Petitioners Brief — Mont. Power Co. v. U.S.E.P.A.
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Supreme Court, U. 8.
r D 2
1977
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United eaten ®. OR
OcrogxRx TERM, 1976
No. 76-529
MonTANA Power ComPANY, ET L., Petitioners,
v.
Unrrep Srarxs ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Er AL.
No. 76-585
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, ET AL., Petitioners,
v.
Unrtep States ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.
No. 76-594
INDIANA-KENTUCKY ELECTRIC CORPORATION, ET XL., Peiitioners,
v.
UnttTep Srarxs ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.
No. 76-603
ALABAMA PowEeR ComMPANY, ET AL., Petitioners,
v.
Untrep Srarxs ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.
No. 76-619
Uran Power a Licut ComPANY, ET L., Petitioners,
v.
Unrtrep STaTes ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.
No. 76-620
WESTERN ENERGY SUPPLY AND TRANSMISSION ASSOCIATES
AND UTAH INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioners,
v.
Unrirep States ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
WESTERN ENERGY SUPPLY AND
TRANSMISSION ASSOCIATES
AND
UTAH INTERNATIONAL, INC.
[List or COUNSEL ON INsIpDE Cover]
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONERS
WESTERN ENERGY SUPPLY AND TRANSMISSION ASSOCIATES, com-
prised of:
Arizona Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.
Arizona Power Authority
Arizona Public Service Company
City of Anaheim, Utilities Department
City of Burbank, Public Service Department
City of Colorado Springs, Department of Public Utilities
City of Glendale, Public Service Department
City of Los Angeles, Department of Water & Power
City of Pasadena, Water & Power Department
Colorado-Ute Electric Association, Inc.
El Paso Electric Co.
Nevada Power Co.
Pacific Power & Light Co.
Public Service Co. of Colorado
Public Service Co. of New Mexico
Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power
District
San Diego Gas & Electric Co.
Sierra Pacific Power Co.
Southern California Edison Co.
Tucson Gas & Electric Co.
Rex E. Lee
2840 Iroquois Drive
Provo, Utah 84601
Jon L. Kyl
Jennings, Strouss & Salmon
111 West Monroe
Phoenix, Arizona 85003
Uran INTERNATIONAL, INC.
C. C. Dietrich
500 Celifornia Street
San Francisco, California
94104
Robert M. Westberg
Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro
225 Bush Street
San Francisco, California
94104
Mark Wilmer
John J. Bouma
Snell & Wilmer
3100 Valley Center
Phoenix, Arizona 85073
Richard N. Carpenter
Bigbee, Stephenson,
Carpenter & Crout
P.O. Box 699
Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501
rr · · e eee
r e eee eee
Statute and Regulations Involved . . . .
Questions Presented . . . . . .
Statement of the Case .. ... . . . . . . ..
Summary of Argument . . . . . . . .. 11
Argument
1. Ripeness of Redesignation Issue .................... 20
2. Legality of Redesignation Authority in Fed-
eral Land Managers and Indian Governing
—
ee
. 28
T8 40
.. ( la
rere e eee neee been 1b
ii
CITATIONS
CASEs: Page
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136
COD K—— , . 22,23,24
Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322
I Sa 17
Anaconda Company v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d
1301 (10th Cir. 1973) . 21
Arizona Public Service Company v. Fri, 5
E. R. C. 1878 (D. Ariz. 1973) . . 21
Bryan v. Itasca County, Minnesota, 96 S.Ct.
K G 9
City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681
ü 21
Delaware Cit. For Clean Air, Inc. v. Stauffer
Chem. Co., 367 F. Supp. 1040 (D. Del. i973),
aff d 510 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1975) . . . 21
FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99
K — 34
Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351
IPP . 23
Gardner v. Toilet Goods Association, 387 U.S.
1 ..... 22,23, 24,25
Getty Oil Company (Eastern Operations) v.
Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied 409 U.S. 1125 (1973) .. 21
Hagedorn v. Union Carbide Corporation, 363
F. Supp. 1061 (N.D. W.Va. 1973) — 21
Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976) ........... 14,31,35
Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569 (1966) ............... 17
Pinkney v. Ohio Environmental Protection
Agency, 375 F. Supp. 305 (N. D. Ohio 1974) . 21
—
CITATIONS (Continued)
Plan for Arcadia, Inc. v. Anita Associates, 501
F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
e 21
Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253
(D.D.C. 1972), aff'd per curriam, 4 E. R. C.
1815 (D.C.Cir. 1972), aff'd by equally di-
vided Court, sub nom. Fri. v. Sierra Club,
D 2.6.12
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S.
r 35
Toilet Goods Association v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
a 22,23,24,25
Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
it Si . ccnsssscsssnssenssnsssssessscosses 4,12,14
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965) ................. 12
Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976) 14,15
United States v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 278 U.S.
V 17
United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351
1 23
Utah Internat l, Inc. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 126
r 21
STATUTES:
The Clean Air Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. $4
1 passim
REGULATIONS AND PROPOSED REGULATIONS:
Environmental Protection Agency, “Approval
and Promulgation of Implementation Plans:
Prevention of Significant Air Quality Deteri-
oration”
37 Fed. Reg. 23836 (November 9, 1972) ...........
39 Fed. Reg. 18986 (July 16, 1973) .
a >
iv
CITATIONS (Continued)
39 Fed. Reg. 42509 (December 5, 1974) 7,33
Environmental Protection Agency, “Approval
and Promulgation of Implementation Plans:
Significant Deterioration of Air Quality —
Adding § 52.21”, 37 Fed. Reg. 23836
(November 9, 1972) ..
Environmental Protection Agency, “Prevention
of Significant Air Quality Deterioration”, 40
Ce GG L— ͤ ů 6,7,33
Redesignation of Northern Cheyenne Indian
Reservation for Prevention of Significant
Deterioration, 42 Fed. Reg. 21819 (April 29,
3 ͤ ꝗ— 26
CONGRESSIONAL MATERIALS:
Bills and Reports
H. Rep. No. 91-1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
. 16
sa Rep. No. 92-105, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess.
——A 2 ails 5
H. Rep. No. 92-H31, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess
8 G 5
8. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
— 16,17
RECORDS OF DEBATES AND HEARINGS:
116 Cong. Rec. 32910 (1970) . . 16
116 Cong. Rec. 32902 (1970) . . 16
116 Cong. Rec. 42392 (1970) .... — 16
116 Cong. Rec. 32923 (1970) 16
OTHER AUTHORITIES:
Southwest Energy Study, Department of the
Interior, April, 1972
37
Map of Federal Lands (Attached) q 36
Vv
CITATIONS (Continued) Page
Press Release, Text of an Address by President
Jimmy Carter to a Joint Session of Congress
on Energy, April 20, 1977... 28
7 BNA Environmental Reporter, No. 23
(October 8, 1976). 26, Appendix B
Energy Committee Report, New Mexico Legis-
37
18881 ——jç—ͤP—ĩ—
— —
—— . — ON —— ä ——rð1:? 2 2A2— . ͤ%ékũ ũ — —— Ehv—᷑—ęè n j
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OcToBER TERM, 1976
No. 76-529
MonTANA Power ComPANY, ET AL., Petitioners,
v.
UNrrxp STaTes ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET Al
No. 76-585
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, ET AL., Petitioners,
v.
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET Ai
No. 76-594
INDIANA-KENTUCKY ELECTRIC CORPORATION, ET AL., Petition:
v.
UniTep STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET A:
No. 76-603
ALABAMA PoWER COMPANY, ET AL., Petitioners,
v.
UNrrxop STaTEes ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET Al
No. 76-619
Uran Power & Licut ComMPANY, ET XL., Petitioners,
v.
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL
No. 76-620
WESTERN ENERGY SUPPLY AND TRANSMISSION ASSOCIATES
AND UTAH INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioners,
v.
Untrep Srarxs ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATE*
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
WESTERN ENERGY SUPPLY AND
TRANSMISSION ASSOCIATES
AND
UTAH INTERNATIONAL, INC.
2
BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia is reported at 540 F.2d
1114 and is reproduced in the Joint Appendix at 39a.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered
on August 2, 1976. This Court granted the petitions
for writ of certiorari and consolidated the cases on
April 4, 1977. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. 51254 (1).
STATUTE AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED
The relevant provisions of the Clean Air Act, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. 51857, et seq., are set forth in
Appendix A to this Brief. The regulations at issue are
set forth in the Joint Appendix at 206a and amend-
ments thereto are set forth in the Joint Appendix at
242a, 246a, 284a.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED!
1. Whether the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970,
which provide that the Administretor of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency “shall approve” state plans
for the implementation of federal air quality standards
which enforce such standards within the State, require
him to approve such plans, or whether he may approve
' The petitioners’ statement of the first question presented is
identical to the government’s statement of the question presented
in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, No. 72-804, OT 1972, aff'd per
curiam by an equally divided Court, sub nom Fri. v. Sierra Club,
412 U.S. 541 (1973). The second question presented is taken from
the Court’s statement of the second question in its order granting
certiorari.
— 2 —ů r Ä — — U U — on ee”
3
only state plans which, in addition, will effectively
prevent significant deterioration of existing air quality
in any portion of any State.
2. Whether the Clean Air Act permits the Environ-
mental Protection Agency to adopt regulations which
grant to federal land managers and Indian governing
bodies power to reclassify federal and Indian lan.s
within their jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 19702 carefully
spell out the respective roles of the federal and state
governments in achieving the legislative objective of
air quality control. Federal authority is vested in the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agen-
cy, who is given the responsibility for issuing air
quality criteria® and prescribing national primary
and secondary ambient air quality standards for each
air pollutant for which air quality criteria have been
issued.‘
2 Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat 1705, 42 U.S.C. §1857 et seq.
Section 108, 42 U.S.C.§1857c-3
National primary ambient air quality standards are defined as
“standards the attainment and maintenance of which in the judg-
ment of the Administrator ... allowing an adequate margin of
safety, are requisite to protect the public health....” Section
109(b) (1), 42 U.S.C. §1857c-4(b) (1). A secondary standard is de-
fined as “a level of air quality the attainment and maintenance of
which in the judgment of the Administrator ... is requisite to
protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse
effects associated with the presence of [any air pollutant for
which air quality criteria are issued] in the ambient air.” Id. at
subsection (2).
4
The primary responsibility for implementation of
these standards, set by EPA pursuant to statutory
direction and authority, is vested in the individual
states. The key section is §110,5 which provides for
the submission by each state of a plan for implementa-
tion, maintenance, and enforcement of the primary
and secondary standards in each air quality control
region within the state. Section 110 further provides
that the Administrator must approve or disapprove
the state plan within four months after submission
and, specifically, that “the Administrator shall ap-
prove such plan or any portion thereof if he
determines that it was adopted after reasonable notice
and hearing” and that eight specific statutory criteria
are met. None of these criteria has anything to do with
air quality better than the secondary standards.
As discussed in this Court’s review of the history of
federal air quality legislation reaching back to 1955 in
Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 421
U.S. 60, 63-67 (1975), the 1970 Amendments clearly
expanded the role of the federal government “by tak-
ing a stick to the states. . It is equally clear,
however, that “the Amendments explicitly preserved
the principle: ‘Each state shall have the primary re-
sponsibility for assuring air quality within the entire
geographic area comprising such State. This is
demonstrated not only by 5107, but also by
5 42 U.S.C. §1857¢-5
6 421 U.S. at 64
Id. at 64, citing from §107(a), 42 U.S.C. §1857(a) (3) of the
1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act.
5
§101(a) (3), by §116, which preserves to the states
the right to adopt emission standards or limitations or
abatement or control requirements more stringent
than those provided pursuant to the Act, and by §118,
which requires all segments of the federal government
to comply with the requirements of the statute includ-
ing those set by state and local governments.
In short, Congress took a stick to the states not by
removing their responsibility for implementation of
EPA’s air quality standards, but rather by mandating
that the states carry out this responsibility.’
State plans for implementation of the national pri-
mary and secondary standards were initially submitted
some five years ago. Following disclosure by the EPA
Administrator to Congressional committees’ that, in
his view, the Act required approval of plans that met
the eight criteria specified by §110(a) (2), the Sierra
Club and others filed suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia seeking to enjoin
the Administrator from approving any plans that did
® “(a) The Congress finds
R „ „ * *
(3) that the prevention and control of air pollution at its source
is the primary responsibility of States and local govern-
ments. . . 42 U.S.C. §1857(a) (3).
® In the event of failure of state enforcement, 5113 provides for
federal enforcement. 42 U.S.C. §1857c-8.
10 Hearings on Clean Air Act Oversight before the Subcommittee
on Public Health and Environment of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 92-105
(1972), at 530-531; Hearings on Implementation of the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1970 before the Subcommittee on Air and
Water Pollution of the Senate Public Works Committee, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 92-H31 (1972), Pt. 1., at 246-249, 271-276.
6
not prevent significant deterioration of existing air
quality. The District Court held that “plaintiffs have
made out a claim for relief“ i and issued an injunc-
tion. The Court of Appeals affirmed per curi-
am.'2 This Court granted certiorari and, following oral
argument, affirmed without opinion by an equally di-
vided Court.!“
Pursuant to the injunction which was left in effect,
the Administrator disapproved the implementation
plans of all states insofar as they did not provide for
the prevention of significant deterioration’* and
promulgated the regulations at issue here.
Central to the second issue before the Court are the
provisions of the regulations dealing with area designa-
tion and redesignation. The regulations provide for
three classifications of all areas that already meet the
federal primary and secondary standards for sulphur
oxides and particulates. Classes I and II allow only
sharply limited incremental increases in existing levels,
while Class III is set at the level of the secondary stan-
dards. 40 C.F.R. §52.21(c) (2). Class I is to be used for
areas in which “practically any change in the air qual-
Sierra Ciub v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253, 256 (D. D.C.
1972)
2 4 E. R. C. 1815 (1972)
Fri. u. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973)
37 Fed. Reg. 23836 (Nov. 9, 1972)
Though bound to obey the Court’s order, the Administrator
continued to “adhere to the view .. that the Act does not require
EPA or the States to prevent significant deterioration of air qual-
ity,” and that he was issuing his regulations only because of “the
preliminary injunction issued by the District court.” 39 Fed. Reg.
at 18986 (July 16, 1973), set forth in the Joint Appendix at 91a.
.. 3 .
7
ity would be considered significant”; Class II is for
areas where significant would be more than that nor-
mally accompanying moderate well-controlled
growth”; and Class III would allow “deterioration of
air quality up to the national standards“. All areas
are initially designated as Class II.“
The states are given the power to propose redesigna-
tion of any area, including federal lands within their
vorders.'® This redesignation power is subject to cer-
tain notice and hearing requirements”, including
notification to “other States, Indian Governing Bodies,
and Federal Land Managers whose lands may be
affected... % The Administrator must approve the
redesignation unless he determines that the procedural
requirements have not been complied with or that the
State arbitrarily and capriciously disregarded specified
substantive requirements.”
'6 39 Fed. Reg. 42510
„ 40 C.F.R. §52.21(c) (3) (1)
18 Private persons or businesses may not propose redesign tions,
nor are there any procedures for forcing a state, feder , land
manager, or Indian governing body to propose redesignati vas.
9 40 CF. R. §52.21(c) (3) (ii)
2 40 C.F.R. §52.21(c)(3) (ii) (b)
21 The substantive requirements are contained in 40 C. F. R.
§52.21(c) (3) (ii) (d), which provides: The proposed redesignation
is based on the record of the State’s hearing, which must reflect
the basis for the proposed redesignation, including consideration
of (1) growth anticipated in the area, (2) the social, environmen-
tal, and economic effects of such redesignation upon the area
being proposed for redesignation and upon other areas and
[Continued]
8
If the Regulations had granted redesignation author-
ity only to the states, they would approach the
distribution of authority between state and federal
governments set forth in the statute itself. The statute
provides for authority in the states to impose substan-
tive requirements more stringent than the secondary
standards mandated by Congress.” Under the regula-
tions, this same result could be achieved by the state’s
redesignation to Class I or permitting the Class II des-
ignation to remain in effect. Or, if the secondary
standards represent the state’s preferred tradeoff be-
tween environmental and economic/energy-saving
consequences, it could redesignate to Class III. Thus, if
the redesignation authority had been limited to the
states, the only inconsistency between the division of
federal-state authority prescribed by the statute, and
that prescribed by the regulations would be (1) the
lack of flexibility from pigeon-holing into three classi-
fications, (2) the standard and scope of EPA’s review
authority and (3) the notice and hearing requirements.
In fact, the departure from the statute is far more
serious because redesignation authority does not rest
solely with the states. Similar redesignation authority,
subject to similar notice and hearing requirements and
substantive review by EPA solely for the purpose of
determining arbitrary and capricious disregard of the
factors cited in footnote 21, supra, is also conferred
States, and (3) any impacts of such proposed redesignation upon
regional or rational interests.” The “arbitrary and capricious”
standard of review for State redesignations is contained in 40
C.F.R. §52.21(c) (3) (vi) (a).
2 Section 116, 42 U.S.C. §1857d-1
Pie —
ae 4 —
22»ö
9
upon federal land managers? and Indian governing
bodies.“ Federal land managers may propose redesig-
nate only to a more restrictive designation; that is,
from Class II to Class I in the case of lands that the
state has not redesignation, or, where the state has
redesignated as Class III, the federal land manager
could re-redesignate to Class II or Class I. Indian gov-
erning bodies may propose redesignation into any
class, except in those cases where the state has “as-
sumed jurisdiction over an Indian reservation..
23 40 C. F. R. §52.21(c) (3) (iv). “Federal Land Manager is defined
by the Regulations: The phrase Federal Land Manager’ means
the head, or his designated representative, of any Department or
Agency of the Federal Government which administers federally-
owned land, including public domain lands.” 40 C.F.R. §52.21(b!
(3).
% 40 C.F.R. §52.21(c) (3) (v). “Indian Governing Body” is defined
by the Regulations: The phrase Indian Governing Body’ means
the governing body of any tribe, band, or group of Indians subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States and recognized by the
United States as possessing power of self-government.” 40 C. F. R.
§52.21(b) (5).
* 40 C.F.R. §52.21(c) (3) (b). Apparently, the assumption of ju-
risdiction to which the regulation refers is that which occurs
under Public Law 280, 67 Stat. 589, 28 U.S.C. §1360. If the reason
for tying redesignation authority to lack of state assumption of
jurisdiction under Public Law 280 is to impart some kind of con-
gressional authorization to this scheme, Public Law 280 is not
adequate for the purpose. This Court recently clarified in Bryan
v. Itasca County, Minnesota, 96 S.Ct. 2102 (1976), that that stat-
ute had a limited scope insofar as state exercise of power is
concerned: “The primary concern of Congress in enacting Pub.L.
280 that emerges from its sparse legislative history was with the
problem of lawlessness on certain Indian reservations, and the
absence of adequate tribal institutions for law enforcement.” 96
[Continued]
10
Either the federal land manager or the Indian gov-
erning body, before redesignating, is required to
consult with the states in which the federal land or the
Indian reservation is located, or which it borders, just
as the states are required to give notice to other states,
Indian governing bodies, and federal land managers
concerning their proposed redesignations. But the au-
thority to redesignate is vested in the federal land
managers and Indian governing bodies, and not in the
states. This notwithstanding the careful statutory con-
struct which allocates to EPA substantive authority to
set primary and secondary air quality standards and to
the states both substantive authority to set more strin-
gent standards and primary implementation authority
over all standards.
The national primary and secondary standards con-
stitute the limit of EPA’s substantive authority to set
air quality standards. Section 116 vests in the states
the exclusive authority to set substantive air quality
standards beyond the primary and secondary stan-
dards. This division of substantive and implementing
authority between state and federal government is the
foundational principle of the Clean Air Act.
S.Ct. at 2107. With regard to civil jurisdiction, the Court observed
that the relevant provision of the statute “seems to have been
primarily intended to redress the lack of adequate Indian forums
for resolving private legal disputes between reservation Indians,
and between other Indians and other private citizens, by permit-
ting the courts of the states to decide such disputes....” 96
S.Ct. at 2109. In any event, limiting the redesignation authority
of Indian governing tribes to those tribes over whom the states
have not assumed jurisdiction under Public Law 280 clearly pro-
vides no statutory foundation for the regulation. Congress’
decisions concerning authority over air quality standards, and the
implementation of those standards, is contained in the Clean Air
Act, not in Public Law 280.
11
Very simply, the administrative creation of a redes-
ignation authority in federal land managers and Indian
governing bodies reduces this careful statutory con-
struct to a shambles. There is absolutely no statutory
basis for such redesignation authorization. It runs
squarely counter to the exclusive authority of the
states to set standards more strict than those provided
by the Act. Moreover, it adds additional layers of gov-
ernmental review and results in an administrative
authority so fragmented among so many entities that
it creates enormous practical difficulties.
Thus, in attempting to grant redesignation authority
to Indian governing bodies and federal land managers,
the Administrator has not only acted outside the scope
of his authority, but has attempted to delegate to non-
state governmental entities powers which the statute
expressly withheld from federal authority and vested
in the states.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. This litigation presents the classic example of
problems that are encountered when an administrative
agency is forced to attempt to devise regulations in
implementation of an assumed purpose that is con-
trary to the statutory language and structure. The
Environmental Protection Agency, the administrative
agency charged with the enforcement of this statute,
and whose views are therefore entitled to great weight
For the convenience of the Court, and in the interest of effi-
ciency, these petitioners will summarize their argument
concerning the first issue presented, but will not develop that po-
sition in the argument portion of the brief; rather, on this issue
we will adopt the argument presented by petitioners in these con-
solidated cases who have addressed that issue.
12
in matters of interpretation of the statute,”” has con-
sistently, and correctly, taken the position that the
statute does not authorize the Administrator to pre-
scribe air quality standards other than the primary
and secondary standards expressly referred to by the
Act.”
This is also a case in which the legislative history is
ambiguous, but the statutory language is very plain.
Given the limits of the English language, it would be
difficult to express much more clearly the foundational
principle that the Administrator sets primary and sec-
ondary air quality standards; that each state adopts
and submits to the Administrator a plan for the “im-
plementation, maintenance and enforcement” of such
standards; and that the Administrator “shall approve
such plan, or any portion thereof, if he determines that
it was adopted after reasonable notice and hearing”
and that it meets eight specified statutory criteria,
none of which deals with air quality standards other
than the primary and secondary standards.
The statute speaks with equal clarity concerning
substantive authority to set air quality standards. As
to primary and secondary standards, that authority
belongs to the federal government and is exercised by
the Administrator. But, within the range between the
secondary standards and completely uncontaminated
„ Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60,
75 (1975); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965).
See footnote 15, supra. See also the government’s brief in
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, No. 72-804, OT 1972, aff'd per cur-
iam by an equally divided Court, sub nom Fri. v. Sierra Club,
412 U.S. 541 (1973).
13
air, substantive standard-setting authority belongs to
the individual states.“ Enlarging the federal govern-
ment’s substantive authority beyond the authority to
set primary and secondary standards effectively evis-
cerates this additional element of substantive
authority which the statute gave to the states, allowing
them to adopt substantive standards more stringent
than those authorized by the statute.
The statute is explicit. It mandates the setting of
primary and secondary standards and vests the au-
thority to set those standards in EPA. More stringent
standards may be set, but that decision lies within the
authority of the states. Implementation plans for the
purpose of carrying out those standards, submitted by
the states, must be approved so long as they satisfy
eight criteria. Nothing is said of a tertiary standard, or
a ninth criterion, and the existence of either would run
squarely counter to the language and the structure of
the statute. Judicially grafting such a third standard
or a ninth criterion onto the explicit language of the
statute not only contradicts the plain language of the
Act, but also upsets the allocation of authority be-
tween federal and state government by transferring to
EPA the authority which §116 of the Act expressly
grants to the states: the right to make the tradeoff
judgments balancing environmental against nonenvi-
ronmental considerations, so long as the secondary
standards are observed. It is significant that even
EPA, the beneficiary of this increased authority,
agrees that it is inconsistent with the Act.”
Section 116, 42 U.S.C. §1857d-1
In its brief before this court in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, the
government stated: The holding of the courts below is, we sub-
{Continued}
14
This Court has interpreted the 1970 Amendments to
the Clean Air Act on three occasions. Every one of
those opinions, Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S.
246 (1976); Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976); and
Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 421
U.S. 60 (1975), reaffirms that the statute meant what
it said when it required the Administrator to approve
state implementation plans that meet the eight cri-
teria. While it is true that those cases did not involve
the precise issue in this case, all three addressed the
“shall approve” requirement of 5110 in language that
controls this case. The Court in Hancock stated, “The
EPA was required to approve each State’s implemen-
tation plan as long as it was adopted after public
hearings and satisfied the conditions specified in
§110(a) (2).”"
Similarly, in Train v. NRDC, the Court ruled
that:
“Under §110(a) (2) the Agency is required to
approve a state plan which provides for the timely
attainment and subsequent maintenance of am-
bient air standards, and which also satisfies that
section’s other general requirements. The Act
gives the Agency no authority to question the wis-
dom of a State’s choices of emission limitations if
they are part of a plan which satisfies the stan-
dards of 4110(a) (2)... .”®
mit, inconsistent with the careful statutory balance drawn by
Congress between federal and state responsibilities, and, if per-
mitted to stand, would substantially impair the prompt and
effective implementation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1970”. Government’s Brief, Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, No. 72-
804, OT 1972 pp. 5-6.
426 U.S. at 170-171
* 421 U.S. at 79 (Emphasis in the original).
15
And in Union Electric:
“This approach is apparent on the face of
§110(a) (2). The provision sets out eight criteria
that an implementation plan must satisfy, and
provides that if these criteria are met and if the
plan was adopted after reasonable notice and
hearing, the Administrator ‘shall approve’ the
proposed state plan. The mandatory ‘shall’ makes
it quite clear that the Administrator is not to be
concerned with factors other than those speci-
fied.”
The Act’s statement of purpose to “protect and en-
hance the quality of the nation’s air resources so as to
promote the public health and welfare and the produc-
tive capacity of its population” is the sole asserted
statutory authority for the lower court’s holding. That
statement of purpose is not self-fulfilling. Rather than
inferring some assumed implementation of this general
objective, consideration must be focused on what Con-
gress actually did to provide for “protection and
enhancement”. What Congress did is not to be found
in some imagined, though unexpressed, emanations
from 5101, but from the operative provisions of the
Act.
Congress provided for the “protection” or mainte-
nance of existing air quality—including air quality
already better than that provided by the secondary
standards—through two sections of the Act, §111 and
§116. Section 111 grants authority to EPA to set per-
formance standards for new and existing stationary
sources“ and further provides for the enforcement of
* 427 U.S. at 257
Section 101(b) (1). 42 U.S.C. §1857(b) (J).
Section 111, 42 U.S.C. §1857c-6.
16
such standards. The legislative history consistently
emphasized that this provision was designed to pre-
vent or minimize deterioration of existing air
quality.“
Additional protection“ for existing clean air areas
is provided by 5116, which permits the states to adopt
air quality standards more stringent than provided by
the Act. On its face, §116 necessarily rejects the notion
that all substantive air quality standard authority
The President, who first proposed such a scheme, said that it
would insure “that levels of air quality are maintained in the face
of industrial expansion.” 116 Cong.Rec. 32910 (1970). The House
Committee observed that it would “prevent the occurrence any-
where in the United States of significant new air pollution
problems... H.Rep. No. 91-1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970),
at 3. On the Senate side, the Committee reported that
“(mJjaintenance of existing high air quality is assured through
provision for maximum control of new major pollution sources.”
S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), at 2. It was in
advocacy of new source performance standards that Senator
Muskie contended: “While we clean up existing pollution, we
must also guard against new problems. Those areas which have
levels of air quality which are better than the national standards
should not find their air quality degraded by the construction of
new sources.” 116 Cong.Rec. 32902 (1970). Senator Randolph,
Chairman of the Public Works Committee, urged the Senate to
adopt the Conference Report, including “performance standards
for new stationary sources, to make sure that no industrial devel-
opment will degrade the quality of the air so as to endanger
public health and welfare, or interfere with or restrain further
economic growth.” Jd. at 42392. And Senator Dole observed that
“Under this bill, we can continue to encourage the location of new
industry in Kansas and other rural unspoiled regions without fear
of polluting the high quality of air found there. At the same time,
national standards for new stationary sources will not place some
states at a comparative disadvantage affecting industry decisions
on plant locations.” Id. at 32923.
17
would be vested in the federal government. Very sim-
ply, if the lower court’s judgment is upheld, there will
be no range of air quality choices within which the
states’ statutory authority to adopt standards more
stringent than provided by the Act can operate.
Thus, Congress provided for the “protection” of ex-
isting air quality through §111 and §116, not through
§110. The command of 5110 is clear: implementation
plans which satisfy the eight criteria must be ap-
proved.
The Court of Appeals also placed great emphasis on
the legislative history, particularly a passage in the
Senate Report stating that “where current air pollu-
tion levels are already equal to, or better than, the air
quality goals, the Secretary should not approve any
implementation plan which does not provide, to the
maximu extent practicable, for the continued main-
tenance of such ambient air quality“. This and other
samples of legislative history fail to sustain the lower
court’s holding for several reasons.
First, since the statutory language is clear, there is
no need to resort to legislative history. Addison v.
Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 617
(1944); Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 571 (1966);
United States v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 278 U.S. 269
(1929). The excerpt from the Senate Report consists of
a single sentence from a 129 page report. It is not
found either in the House Report or the Conference
Report. There are other pieces of legislative history
upon which the lower court relied, but as noted
7 §.Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1970)
18
above, s there are equally persuasive segments of leg-
islative history that favor the petitioners’ position.
There is no such ambiguity in the language of the stat-
ute. This case is therefore a classic illustration of the
well-settled rule that where the statutory language is
clear, there is no need to resort to legislative history.
Second, the provisions of the legislative history on
which the lower court relied are no more self-fulfiliing
than is the “protect and enchance” language of §101.
What Congress did to insure that implementation
plans provide “to the maximum extent practicable, for
the continued maintenance of such ambient air qual-
ity” is found not in some i ference from the legislative
history, but in the operative provisions of the statute.
“The continued maintenance of ... air quality” al-
ready cleaner than the secondary standards is
provided by §111, dealing with stationary source con-
trols, and by §116, which authorizes the states to
adopt more stringent standards.
Thus, the content of the generalized “protect and
enhance” objective, as well as the fulfillment of the
snippets of legislative history relied on by the lower
court can be found only in the specific provisions of
the Clean Air Act.
2. The Court of Appeals held that the issue of the
Administrator’s statutory authority to grant redesigna-
tion authority to federal land managers and Indian
governing bodies is not ripe for adjudication. The
Court of Appeals erred in this holding.
EPA promulgated these regulations as identical im-
plementation plans for each state. If the holdings of
See footnote 36.
——U— — —
19
four Circuit Courts of Appeal and numerous district
courts concerning the exclusivity of 5307 of the Clean
Air Act as a means of review of implementation plans
is correct, then it is not only appropriate to review all
aspects of the Administrator’s regulations at this time,
but such review at any other time would be foreclosed.
The Court need not even reach the issue whether §307
provides the exclusive means for review of state imple-
mentation plans, however, because under general
principles dealing with ripeness of federal regulations
for judicial review this case is clearly ripe. The issue
presented is purely legal. The agency action is final
within this Court’s decisions on that issue. Most im-
portant of all, the regulations will have a “direct and
immediate impact” not only on the parties to this liti-
gation, but also on important national interests.
On the merits of the second question, Congress has
provided careful and detailed divisions of authority
and responsibility between federal and state govern-
ments, with substantive authority in the . dministrator
to set primary and secondary air quality standards,
substantive authority in the states to set air quality
standards more stringent than the secondary stan-
dards, and authority in the states for the im-
plementation, maintenance, and enforcement of the
substantive standards.
The foundation stones of this carefully fitted fed-
eral-state structure have been abruptly removed by
the Administrator’s creation of a redesignation author-
ity in federal land managers and Indian governing
bodies. This has been accomplished without any statu-
tory authority and, indeed, contrary to several
statutory provisions.
20
The practical implications of this administrative
rearrangement of the statute are as important as its
theoretical ones. The principal impact of the signifi-
cant deterioration regulations will be in the western
United States. This is also an area of the country that
consists of a checkerboard of federal, Indian, state,
and private land. The Administrator has correctly ob-
served that redesignation as Class I could effectively
control growth and development not only within the
redesignated area, but also within a distance of sixty
to one hundred miles of that area. Vesting redesigna-
tion authority in federal land managers and Indian
governing bodies will deprive the states of their statu-
torily conferred rights to make choices concerning
trade-offs between air quality on the one hand and
energy conservation and economic considerations on
the other. Because of the 60-100 mile overreach, this
deprivation will apply to virtually all of the eleven
western states, including lands that are neither federal
nor Indian.
ARGUMENT
1. Ripeness of Redesignation Issue
Interests and policies that are of immediate impor.
tance not only to these parties, but also to the nation
as a whole, require that this second issue on which the
Court granted certiorari® be decided at this time.
The Court’s characterization of the second question as to
which certiorari was granted as set forth in the Questions Pre-
sented, supra, p. 2, might imply that the Court agrees that
ripeness is not an issue in this case. Because ripeness was the ba-
sis for the lower court’s judgment on the redesignation issue,
however, we will treat it briefly.
21
The Clean Air Act contains its own judicial review
procedures. Under §307(b)(1)” petitions for review
of certain actions of the Administrator—including
approval or promulgation of implementation
plans—must be filed within 30 days from the date of
promulgation or approval. Four Circuit Courts of Ap-
peal, the Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth, as well as
numerous federal district courts, have held that 56307 is
the exclusive means by which implementation plans
may be reviewed.“ The regulations here at issue were
promulgated under §110c-5(c)* as identical imple-
mentation plans for each state to prevent significant
deterioration of air quality. The consolidated cases
before the Court were originally filed as petitions for
review under §307. Under the holdings of the cases
cited above, therefore, judicial review of these regula-
tions at this time is more than appropriate; if these
regulations are to be reviewed at all, it must be in an
action filed under §307 within thirty days of their
promulgation.
42 U.S.C. 1857h-5(b) (1)
City of Highland Park v. T.ain, 519 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1975);
Getty Oil Company (Eastern Operations) v. Ruckelshaus, 467
F.2d 349, 355-56 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 1125 (1973);
Plan for Arcadia, Inc. v. Anita Associates, 501 F.2d 390, 392 (9th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034 (1974); Utah Internat l,
Inc. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 126, 128 (10th Cir. 1973); Anaconda Com-
pany v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301, 1304 (10th Cir. 1973);
Pinkney v. Ohio Environmental Protection Agency, 375 F.Supp.
305, 309 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Arizona Public Service Company v.
Fri, 5 E R C 1878 (D. Ariz. 1973); Hagedorn v. Union Carbide
Corporation, 363 F. Supp. 1061, 1068 (N.D. W.Va. 1973); Dela-
ware Cit. For Clean Air, Inc. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 367 F. Supp.
1040, 1046 (D. Del. 1973), aff d 510 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1975).
42 U.S.C. §1857c-5 (e)
22
This case may not be the most appropriate vehicle
for ruling on the exclusivity of 5307 as a means of judi-
cial review of implementation plans. Fortunately, that
issue need not be resolved in this case because, under
general principles of ripeness applicable to judicial re-
view of federal regulations, review of these regulations
is clearly appropriate at this time.“
The rules dealing generally with the ripeness of fed-
eral regulations for judicial review are illustrated by
three cases decided ihe same day, all involving regula-
tions of the Food and Drug Administration. Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Toilet
Goods Association v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967);
and Gardner v. Toilet Goods Association, 387 U.S. 167
(1967). The underlying rationale and the two-fold test
for ripeness were summarized by the Abbott Laborato-
ries opinion:
“Without undertaking to survey the intricacies
of the ripeness doctrine it is fair to say that its
basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through
avoidance of premature adjudication, from entan-
gling themselves in abstract disagreements over
administrative policies, and also to protect the
agencies from judicial interference until an admin-
istrative decision has been formalized and its
It should be noted, however, that if the Court should disagree
with petitioners’ view concerning the general rules dealing with
ripeness, then the question whether §307 provides the exclusive
means for review of state implementation plans (and the appar-
ent conflict between the District of Columbia Circuit and the
Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits on this issue) would
have to be decided in this case, because if those circuits which
hold that review under §307 within thirty days of promulgation is
correct, then this case is not only an appropriate time to review
the regulations, it is the only time that such review can be had.
23
effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging
parties. The problem is best seen in a twofold as-
pect, requiring us to evaluate both the fitness of
the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to
the parties of withholding court consideration.’
The Court held that two of the cases, Abbott Labo-
ratories and Gardner v. Toilet Goods Association,
were ripe for adjudication, but that the third, Toilet
Goods Association v. Gardner (on which the Court of
Appeals relied) was not ripe. Analysis of those three
opinions compels the conclusion that the second issue
in this case should be decided by this Court at this
time.
In the instant case, as in all three of the FDA cases,
the issue is purely legal. It is also, we submit, an issue
as to which the agency action is final within the hold-
ings of this Court in the FDA cases and also Frozen
Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956);
and United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351
U.S. 192 (1956). The finality concern appears to be the
basis for the Court of Appeals judgment on this issue,
that Court observing that, “if the Administrator were
to approve, as replacements for these regulations, indi-
vidual state plans which did not include the powers
granted the federal land managers and Indian govern-
ing bodies, the problems foreseen by petitioners might
never arise.” Joint Appendix 87a. With all due respect,
this amounts to nothing more than an assertion that
the Administrator might reverse his position. These
regulations have been officially promulgated. They
grant to federal land managers and Indian governing
bodies the powers whose legality is the substantive
“ 387 U.S. at 148-49
24
issue in this case. There is no indication, either in this
record or anywhere else, that the Administrator did
not mean to do what he did in these regulations, or
that he now intends to change his mind, or that such a
change would escape challenge.
Even more important, the three FDA opinions
clearly reveal that the controlling factor distinguishing
Abbott Laboratories and Gardner v. Toilet Goods
Association—which were held to be ripe—from Toilet
Goods Association v. Gardner—which was not—was
“the degree and nature of the regulation’s present ef-
fect on those seeking relief”. The regulation at issue
in Toilet Goods Association v. Gardner, the unripe
case, provided for suspension of certification service to
any firm that refused to permit FDA employees cer-
tain access to that firm’s facilities, processes, and
formulae. The Court in that case observed: “This is
not a situation in which primary conduct is affected
—when contracts must be negotiated, ingredients
tested and substituted, or special records com-
piled.”
By contrast, the regulation in Abbott Laboratories,
requiring drug companies to print on the label the es-
tablished name of certain drugs every time the
proprietary name was employed, had a “sufficiently
direct and immediate [impact] as to render the issue
appropriate for judicial review at this stage.” 387 U.S.
at 152. This “sufficiently direct and immediate im-
pact” was explained by the Court:
“If petitioners wish to comply they must change
all their labels, advertisements, and promotional
| Toilet Goods Association b. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 at 164
“ 387 U.S. at 164
25
materials; they must destroy stocks of printed
matter; and they must invest heavily in new print-
ing type and new supplies.
Similarly, Gardner v. Toilet Goods Association, in-
volved, inter alia, a so-called “patch test” exemption
from the statutory color additive provisions. The Toi-
let Goods Association contended that the
Administrator had exceeded his statutory authority in
restricting the patch test exemption. The issue was
ripe for review because:
„ . . [I]t is quite clear that if respondents, fail-
ing judicial review at this stage, elect to comply
with the regulations and await ultimate judicial
determination of the validity of them in subse-
quent litigation, the amount of preliminary paper
work, scientific testing, and recordkeeping will be
substantial.“
The rule that emerges from analysis of the three
FDA cases is quite clear: the free access regulations in
the unripe case, Toilet Goods Association v. Gardner,
did not affect “primary conduct” such as the negotia-
tion of contracts, the testing or substitution of
ingredients, or the compilation of special records. The
other two cases did require “primary conduct.” In the
one case, labeis and promotional materials would have
to be changed, and in the other, substantial amounts
of paperwork, scientific testing, and recordkeeping
would be implicated.
The conduct necessitated by the FDA regulations in
Abbott Laboratories and Gardner v. Toilet Goods is
pale by comparison to this case. The unlawful grant of
387 U.S. at 152
* 387 U.S. at 173
authority to Indian governing bodies and federal land
managers has created a veto power over energy devel-
opment, especially in the western United States served
by these petitioners. It also creates the potential for
abuse of such power by an entity that proposes a re-
designation for purposes other than the merits of the
proposal, e.g. to exert leverage over a private company
or a nearby governmental entity. EPA itself recognizes
the potentia! for this kind of abuse.”
The very existence of that veto power has a con-
crete, impeding impact on planning, investment, and
development for meeting energy needs.” The dollar
value of that impact is many times greater than was
involved in the labels, advertisements, printing type
and supplies in the FDA cases. These petitioners have
existing plants, plants under construction, and plants
A “Guidance Memorandum” on the regulations from the Assis-
tant Administrator of EPA to all Regional Administrators dated
September 18, 1976, reveals the pervasive impact of the federal
and Indian authority. The full text of the Memorandum appears
in 7 BNA Env. Rptr., No. 23, at 859 (Oct. 8, 1976), and is repro-
duced in pertinent part as Appendix B of this brief. The discus-
sion of potential abuse of redesignation authority appears at pp.
3b-4b of Appendix B.
The Northern Cheyenne Indian Tribe recently proposed re-
designation of its reservation in Montana as a Class I area. On
April 29, 1977, EPA published its proposed approval of the rede-
signation and solicited comments on whether the Tribe had
satisfied two procedural criteria. (42 Fed Reg. 21819) The pro-
posed action is supported by both the Department of the Interior
and the state of Montana. However, the redesignation is opposed
by the neighboring state of Wyoming, the Crow Indian Tribal
Council, whose reservation borders on the Cheyenne’s, and the
[Continued]
27
in the planning stages. Planning for all of these facili-
ties, including assurance of adequate coal supplies,
cannot proceed properly, pending resolution of the
conflicting jurisdictions of the states, Indian tribes and
various federal agencies. Site selection and planning
for electric generation plants involves years of effort
and many millions of dollars. Petitioners cannot risk
such expenditures of time and money on planning and
preparing a plant site only to have the site or its fuel
source eliminated by redesignation by an Indian tribe
or manager of federal lands sixty to one hundred miles
distant from the site.“
Even more serious — and immediately pressing — is
the import of this issue to national policy. In his ad-
dress to a joint session of Congress on April 20, 1977,
the President has reminded us that the current energy
problems constitute “the greatest domestic challenge
Montana Power Company, a petitioner in this action. The Crow
Indians oppose the redesignation because it would limit their op-
tions for developing their own coal deposits; Montana Power
Company opposes the redesignation because it would block con-
struction of two power plants planned for the area; the State of
Wyoming opposes the redesignation because it would effectively
limit the development of northern Wyoming by determinations of
the Tribe, Montana and the federal government, when such
growth determinations belong to Wyoming as a matter of consti-
tutional right.
5! In the Guidance Memorandum, cited in footnote 49, the Ad-
ministrator directed that, even where a governing body merely
“announces consideration” of a possible reclassification, EPA
approval of a previously filed application for a construction per-
mit must be withheld pending (and depending upon) EPA action
on the reclassification; and this is true even where the proposed
source is not to be constructed within the political boundaries of
28
our nation will face in our lifetime.“ 2 He has also
challenged the Congress and the American people that
“our plan and our goals for 1985” include a goal “to
increase our coal production by more than two-thirds,
to over one billion tons a year.“ Among the signifi-
cant contexts in which increased use of coal can relieve
our dependence on petroleum products are electric
generation, coal gasification, and coal liquification.
The lead time for that kind of conversion — to what-
ever extent it is to occur — is measured in years.
This and other aspects of the President’s energy
message pose difficult policy decisions, necessarily
implicating not only energy but also environmental
issues and the inter-relationships between them. These
are decisions facing two of the branches of our govern-
ment, Congress and the President, pursuant to their
joint constitutional responsibility to make law. But, in
that kind of setting, with many billions of dollars and
the welfare of future generations at stake, the occasion
is hardly appropriate for the third coordinate branch
to decline to function in its assigned constitutional
role: the interpretation of already existing federal stat-
utes.
2. Legality of Redesignation Authority in Federal
Land Managers and Indian Governing Bodies
Throughout the 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air
Act, Congress gave rather specific content to the gen-
eral finding in §101, “that the prevention and control
2 Press Release, Text of an Address by the President to a Joint
Session of Congress on Energy, April 20, 1977, p. 1.
bid.
—— cere, *
29
of air pollution at its source is the primary responsibil-
ity of states and local governments”.
Section 107(a)* provides:
“Each State shall have the primary responsibil-
ity for assuring air quality within the entire
geographic area comprising such State by submit-
ting an implementation plan for such State which
will specify the manner in which national primary
and secondary ambient air quality standards will
be achieved and maintained within each air qual-
ity region in such State.”
The submission and adoption of implementation
plans referred to by §107 are treated with greater de-
tail in 51108 which provides that “Each State shall
... adopt and submit to the Administrator ... a plan
which provides for implementation, maintenance, and
enforcement ...” of the national primary and second-
ary ambient air quality standards set by the
Administrator. Section 110 further provides that “the
Administrator shall approve such plan or any portion
thereof, if he determines that it was adopted after a
reasonable notice and hearing ...” and that it meets
eight specified criteria. The eight criteria deal with
attainment of the national and primary standards, but
make no mention of air quality standards other than
the primary and secondary standards.
The general statutory scheme is to vest substantive
standard setting authority in the federal government,
specifically EPA, and the implementation, mainte-
nance, and enforcement authority in the states. There
is one departure from this general pattern: the states
„42 U.S.C. §1857c-2
s 42 U.S. §1857¢-5
30
are given substantive authority to adopt air quality
standards, or emissions limitations, (or control or
abatement requirements) more stringent than required
by the Act.“ The purpose of this provision is clear.
Up to the level of the secondary standards, the states
are given no choice. Congress mandated the attain-
ment of that level of air quality within the time limits
set by the Act, through the medium of state imple-
mentation plans. Throughout the Nation, air quality
represented by the secondary standards was not op-
tional, but mandatory.
Up to the air quality level represented by the sec-
ondary standards, then, the states have no option. But
within that incremental range between the secondary
standards and air which is pollution-free, the Act gives
states the leeway to make their own policy choices
concerning the tradeoffs between air quality on the
one hand and, on the other, economic development,
energy conservation through greater use of coal, and
similar considerations. Such issues are among the most
difficult and the most important facing governments
at all levels. Section 116 of the Clean Air Act did not
attempt to answer all of these questions. It did answer
some: to the level of the secondary standards, econ-
omic considerations, energy conservation con-
siderations, or any other considerations — no matter’
how weighty — are not to be balanced against consi-
derations of air quality control. Up to that level,
Congress has already made the balance. But within the
range beyond the secondary standards, the issue is not
a closed one. Within this dynamic area involving pub-
lic policy issues of the greatest possible magnitude,
Section 116, 42 U.S.C. §1857d-1
31
Congress has left the policy options open, for each
state to exercise, according to its own particular needs.
Finally, §118 of the Act“ provides that each de-
partment, agency, and instrumentality of the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Fed-
eral Government ...” shall comply with “Federal,
State, interstate, and local requirements respecting
control and abatement of air pollution to the same
extent that any person is subject to such require-
ments.” This necessarily means that all components of
the federal government are subject to the states’ sub-
stantive authority to set standards more strict than
the secondary standards, and also subject to state
powers of implementation, maintenance, and enforce-
ment, pursuant to approved implementation plans. In
Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976), this Court held
that EPA is not required to obtain permits from the
State of Kentucky, as provided in that State’s imple-
mentation plan. But the Court made it very clear that
all federal entities are required to conform to state air
pollution standards, limitations, and compliance
schedules. In the language of the Court:
“The parties rightly agree that §118 obligates
federal installations to conform to state air pollu-
tion standards or limitations and compliance
schedules. With the enactment of the Amend-
ments in 1970 came the end of the era in
which it was enough for federal facilities to volun-
teer their cooperation with federal and state
officials.“ e
„ 42 U.S.C. §1857f
„ 426 U.S. at 181
32
The Clean Air Act grants authority to two govern-
mental groups: The Environmental Protection Agency,
and state and local governments. No other authority is
granted. No other authority is intended. And it would
be inconsistent with the structure of the statute for
any other authority to be created. The reason is that
the statute itself allocates all substantive authority so
that none is left to allocate. Standard setting authority
to the secondary level is in the federal government.
Standard setting authority beyond the secondary level
is in the states.
Subdivisions iv and v of §3 of §52.21 of the Adminis-
trator’s regulations, purporting to vest reclassification
authority in federal land managers and Indian govern-
ing bodies, amounts to nothing less than removal of
the foundation stones from the statutory structure al-
locating substantive and enforcement authority
between federal and state governments. There is vir-
tually no aspect of the statutory allocation that is left
untouched. Wholly aside from the legality, as a general
matter of delegation doctrine of one administrative
agency redelegating statutory authority to another, the
controlling fact is that, in this case, such redelegation
amounts to nothing less than re-writing the statute.
There is no language in the Act which, either ex-
pressly or by implication, allows the special treatment
of federal and Indian lands within a State. But, in
withdrawing reclassification of lands from state con-
trol, these regulations affect not only those federal and
Indian lands themselves, but neighboring state and
private lands as well. This is because the construction
or modification of a source covered by the regulations
will not be permitted if the effect of that source on air
33
quality concentrations will cause a violation either of
the air quality increments applicable in the immediate
area or the increments applicable in any other ar-
eas.” EPA itself has emphasized the dramatic effect
of this provision:
“Calculations have shown that because of the
small air quality increments specified for Class I
areas, these levels can be violated by a source lo-
cated many miles inside an adjacent Class II or III
area. For example, a power plant which just meets
the Class II increment for SO, could under some
conditions violate the Class I increment for SO, 60
or more miles away.... Therefore, wherever a
Class I area adjoins a Class II or III area, the po-
tential growth restrictions, especially for power
plant development, extend well beyond the Class I
boundaries into the adjacent area. A similar situa-
tion exists, to a greater or lesser degree, wherever
areas of different classification adjoin each
other... . [I]t should be clear that the Class II or
III increment could only be fully utilized toward
the center of the area and that at the periphery,
allowable deterioration will be dictated by the
adjoining Class I area rather than the Class II or
III increment.”
EPA acknowledged that this “drift factor” could limit
growth outside a Class I area as much as 60 to 100
miles.“ The reclassification of federal or Indian lands
can dictate growth and development on adjacent state
and private lands for many miles around.
„ 40 C.F.R. §52.21(d) (2) (i)
© 39 Fed. Reg. 42512 (Dec. 5, 1974), set forth in the Joint Appen-
dix at 218a, 19a.
6! Jd. at 42513, Joint Appendix at 220a
34
By allowing federal and Indian lands to be reclassi-
fied independently of state control, the regulations
treat those lands differently from all other lands in the
states and grant to federal land managers and Indian
governing bodies a decision-making power equal to
that of the states themselves. It is in fact a power that
supersedes and supplants the power that the statute
grants to the states.
Insofar as the prevention of significant deterioration
is concerned, there is nothing inherent in the nature of
air quality above federal or Indian lands which per se
should remove its protection from state control. Even
if there were, that judgment has been made by Con-
gress; it was not left to EPA. Section 118 explicitly
provides that federal lands and entities shall be sub-
ject to the same state and other requirements as other
persons within the state. Similarly, with regard to In-
dian lands and entities, it is well settled that “general
Acts of Congress apply to Indians as wel! as to all oth-
ers in the absence of a clear expression to the
contrary. ...”®? Since the Clean Air Act contains no
special provisions for Indian tribes, they are subject to
all the provisions of the Act, including those granting
the states the responsibility and authority, subject to
EPA’s supervision, for implementing the Act within
their borders.“
® FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 120 (1960)
Several petitioners below argued that the regulations in ques-
tion violated rights of due process under the United States
Constitution. The allocation of the responsibility for reclassifica-
tion of Indian lands by Indian governing bodies and the “reach”
of such reclassifications beyond the Indian land borders certainly
[Continued]
35
In short, by granting federal land managers and In-
dian governing bodies a decision-making power
seperate from that of the states, EPA has purported to
grant authority which the Act does not give it to grant.
It has also attempted to confer that authority on polit-
ical entities whom the Act did not intend to have such
authority.
EPA’s explanatory comment suggests that creating
this redesignation authority “ensures that national
forests and parks can be protected by the federal gov-
ernment from deterioration of air quality.“
Whatever the merits of that argument as a policy mat-
ter, it should be addressed to Congress. Congress has
already decided that issue, and only Congress can
change what it has done. The primary responsibility
for assuring air quality within “the entire geographic
area comprising such state” was conferred on each
state by §107(a) of the Act, and §118 further declared
that each segment of the federal government must
comply with state standards. Any doubt on that sub-
ject was dispelled by Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167,
181 (1976), wherein this Court observed, “The parties
raise due process type issues. While petitioners could seek judicial
review of a federal land manager’s actions or that of a state in
federal or state courts, respectively, there is no judicial forum in
which to review the Indian governing body action. Judicial review
of the actions of Indian tribes under these regulations would only
be available in the narrow sense of seeking review of EPA’s ap-
proval of any designation under the “arbitrary and capricious”
standard. The Court did not grant certiorari on the due process
issue. Nevertheless, the adequacy of available review procedures
is relevant to the legality of the redesignation regulations. Silver
v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
% Joint Appendix, at 222a
36
rightly agree that 5118 obligates federal installations
to conform to state air pollution standards or limita-
tions and compliance schedules.”
The power granted federal agencies and Indian gov.
erning bodies creates particularly severe problems in
the eleven western states served by petitioners because
of the extensive amounts of federal and Indian lands
and checkerboard land ownership patterns in those
states.
This fact is poignantly demonstrated by the North-
ern Cheyenne Indian Reservation redesignation,
discussed in footnote 50, supra, and graphically illus-
trated by the United States Geological Survey Map
appended to this Brief, showing federal land owner-
ship within the United States. Analysis of that map
discloses that, except for portions of northeastern Col-
orado and northeastern New Mexico, there is no place
in the eleven western United States that is located
sixty miles from Federal or Indian Reservation land.
Extending the range to one hundred miles leaves unaf-
fected no part of the State of New Mexico and, in
Colorado, only a tiny triangle (measuring about eight
miles to the side) along the Kansas border. Indeed,
within the vast area south of a line that runs from the
Montana-Wyoming border to the Columbia River, east
of the Sierra Nevadas, north of the Mexican border,
and west of the Rockies’ eastern slope, there is no spot
that is as much as twenty miles from Federal or Indian
reservation land. Thus, within the eleven western
states — the area in which these regulations will have
their principal impact — the statutory authority of the
states to set their own substantive standards so long as
they meet the primary and secondary standards has
been forfeited by regulatory fiat.
37
Several of petitioners’ electric generating plants and
coal mining operations are located in the Four Corners
Area of Arizona, Utah, Colorado and New Mexico.
Within 60 to 100 miles of the existing and proposed
plants within the New Mexico portion of the Four
Corners region there are four Indian reservations, two
national monuments, three national forests, thousands
of acres of federal public domain, as well as three
other states.“ The delegated authority to New Mexico
to redesignate becomes of little value under these cir-
cumstances, since one of the considerations is the
effects of the proposed redesignations on adjoining
areas which include differing Indian governing bodies
and differing federal land managers, each having the
power of reclassification.
A protest by any one of the multiple federal land
managers of Indian governing bodies limits the cir-
cumstances under which EPA can approve the
reclassification. Moreower, each can initiate its own
reclassification, though the federal agencies only to a
more restrictive class. This hodgepodge of conflicting
“sovereigns” utterly ignores the primary role for the
state in which the sources are geographically situated,
and instead creates a maze of potential vetoes for en-
s According to the Energy Committee of the New Mexico Legis-
lature 1976, a “recent study on the northwest coal fields in New
Mexico conducted by the State Geologist showed that coal owner-
ship was 57.3 percent federal, 32 percent Indian, 5.9 percent
private and 4.8 percent state.” See also Southwest Energy Study,
Department of the Interior, April, 1972 at pp. 3-1 to 3-5, which
shows the division of ownership of coal in the five southwestern
states [Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico] to be as
follows: 45 percent federal, 13 percent Indian, 17 percent private,
13 percent state, 12 percent railroads.
38
ergy development that inhibits, if not curtails,
petitioners’ plans to meet the near and long-term en-
ergy crisis.
It is not a sufficient answer that the redesignation
regulations give the states most of the authority that
they were given by the Act (and that EPA agrees they
were given by the Act), i.e., authority to determine for
themselves the air quality within their own bounda-
ries, so long as it is at least as clean as required by the
secondary standards. The reason that this answer is
insufficient is because it is incorrect. If the regulations
had granted redesignation authority solely to the
states, they would have substantially replicated the
division of substantive authority between federal and
state governments provided by the statute. That is,
the federal government, through EPA, would set the
primary and secondary standards but, beyond the sec-
ondary standards, substantive authority would be
vested in the states. States electing standards higher
than the secondary standards could either redesignate
to Class I, or permit the Class II designation to re-
main. Those who preferred the secondary standards
could redesignate to Class III. In fact, the regulations
do not grant redesignation authority only to the states.
Instead, they create a veto power in federal land man-
gers and Indian governing bodies. It is a veto power
which, because of the “drift factor” and the checker-
board pattern of land ownership within the western
United States, gives these federal land managers and
Indian governing boards exactly what the statute gave
to the states: the authority to determine whether, and
to what extent, air quality will be better than that
provided by the secondary standards.“
See footnote 50.
39
Neither is it a sufficient answer that the regulations
require federal land managers and Indian governing
bodies to “consult” with the states in connection with
redesignations, and that the redesignations are subject
to EPA review. Manifestly, the right of consultation is
not equal to the right of decision. What the statute has
given, the regulations have taken away.
Review by EPA does not save the illegality. The
standard of review is to determine arbitrariness and
capriciousness. Even more important, EPA’s authority
to review a redelegation that it had no authority to
make in the first place is hardly an adequate bootstrap
for the creation of such authority.
The short of the matter is that EPA has aitempted,
under the guise of redesignation, to transfer to non-
state entities authority that the statute granted to the
states. No amount of consultation nor review to deter-
mine arbitrarimess and capriciousness can cure that
defect.
40
CONCLUSION |
A single principle resolves both issues in this case.
That principle is judicial fidelity to the language of
the statute. The legislative history offers something for
both sides of the non-degradation issue, but there is no
ambiguity in the statutory language. “Shall approve”
means “shall approve” and three times this Court has
said that the language of §110 precludes consideration
of any factors other than those specified.
If EPA had not been enjoined from implementing
the Clean Air Act as EPA interprets the Clean Air Act,
the redesignation issue would never have arisen. Also,
if redesignation authority had been granted only to the
states, then redesignation would have substantially
reinstated what the Act originally granted: authority
in the states to control the extent to which air quality
will exceed the secondary standards.
The solution, of course, is to return to the original
statutory construct: (1) substantive authority and re-
sponsibility in EPA to set primary and secondary air
quality standards, (2) substantive authority in the
states to set other air quality standards, and (3) au-
thority and responsibility in the states for the
implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of the
standards.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia must therefore be reversed.
41
Respectfully submitted,
WESTERN ENERGY SUPPLY AND TRANSMISSION
ASSOCIATES
Rex E. Lee Mark Wilmer
2840 Iroquois Drive John J. Bouma
Provo, Utah 84601 Snell & Wilmer
Jon L. Kyl 3100 Valley Center
Jennings, Strouss & Phoenix, Arizona 85073
Salmon
111 West Monroe
Phoenix, Arizona 85003
Uran INTERNATIONAL, INC.
C.C. Dietrich Richard N. Carpenter
500 California Street Bigbee, Stephenson,
San Francisco, Carpenter & Crout
California 94104 P. O. Box 669
Robert M. Westberg Santa Fe, New Mexico
Pillsbury, Madison & 87501
Sutro
225 Bush Street
San Francisco,
California 94104
DATED: May 19, 1977
APPENDIX
APPENDIX A
Relevant excerpts from the Clean Air Act, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq., are as follows:
§ 1857. [§ 101.] Congressional findings;
purposes of subchapter
(a) The Congress finds—
(1) that the predominant part of the Nation’s
population is located in its rapidly expanding
metropolitan and other urban areas, which gener-
ally cross the boundary lines of local jurisdictions
and often extends into two or more States;
(2) that the growth in the amount and complex-
ity of air pollution brought about by urbanization,
industrial development, and the increasing use of
motor vehicles, has resulted in mounting dangers
to the public health and welfare, including injury
to agricultural crops and livestock, damage to and
the deterioration of property, and hazards to air
and ground transportation;
(3) that the prevention and control of air pollu-
tion at its source is the primary responsibility of
States and local governments; and
(4) that Federal financial assistance and leader-
ship is essential for the development of
cooperative Federal, State, regional, and local pro-
grams to prevent and control air pollution.
(b) The purposes of this subchapter are—
(1) to protect and enhance the quality of the
Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public
health and welfare and the productive capacity of
its population; | a
2a
(2) to initiate and accelerate a national research
and development program to achieve the preven-
tion and control of air pollution;
(3) to provide technical and financial assistance
to State and local governments in connection with
the development and execution of their air pollu-
tion prevention and control programs; and
(4) to encourage and assist the development and
operation of regional air pollution control pro-
grams.
a. * *
§ 1857c—2. [§ 107.] Air quality control re-
gions—Responsibility of State for air
quality; submission of implementation plan
(a) Each State shall have the primary responsi-
bility for assuring air quality within the entire
geographic area comprising such State by submit-
ting an implementation plan for such State which
will specify the manner in which national primary
and secondary ambient air quality standards will
be achieved and maintained within each air qual-
ity control region in such State.
§ 1857d—1. [§ 116.] Retention of State
authority
Except as otherwise provided in sections
1857c—10(c), (e), end (f), 1857f—6a,
1857f—6c(c)(4), and 1857f—11 of this title
(preempting certain State regulation of moving
sources) nothing in this chapter shall preclude or
deny the right of any State or political subdivision
thereof to adopt or enforce (1) any standard or
3a
limitation respecting emissions of air pollutants or
(2) any requirement respecting control or abate-
ment of air pollution; except that if an emission
standard or limitation is in effect under an applic-
able implementation plan or under section
1857c—6 or section 1857c—7 of this title, such
State or political subdivision may not adopt or
enforce any emission standard or limitation which
is less stringent than the standard or limitation
under such plan or section.
ae. ae
§ 1857f. [§ 118.] Control and abatement of
air pollution from Federal facilities; com-
pliance of Federal departments, etc., with
Federal, State, interstate, and local re-
quirements; exemption by President of any
emission source from any executive
branch department, etc.; report to Con-
gress
Each department, agency, and instrumentality
of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches
of the Federal Government (1) having jurisdiction
over any property or facility, or (2) engaged in any
activity resulting, or which may result, in the dis-
charge of air pollutants, shall comply with
Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements
respecting control and abatement of air pollution
to the same extent that any person is subject to
such requirements. The President may exempt
any emission source of any department, agency, or
instrumentality in the executive branch from
compliance with such a requirement if he deter-
mines it to be in the paramount interest of the
4a
United States to do so, except that no exemption
may be granted from section 1857c—46 of this title,
and an exemption from section 1857c—7 of this
title may be granted only in accordance with sec-
tion 1857c—7 (e) of this title. No such exemption
shall be granted due to lack of appropriation un-
less the President shall have specifically requested
such appropriation as a part of the budgetary pro-
cess and the Congress shall have failed to make
available such requested appropriation. Any ex-
emption shall be for a period not in excess of one
year, but additional exemptions may be granted
for periods of not to exceed one year upon the
President’s making a new determination. The
President shall report each January to the Con-
gress all exemptions from the requirements of this
section granted during the preceding calendar
year, together with his reason for granting each
such exemption.
R + * ©
§ 1857h—2. [§ 304.] Citizen suits—
Establishment of right to bring suit
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this
section, any person may commence a civil action
on his own behalf—
(1) against any person (including (i) the United
States, and (ii) any other governmental instru-
mentality or agency to the extent permitted by
the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution)
who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an emission
standard or limitation under this chapter or (B)
an order issued by the Administrator or a State
with respect to such a standard or limitation, or
5a
(2) against the Administrator where there is al-
leged a failure of the Administrator to perform
any act or duty under this chapter which is not
discretionary with the Administrator.
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without
regard to the amount in controversy or the citizen-
ship of the parties, to enforce such an emission
standard or limitation, or such an order, or to or-
der the Administrator to perform such act or
duty, as the case may be.
Non-restriction of other rights
(e) Nothing in this section shall restrict any
right which any person (or class of persons) may
have under any statute or common law to seek
enforcement of any emission standard or limita-
tion or to seek any other relief (including relief
against the Administrator or a State agency).
§ 1857h—5. [ 307.] Administrative pro-
ceedings and judicial review
E „ „ *
(b) (1) A petition for review of action of the
Administrator in promulgating any national pri-
mary or secondary ambient air quality standard,
any emission standard under section 1857c—7 of
this title, any standard of performance under sec-
tion 1857c—6 of this title, any standard under
section 1857f—1 of this title (other than a stan-
dard required to be prescribed under section
1857f—1(b) (1) of this title), any determination
6a
under section 1857f—1(b) (5) of this title, any
control or prohibition under section 1857f—6c of
this title, or any standard under section 1857f—9
of this title may be filed only in the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. A
petition for review of the Administrator’s action in
approving or promulgating any implementation
plan under section 1857c—5 of this title or section
1857c—6(d) of this title may be filed only in the
United States Court of Appeals for the appro-
priate circuit. Any such petition shall be filed
within 30 days from the date of such promulgation
or approval, or after such date if such petition is
based solely on grounds arising after such 30th
day.
(2) Action of the Administrator with respect to
which review could have been obtained under par-
agraph (1) shall not be subject to judicial review
in civil or criminal proceedings for enforcement.
APPENDIX B
The following Memorandum appears in 7 BNA En-
vironmental Reporter, No. 23, at 859 (Oct. 8, 1976).
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM ON SIGNIFI-
CANT DETERIORATION REGULATIONS —
DATED SEPTEMBER 28, 1976.
SUBJECT: Additional Guidance on Prevention of
Significant Deterioration (PSD) Reg-
ulations
FROM: Roger Strelow
Assistant Administrator
for Air and Waste Management (AW-
443).
MEMO TO: Regional Administrators
Questions arising from the Regions have indi-
cated the need for further headquarters guidance
on various aspects of the PSD regulation (40 CFR
52.21).
A. Several questions relate to 40 CFR 52.21 (d)
(5), which reads as follows:
(5) Where an owner or operator has applied for
permission to construct or modify pursuant to this
paragraph and the proposed source would be lo-
cated in an area which has been proposed for
redesignation to a more stringent class (or the
State, Indian Governing Body, or Federal Land
Manager has announced such consideration), ap-
proval shall not be granted until the Ad-
ministrator has acted on the proposed redesigna-
tion.
2b
The purpose of paragraph (d) (5) is to insure
that while a governing body is seriously pursuing
the redesignation of an area to Class I, the re-
designation will not be compromised or nullified
bv a new or modified source. I would like to stress
several basic points about this provision:
1. The issue of which was first in time — the
source’s permit application or the governing
body’s announcement of redesignation considera-
tion — is irrelevant under paragraph (d) (5). If
the governing body announces such reconsidera-
tion any time before a final permit has been
issued, paragraph (d) (5) will be triggered.
2. A proposed source need not be located within
the political boundaries of the governing body
considering the redesignation in order for para-
graph (d) (5) to apply. If the source’s emissions
could pose a threat to the proposed redesignation,
then final permit approval would have to be with-
held pending EPA’s action on the proposed
redesignation.
As is true of most aspects of the PSD regula-
tions, the Regions will have to exercise their sound
judgment on a case-by-case basis in determining
whether a proposed source would be located far
enough from the political boundaries of the gov-
erning body so as not to pose a threat to the
proposed redesignation. This type of judgment
should not present novel problems for the Re-
gions, since the PSD regulation ultimately
requires (in paragraph (d) (2) (i)) a finding that a
source will not violate the applicable increments
in any surrounding areas.
3b
I realize that one could read paragraph (d) (5)
in a very literal fashion to apply only to sources
which would be constructed within the political
boundaries of the governing body considering the
redesignation. This interpretation would, however,
do violence to the basic purpose of the PSD
regulation (which is to insure that applicable air
quality increments are not violated by new
sources, without regard to the political boundaries
a source might choose to locate within), and would
do violence to the basic intent of paragraph (d) (5)
(which is to insure that a pending redesignation
will not be jeopardized by a new source).
3. Paragraph (d) (5) will be triggered even
where a governing body “announces considera-
tion” of a proposed redesignation. There is good
reason for allowing such an early triggering event,
since EPA regulations and guidelines require the
governing body to go through several procedural
steps (including detailed document preparation)
before the redesignation can even be formally
proposed. If this approach were not taken, then a
governing body which was actively and expedi-
tiously endeavoring to secure a redesignation
could still find the redesignation compromised or
nullified by an intervening permit approval.
We must recognize, however, the potential for
abuse in such a case and take care to guard against
it. The clause must not operate to allow a govern-
ing body to frustrate construction of a source if
that governing body does not seriously intend to
pursue a redesignation or does not pursue it ac-
tively and expeditiously.
4b
Therefore, whenever a governing body an-
nounces it is considering a redesignation,’ and
that announcement would affect a proposed
source’s application, EPA should make clear to
the governing body (in writing) that new source
approvals will be withheld only so long as the gov-
erning body is actively and expeditiously
proceeding towards redesignation. EPA should set
forth a reasonable schedule of action considering
all the circumstances of each case? and notify the
governing body that any significant departure
from that schedule, or any other evidence that the
governing body is not actively and expeditiously
pursuing redesignation, would be considered
grounds for EPA to suspend the operation of par-
agraph (d) (5) and complete action on permits
being withheld.
Such a suspension of paragraph (d) (5) should
not occur automatically upon the failure of a gov-
erning body to meet a given deadline. Again, all
relevant circumstances would have to be weighed.
No special form of “announcement” is required. Any evi-
dence that the governing body, or an appropriate official
thereof, has seriously determined to consider redesignation
and has communicated this determination in writing to EPA
should suffice. In any event, as discussed in the text above.
the form of announcement is not nearly as important as the
governing body’s follow-up actions in determining whether
paragraph (d) (5) should hold up a permit.
* Le., type of governing body (State? Indian Tribe?), num-
ber of potentially-affected jurisdictions, number of other
govermental approvals needed, size of area affected, etc. It
would probably be wise to develop this schedule in consulta-
tion with representatives of the governing body.
5b
For instance, if a delay were caused through no
fault of the governing body, it would probably be
improper to suspend paragraph (d) (5). The main
point is that EPA must remain satisfied that the
governing body is doing all that can reasonably be
expected to process the redesignation actively and
expeditiously.
4. Paragraph (d) (5) only restricts EPA from
granting permit approval while a redesignation is
pending. A Region may therefore carry out all
other provisions of paragraphs (d) and (e) in this
period (if it chooses). This might have the salutary
effect of “keeping the heat” on the governing body
to complete its redesignation procedures. It might
also, however, constitute in a Region’s judgment an
unwarranted diversion of resources for a permit
which may never be issued. The Regions should
use their own judgment in this area.
5. A Region may grant a permit pending a re-
designation if the Region determines that the
source would not violate the increments which
would result from the redesignation.
6. When a potential applicant contracts a Region
about initiating the permit process, the Region
should make the applicant aware of the implica-
tions of paragraph (d) (5) so that the applicant
may be encouraged to complete its application
expeditiously. Obviously, whenever paragraph (d)
(5) is triggered, the Region should immediately
notify those whose permit applications will be af-
fected.
B. A question has been raised concerning the
applicability of the PSD regulations to certain
6b
kinds of coal cleaning plants 552.21 (d) (1) (ii)].
specifically those that do not utilize a thermal
dryer. Although the wording of the proposal of
§52.21 (d) (1) (ii) read “coal cleaning plants
(thermal dryers)” the final regulations read simply
“coal cleaning plants.” Region VIII has recently
interpreted the PSD regulation to cover all coal
cleaning plants, regardless of whether a thermal
dryer is used. Region VIII’s interpretation is cor-
rect.
C. One Region has questioned whether a PSD
permit can be conditioned to require emission con-
trol that goes beyond best available control
technology (as when a power plant intends to use
low sulfur coal and a flue gas scrubber and will be
well below the NSPS for SO, from power plants).
Unless it is necessary to meet the applicable air
quality increment, we can not require a source to
go beyond BACT. However, should a source indi-
cate on its permit application that its emissions
will be less than that which we would ordinarily
define as BACT, the lesser emission rate may be
made an enforceable condition of the permit. The
legally enforceable emission rate should be used for
purposes of keeping track of the unused portion of
the increment. Obviously, the situation where ac-
tual emissions are less than the legally enforceable
emission rate presents the potential for a source to
“hoard” a major portion of the remaining incre-
ment for future expansion. Therefore, where a
source will go beyond BACT, Regions should at-
tempt to make the lesser emissions a legally
binding permit condition.
7b
D. Finally, some Regional Offices have re-
quested a change to the PSD regulations enabling
the Regional Administrator to require the appli-
cants to perform the necessary diffusion modeling.
We feel, and OGC concurs, that adequate author-
ity to require such analysis is presently provided
under §52.21 (d) (3), which indicates that EPA
can require a source to submit“... information
necessary to determine the impact that the con-
struction or modification will have on sulfur
dioxide and particulate matter air quality
levels 5
cc. Regional Counsels
Regional Air Directors
Regional Enforcement Directors
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.