in a state
court where both a motion for acquittal and for a new
he District Court's order stated in part
I this were a question of first impression in the Fifth
Circuit, this Court might be inclined to grant the petition. Re-
gardiess of whether an appellate court or a trial jury makes
the determination that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a
finding of guilt as to a particular charge, and regardless of
whether a petitioner moves for a new trial on other grounds
in addition to asserting the ground of insufficiency of evidence,
it would seem that the double jeopardy clause would preclude
giving the prosecution a second chance. See Green v. U.S., 366
U.S. 184, 78 8. Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 76 (1957). However, as peti-
tioner has conceded, this is not the law in the Fifth Circuit.
See U.S. v. Bass, 490 F.2d 846 (6th Cir. 1974). R. 106-06.
“Florida also contended in ita supplemental brief and during
oral argument that the Stone v. Powell principle governing habeas
collateral relief enunciated in the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule context extends to this case where Petitioner has had repeated
consideration of his double jeopardy claim by state courts, In
responding to how the dissenters in Stone v. Powell characterized
the Court’s opinion “. . as laying the groundwork for a ‘drastic
withdrawal of federal habeas jurisdiction, if not for ali grounds
„then at least [for many] .. „ the Supreme Court denoted
the limited impact of ita opinion.
“With all respect, the hyperbole of the dissenting opinion is
misdirected, Our decision today is not concerned with the scope
of the habeas corpus statute as authority for litigating consti-
tutional claims generally. We do reaffirm that the exclusionary
rule is a judicially created remedy rather than a personal
constitutional right... and we emphasize the minimal utility
of the rule when sought to be applied to Fourth Amendment
claims in a habeas corpus proceeding. ... In sum, we hold
only that a federal court need not apply the exclusionary rule
on habeas review of a Fourth Amendment claim absent a
showing that the state prisoner was denied an opportunity
for a full and fair litigation of that claim at trial and on direct
review. Our decision does not mean that the federal court
trial are timely made, does the subsequent reversal of a
conviction by a state appellate court because of insuffi-
cient evidence bar retrial of a person for the same offense
a second time?’ In other words, does the double jeopardy
lacks jurisdiction over such a claim, but only that the appli-
cation of the rule is limited to cases in which there has been
both such a showing and a Fourth Amendment violation.”
(Emphasis added). Stone v. Powell, 1976, —— U.S. , 96
S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.E.2d 1067, 1088 n.37.
In light of the limited scope of Stone v. Powell, it is not applicable
to this appeal where the only question is a legal one—does double
jeopardy apply to his case? Furthermore, it is a specifically pro-
claimed “personal constitutional right”. See note 4 above.
* Petitioner’s argument is basically that had the trial court prop-
erly ruled on his motion for acquittal directing the jury to return
a verdict of acquittal because of insufficient evidence, the State
would not have been able to put Petition into jeopardy for a
second time for the same offense. Consequently, when an appellate
court reverses a conviction because of the trial court’s error in not
directing a verdict of acquittal for insufficient evidence, the same
result, it is urged, necessarily follows.
No question exists about the inability of State or any prosecuting
body to appeal a trial level verdict of not guilty or an acquittal. See
United States v. Wilson, 1975, 420 U.S. 332, 341 n. 9, 95 S.Ct. 1013,
43 L.Ed.2d 232; North Carolina v. Pearce, 1969, 395 U.S. 711, 717,
89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656; Green v. United States, 1957, 335
U.S. 184, 187-88, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199. However, it is also
clear that a person may in certain instances be retried. In the words
of Mr. Justice Story in United States v. Perez, 1824, 9 Wheat, 579,
580, 6 L.Ed. 165, in an instance where a prosecution terminated in
a mistrial.
“We are of the opinion, that the facts constitute no legal
bar to a future trial. The prisoner has not been convicted or
acquitted, and may again be put on his defense. We think,
that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested courts
of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving
any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circum-
stances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for
— — or the ends of publie justice would otherwise be
eated.“
In its recent pronouncement in the double jeopardy area, the
Supreme Court applied the Peres standard where a mistrial was
declared because of a hung jury. United States v. Sanford, 1976,
— US. ——, 97 8. Ct. 20, 50 L.Ed.2d 17. Also, “[i]t is elementary
in our law that a person can be tried a second time for an offense
10
principle encapsulated in the Fifth Amendment necessi-
tate that Petitioner’s second conviction for first degree
murder be vacated?
Although on superficial examination of the Double
Jeopardy Clause its meaning appears to be plain; judicial
experience demonstrates the deceptively subtle meaning
of twice. For purposes of this appeal, the entire history
of double jeopardy need not be considered because of the
Bryan-Sapir-Forman trilogy * which this Circuit utilized
to formulate the Musquiz principle.’
The Supreme Court decisions comprising this trilogy
entail discussion of reversal on appeal of a federal con-
viction because of insufficient evidence. For purposes
when his prior conviction for that same offense has been set aside
by his appeal.” Forman v. United States, 1960, 361 U.S. 416, 425, 80
S.Ct. 481, 486, 4 L.Ed.2d 412. Despite the “elementary” concept
that one may be tried a second time for an offense, the application
of that principle is not so easily accomplished. In similar fashion,
the “necessarily follows” portion of Petitioner’s argument is chal-
lengeable.
Forman v. United States, 1960, 361 U.S. 416, 80 S.Ct. 481, 4
L.Ed.2d 412; Sapir v. United States, 1955, 348 U.S. 373, 75 S.Ct.
422, 99 L.Ed. 426; Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552, 70 S.Ct.
317, 94 L.Ed. 335.
Even prior to this Court’s decision in Musquiz, supra, the re-
versal for insufficient evidence practice of remanding for a new trial
versus remanding with instructions to dismiss the indictment had
been predicated on whether Prisoner had requested a new trial or
not. See United States v. Goodson, 5 Cir. 1971, 439 F.2d 1056, 1059.
Contra, United States v. Johnson, 5 Cir., 1970, 427 F.2d 957.
As indicated, Bryan, supra, directly discusses whether a remand
instructing a new trial is appropriate rather than a remand direct-
ing dismissal of the indictment or similar action. In Sapir, supra,
the per curiam opinion by the Supreme Court is rather unenlighten-
ing. However, in his concurring opinion Mr. Justice Douglas indi-
cates that Spair had only made a motion for acquittal. For that
reason, reversal of a conviction by the Court of Appeals for in-
sufficient evidence requires dismissal of the indictment. The con-
curring opinion continues “If petitioner had asked for a new trial,
different considerations would come into play, for then the defend-
ant opens the whole record for such disposition as might be just.”
Sapir, supra at 374, 75 S.Ct. at 423, 99 L.Ed. at 427. In dicta in
Forman, both Bryan and Sapir are discussed. The Supreme Court
11
of this Petitioner's appeal from a state court convietion,
it is important to recognize the framework of Bryan-
Sapir-Forman, They arose in the context of the inter-
play between the Double Jeopardy Clause and the power
of the Courts of Appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 2106 to affect
a court’s judgment, decree, or order brought appropriately
before a Court of Appeals. The ruling of the Supreme
Court in Bryan is evident.
A new trial was one of the remedies which peti-
tioner sought. He properly gave the District Court
an opportunity after verdict to correct its error in
failing to sustain his motion for judgment of acquit-
tal at the conclusion of all the evidence, which
claimed error was assigned as a ground for a new
trial. We agree that on this record the order for a
new trial was a just and appropriate judgment
which the Court of Appeals was authorized to enter
by 28 U.S.C. § 2106.
Petitioner’s contention that to require him to stand
trial again would be to place him twice in jeopardy
is not persuasive. He sought and obtained the re-
versal of his conviction, assigning a number of
concluded “[m]oreover, Sapir made no motion for a new trial
in the District Court, while here petitioner filed such a motion.
That was a decisive factor in Sapir’s case.” Forman, supra at 426,
80 S.Ct. at 487, 4 L.Ed.2d at 419. It is important to remember
that Forman was an instance where the Court of Appeals re-
versed because of an improper jury instruction—-not on insufficiency
of the evidence. The evidence in Forman was sufficient. Jd. at 424-
26, 80 S.Ct. at 486, 4 L.Ed.2d at 418-19. Thus, the Supreme Court’s
affirmance of the reversal with a remand for a new trial in For-
man is not inconsistent with the “distinguishing” criterion set forth
in Bryan and Sapir.
11 28 U.S.C. § 2106 states
The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdic-
tion may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judg-
ment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before it for
review, and may remand the cause and direct the entry of such
appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further
proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.
June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat. 963.
12
alleged errors on appeal, including denial of his
motion for judgment of acquittal. “. . . where the
accused successfully seeks review of a conviction,
there is no double jeopardy upon a new trial.” Fran-
cis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462 [67 S.Ct. 374, 91
L.Ed. 422]. See Trono v. United States, 199 U.S.
521, 533-34 [26 S.Ct. 121, 50 L.Ed. 292], Bryan,
supra, at 560, 70 S.Ct. at 321, 94 L.Ed. at 342.
Furthermore, as this Court recognized in Musquiz, supra
at 966, “(t]he distinction between Bryan, on the one
hand, and Forman and Sapir on the other, seems to
turn, under the present state of the law at least, on
whether the defendant made a motion for a new trial in
the district court.” This distinction remains viable.”
In following our Musquiz practice, we are aware of the Supreme
Court’s recent pronouncements in the double jeopardy arena. In
these recent decisions, the Supreme Court has clarified the ability
of Government to appeal a Judge’s ruling on a legal issue in favor
of a defendant after a guilty verdict. In one, United States v.
Morrison, 1976, ——- U.S. ——, 97 S.Ct. 24, 50 L.Ed.2d 1, the
Supreme Court quoted from United States v. Wilson, 1975, 420
U.S. 332, 95 S.Ct. 1013, 43 L.Ed.2d 232,
“We therefore conclude that when a judge rules in favor of
the defendant after verdict of guilty has been entered by the
trier of fact, the Government may appeal from that ruling with-
out running afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 420 U.S. at
352-353 [95 S.Ct. [1013], at 1026].” Morrison, supra at ——,
97 S. at 26.
The Court’s rationale in Morrison and United States v. Rose high-
lights an underlying concern of the double jeopardy principle. The
appeal by Government, if successful, would result only in the rein-
statement of the guilty verdict. No further proceedings relating
to guilt or innocence would be required. United States v. Morrison,
1976, ——— U.S. ——, 97 S.Ct. 24, 50 L.Ed.2d 1, United States v.
Rose, 1976, —— U.S. ——, 97 S.Ct. 26, 50 L.Ed.2d 5. On the same
day Morrison and Rose were decided, the Supreme Court ruled that
Government may appeal a District Court’s dismissal of an indict-
ment which occurs after a hung jury mistrial but before a retrial.
The reasoning was that United States v. Perez, 1824, 9 Wheat, 579,
580, 6 L.Ed. 165, permits a retrial when a mistrial occurs and based
on Serfass v. United States, 1975, 420 U.S. 377, 95 S.Ct. 1055, 43
L.Ed.2d 265, jeopardy had not attached because the retrial had not
13
As indicated, Petitioner through his counsel made both
a motion for acquittal and a motion for a new trial while
this case was before the state trial court. Since Musquiz
the usual practice of this Circuit when reversing a con-
viction due to insufficient evidence has been to remand
with directions for a new trial—if a motion for a new
trial was made in the trial court. At Petitioner’s first
trial, one was made. Thus, the only remaining consid-
eration is whether the Florida Supreme Court possessed
the power to review judgments, decrees, or orders similar
to the power possessed by this Court under 28 U.S.C.
2106.“
3, 4] That the Supreme Court of Florida has review
power at least equal to that possessed by this Court un-
der § 2106 is demonstrated by the recent decision of
Tibbs v. State of Florida, Fla., 1976, 337 So.2d 788
[1976]. In Tibbs, the Supreme Court of Florida cited as
its authority to review convictions for which the death
sentence has been imposed, Fla.App.R. 6.16(b) “ which
begun. United States v. Sanford, 1976, ——- U.S. ——, 97 S.Ct. 20,
50 L.Ed.2d 17.
Despite the importance placed by these decisions on the idea that
the Double Jeopardy Clause is directed at the prevention of multi-
ple prosecutions which includes new trials, their differences must be
recognized. They entail discussion of appeals by Government from
adverse legal determinations by a court. In Petitioner’s instance,
Florida does not appeal his conviction. Also, the clarification offered
by these recent cases does not consider the Bryan-Sapir-Forman
motion for new trial distinction. As a result, the additional scrutiny
by the Supreme Court of instances when the Double Jeopardy Clause
precludes appeals by Government does not move the procedure be-
gun with Bryan and adopted by our Musquiz decision from the
shadows of uncertainty into the sunlight of clarity. But cf. United
States v. Wiley, 1975, 170 U.S.App.D.C. 382, 517 F.2d 1212, 1215-18.
Previous decisions have considered whether the Double Jeopardy
Clause applies to the states and have determined that it does. See
United States v. Wilson, 1975, 420 U.S. 332, 339, 95 S.Ct. 1013, 43
L.Ed.2d 232; Benton v. Maryland, 1969, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056,
23 L.Ed.2d 707.
As enacted, Fla. App. R. 6.16(b) is a verbatim copy of F.S.A.
§ 924.32 which was repealed by Laws 1970, c. 70-339, § 180. This
review provision grants the Florida Court the power to review
the evidence “in the interest of justice” even if the convicted de-
14
speaks, as did the Supreme Court of Florida, in terms
of the “interests of justice” without regard to the legal
insufficiency of the evidence. In light of this power of
review and this Court’s practice when both a motion of
acquittal and for a new trial have been made, we affirm
the District Court’s denial of a writ of habeas corpus.”
fendant does not make such a request. As the quotation of Fla.App.
R. 6.16(b) below indicates, this is a mandated review for one
sentenced to death.
b. Sufficiency of Evidence. Upon an appeal by the defend-
ant from the judgment the appellate court shall review the
evidence to determine if it is insufficient to support the judg-
ment where this is a ground of appeal. Upon an appeal from
the judgment by a defendant who has been sentenced to death
the appellate court shall review the evidence to determine if
the interests of justice require a new trial, whether the in-
sufficiency of the evidence is a ground of appeal or not. (Em-
phasis added).
15 See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 5 Cir., 1975, 516 F.2d 431,
436; In Re Joyce, 5 Cir., 1975, 506 F.2d 373, 379; United States v.
Bass, 5 Cir., 1974, 490 F.2d 846, 852; United States v. Peterson, 5
Cir., 1974, 488 F.2d 645, 651; United States v. Blake, 5 Cir., 1974,
488 F.2d 101, 107; United States v. Apollo, 5 Cir., 1973, 476 F.2d
156, 158 n. 1; United States v. Robinson, 5 Cir., 1972, 468 F.2d
189, 194; United States v. Restano, 5 Cir., 1971, 449 F.2d 485,
488; United States v. Musquiz, 5 Cir., 1971, 445 F.2d 963.
It is important to recognize that the Musquiz rule is not a man-
datory practice in all instances. The wording of § 2106 speaks in
terms of “. . . such further proceedings to be had as may be just
under the circumstances.” (Emphasis added). Under this § 2106
standard, we have recognized that a new trial may not be war-
ranted when the prosecution had an opportunity to fully develop its
case and failed to do so or when the prosecution did fully develop its
case. See United States v. Peterson, 5 Cir., 1974, 488 F.2d 645,
n. 14.
In a line of pre-Musquiz opinions, some of which indicate ap-
parent awareness of the distinction between making both a motion
for acquittal and for a new trial, some which do not, and others
which do not reveal whether both motions were made, see, e.g.,
United States v. Arendale, 5 Cir., 1971, 444 F.2d 1260, 1269-70;
Watkins v. United States, 5 Cir., 1969, 409 F.2d 1382, 1386; Mon-
toya v. United States, 5 Cir., 1968, 402 F.2d 847, 850; Newsom v.
United States, 5 Cir., 1962, 311 F.2d 74; Hamilton v. United States,
5 Cir., 1962, 304 F.2d 542; Ackerman v. United 8 es, 5 Cir., 1961,
293 F.2d 445, 448; Riggs v. United States, 5 Cir., 1960, 280 F.2d
949, 955; Guevara v. United States, 5 Cir., 1957, 242 F.2d 745, 747,
15
If the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude such
action by this Court exercising its § 2106 powers, it like-
wise does not prevent similar action by a state court
exercising analogous powers.“
AFFIRMED.
this Court has reversed for insufficient evidence and remanded for
a presentation by Government to the trial court that it possesses
sufficient additional evidence to carry its burden. If so, a new trial
was considered appropriate. If not, a verdict of acquittal or similar
action would have been proper. Despite our prior, pre-Musquiz
vacillation, United States v. Bass, 5 Cir., 1974, 490 F.2d 846, 852-53,
demonstrates our present adherence to Musquiz and that the
Musquiz rule is not inflexible. The malleability of this Court’s re-
versal and remand order is governed by the “just” factor of 28
U.S.C. § 2106 in conjunction with the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Likewise, Fla.App.R. 6.16(b) and its predecessor F.S.A. § 924.32
re mire the Florida Court to“. . . determine if the interests of
justice require a new trial.. Also, F. S.A. § 924.36, repealed by
Laws 1970, c. 70-339, § 180, provided that “[w]hen the judgment is
reversed, the appellate court shall either order that the defendant
be discharged from the cause, or, if it thinks proper, grant a new
trial.” At the time of its review of Petitioner’s first conviction in
1968, the Florida Supreme Court possessed power at least as great
as that held by this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2106. As such, the
Florida Supreme Court’s reversal and remand order is constrained
by the relevant Florida statutes in conjunction with the Double
Jeopardy Clause. The degree of pliability of the order under the
“interests of justice” or “thinks proper” factors is not directly
in question in this case—the ordering of a new trial is within the
boundaries set by these factors.
17 As intimated above in note 16, this case is decided on the basis
of the similarity between the Florida Supreme Court’s review
powers and its review of Petitioner’s case to this Court’s Musquiz
procedure from the trial level context of both a motion for acquittal
and for a new trial. Recognizing that, in a state case where there
has been the equivalent of a motion for directed judgment of acquit-
tal accompanied by a motion for new trial on that ground or others,
the use of Fla.App.R. 6.16(b)’s “interests of justice” as the court
“thinks proper” might amount to an impermissible state attempt
to circumvent the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy protections,
we do not intimate nor do we consider whether or to what degree
variances in Florida’s “interests of justice” or “thinks proper”
standards may require a different outcome in another case. It is
sufficient for disposition of this case that Petitioner's Fifth Amend-
ment protections have not been violated by the Florida Court’s
statutorily required review and its subsequent order of a new trial.
16
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 76-6617
RICHARD AUSTIN GREENE, PETITIONER,
V.
RAYMOND D. MASSEY, Superintendent,
Union Correctional Institutional
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO the United
States Court of Appeals for the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
ON CONSIDERATION of the motion for leave to proceed
herein in forma pauperis and of the petition for writ
of certiorari, it is ordered by this Court that the motion
to proceed in forma pauperis be, and the same is hereby,
granted; and that the petition for writ of certiorari be,
and the same is hereby, granted.
June 20, 1977
& „. 2. eoveenment etre orrice; 1977 242665 39
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.