Petition — Henry v. United Overseas Marine Corp.

Supreme Court brief1977

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Supreme Court, US ~

FILED

MAY 2 197?

MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

in the Supreme Court of the

Unjted States

October Term, 1976

No 76-1520

ROBERT HENRY,

Petitioner

and HELEN HENRY, h/w

vs.

UNITED OVERSEAS MARINE

CORPORATION,

Respondent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Morris M. SHUSTER,

Myra B. JOSEPHSON,

SHUSTER & BECKMAN,

Attorneys for Petitioner

700 Widener Building

1339 Chestnut Street

Philadelphia, Pa. 19107

Murrelle Printing Co., Law Printers, Box 100, Sayre, Pa. 18840

~

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PETITION:

Statutory Provisions Involved .................c0seceeeeeees

eB GI perrnsterieinrieneienen

Reasons for Granting the Writ:

I. The Supreme Court Should Grant Certiorari

To Resolve Important Questions of Federal

Law Posed by the 1972 Enactment of 33

2 10

A. Pre-amendment law—a brief summary 10

B. §905(b) and post-amendment law—the

unanswered questions .......................00++ 13

C. Why certiorari in this case ...................... 25

APPENDIX

Sur Petition for Rehearing ....................cccccccccceeeeeoee la

SD GED ciccenctnsrensinsnntntatnnstntennsmenmensenmncnnenses 2a

a Be irittiicecititniitititienitnriatsiinaitictesta tea 4a

EEE GES TTIED cccccecsctterctcceeeenmncen 5a

TABLE OF CITATIONS

CASES:

Anuszewski vs. Dynamic Mariner Corp., Panama,

540 F.2d 757 (4th Cir. 1976) 00. 15

i

Ballwanz vs. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 319 F.2d 457

I I i aie 16

Barlow’s, Inc. vs. Usery, 424 F. Supp. 437 (D.

Idaho 1976), probable jurisdiction noted

a 18

Brown vs. Ivarans Rederi A/S, 545 F.2d 854 (3rd

Cir. 1976), pet. for cert. filed 2/26/77, No.

pERESS SRE AN AT ree OS 9, 15,17, 18

Ferrante vs. Swedish American Lines, 331 F.2d

,f ( % Peni: ca eee

2,9, 12, 14, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 25

Fisher vs. United States Lines Co., 198 F. Supp. 815

Oe eee 12,17

Gay vs. Ocean Transport & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d

a ee eee 15

Giacona vs. Capricorn Shipping Co., 394 F. Supp.

ff ee 15

Guerra vs. Bulk Transport Corp., et al., 546 F.2d

§ 4, | asks 15, 16

Gutierrez vs. Waterman Steamship Corp., 373 U.S.

ee ee

2,9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 25

Kermerac vs. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,

I 11

Knox vs. United States Lines, 294 F.2d 354 (3rd

a RRR eR NEAR 12

Lindsay, Executrix vs. McDonnell Douglas Air-

craft Corporation, 460 F.2d 631 (8th Cir.

RSS SERS ae eee 17

Marant vs. Farrell Lines, Inc., No. 76-1383 (3rd

ia 17

Napoli vs. Hellenic Lines Ltd., 536 F.2d 505 (2nd

FR Re ee ee ae 15

Ryan Stevedoring Co. vs. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp.,

Se es Ge CED eiterectennennsensenseeneesenen 20

Slaughter vs. S.S. Ronde, et al., 390 F. Supp. 637

ee GE, RD cendinetseeeentitioninn 15

Teofilovich vs. d’Amico Mediterranean/Pacific

Line, No. CV 75-1269 (C.D. Cal. 6/11/76) .. 24

Victory Carriers, Inc. vs. Law, 404 U.S. 202

SII icissdhsoatissieterstiadinasstataidsinaaiaininadiieailininsiendigtedions 20

West vs. United States, 361 U.S. 118 (1959) ....... 12

STATUTES:

Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensa-

tion Act, 33 U.S.C.A.:

III - dintasdipteipareeamusnnes 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14,

15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 25, 26

IIIIED: | qcpsesiiiisienmenmiendigesnsembtguunveiduea 4,5

II ania ssidasiteieatatei aint tiathleneaeneneeemeeraentemmneie 5

Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29

U.S.C.A. §651, et seq. ..........000 17, 18, 21, 24, 26

RF 2

TEXTS:

Restatement (2d) of Torts:

Ee 12

eae 12

ee 12

Ee 12

STI inetenseuipenesiatenemammneniantmninnsimisninennmmmsnenmennes 12, 16

ee 12, 16

oe 12, 16

ee 12

$414, and coms. a and c thereto ...................... 18

Restatement of Torts:

TUTTIIOY cnsinernesiaesinndiilimensidancemnnnssienieidetiinbiaimeiamiimeanimenest 12

MISCELLANEOUS:

Cooper and Company Longshoring Study Report,

. se ew 21, 26

Gilmore and Black, The Law of Admiralty, 2d Ed.

GRUTOTED ‘cenbiestnssencinnensiisieaneneesabliatintnennisntsenmnniatiiiadsiatd 11,17

Harper & Kime, The Duty To Control the Con-

duct of Another, 43 Yale L.J. 886 (1933-

aE 12

House Report, No. 92-1441 (9/25/72), 1972 US.

Code Cong. & Adm. News 4698, et seq. ....13, 15, 22

Robertson, David W., Negligence Actions by Long-

shoremen Against Shipowners Under the 1972

Amendments to the Longshoremen’s and Har-

bor Workers’ Compensation Act, 7 Journal of

Maritime Law and Commerce 447 (April,

SD. ceuvcennesensesncsnensnmniennennnnennsreqmemnenenenin 15

Senate Report, No. 92-1125 (9/14/72) ............00+0. 13

iv

Opinions Below

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

THIRD CIRCUIT

The Petitioner, Robert Henry, respectfully prays that

a writ of certiorari be issued to review the judgment

without a full opinion of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit, entered on January 6, 1977,

rehearing denied February 2, 1977.

OPINIONS BELOW

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit rendered its judgment order affirming the decision

of the court below on January 6, 1977 (2a). Petition

for rehearing en banc was denied on February 2, 1977

(la). The opinion in the District Court was rendered

orally from the bench on March 12, 1976 (5a). How-

ever, since the affirmation on appeal, shipowner’s counsel

has requested that the District Court publish its opinion,

which said Court has agreed to do.

Jurisdiction and Questions Presented

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28

US.C.A. §1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Where the facts are undisputed and Respondent con-

cedes that Petitioner would have prevailed under pre-33

U.S.C.A. §905(b) maritime negligence law pursuant to

Gutierrez vs. Waterman Steamship Corp., 373 U.S. 206

(1963), and Ferrante vs. Swedish American Lines, 331

F.2d 571 (3rd Cir. 1964), should not the Supreme Court

grant certiorari now to decide the following important

questions of Federal law:

1. Since §905(b) authorizes a negligence remedy

against the vessel “in accordance with .. . §33,” and

Congress reenacted §33(a) and (i) without amendment,

did Congress intend to preserve and continue intact pre-

amendment maritime negligence law, as developed by the

Federal Courts, or to preserve some but not all of pre-

amendment law, or to preserve none of it?

2. Does the lower courts’ rejection of the Gutierrez-

Ferrante standard of care further or thwart a paramount

objective of Congress in enacting §905(b) of promoting

safety in the hazardous longshoring industry?

Questions Presented

3. Do repeated Congressional statements, that

§905 (b) will place the harbor worker and the vessel on

the same footing as an employe: and a land-based third

party, mean that the vessel would only be liable when

it is at fault, or is it also a mandate to the Federal Courts

to develop a new standard of care for vessel owners by

adopting land-based negligence principles which were

previously found repugnant to maritime negligence law?

Statutory Provisions Involved

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

1. 33 US.C.A. $905 (b):

In the event of injury to a person covered under this

Act caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such person,

the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly

stevedoring services, no such action shall be permitted if

the injury was caused by the negligence of persons en-

gaged in providing stevedoring services to the vessel. If

provi

mitted if the injury was caused by the

persons engaged in providing ship building

repair ser-

vices to the vessel. The liability of the vessel under this

subsection shall not be based upon the warranty of sea-

worthiness or a breach thereof at the time the injury

occurred. The remedy provided in this subsection shall

2. 33 USCA. §933(a):

If an account of a disability or death for which com-

pensation is payable under this Act the person entitled to

such compensation determines that some person other

Statutory Provisions Involved

than the employer or a person or persons in his employ

is liable in damages, he need not elect whether to receive

such compensation or to recover damages against such

third person.

3. 33 US.C.A. §933(i):

(i) The right to compensation or benefits under this

Act shall be the exclusive remedy to an employee when

he is injured, or to his eligible survivors or legal repre-

sentatives if he is killed, by the negligence or wrong of

any other person or persons in the same employ: Pro-

vided, That this provision shall not affect the liability

of a person other than an officer or employee of the

Statement of the Case

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This diversity personal injury action was brought by

Robert Henry, a longshoreman, against a foreign ship-

owner and it is governed by maritime law. On March

12, 1976, the action, by agreement, proceeded as though

a jury had been impaneled, with plaintiff resting after

introducing into evidence the parties’ stipulation and sup-

plemental stipulation of facts. Shipowner then moved

for a directed verdict under F.R.C.P. 50. The parties

had agreed that if the Court denied the motion, then judg-

ment would be entered for Henry by agreement in the

amount of $30,000. The Court, however, granted the

motion. At the same time, the Court rendered its opinion

from the bench. Judgment was entered in favor of the

shipowner, which was later affirmed by the Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit.

On February 28, 1973, Robert Henry, a longshore-

man, was employed by Northern Metal Company, a

stevedoring company, along with other longshoremen, to

discharge cargo from the shipowner’s vessel, the SS Pacific

Breeze. Henry and the other members of his gang were

assigned to work in the vessel’s No. 3 lower tween-deck.

The cargo discharge operation was pursuant to permis-

sion and authority of the shipowner and by virtue of a

contract between the stevedore and the vessel's time

charterer.

The cargo to be discharged from the No. 3 tween-

deck consisted of crates of plywood which were first un-

Statement of the Case

loaded and bales of hemp. The bales of hemp weighed

approximately 275 pounds each and were stowed in the

forward part of the hatch and continued aft along ap-

proximately one-quarter of the coaming on botn sides

so that the stow was in a “U” shape. The hemp was

stowed 7 or 8 bales high and the entire stow was 14 to

16 feet off the deck.

The longshoremen commenced to discharge the hemp

at about 10:10 a.m. The actual discharge of the hemp

had been in progress for approximately 342 hours prior

to Henry’s accident. During that time period, the long-

shoremen used the same equipment and followed the

same method of discharge. The equipment used in the

discharge consisted of the vessel’s winches, for which the

ship supplied the power, the vessel’s booms and runners,

and the stevedore’s bale hooks.

The longshoremen were not supplied any staging to

do their work. Therefore, since they were unable to reach

the top of the stow, they placed their bale hooks in the

bales on the face or front of the stow as high as possible.

The bale hooks were then attached to the ship’s booms

and runners, and the ship’s winches pulled the bales from

the stow and out of the hatch. By discharging in this way,

bales which remained in the stow were caused to shift

and/or fall. This method of discharge was authorized

and approved by Northern Metal’s gang boss and ship

boss, but not by its stevedoring superintendent.

Prior to Henry’s accident, the vessel's chief mate

and third mate made periodic inspections of the cargo

operation in the No. 3 lower tween-deck. Prior to Henry's

accident, the chief mate and third mate had actual knowl-

Statement of the Case

edge that the method being used to discharge the hemp

was not reasonably safe. Prior to Henry’s accident, the

chief mate and third mate had actual knowledge of the

reasonably safe method of discharge of the hemp, i.e.,

discharge the hemp from the very top tier down. North-

ern Metal’s stevedoring superintendent, who was the ship

and gang bosses’ supervisor, also had this knowledge.

Nonetheless, at no time prior to Henry’s accident did

the chief mate or third mate stop the discharge by cutting

off the power to the vessel’s winches until the method of

discharge was made reasonably safe or take any other

corrective action, such as warning the stevedoring super-

intendent that the method of discharge that was con-

tinually being used was not reasonably safe.

Henry was injured at about 2:30 p.m. when bales

of hemp fell from the stow and struck him.

Henry’s accident occurred subsequent to the 1972

enactment of §905(b) of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor

Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §901, ef seq.

(LHWCA).

The District Court held that this amendment altered

pre-existing general maritime negligence law; that Con-

gress did not intend to make a vessel owner liable for

failure to take any corrective action when he knows of

a stevedore’s improper method of operation except only

when the shipowner has exercised control over the man-

ner or method of doing the work.

The Third Circuit's judgment order which affirmed

the District Court specifically cited those portions of the

lower court’s opinion, turning on control over the man-

Statement of the Case

ner or method of doing the work, as well as a prior 33

U.S.C.A. §905(b) decision in Brown vs. Ivarans Rederi

A/S, 545 F.2d 854 (3rd Cir. 1976), petition for cert.

filed 2/26/77, No. 76-1182.

The courts below rejected Petitioner’s contentions

that (1) the negligence standard set forth in Gutierrez

vs. Waterman Steamship Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963),

and followed in Ferrante vs. Swedish American Lines,

331 F.2d 571 (3rd Cir. 1964), were still applicable after

the 1972 enactment of §905(b); (2) Congress did not

intend to overrule or replace the Gutierrez-Ferrante negli-

gence standard by the enactment of the 1972 Amendments

to the LHWCA, since that negligence standard furthered

a paramount Congressional objective of promoting safety

in the hazardous longshoring industry; (3) in enacting

the 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA, Congress recog-

nized, endorsed and preserved the pre-existing judicial

methodology in developing maritime negligence principles.

10

Reasons for Granting the Writ

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. The Supreme Court Should Grant Certiorari To

Resolve Important Questions of Federal Law Posed by the

1972 Enactment of 33 U.S.C.A. §905 (b)

A. Pre-Amendment Law—A Brief Summary:

Prior to the 1972 enactment of §905(b), this Court

had evolved two distinct bases for harbor workers and

seamen to recover damages under maritime tort law.

One was unseaworthiness, the other was negligence.

Initially, in 1903, the unseaworthiness remedy, liability

without fault, was held available to seamen. In 1920,

through the passage of the Jones Act, a negligence rem-

edy, liability based on fault, was provided for seamen.

In 1926, this Court held that the Jones Act negligence

remedy also was available for longshoremen. Six months

thereafter, the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’

Compensation Act (LHWCA) was enacted, with its ex-

clusive liability provision granted to the stevedore, the

longshoreman’s employer. The longshoreman’s right to

sue third parties, including shipowners, was left unim-

paired.

In 1946, this Court held that the unseaworthiness

remedy, available to seamen, was also available to long-

shoremen. From 1946 to 1972, this Court has held

that both seamen and longshoremen, who do work

traditionally done by seamen, are entitled individually

11

Reasons for Granting the Writ

and/or jointly, to the unseaworthiness and negligence

remedy against the shipowner. During the same time

period, this Court also has held that the shipowner was

entitled, in most instances, to recover full indemnity

from the stevedore so that the stevedore in effect bore

the cost of the longshoreman's damages, notwithstanding

the exclusive liability provision of the LHWCA.

These developments led to a substantial number of

maritime tort cases, to be filed and decided by the Fed-

eral Courts. However, decisions based on the negli-

gence/fault remedy were relatively sparse in compari-

son with the unseaworthiness/no-fault remedy, which

was a less burdensome basis for recovery. For a full

history with citations and discussion of these develop-

ments, see Gilmore and Black, The Law of Admiralty,

2d Ed., pp. 272-280, 436-448 (1975).

In Kermerac vs. Compagnie Generale Transatlanti-

que, 358 U.S. 625, 632 (1959), an action based on

maritime negligence, this Court held that:

. . . the owner of a ship in navigable waters

owes to all who are on board for purposes not

inimical to his legitimate interest, the duty of ex-

ercising reasonable care under the circumstances of

each case.

Subsequently, in Gutierrez vs. Waterman Steamship

Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963), this Court, in a longshore-

man’s maritime negligence case, held in an 8-1 decision

and opinion by Mr. Justice White that a shipowner’s duty

of care required the shipowner to take corrective action

when it knew of the stevedore’s unsafe method of op-

12

Reasons for Granting the Writ

eration. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals followed

this precedent without any deviation based on factual

distinctions, Ferrante vs. Swedish American Lines, 331

F.2d 571 (3rd Cir. 1964). In fact, decisions in the

Third Circuit had recognized this duty of care prior to

the Supreme Court's decision in Gutierrez, supra. See

Knox vs. United States Lines, 294 F.2d 354 (3rd Cir.

1961); Fisher vs. United States Lines Co., 198 F. Supp.

815 (E.D. Pa. 1961). Moreover, the development of

this negligence standard reflected the ongoing judicial

process of creativity and flexibility in the development

of a uniform maritime tort law by adopting and/or modi-

fying accepted principles of land-based law relating to

duties arising from special relationships between par-

ties.' See Restatement (2d) of Torts, §§314A, B, 315,

318, 344; Restatement of Torts, §344; Harper & Kime,

The Duty To Control the Conduct of Another, 43 Yaie

L.J. 886 (1933-34). No Federal Court, during the pre-

1972 Amendment era, however, adopted or incorporated

into maritime negligence law land-based principles of

negligence law applicable to landowners such as stated

in Restatement (2d) of Torts, §§342, 343, 343A.

—_—_— le or

'In West vs. United States, 361 U.S. 118 (1959), this Court

held that a shipowner whose vesse] was out of navigation, has

a duty to provide a shipyard worker with a safe place to work

only when the shipowner had control over the ship or control over

the repair work done. The West holding did not deter this Court

from its subsequent ruling in Gutierrez, supra, since during cargo

operations, a vessel js in navigation and the shipowner is in control

of its vewel. Moreover, a basis for a special relationship between

a longshoreman/harbor worker and the vessel owner exists be-

cause of the ship’s officer’s expertise in cargo operations, which

does not exist in shipyard repair operations.

13

Reasons for Granting the Writ

Prior to the 1972 enactment of §905(b), Petitioner

would have at least been entitled to a jury determination

of his claim and would have prevailed in view of the

parties’ stipulation. The shipowner recognized and con-

ceded this in the courts below. The shipowner contended

in the courts below that the enactment of §905(b) re-

sulted in the Congressional overruling of Gutierrez vs.

Waterman Steamship Corp., supra, and its progeny. The

courts below have agreed with this contention.

B. §905(b) and Post-Amendment Law—The Un-

answered Questions:

Section 905 (b) provides for:

(1) a remedy against the vessel (owner) for

injury caused by negligence;

(2) an elimination of the warranty of sea-

worthiness;

(3) an elimination of the vessel's (owner's)

right of indemnity against the stevedore.

The Congressional discussion of these three aspects

of §905(b) are exactly the same in the Senate Report, No.

92-1125, September 14, 1972, and the House Report, No.

92-1441, September 25, 1972, 1972 U.S. Code Cong. &

Adm. News 4698, et seg. It is lumped together under one

heading, “Elimination of Unseaworthiness Remedy,” 1972

U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 4701-05.

Section 905(b) and its legislative history raises at

least these significant federal questions which remain unan-

swered by this Court:

14

Reasons for Granting the Writ

(1) Since §905(b) authorizes a negligence

remedy against the vessel “in accordance with .. .

§33,"" and Congress reenacted §33(a) and (i) with-

out amendment, did Congress intend to preserve and

continue intact pre-amendment maritime negligence

law, as developed by the Federal Courts, or to pre-

serve some but not all of pre-amendment law, or to

preserve none of it?

(2) Does the lower courts’ rejection of the

Gutierrez-Ferrante standard of care further or

thwart a paramount objective of Congress in enacting

$905 (b) of promoting safety in the hazardous long-

shoring industry?

(3) Do repeated Congressional statements,

that §905(b) will place the harbor worker and the

vessel on the same footing as an employee and a land-

based third party, mean that the vessel would only

be liable when it is at fault, or is it also a mandate to

the Federal Courts to develop a new standard of

care for vessel owners by adopting land-based negli-

gence principles which were previously found repug-

nant to maritime negligence law?

(4) Under §905(b), are the negligence stan-

dards applicable to longshoremen the same as those

standards applicable to seamen?

(5) In eliminating the vessel's right to in-

demnity, did Congress intend to narrow the vessel’s

duty to exercise reasonable care?

Questions 1, 3 and 4 are related. Among the Courts

of Appeals which have passed upon the negligence stan-

15

Reasons for Granting the Writ

dard of care issue, all of them, Second, Third, Fourth and

Fifth Circuits, have held that §905(b) creates a new negli-

gence action.’ Napoli vs. Hellenic Lines Lid., 336 F.2d

505 (2nd Cir. 1976); Brown vs. lvarans Rederi A/S, 545

F.2d 854 (3rd Cir. 1976); Anuszewski vs. Dynamic

Mariner Corp., Panama, 540 F.2d 757 (4th Cir. 1976);

Gay vs. Ocean Transport and Trading, Lid. and Guerra

vs. Bulk Transport Corp., et al., 346 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir.

1977).

The Second, Fourth and Fifth Circuits, in reaching

this conclusion, have relied primarily on a statement in

the Congressional Reports that for the vessel to be liable,

it must act “in a negligent manner such as would render

a land-based third party in nonmaritime pursuits liable un-

der similar circumstances.” 1972 U.S. Code Cong. &

Adm. News 4704. Of all the generally accepted land-

based negligence principles available to the Second, Fourth

and Fifth Circuits, they have opted for the restrictive land-

based principles applicable to owners and possessors of

land. No reason or logic or policy is given for this choice.

In the name of uniformity, the Restatement (2d) of Torts

* Prior to the Cireuit Courts’ decisions, most District Courts’

decisions also held that $905 b) ereated a new negligence action.

Two Distriet Courts, however, have held that $905 b) did pot

create a new negligence action, Slaughter vs. 8. 8. Ronde, et al,

390 F. Supp. 637, 640 (8.1. Ga. 1974), and Giacona vs. Capricorn

Shipping Co., 394 PF. Supp. 1189, 1192-94 (S.D. Tex. 1975). See

Robertson, David W.. Negligence Actions by Longshoremen

Against Shipowners Under the 1972 Amedments to the Long

shoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 7 Journal of

Maritime Law and Commeree 447 (April, 1976), where the

author effeetively reviews and analyzes all post-$905(b) litiga-

iton throughout the country to the date of publication.

16

Reasons for Granting the Writ

has been utilized by these courts as a statement of the

applicable legal principles.

The Fourth Circuit has opted for §343. The Second

Circuit has rejected §343 and has chosen §343A. The

Fifth Circuit has selected §§342, 343 and 343A, with an

indicated preference for §343A. However, that Circuit has

held that §343A is not applicable when the danger is

initially created by the stevedore, since this is not the type

of danger the longshoreman must face, notwithstanding

knowledge, Guerra vs. Bulk Transport Corp., et al., supra,

p. 1242. This conclusion is contrary to the poignant de-

scription of the longshoreman’s plight in Ballwanz vs.

Isthmian Lines, Inc., 319 F.2d 457, 462 (4th Cir. 1963),

where the Court stated:

The plaintiff was one of a gang of eight long-

shoremen working in the hold of the defendant ship.

He had no responsibility for, or authority over, any

of his fellow workers. His duty was to do his work

as he was instructed. He was in no sense obligated

to protest against the method of operation which he

had been instructed to follow or to devise a safer

method, nor was he obligated to call for additional

or different equipment.

The opinions of these Circuits do not consider or dis-

cuss whether such negligence standards further Congress’

intention to promote safety. The opinions of these Cir-

cuits do not consider that, historically, the Federal Courts

in the development of maritime tort law prior to the enact-

ment of §905(b) incorporated recognized land-based neg-

ligence principles, but never had adopted the restrictive

negligence standards applicable to landowners because of

17

Reasons for Granting the Writ

their assumption of risk underpinning. See Gutierrez vs.

Waterman Steamship Corp., supra; Ferrante vs. Swedish

American Lines, supra; Fisher vs. United States Lines Co.,

supra; Lindsay, Executrix vs. McDonnell Douglas Air-

craft Corporation, 460 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1972). More-

over, these opinions do not consider pre-§905 (b) maritime

negligence decisions by this Court on the assumption that

§905(b) wiped the slate clean. There is also an im-

plicit rejection without discussion or ana. /sis of the cogent

position taken by the respected legal writers, Gilmore and

Black, that the negligence standards under $905 (b) should

be the same as those applicable to seamen, Gilmore and

Black, The Law of Admiralty, 2d Ed., pp. 453-455.

The Third Circuit has taken a different route. It has

rejected §343A because of its assumption of risk under-

pinning, Brown vs. /varans Rederi A/S, supra, pp. 863-

864. In Brown, supra, the Court held that pre-Amend-

ment maritime negligence law continues to govern the

longshoreman’s negligence action against the vessel, so

long as such pre-amendment legal principles are not in-

consistent with §905(b). The Court suggested and later

held in Marant vs. Farrell Lines, Inc., No. 76-1383 (3rd

Cir. 1977), opinion reproduced in Brown vs. Ivarans

Rederi A/S, petition for cert. No. 76-1182, that the Oc-

cupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 US.C.A.

§651, et seqg., and the longshoring safety regulations there-

under, which were a part of the pre-§905(b) maritime

law, mandated in the post-§905(b) era that the major

responsibility for the safe conduct of the work be borne

by the stevedore.’

* However, reliance on OSHA to effectively enforce safety

regulations and enforee accident prevention measures by the

18

Reasons for Granting the Writ

Thus, the vessel's potential liability was narrowed

when the stevedore’s negligence was a contributing cause

of the accident. In Petitioner's case, the Court extended

this principle and held that where the stevedore is initially

negligent, the vessel, despite actual knowledge and ability

to take corrective action, has no duty to exercise reason-

able care."

In Petitioner’s case, neither the District Court nor

the Court of Appeals, which cited Brown, supra, analyzed

or discussed why their rejection of the Gutierrez-Ferrante

duty was mandated by §905 (b) , or why and how this duty

was inconsistent with §905 (b) .

Thus, the Third Circuit, along with the Fourth and

Fifth Circuits, have answered Question (2) and related

stevedore is being undermined at another level. Recent judicial

developments hamper OSHA's investigatory power, holding that

inspections without a warrant, pursuant to OSHA regulations,

are a violation of the Fourth Amendment, Barlow's, Inc. vs. Usery,

424 F. Supp. 437 (D. Idaho 1976), probable jurisdiction noted

April 18, 1977, No. 76-1143. For the longshoreman, it looks like

Cateh-22.

‘In affirming the Distriet Court, the Court of Appeals held

that a vessel's duty of care would exist if it exercised control

over the stevedore’s work method. This, too, is a recognized land-

based negligence principle. See Restatement (2d) of Torts, $414.

However, the Distriet Court, with the implicit approval of the

Court of Appeals, opted for Restatement (2d) of Torts, §414,

com. e's, rather than com. a’s, deseription of control. These

comments are contradictory. Under eom. a, Henry would be

entitled to a jury determination of the “control” issue, and under

com. ¢, he would not. Moreover, where the duty of care arises

from a special relationship such as the Gutierrez-Perrante duty,

the control required is over the premises or the chattel generally,

and not the specifie details of the work being done.

19

Reasons for Granting the Writ

Question (5) above. Without discussion or analysis,

those Circuits have concluded that the Gutierrez-Ferrante

standard of care was inconsistent with and thwarted a

paramount Congressional objective of promoting safety

in the hazardous longshoring industry. The development

of an important body of Federal law should not be per-

mitted to stand on such misguided and unspoken founda-

tions. The Gutierrez-Ferrante duty of care does promote

safety. It is not inconsistent with §905(b). The follow-

ing analysis will substantiate these conclusions.

Shipowners (in an amici brief filed below) argued

that to expose them to liability for negligence under Peti-

tioner’s circumstances results in removing the incentive

for the stevedore to be safe and, in fact, encourages the

stevedore to engage in unsafe practices. The heart of this

argument lies in the Congressional enactment which in-

sulates the stevedore from any liability to the shipowner

arising from the shipowner’s liability to the longshoreman.

Shipowners initially attempted to convince the courts that

concurrent negligence principles should not apply under

the Amendments. Shipowners argued that it would be

manifestly unfair to require them to pay one hundred per

cent of the damages when they were not one hundred per

cent at fault and the stevedore was not only not required

to contribute, but was reimbursed its compensation pay-

ments from the recovery made from the. shipowner. The

courts have thus far uniformly rejected this argument.

The shipowners have now turned this argument to

attempt to convince the courts to interpret the 1972

Amendments to place a very narrow burden or duty upon

them to exercise reasonable care. They now argue that

to hold the shipowner and the stevedore concurrently neg-

20

Reasons for Granting the Writ

ligent under Petitioner's facts would result in a windfall

to the stevedore and destroy the stevedore’s incentive to

eliminate dangerous conditions or practices which the

stevedore has created aboard the vessel. The effect of this

argument would be to leave exclusively to the stevedore

the responsibility for eliminating such conditions.”

When the 1972 Amendments are viewed against pre-

1972 Amendment history, it is evident that Congress did

not intend to leave that responsibility exclusively to the

stevedore. Prior to the 1972 Amendments, the law,

through the “Ryan” bridge, created a greater economic

incentive on the stevedore to avoid unsafe and dangerous

work practices than presently exists under the 1972

Amendments. Prior to the 1972 Amendments, the steve-

dore was liable not only for compensation, but was also

liable to fully indemnify the shipowner who was liable

to a longshoreman under the Gutierrez-Ferrante doctrine

of negligence. Despite this economic incentive, high in-

jury frequency rates persisted and escalated in the long-

shoring industry.’

*The loss from avoidable unsafe methods employed by the

stevedore would then be allocated between the stevedore and the

longshoreman. Here, as in any compensation system, the in-

jured employee bears part of the cost for injuries caused by

avoidable unsafe practices, ie., loss of one-third earnings, loss

of recovery for physieal and mental pain and suffering.

* Ryan Stevedoring Co. vs, Pan-Atlantic 8.8. Corp., 350 US.

124 (1956).

* Longshoring has long been recognized as an extremely

hazardous oceupation. The injury statisties cited by Justice

Douglas in his dissent in Victory Carriers, Inc. vs. Law, 404 US.

202, 218 (1971), revealed 92.3 accidents per million man hours

worked, indicating that a stevedoring employee whw works fairly

21

Reasons for Granting the Writ

At the same time, the accident prevention incentive

of the Gutierrez-Ferrante negligence doctrine on the ship-

owner was completely diluted by the “Ryan” bridge. This

occurred because the shipowner could recoup all losses

from the stevedore resulting from the shipowner’s failure

to act reasonably to prevent unsafe stevedore work prac-

tices or conditions of which the shipowner knew or should

have known.

In view of the above, the following realities existed

prior to the 1972 Amendments:

1. The economic and coercive incentives to elimi-

nate unsafe working conditions by the stevedore was in

fact exclusively on the stevedore.

2. The exposure of the shipowner for negligence

as an incentive for him to correct unsafe stevedore work

conditions involving ship’s equipment, of which he knew

or should have known, was ineffectual because of the

shipowner’s right to indemnity. .

3. There existed countervailing factors or incen-

tives which negated the cost savings incentive of accident

reduction for the stevedore, such as graphically detailed

in a section of the Cooper and Company Federally-funded

regularly can expect an accident roughly every five years. Con-

cerned about the high longshoring accident rate, the Oceupa-

tional Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), which ad-

ministers the maritime safety program, commissioned a private

consulting firm, Cooper and Company, to conduct a research

study of the longshoring industry. According to that report, in

1971, the lost time injuries per million employee hours increased

to 71.1, as compared to 69.1 in 1970, Cooper and Company Long-

shoring Study Report, Feb. 5, 1976.

22

Reasons for Granting the Writ

study of the longshoring industry. The negative incentives

cited by the report include the push for higher produc-

tivity and shorter loading time, since stevedoring time is

considered dead time. Thus, shipping company operators

have economic pressures to have loading and unloading

conducted as quickly as possible, which results in cutting

corners and taking chances. The study also noted that

there are negative incentives on management operating

against accident reduction measures, despite the high in-

surance premiums and high cost of accidents. These fac-

tors include the fact that stevedores and shipping com-

panies are closely linked and that often, owners of shipping

companies also own the stevedores, and/or that many

shipping companies do their own stevedoring.

It is against this background of the 1972 Amendments

that the following Congressional statement* must be meas-

ured, 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News at 4704:

Thus, nothing in the bill is intended to derogate

from the vessel’s responsibility to take appropriate

corrective action when it knows or should have

known about a dangerous condition.

The 1972 Amendments encompass more than com-

promises to allocate the cost of longshore injuries between

the longshoreman, the shipowner and the stevedore. The

elimination of the shipowner’s right of indemnity from

the stevedore now creates a meaningful economic incen-

“Congress has also stated: “. . . it would be fairer to all

concerned and fully consistent with the objective of protecting the

health and safety of employees who work on board vessels for the

liability of vessels as third parties to be predicated on negligence,

rather than the no-fault concept of unseaworthiness ... .” 1972

U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News at 4703.

23

Reasons for Granting the Writ

tive for the shipowner, through its officers who are trained

in cargo operations safety,” to participate in accident pre-

vention when it knows or should know of a stevedore’s

unsafe or dangerous work practice or condition, which in-

volves ship’s equipment, since otherwise the shipowner

alone will bear the total cost of the loss.

Moreover, this incentive also results in giving the

shipowner the motivation to maintain an ongoing business

relationship with the stevedore who follows safe work

practices with the resultant reduced accident probability.

Such a stevedore will thus reduce the likelihood of the

shipowner bearing the cost of the loss, as well as the

cost necessary to defend any claim against the shipowner.

The argument made by the shipowners that carrying

forward the Gutierrez-Ferrante doctrine of negligence into

the 1972 Amendment era would create an incentive for

the stevedore to adopt unsafe practices is unrealistic. To

*For example, the Merchant Marine Academy in Kings

Point, New York, was established in 1943 under the Maritime

Administration of the Department of Commerce. It offers a

four-year undergraduate program to prepare and train deck and

engineering officers. In the catalogue for 1975-1976, courses in

cargo are listed as mandatory for those students pursuing the

nautical science curriculum, the course of study which prepares

deck officers. U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, Catalogue 1975-

1976 at 28, 32. The course descriptions indicate that safety in

cargo operations and mathematics of cargo stowage to fulfill prin-

ciples of cargo handling are included. Jd. at 47. The Catalogue

also states that “(d)eck officers are responsible for the safe navi-

gation of the vessel, loading and discharge of cargo, vessel mainte-

nance and shipboard safety.” Jd. at 50. The curriculum is thus

designed to train deck officers in cargo safety to enable them to

accept and fulfill their professional responsibilities.

24

Reasons for Granting the Writ

the contrary, the Gutierrez-Ferrante doctrine of negligence

gives to the stevedore these additional incentives to act

initially in a safe manner beyond the cost of compensation

and the OSHA regulations:

1. A stevedore will know that if it engages in unsafe

work practices aboard a vessel, that it will likely be stopped

and subject to economic loss by payment to the shipowner

for his loss sustained by a work stoppage for this reason.”

2. A stevedore will know that it is subject to lose

the business of a shipowner who is exposed to liability

as a result, in part, of the stevedore’s unsafe work practices.

These factors clearly nullify the questionable nega-

tive incentive which may come from the windfall recoup-

ment by the stevedore of compensation payments'' under

these circumstances.

Congress clearly intended to provide job safety in-

centives to both the stevedore and the shipowner as to

In Teofilovich vs. d’ Amico Mediterranean/Pacific Line, No.

CV 75-1269 (C.D. Cal. June 11, 1976), the Court noted at p.

13 that: “. . . if a condition is found which is unsafe for the

professional longshoremen, as a rule the contractor can remedy it

at the expense of the shipowner ; that if the stevedoring operations

are thereby delayed, the shipowner normally must pay for standby

time ....°’ If, as the Teofilovich court recognized, the stevedore

may charge the shipowner for idle standby time resulting from

unsafe conditions aboard created by the vessel, then conversely,

the v sel can remedy unsafe stevedoring methods in a similar

fashion—by providing by contract that they will be remedied at

the stevedore’s expense and that the stevedore must bear the

economic brunt of any delays thus occasioned.

"' It is uncertain whether the repayment of past com pensa-

tion benefits in any way affects future compensation insurance

rates. There is nothing in this record which indicates this.

25

Reasons for Granting the Writ

the manner that the stevedore performed its work aboard

a vessel which involves the use of ship’s equipment. These

incentives would operate together to increase accident pre-

vention activities and promote safety for longshoremen in

the following manner. Initially, the stevedore would be

exposed to the job safety incentives affecting it. If those

job safety incentives did not result in a safe method of

work involving ship’s equipment, then the second line of

defense against avoidable accidents to longshoremen

would tien come into play through the safety incentives

which affect a shipowner through its officers who are

knowledgeable in cargo operations safety, when they know

or should know of the stevedore’s unsafe work method

involving ship’s equipment.

The Gutierrez-Ferrante duty of care, if imposed on

the shipowner pursuant to §905(b), would therefore,

carry out a paramount Congressional objective of requir-

ing both the stevedore and the shipowner to become in-

volved in accident prevention by providing each with

appropriate incentives to do so.

C. Why Certiorari in This Case:

This Court should exercise jurisdiction in Petitioner's

case because it is an appropriate one in which to decide

some, if not all, of the important Federal law questions

discussed above.

In Petitioner’s case, the facts are not in dispute. Re-

spondent has conceded that, under the pre-amendment

maritime negligence law, Petitioner would prevail. Thus,

Petitioner’s case places sharply into focus several of the

questions posed by the enactment of §905(b).

Reasons for Granting the Writ

Moreover, a decision in this case, irrespective of the

result, will terminate this litigation without any further

extensive judicial proceedings. On the assumption that

this Court will eventually address itself to the questions

raised here, judicial economy will thus be promoted by

this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction under these circum-

stances.

Nearly 412 years have elapsed since §905(b) be-

came law. In that time period, it has been determined

that since OSHA's inception, and continuing into the post-

$905 (b) era, the injury frequency rate for longshoring

has not substantially changed."*

During this time period, the Courts of Appeals and

the District Courts have continued to be flooded with liti-

gation to resolve issues posed by §905(b). These courts

have agreed on some issues, disagreed on others, and

have reached results on other issues without discussion or

analysis. It would be appropriate for this Court now

to exercise its jurisdiction over this case to give guidance

to persons affected by §905(b) and to the lower Federal

Courts, as well as to make certain that the Federal Courts

fulfill Congress’ intent and objectives in enacting $905 (b) .

Respectfully submitted,

Morris M. SHUSTER,

Myra B. JOSEPHSON,

Attorneys for Petitioner.

700 Widener Building,

Philadelphia, PA 19107

'? Cooper and Company Longshoring Study Report, February

5, 1976.

la

Order Dated February 2, 1977

APPENDIX

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 76-1618

Helen Henry

Robert Henry

v.

United Overseas Marine Corporation

Robert Henry, Appellant

SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING

Present: Seitz, Chief Judge, and Van Dusen, Al ‘i-

sert, Adams, Gibbons, Rosenn, Hunter, Weis, and Garth,

Circuit Judges, and Knox, District Judge.

The petition for rehearing filed by Appellant in the

above entitled case having been submitted to the judges

who participated in the decision of this court and to all

the other available circuit judges of the circuit in regular

active service, and no judge who concurred in the deci-

sion having asked for rehearing, and a majority of the cir-

cuit judges of the circuit in regular active service not hav-

ing voted for rehearing by the court in banc, the petition

for rehearing is denied.

By the Court,

(s) Aldisert

Judge

Dated: February 2, 1977

2a

Judgment Order

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 76-1618

Helen Henry

Robert Henry

V.

United Overseas Marine Corporation

Robert Henry, Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil No. 73-1613)

Argued January 6, 1977 before: Aldisert and Weis,

Circuit Judges, and Knox, District Judge.*

JUDGMENT ORDER

After consideration of all contentions raised by ap-

pellant, and for the reasons set forth in the district court

oral opinion by The Honorable Alfred L. Luongo on

*Hlonorable William W. Knox, of the United States District

Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by desig-

nation.

3a

Judgment Order

March 12, 1976 (as set forth at pages 42a-53a of the

joint appendix)’, it is

ADJUDGED AND ORDERED that the judgment of

the district court be and is hereby affirmed.

Costs taxed against appellant.

By the Court,

(s) Aldisert

Circuit Judge

Attest:

(s) Thomas F. Quinn

Thomas F. Quinn, Clerk

Dated: Jan 6 1977

Certified as a true copy and issued in liew of a formal man-

date on February 10, 1977.

Test :

Thomas F. Quinn

Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circwtt

Costs taxed in favor of appellee as follows;

DUG couséocstesesaul $666.00

See also Brown v. Rederi, —— F.2d —— (No. 76-1087)

(3d Cir., Nov. 4, 1976).

Civil Judgment

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Civil Action No. 73-1613

Robert Henry

vo

United Overseas Marine Corporation

CIVIL JUDGMENT

Before Honorable Alfred L. Luongo

AND NOW, this 12th day of March 1976, in ac-

cordance with civil jury trial, and the Court having

GRANTED defendant's motion for directed verdict,

IT IS ORDERED that Judgment be and the same

is hereby entered in favor of defendant United Overseas

Marine Corporation and against plaintiff Robert Henry,

together with costs.

By the Court:

Attest: (s) Lee V. A. Yates

Deputy Clerk

Civ1 8/75

Argument on Motions

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Civil Action No. 73-1613

Robert Henry

vs.

United Overseas Marine Corporation

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

March 12, 1976

Before: Hon. Alfred L. Luongo, J.

ARGUMENT ON MOTIONS

THE COURT: All right, in the matter of Henry

versus United Overseas.

MR. SHUSTER: If Your Honor pleases, so that

Your Honor may be in the appropriate procedural pos-

ture to decide the matter now pending before you, Mr.

White and I have agreed that Your Honor may proceed

as if a jury had been empaneled in this matter and heard

6a

Argument on Motions

the evidence which will be presented to you upon which

Mr. White is going to make his motion.

MR. WHITE: And I certainly agree with that pro-

cedure, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Then we will assume for

this purpose that the jury had been empaneled and you

may now proceed.

MR. SHUSTER: If Your Honor please, at this

time I would like to formally offer into evidence the stip-

ulation and supplemental stipulation of the parties which

are already filed of record.

THE COURT: And they are marked and docketed

as Documents Nos. 43 and 44.

MR. SHUSTER: With that, sir, the plaintiff rests.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. White.

MR. WHITE: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Before you make the argument, you

have a motion?

MR. WHITE: Yes. I would come up to the micro-

phone and make the motion.

THE COURT: Just for the moment make the mo-

tion from there and then I want to make a brief statement.

MR. WHITE: Your Honor, pursuant to Rule 50

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendant

moves for a directed verdict at the conclusion of plain-

tiff’s evidence.

THE COURT: I am agreeable to proceed in the

fashion requested by counsel since the stipulation which

7a

Argument on Motions

has been filed contemplates filing a motion for directed

verdict under Rule 50 by the defendant, and the stipula-

tion proceeds further to provide that in the event the Court

denies the defendant's motion for directed verdict, in such

case judgment is to be entered by agreement for the plain-

tiff, Robert Henry, against the defendant in the amount

of $30,000. It is clear, therefore, that the parties have

covered every contingency for the function of the jury,

and I am, therefore, agreeable to proceed in this fashion.

And, Mr. White, you may now argue your motion.

MR. WHITE: Thank you, Your Honor.

If Your Honor please, as a result of a stipulation

that has been entered into between the parties, there is

certainly no crec ibility issue in this case.

Defendant’s motion for directed verdict is basically

premised on two principles: Namely, that on the stipulat-

ed set of facts, as a matter of law defendant owed no duty

to plaintiff in this matter. That is for Your Honor to de-

cide, whether the facts as stipulated give rise to a duty

owed by the shipowner to plaintiff longshoreman un-

der the 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen and

id

Har-

duty more

con-

is entitled to a directed verdict as a matter of law.

Argument on Motions

1 would like to address myself initially to the duty

that the shipowner owes to a longshoreman under the

amendments, and secondly to the matter of proof based

principally on the arguments relied on by plaintiff in his

brief.

As Your Honor knows, as a result of being on the

panel in Lucas I, the purpose of the 1972 amendments

was to take away the warranty of seaworthiness to the

plaintiff longshoremen and to remove the shipowner’s ac-

tion for indemnity against the stevedore. The reasons

and purpose have been set forth in a number of opinions

and I do not intend to go into that in any great detail ex-

cept to say that the quid pro quo for the shipowner under

the amendments was not only the abolition of its right to

indemnity against the stevedore, but a narrow standard of

care under the negligence action which Congress still per-

mitted. This narrow standard of care, of course, is pur-

suant to land based principles. That, I think, has been

rather well established by the opinions that have ad-

dressed this issue in the past two and three years.

I realize that by analogizing to land based princi-

ples the Court is not bound by any particular law of any

particular state. The Court can refer to land based prin-

ciples, be governed by land based principles, and yet in

effect establish a Federal admiralty common law. But

certainly Congress intended the courts to be guided by

common law or land based principles.

With that brief background I would refer to three

—or two, at any rate, possibly three important facts in

the stipulation that I think are crucial in determining the

motion.

9a

Argument on Motions

The first crucial fact is that the shipowner in this

case did not engage the stevedore. That engagement was

made by the time charterer of the vessel, and the time

charterer is not a party to this lawsuit. There was no con-

tractual relationship between the shipowner and the steve-

dore.

The second fact that is rather clear from the stipula-

tion is that the stevedore was negligent in the manner in

which they discharged the bales of sisal. They pulled out

intermediate tiers causing the topmost tiers to be unsecure,

and as a result of doing this a bale fell and struck Mr.

Henry.

The third factor from the stipulation that | think is

crucial is the fact that the shipowner, through its third

officer and its chief officer, had knowledge of the method

being used by the stevedore. The legal question, there-

fore, is what effect, if any, does that knowledge have in

terms of liability to the shipowner. And defendant sub-

mits it has no effect whatsoever, and does not give rise to

any duty.

We have stipulated that the knowledge that existed

was actual knowledge. For purposes of legal argument,

actual and constructive knowledge are the same. So it

would make no difference whether the third officer and

the chief officer did not have actual knowledge, but that

the condition existed long enough that they would have

constructive knowledge. It makes no difference. The two,

for purposes of argument, are considered in the same

boat, and, again, defendant asserts there is no liability on

the basis of that actual or constructive knowledge.

10a

Argument on Motions

It is our position that the defendant shipowner, once

it turns over the vessel to a stevedore, is obligated to have

the vessel in a reasonably safe condition so that the steve-

dore utilizing its expertise can stevedore the vessel in a

safe manner. Once that is done there is no liability to the

shipowner for anything that happens subsequently as a

result of the improper method of stevedoring that is being

utilized by the stevedore through its employees and su-

pervisory personnel. This is consistent with numerous

state and Federal cases.

In my brief I have pointed out the case of Fisher

versus United States, which was a decision from this cir-

cuit, applying Pennsylvania law. I have referred to the

numerous Pennsylvania cases on the point which all held

that once a landowner—and we are using the landowner

as the analogy for the shipowner—once the landowner

turns the work over to an independent contractor and ex-

ercises no control over that independent contractor in

terms of the methods utilized by that contractor, there is

no liability for an improper method or an unsafe condi-

tion created by that independent contractor through _ its

employees.

Fisher, of course, involved the United States of

America. It was a construction site accident where the

Government had safety inspectors on the job site, and the

court held that the Government, through the personnel it

had on the job site, was not liable for any injury to an

employee of an independent contractor, notwithstanding

that the safety inspectors and supervisors of the Govern-

ment knew or should have known of the dangerous con-

dition which ultimately caused the accident. We have

precisely the same situation in this case.

lla

Argument on Motions

The chief officer and third officer were, of course,

employees of the shipowner, but under Fisher, and the

cases relied on by Fisher, there is no legal duty to do any-

thing; there is no duty created between the employee of

the independent contractor and the landowner, even with

knowledge. And I think this is an accurate reflection of

realities in the modern business world. A _ shipowner

comes into the port, in this case the Pacific Breeze was a

Chinese vessel. It is really unrealistic to assume that a

foreign shipowner operating through a foreign crew is go-

ing to be able to do anything to upgrade the safety pro-

gram of a stevedore when the stevedore utilizes an im-

proper method; unrealistic in terms of a foreign shipown-

er-stevedore relationship.

The stipulation concedes that the stevedore was neg-

ligent. The stipulation includes that the stevedoring su-

pervisory personnel knew that the method being used was

improper. If they knew it already, isn’t it superfluous for

the shipowner, through its crew members to say anything

to them: “Hey, you are using an improper method.” It

is an exercise in futility. They are telling them something

they already know and, therefore, no legal duty should be

created.

In the last part of the stipulation, the original stipu-

lation, there are pointed out four things that the shipown-

er didn’t do, and that has been admitted. The shipowner

didn’t request Northern Metal Company to change the

method. But there is no evidence in the stipulation that

such a request would have been acted on. Therefore, how

can it be a proximate cause of the accident, and plain-

tiff, of course, has the burden of proof on proximate

12a

Argument on Motions

causation. He has to introduce sufficient evidence upon

which reasonable men might conclude that the failure to

make a request was the proximate cause. There has been

no such evidence entered into the record.

Secondly, the stipulation says that there was no sug-

gestion made to Northern Metal by the shipowner that

they change their method. The same argument holds true

with the failure to make a suggestion. There is no evi-

dence that any suggestion would have been followed and,

therefore, as a matter of law it cannot be the proximate

cause of the accident.

Thirdly, the stipulation contains the fact that there

was no order made by the shipowner to the stevedore to

change its method of discharge. Again, the stipulation

doesn’t contain any facts that such an order would have

been followed. Indeed the shipowner didn’t even con-

tract with the independent contractor. That was done by

the time charterer.

The final point that is made is that the shipowner

did not stop the discharge until such time as the method

was changed. There is no question but that the shipowner

had it within its power to do that. They could have turned

off the electrical supply to the winches and stopped the

discharge procedure.

Comment D, I believe it is, to Section 14 of the Re-

statement of Torts, covers that precise situation when it

deals with the issue of control of an independent contrac-

tor by a landowner.

THE COURT: Section 14?

=_ 6+ ee

l3a

Argument on Motions

MR. WHITE: Section 414 of the restatement, and

it is Comment C to that section where it states, “It is not

enough that he—” referring to the employer of an inde-

pendent contractor—and I am not suggesting that the

shipowner is an employer of an independent contractor,

because they didn’t contract with the stevedore in this case,

but they are referring to aii employer of an independent

contractor when they say, “It is not enough that he has

merely a general right to order the work stopped or re-

sumed to inspect its progress or to receive reports, to make

suggestions or recommendations which need not neces-

sarily be followed, or to prescribe alterations or devi-

ations. Such a general right is usually reserved to em-

ployers, but it does not mean that the contractor is con-

trolled as to his methods of work as to operative detail.”

It is defendant’s position that even though ultimate-

ly the shipowner could have cut off the power to the

winches, that that does not create a duty upon the ship-

owner to do so, and certainly does not give the shipown-

er the necessary control over the methods of work of the

independent contractor, the stevedore in this situation, to

impose a duty.

On the issue of control, plaintiff's brief by and large

relies upon pre-1972 cases, Maritime cases, and it is pri-

marily addressed to the issue of control. And the argu-

ment is made that there are sufficient facts in this stip-

ulation, and in the supplemental stipulation, which a jury

could conclude, or could infer that the shipowner had

control over the stevedoring operation. Defendant con-

tends that there is no sufficient evidence, and I refer to

Comment C of Section 414; I refer to Fisher versus Unit-

14a

Argument on Motions

ed States, where there were two or more personnel from

the Government on the job site; I refer to Hader; I refer

to Crane; I refer to Brletich; I refer to Sylvania—Moore

versus Sylvania Products, all of which, as a matter of law,

refused to impose a duty on the landowner for negligence

of the independent contractor.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank vou, Mr. White.

MR. SHUSTER: If Your Honor please, [ hope-

fully will be very brief. I just want to make a couple of

points because I know Your Honor has had the briefs

and is aware of what they contain. I would just like to

State the issue simply, sir, or differently.

If Your Honor please, as I see the issue, I see it

slightly differently than Mr. White. I see what is before

you, as Your Honor looks at the 1972 amendment and

tries to fashion what Congress intended the Federal Courts

to do, whether this stipulation and the reasonable infer-

ences therefrom, creates a jury question which Your Hon-

or otherwise would have to present to a jury for them to

determine whether or not the shipowner in this case was

negligent or not. And in this instance, sir, briefly sum-

marized, what the stipulaiton indicates is that the ship-

owner’s winches and gears were used, that their emplov-

ees knew of a dangerous condition, knew the dangerous

condition was persisting, knew that the stevedore was not

changing that dangerous condition, had a way of stopping

it and did nothing. And it seems to me in light of the his-

tory of the Act that says the shipowner too has to partici-

pate in accident prevention under circumstances when

—

15a

Argument on Motions

they know of a dangerous condition, that this at least cre-

ates a jury question in terms of the stipulation, the rea-

sonable inferences.

| just want to make one comment about what—ac-

tually two comments about what Mr. White said. One is

a question of a foreign shipowner coming into this port.

I think it is obvious when a foreign shipowner comes into

this port he is subject and has to be bound by the laws

of the United States; he takes advantage of the courts of

the United States. As far as the question of proximate

cause as to the first three items of 42-A, B, and C, Mr.

White has argued that there is no indication in the stip-

ulation had these things been done, that is suggesting to

change the method that in fact this would have been done.

This may be a minor technicality, sir, but I would just

like to point out to you that in stipulation number 38, it

indicates that it was the ship boss and the gang boss who

had to approve the method and, therefore, were aware

of it. The ship superintendent was aware of the proper

method, and there was nothing in the stipulation that he

was actually aware of the fact that this improper method

was going on and he, of course, being a superior to these

two men, a jury could then infer had this been brought

to his attention he would have seen to it that people under

his supervision would have corrected it.

THE COURT: Just a minute. Whai about stip-

ulation number 28?

MR. SHUSTER: Yes, sir. The supervisory em-

ployees, I think if you look at 28 with 38 you get which

supervisory employees you are talking about.

16a

Argument on Motions

THE COURT: lIamsorry. All right.

MR. SHUSTER: Well, sir, if I lost on that one,

sir, in terms of what the inferences are, in terms of prox-

imate cause, it seems to me you get down to the basic

question that they did have the ability to stop the method.

There is no question about that as far as proximate cause

is concerned. That is all I have to say, sir.

THE COURT: I can understand that counsel have

made a very conscious effort to try to devise a pro-

cedure which will guarantee appellate review of a fact

situation so that we can begin to fill in the outlines of

the obligation of the vessel owner under the 1972 amend-

ment to the Longshoremen and Harborworkers’ Act.

Under normal circumstances I believe | would have

accommodated counsel and filed a written, and perhaps

lengthy, and hopefully scholarly opinion, setting forth my

reasons for what I am about to do. But | think that the

factual situation in this case, as defined and limited by

the stipulation of facts filed by counsel, renders this case

of relatively minor significance in the overall pattern of

the cases which will ultimately define the outlines of the

shipowners’ obligations as they relate to cargo operations.

I will start at the end, or pirhaps we will call it

the beginning because if indeed a jury were here in the

jury box, the beginning and the end would be the same.

I grant the defendant’s motion for directed verdict. That

would be all I would say if a jury were in the box and

leave it to counsel to do something at a later stage. But |

think that the circumstances here require some exposi-

tion, albeit brief, of my views, and the considerations that

me Oper = oe ee

17a

Argument on Motions

have caused me to direct the verdict in favor of the de-

fendant.

Northern Metals Company, the stevedore, and plain-

tiff’s employer, is clearly, by any definition, an indepen-

dent contractor hired to discharge cargo. Indeed in this

case Northern Metal was not even hired by the vessel

owner. It was hired by the time charterer of the vessel.

I make no great issue of that. That is not the important

element here.

What is important is that there is no evidence in this

stipulation which has been submitted to the Court that the

vessel owner, or the charter party retained any right to

control the method and manner of doing the work. | have

no idea whether under other factual circumstances, or

other types of evidence that might be presented, custom of

the trade, or otherwise, there might be some evidence of

the degree of control retained by a vessel owner of the

precise manner and method of doing the work for which

the stevedore, presumably an expert, was engaged to per-

form.

The only evidence in this stipulation, that which re-

lates to the checking of the cargo holds by the chief mate

and the third mate where work was being performed, is

consistent with the vessel owner’s checking of the prog-

ress and results of the work, much as the role performed

by the safety inspectors in Fisher versus United States, one

of the cases relied upon by defendant, 441 Fed. 2d 1288,

Third Circuit (1971).

In plaintiff's brief —not so much in the oral argument

here today, but in the brief—plaintiff has argued that

there is a fact question as to whether the shipowner rea-

18a

Argument on Motions

sonably should or should not have expected the stevedore

to change the method of discharge. And the stipulation

does provide that there is no evidence that any request, or

suggestion, or even an order to change the method of work

was made.

On the other hand, as defendant has pointed out,

there is no evidence that had such a request or sugges-

tion, or order been issued, that it would have had any ef-

fect. And this, again, goes back to the earlier statement

that | made, that there is nothing in the evidence before

me to indicate that the shipowner retained any right to

control the method and manner of performing the work.

I can envision situations in which the method used

by the independent contractor creates such a high degree

of risk and danger to persons, and property, as to justify

the extreme measure of cutting off the power to the

winches. But this is not such a case. I can envision a

case, for example, where the independent contractor’s

personnel has come aboard and it becomes obvious in

short order that they have broken into the bonded cargo

and have drunk themselves into a state of intoxication, and

in some fashion show a complete lack of control and a

degree of conduct, or lack of control as to create a seri-

ous danger that would require a vessel owner to take the

extreme measure and put a halt to the operations.

I do not accept the argument made by plaintiff's

counsel that the control over the power source is the kind

of control that makes the shipowner liable for the acts

of the independent contractor. I shudder to think that if

1, as a home owner, hired an independent contractor, and

that independent contractor makes use of my source of

+

=" — ae wae =

19a

Argument on Motions

electricity, my source of water, and that that will be in-

terpreted, the fact that he does make use of them, would

be interpreted as a measure of control on my part over the

method and manner in which he performs his work, is

unthinkable. And I reject the fact that the vessel owner

has control over the power source to the winches as a ba-

sis {ur concluding that the vessel owner has the right to

control the manner and method of the work performed

by the stevedore.

In my view, Congress intended to relieve the vessel

owner of liability for the negligent performance by the

stevedore of the work which the stevedore was hired to

do. Congress did intend to make the vessel owner liable

for its own independent acts of negligence, not for the

vessel owner’s failure to correct the stevedore in what the

vessel owner regarded as an improper method of doing

work the stevedore was hired to perform.

There are many acts of negligence for which a vessel

owner may be liable, as for example, oil on the deck

placed there by the carelessness of ship’s personnel, or

oil on the deck pre-existing the arrival of the stevedores.

And, incidentally, the oil on the deck I believe was an il-

lustration used in the legislative hisory of the 1972 amend-

ment; or a loose step about which the stevedore might not

become aware when the stevedore comes aboard to do

the work. I agree that there is liability and should be li-

ability, and | believe Congress intended that there be li-

ability for such independent acts of negligence on the part

of the vessel.

Counsel for the plaintiff has submitted the opinion in

Marant versus Farrell Lines, Inc., Civil Action 73-2615 in

20a

Argument on Motions

this Court, as reflecting the view that in the Lucas case,

the three-judge panel of this Court, of which I happened

to be a member, intended that there be concurrent negli-

gence on the part of the vessel owner and the stevedore.

My interpretation of the Lucas language differs from the

Judge who wrote the opinion in Marant.

In my view, Lucas simply intended to refute the argu-

ment by the counsel for the vessel owners in Lucas, that

Congress intended there to be liability only if the negli-

gence of the vessel was the sole cause of the accident.

My interpretation of Lucas is that it is possible for there

to be independent causes of an accident which can join

together, in which case there could be fault on the part

of the stevedore and there could be fault on the part of

the vessel, in which case the vessel will be responsible and

liable if it independently was at fault. But I do not be-

lieve that it is a proper interpretation of Lucas to regard

as concurrent negligence the failure of the vessel owner

to correct the negligent act on the part of the stevedore in

the performance of his duties. In that respect I differ

with the Marant court.

1 add a word, simply as further reason for my con-

clusion. To adopt the interpretation advanced by plain-

tiff in this case, would be to create chaos in stevedoring

operations.

If the vessel owner were placed in the situation of

having to correct an improper method of operation, imag-

ine what would happen in the course of operations: The

chief mate observes a certain method and he then gets in-

to a dispute with the gang boss, and thereafter the super-

intendent and the ship boss over what is or what is not

——

21a

Argument on Motions

the proper method of operation. They may disagree as to

whether the operation being performed by the stevedore

is a proper or an improper one. I recognize that that is

not the fact here. It is stipulated that everyone was aware

that this was not a reasonably safe method. But | am sim-

ply speaking now to what Congress contemplated by this.

Query: Would this call then for a stoppage of work

while they then call for an arbitrator to decide who is

right as to what is the proper method of operation? Cer-

tainly the facts of life in the commercial world would not

accept that as a viable alternative to placing the control

of the method of operation on the person who was en-

gaged to perform that kind of work with the limited res-

ervation that I expressed earlier, when the conduct of the

stevedore reaches a certain stage, then any reasonable per-

son would have to, even at the extreme expense of the

cost of shutting down operations, have to shut down op-

erations. As | said, I do not think that this is such a sit-

uation.

There were several other thoughts that occurred to

me, but I cannot think of them at this moment.

One of the things that I did want to express, | am

aware of the various standards that have been espoused

in a number of the cases. This case does not call upon

me to say what standard should be applicable ultimately.

On this fact situation | am simply noting that I could not

submit to a jury and have them speculate on these issues

of control.

I am not at all certain that those cases which have

equated the vessel owner’s responsibility under the 1972

a

22a

Argument on Motions

amendment to a land based landowner’s obligation to the

workmen of an independent contractor will ultimately be

the test applicable in this Federal common law relating to

vessel owner and longshoremen. My own personal view

is that in the course of time there will develop a Federal

common law which will be peculiar to the relationship

between vessel owner, stevedore and longshoremen. It

will be as Congress mandated, a uniform Federal law. It

will not be bound to any particular state law or state the-

ory, but I think what will ultimately emerge at the very

least is that the vessel owner will not bear the responsi-

bility for failing to tell the stevedore how properly to per-

form his duty.

(Off the record discussion.)

THE COURT: Interestingly, one of my colleagues

on the three-judge panel on the Lucas case, Judge Huy-

ett—indeed he was the author of the Lucas opinion—in

the case of Shields, et al. versus A. P. Moller, Civil Ac-

tion No. 74-1032, i:. a nonjury trial on January 23, 1975,

ruled that there was no liability on the part of the vessel

owner for bringing aboard a gas forklift truck into a hold

in which there were no ventilators where ship’s person-

nel on the main deck apparently were present when the

forklift truck was taken aboard.

I was looking through the transcript here to see if

I could find any specific comment. I can only say that

one of Judge Huyett’s conclusions of law, as reflected in

the transcript, is that there is no retention of control by

the shipowner of the work performed by the stevedore

company. Next, since there was no retention of control

by the defendant shipowner, there was no duty on the part

nme ee

23a

Argument on Motions

of the defendant to protect the plaintiffs against the equip-

ment of their own employer, which equipment had been

brought on the ship by the plaintiff's own employer, and

found that there was no negligence on the part of the ves-

sel owner under those facts.

He added this comment: “May I say that I believe

that it would undermine and be completely contrary to

the congressional purpose of the 1972 amendments to hold

a shipowner liable where the stevedore company had com-

plete control of the work being done and where the steve-

dore company had brought the gas forklift truck on board,

which was the equipment involved in this case, and di-

rected its operation, and of course where the ship had no

notice or knowledge of the allegedly dangerous condi-

tion.” I note that last statement of Judge Huyett’s,

of course, is a complete distinction from the facts before

me where it is stipulated that the shipowner does have

knowledge. But I thought it would be interesting, in any

event, to get the reaction of the author of the Lucas opin-

ion to his theory of liability.

I have not undertaken to list the various cases by

name. Counsel have set them forth in their briefs: The

Hite case, the Frasca case, and all of the rest of them, in-

cluding the one cited by Mr. Shuster. But, as I say, I

don’t think that this is an appropriate case to go into an

extended exposition as to what the ultimate standard will

be. I conclude only that the shipowner has no liability

for failure to correct the kind of improper work that was

taking place on this vessel on the day in question.

MR. SHUSTER: If your Honor please, for pur-

poses of clarification of the record, do I gather from Your

24a

Argument on Motions

Honor’s ruling that Your Honor is rejecting the princi-

ples that were stated in Fisher versus United States, and

Ferrante, and the line of pre-amendment cases—

THE COURT: You don’t mean Fisher versus Unit-

ed States. You mean Fisher versus Norships.

MR. WHITE: I think he means Fisher versus

United States Lines Company.

THE COURT: Just a moment. I thought you were

referring to—well, maybe it is referred to by the name

“Fisher versus Norships”’.

MR. WHITE: That is Judge Davis’ opinion.

MR. SHUSTER: I am talking about Wallace Fish-

er, sir.

THE COURT: (Pause.) Oh, yes. Yes. I am

aware of all of the cases cited in your brief. I have read

them all carefully. I am saying that the new Act effects a

change, and whatever the pre-1972 law was, I think Con-

gress meant it when it said that the vessel owner shall not

be liable, or vice versa—I guess it is the stevedore shall

not be liable directly or indirectly for the negligence of

somebody else. And I believe they meant the other to be

true also.

MR.SHUSTER: Thank you, sir.

One other matter of clarification. Can I also as-

sume, based on Your Honor’s ruling, and in reference to

the other Fisher case, that Your Honor has considered the

principles as stated in the Restatement of Torts 343 and

343-a—

25a

Argument on Motions

THE COURT: I have considered all of those. I

am not called upon to rule in this case precisely whether

if those cases had been applicable—or rather if the facts

in this case warranted I would have applied 343 and 343-a

to this case. I have said to you that I do not think any

one specific brand or style, or principle, or statement of

land based law is going to outline the duty of the vessel

owner. I simply said that on the facts of this case—and

that, remember, is my ruling, I direct a verdict in favor

of the defendant.

MR.SHUSTER: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Everything else I said was pure

dictum.

MR.SHUSTER: Yes, sir.

On the question of proceeding, I would like to call

Your Honor’s attention to a matter which is now pending

before the Court of Appeals. As I understand it, at the

present time there is pending before the Court of Appeals

the case—and I will spell the plaintiff's name, it is rath-

er difficult to pronounce—it is Z-u-k-a-u-s-k-a-s versus So-

ciety, it is a foreign company, it is Appeal No. 74-166 in

the Court of Appeals. Briefing has been completed and

I understand it is scheduled for oral argument sometime

this month in which the issue presented is, to the Court

of Appeals for the first time, what is the duty for negli-

gence in the post-1972 era.

Now at this point, Your Honor, as I see it, there are

two options available to me, and I would like, if Your

Honor would have no objection, to give me your feelings.

And one is to go directly to the Court of Appeals, the oth-

26a

Argument on Motions

er is to file a motion for a new trial with you and ask you

to hold that in abeyance pending—

THE COURT: I will give you an answer immedi-

ately. Go directly to the Court of Appeals. I doubt seri-

ously that whatever that case is on appeal it is going to

rule all the rest of the cases. If you decide, after you have

taken the appeal, and if the Court of Appeals comes down

and its ruling is such that it will change everything, may-

be Mr. White will agree that the appeal be withdrawn by

agreement and you come back and we would agree then

to have judgment entered in your favor rather than wait

and have it reversed on appeal. But why waste time?

This is a very short record, extremely short. You have a

stipulation and your notice of appeal. That is your whole

record, plus the transcript of what was said in this oral

argument. That is the whole record, is it not?

MR.SHUSTER: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: I cannot think of a cheaper, easi-

er case to appeal than this one. Maybe a bad case to ap-

peal, but nevertheless I cannot think of a cheaper or easi-

er case to appeal. In the meantime, if the Court of Ap-

peals rules in the Zukauskas case in such a fashion that

makes it abundantly clear that | am wrong, Mr. White,

| am sure, is a reasonable man and | will agree to a with-

drawal of the appeal and pay your $30,000. It is as simple

as that.

One thing is certain: The Court of Appeals will not

send this case back to me for retrial. It will either af-

firm me or reverse me, in which case it will direct, or it

will return it to me with a direction to enter judgment in

27a

Argument on Motions

your client’s favor for $30,000. So anything else we do

would be simply a marking of time and wasting of time.

MR. SHUSTER: All right, sir.

THE COURT: I suggest instead that you file your

notice of appeal.

MR. WHITE: If Your Honor please, I would sim-

ply, for the record, ask you to enter judgment on the di-

rected verdict.

THE COURT: Yes. There is no reason why judg-

ment should not be entered, no reason whatsoever for

motions for new trial in a case submitted on stipula-

tions. I am either right or I am wrong.

I direct the judgment be entered on the directed ver-

dict in favor of the defendant, United Overseas Marine

Corporation. And, I take it, that will be accomplished in

the course of the day.

MR.SHUSTER: Thank you.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Petition — Henry v. United Overseas Marine Corp. · 434 U.S. 820 | Frix