Amicus Brief — Quern v. Mandley

—

„ Supreme Court, U. &

3 JUL 25 1977

Supreme Court of the

Octoszr Tanzt, 1976

Nos. 76-1159 and 76-1416

ARTHUR F. QUERN, 2 Director, ILIINOIS DEPARTMENT OF

PUBLIC AID, et al.,

Petitioners,

VENUS MANDLEY, Individually and on Behalf of All Others

Similarly Si

Respondents.

JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, IR., SECRETARY OF HEALTH,

EDUCATION AND WELFARE,

v.

Petitioner,

VENUS MANDLEY, — Ginne 1. on Behalf of All Others

ituat

Respondents.

On Writs of Certiorari to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

— .

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF THE STATE OF

NEW JERSEY

—_

Wipeeene F. A New J

ttorney General of New Jersey

Attorney for the State of New Jersey

State House Annex

Trenton, New Jersey 08625

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS — 2

Arcument—Section 406(e) of the Social Security

Act does not require states participating in the

program of “emergency assistance to needy fami-

lies with children” to furnish assistance to all needy

families with children to whatever extent is neces-

sary to avoid destitution » 0

ConcLUSION 19

Baxter v. Minter, 378 F.Supp. 1213 (D. Mass. 1974) 11

Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.

723 (1975) 6

Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975) 14. 16, 17

Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972 16

Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) 8,14

De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976 12

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) ll

Gonzalez v. Young, 418 F. Supp. 566 (D.N.J. 1976)

vacated and remanded, —— F.2d—— (3d Cir.

July 15, 1977) 3

King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) 8, 15, 16

Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970) 16

Mandley v. Trainor 523 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1975) —.7, 13-17

ii TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

N.Y. State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino, 413

U.S. 405 (1973) 11-14

Ohio Bur. of Employment Services v. Hodory, 45

U.S.L.W. 4544 (May 31, 1977) oe

Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970) 8

Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971) 15-17

Williams v. Wohlgemuth, 540 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.

1976) 7, 16, 17

Wise v. Klein, Dkt. No. 76-274 (D.N.J., filed Feb-

ruary 17, 1976) 3

Statutes Cited

Social Security Act 2,3

Sec. 402(a) (10) 15-17

Sec. 408 4

See. 408(a) (5) 6, 9, 18, 19

Sec. 406(a) 8, 16

See. 406 (a) (1) 7

Sec. 406 (e) 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 13-19

Sec. 406 (e) (1) — 6-8, 13

42 US.C.:

See. 602(a) (10) 15

Sec. 603(a) (5) 5

See. 606(a) 8, 16

See. 606(e) 5

TABLE OF CONTENTS iii

PAGE

Regulations Cited

45 C. F. R.:

Sec. 233. 10(a) (1) (ü) 17

Sec. 233.10 (a) (1) (i) A) 17

Sec. 233.120 (a) (1) (3) 14

N. J. A. C. 10:82-5.12 3

Other Authorities Cited

Lupu, Welfare and Federalism: AFDC Eligibility

Policies and the Scope of State Discretion, 57

B.U.L. Rev. (1977):

1, 22 18

S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. reprinted in

(1967) U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News:

2834 at 3002-3003 10, 11

— — ——

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser Term, 1976

Nos. 76-1159 and 76-1416

—

ARTHUR F. QUERN, Acting Director, ILLINIOS

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC AID, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

VENUS MANDLEY, Individually and on Behalf of

All Others Similarly Situated,

_ Respondents.

JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., SECRETARY OF

HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE,

Petitioner,

v.

VENUS MANDLEY, Individually and on Behalf of

All Others Similarly Situated,

Respondents.

On Writs of Certiorari to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

>.

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF THE STATE OF

NEW JERSEY

Interest of the Amicus

The State of New Jersey is filing a separate amicus

curiae brief in this matter because its outcome will un-

questionably affect the State’s ability, legislatively and

administratively, to fashion within reasonable fiscal limits

a public assistance program providing emergency relief in

a manner most responsive to public needs. The decision

of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh

Cireuit, which construed the Social Security Act to re-

quire an emergency assistance program far broader in

coverage than that envisioned by Congress, promises to

substantially undermine the necessary flexibility a state

must have to fashion such assistance programs attuned

to the immediate local climate. This is particularly true

with respect to the nationwide relief ordered by the court,

the most immediate effect of which could be the revoca-

tion by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare

of his approval of New Jersey’s emergency assistance pro-

gram and the consequent loss of federal matching funds

which are so vital to the continued operation of public

assistance in the State.

Although New Jersey’s limited fiscal resources do not

permit it to provide every desirable public assistance

service, the State has nonetheless fashioned an extensive

and wide-ranging welfare program. This program, of

which emergency assistance is an integral part, reflects

difficult choices made by the duly elected representatives

of the people in terms of evaluating and balancing the

complex and competing needs of the poor. The choices

made by the State respecting emergency assistance grants

are difficult in that, within the limits of a fixed appro-

priation for that purpose, it must attempt to provide a

meaningful amount of assistance to as broad a class of

recipients as possible. It is precisely this dilemma, faced

by regulation (N. J. A. C. 10:82-5.12) to provide meaning-

ful assistance to those who find themselves facing immi-

nent homelessness due to emergency circumstances. Shel-

ter, food, and clothing are provided, as necessary, to

people who suddenly find themselves in such a desperate

situation.

This emergency assistance program, however, has come

under legal challenge in the courts as inconsistent with

the Social Security Act. Indeed, lawsuits challenging New

Jersey’s emergency assistance program, and raising issues

similar to those presented in this case, are currently pend-

ing in the federal courts. Gonzalez v. Young, 418 F.Supp.

566 (D.N.J. 1976) vacated and remanded, —— F.2d

(3d Cir. July 15, 1977); Wise v. Klein, Dkt. No. 76-274

(D.N.J., filed February 17, 1976). As already mentioned,

New Jersey’s program is also subject to possible challenge

by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare as a

result of the Seventh Cireuit’s decision in the instant

matter. Thus, any decision by the Court in the present

case will substantially, if not conclusively, impact on the

outcome of the Gonzalez and Wise matters, future actions

of the Secretary, and the validity of N. J. A. C. 10:82-5.12.

An affirmance of the court of appeals’ decision may

result in the imposition upon New Jersey by judicial de-

has a vital interest in preserving the authority of its Legis-

lature, consistent with the Social Security Act, to fashion

provisions for emergency assistance which are in accord

with its views of proper allocation of State resources

among the competing interests of the poor.

ARGUMENT

Section 406(e) of the Social Security Act does not

“(a) From the sums appropriated therefor, the

Secretary of the Treasury shall pay to each State

has an approved plan for aid and services to

under the State plan during such quarter as emer-

gency assistance to needy families with children”

42 US.C. § 608(a)(5).

The definition of “emergency assistance to needy families

with children,” for which Congress has offered 50% fed-

eral funding, is set forth in § 406(e) of the Social Security

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 606(e):

“(e)(1) The term ‘emergency assistance to needy

families with children’ means any of the following,

furnished for a period not in excess of 30 days

in any 12-month period, in the case of a needy child

under the age of 21 who is (or, within such period

as may be specified by the Secretary, has been)

living with any of the relatives specified in sub-

section (a)(1) of this section in a place of resi-

dence maintained by one or more of such relatives

as his or their own home, but only where such

child is without available resources, the payments,

care, or services involved are necessary to avoid

destitution of such child or to provide living ar-

rangements in a home for such child, and such

destitution or need for living arrangements did not

arise because such child or relative refused with-

out good cause to accept employment or training

for employment—

“(A) money payments, payments in kind, or

such other payments as the State agency may

specify with respect to, or medical care or any

other type of remedial care recognized under

State law on behalf of, such child or any other

member of the household in which he is living,

and

“(B) such services as may be specified by the

Secretary ;

_— —_ 9

ers with families in the State or in such part or

parts thereof as the State shall designate.“

The State of New Jersey submits that this statute con-

tains no mandatory eligibility eriteria binding upon all

states which participate in § 406 (e) programs, but that

it merely delineates the outer parameters within which

federal moneys may be employed by the states to fund

their individually tailored programs.

“The starting point in every case involving construc-

tion of a statute is the language itself.” Blue Chip

Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975)

(Powell, J., concurring). The statute begins with the

with children’ means any of the following... It is at

once apparent that this is merely a definitional section, de-

signed to be read with § 403(a)(5). Section 406(e)(1)

is not in nature or tone directory since it does not man-

date the performance of any act or the undertaking of

any duty. The statute merely permits a term of art,

“emergency assistance to needy families with children,”

to be applied, for purposes of § 403(a)(5), to “any,” but

not necessarily “all,” “of the following” items.

“Any of the following” refers clearly to § 406(e)(1)

(A): “money payments, payments in kind, or such other

payments as the State agency may specify... .” Partici-

pating states are thus not obligated to provide any spe-

cific kinds of emergency relief but may choose, each in

7

its own discretion, the type[s] of aid to be made avail-

able. This area of state diseretion has been recognized

even by the decisions in Williams v. Wohlgemuth, 540

F.2d 163, 169 (3d Cir. 1976) and Mandley v. Trainor,

523 F.2d 415, 420 (7th Cir. 1975). Surely this Congres-

sional delegation of discretion to the states respecting

the types of assistance to be made available is evidence

that Congress never intended that participating states

must provide emergency assistance to avoid the destitu-

tion of all individuals who, due to an emergency, are

“without resources.” It makes little sense to mandate

such a broad base of eligibility coverage, while at the

same time permitting state discretion as to the types of

aid to be made available. Under such an arrangement,

it is not inconceivable that an individual “eligible” for

assistance pursuant to the presumably binding criteria

would nevertheless remain unaided simply because the

state had not chosen to make available as part of its

plan precisely the type of assistance necessary to remedy

the emergent situation. Congress undoubtedly never in-

tended such an anomalous result.

Other than the decision as to the kinds of aid to offer,

§ 406(e)(1) entrusts other important elements of emer-

gency assistance to state discretion. Thus, states may

determine the period of time during which assistance is

available (“not in excess of 30 days in ar, 12-month

period”), and whether or not migrant workers are to be

included. Williams v. Wohlgemuth, supra, 540 F.2d at

169; Mandley v. Trainor, supra, 523 F.2d at 420.

One additional area of state discretion goes to the

heart of the issue of eligibility determination. Section

406(e)(1) assistance is available “in the case of a needy

child under the age of 21” living in the home of any

relative specified in § 406(a)(1). It has long been settled

41

oh

+f

38

a.

F

:

7

eurity Act.“ Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 478

(1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 334 (1968). This

Court has previously noted that the legislative history of

Social Security Act makes it clear that states have

2 * *

is a “needy child,” — What —7 —

should be made available to such a child, and for how

long a period it should be available, strongly indicates

an intention to permit the states to fashion emergency

assistance programs to fit their individual needs within

broad federal guidelines.

This conclusion is buttressed, rather than undermined,

by that portion of § 406(e)(1) which must serve as the

focus of the Court’s analysis. That portion provides,

in essence, that “emergency assistance” means state-desig-

* The term “needy child” should not be confused with the term

“dependent child.” It is well settled that “dependent child” is defined

by § 406(a) of the Social Security Act, 42 US. C. § 606(a), as a

“needy child” who meets various conditions of eligibility for Aid to

Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) set forth therein. It

is equally well settled that the AFDC standard of need and level of

benefits is fixed by the states. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397

(1970). Since the determination of who is a “needy child” is neces-

sarily a function of the level of benfits and standard of need, the

definition of that term is, in effect, also the product of state

discretion.

nated relief for a state-defined “needy child . . . but only

where [1] such child is without available resources,” [2]

the assistance is “necessary to avoid destitution of such

child” or to provide living arrangements for ‘he child,

and [3] the destitution is not attributable to a refusal,

without good cause, by the child or his relative to accept

employment or training. It is immediately apparent that

this portion does not affirmatively direct that every indi-

vidual who satisfies each of the three enumerated criteria

shall be eligible for emergency assistance. To the con-

trary, this portion of the statute is prefaced by words

of limitation, the intent of which is not to set forth broad

eligibility criteria against which the applications of indi-

viduals for assistance will be measured but to delineate

the conditions under which federal matching funds will

be made available pursuant to § 403(a)(5) and its com-

panion definitional counterpart, § 406(e). In effect, then,

this portion of the statute means that § 403(a)(5) funds

are available to the states, who may disburse them as

emergency assistance but only where necessary to avoid

the destitution of a needy child who lacks available re-

sources, provided that destitution is not the result of a

refusal to accept employment. The language of the stat-

ute clearly indicates that the three specified conditions

were intended to serve only as restraints upon the man-

ner in which federal funds could be disbursed by the

states. To read them otherwise, as did the court below,

is to distort the clear meaning of these conditions, which

are preceded by a phrase which limits the expenditure of

funds rather than mandates eligibility coverage.

The legislative history of § 406(e), though admittedly

scanty, provides support for this construction. The Sen-

ate Finance Committee report speaks of providing “flex-

ible and appropriate tools to accomplish these objectives,”

rather than imposing stringent standards upon the states.

10

8S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. reprinted in [1967

U.S. Code Cong. d Adm. News 2834 at 3002. In describ-

in the class of recipients for whom emergency assistance

was designed, the report states:

“The eligible families involved are those with chil-

dren under 21 who either are, or have recently

been, living with close relatives. The families do

not have to be receiving, or eligible upon applica-

tion to receive, AFDC (although they are generally

of the same type), but they must be without any

available resources and the payment or service must

be necessary in order to meet an immediate need

that would not otherwise be met.” Id. at 3003.

Interestingly enough, the report, like the statute, em-

words of limitation to describe the conditions under

federal funds may be made available. Had Con-

gress intended to provide a definition of eligibility, it is

more likely that the report would have stated, in direct

terms, that “All individuals lacking available resources

must be eligible.” When the report and statute are con-

sidered together, and in context, it is far from clear that

Congress ever attempted to define the class of benefi-

ciaries of emergency assistance. Cf. Ohio Bur. of Em-

ployment Services v. Hodory, 4 U.S. L. W. 4544, 4547 (May,

31, 1977).

If indeed. Congress intended § 406(e) to serve as a

mandatory eligibility standard binding upon the states,

it did so by employing extraordinarily vague terms which

are unwieldy in practice. Terms such as “to avoid des-

titution” are so very general that, as specific criteria

purportedly binding the states, they fail on account of

imprecision and indefiniteness. As the Court has noted,

11

all welfare recipients are by hypothesis “destitute,” Gold-

berg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970), and the general

purpose of every public assistance program is “to avoid

destitution.” Oongress’ use of this term in § 406(a)

strongly suggests that it intended to permit the states

to play the major role in designing eligibility eriteria.“

For if “to avoid destitution” is viewed as a Congression-

ally-designed eligibility standard, that standard is essen-

tially meaningless and its utilization for that purpose

would transform emergency assistance into an open-ended

program by which anyone who mismanages his income

or public assistance grant would be assured of further,

supplementary assistance. This is a far ery from the

announced Congressional desire to provide assistance to

counteract the effects of bona fide emergencies which give

rise to evictions, utility termination or lack of food. S.

Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in [1967]

U.S. Code Cong. d Adm. News 2834 at 3002.

In N.Y. State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino, 413

US. 405 (1973), the Court was presented with the issue

of whether the Work Incentive Program of the Social

Security Act, which requires that certain employable pub-

lie assistance recipients must register for employment,

preempts work rules adopted by the State of New York.

The plaintiffs contended that the State rules were more

* This reasoning has been adopted by at least one federal court.

In Baxter v. Minter, 378 F.Supp. 1213 (D. Mass. 1974), it was

concluded that :

“The terms ‘needy’ and ‘destitution’ were not defined by

Congress and no explicit statutory standard is available for

guidance. A court can infer, therefore, that Congress used

general terms in the statute when describing the poverty line

of eligibility because it intended the states to supply their own

precise standards of need.” 378 F. Supp. at 1218.

a

Sn

12

stringent than the federal statute and that since the lat-

“This Court has repeatedly refused to void state

statutory programs, absent congressional intent to

preempt them.

“If Congress is authorized to act in a field, it

should manifest its intention clearly. It will not

be presumed that a federal statute was intended to

supersede the exercise of the power of the state

unless there is a clear manifestation of intention

to do so. The exercise of federal supremacy is not

lightly to be presumed.” 413 U.S. at 413.

See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). The Court

decided that this principle had direct application to fed-

eral-state public assistance programs, such as Aid to Fam-

ilies with Dependent Children (AFDC), especially in

light of the acknowledged fact that states:

. . . have considerable latitude in allocating their

AFDC resources, since each State is free to set its

own standard of need and to determine the level of

benefits by the amount of funds it devotes to the

„ N.Y. State Dept. of Social Services v.

Dublino, supra, 413 U.S. at 414.

— the Dublino Court held that:

. If Congress had intended to preempt state

„ r

of the AFDC program as employment referrals

for those on assistance, such intentions would in

all likelihood have been expressed in direct and

13

unambiguous language. No such expression exists,

however, either in the federal statute or in the com-

mittee reports.” Id. (emphasis added).

Similarly, had Congress intended to preempt the field

of emergency assistance by foreclosing a state role in de-

termining the eligibility standard, it should have clearly

manifested its intention in “direct and unambiguous lan-

guage,” and should just as succinctly have defined both

the federal standard as well as the permissible areas of

discretion reserved to the states. Like the Work Incen-

tive Program, however, “no such expression exists” in

§ 406(e)(1) “except in the most peripheral way.” 413

U.S. at 417. Indeed, the Seventh Cireuit's opinion in

Mandley v. Trainor, 523 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1975) unwit-

ingly supports this conclusion. Even though that court

held that Congress provided obligatory eligibility eri-

teria in § 406(e)(1), it admitted that the standards set

forth were “somewhat amorphous” and intapable of pre-

cise definition. 523 F.2d at 422-423. The court, however,

conveniently skirted this deficiency be declaring that “This

court need not establish the exact meaning of the eligi-

bility provision of Section 606(e) because this case re-

quires only that the validity of the specifie Illinois pro-

gram be determined.” 523 F.2d at 422. It is submitted,

in response, that the Seventh Circuit refused to delineate

the eligibility criteria which it “found” in § 406(e) be-

cause given its vague and general terms, it is incredibly

difficult, if not impossible, to do so with any degree of

precision. When the vague “avoidance of destitution”

term of § 406(e) is combined with the fact of state dis-

cretion in defining “needy child” as well as the lack of

an explicit statement indicating Congress’ intent to pre-

empt this area by restricting the states’ role in fashion-

ing eligibility standards, it becomes clear that Congress

14

never planned to impose an eligibility standard upon the

states, but that this area was to be reserved to state

discretion exercisable within broadly structured guide-

lines. Had this been recognized by the Seventh Circuit

that not have been faced with the dilemma

statutory standard which it could not define.

The Mandley court’s abdication (523 F.2d at 423) to

the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare of the

responsibility for deciphering the eligibility standard of

§ 406(e) ignores the fact that the Secretary has, since

1969, consistently taken the position that states have the

S,

v

“specify the emergency needs” which state plans will meet.

45 C.F.R. § 233.120(a)(1), (3). It need hardly be pointed

out that the Secretary’s construction of this statute

should be followed unless there are compelling indica-

tions that it is wrong. N.Y. State Dept. of Social

Services v. Dublino, supra, 413 U.S. at 421 (1973); Dan-

dridge v. Williams, supra, 397 U.S. at 481-482 (1970).

After Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975), it is clear

that no special rule of construction exists by which Social

r

unless the Act or its legislative history clearly ex-

hibits an intent to exclude them from coverage, in

effect creating a presumption of coverage when the

statute is ambiguous.” 420 U.S. at 580.

Recognizing that such a rule represented a “departure

from ordinary principles of statutory interpretation” un-

15

supported by its prior decisions, the Court declared that

proper analysis should proceed according to the follow-

ing principle:

Once the federal standard of eligibility is de-

fined, a participating State may not deny aid to

persons who come within it in the absence of a

clear indication that Congress meant the coverage

to be optional. The method of analysis used to

define the federal standard of eligibility is no dif-

ferent from that used in solving any other problem

of statutory construction.” Jd. (emphasis added).

Thus, a necessary first step in eligibility analysis is to

isolate and define the standard of eligibility. It may not

merely be presumed that an eligibility standard exists,

and then further presumed that an individual is eligibile

absent any language indicating exclusion. The Mandley

court’s analysis failed to follow these principles, because

it nowhere defined the federal eligibility standard. Until

such a definition is presented, courts which compare state

emergency assistance plans against § 406(e) for the pur-

pose of isolating possible conflicts are merely indulging

in question-begging exercises. To date, neither Congress

nor the courts have yet “defined” the elusive standard of

§ 406(e).

The Mandley court's holding (523 F.2d at 422) was

bottomed on the Court’s decisions in the line of cases

which includes King v. Smith, supra, 392 U.S. 309, and

Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971), each of which

hold that, by virtue of § 402(a)(10) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 602(a)(10), federal participation in state AFDC pro-

grams is conditional on the state’s offering benefits to

all persons who are eligible under federal standards. Thus,

all individuals who meet the federal definition of “de-

16

pendent child,” § 406(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 606(a),

ae ens Cet cate aie Guan an Ae

granted AFDC benefits according to § 402(a) (10). See

Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 578 (1975). For instance,

when Alabama attempted to deny AFDC assistance by ex-

panding the definition of “parent” to include any male

living in the household, King v. Smith, supra, and when

California broadened the concept of “parent” to include

a “male assuming the role of a spouse,” Lewis v. Martin,

397 U.S. 552 (1970), the Court had little diffieulty in strik-

ing them down. Likewise, it struck down an Illinois

regulation denying AFDC to otherwise eligible students

who attended college, Townsend v. Swank, supra, and

similarly disapproved of the California policy which spe-

cified that a father absent from the home on account of

military service was not “continuously absent” for the

purpose of f 406(a). Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S.

definition and funding provisions are entirely separate

from those of AF DC—bhe paid to all eligible individuals.“

Ww . Wohlgemuth, supra, 540 F.2d at 169. Thus,

!

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5

8

“Such a broad-based eligibility standard does not

appear to have been imposed upon the states ex-

pressly by the statutory amendments creating the

17

For similar reasons, the so-called Townsend regulation,

45 C.F.R. 5 233.10(a)(1)(ii), which is merely the HEW

codification of the holding in Townsend v. Swank, is also

inapplicable to the instant case. This regulation, relied

upon in both Mandley (523 F.2d at 421) and Williams v.

Wohlgemuth, supra, 540 F. Ad at 170, provides:

(u) A State may:

(A) Provide more limited public assistance

coverage than that provided by the Act only

where the Social Security Act or its legislative

history authorized more limited coverage;” 45

C.F.R. § 233.10(a)(1)(ii)(A).

It is submitted that the Burns principle is just as ap-

plicable to this regulation as it is to the Townsend hold-

ing. Thus, before a state may limit “coverage,” it must

be determined that the federal statute, in the first instance,

does indeed provide coverage through a defined eligibility

standard. Again, no such standard has yet been defined

or identified because none exists.

Aside from the fact that § 402(a)(10) is unrelated to

§ 406(e), there is an even more basic reason why the

King-Townsend holdings should not be extended to the

area of emergency assistance. The King-Townsend cases

recognize that the state fiscal resources appropriated for

public assistance are finite and that whether those limited

resources will provide effective assistance to needy people

is a function of both the breadth of the class of eligible

recipients, as well as the existing standard of need and

level of benefits paid. In allocating their limited funds

to expanding caseloads, the states, as a result of these

holdings, are precluded from reducing the number of

families eligible for assistance. Thus, adjustment of the

standard of need and level of benefits paid is the only

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