Petitioners Brief — Mont. Power Co. v. U.S.E.P.A.

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Supreme Court, U. 8.

r D 2

1977

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United eaten ®. OR

OcrogxRx TERM, 1976

No. 76-529

MonTANA Power ComPANY, ET L., Petitioners,

v.

Unrrep Srarxs ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Er AL.

No. 76-585

AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, ET AL., Petitioners,

v.

Unrtep States ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

No. 76-594

INDIANA-KENTUCKY ELECTRIC CORPORATION, ET XL., Peiitioners,

v.

UnttTep Srarxs ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

No. 76-603

ALABAMA PowEeR ComMPANY, ET AL., Petitioners,

v.

Untrep Srarxs ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

No. 76-619

Uran Power a Licut ComPANY, ET L., Petitioners,

v.

Unrtrep STaTes ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

No. 76-620

WESTERN ENERGY SUPPLY AND TRANSMISSION ASSOCIATES

AND UTAH INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioners,

v.

Unrirep States ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

WESTERN ENERGY SUPPLY AND

TRANSMISSION ASSOCIATES

AND

UTAH INTERNATIONAL, INC.

[List or COUNSEL ON INsIpDE Cover]

COUNSEL FOR PETITIONERS

WESTERN ENERGY SUPPLY AND TRANSMISSION ASSOCIATES, com-

prised of:

Arizona Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.

Arizona Power Authority

Arizona Public Service Company

City of Anaheim, Utilities Department

City of Burbank, Public Service Department

City of Colorado Springs, Department of Public Utilities

City of Glendale, Public Service Department

City of Los Angeles, Department of Water & Power

City of Pasadena, Water & Power Department

Colorado-Ute Electric Association, Inc.

El Paso Electric Co.

Nevada Power Co.

Pacific Power & Light Co.

Public Service Co. of Colorado

Public Service Co. of New Mexico

Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power

District

San Diego Gas & Electric Co.

Sierra Pacific Power Co.

Southern California Edison Co.

Tucson Gas & Electric Co.

Rex E. Lee

2840 Iroquois Drive

Provo, Utah 84601

Jon L. Kyl

Jennings, Strouss & Salmon

111 West Monroe

Phoenix, Arizona 85003

Uran INTERNATIONAL, INC.

C. C. Dietrich

500 Celifornia Street

San Francisco, California

94104

Robert M. Westberg

Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro

225 Bush Street

San Francisco, California

94104

Mark Wilmer

John J. Bouma

Snell & Wilmer

3100 Valley Center

Phoenix, Arizona 85073

Richard N. Carpenter

Bigbee, Stephenson,

Carpenter & Crout

P.O. Box 699

Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501

rr · · e eee

r e eee eee

Statute and Regulations Involved . . . .

Questions Presented . . . . . .

Statement of the Case .. ... . . . . . . ..

Summary of Argument . . . . . . . .. 11

Argument

1. Ripeness of Redesignation Issue .................... 20

2. Legality of Redesignation Authority in Fed-

eral Land Managers and Indian Governing

—

ee

. 28

T8 40

.. ( la

rere e eee neee been 1b

ii

CITATIONS

CASEs: Page

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136

COD K—— , . 22,23,24

Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322

I Sa 17

Anaconda Company v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d

1301 (10th Cir. 1973) . 21

Arizona Public Service Company v. Fri, 5

E. R. C. 1878 (D. Ariz. 1973) . . 21

Bryan v. Itasca County, Minnesota, 96 S.Ct.

K G 9

City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681

ü 21

Delaware Cit. For Clean Air, Inc. v. Stauffer

Chem. Co., 367 F. Supp. 1040 (D. Del. i973),

aff d 510 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1975) . . . 21

FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99

K — 34

Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351

IPP . 23

Gardner v. Toilet Goods Association, 387 U.S.

1 ..... 22,23, 24,25

Getty Oil Company (Eastern Operations) v.

Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972),

cert. denied 409 U.S. 1125 (1973) .. 21

Hagedorn v. Union Carbide Corporation, 363

F. Supp. 1061 (N.D. W.Va. 1973) — 21

Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976) ........... 14,31,35

Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569 (1966) ............... 17

Pinkney v. Ohio Environmental Protection

Agency, 375 F. Supp. 305 (N. D. Ohio 1974) . 21

—

CITATIONS (Continued)

Plan for Arcadia, Inc. v. Anita Associates, 501

F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419

e 21

Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253

(D.D.C. 1972), aff'd per curriam, 4 E. R. C.

1815 (D.C.Cir. 1972), aff'd by equally di-

vided Court, sub nom. Fri. v. Sierra Club,

D 2.6.12

Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S.

r 35

Toilet Goods Association v. Gardner, 387 U.S.

a 22,23,24,25

Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council,

it Si . ccnsssscsssnssenssnsssssessscosses 4,12,14

Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965) ................. 12

Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976) 14,15

United States v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 278 U.S.

V 17

United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351

1 23

Utah Internat l, Inc. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 126

r 21

STATUTES:

The Clean Air Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. $4

1 passim

REGULATIONS AND PROPOSED REGULATIONS:

Environmental Protection Agency, “Approval

and Promulgation of Implementation Plans:

Prevention of Significant Air Quality Deteri-

oration”

37 Fed. Reg. 23836 (November 9, 1972) ...........

39 Fed. Reg. 18986 (July 16, 1973) .

a >

iv

CITATIONS (Continued)

39 Fed. Reg. 42509 (December 5, 1974) 7,33

Environmental Protection Agency, “Approval

and Promulgation of Implementation Plans:

Significant Deterioration of Air Quality —

Adding § 52.21”, 37 Fed. Reg. 23836

(November 9, 1972) ..

Environmental Protection Agency, “Prevention

of Significant Air Quality Deterioration”, 40

Ce GG L— ͤ ů 6,7,33

Redesignation of Northern Cheyenne Indian

Reservation for Prevention of Significant

Deterioration, 42 Fed. Reg. 21819 (April 29,

3 ͤ ꝗ— 26

CONGRESSIONAL MATERIALS:

Bills and Reports

H. Rep. No. 91-1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.

. 16

sa Rep. No. 92-105, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess.

——A 2 ails 5

H. Rep. No. 92-H31, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess

8 G 5

8. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.

— 16,17

RECORDS OF DEBATES AND HEARINGS:

116 Cong. Rec. 32910 (1970) . . 16

116 Cong. Rec. 32902 (1970) . . 16

116 Cong. Rec. 42392 (1970) .... — 16

116 Cong. Rec. 32923 (1970) 16

OTHER AUTHORITIES:

Southwest Energy Study, Department of the

Interior, April, 1972

37

Map of Federal Lands (Attached) q 36

Vv

CITATIONS (Continued) Page

Press Release, Text of an Address by President

Jimmy Carter to a Joint Session of Congress

on Energy, April 20, 1977... 28

7 BNA Environmental Reporter, No. 23

(October 8, 1976). 26, Appendix B

Energy Committee Report, New Mexico Legis-

37

18881 ——jç—ͤP—ĩ—

— —

—— . — ON —— ä ——rð1:? 2 2A2— . ͤ%ékũ ũ — —— Ehv—᷑—ęè n j

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcToBER TERM, 1976

No. 76-529

MonTANA Power ComPANY, ET AL., Petitioners,

v.

UNrrxp STaTes ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET Al

No. 76-585

AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, ET AL., Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET Ai

No. 76-594

INDIANA-KENTUCKY ELECTRIC CORPORATION, ET AL., Petition:

v.

UniTep STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET A:

No. 76-603

ALABAMA PoWER COMPANY, ET AL., Petitioners,

v.

UNrrxop STaTEes ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET Al

No. 76-619

Uran Power & Licut ComMPANY, ET XL., Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL

No. 76-620

WESTERN ENERGY SUPPLY AND TRANSMISSION ASSOCIATES

AND UTAH INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioners,

v.

Untrep Srarxs ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATE*

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

WESTERN ENERGY SUPPLY AND

TRANSMISSION ASSOCIATES

AND

UTAH INTERNATIONAL, INC.

2

BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia is reported at 540 F.2d

1114 and is reproduced in the Joint Appendix at 39a.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered

on August 2, 1976. This Court granted the petitions

for writ of certiorari and consolidated the cases on

April 4, 1977. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked

under 28 U.S.C. 51254 (1).

STATUTE AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

The relevant provisions of the Clean Air Act, as

amended, 42 U.S.C. 51857, et seq., are set forth in

Appendix A to this Brief. The regulations at issue are

set forth in the Joint Appendix at 206a and amend-

ments thereto are set forth in the Joint Appendix at

242a, 246a, 284a.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED!

1. Whether the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970,

which provide that the Administretor of the Environ-

mental Protection Agency “shall approve” state plans

for the implementation of federal air quality standards

which enforce such standards within the State, require

him to approve such plans, or whether he may approve

' The petitioners’ statement of the first question presented is

identical to the government’s statement of the question presented

in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, No. 72-804, OT 1972, aff'd per

curiam by an equally divided Court, sub nom Fri. v. Sierra Club,

412 U.S. 541 (1973). The second question presented is taken from

the Court’s statement of the second question in its order granting

certiorari.

— 2 —ů r Ä — — U U — on ee”

3

only state plans which, in addition, will effectively

prevent significant deterioration of existing air quality

in any portion of any State.

2. Whether the Clean Air Act permits the Environ-

mental Protection Agency to adopt regulations which

grant to federal land managers and Indian governing

bodies power to reclassify federal and Indian lan.s

within their jurisdiction.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Clean Air Act Amendments of 19702 carefully

spell out the respective roles of the federal and state

governments in achieving the legislative objective of

air quality control. Federal authority is vested in the

Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agen-

cy, who is given the responsibility for issuing air

quality criteria® and prescribing national primary

and secondary ambient air quality standards for each

air pollutant for which air quality criteria have been

issued.‘

2 Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat 1705, 42 U.S.C. §1857 et seq.

Section 108, 42 U.S.C.§1857c-3

National primary ambient air quality standards are defined as

“standards the attainment and maintenance of which in the judg-

ment of the Administrator ... allowing an adequate margin of

safety, are requisite to protect the public health....” Section

109(b) (1), 42 U.S.C. §1857c-4(b) (1). A secondary standard is de-

fined as “a level of air quality the attainment and maintenance of

which in the judgment of the Administrator ... is requisite to

protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse

effects associated with the presence of [any air pollutant for

which air quality criteria are issued] in the ambient air.” Id. at

subsection (2).

4

The primary responsibility for implementation of

these standards, set by EPA pursuant to statutory

direction and authority, is vested in the individual

states. The key section is §110,5 which provides for

the submission by each state of a plan for implementa-

tion, maintenance, and enforcement of the primary

and secondary standards in each air quality control

region within the state. Section 110 further provides

that the Administrator must approve or disapprove

the state plan within four months after submission

and, specifically, that “the Administrator shall ap-

prove such plan or any portion thereof if he

determines that it was adopted after reasonable notice

and hearing” and that eight specific statutory criteria

are met. None of these criteria has anything to do with

air quality better than the secondary standards.

As discussed in this Court’s review of the history of

federal air quality legislation reaching back to 1955 in

Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 421

U.S. 60, 63-67 (1975), the 1970 Amendments clearly

expanded the role of the federal government “by tak-

ing a stick to the states. . It is equally clear,

however, that “the Amendments explicitly preserved

the principle: ‘Each state shall have the primary re-

sponsibility for assuring air quality within the entire

geographic area comprising such State. This is

demonstrated not only by 5107, but also by

5 42 U.S.C. §1857¢-5

6 421 U.S. at 64

Id. at 64, citing from §107(a), 42 U.S.C. §1857(a) (3) of the

1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act.

5

§101(a) (3), by §116, which preserves to the states

the right to adopt emission standards or limitations or

abatement or control requirements more stringent

than those provided pursuant to the Act, and by §118,

which requires all segments of the federal government

to comply with the requirements of the statute includ-

ing those set by state and local governments.

In short, Congress took a stick to the states not by

removing their responsibility for implementation of

EPA’s air quality standards, but rather by mandating

that the states carry out this responsibility.’

State plans for implementation of the national pri-

mary and secondary standards were initially submitted

some five years ago. Following disclosure by the EPA

Administrator to Congressional committees’ that, in

his view, the Act required approval of plans that met

the eight criteria specified by §110(a) (2), the Sierra

Club and others filed suit in the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia seeking to enjoin

the Administrator from approving any plans that did

® “(a) The Congress finds

R „ „ * *

(3) that the prevention and control of air pollution at its source

is the primary responsibility of States and local govern-

ments. . . 42 U.S.C. §1857(a) (3).

® In the event of failure of state enforcement, 5113 provides for

federal enforcement. 42 U.S.C. §1857c-8.

10 Hearings on Clean Air Act Oversight before the Subcommittee

on Public Health and Environment of the House Committee on

Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 92-105

(1972), at 530-531; Hearings on Implementation of the Clean Air

Act Amendments of 1970 before the Subcommittee on Air and

Water Pollution of the Senate Public Works Committee, 92d

Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 92-H31 (1972), Pt. 1., at 246-249, 271-276.

6

not prevent significant deterioration of existing air

quality. The District Court held that “plaintiffs have

made out a claim for relief“ i and issued an injunc-

tion. The Court of Appeals affirmed per curi-

am.'2 This Court granted certiorari and, following oral

argument, affirmed without opinion by an equally di-

vided Court.!“

Pursuant to the injunction which was left in effect,

the Administrator disapproved the implementation

plans of all states insofar as they did not provide for

the prevention of significant deterioration’* and

promulgated the regulations at issue here.

Central to the second issue before the Court are the

provisions of the regulations dealing with area designa-

tion and redesignation. The regulations provide for

three classifications of all areas that already meet the

federal primary and secondary standards for sulphur

oxides and particulates. Classes I and II allow only

sharply limited incremental increases in existing levels,

while Class III is set at the level of the secondary stan-

dards. 40 C.F.R. §52.21(c) (2). Class I is to be used for

areas in which “practically any change in the air qual-

Sierra Ciub v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253, 256 (D. D.C.

1972)

2 4 E. R. C. 1815 (1972)

Fri. u. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973)

37 Fed. Reg. 23836 (Nov. 9, 1972)

Though bound to obey the Court’s order, the Administrator

continued to “adhere to the view .. that the Act does not require

EPA or the States to prevent significant deterioration of air qual-

ity,” and that he was issuing his regulations only because of “the

preliminary injunction issued by the District court.” 39 Fed. Reg.

at 18986 (July 16, 1973), set forth in the Joint Appendix at 91a.

.. 3 .

7

ity would be considered significant”; Class II is for

areas where significant would be more than that nor-

mally accompanying moderate well-controlled

growth”; and Class III would allow “deterioration of

air quality up to the national standards“. All areas

are initially designated as Class II.“

The states are given the power to propose redesigna-

tion of any area, including federal lands within their

vorders.'® This redesignation power is subject to cer-

tain notice and hearing requirements”, including

notification to “other States, Indian Governing Bodies,

and Federal Land Managers whose lands may be

affected... % The Administrator must approve the

redesignation unless he determines that the procedural

requirements have not been complied with or that the

State arbitrarily and capriciously disregarded specified

substantive requirements.”

'6 39 Fed. Reg. 42510

„ 40 C.F.R. §52.21(c) (3) (1)

18 Private persons or businesses may not propose redesign tions,

nor are there any procedures for forcing a state, feder , land

manager, or Indian governing body to propose redesignati vas.

9 40 CF. R. §52.21(c) (3) (ii)

2 40 C.F.R. §52.21(c)(3) (ii) (b)

21 The substantive requirements are contained in 40 C. F. R.

§52.21(c) (3) (ii) (d), which provides: The proposed redesignation

is based on the record of the State’s hearing, which must reflect

the basis for the proposed redesignation, including consideration

of (1) growth anticipated in the area, (2) the social, environmen-

tal, and economic effects of such redesignation upon the area

being proposed for redesignation and upon other areas and

[Continued]

8

If the Regulations had granted redesignation author-

ity only to the states, they would approach the

distribution of authority between state and federal

governments set forth in the statute itself. The statute

provides for authority in the states to impose substan-

tive requirements more stringent than the secondary

standards mandated by Congress.” Under the regula-

tions, this same result could be achieved by the state’s

redesignation to Class I or permitting the Class II des-

ignation to remain in effect. Or, if the secondary

standards represent the state’s preferred tradeoff be-

tween environmental and economic/energy-saving

consequences, it could redesignate to Class III. Thus, if

the redesignation authority had been limited to the

states, the only inconsistency between the division of

federal-state authority prescribed by the statute, and

that prescribed by the regulations would be (1) the

lack of flexibility from pigeon-holing into three classi-

fications, (2) the standard and scope of EPA’s review

authority and (3) the notice and hearing requirements.

In fact, the departure from the statute is far more

serious because redesignation authority does not rest

solely with the states. Similar redesignation authority,

subject to similar notice and hearing requirements and

substantive review by EPA solely for the purpose of

determining arbitrary and capricious disregard of the

factors cited in footnote 21, supra, is also conferred

States, and (3) any impacts of such proposed redesignation upon

regional or rational interests.” The “arbitrary and capricious”

standard of review for State redesignations is contained in 40

C.F.R. §52.21(c) (3) (vi) (a).

2 Section 116, 42 U.S.C. §1857d-1

Pie —

ae 4 —

22»ö

9

upon federal land managers? and Indian governing

bodies.“ Federal land managers may propose redesig-

nate only to a more restrictive designation; that is,

from Class II to Class I in the case of lands that the

state has not redesignation, or, where the state has

redesignated as Class III, the federal land manager

could re-redesignate to Class II or Class I. Indian gov-

erning bodies may propose redesignation into any

class, except in those cases where the state has “as-

sumed jurisdiction over an Indian reservation..

23 40 C. F. R. §52.21(c) (3) (iv). “Federal Land Manager is defined

by the Regulations: The phrase Federal Land Manager’ means

the head, or his designated representative, of any Department or

Agency of the Federal Government which administers federally-

owned land, including public domain lands.” 40 C.F.R. §52.21(b!

(3).

% 40 C.F.R. §52.21(c) (3) (v). “Indian Governing Body” is defined

by the Regulations: The phrase Indian Governing Body’ means

the governing body of any tribe, band, or group of Indians subject

to the jurisdiction of the United States and recognized by the

United States as possessing power of self-government.” 40 C. F. R.

§52.21(b) (5).

* 40 C.F.R. §52.21(c) (3) (b). Apparently, the assumption of ju-

risdiction to which the regulation refers is that which occurs

under Public Law 280, 67 Stat. 589, 28 U.S.C. §1360. If the reason

for tying redesignation authority to lack of state assumption of

jurisdiction under Public Law 280 is to impart some kind of con-

gressional authorization to this scheme, Public Law 280 is not

adequate for the purpose. This Court recently clarified in Bryan

v. Itasca County, Minnesota, 96 S.Ct. 2102 (1976), that that stat-

ute had a limited scope insofar as state exercise of power is

concerned: “The primary concern of Congress in enacting Pub.L.

280 that emerges from its sparse legislative history was with the

problem of lawlessness on certain Indian reservations, and the

absence of adequate tribal institutions for law enforcement.” 96

[Continued]

10

Either the federal land manager or the Indian gov-

erning body, before redesignating, is required to

consult with the states in which the federal land or the

Indian reservation is located, or which it borders, just

as the states are required to give notice to other states,

Indian governing bodies, and federal land managers

concerning their proposed redesignations. But the au-

thority to redesignate is vested in the federal land

managers and Indian governing bodies, and not in the

states. This notwithstanding the careful statutory con-

struct which allocates to EPA substantive authority to

set primary and secondary air quality standards and to

the states both substantive authority to set more strin-

gent standards and primary implementation authority

over all standards.

The national primary and secondary standards con-

stitute the limit of EPA’s substantive authority to set

air quality standards. Section 116 vests in the states

the exclusive authority to set substantive air quality

standards beyond the primary and secondary stan-

dards. This division of substantive and implementing

authority between state and federal government is the

foundational principle of the Clean Air Act.

S.Ct. at 2107. With regard to civil jurisdiction, the Court observed

that the relevant provision of the statute “seems to have been

primarily intended to redress the lack of adequate Indian forums

for resolving private legal disputes between reservation Indians,

and between other Indians and other private citizens, by permit-

ting the courts of the states to decide such disputes....” 96

S.Ct. at 2109. In any event, limiting the redesignation authority

of Indian governing tribes to those tribes over whom the states

have not assumed jurisdiction under Public Law 280 clearly pro-

vides no statutory foundation for the regulation. Congress’

decisions concerning authority over air quality standards, and the

implementation of those standards, is contained in the Clean Air

Act, not in Public Law 280.

11

Very simply, the administrative creation of a redes-

ignation authority in federal land managers and Indian

governing bodies reduces this careful statutory con-

struct to a shambles. There is absolutely no statutory

basis for such redesignation authorization. It runs

squarely counter to the exclusive authority of the

states to set standards more strict than those provided

by the Act. Moreover, it adds additional layers of gov-

ernmental review and results in an administrative

authority so fragmented among so many entities that

it creates enormous practical difficulties.

Thus, in attempting to grant redesignation authority

to Indian governing bodies and federal land managers,

the Administrator has not only acted outside the scope

of his authority, but has attempted to delegate to non-

state governmental entities powers which the statute

expressly withheld from federal authority and vested

in the states.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1. This litigation presents the classic example of

problems that are encountered when an administrative

agency is forced to attempt to devise regulations in

implementation of an assumed purpose that is con-

trary to the statutory language and structure. The

Environmental Protection Agency, the administrative

agency charged with the enforcement of this statute,

and whose views are therefore entitled to great weight

For the convenience of the Court, and in the interest of effi-

ciency, these petitioners will summarize their argument

concerning the first issue presented, but will not develop that po-

sition in the argument portion of the brief; rather, on this issue

we will adopt the argument presented by petitioners in these con-

solidated cases who have addressed that issue.

12

in matters of interpretation of the statute,”” has con-

sistently, and correctly, taken the position that the

statute does not authorize the Administrator to pre-

scribe air quality standards other than the primary

and secondary standards expressly referred to by the

Act.”

This is also a case in which the legislative history is

ambiguous, but the statutory language is very plain.

Given the limits of the English language, it would be

difficult to express much more clearly the foundational

principle that the Administrator sets primary and sec-

ondary air quality standards; that each state adopts

and submits to the Administrator a plan for the “im-

plementation, maintenance and enforcement” of such

standards; and that the Administrator “shall approve

such plan, or any portion thereof, if he determines that

it was adopted after reasonable notice and hearing”

and that it meets eight specified statutory criteria,

none of which deals with air quality standards other

than the primary and secondary standards.

The statute speaks with equal clarity concerning

substantive authority to set air quality standards. As

to primary and secondary standards, that authority

belongs to the federal government and is exercised by

the Administrator. But, within the range between the

secondary standards and completely uncontaminated

„ Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60,

75 (1975); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965).

See footnote 15, supra. See also the government’s brief in

Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, No. 72-804, OT 1972, aff'd per cur-

iam by an equally divided Court, sub nom Fri. v. Sierra Club,

412 U.S. 541 (1973).

13

air, substantive standard-setting authority belongs to

the individual states.“ Enlarging the federal govern-

ment’s substantive authority beyond the authority to

set primary and secondary standards effectively evis-

cerates this additional element of substantive

authority which the statute gave to the states, allowing

them to adopt substantive standards more stringent

than those authorized by the statute.

The statute is explicit. It mandates the setting of

primary and secondary standards and vests the au-

thority to set those standards in EPA. More stringent

standards may be set, but that decision lies within the

authority of the states. Implementation plans for the

purpose of carrying out those standards, submitted by

the states, must be approved so long as they satisfy

eight criteria. Nothing is said of a tertiary standard, or

a ninth criterion, and the existence of either would run

squarely counter to the language and the structure of

the statute. Judicially grafting such a third standard

or a ninth criterion onto the explicit language of the

statute not only contradicts the plain language of the

Act, but also upsets the allocation of authority be-

tween federal and state government by transferring to

EPA the authority which §116 of the Act expressly

grants to the states: the right to make the tradeoff

judgments balancing environmental against nonenvi-

ronmental considerations, so long as the secondary

standards are observed. It is significant that even

EPA, the beneficiary of this increased authority,

agrees that it is inconsistent with the Act.”

Section 116, 42 U.S.C. §1857d-1

In its brief before this court in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, the

government stated: The holding of the courts below is, we sub-

{Continued}

14

This Court has interpreted the 1970 Amendments to

the Clean Air Act on three occasions. Every one of

those opinions, Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S.

246 (1976); Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976); and

Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 421

U.S. 60 (1975), reaffirms that the statute meant what

it said when it required the Administrator to approve

state implementation plans that meet the eight cri-

teria. While it is true that those cases did not involve

the precise issue in this case, all three addressed the

“shall approve” requirement of 5110 in language that

controls this case. The Court in Hancock stated, “The

EPA was required to approve each State’s implemen-

tation plan as long as it was adopted after public

hearings and satisfied the conditions specified in

§110(a) (2).”"

Similarly, in Train v. NRDC, the Court ruled

that:

“Under §110(a) (2) the Agency is required to

approve a state plan which provides for the timely

attainment and subsequent maintenance of am-

bient air standards, and which also satisfies that

section’s other general requirements. The Act

gives the Agency no authority to question the wis-

dom of a State’s choices of emission limitations if

they are part of a plan which satisfies the stan-

dards of 4110(a) (2)... .”®

mit, inconsistent with the careful statutory balance drawn by

Congress between federal and state responsibilities, and, if per-

mitted to stand, would substantially impair the prompt and

effective implementation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of

1970”. Government’s Brief, Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, No. 72-

804, OT 1972 pp. 5-6.

426 U.S. at 170-171

* 421 U.S. at 79 (Emphasis in the original).

15

And in Union Electric:

“This approach is apparent on the face of

§110(a) (2). The provision sets out eight criteria

that an implementation plan must satisfy, and

provides that if these criteria are met and if the

plan was adopted after reasonable notice and

hearing, the Administrator ‘shall approve’ the

proposed state plan. The mandatory ‘shall’ makes

it quite clear that the Administrator is not to be

concerned with factors other than those speci-

fied.”

The Act’s statement of purpose to “protect and en-

hance the quality of the nation’s air resources so as to

promote the public health and welfare and the produc-

tive capacity of its population” is the sole asserted

statutory authority for the lower court’s holding. That

statement of purpose is not self-fulfilling. Rather than

inferring some assumed implementation of this general

objective, consideration must be focused on what Con-

gress actually did to provide for “protection and

enhancement”. What Congress did is not to be found

in some imagined, though unexpressed, emanations

from 5101, but from the operative provisions of the

Act.

Congress provided for the “protection” or mainte-

nance of existing air quality—including air quality

already better than that provided by the secondary

standards—through two sections of the Act, §111 and

§116. Section 111 grants authority to EPA to set per-

formance standards for new and existing stationary

sources“ and further provides for the enforcement of

* 427 U.S. at 257

Section 101(b) (1). 42 U.S.C. §1857(b) (J).

Section 111, 42 U.S.C. §1857c-6.

16

such standards. The legislative history consistently

emphasized that this provision was designed to pre-

vent or minimize deterioration of existing air

quality.“

Additional protection“ for existing clean air areas

is provided by 5116, which permits the states to adopt

air quality standards more stringent than provided by

the Act. On its face, §116 necessarily rejects the notion

that all substantive air quality standard authority

The President, who first proposed such a scheme, said that it

would insure “that levels of air quality are maintained in the face

of industrial expansion.” 116 Cong.Rec. 32910 (1970). The House

Committee observed that it would “prevent the occurrence any-

where in the United States of significant new air pollution

problems... H.Rep. No. 91-1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970),

at 3. On the Senate side, the Committee reported that

“(mJjaintenance of existing high air quality is assured through

provision for maximum control of new major pollution sources.”

S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), at 2. It was in

advocacy of new source performance standards that Senator

Muskie contended: “While we clean up existing pollution, we

must also guard against new problems. Those areas which have

levels of air quality which are better than the national standards

should not find their air quality degraded by the construction of

new sources.” 116 Cong.Rec. 32902 (1970). Senator Randolph,

Chairman of the Public Works Committee, urged the Senate to

adopt the Conference Report, including “performance standards

for new stationary sources, to make sure that no industrial devel-

opment will degrade the quality of the air so as to endanger

public health and welfare, or interfere with or restrain further

economic growth.” Jd. at 42392. And Senator Dole observed that

“Under this bill, we can continue to encourage the location of new

industry in Kansas and other rural unspoiled regions without fear

of polluting the high quality of air found there. At the same time,

national standards for new stationary sources will not place some

states at a comparative disadvantage affecting industry decisions

on plant locations.” Id. at 32923.

17

would be vested in the federal government. Very sim-

ply, if the lower court’s judgment is upheld, there will

be no range of air quality choices within which the

states’ statutory authority to adopt standards more

stringent than provided by the Act can operate.

Thus, Congress provided for the “protection” of ex-

isting air quality through §111 and §116, not through

§110. The command of 5110 is clear: implementation

plans which satisfy the eight criteria must be ap-

proved.

The Court of Appeals also placed great emphasis on

the legislative history, particularly a passage in the

Senate Report stating that “where current air pollu-

tion levels are already equal to, or better than, the air

quality goals, the Secretary should not approve any

implementation plan which does not provide, to the

maximu extent practicable, for the continued main-

tenance of such ambient air quality“. This and other

samples of legislative history fail to sustain the lower

court’s holding for several reasons.

First, since the statutory language is clear, there is

no need to resort to legislative history. Addison v.

Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 617

(1944); Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 571 (1966);

United States v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 278 U.S. 269

(1929). The excerpt from the Senate Report consists of

a single sentence from a 129 page report. It is not

found either in the House Report or the Conference

Report. There are other pieces of legislative history

upon which the lower court relied, but as noted

7 §.Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1970)

18

above, s there are equally persuasive segments of leg-

islative history that favor the petitioners’ position.

There is no such ambiguity in the language of the stat-

ute. This case is therefore a classic illustration of the

well-settled rule that where the statutory language is

clear, there is no need to resort to legislative history.

Second, the provisions of the legislative history on

which the lower court relied are no more self-fulfiliing

than is the “protect and enchance” language of §101.

What Congress did to insure that implementation

plans provide “to the maximum extent practicable, for

the continued maintenance of such ambient air qual-

ity” is found not in some i ference from the legislative

history, but in the operative provisions of the statute.

“The continued maintenance of ... air quality” al-

ready cleaner than the secondary standards is

provided by §111, dealing with stationary source con-

trols, and by §116, which authorizes the states to

adopt more stringent standards.

Thus, the content of the generalized “protect and

enhance” objective, as well as the fulfillment of the

snippets of legislative history relied on by the lower

court can be found only in the specific provisions of

the Clean Air Act.

2. The Court of Appeals held that the issue of the

Administrator’s statutory authority to grant redesigna-

tion authority to federal land managers and Indian

governing bodies is not ripe for adjudication. The

Court of Appeals erred in this holding.

EPA promulgated these regulations as identical im-

plementation plans for each state. If the holdings of

See footnote 36.

——U— — —

19

four Circuit Courts of Appeal and numerous district

courts concerning the exclusivity of 5307 of the Clean

Air Act as a means of review of implementation plans

is correct, then it is not only appropriate to review all

aspects of the Administrator’s regulations at this time,

but such review at any other time would be foreclosed.

The Court need not even reach the issue whether §307

provides the exclusive means for review of state imple-

mentation plans, however, because under general

principles dealing with ripeness of federal regulations

for judicial review this case is clearly ripe. The issue

presented is purely legal. The agency action is final

within this Court’s decisions on that issue. Most im-

portant of all, the regulations will have a “direct and

immediate impact” not only on the parties to this liti-

gation, but also on important national interests.

On the merits of the second question, Congress has

provided careful and detailed divisions of authority

and responsibility between federal and state govern-

ments, with substantive authority in the . dministrator

to set primary and secondary air quality standards,

substantive authority in the states to set air quality

standards more stringent than the secondary stan-

dards, and authority in the states for the im-

plementation, maintenance, and enforcement of the

substantive standards.

The foundation stones of this carefully fitted fed-

eral-state structure have been abruptly removed by

the Administrator’s creation of a redesignation author-

ity in federal land managers and Indian governing

bodies. This has been accomplished without any statu-

tory authority and, indeed, contrary to several

statutory provisions.

20

The practical implications of this administrative

rearrangement of the statute are as important as its

theoretical ones. The principal impact of the signifi-

cant deterioration regulations will be in the western

United States. This is also an area of the country that

consists of a checkerboard of federal, Indian, state,

and private land. The Administrator has correctly ob-

served that redesignation as Class I could effectively

control growth and development not only within the

redesignated area, but also within a distance of sixty

to one hundred miles of that area. Vesting redesigna-

tion authority in federal land managers and Indian

governing bodies will deprive the states of their statu-

torily conferred rights to make choices concerning

trade-offs between air quality on the one hand and

energy conservation and economic considerations on

the other. Because of the 60-100 mile overreach, this

deprivation will apply to virtually all of the eleven

western states, including lands that are neither federal

nor Indian.

ARGUMENT

1. Ripeness of Redesignation Issue

Interests and policies that are of immediate impor.

tance not only to these parties, but also to the nation

as a whole, require that this second issue on which the

Court granted certiorari® be decided at this time.

The Court’s characterization of the second question as to

which certiorari was granted as set forth in the Questions Pre-

sented, supra, p. 2, might imply that the Court agrees that

ripeness is not an issue in this case. Because ripeness was the ba-

sis for the lower court’s judgment on the redesignation issue,

however, we will treat it briefly.

21

The Clean Air Act contains its own judicial review

procedures. Under §307(b)(1)” petitions for review

of certain actions of the Administrator—including

approval or promulgation of implementation

plans—must be filed within 30 days from the date of

promulgation or approval. Four Circuit Courts of Ap-

peal, the Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth, as well as

numerous federal district courts, have held that 56307 is

the exclusive means by which implementation plans

may be reviewed.“ The regulations here at issue were

promulgated under §110c-5(c)* as identical imple-

mentation plans for each state to prevent significant

deterioration of air quality. The consolidated cases

before the Court were originally filed as petitions for

review under §307. Under the holdings of the cases

cited above, therefore, judicial review of these regula-

tions at this time is more than appropriate; if these

regulations are to be reviewed at all, it must be in an

action filed under §307 within thirty days of their

promulgation.

42 U.S.C. 1857h-5(b) (1)

City of Highland Park v. T.ain, 519 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1975);

Getty Oil Company (Eastern Operations) v. Ruckelshaus, 467

F.2d 349, 355-56 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 1125 (1973);

Plan for Arcadia, Inc. v. Anita Associates, 501 F.2d 390, 392 (9th

Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034 (1974); Utah Internat l,

Inc. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 126, 128 (10th Cir. 1973); Anaconda Com-

pany v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301, 1304 (10th Cir. 1973);

Pinkney v. Ohio Environmental Protection Agency, 375 F.Supp.

305, 309 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Arizona Public Service Company v.

Fri, 5 E R C 1878 (D. Ariz. 1973); Hagedorn v. Union Carbide

Corporation, 363 F. Supp. 1061, 1068 (N.D. W.Va. 1973); Dela-

ware Cit. For Clean Air, Inc. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 367 F. Supp.

1040, 1046 (D. Del. 1973), aff d 510 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1975).

42 U.S.C. §1857c-5 (e)

22

This case may not be the most appropriate vehicle

for ruling on the exclusivity of 5307 as a means of judi-

cial review of implementation plans. Fortunately, that

issue need not be resolved in this case because, under

general principles of ripeness applicable to judicial re-

view of federal regulations, review of these regulations

is clearly appropriate at this time.“

The rules dealing generally with the ripeness of fed-

eral regulations for judicial review are illustrated by

three cases decided ihe same day, all involving regula-

tions of the Food and Drug Administration. Abbott

Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Toilet

Goods Association v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967);

and Gardner v. Toilet Goods Association, 387 U.S. 167

(1967). The underlying rationale and the two-fold test

for ripeness were summarized by the Abbott Laborato-

ries opinion:

“Without undertaking to survey the intricacies

of the ripeness doctrine it is fair to say that its

basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through

avoidance of premature adjudication, from entan-

gling themselves in abstract disagreements over

administrative policies, and also to protect the

agencies from judicial interference until an admin-

istrative decision has been formalized and its

It should be noted, however, that if the Court should disagree

with petitioners’ view concerning the general rules dealing with

ripeness, then the question whether §307 provides the exclusive

means for review of state implementation plans (and the appar-

ent conflict between the District of Columbia Circuit and the

Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits on this issue) would

have to be decided in this case, because if those circuits which

hold that review under §307 within thirty days of promulgation is

correct, then this case is not only an appropriate time to review

the regulations, it is the only time that such review can be had.

23

effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging

parties. The problem is best seen in a twofold as-

pect, requiring us to evaluate both the fitness of

the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to

the parties of withholding court consideration.’

The Court held that two of the cases, Abbott Labo-

ratories and Gardner v. Toilet Goods Association,

were ripe for adjudication, but that the third, Toilet

Goods Association v. Gardner (on which the Court of

Appeals relied) was not ripe. Analysis of those three

opinions compels the conclusion that the second issue

in this case should be decided by this Court at this

time.

In the instant case, as in all three of the FDA cases,

the issue is purely legal. It is also, we submit, an issue

as to which the agency action is final within the hold-

ings of this Court in the FDA cases and also Frozen

Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956);

and United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351

U.S. 192 (1956). The finality concern appears to be the

basis for the Court of Appeals judgment on this issue,

that Court observing that, “if the Administrator were

to approve, as replacements for these regulations, indi-

vidual state plans which did not include the powers

granted the federal land managers and Indian govern-

ing bodies, the problems foreseen by petitioners might

never arise.” Joint Appendix 87a. With all due respect,

this amounts to nothing more than an assertion that

the Administrator might reverse his position. These

regulations have been officially promulgated. They

grant to federal land managers and Indian governing

bodies the powers whose legality is the substantive

“ 387 U.S. at 148-49

24

issue in this case. There is no indication, either in this

record or anywhere else, that the Administrator did

not mean to do what he did in these regulations, or

that he now intends to change his mind, or that such a

change would escape challenge.

Even more important, the three FDA opinions

clearly reveal that the controlling factor distinguishing

Abbott Laboratories and Gardner v. Toilet Goods

Association—which were held to be ripe—from Toilet

Goods Association v. Gardner—which was not—was

“the degree and nature of the regulation’s present ef-

fect on those seeking relief”. The regulation at issue

in Toilet Goods Association v. Gardner, the unripe

case, provided for suspension of certification service to

any firm that refused to permit FDA employees cer-

tain access to that firm’s facilities, processes, and

formulae. The Court in that case observed: “This is

not a situation in which primary conduct is affected

—when contracts must be negotiated, ingredients

tested and substituted, or special records com-

piled.”

By contrast, the regulation in Abbott Laboratories,

requiring drug companies to print on the label the es-

tablished name of certain drugs every time the

proprietary name was employed, had a “sufficiently

direct and immediate [impact] as to render the issue

appropriate for judicial review at this stage.” 387 U.S.

at 152. This “sufficiently direct and immediate im-

pact” was explained by the Court:

“If petitioners wish to comply they must change

all their labels, advertisements, and promotional

| Toilet Goods Association b. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 at 164

“ 387 U.S. at 164

25

materials; they must destroy stocks of printed

matter; and they must invest heavily in new print-

ing type and new supplies.

Similarly, Gardner v. Toilet Goods Association, in-

volved, inter alia, a so-called “patch test” exemption

from the statutory color additive provisions. The Toi-

let Goods Association contended that the

Administrator had exceeded his statutory authority in

restricting the patch test exemption. The issue was

ripe for review because:

„ . . [I]t is quite clear that if respondents, fail-

ing judicial review at this stage, elect to comply

with the regulations and await ultimate judicial

determination of the validity of them in subse-

quent litigation, the amount of preliminary paper

work, scientific testing, and recordkeeping will be

substantial.“

The rule that emerges from analysis of the three

FDA cases is quite clear: the free access regulations in

the unripe case, Toilet Goods Association v. Gardner,

did not affect “primary conduct” such as the negotia-

tion of contracts, the testing or substitution of

ingredients, or the compilation of special records. The

other two cases did require “primary conduct.” In the

one case, labeis and promotional materials would have

to be changed, and in the other, substantial amounts

of paperwork, scientific testing, and recordkeeping

would be implicated.

The conduct necessitated by the FDA regulations in

Abbott Laboratories and Gardner v. Toilet Goods is

pale by comparison to this case. The unlawful grant of

387 U.S. at 152

* 387 U.S. at 173

authority to Indian governing bodies and federal land

managers has created a veto power over energy devel-

opment, especially in the western United States served

by these petitioners. It also creates the potential for

abuse of such power by an entity that proposes a re-

designation for purposes other than the merits of the

proposal, e.g. to exert leverage over a private company

or a nearby governmental entity. EPA itself recognizes

the potentia! for this kind of abuse.”

The very existence of that veto power has a con-

crete, impeding impact on planning, investment, and

development for meeting energy needs.” The dollar

value of that impact is many times greater than was

involved in the labels, advertisements, printing type

and supplies in the FDA cases. These petitioners have

existing plants, plants under construction, and plants

A “Guidance Memorandum” on the regulations from the Assis-

tant Administrator of EPA to all Regional Administrators dated

September 18, 1976, reveals the pervasive impact of the federal

and Indian authority. The full text of the Memorandum appears

in 7 BNA Env. Rptr., No. 23, at 859 (Oct. 8, 1976), and is repro-

duced in pertinent part as Appendix B of this brief. The discus-

sion of potential abuse of redesignation authority appears at pp.

3b-4b of Appendix B.

The Northern Cheyenne Indian Tribe recently proposed re-

designation of its reservation in Montana as a Class I area. On

April 29, 1977, EPA published its proposed approval of the rede-

signation and solicited comments on whether the Tribe had

satisfied two procedural criteria. (42 Fed Reg. 21819) The pro-

posed action is supported by both the Department of the Interior

and the state of Montana. However, the redesignation is opposed

by the neighboring state of Wyoming, the Crow Indian Tribal

Council, whose reservation borders on the Cheyenne’s, and the

[Continued]

27

in the planning stages. Planning for all of these facili-

ties, including assurance of adequate coal supplies,

cannot proceed properly, pending resolution of the

conflicting jurisdictions of the states, Indian tribes and

various federal agencies. Site selection and planning

for electric generation plants involves years of effort

and many millions of dollars. Petitioners cannot risk

such expenditures of time and money on planning and

preparing a plant site only to have the site or its fuel

source eliminated by redesignation by an Indian tribe

or manager of federal lands sixty to one hundred miles

distant from the site.“

Even more serious — and immediately pressing — is

the import of this issue to national policy. In his ad-

dress to a joint session of Congress on April 20, 1977,

the President has reminded us that the current energy

problems constitute “the greatest domestic challenge

Montana Power Company, a petitioner in this action. The Crow

Indians oppose the redesignation because it would limit their op-

tions for developing their own coal deposits; Montana Power

Company opposes the redesignation because it would block con-

struction of two power plants planned for the area; the State of

Wyoming opposes the redesignation because it would effectively

limit the development of northern Wyoming by determinations of

the Tribe, Montana and the federal government, when such

growth determinations belong to Wyoming as a matter of consti-

tutional right.

5! In the Guidance Memorandum, cited in footnote 49, the Ad-

ministrator directed that, even where a governing body merely

“announces consideration” of a possible reclassification, EPA

approval of a previously filed application for a construction per-

mit must be withheld pending (and depending upon) EPA action

on the reclassification; and this is true even where the proposed

source is not to be constructed within the political boundaries of

28

our nation will face in our lifetime.“ 2 He has also

challenged the Congress and the American people that

“our plan and our goals for 1985” include a goal “to

increase our coal production by more than two-thirds,

to over one billion tons a year.“ Among the signifi-

cant contexts in which increased use of coal can relieve

our dependence on petroleum products are electric

generation, coal gasification, and coal liquification.

The lead time for that kind of conversion — to what-

ever extent it is to occur — is measured in years.

This and other aspects of the President’s energy

message pose difficult policy decisions, necessarily

implicating not only energy but also environmental

issues and the inter-relationships between them. These

are decisions facing two of the branches of our govern-

ment, Congress and the President, pursuant to their

joint constitutional responsibility to make law. But, in

that kind of setting, with many billions of dollars and

the welfare of future generations at stake, the occasion

is hardly appropriate for the third coordinate branch

to decline to function in its assigned constitutional

role: the interpretation of already existing federal stat-

utes.

2. Legality of Redesignation Authority in Federal

Land Managers and Indian Governing Bodies

Throughout the 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air

Act, Congress gave rather specific content to the gen-

eral finding in §101, “that the prevention and control

2 Press Release, Text of an Address by the President to a Joint

Session of Congress on Energy, April 20, 1977, p. 1.

bid.

—— cere, *

29

of air pollution at its source is the primary responsibil-

ity of states and local governments”.

Section 107(a)* provides:

“Each State shall have the primary responsibil-

ity for assuring air quality within the entire

geographic area comprising such State by submit-

ting an implementation plan for such State which

will specify the manner in which national primary

and secondary ambient air quality standards will

be achieved and maintained within each air qual-

ity region in such State.”

The submission and adoption of implementation

plans referred to by §107 are treated with greater de-

tail in 51108 which provides that “Each State shall

... adopt and submit to the Administrator ... a plan

which provides for implementation, maintenance, and

enforcement ...” of the national primary and second-

ary ambient air quality standards set by the

Administrator. Section 110 further provides that “the

Administrator shall approve such plan or any portion

thereof, if he determines that it was adopted after a

reasonable notice and hearing ...” and that it meets

eight specified criteria. The eight criteria deal with

attainment of the national and primary standards, but

make no mention of air quality standards other than

the primary and secondary standards.

The general statutory scheme is to vest substantive

standard setting authority in the federal government,

specifically EPA, and the implementation, mainte-

nance, and enforcement authority in the states. There

is one departure from this general pattern: the states

„42 U.S.C. §1857c-2

s 42 U.S. §1857¢-5

30

are given substantive authority to adopt air quality

standards, or emissions limitations, (or control or

abatement requirements) more stringent than required

by the Act.“ The purpose of this provision is clear.

Up to the level of the secondary standards, the states

are given no choice. Congress mandated the attain-

ment of that level of air quality within the time limits

set by the Act, through the medium of state imple-

mentation plans. Throughout the Nation, air quality

represented by the secondary standards was not op-

tional, but mandatory.

Up to the air quality level represented by the sec-

ondary standards, then, the states have no option. But

within that incremental range between the secondary

standards and air which is pollution-free, the Act gives

states the leeway to make their own policy choices

concerning the tradeoffs between air quality on the

one hand and, on the other, economic development,

energy conservation through greater use of coal, and

similar considerations. Such issues are among the most

difficult and the most important facing governments

at all levels. Section 116 of the Clean Air Act did not

attempt to answer all of these questions. It did answer

some: to the level of the secondary standards, econ-

omic considerations, energy conservation con-

siderations, or any other considerations — no matter’

how weighty — are not to be balanced against consi-

derations of air quality control. Up to that level,

Congress has already made the balance. But within the

range beyond the secondary standards, the issue is not

a closed one. Within this dynamic area involving pub-

lic policy issues of the greatest possible magnitude,

Section 116, 42 U.S.C. §1857d-1

31

Congress has left the policy options open, for each

state to exercise, according to its own particular needs.

Finally, §118 of the Act“ provides that each de-

partment, agency, and instrumentality of the

executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Fed-

eral Government ...” shall comply with “Federal,

State, interstate, and local requirements respecting

control and abatement of air pollution to the same

extent that any person is subject to such require-

ments.” This necessarily means that all components of

the federal government are subject to the states’ sub-

stantive authority to set standards more strict than

the secondary standards, and also subject to state

powers of implementation, maintenance, and enforce-

ment, pursuant to approved implementation plans. In

Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976), this Court held

that EPA is not required to obtain permits from the

State of Kentucky, as provided in that State’s imple-

mentation plan. But the Court made it very clear that

all federal entities are required to conform to state air

pollution standards, limitations, and compliance

schedules. In the language of the Court:

“The parties rightly agree that §118 obligates

federal installations to conform to state air pollu-

tion standards or limitations and compliance

schedules. With the enactment of the Amend-

ments in 1970 came the end of the era in

which it was enough for federal facilities to volun-

teer their cooperation with federal and state

officials.“ e

„ 42 U.S.C. §1857f

„ 426 U.S. at 181

32

The Clean Air Act grants authority to two govern-

mental groups: The Environmental Protection Agency,

and state and local governments. No other authority is

granted. No other authority is intended. And it would

be inconsistent with the structure of the statute for

any other authority to be created. The reason is that

the statute itself allocates all substantive authority so

that none is left to allocate. Standard setting authority

to the secondary level is in the federal government.

Standard setting authority beyond the secondary level

is in the states.

Subdivisions iv and v of §3 of §52.21 of the Adminis-

trator’s regulations, purporting to vest reclassification

authority in federal land managers and Indian govern-

ing bodies, amounts to nothing less than removal of

the foundation stones from the statutory structure al-

locating substantive and enforcement authority

between federal and state governments. There is vir-

tually no aspect of the statutory allocation that is left

untouched. Wholly aside from the legality, as a general

matter of delegation doctrine of one administrative

agency redelegating statutory authority to another, the

controlling fact is that, in this case, such redelegation

amounts to nothing less than re-writing the statute.

There is no language in the Act which, either ex-

pressly or by implication, allows the special treatment

of federal and Indian lands within a State. But, in

withdrawing reclassification of lands from state con-

trol, these regulations affect not only those federal and

Indian lands themselves, but neighboring state and

private lands as well. This is because the construction

or modification of a source covered by the regulations

will not be permitted if the effect of that source on air

33

quality concentrations will cause a violation either of

the air quality increments applicable in the immediate

area or the increments applicable in any other ar-

eas.” EPA itself has emphasized the dramatic effect

of this provision:

“Calculations have shown that because of the

small air quality increments specified for Class I

areas, these levels can be violated by a source lo-

cated many miles inside an adjacent Class II or III

area. For example, a power plant which just meets

the Class II increment for SO, could under some

conditions violate the Class I increment for SO, 60

or more miles away.... Therefore, wherever a

Class I area adjoins a Class II or III area, the po-

tential growth restrictions, especially for power

plant development, extend well beyond the Class I

boundaries into the adjacent area. A similar situa-

tion exists, to a greater or lesser degree, wherever

areas of different classification adjoin each

other... . [I]t should be clear that the Class II or

III increment could only be fully utilized toward

the center of the area and that at the periphery,

allowable deterioration will be dictated by the

adjoining Class I area rather than the Class II or

III increment.”

EPA acknowledged that this “drift factor” could limit

growth outside a Class I area as much as 60 to 100

miles.“ The reclassification of federal or Indian lands

can dictate growth and development on adjacent state

and private lands for many miles around.

„ 40 C.F.R. §52.21(d) (2) (i)

© 39 Fed. Reg. 42512 (Dec. 5, 1974), set forth in the Joint Appen-

dix at 218a, 19a.

6! Jd. at 42513, Joint Appendix at 220a

34

By allowing federal and Indian lands to be reclassi-

fied independently of state control, the regulations

treat those lands differently from all other lands in the

states and grant to federal land managers and Indian

governing bodies a decision-making power equal to

that of the states themselves. It is in fact a power that

supersedes and supplants the power that the statute

grants to the states.

Insofar as the prevention of significant deterioration

is concerned, there is nothing inherent in the nature of

air quality above federal or Indian lands which per se

should remove its protection from state control. Even

if there were, that judgment has been made by Con-

gress; it was not left to EPA. Section 118 explicitly

provides that federal lands and entities shall be sub-

ject to the same state and other requirements as other

persons within the state. Similarly, with regard to In-

dian lands and entities, it is well settled that “general

Acts of Congress apply to Indians as wel! as to all oth-

ers in the absence of a clear expression to the

contrary. ...”®? Since the Clean Air Act contains no

special provisions for Indian tribes, they are subject to

all the provisions of the Act, including those granting

the states the responsibility and authority, subject to

EPA’s supervision, for implementing the Act within

their borders.“

® FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 120 (1960)

Several petitioners below argued that the regulations in ques-

tion violated rights of due process under the United States

Constitution. The allocation of the responsibility for reclassifica-

tion of Indian lands by Indian governing bodies and the “reach”

of such reclassifications beyond the Indian land borders certainly

[Continued]

35

In short, by granting federal land managers and In-

dian governing bodies a decision-making power

seperate from that of the states, EPA has purported to

grant authority which the Act does not give it to grant.

It has also attempted to confer that authority on polit-

ical entities whom the Act did not intend to have such

authority.

EPA’s explanatory comment suggests that creating

this redesignation authority “ensures that national

forests and parks can be protected by the federal gov-

ernment from deterioration of air quality.“

Whatever the merits of that argument as a policy mat-

ter, it should be addressed to Congress. Congress has

already decided that issue, and only Congress can

change what it has done. The primary responsibility

for assuring air quality within “the entire geographic

area comprising such state” was conferred on each

state by §107(a) of the Act, and §118 further declared

that each segment of the federal government must

comply with state standards. Any doubt on that sub-

ject was dispelled by Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167,

181 (1976), wherein this Court observed, “The parties

raise due process type issues. While petitioners could seek judicial

review of a federal land manager’s actions or that of a state in

federal or state courts, respectively, there is no judicial forum in

which to review the Indian governing body action. Judicial review

of the actions of Indian tribes under these regulations would only

be available in the narrow sense of seeking review of EPA’s ap-

proval of any designation under the “arbitrary and capricious”

standard. The Court did not grant certiorari on the due process

issue. Nevertheless, the adequacy of available review procedures

is relevant to the legality of the redesignation regulations. Silver

v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963).

% Joint Appendix, at 222a

36

rightly agree that 5118 obligates federal installations

to conform to state air pollution standards or limita-

tions and compliance schedules.”

The power granted federal agencies and Indian gov.

erning bodies creates particularly severe problems in

the eleven western states served by petitioners because

of the extensive amounts of federal and Indian lands

and checkerboard land ownership patterns in those

states.

This fact is poignantly demonstrated by the North-

ern Cheyenne Indian Reservation redesignation,

discussed in footnote 50, supra, and graphically illus-

trated by the United States Geological Survey Map

appended to this Brief, showing federal land owner-

ship within the United States. Analysis of that map

discloses that, except for portions of northeastern Col-

orado and northeastern New Mexico, there is no place

in the eleven western United States that is located

sixty miles from Federal or Indian Reservation land.

Extending the range to one hundred miles leaves unaf-

fected no part of the State of New Mexico and, in

Colorado, only a tiny triangle (measuring about eight

miles to the side) along the Kansas border. Indeed,

within the vast area south of a line that runs from the

Montana-Wyoming border to the Columbia River, east

of the Sierra Nevadas, north of the Mexican border,

and west of the Rockies’ eastern slope, there is no spot

that is as much as twenty miles from Federal or Indian

reservation land. Thus, within the eleven western

states — the area in which these regulations will have

their principal impact — the statutory authority of the

states to set their own substantive standards so long as

they meet the primary and secondary standards has

been forfeited by regulatory fiat.

37

Several of petitioners’ electric generating plants and

coal mining operations are located in the Four Corners

Area of Arizona, Utah, Colorado and New Mexico.

Within 60 to 100 miles of the existing and proposed

plants within the New Mexico portion of the Four

Corners region there are four Indian reservations, two

national monuments, three national forests, thousands

of acres of federal public domain, as well as three

other states.“ The delegated authority to New Mexico

to redesignate becomes of little value under these cir-

cumstances, since one of the considerations is the

effects of the proposed redesignations on adjoining

areas which include differing Indian governing bodies

and differing federal land managers, each having the

power of reclassification.

A protest by any one of the multiple federal land

managers of Indian governing bodies limits the cir-

cumstances under which EPA can approve the

reclassification. Moreower, each can initiate its own

reclassification, though the federal agencies only to a

more restrictive class. This hodgepodge of conflicting

“sovereigns” utterly ignores the primary role for the

state in which the sources are geographically situated,

and instead creates a maze of potential vetoes for en-

s According to the Energy Committee of the New Mexico Legis-

lature 1976, a “recent study on the northwest coal fields in New

Mexico conducted by the State Geologist showed that coal owner-

ship was 57.3 percent federal, 32 percent Indian, 5.9 percent

private and 4.8 percent state.” See also Southwest Energy Study,

Department of the Interior, April, 1972 at pp. 3-1 to 3-5, which

shows the division of ownership of coal in the five southwestern

states [Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico] to be as

follows: 45 percent federal, 13 percent Indian, 17 percent private,

13 percent state, 12 percent railroads.

38

ergy development that inhibits, if not curtails,

petitioners’ plans to meet the near and long-term en-

ergy crisis.

It is not a sufficient answer that the redesignation

regulations give the states most of the authority that

they were given by the Act (and that EPA agrees they

were given by the Act), i.e., authority to determine for

themselves the air quality within their own bounda-

ries, so long as it is at least as clean as required by the

secondary standards. The reason that this answer is

insufficient is because it is incorrect. If the regulations

had granted redesignation authority solely to the

states, they would have substantially replicated the

division of substantive authority between federal and

state governments provided by the statute. That is,

the federal government, through EPA, would set the

primary and secondary standards but, beyond the sec-

ondary standards, substantive authority would be

vested in the states. States electing standards higher

than the secondary standards could either redesignate

to Class I, or permit the Class II designation to re-

main. Those who preferred the secondary standards

could redesignate to Class III. In fact, the regulations

do not grant redesignation authority only to the states.

Instead, they create a veto power in federal land man-

gers and Indian governing bodies. It is a veto power

which, because of the “drift factor” and the checker-

board pattern of land ownership within the western

United States, gives these federal land managers and

Indian governing boards exactly what the statute gave

to the states: the authority to determine whether, and

to what extent, air quality will be better than that

provided by the secondary standards.“

See footnote 50.

39

Neither is it a sufficient answer that the regulations

require federal land managers and Indian governing

bodies to “consult” with the states in connection with

redesignations, and that the redesignations are subject

to EPA review. Manifestly, the right of consultation is

not equal to the right of decision. What the statute has

given, the regulations have taken away.

Review by EPA does not save the illegality. The

standard of review is to determine arbitrariness and

capriciousness. Even more important, EPA’s authority

to review a redelegation that it had no authority to

make in the first place is hardly an adequate bootstrap

for the creation of such authority.

The short of the matter is that EPA has aitempted,

under the guise of redesignation, to transfer to non-

state entities authority that the statute granted to the

states. No amount of consultation nor review to deter-

mine arbitrarimess and capriciousness can cure that

defect.

40

CONCLUSION |

A single principle resolves both issues in this case.

That principle is judicial fidelity to the language of

the statute. The legislative history offers something for

both sides of the non-degradation issue, but there is no

ambiguity in the statutory language. “Shall approve”

means “shall approve” and three times this Court has

said that the language of §110 precludes consideration

of any factors other than those specified.

If EPA had not been enjoined from implementing

the Clean Air Act as EPA interprets the Clean Air Act,

the redesignation issue would never have arisen. Also,

if redesignation authority had been granted only to the

states, then redesignation would have substantially

reinstated what the Act originally granted: authority

in the states to control the extent to which air quality

will exceed the secondary standards.

The solution, of course, is to return to the original

statutory construct: (1) substantive authority and re-

sponsibility in EPA to set primary and secondary air

quality standards, (2) substantive authority in the

states to set other air quality standards, and (3) au-

thority and responsibility in the states for the

implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of the

standards.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Dis-

trict of Columbia must therefore be reversed.

41

Respectfully submitted,

WESTERN ENERGY SUPPLY AND TRANSMISSION

ASSOCIATES

Rex E. Lee Mark Wilmer

2840 Iroquois Drive John J. Bouma

Provo, Utah 84601 Snell & Wilmer

Jon L. Kyl 3100 Valley Center

Jennings, Strouss & Phoenix, Arizona 85073

Salmon

111 West Monroe

Phoenix, Arizona 85003

Uran INTERNATIONAL, INC.

C.C. Dietrich Richard N. Carpenter

500 California Street Bigbee, Stephenson,

San Francisco, Carpenter & Crout

California 94104 P. O. Box 669

Robert M. Westberg Santa Fe, New Mexico

Pillsbury, Madison & 87501

Sutro

225 Bush Street

San Francisco,

California 94104

DATED: May 19, 1977

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

Relevant excerpts from the Clean Air Act, as

amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq., are as follows:

§ 1857. [§ 101.] Congressional findings;

purposes of subchapter

(a) The Congress finds—

(1) that the predominant part of the Nation’s

population is located in its rapidly expanding

metropolitan and other urban areas, which gener-

ally cross the boundary lines of local jurisdictions

and often extends into two or more States;

(2) that the growth in the amount and complex-

ity of air pollution brought about by urbanization,

industrial development, and the increasing use of

motor vehicles, has resulted in mounting dangers

to the public health and welfare, including injury

to agricultural crops and livestock, damage to and

the deterioration of property, and hazards to air

and ground transportation;

(3) that the prevention and control of air pollu-

tion at its source is the primary responsibility of

States and local governments; and

(4) that Federal financial assistance and leader-

ship is essential for the development of

cooperative Federal, State, regional, and local pro-

grams to prevent and control air pollution.

(b) The purposes of this subchapter are—

(1) to protect and enhance the quality of the

Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public

health and welfare and the productive capacity of

its population; | a

2a

(2) to initiate and accelerate a national research

and development program to achieve the preven-

tion and control of air pollution;

(3) to provide technical and financial assistance

to State and local governments in connection with

the development and execution of their air pollu-

tion prevention and control programs; and

(4) to encourage and assist the development and

operation of regional air pollution control pro-

grams.

a. * *

§ 1857c—2. [§ 107.] Air quality control re-

gions—Responsibility of State for air

quality; submission of implementation plan

(a) Each State shall have the primary responsi-

bility for assuring air quality within the entire

geographic area comprising such State by submit-

ting an implementation plan for such State which

will specify the manner in which national primary

and secondary ambient air quality standards will

be achieved and maintained within each air qual-

ity control region in such State.

§ 1857d—1. [§ 116.] Retention of State

authority

Except as otherwise provided in sections

1857c—10(c), (e), end (f), 1857f—6a,

1857f—6c(c)(4), and 1857f—11 of this title

(preempting certain State regulation of moving

sources) nothing in this chapter shall preclude or

deny the right of any State or political subdivision

thereof to adopt or enforce (1) any standard or

3a

limitation respecting emissions of air pollutants or

(2) any requirement respecting control or abate-

ment of air pollution; except that if an emission

standard or limitation is in effect under an applic-

able implementation plan or under section

1857c—6 or section 1857c—7 of this title, such

State or political subdivision may not adopt or

enforce any emission standard or limitation which

is less stringent than the standard or limitation

under such plan or section.

ae. ae

§ 1857f. [§ 118.] Control and abatement of

air pollution from Federal facilities; com-

pliance of Federal departments, etc., with

Federal, State, interstate, and local re-

quirements; exemption by President of any

emission source from any executive

branch department, etc.; report to Con-

gress

Each department, agency, and instrumentality

of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches

of the Federal Government (1) having jurisdiction

over any property or facility, or (2) engaged in any

activity resulting, or which may result, in the dis-

charge of air pollutants, shall comply with

Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements

respecting control and abatement of air pollution

to the same extent that any person is subject to

such requirements. The President may exempt

any emission source of any department, agency, or

instrumentality in the executive branch from

compliance with such a requirement if he deter-

mines it to be in the paramount interest of the

4a

United States to do so, except that no exemption

may be granted from section 1857c—46 of this title,

and an exemption from section 1857c—7 of this

title may be granted only in accordance with sec-

tion 1857c—7 (e) of this title. No such exemption

shall be granted due to lack of appropriation un-

less the President shall have specifically requested

such appropriation as a part of the budgetary pro-

cess and the Congress shall have failed to make

available such requested appropriation. Any ex-

emption shall be for a period not in excess of one

year, but additional exemptions may be granted

for periods of not to exceed one year upon the

President’s making a new determination. The

President shall report each January to the Con-

gress all exemptions from the requirements of this

section granted during the preceding calendar

year, together with his reason for granting each

such exemption.

R + * ©

§ 1857h—2. [§ 304.] Citizen suits—

Establishment of right to bring suit

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this

section, any person may commence a civil action

on his own behalf—

(1) against any person (including (i) the United

States, and (ii) any other governmental instru-

mentality or agency to the extent permitted by

the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution)

who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an emission

standard or limitation under this chapter or (B)

an order issued by the Administrator or a State

with respect to such a standard or limitation, or

5a

(2) against the Administrator where there is al-

leged a failure of the Administrator to perform

any act or duty under this chapter which is not

discretionary with the Administrator.

The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without

regard to the amount in controversy or the citizen-

ship of the parties, to enforce such an emission

standard or limitation, or such an order, or to or-

der the Administrator to perform such act or

duty, as the case may be.

Non-restriction of other rights

(e) Nothing in this section shall restrict any

right which any person (or class of persons) may

have under any statute or common law to seek

enforcement of any emission standard or limita-

tion or to seek any other relief (including relief

against the Administrator or a State agency).

§ 1857h—5. [ 307.] Administrative pro-

ceedings and judicial review

E „ „ *

(b) (1) A petition for review of action of the

Administrator in promulgating any national pri-

mary or secondary ambient air quality standard,

any emission standard under section 1857c—7 of

this title, any standard of performance under sec-

tion 1857c—6 of this title, any standard under

section 1857f—1 of this title (other than a stan-

dard required to be prescribed under section

1857f—1(b) (1) of this title), any determination

6a

under section 1857f—1(b) (5) of this title, any

control or prohibition under section 1857f—6c of

this title, or any standard under section 1857f—9

of this title may be filed only in the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. A

petition for review of the Administrator’s action in

approving or promulgating any implementation

plan under section 1857c—5 of this title or section

1857c—6(d) of this title may be filed only in the

United States Court of Appeals for the appro-

priate circuit. Any such petition shall be filed

within 30 days from the date of such promulgation

or approval, or after such date if such petition is

based solely on grounds arising after such 30th

day.

(2) Action of the Administrator with respect to

which review could have been obtained under par-

agraph (1) shall not be subject to judicial review

in civil or criminal proceedings for enforcement.

APPENDIX B

The following Memorandum appears in 7 BNA En-

vironmental Reporter, No. 23, at 859 (Oct. 8, 1976).

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM ON SIGNIFI-

CANT DETERIORATION REGULATIONS —

DATED SEPTEMBER 28, 1976.

SUBJECT: Additional Guidance on Prevention of

Significant Deterioration (PSD) Reg-

ulations

FROM: Roger Strelow

Assistant Administrator

for Air and Waste Management (AW-

443).

MEMO TO: Regional Administrators

Questions arising from the Regions have indi-

cated the need for further headquarters guidance

on various aspects of the PSD regulation (40 CFR

52.21).

A. Several questions relate to 40 CFR 52.21 (d)

(5), which reads as follows:

(5) Where an owner or operator has applied for

permission to construct or modify pursuant to this

paragraph and the proposed source would be lo-

cated in an area which has been proposed for

redesignation to a more stringent class (or the

State, Indian Governing Body, or Federal Land

Manager has announced such consideration), ap-

proval shall not be granted until the Ad-

ministrator has acted on the proposed redesigna-

tion.

2b

The purpose of paragraph (d) (5) is to insure

that while a governing body is seriously pursuing

the redesignation of an area to Class I, the re-

designation will not be compromised or nullified

bv a new or modified source. I would like to stress

several basic points about this provision:

1. The issue of which was first in time — the

source’s permit application or the governing

body’s announcement of redesignation considera-

tion — is irrelevant under paragraph (d) (5). If

the governing body announces such reconsidera-

tion any time before a final permit has been

issued, paragraph (d) (5) will be triggered.

2. A proposed source need not be located within

the political boundaries of the governing body

considering the redesignation in order for para-

graph (d) (5) to apply. If the source’s emissions

could pose a threat to the proposed redesignation,

then final permit approval would have to be with-

held pending EPA’s action on the proposed

redesignation.

As is true of most aspects of the PSD regula-

tions, the Regions will have to exercise their sound

judgment on a case-by-case basis in determining

whether a proposed source would be located far

enough from the political boundaries of the gov-

erning body so as not to pose a threat to the

proposed redesignation. This type of judgment

should not present novel problems for the Re-

gions, since the PSD regulation ultimately

requires (in paragraph (d) (2) (i)) a finding that a

source will not violate the applicable increments

in any surrounding areas.

3b

I realize that one could read paragraph (d) (5)

in a very literal fashion to apply only to sources

which would be constructed within the political

boundaries of the governing body considering the

redesignation. This interpretation would, however,

do violence to the basic purpose of the PSD

regulation (which is to insure that applicable air

quality increments are not violated by new

sources, without regard to the political boundaries

a source might choose to locate within), and would

do violence to the basic intent of paragraph (d) (5)

(which is to insure that a pending redesignation

will not be jeopardized by a new source).

3. Paragraph (d) (5) will be triggered even

where a governing body “announces considera-

tion” of a proposed redesignation. There is good

reason for allowing such an early triggering event,

since EPA regulations and guidelines require the

governing body to go through several procedural

steps (including detailed document preparation)

before the redesignation can even be formally

proposed. If this approach were not taken, then a

governing body which was actively and expedi-

tiously endeavoring to secure a redesignation

could still find the redesignation compromised or

nullified by an intervening permit approval.

We must recognize, however, the potential for

abuse in such a case and take care to guard against

it. The clause must not operate to allow a govern-

ing body to frustrate construction of a source if

that governing body does not seriously intend to

pursue a redesignation or does not pursue it ac-

tively and expeditiously.

4b

Therefore, whenever a governing body an-

nounces it is considering a redesignation,’ and

that announcement would affect a proposed

source’s application, EPA should make clear to

the governing body (in writing) that new source

approvals will be withheld only so long as the gov-

erning body is actively and expeditiously

proceeding towards redesignation. EPA should set

forth a reasonable schedule of action considering

all the circumstances of each case? and notify the

governing body that any significant departure

from that schedule, or any other evidence that the

governing body is not actively and expeditiously

pursuing redesignation, would be considered

grounds for EPA to suspend the operation of par-

agraph (d) (5) and complete action on permits

being withheld.

Such a suspension of paragraph (d) (5) should

not occur automatically upon the failure of a gov-

erning body to meet a given deadline. Again, all

relevant circumstances would have to be weighed.

No special form of “announcement” is required. Any evi-

dence that the governing body, or an appropriate official

thereof, has seriously determined to consider redesignation

and has communicated this determination in writing to EPA

should suffice. In any event, as discussed in the text above.

the form of announcement is not nearly as important as the

governing body’s follow-up actions in determining whether

paragraph (d) (5) should hold up a permit.

* Le., type of governing body (State? Indian Tribe?), num-

ber of potentially-affected jurisdictions, number of other

govermental approvals needed, size of area affected, etc. It

would probably be wise to develop this schedule in consulta-

tion with representatives of the governing body.

5b

For instance, if a delay were caused through no

fault of the governing body, it would probably be

improper to suspend paragraph (d) (5). The main

point is that EPA must remain satisfied that the

governing body is doing all that can reasonably be

expected to process the redesignation actively and

expeditiously.

4. Paragraph (d) (5) only restricts EPA from

granting permit approval while a redesignation is

pending. A Region may therefore carry out all

other provisions of paragraphs (d) and (e) in this

period (if it chooses). This might have the salutary

effect of “keeping the heat” on the governing body

to complete its redesignation procedures. It might

also, however, constitute in a Region’s judgment an

unwarranted diversion of resources for a permit

which may never be issued. The Regions should

use their own judgment in this area.

5. A Region may grant a permit pending a re-

designation if the Region determines that the

source would not violate the increments which

would result from the redesignation.

6. When a potential applicant contracts a Region

about initiating the permit process, the Region

should make the applicant aware of the implica-

tions of paragraph (d) (5) so that the applicant

may be encouraged to complete its application

expeditiously. Obviously, whenever paragraph (d)

(5) is triggered, the Region should immediately

notify those whose permit applications will be af-

fected.

B. A question has been raised concerning the

applicability of the PSD regulations to certain

6b

kinds of coal cleaning plants 552.21 (d) (1) (ii)].

specifically those that do not utilize a thermal

dryer. Although the wording of the proposal of

§52.21 (d) (1) (ii) read “coal cleaning plants

(thermal dryers)” the final regulations read simply

“coal cleaning plants.” Region VIII has recently

interpreted the PSD regulation to cover all coal

cleaning plants, regardless of whether a thermal

dryer is used. Region VIII’s interpretation is cor-

rect.

C. One Region has questioned whether a PSD

permit can be conditioned to require emission con-

trol that goes beyond best available control

technology (as when a power plant intends to use

low sulfur coal and a flue gas scrubber and will be

well below the NSPS for SO, from power plants).

Unless it is necessary to meet the applicable air

quality increment, we can not require a source to

go beyond BACT. However, should a source indi-

cate on its permit application that its emissions

will be less than that which we would ordinarily

define as BACT, the lesser emission rate may be

made an enforceable condition of the permit. The

legally enforceable emission rate should be used for

purposes of keeping track of the unused portion of

the increment. Obviously, the situation where ac-

tual emissions are less than the legally enforceable

emission rate presents the potential for a source to

“hoard” a major portion of the remaining incre-

ment for future expansion. Therefore, where a

source will go beyond BACT, Regions should at-

tempt to make the lesser emissions a legally

binding permit condition.

7b

D. Finally, some Regional Offices have re-

quested a change to the PSD regulations enabling

the Regional Administrator to require the appli-

cants to perform the necessary diffusion modeling.

We feel, and OGC concurs, that adequate author-

ity to require such analysis is presently provided

under §52.21 (d) (3), which indicates that EPA

can require a source to submit“... information

necessary to determine the impact that the con-

struction or modification will have on sulfur

dioxide and particulate matter air quality

levels 5

cc. Regional Counsels

Regional Air Directors

Regional Enforcement Directors

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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