Petition — Utah Power & Light Co. v. U.S.E.P.A.

Bupreme Court, U. A

FILED

NOV 1 976

MICHAEL RODAK, JR, CLERK |

IN THE

Supreme Court ot the Anited States

Ocroper TERM, 1976

No. 76*619

Utan Power & Licut Company, Er AL., Petitioners

v.

Untrep States ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

ET AL., Respondents

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

[List of Counsel on Inside Cover]

— — — bP . !„!łl4∘7ö

FE Due c. Wasuuworom, D. C.

COUNSEL FOR PETITIONERS

Uran Pow & Ligut Company

CoMPANY

Gerry Levenberg Utan Power & Licut Company

Thomas A. Kerol

, Sidney G. Baucom

Leonard, Cohen and Gettings Verl R. Topham

1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D. C. 20006 P.O. Box 899

Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

Pusiic Service ComPaNny oF COLORADO

CHEYENNE Licut, FugL anp Power

CoMPANY

Bryant O’Donnell Piatre River Pow AvTHoriry

Kelly, Stansfield & O’Donnell Moses, Wittemyer and Harrison, P.C.

550 Fifteenth Street 250 Arapahoe Avenue

Denver, Colorado 80202 Boulder, Colorado 80302

228 ELxcr ICG ASSOCIATION

NC.

Girts Krumins

P.O. Box 1149

Montrose, Colorado 81401

INDEX

Page

EE EE ES LE 2

ET EL eee 2

er = eee eee 2

Srarurz Ax Db Recutations Invonvep ................ 3

r . eee 4

Reasons ror Grantine THe WIr 4

A. The Clean Air Act and recent decisions of this

Court firmly establish that the States have pri-

mary responsibility for controlling air quality

throughout their entire geographic area ..... 5

B. Contrary to the explicit provisions of the Act

and this Court’s holdings, the Administrator

has abrogated the States’ responsibilities to

assure air quality throughout their entire geo-

D cubékendadsoasseeedaccacetcese 6

C. Whether EPA is authorized to grant reclassi-

fication powers to federal land managers and

Indian governing bodies is a matter ripe for

review under Section 307(b)(1) of the Clean

Air Act, as mende! 9

EE ̃ ...e 14

Aprenpix F—Petitioners in the Consolidated Proceed-

ings Below

APPENDICEs:

The following documents are incorporated by reference

from the petition for a writ of certiorari of petitioner

Montana Power Co., No. 76-529:

A—Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia Circuit

B—EPA Regulations for prevention of significant air

quality deterioration

C—Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit

E—Relevant excerpts from the Clean Air Act, 42

U.S.C. § 1857, et seq.

ii

CITATIONS

Page

Cases:

Brown v. Environmental Protection Agency, 521 F.2d

827 (C.A. 9, 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3681

US 11,12

Getty Oil v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F. 349 (C. A. 3, 1972),

cert, denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973) .............. 10, 12

Hancock v. Train, — U.S. —, 96 S.Ct. 2006 (1976) . . 5,6

Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681 (C. A. 7, 1975),

cert denied, — U.S. —, 96 S.Ct. 1141 (1976) 10

Plan for Arcadia v. Anita Associates, 501 F.2d 390

(C.A. 9), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034 (1974) ..... 10

Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, cert. granted, 409 U.S.

1124, fd by an equally divided Court, sub nom.

Fri. v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973) 4,5

Toilet Goods Ass’n, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158

(BREED 00000005 2000600 45 be nue ieee eee 12

Train v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 421 U.S. 60

een 5, 8, 9

Union Electric Company v. E. P. A., — U.S. —, 96 S. Ot.

TTT Ä 6,11

STATUTES AND REGuLATIONS:

Clean Air Act, 81 Stat. 485, as amended, 84 Stat. 1676,

42 U.S.C. 1857 et seq.:

Yo Ree ee 5

. c 5

Ir au 9, 10

eee. see eee 6

ieee, passim

III.. 4

@ C.F ae § GRE CHOP ccoccccdcesencacancdudcu 4,6

39 Fed. Reg. 42509 et seq. (Dec. 5, 1974) .......... 2, 7, 14

40 Fed. Reg. 2802 (Jan. 16, 1975) ))))) 2

40 Fed. Reg. 25004 (June 12, 1970)))7¼::n 2

40 Fed. Reg. 42011 (Sept. 10, 1975 2

MISCELLANEOUS:

Bureau of Land Management, Public Land Statistics,

rer 8

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser Term, 1976

— —

No.

Uran Power & Licut Company, Er AL, Petitioners

v.

Unrrep States ENviRonMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

ET AL., Respondents

— —

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Petitioners pray that a writ of certiorari issue to re-

view the judgment of the United States Court of Ap-

peals for the District of Columbia Circuit entered in

this proceeding on August 2, 1976.

The opinion of the Court of Appeals has not yet been

officially reported, but is unofficially reported at 9 ERC

1129 (Appendix A).“ That opinion reviewed regula-

tions promulgated by the Environmental Protection

Agency as amendments to state implementation plans

under the Clean Air Act, which were published in the

Federal Register, together with an explanatory pre-

amble on December 5, 1974 (39 Fed. Reg. 42509), and

were revised on January 16, 1975 (40 Fed. Reg. 2802),

June 12, 1975 (40 Fed. Reg. 25004) and September 10,

1975 (40 Fed. Reg. 42011). The regulations thus pro-

mulgated amended Part 52 of 40 C.F.R. (Appendix B).

The judgment of the Court of Appeals ( Appendix C)

was entered on August 2, 1976. The jurisdiction of

this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

J. Whether the Environmental Protection Agency

has authority, under the Clean Air Act, to promulgate

regulations amending state plans for implementation

of the established national ambient air quality stand-

ards so as to include provisions for prevention of sig-

nifieant deterioration in areas where the air quality is

already better than is required to comply with those

A petition for certiorari was recently filed in this proceeding

on behalf of sev -ral other petitioners below and been assigned ©

No. 76-529. This petition adopts as its own the following appen-

(lices to the petition in No. 76-529: Appendices A, R. C.

‘lereinafter, unless otherwise indieated, all references to the Ap-

pendices will be to those appended to No. 76-529.

W

3

2. Assuming that the Environmental Protection

Agency does have such authority, whether the signifi-

eant deterioration regulations which it has promul-

gated violate the Clean Air Act, because they grant to

federal land managers and Indian governing bodies

the power to reclassify federal and Indian lands, which

may impose more stringent air quality limitations

upon adjoining state and private lands 60 or more

miles from federal or Indian lands in derogation of

the states’ primary responsibility under the Clean Air

Act.

3. Whether the issue of the Environmental Pro-

| tection Agency's statutory authority to grant such re-

classification powers to federal land managers and

Indian governing bodies by promulgation of regula-

tions amending state implementation plans is ripe for

review under Section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act.

— — —

STATUTE AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

Section 307(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b), of the Clean

Air Act, as amended, provides, in pertinent part:

(1) ...A petition for review of the Administra-

tor’s action in .. promulgating any implementa-

tion plan under section 110 of this title... may be

filed only in the United States Court of Appeals

for the appropriate circuit. Any such petition

shall be filed within 30 days from the date of such

promulgation, ... or after such date if such peti-

tion is based solely on grounds arising after such

30th day.

(2) Action of the Administrator with respect to

which review could have been obtained under

ey Ty

4

paragraph (1) shall not be subject to judicial re-

view in civil or criminal proceedings for enforce-

ment.

Other relevant provisions of the Clean Air Act, as

amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq., are set forth in Ap- |

pendix E to the petition for writ of certiorari in No.

76-529. The regulations being reviewed, 40 C. F. R.

§§ 52.01(d), (f), and 52.21 (1975), as amended, 40

Fed. Reg. 42011 (September 10, 1975) are set forth in

Appendix B to the petition in No. 76-529.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioners adopt as their own the Statement of the

Case set forth in No. 76-529.

Petitioners adopt as their own the reasons advanced

in the petition in No. 76-529, which focuses on the basic

issue of EPA’s authority under the Clean Air Act, as

amended, to promulgate regulations amending state im-

plementation plans so as to include provisions for the

prevention of significant deterioration of air quality

that is better than national ambient air quality stand-

ards. This Court previously granted certiorari on that

fundamental statutory issue in Sierra Club v. Ruckels-

haus, 409 U.S. 1124 (1973), which resulted in affirmance

by an equally divided court, Fri v. Sierra Club, 412

U.S. 541 (1973).

Should this Court conclude that EPA is authorized to

promulgate regulations amending state implementation

plans so as to require the prevention of significant de-

terioration, another issue must be resolved. That is-

sue is whether such regulations may empower federal

land managers and Indian governing bodies to reclas-

5

sify federal and Indian lands, which has the operative

effect of impinging upon the sovereign states’ primary

responsibility under the Clean Air Act for controlling

air quality throughout their entire geographie areas.

The lower court declined to review this important is-

sue believing it is not ripe for review. The lower

court’s interpretation of the review provisions of the

Clean Air Act is clearly contrary to the express pro-

visions of the Act and, if permitted to stand, will fore-

close petitioners from obtaining a decision on the merits

of an important and far-reaching delegation of au-

thority by EPA to federal land managers and Indian

governing bodies.

A. The Clean Air Act and Recent Decisions of This Court

Firmly Establish that the States Have Primary Responsi-

bility for Controlling Air Quality Throughout Their Entire

Geographic Areas.

The Clean Air Act declares in Section 101(a) (3), 42

U.S.C., § 1857 (a) (3) that the prevention and control

of air pollution at its source is the primary responsi-

bility of States and local governments. Section

107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1857¢-2(a), provides that Each

State shall have the primary responsibility for assur-

ing air quality within the entire geographic area com-

prising such State

On three occasions since its equally divided affirm-

ance of Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973), this

Court has noted that Congress, in passing the Clean Air

Act Amendments of 1970, explicitly preserved the

principle that, ‘Each State shall have the primary re-

sponsibility for assuring air quality within the entire

geographic area comprising such State ...’.’’ Train v.

Natural Resources Def. Council, 421 U.S. 60, 64 (1975) ;

Hancock v. Train, — US. —, 96 S.Ct. 2006, 2008

6

(1976) ; accord, Union Electric Company v. E.P.A., —

U.S. —, 96 8. Ot. 2518, 2525 (1976).

Although this Court held (Justices Stewart and

Rehnquist dissenting, 96 S.Ct. at 2022), that Section

118 does not require existing federal installations to ob-

tain state permits in order to continue operations, it

acknowledged that Section 118 of the Clean Air Act,

42 U.S.C, § 1857f, ‘‘mekes it the duty of federal facili-

ties to comply with state-established air quality and

emission standards.“ Hancock v. Train, supra, 96 8.

Ct. at 2014 (emphasis supplied).

B. Contrary to the Explicit Provisions of the Act and This

Court's Holdings, the Administrator Has Abrogated the

States’ Responsibilities To Assure Air Quality Throughout

Their Entire Geographic Areas.

Federal land managers and Indian governing bodies

are permitted by the regulations to redesignate their

lands independently of state control and in a manner

inconsistent with surrounding state designations 40

C. F. R. 5 52.21 (e) (3) (ir) and (v) (1975) (App. B,

80a). Federal land managers may only redesignate to

a more restrictive classification ; that is, from a Class II

to a Class I designation § 52.21(¢)(3)(iv). Indian

governing bodies may redesignate to either Class I or

Class III § 52.21(¢)(3)(v).

The Administrator has recognized that the power to

reclassify to a Class I designation means the power to

control land use ‘‘60 or more miles“ outside the Class I

area:

[Because of the small air quality increments

specified for Class I areas, these — can be vio-

lated by a source many miles inside an adjacent

Class II or III area. For example, a power plant

which just meets the Class II increment for SO:

7

could under some conditions violate the Class I in-

crement for SOz 60 or more miles away. Under the

regulations promulgated below, a source could not

be allowed to construct if it would violate an air

quality increment either in the area where the

source is to be located or in any neighboring area

in the State. Therefore, wherever a Class [ area

adjoins a Class II or III area, the potential

growth restrictions, especially for power plant de-

velopment, extends well beyond the Class I bound-

aries into the adjacent areas... . [I]t should be

clear that the Class II or III inerement could only

be fully utilized toward the center of the area and

that at the periphery, allowable deterioration will

be dictated by the adjoining Class I area rather

than the Class IT or III increment. 39 Fed. Reg.

42512 (Dee. 5, 1974) (emphasis supplied) (App.

B. 66a-67a).

There is nothing in the Act or its legislative history

to support granting either federal land managers or

Indian governing bodies power to “dictate” the use of

state and private lands in this fashion. EPA’s only

justification for this extraordinary grant of authority

is that [tjhere is nothing in the Clean Air Act or the

legislative history of that Act that indicates the Con-

gress intended to preclude the Federal Government

from meeting more restrictive standards than are im-

posed by the States” 39 Fed. Reg. 42513 (Dee. 5,

1974) (App. B, 70a). That argument does not answer,

it begs, the issue whether the Act authorizes EPA to

grant federal land managers and Indian governing

bodies effective veto power over the air pollution con-

trol strategies chosen by the respective states. The

differences are not semantical—they are quite real, es-

pecially in the Western states where federal land own-

ership is extensive. As shown by Bureau of Land

Management, Public Land Statistics, Table 7, 1975,

the total federal acreage and percentage of federal land

within the four states comprising petitioners’ service

area is as follows:

Federal Federal Lands as

State Acreage Percentage of State

Utah 34,882,460 66 %

Colorado 23,973,450 36%

Wyoming 29,927,861 48%

Idaho 33,732,820 64%

Moreover, with federal land scattered throughout a

state, federal land managers’ power to ‘‘dictate’’ large

portions of state and private lands usage intensifies;

indeed, in Utah, there is no point on private or state

land that is farther than 20 miles from an adjoining

federal or Indian border.

The practical effect is that states such as Utah,

Colorado, Wyoming and Idaho are divested to a large

extent of their responsibility to control air quality

within their borders. At best, their control is coneur-

rent with federal land managers and Indian governing

bodies. At worst, they are now relegated to a second-

ary role in controlling air quality.

There is no statutory or judicial support for such

an abrogation of state responsibility under the Clean

Air Act. The Act is explicit in expressing Congress’

intent that states maintain control of their land uses

in achieving national air quality standards. Train v.

Natural Resources Def. Council, supra at 86-87. The

Administrator’s grant of power to federal land mana-

gers and Indian governing bodies contravenes that

Congressional intent.

e

C. Whether EPA Is Authorized To Grant Reclassification

Powers to Federal Land Managers and Indian Governing

Bodies Is a Matter Ripe for Review Under Section 307(b)(1)

of the Clean Air Act, as Amended.

Congress created for the Clean Air Act its own

judicial review procedures. In § 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.

1857h-5(b)(1), Congress established a 30-day statu-

tory limitation period for the filing of a petition to

review the Administrator’s action in promulgating

any impiementation plan. This is in keeping with

Congress’ intent under the Clean Air Act Amendments

of 1970, which “‘imposed upon the Agency and states a

comprehensive planning task of the first magnitude

which was to be accomplished in a relatively short

time.“ Train v. Natural Resources Def. Council, supra

at 68.

The court below disregarded § 307 (b) (1), refusing

to decide whether the Administrator had exceeded his

statutory authority in granting federal land managers

and Indian governing bodies the power to redesignate

their lands, finding this issue ‘‘not yet ripe for re-

view.“ (App. A, 47a). Review by this Court is necessary

in order to affirm the intent of Congress and to resolve

promptly all questions raised concerning the Adminis-

trator’s authority to promulgate the regulations.

As the lower court correctly recognized, the chal-

lenged regulations were promulgated by the Adminis-

trator pursuant to section 110(¢) (1), 42 U.S.C. §1857e-

50e) (I), as amendments to the state implementation

plans (App. A, lla). Each state implementation plan

was amended to incorporate by reference the new

regulations (/d.). Judicial review of the promulga-

10

tion of any state implementation plan is provided in

section 307 (b) (1):

A petition for review of the Administrator’s

action in. . . promulgating any implementation

— under section 110 of this title . . . may be

ed only in the United States Court of Appeals

for the appropriate circuit. Any such petition

shall be filed within 30 days from the date of such

promulgation, ... or after such date if such peti-

tion is based solely on grounds arising after such

30th day. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b) (1) (emphasis

supplied).

And 5 307 (b) (1) is the exclusive means for obtain-

ing judicial review of the promulgation of any

state implementation plan. Highland Park v. Train, 519

F.2d 681 (C. A. 7, 1975), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 96

S.Ct. 1141 (1976); Plan for Arcadia v. Anita Associ-

ates, 501 F.2d 390, 392 (C.A.9), cert. denied, 419 US.

1034 (1974); Getty Oil v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349

(C. A. 3, 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).

Failing to realize the exclusivity of judicial review

of implementation plans under § 307 (b) (1), the lower

court declined to decide whether the Administrator

possesses authority to delegate reclassification powers

to federal land managers and Indian governing bodies,

finding it not yet ripe for review (App. A, 47a). This

conclusion is based on the errone us assumption that

judicial review of the Administrator’s power to amend

state implementation plans could be obtained at some

later date. But, as this Court recently pointed out,

under § 307(b)(1), petitions for review of an imple-

mentation plan may be filed more than 30 days after

promulgation of such implementation plan only if

the petition is based solely on grounds arising after

11

such 30th day Union Electric Co. v. K. P. A., — US.

—, 96 S. Ct. 2518, 2523 (1976) (emphasis supplied).

Petitioners’ failure to seek judicial review of the reg-

ulations within 30 days of their promulgation would

have precluded them from challenging the Adminis-

trator’s statutory authority to promulgate the regula-

tions. Land reclassification at some future date by a

federal land manager or Indian governing body—

the more concrete context“ the lower court referred to

(App. A, 48a )—would not enable petitioners to obtain

review of the Administrator’s authority to delegate

those powers, since a challenge to that authority would

not be based solely on grounds arising after such 30th

day,“ as required by § 307(b)(1).

In Brown v. Environmental Protection Agency, 521

F. 2d 827 (C.A.9, 1975), cert granted, 44 U.S. L. W. 3681

(June 1, 1976), EPA made an argument similar to that

which it advanced in the court below in this case. The

State of California challenged the Administrator’s

authority under the Clean Air Act to impose any sanc-

tions or penalties against California for its failure to

administer and enforce transportation controls set out

in the State’s implementation plan. EPA there argued

that a determination regarding the Administrator’s

authority was not yet ripe because the Administrator

had yet to institute procedures necessary to invoke

the sanctions. The court rejected that argument stat-

ing:

We do not believe any doctrine of ripeness or

exhaustion of administrative remedies should pre-

clude our determination of the issues raised in

this proceeding by the State of California and

others regarding the authority to impose the regu-

12

lations with res to which these petitions for

review were filed. Such issues must be determined

in this proceeding for it is unlikely they could

be raised ‘in a civil or criminal proceeding for

enforcement.’ Moreover, the orderly admimstra-

tion of the Clean Air Act requires that the serious

questions to which the parties have addressed

themselves be resolved as expeditiously as pos-

sible.“ (Id. at 831, emphasis supplied).

Similarly, the court below should not have refrained

from deciding whether the Administrator exceeded his

statutory authority. Section 307(b)(1) left no disere-

tion to either petitioners or the court. Petitioners

were required to file their petition for review within

30 days of the regulations’ promulgation, and the court,

having correctly concluded that the validity of EPA-

promulgated state implementation plans was at issue

(App. A, lla), was required to grant judicial review.

The lower court’s reliance on Toilet Goods Ass’n,

Ine. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967), is misplaced

(App. A, 47a). This Court found the particular issue

in Toilet Goods not yet ripe for review only after hav-

ing satisfied itself that, under the Administrative Pro-

cedure Act, petitioners would be afforded at a later

date effective judicial review with respect to the issue

of the underlying statutory authority to promulgate

the challenged regulations (Id. at 165-66). But, as

Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349, 356 (C. A.

3, 1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 1125 (1973), made clear,

“The Declaratory Judgment Act and APA could not

afford a basis for jurisdiction“ of a challenge to the

SEPA did not seek certiorari on this issue. Environmental

Protection Agency v. Brown, Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,

No. 75-909.

—

13

promulgation of an implementation plan because Con-

gress in § 307 (b) (1) of the Clean Air Act provided an

exclusive method for judicial review of state imple-

mentation plans.

Moreover, the lower court’s inability to ‘‘foresee any

irreparable injury which may arise from deferral’’ of

the question whether the Administrator exceeded his

authority in granting the classification powers to fed-

eral land managers and Indian governing bodies is

quite beside the point (App. A, 48a). Congress no-

where provided in the Clean Air Act of 1970 that peti-

tions for review of the Administrator’s promulgation

of implementation plans must demonstrate ‘‘irrepa-

rable injury.“ Indeed, since petitioners can not later

mount a challenge to the Adm.nistrator’s lack of statu-

tory authority to promulgate the amended state imple-

mentation plans, it is the refusal of the lower court to

decide the issue that will inflict irreparable injury“

on petitioners by forever foreclosing judicial review

on this issue.

Finally, the lower court further justified its refusal

to review the issue with the following hypothesis:

if the Administrator were to approve, as re-

placements for these regulations, individual state

plans which did not include the powers granted to

federal land managers and Indian governing bod—

ies, the problems foreseen by petitioners might

never arise. (App. A, 48a).

At no time has the Administrator suggested that he

might approve state plans which did not include the

reclassification powers which he granted to federal land

managers and Indian governing bodies. Quite to the

14

contrary, the Administrator declared in the preamble

to the regulations:

EPA did not intend to preclude State redesigna-

tions provided that the Federal Land Manager can

elect to keep the air quality over Federal lands in

a more pristine condition than the State might

designate, Therefore, the regulations. . . reserve

to the Federal Land Manager the authority to sub-

ject such lands to a more stringent designation.

St revised regulations make it clear that the

Federal Government can protect air quality over

all Federal lands. 39 Fed. Reg. 42513 (Dee. 5,

1974) (emphasis supplied) (App. B, 69a-70a).

The lower court has thus refused to decide an im-

portant issue, and has as well erroneously decided other

significant issues concerning the Administrator’s au-

thority under the Clean Air Act, which this Court

should review and decide.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, this petition for writ of

certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

[List of Counsel on next page]

Dated: November 1, 1976

Uran Power & Liont Company

Pune Service Company or CoLorapo

— — :

Piarre River Power AvuTHoriry

Cuevenne Licnt, Fue. ann Power

COMPANY

Gerry Levenberg Uran Power & Liout Company

Thomas A. Karol

; Sidney G. Baucom

Leonard, Cohen and Gettings Verl R. Topham

1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D. C. 20006 P.O. Box 899

Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

Pusiic Service Company or CoLoRapo

Cueyvenne Lieut, Fue. ann Power

CoMPANY

Bryant O'Donnell Parr River Power AvuTHoriry

Kelly, Stansfield & O'Donnell Moses, Wittemyer and Harrison, P.C.

550 Fifteenth Street 250 Arapahoe Avenue

Denver, Colorado 80202 Boulder, Colorado 80302

38 Evectric AssociaTIONn

NC.

Girts Krumins

P.O. Box 1149

Montrose, Colorado 81401

The following parties were other petitioners in the con-

solidated proceedings below :

Montana Power Company, Pacific Power and Light Com-

pany, Portland General Electric Company, Puget Sound

Power & Light Company, Washington Water Power Com-

pany, Pacific Coal Gasification Company, Transwestern

Coal Gasification Company, The Dayton Power and Light

Co., Kentucky Power Company, Ohio Edison Company,

Ohio Power Company, Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company,

The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, Columbus

and Southern Ohio Electric Company, Sierra Club, The

Washington Metropolitan Coalition for “lean Air, New

Mexico Citizens for Clean Air and Water, Oregon Environ-

mental Council, Sally Rodgers, John Tanton, Susan L.

Moore, Stephen Winter, the State of New Mexico, the State

of Nevada, Buckeye Power, Inc., Ohio Valley Electric Cor-

poration, Indiana Kentucky Electric Corporation, Indiana

& Michigan Electric Corporation, Indiana Statewide Rural

Electric Cooperative, Inc., Indianapolis Power and Light

Company, Northern Indiana Public Service Company, Pub-

lie Service Company of Indiana, Inc., Southern Indiana

Gas and Electric Company, Utah International, Inc., Ala-

bama Power Company, Georgia Power Company, Gulf

Power Company, Mississippi Power Company, Western

Energy Supply and Transmission Associates, Arizona Pub-

lie Service Company, Arizona Power Cooperative, Inc.,

Nevada Power Company, Salt River Project Agricultural

Improvement and Power District, San Diego Gas & Elec-

trie Company, Southern California Edison Company, Edi-

son Electric Institute, the Kentucky Utilities Company,

American Petroleum Institute, Standard Oil Company,

Atlantic-Richfield Company, Continental Oil Company,

Exxon Corporation, Gulf Oil Corporation, Mobil Oil Cor-

poration, Shell Oil Corporation, Texaco, Inc., Tucson Gas

& Electric Company, and Union Oil Company of California.