Amicus Brief — Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

No. 76-1383

CHRISTIANSBURG GARMENT Company, Petitioner.

3

EQuaL ENWTLOYW MEN T OpporruNtry CoM MISSION,

Pe sponde nt.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

BRIEF FOR THE

NATIONAL CHAMBER LITIGATION CENTER

AS AMICUS CURIAE

Of Counsel:

LAWRENCE B. Kraus Ronert J. Hickey

NATIONAL CHAMBER Gi. Brock wen Ileytrn

LITIGATION CENTER KIRLIN, CAMPBELL &

1615 H Street, N.W. K RATING

Washington, D.C. 20062 1150 Connecticut

(202) 659-6036 Avenue N. W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 296-4911

STerHen A. Boxart

STaNn.ey T. Karteczyc, JR.

NATIONAL CHAMBER

LITIGATION CENTER

1615 H Street, N. W.

Washington, D.C. 20062

(202) 659-6218

Counsel for the National

Chamber Litigation

Center

Paess of Ban S. Adams Fates, Inc., Wasnincron, D.C

—ͤ—1—— —H ee

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

. 6 ooo 5 6.0066 cncédddadccctcvees 1

rere eee eee e 2

QuesTION PaäsnN T 3

eee sees sse ses sss s esssese s 3

I. Tae History or Atrorney’s Fees in THE UNITED

States as WELL as THE LeoisLative History AND

PLalx Meantine or Section 706 (K) EstaBiisH THAT

Prevaitine Derenpants SHOULD Be Awarpep Ar-

TORNEYS’ FRES oN THE Same Basis as PREVAILING

PO 1—L— . ̃ 3

A. History of Attorneys Fees ................. 3

B. Attorneys’ Fees Under the Civil Rights Act

+„57„'2 wade sedesesds cocdeascessees 6

C. Legislative History of Section 706(k) ........ 7

D. Other Attorneys’ Fees Provisions in the Civil

r ͤ ˙i . eee 11

E. Conformity with Other Prevailing Statutes .. 12

II. Pune Ponce Supports tHe Awarp or Arror-

neys’ Fees to Prevaminc DEFENDANTS ON THE

Same Basis as To Prevamine PLAINTIFFS ........ 13

A. The Title VII Respondent .................. 14

B. The Title VII Plaintiff ..................... 17

C. Society Benefits from the Defense of Actions

as Well as Their Prosecution ............... 19

III. Tae Firra AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF

THE UNITED States Requires Equa, TREATMENT OF

PLaIntTiFFs AND DerENDANTS IN ReGaRD TO THE

Awarp or Atrorngeys’ FE. 20

IV. Tue App.icasBLe Stanparp Is Equa Treatment... 21

r ˙—˙ ee 23

ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Casxs: Page

Aid Auto Stores, Inc. v. Cannon, 525 F.2d 468 (2nd Cir.

738 (N.D. Cal. 19769))))) „ ees 16

Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,

421 U.S. 240 (19750) . 4 „

Bell v. Alamatt Motel, 243 F. Supp. 472 (N. D. Miss.

196500 „„ „ „ „ „ „„„„P„ͤ 4, 5, 7

Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) . .. . . 5 20

Califano v. Goldfarb, — US. —, 97 S. Ct. 1021

(197% 2 . f f .

Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534 F. 2d 993 (2nd Cir.

1976)))))))))::,,l u 2 „ ee eee

E

Eoull Bag 579 ( baa se ay 16, 18

q m 5 — 2 ommission v. Metro-

politan Atlanta Giris Club, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 1006

(N. D. Ga. 19760 ʒ )ʒ) nee e ener eee teens 14, 15

a 4. —1— 4 — 898 (W. D. Ok. = 16

mplo unity Commission v.

Coreliea National Bank, 12 FEP Cases 1565

(D.S.C. 19760))))):ꝛ 4 22

Equal Employment rtunity Commission v. West-

ern Electric, 10 FEP Cases 1275 (D. Md. 1975) .. 22

Ernst d Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 US 185 (1976) ...... 6

Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386

U.S. 714 (19877777 4 eens 3,4

Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) 21

Garnett v. Holy Cross Hospital, —— F. Supp. ——,

14 FFP Cases 354 (D. Md. 1975) .. 14

Grubbs v. Butz, 548 F. 2d 973 (D. C. Cir. 1976) 7,9

Hall v. Cole, 412 US 1 (1973)))): cece eee e se eees 3,4

International Brot od of Teamsters v. United

States, —— US ——, 97 S. Ct. 1843 (1977) 19

Johnson v. Robinson, 415 US 361 —_— Weesen 20

Lamphere v. Brown oT — F.2d ——, slip

op., p. 11 (Ist Cir. April 25, eee

Lea v. Cone Mills, 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971) ........ 7

Leibman v. J. W. Peterson Coal d Oil Co., 63 F. R. D. 684

(N.D. III. 197⸗c)))))))ʒ eee eee ee ee eens 18

Table of Authorities Continued iii

Page

Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 14 FEP

(8b. Tr. 1977) 0 Cases 05 18

Matthews v. Lucas, — US. —, 96 8. Ct. 2755

eee ee eee 20-21

McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 533 (5th Ci

1972), cert. den. 409 U.S. 896 (1972), nh dow 409

U.S. 1050 (1972) 6. eee cece cece ceeecee. 14

Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, 396 US 375 (1970) ........ 4

— 55 Webster College, 423 F. Supp. 615 (E. D. Mo.

NAACP v. Federal Power Commission, 435 tis 662

eee eee eee en 20

eee 13. 1

Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 US 400 10

in

‘ 5 Pa, 1974) eee n — 16

arker v. thews, 13 FEP Cases 595 (D. P. C. 1976) 17

Patterson v. American Tobacco C P Ca

(E.D. Va. 1975) „ ; : — — 86 16

Rood v, Rood, 006 US. 71 (1971) ....... e 21

osenfeld v. Southern Pacific Rail Co. EP

Cases 72 (D.C. Cal. 15715 W me © — 16

Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc., 516 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir.

1975), U.S. App. 1 1 No. 76-1060 16

Shock v. Tester, 405 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. den.

394 U.S. 1020 (1969), reh. den. 395 U.S. 941 (1969

Taylor v. Goodyear Tire & R bbe 6 ; to

672 (D.C. Ala. 1973) — 5 — 16

“ee eee eee

eee cases 6

Cir. Z 6, 16

Van Hommissen v. Xerox Corp., 503 F.2d 1131 (oth Gir

eee 6

iv Table of Authorities Continued —

Weathers v. Peters Realty Corp., 499 F.2d 1197 (6th

Cir. 1974) 0... ccc ceccenccccecccccccsccccccces

Weinbe v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) ....... 20

Willett 1 Buen 4 Henry College, 427 F. Supp. 631 9

(W. D. Va. 1977) ) „ —

Fick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)

Srarurokr Provisions:

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, 42 USC § 2000

et oon 1974)

42 UBC J hůh h 6. 8, 11

42 USC 920001... aga eceecteestesteses 12, 17

2 1 246, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 21

Clayton Anti-Trust Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 USC $15

1

Clean Air Act, 84 Stat. 1706, 42 USC § 1857h-2(d)

(Supp. 1977) ))))))))))

Copyright Act, 61 Stat. 652, 17 USC 6116 (1952) .... 5

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88

Eg . 891, 29 USC § 1132(g) (1975)

Em t Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat.

10B (1974) 0... kn . 10, 13

Fair Housing Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 88, 42 USC § 3612(c)

(DTT). cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccsecoosces

Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1069, as

"amended, 29 USC 216(b) (1965))/)/ 5

Labor 1. 29 Ul and Disclosure Act, 73

Stat. 29 USC 501(b) (197) 5

Noise Control Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 1243, 42 USC

§$4911(d) 197777. 13

Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 82, USC §77k(e)

GIDE). cccccccccocsccvcescccessoesesonseoss 5,12

Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1176, 15 USC

§ 77www(a) (197i7777777j ee eees

Table of Authorities Continued v

Page

MISCELLANEOUS:

Committee Print, Legislative History of the Equal Em-

ployment Opportunity Act of 1972 (November

— PP 10, 11

110 Cong. Rec. 13668-69, 1421214, 32110-13 (1963) .... 8,9

117 Cong. Ree. 31979-80, 32110-13 (1971) ....... eee

Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 Harv L.

, de 18

H.R. Rep. No. 92-238, 92nd Cong., Ist Sess. 32 (1971) .. 12

Hearing before Subcommittee No. 5 of the Committee

on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 88th

Cong., Ist Sess., Part 1, p. 653 (1963) .......... 8

Hickey, Government Re ton of Union Racial Poli-

cies, 7 B.C. Ind. and Comm. L. Rev. 191 (1966) .. 7

Sape and Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal

Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 GWLR

% ————A A 10

U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,

Employment and Wages, First Quarter of 1975,

i Eo ot iy a RaD 14

Wolfrom, The Antibiotics Case, 1976 Research Journal

. Ger a Ere 16

ees

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

No. 76-1383

CHRISTIANSBURG GARMENT CoMPANY, Petitioner,

V.

EquaL EMPLOYMENT OpportTUNITY COMMISSION,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

BRIEF FOR THE

NATIONAL CHAMBER LITIGATION CENTER

AS AMICUS CURIAE

STATEMENT OF INTEREST *

The National Chamber Litigation Center [herein-

after the Center] is a non-profit, tax-exempt corpora-

tion organized and operated under the laws of the Dis-

trict of Columbia. Center members include trade asso-

ciations and corporations of all sizes, representing a

cross section of employees throughout the United

States. The Center is organized and operated as a busi-

* Written consent of the parties to the filing of this brief has

been obtained as required by Rule 42(2) of the Supreme Court

Rules.

2

ness-oriented, public interest law firm, with its attor-

neys serving as counsel in matters important to com-

merce and industry.

The Center’s membership is comprised of employers

subject to the provisions of the Equal Employment Op-

portunity Act, including those provisions relating to

the payment of attorneys’ fees and costs at issue here.

The issue of awards of attorneys’ fees is crucial to

the Center’s own operations. Entirely dependent upon

membership dues and other voluntary contributions for

its fiscal well-being, the Center’s only other potential

source of operating revenues rests in the award of at-

torneys’ fees upon conclusion of litigation. Judicial

application of a restrictive standard to prevailing em-

ployer/defendants discriminates against the Center as

well as others representing employer interests in Ticle

VII cases. Where statutes permitting awards of at-

torneys’ fees to prevailing parties exist, they must ap-

ply on an equal basis to each prevailing party. To do

otherwise would be an invidious discrimination of the

variety justly struck down by this Court in the past.

STATUTE INVOLVED

Section 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(k) provides:

In any action or * — under this sub-

chapter the court, in its di on, may allow the

ater | party, other than the Commission or the

nited States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part

of the costs, and the Commission and the United

States shall be liable for costs the same as a private

person.

3

QUESTION PRESENTED

Should the standard applied by district courts in ex-

ercising their discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees to

a prevailing defendant in a Title VII action under the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, (42 U.S.C

be 212

— : the same as the standard for a prevailin g

ARGUMENT

A. History of Attorneys’ Fees

In the absence of statutory or contractual provisions

to the contrary, a prevailing litigant in the United

States is not ordinarily entitled to collect attorneys’

fees from the loser. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v

Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240, 247 (1975) ; Fleisch-

mann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co. 386 U.S

114, 717 (1967). Two nonstatutory exceptions to this

American Rule” have been developed by the courts

in the exercise of their equitabl

412 U.S. 1,45 (1973). On

The first exception is that attorneys’ f i

allowed to a successful litigant, — @e “‘Hidieation

confers a substantial benefit on the members of an as-

certainable class, and where the court’s jurisdiction

over the subject matter of the suit makes possible an

The amicus relies on Petitioner's sta

—— te : ;

recitation of the Opinion Below and Juri —— 2 the case and its

4

award that will operate to spread the costs propor-

tionately among them.“ Id. quoting Mills v. Electric

Auto-Lite, 396 U.S. 375, 393-394 (1970). The second

exception to the American Rule is that federal courts

can award attorneys’ fees to a litigant where the op-

ponent has acted ‘‘in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly

or for oppressive reasons.’’ Hall v. Cole, supra;

Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,

supra at 258-259.

In addition to these common law”’ exceptions to the

American Rule, Congress has made “‘specifie and ex-

plicit provisions for the allowance of attorneys’ fees

under selected statutes granting or protecting various

federal rights.“ Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., supra

at 260. These statutes greatly expand the exceptions

to the American Rule by providing for the payment

of attorneys’ fees in a wide diversity of cases. It is im-

portant to emphasize that the statutory expansion is

in addition to and not a codification of the common law

exceptions. This Court stated in Newman v. Piggie

Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, footnote 4

(1968):

4. If Congress’ objective had been to authorize the

assessment of attorney’s fees against defendants

who made completely groundless contentions for

p of delay, no new statutory provision

would have been necessary, for it has long been

held that a federal court may award counsel fees

to a successful plaintiff where a defense has been

maintained ‘in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly,

or for oppressive reasons.’

Thus, the Court must start with a statutory standard

beyond the bad faith exception provided by common

law. See also, Bell v. Alamatt Motel, 243 F. Supp. 472,

474 (N.D. Miss. 1965).

——

5

These statutory attorneys’ fees provisions fall into

several categories depending on what Congress was at-

tempting to accomplish in each statute. Some statutes

allow only prevailing plaintiffs to recover fees, but

under other statutes, either party can recover if he or

she prevails. Furthermore, under some statutes, the

payment is mandatory. For example, under Section 4

of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1973), payment of

attorneys’ fees to prevailing plaintiffs is mandatory,’

while under Section 812 of the Fair Housing Act of

1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(e) (1974), attorneys’ fees may

be awarded only to a prevailing plaintiff at the discre-

tion of the court.“ Numerous statutes similar to that in

the instant case allow the payment of attorneys’ fees,

at the discretion of the court, to the prevailing party.“

Thus, as this court has held:

Under this scheme of things, it is apparent that

the circumstances under which attorneys’ fees are

to be awarded and the range of discretion of the

courts in making those awards are matters for

Congress to determine. Alyeska Pipeline Service

Co., supra at 262.

It is evident that Congress knew how to treat plaintiffs

and defendants differently where there existed a rea-

sonable basis for that difference. Thus, where no such

difference exists, the Court should not infer different

standards.

* See also, 52 Stat. 1069, as amended by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b),

Alyeska, supra at note 34.

* See also, Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,

§ 501, 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1975).

* See, e. g., Copyright Act, § 1, 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1952) ; Trust In-

denture Act of 1939, § 323, 15 U.S.C. § 77 www(a) (1971) ; Securi-

ties Act of 1933, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1971).

B. Attorneys’ Fees Under the Civil Rights of 1964.

Section 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k) (1974) provides that:

In any action . . . the court, in its discretion, may

allow the prevailing party, other than the Commis-

sion or the United States, a reasonable attorney's

fee....

Where the plain meaning of a statute is clear on its

face, it is unnecessary to refer to the legislative history.

United States v. Standard Brewery, 251 U.S. 210, 217

(1920); United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648

(1961). Where the language of the statute is clear, it is

not for a court to say that a legislative act encompasses

a more restrictive meaning. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfel-

der, 425 U.S. 185, 200-201 (1976); United States v.

Kelly, 519 F.2d 251, 256 (8th Cir. 1975). The meaning

of this section is clear and unequivocal on its face ; if

either party, except the Commission, prevails, it is en-

titled to be considered for an award of attorneys’ fees.

Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corporation, 503 F.2d 1131,

1133 (9th Cir. 1974).° No distinction is drawn by the

statute between prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing de-

fendants. In Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises,

supra at 402, this Court set the test for award of at-

torneys’ fees under Title II of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964.° There, the court held that a prevailing plain-

* Accord, United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.2d

359, 362 (3rd Cir. 1975).

„The language of the attorneys’ fees provision of Title II is al-

most identical to that here. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1974). The

only differences in language are that Section 202(b) refers to ‘the

United States while § 706 (k) refers to the Commission or the

United States and Section 202 (b) begins In any action com-

7

tiff should ordinarily recover his attorney's fees un-

less special circumstances would render such an award

unjust“. This test has been held appropriate in award-

ing attorneys’ fees to successful plaintiffs in Title VII

litigation. Lea v. Cone Mills, 438 F.2d 86, 88 (4th Cir.

1971). Despite this, the Fourth Circuit in the instant

litigation ignored the plain meaning of Section 706(k)

and the Supreme Court’s instruction in Newman v.

Piggie Park Enterprises, supra, that the statutory

standard went beyond the bad faith common law ex-

ception.

C. Legislative History of Section 706(k)

Although resort to legislative history is not neces-

sary to determine the meaning of this statute, a review

of this confirms its plain language. The legislative his-

tory of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 establishes that

Congress had a dual purpose in providing that prevail-

ing parties in Title VII litigation could obtain at-

torneys’ fees. Those purposes were to encourage plain-

tiffs of limited means to bring meritorious actions, and

equally important, to deter the bringing of lawsuits

without foundation. Trubbs v. Butz, 548 F.2d 973, 975

(D.C. Cir. 1976) ; U.S. v. Gray, 319 F. Supp. 871, 872-

73 (D. R. I. 1970), quoting with approval, Bell v. Ala

matt Motel, supra.

The only discussion in the legislative history which

is truly illuminating as to the intent of Congress in en-

menced pursuant to this title’’, while 706(k) begins In any action

or proceeding under this fitle.’’

Although not part of its official history, Title VII has its origin

in many laws going back to 1944. See, Hickey, Government Regula

tion of Union Racial Policies, 7 B.C.Ind. and Comm. L. Rev. 191

(1966). However, the principa’ thrust for the present statute was

8

acting the attorneys’ fee provision is the statement

made by Senator Pastore on the Senate floor during

debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1964:°

The purpose of this provision in the modified sub-

stitute is to discourage frivolous suits. Here the

court within its discretion is given power to order

yment of attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party.

First of all, it is within the discretion of the court.

It is not favoritism toward one party, as against

the other. When a person realizes that he takes

the chance of having attorneys’ fees assessed

against him if he does not prevail, he will deliber-

ate before he brings suit. He will make certain that

he is not on frivolous ground. (emphasis added)

110 Cong. Ree. 14214 (1963).

Senator Lausche concurred in this assessment stating:

that language was inserted in the bill to deter the

bringing of lawsuits without foundation.

In this bill we wanted to discourage the bringing

of lawsuits and we therefore provided that attor-

ney’s fees shall be allowed only in favor of the

victorious party. 110 Cong. Rec. 13668-69 (1963).

a bill introduced in 1963 by Representative Celler. Section 204 (b)

of that proposal provided for attorneys’ fees for the person ag-

grieved’’. Hearing before Subcommittee No. 5 of the Committee on

the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 88th Cong., Ist Sess., Part

1, page 653 (1963). The substitution of the phrase ‘‘ prevailing

party for the person aggrieved’’ in the statute introduced the

following year indicates a conscious awareness that plaintiffs and

defendants should be treated equally.

* Senator Pastore s remarks were directed toward the attorneys’

fee provision of Title II of the Act. As previously noted that pro-

vision is essentially identical to the one in Title VII. See, supra,

n. 6.

The remarks of Senators Pastore and Lausche regard-

ing this interpretation of the provision were undis-

puted.’

Relying upon the comments of the two Senators, the

court in United States v. Gray, supra at 873, agreed

that prevailing plaintiffs and defendants should be

treated equally and awarded attorneys’ fees to the

defendants.” Similarly, the United States Court of

— for the District of Columbia Circuit has

stated:

But second, and equally important, Congress in-

tended to deter the bringing of leneniin without

foundation _by providing that the ‘prevailing

rty’—be it plaintiff or defendant-—could obtain

egal fees. Were this not Congress’ intent, it would

have authorized fees only to prevailing plaintiffs,

or to any party as it has done in many other cir-

cumstances (emphasis added). Grubbs v. Butz,

supra, at 975-76.

In light of the foregoing, it is clear that Congress

was as concerned with the rights of successful defend-

ants vis-a-vis attorneys’ fees as it was with those of

successful plaintiffs and that fees should be awarded to

successful parties on the same basis.

= See also remarks of Senator Miller that ambulance chasing’’ is

discouraged by the fact that attorneys’ fees are awarded to the pre-

vailing party. 110 Cong. 14213-14 (1963).

The district court in Gray appears to have misapplied the

standard set by this court in Newman v. Piggie Park, supra. There,

this Court said that absent exceptional circumstances, successful

plaintiffs should be awarded attorneys’ fees in Title II cases. The

district court, although noting Piggie Park and expressing its be

lief that plaintiffs and defendants should be treated equally, ap-

plied a meritless standard in awarding fees to the defendant.

See, infra, p. 22.

10

This conclusion is buttressed by the legislative his-

tory of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of

1972 which amended Title VII of the 1964 Civil

Rights Act. The most significant change wrought by

the 1972 Act was, of course, to vest the Equal Employ-

ment Opportunity Commission with the power to sue

to enforce the Act, thereby eliminating the prior Act’s

almost total reliance on individuals pursuing relief

with their own resources.”

The 1972 legislative history indicates no disagree-

ment either with the meaning ascribed to the attorneys’

fees language by Senator Pastore, supra, or with the

interpretations of the courts in awarding attorneys’

fees on an equal basis to plaintiffs and defendants. Al-

though several attempts were made in 1972 to amend

the attorneys’ fee section of the 1964 Act, the final bill

left it unchanged. While not ultimately adopted, the

proposed amendments are instructive as to Congress’

interpretation of the 1964 Act.

In this regard, the Senate had adopted an amend-

ment which would have mandated the payment of at-

torneys’ fees to small businesses and unions in any

Title VII actions brought by the EEOC or the govern-

ment, unless it was found that the defense had been

put forth in bad faith. Leg. Hist. 1177-1180, 1185.“ The

Senate receded from the amendment in conference, ap-

parently because of concern that it would encourage

™ 86 Stat. 103 (1972).

12 See, Sape and Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Em-

ployment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 G.W.L.R. 824 (1972).

Leg. Hist. references are to the Committee Print. Legislative

History of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (No-

vember 1972).

* —

11

unworthy defenses and because it was not related to

the outcome of the litigation. Leg. Hist. 1183-84, 8.

Rep. No. 92-681, 92nd Cong., 2d. Sess. 19 (1972). Yet

the concern of Congress with the heavy financial bur-

den imposed on defendants was clear.

This concern is also indicated by the House’s rejec-

tion of a bill which would have amended Section

706(k) to allow only prevailing plaintiffs’ to be

granted attorneys’ fees. Under that proposal, defend-

ants would have been able to recover attorneys’ fees

only under the American Rule. This revision of the bill

was replaced on the House floor by a substitute which

left 706(k) unchanged.” Rejection of the ‘prevailing

plaintiff' language indicates that Congress believed

section 706(k) required a test other than the bad faith

test of the American Rule. If Congress had felt that the

traditional American Rule left defendants adequately

protected, no purpose would have been served in drop-

ping the Committee revision of the bill.

Thus, it is significant that the attorneys’ fee section

was attacked from both sides; by those who wanted to

restrict it to plaintiffs, and those who wished to make it

mandatory for defendants. That the amendment

emerged unscathed is certainly indicative of the fact

that Congress believed the original provision applied

equally to both plaintiffs and defendants.

D. Other Attorneys’ Fees Provisions in the Civil Rights Act.

We have already noted that the attorneys’ fees pro-

vision of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42

U.S.C. § 2000 a-3(b), Section 204, contains language es-

Compare H. Rep. No. 92-238, 92nd Cong. Ist Sess. 32 (1971)

with 117 Cong. Ree. 31979-80, 2110-13 (1971).

12

sentially identical to that in Title VII. Moreover, an

examination of the attorneys’ fee provision in Title III

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000b-1

(1974)"* which contains no provision for actions by pri-

vate plaintiffs (actions can only be brought by the At-

torney General!) is illuminating.

There Congress provided that attorneys’ fees could

be imposed upon the government, but the government

was not allowed to collect fees. Thus, Congress was not

concerned with allowing private defendants to recover

attorneys’ fees from the government where it is an

unsuccessful plaintiff as it was in the instant case. But

more importantly, it indicates that Congress in enact-

ing the Civil Rights Act was fully able to structure a

provision which provided that attorneys’ fees could be

awarded differently based on the identity of the par-

ties. Because such a provision is conspicuous by its

absence in Section 706(k), it should not be so construed.

its legislative history, but also with the interpretation

accorded similar provisions of other statutes. In this

regard, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit in applying the attorneys’ fees provi-

sion of Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15

U.S.C. §77k(e) (1971)” held that the test to be ap-

plied to both plaintiffs and defendants was to be the

“42 U.S.C. § 2000b-1 provides: In any action or proceeding

under this subchapter the United States shall be liable for costs,

including a reasonable attorneys’ fee, the same as a private person

15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) authorizes a fee award if the court believes

the suit or the defense to have been without merit

13

same. Aid Auto Stores, Inc. v. Cannon, 525 F.2d 468,

471 (2d Cir. 1975). In Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 484

F.2d 1331, 1338 at n. 7 (Ist Cir. 1973), the court held

that under Section 304(d) of the Clean Air Act, 42

U.S.C. §1857(h)-2d (1969),” the parties should be

treated equally in awarding fees, since ‘‘. . . the identity

of the party . . . would be of little moment.“ Moreover,

under other acts with attorneys’ fees provisions similar

to those here, there are no indications of any different

treatment of plaintiffs and defendants. Noise Control

Act of 1972, § 12, 42 U.S.C. §4911(d) (1977); Em-

ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 502,

29 U.S.C. § 1132 (g) (1975).

We submit that there is no rational reason for ignor-

ing the intent of Congress and treating prevailing de-

fendants any differently under this statute than they

are under any of the other statutes with similar pro-

visions.

0

PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’

FEES TO PREVAILING DEFENDANTS ON THE SAME BASIS AS

TO PREVAILING PLAINTIFFS.

The plain language of Section 706(k), the legislative

history of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1972

amendments thereto, and an analysis of the evolution

by statute and case law of the right to attorneys’ fees,

all support the position that in Title VII cases, plain-

tiffs and defendants deserve equal treatment when a

court exercises its discretion to award attorneys’ fees.

The same position is reached as a matter of public

Section 304(d) permits an award to any party, whenever the

Court determines such an award is appropriate

14

policy. There is no generic difference between plaintiffs

and defendants, and the potential award of attorneys’

fees should be focused as much on encouraging meri-

torious litigation as on discouragement of suits without

merit. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. En-

vironmental Protection Agency, supra.

A. The Title VII Respondent

The potential of a Title VII lawsuit confronts not

only giant industries, but also individuals employing

as few as 15 persons per working day for twenty calen-

dar weeks a year. Section 701(a), (b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

(a) & (b) (1974).“ The broadly phrased statutory lan-

guage of Title VII encompasses non-profit organiza-

tions and charitable groups such as hospitals, churches,

schools and community service organizations. See, e. g.,

Mosby v. Webster College, 423 F. Supp. 615 (E.D. Mo.

1976) ; Willett v. Emory & Henry College, 427 F. Supp.

631 (W.D. Va. 1977); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460

F. 2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972) cert. den. 409 U.S. 896 (1972),

reh. den. 409 U.S. 1050 (1972) ; Equal Employment Op-

portunity Commission v. Metropolitan Atlanta Girls

Club, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Ga. 1976); and

Garnett v. Holy Cross Hospital, —— F. Supp. —— 14

FEP Cases 354 (D. Md. 1975).“

In all of these cases, the defendant organization had

to bear its own attorneys’ fees, and in all of these cases

The Department of Labor estimates that 98% of the businesses

subject to state unemployment laws employ 99 or less employees.

US. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment

and Wages, First Quarter of 1975, p. 20 (1976).

This and subsequent citations refer to the cases as reported in

the Bureau of National Affairs Fair Employment Practices Cases.

These cases have not been officially reported.

15

except in Metropolitan Atlanta Girls Club the defend-

ant prevailed. It is fair to assume the money for these

fees came from funds that would otherwise have been

directed toward education, medical care and com-

munity service. As the United States Court of Appeals

for the First Circuit noted:

For private colleges and universities, not only

do heavy litigation expenses impose a financial

burden which may ultimately be passed on in some

measure to students or be absorbed to the detri-

ment of some educational function, but the process

of involving every department in depth in fact

finding and defense may well be deeply disruptive

to the institution’s mission. In both a material and

non-material sense they are fragile, not perhaps

in their capacity to endure but in their capacity to

remain effective while enduring. This is not to sug-

gest that other institutions, such as hospitals or

small businesses, may not be similarly burdened.

Lamphere v. Brown University, —— F.2d ——,

slip opinion, p. 11 (1st Cir. April 25, 1977)

The size of fees to defend a Title VII case which is

a burden even for large businesses, is a financial dis-

aster for small businesses and non-profit organizations.

This fact has been judicially recognized in at least one

reported decision in which the EEOC argued against

attorneys’ fees for a prevailing employer defendant on

the basis that its suit was brought in good faith:

Plaintiff reads something into the pertinent stat-

ute, supra, which is not there. The Court does not

uestion Plaintiff’s faith but this is not all

t should be consi under the Statute in the

exercise of discretion on this point. Considerations

regarding Defendant’s size and financial stature

and the im yh Sat, 4 T5 tion

dictate in opinion of Court that it should

16

recover a reasonable attorneys’ fee herein. Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission v. Service

we Corp., 418 F. Supp. 898, 901 (W. D. Ok.

The following cases, while involving awards of at-

torneys’ fees to successful plaintiffs, are illustrative

of the burden of successfully defending a Title VII

suit. For example in Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission v. Enterprise Ass’n., 542 F.2d 579 (2nd

Cir. 1976), an award of $50,000 in attorneys fees was

affirmed, while the. charging party had originally

sought $128,092. An intexim fee of $125,000 was

awarded following a request for $263,038 in fees in

Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 11 FEP Cases 586

(E.D. Va. 1976). A minority class action brought

$35,000 in attorneys’ fees in Sabala v. Western Gillette,

Inc., 516 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1975), U.S. App. Pending,

No. 76-1060 while $27,244 went to plaintiff’s attor-

neys for a sex bias class action in Ostapowicz v. John-

son Bronze Co., 12 FEP Cases 1468 (W.D. Pa. 1974).

In Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Railway Co., 4 FEP

Cases 72 (D.C. Cal. 1971), a non-class sex discrimina-

tion case brought $30,000 in attorneys’ fees, and $20,000

in fees for plaintiffs plus $5,000 for intervenors was

awarded in Taylor v. Goodyear Tire d Rubber Co., 6

FEP Cases 672 (D.C. Ala. 1973). Intervenors’ attor-

neys were more fortunate in Alanis v. California Pro-

cessors, Inc., 13 FEP Cases 738 (N.D. Cal. 1976) re-

covering $35,000 in a Title VII proceeding. And in at

least one Civil Rights Act case, attorneys’ fees ex-

ceeded $200,000. United States v. United States Steel

Corporation, 7 FEP Cases 320 (D. Ala. 1973).“ Some

*° In non-civil rights cases, fees have reached ten million dollars.

Wolfrom, The Antibiotics Case, 1976 Research Journal 251, 327-37,

359.

17

courts have even offered incentive bonuses in Title

VII ͤ cases. Parker v. Matthews, 13 FEP Cases 595,

602-603 (D. D.C. 1976).

When Title VII defendants incur similar expenses

in opposing invalid lawsuits, they should be entitled to

a fee award on the same basis as a successful plaintiff.

In the absence of being able te recover these fees, the

financial burden could conceivably cause the collapse

of small and non-profit employers. The net result of

such a collapse would be a loss of jobs for the com-

pany’s employees, and, in the case of the non-profit

organization, termination of important community

services.

B. The Title VII Plaintiff

Title VII provides that suit may be filed by the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or by the

person aggrieved. Of course, when the Commission

loses a case and is held responsible for the prevailing

defendant’s attorneys’ fees, the courts need not be con-

cerned with that award discouraging the Commission

from instituting future actions, since as one court noted

in awarding $160,000 in attorneys’ fees against the De-

partment of Labor in a sex discrimination class action,

„the United States . . has infinite ability to pay.“

Copeland v. Usery, 14 FEP Cases 1677, 1678 (D. D.C.

1977). Furthermore, Congress in enacting the Civil

Rights Act recognized in Title III, discussed supra,

that the government could afford to pay a prevailing

defendant.

In Title VII cases where the government is not the

plaintiff, individuals will often posture their cases as

class actions in which substantial recoveries are sought.

Policy reasons exist for making these class action plain-

18

tiffs responsible for attorneys’ fees in cases where they

are unsuccessful. The availability of a class designation

may actually generate lawsuits, since the conduct of

some attorneys in actions under Rule 23 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure indicate that they believe ‘‘the

rule was adopted for their benefit rather than for the

multitude of individuals comprising the class whose

rights they were presumably vindicating.’’ Leibman v.

J. W. Petersen Coal & Oil Co., 63 F. R. D. 684, 701 (N. D.

III. 1974). Similar judicial concerns also exist in Title

VII class actions. Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 14

FEP Cases 561, 570-575 (S.D. Tx. 1977). See also De-

velopments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L. Rev.

1318 (1976).

Since members of the class must opt in“ in order

to share benefits in a Title VII class action suit, there

is no reason why the class should be eligible for the

benefit without assuming equal responsibility for de-

fendant’s attorneys’ fees and costs should the action

fail. The risk could spread among the class, which, by

definition, must be of sufficient size in order to meet

the numerosity requirements of Rule 23. Weathers v.

Peters Realty Corp., 499 F.2d 1197 (6th Cir. 1974).

Moreover, individual plaintiffs and class action plain-

tiffs in Title VII cases are often assisted in their efforts

to obtain redress. HEOC v. Enterprise Ass’n, supra.

These groups, such as unions, have a greater capability

of spreading the litigation costs among their member-

ship than do small employers and non-profit corpora-

tions. In light of the above, it is clear that the standard

for attorneys’ fees should be the same for successful

plaintiffs and defendants in Title VII actions.

*

*

5

5

§

19

C. Society Benefits from the Defense of Actions as Well as

Their Prosecution.

No social goals warrant making a distinction between

plaintiffs and defendants insofar as the award of at-

torneys’ fees is concerned, a fact which has been ree-

ognized. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.

Environmental Protection Agency, supra. Evenhanded

treatment of the imposition of attorneys’ fees encour-

uges both plaintiffs and defendants to consider the

merit of bringing or contesting a lawsuit, while a more

permissive standard for fee awards for plaintiffs than

defendants could sérve to discourage a defendant from

vigorously opposing a suit. Assertion of proper de-

fenses is an essential ingredient in the proper develop-

ment of the law, since a defendant is optimally situated

to assist the court in considering all aspects of the is-

sues being litigated.

Moreover, an effective Title VII defense will often

inure to the good of a company’s employees since bene-

fits held by certain employees are often challenged in

Title VII actions. See e.g., International Brotherhood

of Teamsters v. United States, —— U.S. ——, 97 S. Ct.

1843 (1977). In the absence of an active defense, the

employees’ rights to these benefits will often go unpro-

tected. In addition, civil rights actions can generate

claims for reverse discrimination when an unlawfully

imposed remedy for past bias limits opportunities for

persons who are not members of the protected class. Cf.

Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993, 998 (2nd

Cir. 1976).

A vigorously presented defense brings these impor-

tant issues into sharper focus for the court. Lastly, the

failure of an employer to present adequate defenses

may result in severe restrictions on the income of the

business to the detriment of both the enterprise and its

shareholders. NAACP v. Federal Power Commission,

425 U.S. 662 (1976). A vigorously presented defense

brings these important issues into sharper focus for the

court.

Although the Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution contains no equal protection’’ clause

equivalent to that of the Fourteenth Amendment, the

Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause is ap-

plicable to the Federal government through the Fifth

Amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). If

a classification would be invalid under the equal pro-

tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is also

inconsistent with the due process clause of the Fifth

Amendment. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974).

Thus, unjustifiable discrimination against women may

violate the Fifth Amendment on equal protection

grounds. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636

(1975). Diseriminatory enforcement of a neutral stat-

ute can also be a violation of the equal protection re-

quirement which ‘‘prohibits discriminatory admini-

stration of valid statutes. United States v. Falk, 479

F. 2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1973) ; Shock v. Tester, 405 F.2d

852 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. den. 394 U.S. 1020 (2969),

reh. den. 395 U.S. 941 (1969).

Obviously not all legislative distinctions present

questions of Constitutional violations. As this Court

noted in Matthews v. Lucas:

21

Statutory classifications, of course are not per se

unconstitutional; the matter depends upon the

character of the discrimination and its relation to

legitimate legislative aims. —— U.S. ——, 96 S.

Ct. 2755, 2761 (1976).

Thus, although classifications may be made to pass con-

stitutional muster they must not treat similarly situa-

ted persons differently. Califano v. Goldfarb, U.S.

„97 S. Ct. 1021, 1027 (1977) ; Frontiero v. Richard-

son, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71

(1971).

The language of Section 706(k) demonstrates that

Congress has not specified different standards for pre-

vailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants in Title

VII cases. The courts below, however, took it upon

themselves to impose an unreasonable classification

upon petitioner which placed it in a less favored posi-

tion in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Con-

stitution of the United States. Yick Wo v. Hopkins,

118 U.S. 356, 373-374 (1886).

IV

THE APPLICABLE STANDARD IS EQUAL TREATMENT

In light of the plain meaning of section 706(k), the

legislative history of that section, and the relevant

policy considerations, it is mandatory that prevailing

defendants be treated the same as prevailing plaintiffs

when awarding attorneys’ fees. Accordingly, the test

for award of attorneys’ fees expressed by this Court in

Newman v. Piggie Park, supra, should be applied to

prevailing defendants in Title VII actions. That is that

fees should ordinarily be awarded, unless special cir-

cumstances would render such an award unjust.”

* Even if this Court should not agree that the Piggie Park test is

The application of an objective test such as this

eliminates continuing litigation over the meaning of a

subjective standard, such as the common law bad faith

exception followed below. Moreover, as one court has

stated :

Under the standard proposed by plaintiff [subjec-

tive good faith] in its opposition brief, no attor-

neys’ fee could ever be awarded against the Com-

mission as long as the EEOC attorneys subjec-

tively felt that their litigation zeal was exercised

in good faith for the noble cause of employment

—wv- EEOC v. Western Electric Co., supra, at

1276.

EEOC v. South Carolina National Bank, 12 FEP Cases 1565, 1566

(D.S.C. 1976); EEOC v. Western Electric, 10 FEP Cases 1275,

1276 (D. Md. 1975).

For the foregoing reasons, the decision below should

be reversed and the cause remanded for determination

of an appropriate attorneys’ fee.

Respectfully submitted,

Of Counsel:

LAWRENCE B. KRAUS

NATIONAL CHAMBER

LITIGATION CENTER

Rosert J. Hickey

G. Brockwet HeEyYLIN

KIRIIN, CAMPBELL &

1615 H Street, N. W. KEATING

Washington, D.C. 20062 1150 Connecticut

(202) 659-6036 Avenue N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 296-4911

SrepHen A. Boxart

STan.ey T. Kaeczyc, Jr.

NATIONAL CHAMBER

LITIGATION CENTER

1615 H Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20062

(202) 659-6218

Counsel for the National

Chamber Litigation

Center

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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