Opposition — Beame v. Friends of the Earth

Supreme Court brief1977

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Text

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Sup.cme Court, U. &

—~ FILEQ .

Nos. 76-1718 and rer nso eae

1

, JR., CLERK

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1977

ABRAHAM BEAME, ET AL., PETITIONERS

Vv.

FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, ET AL.

HuGH L. CAREY, ET AL., PETITIONERS

Vv.

FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, ET AL.

ON PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY IN OPPOSITION

WADE H. MCCREE, JR.,

Solicitor General,

JAMES W. MOORMAN,

Acting Assistant Attorney General,

EDMUND B. CLARK,

MICHAEL D. GRAVES,

NEIL T. PROTO,

JOAN BERNSTEIN, Attorneys,

General Counsel, Department of Justice,

GERALD K. GLEASON, Washington, D.C. 205380.

Deputy Associate General Counsel,

LAWRENCE NOVEY,

Attorney,

Environmental Protection Agency,

Washington, D.C. 20460.

INDEX

Page

EES ee a 2

Jurisdiction _............... I TRESS Ti i de 2

Ee ae 2

Statutes involved Aa ns BRM ret tei 2

CMS RE I SS Se te 3

FREE TE CR an AO eRe a a 13

Conclusion 18

TE cialisdiserteshcniapeesiapinticedstahciaseivebshinasiailcesliicigeesaiiae la

CITATIONS

Cases:

Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d

BS RENT Ren ane ee eo et oa 15

Brown v. Environmental Protection Agen-

Oe ne 8,9

City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F. 2d

681, certiorari denied, 424 U.S. 927_. 15

District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d

ERROR ROR re Ce 8

E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. v.

Train, 528 F.2d 1136, affirmed on other

grounds, No. 75-978, February 23,

fae RTE ERIE a ns nt ee 16

Environmental Protection Agency v.

Brown, Nos. 75-909, 75-960, 75-1050

and 75-1055, decided May 2, 1977.8, 13, 14

Friends. of the Earth v. Carey, 401 F.

Supp. 1386 _ 6

Friends of the Earth © v. y. Carey, 422, F.

AE ee 7,8

Cases—Continued

Friends of the Earth v. Carey (Friends

pS 2. | een

Friends of the Earth v. Environmental

Protection Agency (Friends 1), 499 F.

PF Re eee oe 5, 10,

Friends of the Earth v. Wilson, 389 F.

SO IID chi i cnsinnnsecliintiioaincentlinnlaghaniecas FS

Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 _.___.

Getty Oil Co. (Eastern Operations) v.

Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349, certiorari

Cee, Ge EA EEO

Granite City Steel Co. v. Environmental

Protection Agency, 501 F.2d 925 ___.

Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. United States

Environmental Protection Agency, 554

SI ite iekaaiicsc ule shiatadoiabpeiadeliiataatiiaidber sa

Lubrizol Corp. v. Train, 547 F.2d 310.

Maryland v. Environmental Protection

Agency, 521 F.2d 215 _.._______.

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

v. Environmental Protection Agency,

§ gg RRP at ee

National League of Cities v. Usery, 426

I ga icittrisinnecil hid nibesi wilrmgiabapaniain

Oljato Chapter of Navajo Tribe v. Train,

a

Peabody Coal Co. v. Train, 518 F.2d 940.

Plan for Arcadia, Inc. v. Anita Assoct-

ates, 501 F.2d 390, certiorari denied,

I Fe I icici aheiaiccciiicstecbitedi clint

Sun “pts gin Ltd. v. ee 532 F.2d

Page

11,17

Cases—Continued

Train v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-

ae

Union Electric Co. v. Environmental Pro-

tection Agency, 427 U.S. 246 _ .

United States v. Adamo Wrecking Co. he

545 F.2d 1, certiorari granted April 4,

1977, No. 76-911 aS ES

Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414.

Statutes and regulations:

Clean Air Act of 1970, 77 Stat. 392, as

amended and added, 42 U.S.C. (and

Supp. V) 1857 et seq.:

Section 101(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. 1857

GI. icinstttsinincenininisimaensnmwinasinnases

Section 107(a), 42 U.S.C. 1857c-2

SE. schalihnihcshaishin Gicsteibiadindiiiabistiaiieisaitminaion

Section 109, 42 U.S.C. 1857¢-4

Section 110, 42 U.S.C. (and Supp. V)

SEES Seay ee

Section 110(a), 42 U.S.C. (and Supp.

TI voici temecnin sedaien

Section 110(a) (1), 42 U. S.C. 1857¢-5

ee

Section 110(a) (2), 42 U.S.C. 1857-5

es Ane

Section 110(a) (2) (B), 42 U.S.C.

1857¢e-6(a) (2) (B) -........-

Section 110(a) (2) (G), 42 U.S.C.

1857e-6(a) (2) (G)

Section 110(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. (and

Supp. V) 1857c-5(a) (3)

15, 16

IV

Statutes and regulations—Continued Page

Section 110(c), 42 U.S.C. (and Supp.

V) 1857¢e-5(c) slahiphctinsitinitelendais la, 6a

Section 110(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. (and

Supp. V) 1857c-5(c)(1) -------- 8, 6a

Section 113, 42 U.S.C. 1857¢-8 6

Section 304, 42 U.S.C. 1857h-2 4, 9a

Section 307, 42 U.S.C. (and Supp. V)

| RR Serer aes 11, 13, 18, 12a

Section 307(b), 42 U.S.C. (and Supp.

VP ED Sa de 4,7

Section 307(b) (1), 42 U.S.C. (and

Supp. V) 1857h-5(b) (1) 4

Section 307(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. (and

Supp. V) 1857h-5(b) (2) 16

28 U.S.C. 2101(¢) __.... 12

Miscellaneous:

5 ER SRE LDL 3

Ge a i ae. 8

S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.

(RNR ad hci cnigka sy poten, 16

Iu the Suprene Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1977

No. 76-1718

ABRAHAM BEAME, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, ET AL.

No. 76-1737

HuGH L. CAREY, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v. |

FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, ET AL.

ON PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY IN OPPOSITION *

* This brief was filed with this Court and served in type-

written form on August 3, 1977. The only substantive changes

appearing in this printed brief are footnote 2, infra, and the

second sentence of paragraph 2 on page 4, infra.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals is reported at

552 F.2d 25 and is reproduced as Appendix I to

the petition in No. 76-1718.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered

on January 18, 1977 (No. 76-1718, Pet. App. I, 1-3),

and a timely petition for rehearing was denied on

March 4, 1977 (No. 76-1718, Pet. App. II, 62-66).

The petition for a writ of certiorari in No. 76-1718

was filed on June 2, 1977. The petition for 4 writ of

certiorari in No. 76-1737 was filed on June 6, 1977.’

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28

U.S.C. 1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the provisions of a Transportatior Control

Plan, prepared by the State of New York with the

cooperation of the City of New York and approved by

the Environmental Protection Agency pursuant to

Section 110 of the Clean Air Act can be enforced

against the State and the City in a “citizen suit”

under Section 304 of the Act.

STATUTES INVOLVED

The relevant provisions of the Clean Air Act are

reproduced in the Appendix, infra.’

? See page 12, infra.

2 Quotations herein from the Clean Air Act do 1°t reflect

the Clean Air Amendments of 1977, signed on August 7,

1977. Those Amendments do not affect any issues ir this case.

STATEMENT

1. The Administrator of the Environmental Pro-

tection Agency (EPA) is directed by the Clean Air

Act, 77 Stat. 392, as amended and added, 42 U.S.C.

(and Supp. V) 1857 et seg. (the Act), to establish

standards governing maximum concentrations of par-

ticular pollutants in the air (Section 109, 42 U.S.C.

1857c-4). On April 30, 1971, the Administrator pro-

mulgated national primary and secondary air quality

standards for those pollutants resulting chiefly from

motor vehicle emissions. 36 Fed. Reg. 8186. There-

upon, it became the responsibility of each state gov-

ernment to “specify the manner in which * * * air

quality standards will be achieved and maintained”’

within the state (Sections 101(a)(3), 107(a), 42

U.S.C. 1857(a) (3), 1857¢-2(a) ).

Under the Act, each state must submit to the Ad-

ministrator a plan for “implementation, mainten-

ance and enforcement” in that state of the national

primary and secondary standards (Section 110(a)

(1), 42 U.S.C. 1857c-5(a)(1)). These implementa-

tion plans provide the regulatory scheme for control-

ling emissions from stationary and moving sources of

pollution to the extent necessary to attain the na-

tional standards. The required elements of a state

implementation plan include, inter alia, such methods

of pollution control “as may be necessary * * *, in-

cluding, but not limited to, land-use and transporta-

tion controls” (Section 110(a)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C.

1857c-5(a) (2) (B)), and a procedure for “inspection

and testing of motor vehicles” (Section 110(a) (2),

(G), 42 U.S.C. 1857¢-5(a) (2) (G)).

4

The Administrator’s approval or disapproval of an

implementation plan is subject to judicial review pur-

suant to Section 307(b), 42 U.S.C. (and Supp. V)

1857h-5(b), which provides that a petition for review

of the Administrator’s action “shall be filed within 30

days from the date of such promulgation, approval, or

action, or after such date if such petition is based

solely on grounds arising after such 30th day.” That

section also provides that actions of the Administrator

with respect to which review could have been obtained

under the section shall not be subject to judicial re-

view in civil or criminal proceedings for enforcement.

In addition, Section 304 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 1857

h-2, authorizes “citizen suits,’ whereby “any per-

son” may commence a civil action against any fed-

eral, state or local instrumentality for violating a

provision of a state implementation plan.

2. The New York State Implementation Plan was

submitted to EPA on January 31, 1972, and ap-

proved by the Administrator on May 31, 1972, pur-

suant to Section 110(a)(2) of the Clean Air Act, 42

U.S.C. 1857c-5(a)(2). This plan did not contain

transportation control measures. On April 17, 1973,

the State of New York, after consultation with peti-

tioners in No. 76-1718 (hereafter “City petitioners”),

submitted its Transportation Control Plan (Plan), in-

cluding a plan to control motor vehicle pollution in

the New York City metropolitan area. The Plan

submitted by the state was approved by the Adminis-

trator on June 22, 1973, with minor exceptions.

8. Within the 30-day statutory deadline provided

in Section 307(b) (1), 42 U.S.C. (and Supp. V) 1857h-

5

5(b) (1), respondents challenged the Administrator’s

approval of the Plan in the court of appeals. The pri-

mary challenges related to the vagueness of portions

of the Plan, and the failure of the state to begin its

implementation. The court upheld the plan in all sub-

stantial respects, remanding only for further expla-

nation of certain points. The court held, however,

that it lacked jurisdiction to order the state to imple-

ment the Plan in a Section 307 proceeding. Friends

of the Earth v. Environmental Protection Agency

(Friends I), 499 F.2d 1118 (C.A. 2).

On October 11, 1974, respondents filed a “citizen

suit” under Section 304(a) of the Act, seeking a man-

datory injunction against appropriate state and city

Officials requiring compliance with the New York

Plan. The district court denied the request for in-

junctive relief in light of the “total lack of expertise

in the court” and “the existence of a federal agency

with such expertise charged with the enforcement of

the highly technical and difficult problems involved.”

Friends of the Earth v. Wilson, 389 F. Supp. 1394,

1395 (S.D. N.Y.). The court noted, however, that

“the State and City do not found their opposition to

the preliminary injunction on the grounds that they

are in compliance”; that, in fact, counsel for the

State “stated in open court * * * that ‘this plan is a

legally enforceable plan, is a legally adequate plan

and that the state is committed [obligated] to fulfill-

ing its responsibilities thereunder’” (id. at 1395).

“He went on to say,” the court noted further, “that

the State apparently had no intention of implement-

6

ing certain strategies of the plan and observed, ‘If

there is a valid legal ground for such a refusal, we

have not been able to find it, your honor.’ ” bid.

After EPA found that the State and City were in

violation of certain aspects of the Plan, respondents

returned to the district court seeking a preliminary

injunction against both state and city officials order-

ing Plan enforcement. On August 28, 1975, the dis-

trict court denied the request for relief, Friends of

the Earth v. Carey, 401 F. Supp. 1386 (S.D. N.Y.).

The court of appeals reversed. Friends of the

Earth v. Carey (Friends II), 535 F.2d 165 (C.A. 2).

It held that once a suit is commenced under Section

304 the “district court is obligated upon a showing

that the state has violated the plan, to issue appro-

priate orders for its enforcement” (id. at 173), re-

gardless of whether EPA sought judicial enforcement

under Section 113 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 1857c-8 (ibid.).

“I]t is beyond serious dispute,” said the court, “that

the defendants are now almost a year in default in

carrying out the principal strategies of the man-

dated Plan, which are central to achieving the pri-

mary ambient air quality standards prescribed by

Congress, with the result that the public of New York

City is exposed to carbon monoxide pollution that has

in the meantime climbed to over five times the federal

health standards. The court cannot consistently with

its duty be a party to the delaying process that has

led to this situation.” Jd. at 180. It remanded the

case, ordered the district court to enter partial sum-

mary judgment for respondents and expeditiously

7

“take such further steps as are necessary to insure

enforcement.” Ibid.

4. On April 30, 1976, the district court ordered

implementation and enforcement of appropriate por-

tions of the Plan. In the interim, the City petitioners

sought rehearing in the court of appeals “to raise

constitutional issues with respect to the Plan which

had not previously been considered” (Pet. App. I,* 6).

On June 2, 1976 the court denied the petition (id.

at 6-7):

‘[W]ithout prejudice to consideration by the

United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York of constitutional issues not

decided prior to the entry of the order which was

the subject of the notice of appeal * * * and with-

out prejudice to the right of the defendants to

move in the said District Court to set aside the

order of the District Court dated April 30, 1976,

on the aforesaid constitutional grounds.’

Thereafter the City petitioners moved the district

court to vacate the partial summary judgment en-

tered on April 30, 1976, and for summary judgment

in the city’s favor based on 10th Amendment infirmi-

ties.

On July 13, 1976, the district court granted the

City petitioners’ motion. Friends of the Earth v.

Carey, 422 F. Supp. 638 (S.D. N.Y.). The court

concluded that it could consider constitutional objec-

tions to the Plan raised by the City petitioners for

the first time in this enforcement proceeding despite

*“Pet. App.” refers to the petition in No, 76-1718,

8

their failure to raise them under Section 307(b)

within 30 days after the Plan was approved by EPA.

Id. at 640-641.

On the merits of the City petitioners’ contention,

the district court examined cases presenting Tenth

Amendment challenges by various state governments

to transportation control plans (TCP’s) prepared

for them by the Administrator of EPA pursuant to

Section 110(c)(1) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. (and Supp.

V) 1857c-5(c)(1). District of Columbia v. Train,

521 F.2d 971 (C.A. D.C.); Maryland v. Environ-

mental Protection Agency, 530 F.2d 215 (C.A. 4);

Brown v. Environmental Protection Agency, 521 F.2d

827 (C.A. 9).* In general, these cases held that the

Administrator was not authorized by the Clean Air

Act to compel a State or municipality to implement

certain aspects of an EPA-formulated TCP against

polluters. The district court characterized the Plan

here, although formulated by New York State, as the

“functional equivalent of the suggestions of an inter-

* At the time of the district court decision, this Court had

granted certiorari in each of these cases. On May 2, 1977, the

judgments were vacated and the actions remanded for con-

sideration of mootness, in light of EPA’s representation that

certain modifications to the regulations were necessary. En-

vironmental Protection Agency Vv. Brown, Nos. 75-909, 75-

960, 75-1050 and 75-1055. Those modifications have now been

made. See 42 Fed. Reg. 30504 (June 15, 1977). The issues in

Brown are now ripe for consideration by the courts of appeals

and, if necessary, by this Court. The state petitioners in both

Brown and Maryland have stated to the respective courts

of appeals that the issues are not moot. Oral argument on

both the question of mootness and the merits has been sched-

uled in Brown.

ested party,” and concluded that “approval of the plan

was the functional equivalent of promulgation by the

Administrator of his own plan.” 422 F. Supp. at 645.

Therefore, the court reasoned, although the New

York Plan was formulated by the City and State, “it

is in the same posture as a plan which the Adminis-

trator has promulgated” for a state under Section

110(c)(1) (422 F. Supp. at 645), and as in Brown

v. Environmental Protection Agency and similar cases

supra, the State and City cannot be compelled to im-

plement the New York Plan pursuant to a citizen

suit. Jd. at 643.

The court of appeals reversed (Pet. App. I). The

court noted its decision to permit the City petitioners

to raise “constitutional issues” but stated that in “so

ruling we did not authorize the district court to en-

gage in reinterpretation that would contradict our

own prior considered construction of it or our de-

termination as to the scope of enforceability.” Pet.

App. I, 6-7.

On the merits, the court of appeals characterized

the district court opinion as having “emasculated the

Plan as an enforceable instrument.” Pet. App. I, 9.

Its analysis began with the fact that the “State of

New York, with the assistance of the Department of

Air Resources of the New York City Environmental

Protection Administration and other city agencies,

prepared and promulgated the Plan here at issue

** *” (Pet, App. I, 18-14, and n. 3), and that the

“State has not only failed to join the City in asserting

the latter’s defenses to enforcement of the Plan but,

ont

10

to the contrary, has defended the Plan and concedes

that it is enforceable against it.” Pet. App. I, 30-31.

The court concluded that the City petitioners were

precluded from raising objections that could have

been raised in a Section 307 petition for review. The

court stated (Pet. App. I, 33-34):

The purpose of § 307 was to assure that once

an implementation plan had been promulgated

by a state and approved by the EPA and a

reasonable time had been allowed for affected

parties to seek by way of a petition for review

to have it modified or nullified, it would have

finality and become enforceable. If states and

their subdivisions, after preparing and through

their responsible executives accepting the obliga-

tion of enforcing implementation plans under the

Act, were allowed to disregard their commit-

ments and to renege upon the obligations under-

taken by them, the plans would amount to noth-

ing more than voluntary, unenforceable declara-

tions of principles. * * *

In order to protect public health effectively

Congress provided that such plans, after fair

allowance for due process, would be enforceable.

For these reasons § 307 has been upheld as a

bastion of enforceability. See Union Electric Co.

v. EPA, 44 U.S.L.W. 5060 (June 25, [1976]) ;

Oljato Chapter of Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515

F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Getty Oil Co. v.

Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972), cert.

denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).

The Court also questioned the propriety of the fact

that the City was raising objections to the Plan it

helped design, after remaining silent through the criti-

11

cal period of Plan approval by EPA and judicial

review in Friends I.

[T]he picture before us is one where the City,

having voluntarily cooperated with the State in

the drafting and promulgation of the very strate-

gies now attacked by it, seeks in effect to renege

on its own creation and commitment.

The architects of the Plan were not Congress

or the EPA but the State and City of New York.

* * * In clear and unmistakeable [sic] terms the

Plan obligates them to carry out the very strate-

gies which the City now contends that it cannot

be ordered to enforce [ Pet. App. I, 35-36. ]

To permit the City petitioners now to attack the

validity of the Plan, the court stated, would be “di-

rectly contrary to our holding that ‘acceptance by the

EPA and judicial ratification by this court’ resulted

in the Plan becoming ‘binding upon and enforceable -

against state and local officials’ * * *.” Id. at 44.

Despite the restrictions in Section 307, 42 U.S.C.

(and Supp. V) 1857h-5, and the binding effect of

Friends I, the court noted that the state possessed an

available statutory remedy to deal with funding or

personnel problems. “Should the State conclude that

the Plan should be revised, it may submit such revi-

sions as are necessary to the Administrator for ap-

proval under § 110(a) (3) of the Act.” Pet. App. I,

42. See also id. at 43-45.

Finally, the court rejected the district court’s con-

clusion that EPA’s approval of a state-developed TCP

was no different from EPA’s promulgation of one

(id. at 45). It stated (id. at 47-48):

12

Although the district court here attempted to

place the present case within the mold of Brown,

District of Columbia and Train, the facts and the

issues here are significantly different and clearly

distinguishable. The most fundamental differ-

ence lies in the fact that, in contrast to those

cases, the State here has clearly and unequivo-

cally promulgated its own pollution-control plan

which represents its own policy decision, formu-

lated through public notice by the State to its

citizens and local governments, and through

State-conducted public hearings.

Nor did the court of appeals find this Court’s decision

in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.

833, an obstacle to citizen enforcement.

The present case represents neither an interfer-

ence with integral governmental functions of the

City, nor a usurpation of State or City decision-

making. On the contrary, the Plan reflects State

and City policy decisions to be carried out by

them according to their own dictates rather than

those of the federal government. In formulat-

ing, proposing, and revising the Plan through

public notice and public hearings, the State ex-

ercised its sovereign powers to make policy

choices participated in by its citizens and its

political subdivisions. [Pet. App. I, 52-53.]

EPA’s approval of the Plan was mandatory once

the criteria of the Act were met, and did not alter

the substantive provisions of the Plan or affect the

State’s “policy choices” which resulted in those pro-

visions. Jd. at 53.

13

ARGUMENT

1. The petition in No. 76-1737 is jurisdictionally

out of time under 28 U.S.C. 2101(c). The court of

appeals denied rehearing on March 4, 1977. The time

for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari was not

extended and, accordingly, expired on June 2, 1977.

The petition was filed June 6, 1977. Further refer-

ences to “petitioner” or the “petition” in this brief

refer to No. 76-1718.

2. Petitioners’ contention (Pet. 5) that this case

“presents the Court with the occasion to deal with the

issues previously presented to it in EPA v. Brown and

its companion cases * * * and upon which the Court

did not finally decide” is incorrect. |

First, no such issues can be reached at all unless

this Court were to reject the holding of the Court of

Appeals that the objections were made too late in

light of Section 307 of the Act. See Point 3, infra.

But, in any event, the Brown issue is not present here.

Brown and its kindred cases presented a signifi-

cantly different issue: whether EPA could lawfully

promulgate binding transportation control plans for

states which had failed to prepare their own plans as

required by Section 110, 42 U.S.C. (and Supp. V)

1857c-5. As this Court said in vacating and remand-

ing the cases, “[t]hese cases * * * raise questions

concerning the authority of the Administrator * * *

to compel various types of implementation and en-

forcement actions by the States. * * * The critical

fact about all the foregoing obligations was that

they were imposed on the states, under 40 C.F.R.

§ 52.23, as elements of an applicable implementation

14

plan.” Slip op. 1-2. Unlike the transportation control

plan promulgated for California by the Administrator

in Brown, supra, and its companion cases, the New

York Plan was “prepared and promulgated” by the

State of New York with the “cooperation and exten-

sive effort” of City petitioners. Pet. App. I, 13-14,

and n. 3. The issue of whether the federal govern-

ment may “coerce” States and localities into imple-

menting an EPA-prepared plan, allegedly in violation

of the Tenth Amendment, is simply not present here.

Contrary to the district court’s view, the fact that

New York was required by Congress to adopt a plan

does not reduce New York to a mere “interested

party” in a federal proceeding, nor does it make this

Plan indistinguishable from one imposed on a state by

the Administrator. The narrow view of the district

court entirely overlooks the fact that the Administra-

tor is required to approve a State plan that conforms

to the statute. See Train v. Natural Resources De-

fense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 79. Unlike the situation

in Environmental Protection Agency v. Brown, supra,

New York here was “at liberty to adopt whatever mix

of emission limitations it deem[ed] best suited to its

particular situation.” Jd. at 79. It was given “vir-

tually absolute power in allocating emission limita-

tions so long as the national standards are met,”

Union Electric Co. v. Environmental Protection

Agency, 427 U.S. 246, 267, and so is in no position

to claim that the EPA has imposed a plan upon it.°

*The court of appeals stated the “present case presents

neither an interference with integral governmental functions

of the City, nor a usurpation of State or City decision-making.

On the contrary, the Plan reflects State and City policy de-

15

3. Petitioners further contend (Pet. 22-25) that

the court of appeals erred in refusing to allow objec-

tions to the New York transportation control plan in

this proceeding because petitioners failed to raise

them in the manner prescribed by Section 307 of the

Act. As we have noted, that was an independent

ground supporting the court’s judgment, which if cor-

rectly decided, alone disposes of petitioners’ challenges

to the plan.

In our view, the court of appeals rightly concluded

that Section 307(b)(2) of the Act precludes peti-

tioners from challenging the validity of the plan at

this late date. See Union Electric Co. v. Environmental

Protection Agency, 427 U.S. 246; Yakus v. United

States, 321 U.S. 414, 427-436.° Congress required that

cisions to be carried out by them according to their own dic-

tates rather than those of the federal government.” Pet App.

I, 52-58. “Federal imposition of policy never took place in

this case * * *.” Jd. at 59.

Instead, the court found the federal-state-local relationship

in this case analogous to that envisioned in the Economic

Stabilization Act of 1970, upheld in Fry v. United States,

421 U.S. 542, and distinguished by the Court in National

League of Cities, supra. Pet. App. I, 57-60.

* See also Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. United States Envir-

onmental Protection Agency, 554 F.2d 884 (C.A. 8) ; Lubrizol

Corp. V. Train, 547 F.2d 310 (C.A. 6) ; City of Highland Park

v. Train, 619 F.2d 681 (C.A. 7), certiorari denied, 424 U.S.

927; Oljato Chapter of the Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515

F.2d 654, 661 (C.A. D.C.) ; Natural Resources Defense Coun-

cil, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 512 F.2d 1351

(C.A. D.C.) ; Granite City Steel Co. v. Environmental Pro-

tection Agency, 501 F.2d 925 (C.A. 7); Plan for Arcadia, Inc.

Vv. Anita Associates, 601 F.2d 390, 392 (C.A. 9), certiorari

denied, 419 U.S. 1084; Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d

1301-1805 (C.A. 10); Getty Oil Co. (Eastern Operations) v.

16

challenges to the validity of a transportation coMtrol

plan be raised promptly “[i]n order to maintai” the

integrity of the time sequences provided throughout

the Act.” S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.

41 (1970). Cf. Yakus v. United States, suprd» 321

U.S. at 489.

The court found the application of the pri®ciple

underlying Section 307(b) (2), 42 U.S.C. (and Supp.

V) 1857h-5(b) (2), particularly relevant to th® ©"

duct of petitioners, who “cooperated with the State

in the drafting and promulgation of the very ¢tvate-

gies now attacked by [them]”. Pet. App. I, 35. They

devised a plan which “fi]n clear and unmista*eable

[sic] terms * * * obligates them to carry ov the

* * * strategies * * *. Indeed, the Plan repeatedly

refers to and lists the different State and City d@P4't-

ments and agencies that are to implement these StT@-

tegies * * *” (id. at 36). “[T]he Plan itself ™akes

it clear beyond any reasonable doubt that bot! the

State and City represented that their responsible

officials would carry out each of the detailed str2ts!e

outlined in the Pian, using the State and City p®™5°”-

nel and facilities described in the plan.” /d. at 42-43.

Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349, 359 (C.A. 2), certiorari denied,

409 U.S. 1125; United States v. Adamo Wrecking C2 545

F.2d 1 (C.A. 6), certiorari granted April 4, 1977, No. “911.

Courts applying the parallel judicial review provision °! the

Federal Water Pollution Control Act also have held +®#* re-

view must be had promptly or not at all. See Sun Enter-

prises, Ltd. v. Train, 582 F.2d 280, 287 (C.A. 2) ; B. 1, 2 Pont

de Nemours and Co. V. Train, 528 F.2d 1136, 1187 aP@ ®- 1,

1142 (C.A. 4), affirmed on other grounds, No. 75-978

February 28, 1977; Peabody Coal Co. v. Train, 518 F°24 940

(C.A, 6).

17

Moreover, petitioners failed to pursue their opportuni-

ties to avoid their obligations either by advising the

Administrator before Plan approval in 19738, or by

petitioning for review pursuant to Section 307(b) (1).

Petitioners also could have raised “defenses” or ob-

jections by intervention or amicus curiae participation

in Friends I, or in the subsequent district court en-

forcement proceeding, F'riends of the Earth v. Wilson,

889 F. Supp. 1394 (S.D. N.Y.). Instead, the City

told the district court it was “in compliance with the

plan”; that enforcement should not occur because of

“necessary expense and diversion of manpower dur-

ing the present hiring freeze”; and because the is-

sues were “highly technical.” Jd. at 1395-1396. It was

not until four years after EPA approval that the peti-

tioners first sought to raise their present “defenses”

to a plan the court of appeals had previously concluded

in Friends | was “binding upon and enforceable

against state and local officials” (Pet. App. I, 42-

45).

4. Petitioners are not without recourse, however.

Contrary to petitioners’ assertions (Pet. 24-25), the

Clean Air Act does not “bind a State and its subdivi-

sions to their initial voluntary commitments, notwith-

standing that significant changes may thereafter oc-

cur * * *.” Section 110(a) (3), 42 U.S.C. (and Supp.

V) 1857c-5(a) (3), prevides a mechanism that per-

mits a revision of the Plan on the State’s initiative.

As this Court noted in Train v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, supra, 421 U.S. at 80, the revi-

sion section is “the mechanism by which the States

may obtain approval of their developing policy choices

18

as to the most practicable and desirable methods of re-

stricting total emissions to a level which is consistent

with the national ambient air standards.” Thus, the

State has complete discretion in proposing substantive

revisions to the Plan if it thinks “significant changes’’

have occurred since the Plan’s approval.’

Thus, the substantive objections raised by peti-

tioners can be embodied in proposed revisions to the

Plan and submitted to EPA; the Agency action would

then be subject to a timely petition for review under

Section 307.°

CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that the petitions for

a writ of certiorari should be denied.

WADE H. MCCREE, JR.,

Solicitor General.

JAMES W. MOORMAN,

Acting Assistant Attorney General.

EDMUND B. CLARK,

JOAN BERNSTEIN, MICHAEL D. GRAVES,

General Counsel, NEIL T. PROTO,

GERALD K. GLEASON, Attorneys.

Deputy Associate General Counsel,

LAWRENCE NOVEY,

Attorney,

Environmental Protection Agency.

AuGust 1977. |

' To date, the State of New York has chosen not to seek a

revision of the Plan; on the contrary, the State has defended

the validity of the TCP and has acknowledged its obligation

to implement its provisions. Pet. App. 13-14 and n. 3.

_ ® Petitioners’ objections (Pet. 14-19) to the district court’s

order following the remand in this case (Pet. App. IV, 79-163)

have not yet been presented to the court of appeals and thus

are not properly before this Court.

la

APPENDIX

Relevant provisions of the Clean Air Act, 77 Stat.

$92, as amended and added, 42 U.S.C. (and Supp. V)

1857 et seq. provide:

Section 107(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 1857c-2(a):

Each State shall have the primary responsi-

bility for assuring air quality within the entire

geographic area comprising such State by sub-

mitting an implementation plan for such State

which will specify the manner in which national

primary and secondary ambient air quality

standards will be achieved and maintained with-

in each air quality control region in such State.

Section 110(a), (c) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. (and

Supp. V) 1857c-5(a), (c):

(a) Submission to setietecter: time for sub-

mission; State procedures; required con-

tents of plans for approval by Administra-

tor; approval of revised plan by Adminis-

trator.

(1) Each State shall, after reasonable notice

and public hearings, adopt and submit to the Ad-

ministrator, within nine months after the promul-

gation of a national primary ambient air quality

standard (or any revision thereof) under sec-

tion 1857c-4 of this title for any air pollutant,

a plan which provides for implementation, main-

tenance, and enforcement of such primary stand-

ard in each air quality control region (or por-

tion thereof) within such State. In addition, such

State shall adopt and submit to the Administra-

tor (either as a part of a plan submitted under

the preceding sentence or separately) within nine

2a

months after the promulgation of a national

ambient air quality secondary standard (or re-

vision thereof), a plan which provides for im-

plementation, maintenance, and enforcement of

such secondary standard in each air quality con-

trol region (or portion thereof) within such

State. Unless a separate public hearing is pro-

vided, each State shall consider its plan imple-

menting such secondary standard at the hearing

required by the first sentence of this paragraph.

(2) The Administrator shall, within four

months after the date required for submission

of a plan under paragraph (1), approve or dis-

approve such plan, or any portion thereof. The

Administrator shall approve such plan, or any

portion thereof, if he determines that it was

adopted after reasonable notice and hearing and

that—

(A) (i) in the case of a plan implement-

ing a national primary ambient air quality

standard, it provides for the attainment of

such primary standard as expeditiously as

practicable but (subject to subsection (e)

of this section) in no case later than three

years from the date of approval of such plan

(or any revision thereof to take account of

a revised primary standard) ; and (ii) in the

case of a plan implementing a national sec-

ondary ambient air quality standard, it

specifies a reasonable time at which such

secondary standard will be attained;

(B) it ineludes emission limitations,

schedules, and timetables for compliance

with such limitations, and such other meas-

ures as may be necessary to insure attain-

8a

ment and maintenance of such primary or

secondary standard, including, but nut limit-

ed to, land-use and transportation controls;

(C) it ineludes provision for establish-

ment and operation of appropriate devices,

methods, systems, and procedures necessary

to (i) monitor, compile, and analyze data

on ambient air quality and, (ii) upon re-

quest, make such data available to the Ad-

ministrator ;

(D) it includes a procedure, meeting the

requirements of paragraph (4), for review

(prior to construction or modification) of

the location of new sources to which a stand-

ard of performance will apply;

(E) it contains adequate provisions for

inter-governmental cooperation, including

measures necessary to insure that emissions

of air pollutants from sources located in any

air quality control region will not interfere

with the attainment or maintenance of such

primary or secondary standard in any por-

tion of such region outside of such State or

in any other air quality control region;

(F) it provides (i) necessary assurances

that the State will have adequate personnel,

funding, and authority to carry out such

implementation plan, (ii) requirements for

installation of equipment by owners or op-

erators of stationary sources to monitor

emissions from such other sources, (iii) for

periodic reports on the nature and amounts

of such emissions; (iv) that such reports

shall be correlated by the State agency with

any emission limitations or standards es-

4a

tablished pursuant to this chapter, which

reports shall be available at reasonable times

for public inspection; and (7) for authority

comparable to that in section 1857h-1 of this

title, and adequate contingency plans to im-

plement such authority ;

(G) it provides, to the extent necessary

and practicable, for periodic inspection and

testing of motor vehicles to enforce com-

pliance with applicable emission standards;

and

(H) it provides for revision, after public

hearings, of such plan (i) from time to time

as may be necessary to take account of re-

visions of such national primary or second-

ary ambient air quality standard or the

availability of improved or more expeditious

methods of achieving such primary or sec-

ondary standard; (ii) whenever the Ad-

ministrator finds on the basis of informa-

tion available to him that the plan is sub-

stantially inadequate to achieve the national

ambient air quality primary or secondary

standard which it implements.

(3)(A) The Administrator shall approve any

revision of an implementation plan applicable to

an air quality control region if he determines

that it meets the requirements of paragraph (2)

and has been adopted by the State after reason-

able notice and public hearings.

(B) As soon as practicable, the Administra-

tor shall, consistent with the purposes of this

chapter and the Energy Supply and Environ-

mental Coordination Act of 1974, review each

State’s applicable implementation plan and re-

port to the State on whether such plans can be

revised in relation to fuel burning statutory

sources (or persons supplying fuel to such

sources) without interfering with the attainment

and maintenance of any national ambient air

quality standard within the period permitted in

this section. If the Administrator determines

that any such plan can be revised, he shall notify

the State that a plan revision may be submitted

by the State. Any plan revision which is sub-

mitted by the State shall, after public notice and

opportunity for public hearing, be approved by

the Administrator if the revision relates only to

fuel burning stationary sources (or persons sup-

plying fuel to such sources), and the plan as

revised complies with paragraph (2) of this sub-

section. The Administrator shall approve or dis-

approve any revision no later than three months

after its submission.

(4) The procedure referred to in paragraph

(2) (D) for review, prior to construction or modi-

fication, of the location of new sources shall (A)

provide for adequate authority to prevent the con-

struction or modification of any new source to

which a standard of performance under section

1857c-6 of this title will apply at any location

which the State determines will prevent the at-

tainment or maintenance within any air quality

control region (or portion thereof) within such

State of a national ambient air quality primary

or secondary standard, and (B) require that

prior to commencing construction or modification

of any such source, the owner or operator there-

of shall submit to such State such information as

6a

may be necessary to permit the State to make a

determination under clause (A).

(c) Preconditions for preparation and publica-

tion by Administrator of proposed regula-

heartage Set coed Sitcigalines getanel io

promul

gation # gh - tions by Administrator;

(1) The Administrator shall, after considera-

tion of any State hearing record, promptly pre-

pare and publish proposed regulations setting

forth an implementation plan, or portion there-

of, for a State if-—

(A) the State fails to submit an imple-

mentation plan for any national ambient air

quality primary or secondary standard with-

in the time prescribed.

(B) the plan, or any portion thereof,

submitted for such State is determined by

the Administrator not to be in accordance

with the requirements of this section, or

(C) the State fails, within 60 days after

notification by the Administrator or such

longer period as he may prescribe, to revise

an implementation plan as required pur-

suant to a provision of its plan referred to

in subsection (a)(2)(H) of this section.

If such State held no public hearing associated

with respect to such plan (or revision thereof),

the Administrator shall provide opportunity for

such hearing within such State on any proposed

regulation. The Administrator shall, within six

7a

months after the date required for submission of

such plan (or revision thereof), promulgate any

such regulations unless, prior to such promulga-

tion, such State has adopted and submitted a plan

(or revision) which the Administrator deter-

mines to be in accordance with the requirements

of this section.

(2)(A) The Administrator shall conduct a

study and shall submit a report to the Committee

on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the

United States House of Representatives and the

Committee on Public Works of the United States

Senate not later than three months after June

22, 1974, on the necessity of parking surcharge,

management of parking supply, and preferential

bus/carpool lane regulations as part of the ap-

plica»le implementation plans required under this

section to achieve and maintain national pri-

mary ambient air quality standards. The study

shall include an assessment of the economic im-

pact of such regulations, consideration of alter-

native means of reducing total vehicle miles

traveled, and an assessment of the impact of

such regulations on other Federal and State pro-

grams dealing with energy or transportation.

In the course of such study, the Administrator

shall consult with other Federal officials includ-

ing, but not limited to, the Secretary of Trans-

portation, the Federal Energy Administrator, and

the Chairman of the Council on Environmental

Quality.

(B) No parking surcharge regulation may be

required by the Administrator under paragraph

(1) of this subsection as a part of an applicable

implementation plan. All parking surcharge

8a

regulations previously required by the Adminis-

trator shall be void upon June 22, 1974. This

subparagraph shall not prevent the Administra-

tor from approving parking surcharges if they

are adopted and submitted by a State as part of

an applicable implementation plan. The Admin-

istrator may not condition approval of any im-

plementation plan submitted by a State on such

plan’s including a parking surcharge regulation.

(C) The Administrator is authorized to sus-

pend until January 1, 1975, the effective date or

applicability of any regulations for the manage-

ment of parking supply or any requirement that

such regulations be a part of an applicable im-

plementation plan approved or promulgated un-

der this section. The exercise of the authority

under this subparagraph shall not prevent the

Administrator from approving such regulations

if they are adopted and submitted by a State as

part of an applicable implementation plan. If

the Administrator exercises the authority under

this subparagraph, regulations requiring a re-

view or analysis of the impact of proposed park-

ing facilities before construction which take ef-

fect on or after January 1, 1975, shall not apply

to parking facilities on which construction has

been initiated before January 1, 1975.

(D) For purposes of this paragraph—

(i) The term “parking surcharge regula-

tion” means a regulation imposing or re-

quiring the imposition of any tax surcharge,

fee, or other charge on parking spaces, or

any other area used for the temporary stor-

age of motor vehicles.

(ii) The term “management of parking

supply” shall include any requirement pro-

viding that any new facility containing a

given number of parking spaces shall re-

ceive a permit or other prior approval, is-

suance of which is to be conditioned on air

quality considerations.

(iii) The term “preferential bus/carpool

lane” shall include any requirement for the

setting aside of one or more lanes of a street

or highway on a permanent or temporary

basis for the exclusive use of buses or car-

pools, or both.

(E) No standard, plan, or requirement, re-

lating to management of parking supply or pref-

erential bus/carpool lanes shall be promulgated

after June 22, 1974, by the Administrator pur-

suant to this section, unless such promulgation

has been subjected to at least one public hearing

which has been held in the area affected and for

which reasonable notice has been given in such

area. If substantial changes are made following

public hearings, one or more additional hearings

shall be held in such area after such notice.

Section 304 of the Act, 42 US.C. 1857h-2:

(a) Establishment of right to bring suit.

Except as provided in subsection (b) of this

section, any person may commence a civil action

on his own behalf—

(1) against any person (including (i)

the United States, and (ii) any other gov-

ernmental instrumentality or agency to the

extent permitted by the Eleventh Amend-

10a

ment to the Constitution) who is alleged to

be in violation of (A) an emission standard

or limitation under this chapter or (B) an

order issued by the Administrator or a State

with respect to such a standard or limita-

tion, or

(2) against the Administrator where

there is alleged a failure of the Administra-

tor to perform any act or duty under this

chapter which is not discretionary with the

Administrator.

The district courts shall have jurisdiction, with-

out regard to the amount in controversy or the

citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an

emission standard or limitation, or such an or-

der, or to order the Administrator to perform

such act or duty, as the case may be.

(b) Notice.

No action may be commenced—

(1) under subsection (a)(1) of this sec-

tion—

(A) prior to 60 days after the plaintiff

has given notice of the violation (i) to the

Administrator, (ii) to the State in which

lla

any person may intervene as a matter of

right.

(2) under subsection (a) (2) of the section

prior to 60 days after the plaintiff has given

notice of such action to the Administrator.

except that such action may be brought im-

mediately after such notification in the case of

an action under this section respecting a viola-

tion of section 1857c-7(c)(1)(B) of this title or

order issued by the Administrator pursuant

to section 1857c-8(a) of this title. Notice under

this subsection shall be given in such manner as

the Administrator shall prescribe by regulation.

(c) Venue; intervention by Administrator.

(1) Any action respecting a violation by a

12a

(e) Non-restriction of other rights.

Nothing in this section shall restrict any right

which any person (or class of persons) may have

under any statute or common law to seek en-

forcement of any emission standard or limita-

tion or to seek any other relief (including relief

against the Administrator or a State agency).

(f) Definition.

For purposes of this section, the term “emis-

sion standard or limitation under this chapter”

means—

(1) aschedule or timetable of compliance,

emission limitation, standard of perform-

ance or emission standard, or

(2) a control or prohibition respecting a

motor vehicle fuel or fuel additive,

which is in effect under this chapter (including

a requirement applicable by reason of section

1857f of this title or under an applicable im-

plementation plan.

Section 307 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. (and Supp. V)

1857h-5 :

(a)(1)' In connection with any determination

under section 1857c-5(f) or section 1857f-1(b)

(5) of this title, or for purposes of obtaining

information YI section 1857f-1(b)(4) or

ye 4) of this title, the Administrator

for the attendance and tes-

many of Giibanen Gul ee onueenalt as

vant papers, books, and documents, and he may

' So in original, Subsec. (a) was enacted without a par. (2).

18a

administer oaths. Except for emission data, upon

a showing satisfactory to the Administrator by

such owner or operator that such papers, books,

documents, or information or particular part

thereof, if made public, would divulge trade se-

crets or secret processes of such owner or opera-

tor, the Administrator shall consider such rec-

ord, report, or information or particular portion

thereof confidential in accordance with the pur-

poses of section 1905 of Title 18, except that

such paper, book, document, or information may

be disclosed to other officers, employees, or au-

thorized representatives of the United States

concerned with carrying out this chapter, to per-

sons carrying out the National Academy of Sci-

ences’ study and investigation provided for in

section 1857f-1(c) of this title, or when relevant

in any proceeding under this chapter. Witnesses

summoned shall be paid the same fees and mile-

age that are paid witnesses in the courts of the

United States. In case of contumacy or refusal

to obey a subpena served upon any person under

this subparagraph, the district court of the

United States for any district in which such per-

son is found or resides or transacts business, up-

on application by the United States and after no-

tice to such person, shall have jurisdiction to

issue an order requiring such person to appear

and give testimony before the Administrator to

appear and produce papers, books, and documents

before the Administrator, or both, and any fail-

ure to obey such order of the court may be pun-

ished by such court as a contempt thereof.

(b) (1) A petition for review of action of the

Administrator in promulgating any national pri-

l4a

mary or secondary ambient air quality standard,

any emission standard under section 1857c-7 of

this title, any standard of performance under

section 1857c-6 of this title, any standard under

section 1857f-1 of this title (other than a stand-

ard required to be prescribed under section 1857

f-1(b) (1) of this title), any determination un-

der section 1857f-1(b) (5) of this title, any con-

trol or prohibition under section 1857f-6c of this

title or any standard under section 1857f-9 of this

title may be filed only in the United States Court

of Appeals for the District of Columbia. A pe-

tition for review of the Administrator’s action

in approving or promulgating any implementa-

tion plan under section 1857c-5 of this title or

section 1857c-6(d) of this title, may be filed

only in the United States Court of Appeals for

the appropriate circuit. Any such petition shall

be filed within 30 days from the date of such

promulgation or approval, or after such date if

such petition is based solely on grounds arising

after such 30th day.

(2) Action of the Administrator with respect

to which review could have been obtained under

paragraph (1) shal! not be subject to judicial

review in civil or criminal proceedings or en-

forcement.

(c) In any judicial proceeding in which re-

view is sought of a determination under this

chapter required to be made on the record after

notice and opportunity for hearing, if any party

applies to the court for leave to adduce addi-

tional evidence, and shows to the satisfaction

of the court that such additional evidence is ma-

terial and that there were reasonable grounds for

15a

the failure to adduce such evidence in the pro-

ceeding before the Administrator, the court may

order such additional evidence (and evidence in

rebuttal thereof) to be taken before the Admin-

istrator, in such manner and upon such terms

and conditions as to the court may deem proper.

The Administrator may modify his findings as

to the facts, or make new findings, by reason

of the additional evidence so taken and he shall

file such modified or new findings, and his recom-

mendation, if any, for the modification or setting

aside of his original determination, with the re-

turn of such additional evidence.

® wv. &. sovaenwent paimtine orrice; 1977 248283 44

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