Memorandum — Massachusetts v. United States

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In the Supreme Court of the Hnited States

OctToser Term, 1976

THe COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, PETITIONER

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FIRST CIRCUIT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES

Wape H. McCree, Jr..

Solicitor General,

Department of Justice,

Washington, D.C. 20530.

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OcToBER TERM, 1976

No. 76-1500

THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, PETITIONER

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOH A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FIRST CIRCUIT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES

Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of the federal

excise tax imposed upon the use of civil aircraft by Sec-

tion 4491 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26

U.S.C.), as applied to aircraft owned by petitioner and

used for official purposes.' In this refund suit brought in

the United States District Court for the District of Massa-

chusetts,’ the district court upheld the tax. as a valid user

'The aircraft in question in this case is a helicopter purchased

by petitioner in 1969 for use by the Massachusetts state police.

Petitioner registered it with the Federal Aviation Administration as

a public use aircraft and uses it primarily to promote highway safety.

In performing that function, it serves as an airborne command post

and provides transportation in medical emergencies. On occasion.

the helicopter is also used in searches for criminals and escapees

from correctional facilities.

"Petitioner sought the return of $130 in tax (plus interest and

penalties) (Pet. App. A-5).

(1)

2

charge for services rendered (Pet. App. A-1 to A-4). The

court of appeals affirmed on the same ground, stating

that “‘[nJo logical reason exists why users of the air

transportation system should not pay their fair share of

such costs’ ” (Pet. App. A-5 to A-10, quoting from Srate

of Texas v. United States, 30 A.F.T.R. 2d 5935, 5938

(W.D. Tex.), affirmed per curiam, 31 A.F.T.R. 2d 1473

(C.A. 5)).

1. Section 4491 of the Code was enacted in connection

with the Airport and Airway Development and the Airport

and Airway Revenue Acts of 1970, 84 Stat. 219, 236. These

Statutes provide for substantial expansion and im-

provement of the airport and airway system, to be financed

in large measure “through the imposition and application of

airport and airway user charges” (H.R. Rep. No. 91-601,

9ist Cong., Ist Sess., p. | (1969)), including an annual ex-

cise tax imposed upon the use of taxable civil aircraft under

Section 4491. See H.R. Rep. No. 91-601, supra, at 38; S.

Rep. No. 91-706, 9ist Cong., 2d Sess., p. 5(1970). “Taxable

civil aircraft” is defined by the pertinent Treasury Regula-

tions as any engine driven craft registered or required to be

registered with the Federal Aviation Administration.

including “civil aircraft owned by the United States and

State and local governments.” See Section 4492 of the Code;

Treasury Regulations, Section 154.3-1(b)(2) (26 C.F.R.),

Appendix, infra, p. 4a; H.R. Rep. No. 91-601, supra, at

48-49.

The direct link between the Development Act and the

excise tax here in issue was established by Section 208 of the

Airport and Airway Revenue Act, 84 Stat. 250, which

created the Airport and Airway Trust Fund. This fund was

to be the depository of the proceeds of the various airport

and airway user charges, from which the airport develop-

ment expenditures were to be made. H.R. Rep. No. 91-601,

3

supra, at 41. Since the user charge imposed under Section

4491 was “based upon the premise that all aircraft should

pay a basic fee as an entry fee to use the system” (H.R. Rep.

No. 91-601, supra, at 40), Congress eliminated the

exemptions previously granted to state and local

governments and to the federal government, with respect to

the companion excise tax on the transportation of persons

by air (Section 4261 of the 1954 Code). Section 205(a)(2)

and (3) of the Airport and Airway Revenue Act, 84 Stat.

238.

2. Petitioner argues (Pet. 4-5) that in upholding the

validity of the federal aircraft use tax, the decision below:

(1) undermines the principle of intergovernmental tax

immunity; (2) conflicts with National League of Cities v.

Usery, 426 U.S. 833; and (3) conflicts with State of

Georgia v. United States, N.D. Ga., No. 75-11S5A, de-

cided April 13, 1977, in which the district court ruled

that the tax was unconstitutional as applied to aircraft

owned by the states.

a. As the court of appeals correctly observed (Pet. App.

A-7), the federal aircraft use tax is “a charge for services

rendered * * * and represents a quid pro quo, and * * *

as such, is outside the scope of the doctrine of implicd

intergovernmental tax immunity” (quoting from State of

Texas v. United States, supra, 0 A.F.1.R. 2d at 5938).

These user taxes or “charges” are specifically earmarked

for air transportation development, and are paid into the

Airport and Airway Trust Fund established solely for

that purpose. In particular, they are to be utilized in the

development of airports, from the planning stages through

construction, and for the planning, research, development,

operation and maintenance, of air traffic control, air

navigation, communications, and supporting services tor

the airway system. These latter services. provided almost

+

exclusively by the Federal Aviation Admiti'stration. are

available to all users of the airway system, whether public

or private. Thus, in withdrawing the exemptions from the

companion air transportation excise tax previously ex-

tended to various governmental and educational organiza-

tions, the House Committee Report stated that “since this

tax is now generally viewed as a user charge * * * there

would appear to be no reason why these governmental

and educational organizations should not pay for their

share of the use of the airway facilities.” H.R. Rep. No.

91-601. supra, at 46. See also 114 Cong. Rec. 8987

(1968).

There is a fundamental difference between a tax that is

designed to produce revenue to support general govern-

mental activities, and a user charge which is designed to

recoup part of the cost of governmental facilities and

services directly from those who benefit from them. Thus, in

substantially analogous cases, this Court has held that

charges for services rendered by state and local govern-

ments for pilotage or wharfage, even though graduated by

tonnage, do not violate Article I1, Section 10, clause 3 of the

Constitution, which provides that “[n]Jo State shall * * * lay

any Duty of Tonnage.” See, e.g.. Clyde Mallory Lines v.

Alabama, 296 U.S. 261; Huse v. Glover, 119 U.S. 543;

Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U.S. 423, Packet Co. v.

Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80, 84. Cf. The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230

U.S. 352, 405. See also Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580,

595-596. Similarly, the Court has upheld state motor vehicle

license and registration fees levied as compensation for the

use of highway facilities furnished by the state. See. ¢.g..

Capitol Grevhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. $42, Aero

Transit Co. v. Commissioner, 332 U.S. 495, Hendrick v.

Marvland, 235 U.S. 610.

a

ed

5

Finally. the Court has sustained state and local enplan-

ing charges upon commercial airline passengers as com-

pensation for the use of state-provided airport facilities

(Evansville Airport vy. Delta Airlines, 405 U.S. 707), against

the challenge that, because they were imposed upon vehicles

OF Passengers in interstate as well as intrastate commerce.

they impermissibly interfered with the former. As the Court

stated in Hendrick v. Marvland, supra, 235 U.S. at 623-624,

“there can be no serious doubt that where a State at its own

expense furnishes special facilities for the use o! those

engaged in commerce, interstate as well as domestic, it may

exact compensation therefor.”

Here, too, the annual excise tax on the use of civil aircraft

iS a payment by the user for airport and airway facilities and

services furnished by the federal government. Accordingly.

petitioner can no more claim the right to free use of these

facilities and services than it could, for example, post its

mail without purchasing stamps.

At all events, petitioner's claim that there is an implied

constitutional immunity of the states and localities from

federal taxation is sertously open to question. The Court

originally recognized such an immunity in [he Collector v.

Day, || Wall. 113, except where the states engage in

business of a private non-governmental! character (see, ¢.g..

South Carolina vy. United States, 199 U.S. 437; Ohio v.

Helvering, 292 U.S. 360). But in Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304

U.S. 405, the Court sustained a federal income tax on

salaries of employees of the bi-state Port of New York

Authority. In so holding, the Court reaffirmed the

distinction drawn by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in

McCulloch vy. Marviand, 4 Wheat. 316, between the

position of the national government (acting with powers of

supremacy under the Constitution) and the states. which are

not accorded such preeminent powers.

6

Similarly, in New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, the

Court upheld a federal tax upon the sale of mineral water by

the State of New York. While the case could have turned

upon the distinction drawn in the earlier cases between

governmental and private activities, none of the opinions of

the members of the Court voting to sustain the tax rested

upon that narrow ground. Rather. under the various tests

suggested in the plurality opinions, the aircraft use tax at

issue here would be valid.

Those tests are: (1) whether the tax is nondiscriminatory

(326 U.S. at 582-584, Frankfurter, J.); (2) whether Congress

expressly stated its intention that the tax apply to —

governmental organizations (id. at 584-586, Rutledge, J.):

and (3) whether the tax unduly interferes with the

performance of the sovereign functions of government, in

the sens of actual impairment of state or city functions (id.

at 586-590, Stone, C.J.). See also National League of Cities

v. Usery, supra, 426 U.S. at 843-844 and nn. 13, 14; id. at

863-864 (Brennan, J.. dissenting); McCormack, /n-

tergovernmenial Immunity and the Eleventh Ainendment,

S51 N.C. L. Rev. 485, 493 (1973). It is therefore not

surprising that shortly after the decision in New York v.

United States, supra, one commentator concluded that

“since the beginning of 1938, it is apparent that the Court

has rejected the reciprocal rule of tax immunity, returned to

the basis of earlier decisions and reaffirmed Chief Justice

Marshall's understanding that immunity doctrine protected

the Federal Government against taxation by the states but

did not equally shield the states against the exercise of the

delegated and supreme taxing power of the Federal

Government.” Rakestraw, The Reciprocal Rule of

Governmental Tax Immunity—A Legal Myth, \\ Fed. Bar

J. 3, 27 (1950).

7

b. Given the status of the aircraft excise tax as a user

charge, this Court's decision in National League of Cities v.

Usery, supra, does not control this case. There, the Court

held that the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards

Act that extended the Act's minimum wage and hour

provisions to almost all employees of the states and their

political subdivisions were unconstitutional. In so ruling,

the Court concluded that “insofar as the challenged

amendments operate to directly displace the States’ freedom

to structure integral operations in areas of traditional

governmental functions, they are not within the authority

granted Congress by * * * [the Commerce Clause]” (426

U.S. at 852). In the Court's view, “the vice of the Act as

sought to be applied here is that it directly penalizes the

States for choosing to hire governmental employees on

terms different from those which Congress has sought to

impose” (id. at 849).

Here, however, the imposition of a nondiscriminatory

charge for the use of federally-improved airport facilities

is not comparable to the imposition of federal wages and

hours standards with respect to state and local govern-

ment employment. By imposing this user charge, Con-

gress sought to require that all aircraft using the national

airway system, including the aircraft of the states, pay

their proportionate share of the cost of improving and

maintaining the essential airport facilities.

c. While we believe that the court of appeals correctly

upheld the constitutionality of the federal aircraft use tax

as applied to the states, we agree with petitioner (Pet.

5. 7-8) that the decision below conflicts with that of the

district court in State of Georgia v. United States, supra.

Since the district court held the statute unconstitutional as

applied to the states, that decision can only be reviewed

by direct appeal to this Court under 28 U.S.C. 1252. The

8

= , ; ' APPENDIX

Solicitor General has authorized a direct appeal in the

State of Georgia case and our appeal will be docketed Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C.):

shortly. Hence, the issue in this case warrants plenary SEC. 4491 [as added by Sec. 206(a), Airport and Air-

consideration by this Court.’ Accordingly, we do not way Revenue Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-258, 84 Stat.

oppose the granting of the petition for a writ of certiorari. | 236, 243]. IMPOSITION OF TAX.

Respectfully submitted. | (a) Imposition of tax.—A tax is hereby imposed

Wave H. McCree. Jr.. on the use of any taxable civil aircraft during any year

Solicitor General. at the rate of

(1) $25, plus

May 1977. (2) (A) in the case of an aircraft (other than a

turbine-engine-powered aircraft) 2 cents a

pound for each pound of the maximum cer-

tificated takeoff weight in excess of 2,500

pounds, or (B) in the case of any turbine

engine powered aircraft, 3'4 cents a pound

for each pound of the maximum certificated

takeoff weight.

(b) By whom paid.—Except as provided in sec-

tion 4493(a), the tax imposed by this section shall be

paid —

(1) in the case of a taxable civil aircraft described

in section 4492(a)(1), by the person in whose

name the aircraft is, or is required to be,

‘In order to provide for congressional review of the airport im- registered, or .

povemens preem. os 7 ©. nome in this case is due to expire (2) in the case of a taxable civil aircraft de-

after July 1, (see 26 U.S.C. l(e)). See S. Rep. No. 91-706, ori

supra, at 3. However, the considerations underlying the constitutional scribed in section 4492(a)(2), by the United

question are equally applicable to the federal air passenger ticket States person by or for whom the aircraft is

excise tax provided by 26 U.S.C. 4261. See City of New York v. owned.

United States, 394 F. Supp. 641 (S.D. N.Y.), affirmed per curiam, ; ' :

538 F. 2d 308 (C.A. 2). certiorari denied. October 4. 1976 (No. (c) Proration of tax.—l\f in any year the first use of

75-1684). the taxable civil aircraft is after the first month in such

year, that portion of the tax which is determined under

subsection (a) (2) shall be reckoned proportionately

DOJ- 1977-05

2a

from the first day of the month in which such use occurs

to and including the last day in such year.

(d) One tax liability per vear.—

(1) /n general.—-To the extent that the tax im-

posed by this section is paid with respect

to any taxable civil aircraft for any year, no

further tax shall be imposed by this section

for such year with respect to such aircraft.

(2) Cross reference..

For privilege of paying tax imposed by this

section in installments, see section 6158.

(e) Termination.—On and after July |, 1980, the

tax imposed by subsection (a) shall not apply.

SEC. 4492 [as added by Sec. 206(a), Airport and Air-

way Revenue Act of 1970, supra]. DEFINITIONS.

(a) Taxable civil aircraft.—For purposes of this

subchapter, the term “taxable civil aircraft” means

any engine driven aircraft—

(1) registered, or required to be registered

under section S0I(a) of the Federal Aviation

Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C., sec. 1401(a)), or

(2) which is not described in paragraph (1) but

which is owned by or for a United States

person.

(b) Weight.—For purposes of this subchapter, the

term “maximum certificated takeoff weight”

means the maximum such weight contained in the type

certificate or airworthiness certificate.

(c) Other definitions.—For purposes of this sub-

chapter

| i

3a

(1) Year.—The term “year” means the one-

year period beginning on July |.

(2) Use.—The term “use” means use in the

navigable airspace of the United States.

(3) Navigable airspace of the United States.—

The term “navigable airspace of the United

States” has the definition given to such term

by section 101(24) of the Federal Aviation

Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C., sec. 1301(24)), ex-

cept that such term does not include the

navigable airspace of the Commonwealth of

Puerto Rico or of any possession of the

United States.

Temporary Regulations in Connection with the Airport

and Airway Revenue Act of 1970 (1954 Code) (26

C.F.R.):

§ 154.3-1 Tax on use of civil aircraft.

(a) Purpose of this section. In general, section

4491 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as added by

the Airport and Airway Revenue Act of 1970, imposes a

tax upon the use, at any time during the taxable period,

of any taxable civil aircraft in the navigable airspace

of the United States. This tax is imposed upon such use

during any taxable period beginning on July |, 1970,

and on each subsequent July | before July 1, 1980.

This section sets forth rules as to the general applica-

bility of the tax and also sets forth rules, as authorized

by section 449%(a), to provide a method whereby certain

lessees of taxable civil aircraft may elect to be liable

for the tax. Further, this section provides administrative

provisions relating to the payment of tax and the filing

of tax returns.

(b) Definitions.—(1) Use. The term “use” means

use in the navigable airspace of the United States, as

4a

defined in section 4492(cM3). except that such term

does not include use by a manufacturer, dealer. whole-

saler, retailer, exporter, or importer of aircraft solely

for demonstration, testing, or delivery purposes. Mere

possession of a civil aircraft does not constitute “use.”

(2) Taxable civil aircraft. —The term “taxable civil

aircraft” means any engine powered aircraft which is

either registered or required to be registered under

section 50l(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49

U.S.C. 1401(a)) or which is owned by or for a U.S.

person. Such term includes civil aircraft owned by the

United States and State and local governments. Military ©

aircraft and aircraft of the National Guard are not

within the definition of taxable civil aircraft.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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