Petition — Lamb Enterprises, Inc. v. Kiroff
Supreme Court brief1977
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
ee OEP Oe LOUIE, UL oy |
pes FILED
pre APR 25 1977
MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1976
TS: minteciiocctnnscmnpeneni 76-1475
LAMB ENTERPRISES, INC., EDWARD O. LAMB, et al.,
Petitioners,
VS.
HONORABLE GEORGE N. KIROFF, et al.,
and RUSSELL MORTON BROWN,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To the United States Court of Appeals
For the Sixth Circuit
RoBerT B. GOSLINE
Davin W. WICKLUND
SHUMAKER, Loop & KENDRICK
811 Madison Avenue
Suite 500
Toledo, Ohio 43624
Attorneys for Defendant
Of Counsel:
LeRoy W. SIGLER
600 Edward Lamb Building
Toledo, Ohio 43604
THE GATES LEGAL PUBLISHING CO., CLEVELAND, OHIO—TEL. (216) 621-5647
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I a seeulinamnpseniniaeicmn
The Constitutional Provisions and Statutes Involved ..
EEL CLOTS CT OF
1. The Right of Full Faith and Credit to a Final
Judgment of the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia Judgment in the
Ohio Courts Is a Federal Constitutional Right,
a Cornerstone Fundamental to the Federalism
of the United States Government, and the Fed-
eral Courts Have Jurisdiction to Issue Writs and
Injunctions to Prevent Relitigation of Such
se
2. The Constitutional Right of Full Faith and
Credit Entitles a Final Judgment of the United
States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia, Which Precludes Further Litigation on the
Same Claim Between the Same Parties in That
Jurisdiction, to the Same Fully Preclusive Ef-
fect in the Courts of Every State of the United
States. Magnolia Petroleum v. Hunt, 320 U‘S.
a a a
3. The Younger-Huffman Holdings Do Not Apply
to All Civil Cases, Particularly Where Their
Principles Conflict With the Very Concept of
Federalism and Comity Which Those Decisions
Were Intended to Support and Fortify. Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Huffman v. Pur-
sue, 420 U.S. 592 (1975)
EATER NE FRI we niin ey COM Ae COC cre I aR 18
APPENDIX:
Opinion and Order of the District Court (Septem-
gg ERENT ae ror Ete NR Ne Al
Judgment of the District Court (September 2,
SITIES ‘scicacaesieicibiliaditaiala catia eat Ih ia Al3
Opinion of the Court of Appeals (January 31,
ESE: SEMEN ek een Re eR Al4
Judgment of the Court of Appeals (January 31,
a rE A ENT I NOE Le On A Ne A36
United States Constitutional Provisions and Stat-
STI "scsscalicsiecndipimababbapeieunibaniiniteeniecaeblaaiiae ache ita dain A37
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Americana of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Kaplus, 368 F.2d 431
(3rd Cir. 1966), cert. denied 386 U.S. 943 (1967) .... 11
Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, dissenting opinion
201-02 (1947)
Bond v. Hume, 243 U.S. 15 (1917) -....22..--cccccecccececeeseeeeeeees 10
Brown v. Lamb, 36 Ohio St. 2d 8 (1973) 00... 6
Brown v. Lamb, 414 F.2d 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert.
gk kG OE. ee 5, 13
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S.
ee: ED demscnseseniecistewnnsscseaeeiernasipuaibbitsins nila ieiitacicieaenilinaa 9
Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938) 0. 10, 15
Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3 (1882) 000000... polar 16
Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948) oo 12
Grubb v. P.U.C.O., 281 U.S. 470 (1930) 0. 10
Ill
Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726 (1946) ..................-... 10
Higginson v. Schoeneman, 190 F.2d 32 (C.A. D.C. 1951) 15
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) 0... eee eeeeeeees gy
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1974) ................ 3, 4,
12,16, 17, 18
Hughes, Admr. v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951) ............ 10
Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951) ................ 12
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943)
WES Aes eK ENS ts RO TT oe dO 3, 4, 14, 16, 18
Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268
I ae 10, 16
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972) ..............-....--.. 13, 14
Monagas v. Vidal, 170 F.2d 99, 106 (1948), cert. denied
OS TEE y
Morris v. Jones, Dir. of Ins., 329 U.S. 545 (1947) ...... 12, 16
Pauling v. McNamara, 331 F.2d 796 (C.A. D.C. 1963),
cert. denied 377 U.S. 933 (1964) ....................ccees 15
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) .............-....-. 13
Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co., 314 U.S. 118
ERI cscasesesesacsniiaiebencnanetesninnainscncemanncsasreemmenesetensieet 12, 13
Westgate-Sun Harbor Co. v. Watson, 206 F.2d 458
A nes insiacreemntenonncnmaneninisiootenntt 15
Woods v. Cannaday, 158 F.2d 184 (C.A. D.C. 1946) ... 15
Woods Exploration and Producing Co., Inc. v. Alumi-
num Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied 404 U.S. 1047 (1972) ..............cccccceeeeees 13
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) ....3, 4, 12, 16,17, 18
Constitutional Provisions ond Statutes
28 U.S.C., 1940 ed. §379 .................. sieisiliniidepainiiccieaion saniene 13
I icc aechieetenhnothbeniiianiansanntienitens 2
BRS Eee saaniabsaeinadclebbodletosies 6
REE 2, 3, 12
RS ee es ee 3, 4, 9, 17
RE ae 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 12, 14, 17
GB UBL. GIDE cneccceessssescnensvnittininaminm 6, 7, 14
United States Constitution:
FD 3, 8, 10
eS | 3, 8, 10
Other
15A C.J.S. 395, Conflict of Laws, §4(4)b ................202..-.- 10
House Report No. 308, 80th Congress, Ist Session pp.
Ae. 2 naan ee 12
Senate Report No. 1559, 80th Congress, 2nd Session pp.
DD cseccssinteinietin gcecenneccencnessssunnessaseiititilsininaniisiaaiinnnannnnnn 12
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1976
ARTE ne
LAMB ENTERPRISES, INC., EDWARD O. LAMB, et al.,
Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE GEORGE N. KIROFF, et al.,
and RUSSELL MORTON BROWN,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To the United States Court of Appeals
For the Sixth Circuit
Petitioners pray that a Writ of Certiorari issue to
review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit entered in the above captioned case
on January 31, 1977 wherein it reversed a judgment of the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio, Western Division and vacated a permanent injunction
previously decreed by that Court.
The ground for this Petition is that the Court of Ap-
peals has incorrectly decided important questions of federal
law which have not been but should be settled by this
Supreme Court.
OPINIONS BELOW
The Opinion of the Court of Appeals entered in this
case has not yet been reported. It and that Court’s judg-
ment are reprinted in the appendix to this Petition at pages
Al4 and A36.
The Opinion of the District Court is reported at 399
F. Supp. 409 and is printed in the appendix to this Petition
at page Al.
The Judgment of the District Court was entered Sep-
tember 2, 1975 and is printed in the appendix at page A13.
JURISDICTION
The original jurisdiction of the District Court is based
on the All Writs Statute, 28 U.S.C. §1651 and upon the
specific exception to the Anti-Injunction Statute, 28 U.S.C.
§2283 which recognizes jurisdiction in the district courts
“to protect and effectuate judgments of federal courts.”
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. §1254(1).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
This case directs attention to (1) the sharp contrast
between the constitutional full faith and credit accorded
a judgment for the plaintiff and that recognized in a
judgment for a defendant and (2) the right of a Federal
Court to enjoin State Court relitigation of a Federal Court
civil judgment.
The questions presented for review by this Petition,
stated affirmatively, are:
Sede
1. The right of full faith and credit to a final judg-
ment of the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia in the Ohio courts is a Federal constitutional
right, a cornerstone fundamental to the federalism of the
United States Government, and the Federal Courts have
jurisdiction to issue writs and injunctions to prevent reliti-
gation of such judgment. Art. IV, Section 1, U. S. Constitu-
tion, 28 U.S.C. §§1738, 1651 and 2283.
2. The constitutional right of full faith and credit
entitles a final judgment of the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, which precludes fur-
ther litigation on the same claim between the same parties
in that jurisdiction, to the same fully preclusive effect in
the courts of every state of the United States. Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
3. The Younger-Huffman holdings do not apply to all
civil cases, particularly where their principles conflict with
the very concept of federalism and comity which those
decisions were intended to support and fortify. Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Huffman v. Pursue, 420 US.
592 (1975).
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
AND STATUTES INVOLVED
These questions arise under United States Constitution
Article IV, Section 1 (Full Faith and Credit) and Article
VI, Clause 2 (Supreme Law of the Land) and under 28
US.C. $1738 (Full Faith and Credit), 42 U.S.C. §1983
(Constitutional Rights), 28 U.S.C. §1651 (All Writs Statute)
and 28 U.S.C. §2283 (Third Exception to the Anti-Injunction
Statute). Their particular provisions are set forth in the
appendix starting at page A37.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action to enjoin the relitigation of a District
of Columbia United States District Court civil judgment,
entered after extended trial and affirmed on appeal, to
effectuate and protect that judgment and to obtain recog-
nition of the full faith and credit guaranteed to it by the
United States Constitution. Article IV, Section 1 United
States Constitution; 28 U.S.C. §1738.
The District Court assumed jurisdiction under the third
exception of 28 U.S.C. §2283 to protect and effectuate that
judgment. In accordance with the holding of Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943), it recognized
that this judgment should be given the same full faith and
credit it has in the District of Columbia where it was
entered and, consequently, enjoined the Ohio relitigation
of that claim as fully precluded in the District of Columbia
and, therefore, equally precluded throughout the United
States.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed stating
that “the District Court should have exercised equitable
restraint and left this litigation” to the Ohio courts. It
based its decjsion principally on Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971) and Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592
(1975). It did not accept the third exception of 28 U.S.C.
§2283 as properly supporting injunctive jurisdiction.
The two lower court decisions put at odds the “federal-
ism” of Magnolia Petroleum (“nationwide application” of
adjudicated rights) and that of Younger and Huffman (non-
intervention in pending State Court cases). The critical
difference is the constitutional right of full faith and credit,
i.e., the constitutional right that, nationwide, a final judg-
me
ee
ment must be given the same preclusive effect it has where
rendered, as compared with the judicial doctrine of res
judicata, the effect of which is determined by the court
asked to enforce it.
This important and fundamental distinction has never
been drawn and it should be settled by this Court.
The District of Columbia Case. On May 21, 1963,
Russel! Morton Brown filed suit in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia alleging that at-
torney’s fees were due him from Edward Lamb and Dis-
patch, Inc. (corporate predecessor to Lamb Enterprises,
Inc.). He vigorously and successfully opposed all efforts
of Lamb and Dispatch, Inc. to avoid the jurisdiction of that
Court. Motions to quash service and motions for summary
judgment were filed by Lamb and denied by the Court.
For seven years Brown fully prosecuted his claim in that
jurisdiction. After eleven days of trial, October 16-Novem-
ber 1, 1967, verdicts were returned and judgment entered
against defendants for $400,000. On December 22, 1967
this was vacated and the trial judge entered judgment n.o.v.
for Lamb and Dispatch, Inc. on the ground that Brown
presented “no evidence * * * requisite for taking” his “‘ac-
tion out of the statute of limitations.” This was affirmed
by the United States Court of Appeals. Brown v. Lamb,
414 F.2d 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1969). And this Court denied
certiorari. 397 U.S. 907 (1970).
In a final effort and after denial of certiorari, Brown
filed a motion in the Court of Appeals for leave to file a
petition for rehearing en banc. This was denied March 30,
1970 and further litigation of his claim in that case was
fully precluded.
The Ohio Case. Seven years before the District of
Columbia case, on April 28, 1959, Brown had filed the iden-
6
tical suit in Lucas County, Ohio Common Pleas Court
against-Edward Lamb and Dispatch, Inc. whose residence
and office were in that county. During the 18 years which
have transpired, it was for long periods of time on the in-
active docket. Originally, a motion directed to the Com-
plaint resulted in a dismissal, appeal and reversal. Finally,
on March 24, 1969, it was dismissed for want of prosecution.
Brown took no action until after the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals turned down his request for rehearing.
Then he filed a motion to vacate. The dismissal was va-
cated, then reinstated. The reinstatement was appealed and
affirmed by the Ohio Court of Appeals but reversed by
the Ohio Supreme Court in Brown v. Lamb, 36 Ohio St. 2d
8 (1973). After remand, an amended motion to dismiss was
filed and overruled. Next, with Court leave, Brown filed
an Amended Complaint naming as new perties the cor-
porate successors of Dispatch, Inc. and Judge Kiroff of
the Lucas County, Ohio Common Pleas Court “indicated
that the cause will proceed to trial.” (Appendix p. A5).
So that if the Federal Courts do not now protect the
District of Columbia judgment, it cannot again be con-
sidered by any Federal Court until it returns to this Su-
preme Court (the “final arbiter” of full faith and credit
questions) on a later petition for certiorari after decisions
by the Ohio Trial, Appellate and then Supreme Courts.
The Present Action for Injunction. On September 13,
1974, Lamb and the other State Court defendants initiated
the present action in the United States District Court. Fed-
eral Court jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. §1343(3) and
reliance was placed on the Civil Rights Statute, 42 U.S.C.
$1983. The relief sought in the District Court was an in-
7
junction against further prosecution’ of the Ohio State
Court suit on the ground that it would violate the full faith
and credit due to the District of Columbia judgment.
The District Court determined that Brown’s cause of
action was put to rest with the final judgment in the Dis-
trict of Columbia court. This final judgment was entitled
to full faith and credit which he recognized as a constitu-
tional right subject to protection under 42 U.S.C. §1983.
He also found that the Ohio law suit constituted relitigation
of the District of Columbia case and that the issuance of
an injunction to protect and effectuate Federal Court judg-
ments was permitted under the last exception of 28 U.S.C.
§2283. Further prosecution of the State Court proceedings
was enjoined (Appendix page Al3).
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
advancing the grounds that such injunction was an unwar-
ranted interference in State Court litigation, held that the
District Court should have “exercised equitable restraint
and left this litigation for resolution in the State Courts of
Ohio.” (Appendix pages Al4 to A36).
In this holding, the Court of Appeals brushed aside
and disregarded (1) the constitutional provisions for full
faith and credit as the supreme law of the land, (2) the
statute providing that judgments are to have “the same
full faith and credit” throughout the United States as in the
court “from which they are taken,” (3) the statute authoriz-
ing Federal Courts to issue writs necessary or appropriate
in aid of their jurisdiction and (4) the specific exception to
1. Including the State Court Judge as a defendant and sub-
sequent entry of the temporary and permanent injunctions ob-
viated the need for him to record and report to the Ohio Supreme
Court the then 16 year old Ohio case as pending, overage and not
tried.
the anti-injunction statute permitting injunctions to protect
and effectuate Federal Court judgments.
Trial of the pending case in the Ohio court will compel
the relitigation of the District of Columbia judgment
which full faith and credit was intended to avoid.
The Court of Appeals failed to recognize the critical
difference between constitutional—statutory full faith and
credit and the judicially declared doctrine of res judicata.
This was error which requires clarification and correction
by this Court.
ARGUMENT
I. The Right of Full Faith and Credit to a Final Judg-
ment of the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia Judgment in the Ohio Courts
Is a Federal Ccustitutional Right, a Cornerstone
Fundamental to the Federalism of the United
States Government, and the Federal Courts Have
Jurisdiction to Issue Writs and Injunctions to Pre-
vent Relitigation of Such Judgment.
The constitutional and statutory mandate of full faith
and credit is basic and it is substantively different from
the decisional rules of res judicata and comity.
Full faith and credit is established by the Constitution.
Congress has been given the authority to prescribe its ef-
fect. By statute that “Effect” is precisely defined, and it
is the supreme law of the land. Article IV, Section 1,
United States Constitution (Full Faith and Credit); Article
VI, Clause 2, United States Constitution (Supreme Law of
the Land); and 28 U.S.C. §1738.
ORME +
As Congress enacted in 28 U.S.C. §1738, the effect of
out-of-state judgments is that they “shall have the same
full faith and credit in every court * * * as * * * in the
courts * * * from which they are taken.” Thus, it is the
District of Columbia, not the State of Ohio that determines
the conclusive nature of the December 22, 1967 judgment
n.o.v. in favor of Lamb and Dispatch, Inc. No further
litigation of Brown’s claim for attorney’s fees between
himself and Lamb and Dispatch, Inc. can beprosecuted in
the District of Columbia and this same effect must be
recognized in Ohio courts.
Neither res judicata nor comity has these attributes.
They are not based on enacted law. Res judicata is neither
constitutional nor statutory. It is “purely a rule of judicial
administration to be applied, like all such rules, as con-
siderations of justice and right application of the policy
required * * *.” Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, dis-
senting opinion 201-02 (1947); see also Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948).
“* * * the doctrine of res judicata is not clear and sharp
in outline. It is a rule of judicial administration grounded
upon the need for putting a period to litigation.” Monagas
v. Vidal, 170 F.2d 99, 196 (1948), cert. denied 335 U.S. 911
(1949).
Comity is even more fluid. “* * * in the legal sense
[it] is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other.
But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its
territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international
duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens
or of other persons who are under the protection of its
laws.” (Emphasis added). Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113,
163-64 (1895).
10
As with any local policy, application of res judicata or
comity is determined by the court enforcing a judgment
rather than the court which entered it. “The public policy
[res judicata] of a state is to be deduced from its Constitu-
tion, laws and judicial decision.” 15A C.J.S. 395, Conflict
of Laws, §4(4)b; Bond v. Hume, 243 U.S. 15 (1917). The
enforcing court sometimes looks behind the judgment to
the issues presented or beyond it to those which might have
been presented. Grubb v. P.U.C.O., 281 U.S. 470, 479
(1930); Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 735 (1946).
Conversely, the fuii faith and credit recognition of the
judgments of another court of the United States is a matter
of right, of constitutional right, “the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.” United States Constitution,
Art. IV, §1 and Art. VI, Clause 2. A judgment of a United
States Court warrants “not some, but full credit” in the
courts of every other state. Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32,
39-40 (1938).
Full faith and credit is a cornerstone, fundamental to
the federalism of the United States Government. The full
faith and credit clause has been characterized as a part of
the “federal system’’, “a nationally unifying force” making
each state “an integral part of a single nation” wherein
judgments “are given nationwide application.” Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943). It em-
bodies a “unifying principle” to “coordinate administration
of justice throughout the nation” and “unify all of the
courts.” Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U‘S.
268, 276-77 (1935); Hughes, Admr. v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609.
RN I
11
612 (1951); Americana of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Kaplus, 368
F.2d 431, 438 (3rd Cir. 1966), cert. denied 386 U.S. 943
(1967).
“These consequences flow from the clear purpose
of the full faith and credit clause to establish through-
out the federal system the salutary principle of the
common law that a litigation once pursued to judgment
shall be as conclusive of the rights of the parties in
every other court as in that where the judgment was
rendered, so that a cause of action merged in a judg-
ment in one state is likewise merged in every other.
The full faith and credit clause like the commerce
clause thus became a nationally unifying force. It
altered the status of the several states as independent
foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore rights and
obligations created under the laws or established by
the judicial proceedings of the others, by making each
an integral part of a single nation, in which rights
judicially established in any part are given nationwide
application. * * * Because there is a full faith and
credit clause a defendant may not a second time chal-
lenge the validity of the plaintiff’s right which has
ripened into a judgment and a plaintiff may not for
his single cause of action secure a second or a greater
recovery.” 320 U.S. at 439-40. (Emphasis added)
This Court has said that full faith and credit “substi-
tuted a command for the earlier principles of comity” and
“ordered submission by one State even to hostile policies
reflected in the judgment of another State,” because the
federal system “demanded it.” The requirements of full
12
faith and credit “are exacting, if not inexorable.” Estin v.
Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948).
And “the federal purpose of the clause makes this
{United States Supreme] court * * * the ‘final arbiter’”
of its application. Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 585
(1951); Morris v. Jones, Dir. of Ins., 329 U.S. 545, 551-52
(1947).
These concepts are more fundamental to “federalism”’
than the non-interference principles discussed in Younger,
supra, at 44 and Huffman, supra, at 601 and 606. Federal-
ism should certainly favor a defendant who has obtained
a fully litigated judgment in one United States jurisdiction
and he should be entitled to be free from State Court
litigation of the same cause of action by the same plaintiff
a second time.
All writs authority and anti-injunction exception.
Where, as here, a Federal Court judgment is sought to be
protected, federal statutes have provided ample federal
jurisdiction to “issue all writs necessary and appropriate
in aid of” that judgment and have specifically excepted
from the anti-injunction statute jurisdiction to protect or
effectuate it. 28 U.S.C. §§1651 and 2283.
This jurisdiction has been exercised in the relitigation
cases which the District Court followed in granting in-
junctive relief.
The Federal Court power to enjoin State court “reliti-
gation of cases and controversies fully adjudicated by”
such courts has long been recognized by court decision.
After denial of this jurisdiction in Toucey v. New York
Life Insurance Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941), Congress amended
28 U.S.C. §2283* specifically to overule the Toucey holding.
2. 1948 revision of Title 28 U.S. Code; House Report No.
308, 80th Congress, lst Session pp. 1-7, A181-82; Senate Report
No. 1559, 80th Congress, 2nd Session pp. 1-2.
—
13
Finality of the District of Columbia judgment is con-
firmed by the rulings of the Appellate and United States
Supreme Courts in Brown v. Lamb, 414 F.2d 1210 (1969)
‘and 397 U.S. 907 (1970). The injunctive relief presently
sought is, therefore, ancillary to enforcing and effectuating
that judgment. Toucey v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., supra, 141-154
(J. Reed Dissenting Opinion); Steffel v. Thompson, 415
U.S. 452, 477-78 (J. White Concurring) (1974); Mitchum
v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 236 (1972).
Prior to 1948, the anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C.,
1940 ed. §379, did not provide the exceptions ‘“‘in aid of its
jurisdiction” nor “to protect or effectuate its judgments.”
These were added at the time of the 1948 revision of the
Judicial Code to reverse Toucey. Congress adopted the
“vigorous dissenting opinion” of the Toucey case, authored
by Justice Reed. According to him, the principle of the
“relitigation exception”, which was enacted by §2283, was
“to avoid relitigation and forced reliance on res judicata.”
(Emphasis added) 314 US. at 146.
Until the Toucey decision and since the amendment of
$2283, the relitigation exception has been regularly and
fully recognized.* Steffel _v. Thompson, supra, 477;
Mitchum v. Foster, supra, 236; Woods Exploration and Pro-
ducing Co., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286,
1312 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
In Steffel, supra, this Court recognized “ ‘that the
Toucey Rule is gone, and that to protect and effectuate its
judgment a federal court may enjoin relitigation in a state
court.’” It saw “no reason * * * to hold that the federal
plaintiff must always rely solely on his plea of res judicata
in the state courts. * * * it would not seem improper to
3. The relitigation exception of §2283 is reinforcement for
the “all writs” statute, 28 U.S.C. §1651.
14
enjoin local prosecutors who refuse to observe adverse fed-
eral judgments.” 415 U.S. at 477-78.
The authority “to effectuate its judgments” is a specific
exception to the anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. §2283.
Its restoration and continued vitality are beyond question.
The right to be free from the burden of relitigation and free
from being relegated solely to the defense of res judicata
in the state courts furnish the equitable considerations
necessary to support an injunction.
Additional jurisdictional authority arises from the fact
that full faith and credit is a constitutional right federally
protected under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Relief which it provides
by a suit in equity “falls within the ‘expressly authorized’
exception of” 28 U.S.C. §2283. Mitchum v. Foster, supra,
at 242-43.
Full faith and credit for a fully litigated judgment
should be recognized as a constitutional right apart and
different from res judicata, as a basic footing to the federal-
ism of the United States Government, as a protection
against relitigation and as a proper subject for injunctive
jurisdiction of the Federal Courts.
2. The Constitutional Right of Full Faith and Credit
Entitles a Final Judgment of the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, Which
Precludes Further Litigation on the Same Claim
Between the Same Parties in That Jurisdiction, to
the Same Fully Preclusive Effect in the Courts of
Every State of the United States. Magnolia Pe-
troleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
As would be the case in any jurisdiction in the country,
the final judgment entered December 22, 1967 in the District
of Columbia and affirmed on appeal, is a complete bar to
15
any further action in the District of Columbia by Brown
against Lamb or Dispatch, Inc. on that claim. If its “effect”
were any less, it is certain that Brown would be in the
District of Columbia Courts rather than the Lucas County,
Ohio Court. His renewed efforts in the Ohio case tell us
that he knows this. Pauling v. McNamara, 331 F.2d 796
(C.A. D.C. 1963); Westgate-Sun Harbor Co. v. Watson, 206
F.2d 458 (C.A. D.C. 1953); Higginson v. Schoeneman, 190
F.2d 32 (C.A. D.C. 1951); Woods v. Cannaday, 158 F.2d 184
(C.A. D.C. 1946).
In Pauling v. McNamara, supra, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia announced the holding that
judgment on motion to dismiss, granted and affirmed in an
earlier case, constituted a final conclusive judgment and
“res judicata” in the later case which stated the same claims.
331 F.2d at 797-98.
In Woods v. Cannaday, supra, that same court applied
the doctrine of res judicata to a default judgment and to
all points which might have been litigated. In the District
of Columbia, as in all courts:
“* * * there must sometime be an end to litigation, not
only in the interest of the adverse party who should
not be vexed twice or thrice or even more times for
the same cause, but also in the interest of the state in
settled law and legal relations and that of courts and
litigants in an orderly judicial process which would be
seriously jeopardized by unnecessary overcrowding of
already crowded dockets.” 206 F.2d at 462.
Comparably, the December 22, 1967 judgment on mo-
tion for judgment n.o.v., after full trial and appeal would
be final and conclusive. This is the District of Columbia
effect which must be given “not some, but full credit” by
the Ohio Court. Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 39-40 (1938);
16
Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3, 10 (1882) (District of Colum-
bia judgment enforced in Ohio).
Because there is a full faith and credit clause a defen-
dant [or plaintiff] may not a second time challenge the
validity of the plaintiff’s [or defendant’s] right which has
ripened into a judgment. Its finality must be recognized
“to the same extent in every other” state. Magnolia Petro-
leum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439-40, 438 (1943); Morris
v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 551 (1947); Milwaukee County v.
M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935).
By reason of the final judgment, no further legal pro-
ceedings on the alleged cause of action can be maintained
in the District of Columbia. The full faith and credit clause
permits nothing less in the State of Ohio.
3. The Younger-Huffman Holdings Do Not Apply to
All Civil Cases, Particularly Where Their Prin-
ciples Conflict With the Very Concept of Fed-
eralism and Comity Which Those Decisions Were
Intended to Support and Fortify. Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Huffman v. Pursue,
420 U.S. 592 (1975).
The Court of Appeals held that “the district court
should have exercised equitable restraint and left this litiga-
tion for resolution in the State Courts of Ohio” citing
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) and Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). This misconceived and in-
correctly applied the principles of comity and federalism
espoused in these two decisions. They apply to pending
criminal or quasi-criminal cases. The full faith and credit
principles of federalism recognized in Magnolia Petroleum
Co. v. Hunt, supra, apply to out-of-state, litigated, civil
judgments. Magnolia commands that every such final judg-
17
ment be given the same full faith and credit in every state
of the United States that it has in the court where it is
rendered. 28 U.S.C. §1738.
Younger, p. 44, made clear that the “comity” and “Our
Federalism” which it sought to protect were the freedom
of the states “to perform their separate functions in their
separate ways.” 401 U.S. at 44. Huffman echoed this con-
cept many times and recognized in 28 U.S.C. §2283 “an
interest in permitting state court to try state cases.” 420
U.S. at 600.
However, this is far different from permitting state
courts to relitigate and retry federal cases which have gone
to a final judgment and are preclusive of any further
litigation in the jurisdiction where rendered. This fits
under the third exception of 28 U.S.C. §2283 granting to
Federal Courts jurisdiction to enjoin State Court suits to
protect and effectuate federal judgments. Neither Younger
nor Huffman addressed or discussed this facet of federalism.
Younger involved an effort to enjoin a criminai prose-
cution. Huffman dealt with a quasi-criminal proceeding,
characterized as a “civil counterpart” of Younger. 420 U.S.
at 611.
The instant case presents an entirely civil proceeding,
a claim for money judgment denied by a United States
District Court after complete and exhaustive litigation in
that Court. The exhaustion requirement of Huffman has
been fully met.
The federal principles significant here, and followed
by the District Court are (1) that the United States courts
have jurisdiction to effectuate and protect their judgments
(28 U.S.C. §2283, Third Exception), and (2) that the full
faith and credit which is due a District of Columbia judg-
ment is the same credit (complete preclusion) that it has
in the jurisdiction where rendered. 28 U.S.C. §1738.
18
Magnolia Petroleum teaches that the full faith and
credit clause “became a nationally unifying force. It al-
tered the status of the several states * * * by making each
an integral part of a single nation, in which rights judicially
established in any part are given nation-wide application.”
320 U.S. at 439.
In this context, Magnolia pointed out that the Consti-
tution commanded a state to enforce a judgment for out-
of-state taxes, for a gambling debt or for wrongful death
even though those actions could not be maintained under
the law of the enforcing state. A defendant having earned
a defense judgment should be given the same right.
Younger and Huffman are determinative in the sphere of
pending, unadjudicated, criminal and quasi-criminal cases.
Magnolia is controlling in the sphere of finally adju-
dicated civil cases to avoid relitigation. This was recog-
nized by the District Court but denied by the Court of Ap-
peals and as a significant issue in interstate relations, it
should apropriately be considered finally determined by
this Court.
CONCLUSION
This case presents important constitutional questions
of (1) full faith and credit for a final, fully-litigated, civil
judgment, (2) the critical distinction between constitutional
full faith and credit and doctrinaire res judicata, (3) the
importance that a judgment once rendered be given nation-
wide effect and (4) the jurisdiction of federal courts to
enjoin state court litigation to protect and effectuate a
federal court judgment and prevent relitigation of such a
judgment.
19
As the “final arbiter” of the application of the full faith
and credit clause, this case presents appropriate issues and
questions which should be determined by this Court.
SHUMAKER, Loop & KENDRICK
Rosert B. GOSLINE
Davip W. WICKLUND
811 Madison Avenue
Suite 500
Toledo, Ohio 43624
(419) 241-4201
Attorneys for Defendant
Of Counsel:
LeRoy W. SIGLER
600 Edward Lamb Building
Toledo, Ohio 43604
(419) 241-1254
Al
APPENDIX
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT
(Filed September 2, 1975)
Civil Action No. C 74-378
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
For THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
LAMB ENTERPRISES, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE HONORABLE GEORGE N. KIROFF, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
WALINSKI, J:
In this “full faith and credit” case, this Court is asked
to end litigation which was begun sixteen years ago, which
has been fought and tried in the federal district court in
the District of Columbia to the United States Supreme
Court, which iias also been through the courts of the State
of Ohio to the Ohio Supreme Court twice, and which now
threatens to be tried all over again, this time in the Com-
mon Pleas Court of Lucas County. This Court is under-
standably somewhat diffident about being drawn into this
seemingly limitless lawsuit, for it seems that no order en-
tered in this dispute goes without question, delay, recon-
sideration, rehearing and, ofttimes, revision or reversal.
A2
Still, the Court’s power has been invoked; rights have been
asserted under the federal constitution; and evidence has
been adduced—all of which require a decision.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Brown first sued Lamb in Lucas County, Ohio, in 1959.
He sought to recover compensation for legal services ren-
dered in connection with proceedings before the Federal
Communications Commission for the renewal of a license
to operate a television station in Erie, Pennsylvania. These
proceedings stretched from 1954 to 1957 during which
Brown is said to have rendered extensive legal services on
behalf of Lamb, who had been assailed as being a member
of the Communist Party and whose qualifications to hold
a broadcast license were said to have been thereby thrown
into question. The Ohio lawsuit dragged on for nearly four
years without coming to trial.
However, in 1963 Brown began again on a new front
in the District of Columbia. Apparently, while sojourning
there, Lamb was served with process; and a suit raising
exactly the same claims was begun in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. That court
denied a motion to quash service on November 12, 1963.
It appears that Lamb somewhat frequently transacted busi-
ness in Washington, and thus that district was not an in-
appropriate forum for Lamb to defend in.
After this motion to quash was decided, the Lucas
County Court placed the cause on its “inactive list until
further order of [the] court.” No reason was given, but
it may be inferred that Brown had elected to proceed with
his claims in the federal court and had so advised the Ohio
Common Pleas Judge. This election must be presumed to
have been knowing and intelligent even though Brown,
a lawyer, knew that he also faced a severe statute of limita-
A3
tions problem in the District of Columbia which he did not
have in Ohio.
The case in Washington proceeded to trial in the latter
part of October, 1967; and a jury returned a verdict in favor
of Brown on November 1, 1967, awarding him $400,000 in
damages. However, on December 22, 1967, Judge Matthews
of the federal district court entered judgment non obstante
veredicto in favor of Lamb. It appears that the judgment
n.o.v. was granted on the basis that Brown had failed to
adduce sufficient evidence as to facts which would take the
case out of the D. C. Statute of Limitations, 12 D.C. Code,
§301(7) (1967). Brown had contended that Lamb should
be equitably estopped from asserting the bar of the statute
because Lamb had lulled Brown into inaction by assurances
which were said to have continued over a period of several
years.
In any event, Brown appealed the judgment n.o.v. to
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit which affirmed the lower court. Brown v.
Lamb, 414 F.2d 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari, 397 U.S. 907 (1970).
During the conduct of the Washington lawsuit, Brown
was pressed in both fora to proceed with both lawsuits. At
one point the federal judge required Brown to go forward
in federal court or dismiss his case there and noted the
problem of the statute of limitations. In Ohio Brown’s case
was listed for dismissal several times, was activated and
placed on pretrial lists and was again placed on the inactive
list January 29, 1968. Lamb also moved several times to
get the case dismissed but did not prevail.
Finally, after the federal judgment had been entered,
the case in Ohio was dismissed inadvertently by Judge
Kiroff on March 24, 1969. He was then asked to vacate
A4
his dismissal order, and he did so October 5, 1970, saying
he had not intended that the Lamb case be dismissed but
that the parties should consult LaBarbera v. Batsch, 10
Ohio St. 2d 106 (1967), to explore the applicability of the
Washington judgment which by then had become final.
Brown moved for reconsideration of the vacation or-
der, and a visiting judge set it aside on March 6, 1972, and
ordered the case dismissed. This last order was then ap-
pealed to the Court of Appeals for Lucas County which
affirmed that order. Brown then appealed to the Ohio
State Supreme Court which reversed the Court of Ap-
peals' and sent the case back to the Common Pleas Court
to be tried. In so doing, the court said: ~
“In our opinion, the trial court abused its. discre-
tion and committed error prejudicial to the appellant
in suspending its order of October 5; 1970; errors which
occurred in subsequent proceedings could not have
transpired but for that abuse. The record establishes
that the order vacating the entry of dismissal was
properly entered and should not have been reheard by
the assigned judge.
“We also note that the case of LaBarbera v. Batsch
(1967), 10 Ohio St. 2d 106, 227 N.E. 2d 55, is distin-
guishable upon its facts from the instant case, is not
dispositive of the issue involving res judicata and
should not have been relied upon for that purpose
below.
1. It should be noted that the Court of Appeals failed to
rule on Lamb’s argument that the case was barred by the doctrine
of res judicata. Therefore, it would appear that the res judicata
issue was not actually before the Ohio Supreme Court and that
any comment by the Supreme Court on that issue was more in
the nature of obiter dicta. Nevertheless, its comments thereon
undoubtedly had some influence on Judge Kiroff on that issue.
A5
“The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed
and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.” Brown v. Lamb, 36 Ohio St. 2d 8, 11
(1973).
Judge Kiroff has since denied a motion to dismiss the
complaint. Moreover, he has granted a motion to add new
parties, has permitted an amendment of the complaint,
has permitted discovery to proceed, and has indicated that
the cause will proceed to trial. Lamb, however, has since
filed the present suit asking this Court to enjoin any
further proceedings in the state court and to enjoin per-
manently the case from being tried therein.
At the hearing on the motion for a preliminary in-
junction, this Court received the documentary evidence
establishing the above facts. Pursuant to Rule 65(a) (2),
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the hearing on the pre-
liminary injunction was also consolidated with trial on
the merits, upon the stipulation of the parties.
The Court finds that Brown’s election to proceed to
trial in Washington, while urging the Ohio court to hold
his case inactive, was done with a purpose to force relitiga-
tion in Ohio if he lost in Washington and that the present
Ohio suit constitutes a relitigation of the federal suit.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
Jurisdiction of this Court is properly invoked pursuant
to 28 U.S.C., § 1343(3), and venue is proper in this Court.
Plaintiffs claim a right to relief under 28 U.S.C., § 1738,
and 42 U.S.C., § 1983.
There is no question that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, U. S. Constitution, Art. IV, § 1, and its implement-
ing statute, 28 U.S.C., § 1738, create rights which plaintiff
may assert.
a
A6
“When a state court refuses credit to the judgment of a
sister state because of its opinion of the nature of the
cause of action or the judgment in which it is merged,
an asserted federal right is denied * * *.” Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 443 (1943).?
Section 1983 requires that a plaintiff show:
a) the denial of a federally guaranteed right,
b) by someone acting under color of state law.
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Ouzts v. Maryland
Nat'l Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1972).
Therefore, since “state action” under § 1983 includes
judicial action, Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 240-2
(1972), this Court concludes that § 1983 is an appropriate
basis on which to raise a claim that the courts of a state
are denying rights asserted under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and § 1738. Moreover, there is no question that a
judgment of the federal district court sitting in the District
of Columbia is entitled to the same full faith and credit
as would be due the judgment of a court of any state.
Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3 (1883) ; Thompson v. D’Angelo,
aoaaee Del. ........, 320 A.2d 729 (1974).
It is further beyond dispute that § 1983 authorizes in-
junctions to prevent the denial of rights guaranteed by
federal law, Mitchum v. Foster, supra, at least in some
instances. However, where a federal court is asked to en-
join proceedings in a state court, important considerations
of comity and federalism come into play and counsel re-
straint. Indeed, 28 U.S.C., § 2283, the anti-injunction stat-
ute, commands as much.
2. See also West Side Belt R. Co. v. Pittsburgh Construction
Co., 219 U.S. 92 (1911), and Titus v. Wallick, 306 U.S. 282 (1939).
a
AT
In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975), the
Supreme Court held that the requirements of Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), also apply when a federal court
is asked to enjoin at least one kind of state civil proceeding.
In Pursue the district court had been asked to enjoin a
state civil nuisance proceeding* which the Supreme Court
concluded was “more akin to a criminal prosecution than
are most civil cases.” Huffman v. Pursue, supra, at 604.
The Court further said:
“For the purposes of the case before us, however, we
need make no general pronouncements upon the appli-
cability of Younger to all civil litigation.” Id. at 607.
Nevertheless, “informed by relevant principles of com-
ity and federalism,” id., this Court feels that Younger and
Pursue require a strong and compelling showing of the
pressing need for immediate federal relief whenever any
state judicial proceeding is sought to be enjoined. This is
so because the competency of state courts to vindicate
federally guaranteed rights, which the court in Pursue
was at pains to underline, requires that an important fed-
eral right be almost certainly in jeopardy of immediate loss
by the very act of continuing the state proceeding in order
for the federal injunction to issue.
Here this Court finds that kind of great and immediate
danger to exist. Firstly, there can be no doubt whatever
that precisely the same cause of action is involved in the
Ohio proceeding as was involved in the Washington case.
Secondly, if the Full Faith and Credit Clause has any
meaning at all, it is that litigants cannot use the federal
system to force their adversaries to defend against the same
claims in seriatim proceedings in different fora after one
3. The State of Ohio was seeking to use the public nuisance
statute, § 3767.01, et seq., Ohio Revised Code, to close a movie
theatre for showing motion pictures alleged to have been obscene.
A8
has already gone to judgment, while at the same time
attempting to shelter themselves behind federal judicial
commitments to constitutionally commanded principles of
comity and federalism. Fermitting such relitigation in the
name of federalism strips too much away from the bark of
one of the most important of constitutional provisions: one
which helped change our country from a loose confederation
of nearly completely sovereign and independent states to a
truly unified nation of shared sovereignties with mutual
obligations. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, supra, at
439-440.*
The existence of a right to an appeal of any Common
Pleas judgment, it should be noted, is clearly an inade-
quate remedy in this case to vindicate the federal right;
for it is the very right to avoid being put to such a showing
in such a duplicative process which the Full Faith and
Credit Clause embraces. The failure of the Ohio Court of
Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court to vindicate Lamb’s
res judicata claim, especially the Supreme Court’s sug-
gested denial of it, surely show the inadequacy of the state
appellate remedies under the unique posture of this case.
This would be so here, even if the full faith and credit right
were limited to being properly asserted only on appeal
after a second trial, which it is not. Thus, it cannot be
said that there is any preempting the state appellate proce-
dure of the kind which defendants correctly say has been
condemned in Atlantic Coast Line Rd. v. Engineers, 398
U.S. 281 (1970).
It is thus very clear that this Court shares plaintiffs’
view that this lawsuit presents a “relitigation” case thus
4. The ability to defend against successive lawsuits, i.e., the
extent of his personal resources etc., of the one who asserts the
full faith and credit right is not a factor here. The poverty or
affluence of the plaintiff herein is therefore not dispositive of any
issue in this case.
A9
coming within a specific exception to the anti-injunction
statute, 28 U.S.C., § 2283. That section states:
“A court of the United States may not grant an
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except
as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
effectuate its judgments.” [Emphasis added.]
Defendants argue that this Court may not reach the
res judicata issue and hence the relitigation claim of plain-
tiffs for two reasons:
(a) that the state appellate courts already have
ruled as an alternate basis against res judicata and
plaintiffs failed to appeal that ruling to the United
States Supreme Court; and
(b) the Washington judgment, being based on the
statute of limitations, is one otherwise than on the
merits and therefore it is only entitled to recognition
as barring the remedy within the District of Columbia.
Before dealing with these contentions, it is necessary
to decide whether the current proceedings in Common
Pleas Court constitute relitigation so as to bring the present
within the last excepti 2 in § 2283.
Where a suit, raising precisely the same claims as were
decided in a previously adjudicated case whose judgment
is final between precisely the same parties, is sought to
be litigated, the second lawsuit constitutes relitigation and
comes within the last exception of § 2283 and the protection
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See, e.g., Woods Ex-
ploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Amer., 438
F.2d 1286, 1312-13 (5th Cir. 1971); Johnson v. Radford, 449
F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1971). See also Jackson v. Carter Oil Co.,
179 F.2d 524 (10th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 812
Al0
(1951). Cf. American Mannex Corp. v. Rozzands, 462 F.2d
688 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1973).
Therefore, this Court concludes as a matter of law
that the pending case before Judge Kiroff is a relitigation
of the District of Columbia lawsuit and comes under the
last exception in § 2283. The Court further concludes that
there are no equitable or other reasons why the pending
suit should not be barred, but that there are such reasons
for halting further litigation. Brown elected to go to trial
in Washington; having tried and failed, he cannot now try
again in Ohio.
Turning now to defendants’ contentions, it is true that
the Ohio Supreme Court “noted” that a previous decision
by that court did not dispose of the res judicata claim. In
view of the Court of Appeals’ failure to decide the res
judicata claim, and in view of the Supreme Court’s decision
on the abuse of discretion issue, it would wrench all mean-
ing from language to regard the comment on the LaBarbera
case as a clear holding on that issue. Even according it
that dignity, however, it is clear that it left Lamb with no
right to an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court as Bullington
had in Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 189 (1947). This
is so because where a decision might have been either on
a federal ground (equating arguendo res judicata with full
faith and credit as held by Woods Exploration & Producing
Co., supra), or on a state ground (i.e., it was an abuse of
discretion for the visiting judge to set aside the vacate
order), and the state ground is sufficient to sustain the
judgment; the Supreme Court has held that it will not
review the federal ground on appeal as of right under 28
U.S.C., § 1257, unless the state ground is too insubstantial
or insufficient. Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277 (1956).
Moreover, the Supreme Court will not decide constitutional
issues under § 1257 raised for the first time in the U. S.
All
Supreme Court on review of a state court decision.
Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437 (1969). Thus, on the
one hand, Lamb could not have gotten review since the
Ohio Supreme Court’s state ground cannot be said to be
too insubstantial, if one considers the federal claim to have
been raised;® and on the other hand, even if it isn’t con-
sidered to have been raised, Lamb could not have done
so for the first time in the U. S. Supreme Court. Either
way Lamb could not have gotten review in the U. S. Su-
preme Court. Therefore, it cannot be said that the federal
question now raised by this lawsuit is foreclosed by a prior
state court determination.
As to the second defense contention that a dismissal
on the statute of limitations is one otherwise than on the
merits, this Court feels that plaintiffs have made a com-
pelling showing that, under the District of Columbia de-
cisions, Brown’s dismissal must be viewed as being on the
merits in the District of Columbia and therefore, is entitled
to full faith and credit as a bar to this Ohio lawsuit. See
Reply Brief of Plaintiffs, filed December 4, 1974, 25-32.
Within the unique facts of this case, the merits of Brown’s
cause of action were finally determined and put to rest
with the final judgment of the Federal District Court in
Washington.*®
In reaching this conclusion, this Court is also guided
by the reasoning used by the court in Williams v. Ocean
Transport Lines, Inc., 425 F.2d 1183, 1187-1190 (3rd Cir.
1970). It is true that in that case the second litigation in-
5. Whether a federal question was sufficiently and properly
raised in a state court is itself ultimately a federal question as to
which a federal court is not bound by the state decision. Street
v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
6. This Court expressly rejects the reasoning and the result
reached in Brand v. Brand, 116 Ky. 785, 76 S.W. 868 (1903).
Al2
volved a federal question, i.e., an unseaworthiness claim
under the Jones Act and the amount of damages obtainable
thereunder. However, the interest of Lamb in avoiding
relitigation of the Washington lawsuit raised a federal ques-
tion, as to which the courts of Ohio and this Court are not
wholly bound by District of Columbia determinations on
dismissals on the statute of limitations. See Riley v. New
York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 349 (1942). And cf. Durfee
v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 116 (1963). Therefore, given the
right under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to avoid re-
litigation, this Court has concluded for itself the nature of
the res judicata effect to be accorded to the decision of the
federal court dismissing Brown’s claims. Williams v. Ocean
Transport Lines, supra, at 1189-1190.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, it is
ORDERED that defendants be and hereby are perma-
nently enjoined from prosecuting, hearing, adjudicating or
otherwise continuing with the proceedings in the case of
Brown v. Lamb, et al., Case No. 186753, now pending in the
Common Pleas Court of Lucas County, Ohio, and that
judgment be entered herein in favor of plaintiffs.
/s/ NicHoLas J. WALINSKI
United States District Judge
Al3
JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT
(Filed September 2, 1975)
Civil Action No. C 74-378
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
For THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
LAMB ENTERPRISES, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE HONORABLE GEORGE N. KIROFF, et al.,
Defendants.
JUDGMENT
This action came on for (hearing) before the Court,
Honorable Nicholas J. Walinski, United States District
Judge, presiding, and the issues having been duly (heard)
and a decision having been duly rendered.
It is Ordered and Adjudged defendants permanently
enjoined from prosecuting, hearing, adjudicating or other-
wise continuing with the proceedings in the case of Brown
v. Lamb, et al., Case No. 186753, now pending in the Com-
mon Pleas Court of Lucas County, Ohio, and that judgment
is entered in favor of plaintiffs.
/s/ NicHovtas J. WALINSKI
United States District Judge
Al4
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
(Filed January 31, 1977)
Nos. 75-2450-54
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For THE SrxtTH CIRCcuIT
LAMB ENTERPRISES, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
JUDGE GEORGE N. KIROFF, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
APPEAL from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio, Western Division.
Before PHILLIPps, Chief Judge, and McCree and ENGEL,
Circuit Judges.
PHILLIPS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which ENGEL, J., concurred. McCreeg, J., (p. 20) filed a
separate concurring opinion.
PHILLIPS, Chief Judge. The Court of Common Pleas
of Lucas County, Ohio, dismissed a suit filed by Russell
Morton Brown to recover attorney’s fees from Lamb Enter-
prises, Inc. (Lamb). In Brown v. Lamb, 36 Ohio St.2d 8
(1973), the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed and remanded
the case to the State trial court for further proceedings.
In its opinion in the present case, reported at 399 F.Supp.
409 (1975), the District Court enjoined the State trial judge
from proceeding with the disposition of the case as directed
by the Supreme Court of Ohio. We reverse on the ground
of unwarranted interference by the United States District
Al5
Court in litigation over which State courts have jurisdiction.
We hold that the District Court should have exercised equi-
table restraint and left this litigation for resolution in the
State Courts of Ohio. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S.
592 (1975); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Louis-
ville Area Interfaith Committee v. Nottingham Liquors, 542
F.2d 652 (6th Cir. 1976).
I.
The suit was filed in the State court in 1959 to recover
compensation claimed by Brown for legal services rendered
in connection with proceedings before the Federal Commu-
nications Commission for the renewal of a license to operate
a television station in Erie, Pennsylvania.
While the Ohio action was pending in the Court of
Common Pleas, Brown filed a second action for the same
attorney’s fees and against the same defendants in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
The District of Columbia action was filed after it ostensibly
was barred by the three-year statute of limitations estab-
lished by District of Columbia Code § 12-301(7), but Brown
pleaded facts that he claimed avoided the operation of the
statute. Jurisdiction was established in the District of
Columbia and on November 1, 1967, a jury returned a ver-
dict for Brown for $400,000. On December 22, 1967, Dis-
trict Judge Matthews of the federal district court granted
a defense motion for judgment n.o.v. on the ground that
the District of Columbia action was commenced after the
expiration of the District of Columbia’s statute of limita-
tions, and Brown had not produced evidence of “a new
or continuing contract [for attorney’s fees] .. .” to take
the case out of the statute of limitations. Brown appealed
the District Court judgment n.o.v. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia affirmed. Brown v. Lamb,
Al6
414 F.2d 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The Supreme Court denied
certiorari. 397 U.S. 907 (1970).
While the District of Columbia action was proceeding
through the federal courts, the Ohio Common Pleas Court,
sua sponte, kept the Ohio action in an inactive status. Ap-
parently through inadvertence, however, the Ohio case was
dismissed for want of prosecution on March’ 24, 1969.
Brown, already unsuccessful in the District of Columbia
litigation, acted to have the erroneous dismissal remedied,
and on October 5, 1970, the case was reinstated. Lamb then
moved the Common Pleas Court for reconsideration of the
reinstatement. On March 6, 1972, a visiting judge ruled
that the case should not have been reinstated and vacated
the order of reinstatement, stating as grounds both want of
prosecution and that the District of Columbia judgment
n.o.v. barred the Ohio action on principles of res judicata.
Brown appealed this last order of dismissal. The Ohio
Court of Appeals, without ruling on the res judicata ques-
tion, affirmed the trial court’s judgment of dismissal. The
Supreme Court of Ohio, in a per curiam opinion reported
at 36 Ohio St. 2d 8 (1973), reversed the Cour{ of Appeals
and remanded the case to the Common Pleas Court for
further proceedings.
On remand, Lamb filed an ‘“‘“Amended Motion to Dis-
miss,” again insisting that the Ohio Common Pleas action
had been abandoned and that the defendants faced “double
vexation” in the Ohio courts. This motion was denied by
Judge George N. Kiroff of the Common Pleas Court of
Lucas County, Ohio.’ Judge Kiroff thereafter granted
leave for Brown to amend his complaint, to add new parties
and to proceed with discovery. Judge Kiroff indicated that
the Ohio action would be readied for trial.
1. Judge Kiroff, and other officials of the Court of Common
Pleas of Lucas County, Ohio, are named defendants in the present
action.
Al7
On September 13, 1974, Lamb and other defendants in
the state court initiated in the District Court the action
from which this appeal arises. Invoking federal court juris-
diction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), and alleging a cause
of action for deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, Lamb asked the District Court to enjoin the rein-
stated proceedings in the Ohio state court on the ground
that any further prosecution of the state court action would
violate the full faith and credit due the District of Columbia
judgment.
The District Court, citing Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943), determined that the full faith
and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution and its imple-
menting statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738,? created rights which may
be asserted via a civil rights action under § 1983. The Court
found that Lamb had presented an appropriate case for
federal court injunction of purely civil state court proceed-
ings, and enjoined further proceedings in the Ohio suit so
as to give Lamb the protection of the full faith and credit
clause. Judge Kiroff, Brown and three other defendants
appeal the order of the District Court permanently enjoin-
ing them from continuing with the reinstated action for
attorney’s fees in the Ohio Court of Common Pleas.
II.
Appellants’ principal contention on this appeal is that
under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and cases
since which purport to extend the analysis of Younger into
*
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 reads in part:
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies
thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and
credit in every court within the United States and Territories
and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts
ork such State, Territory or Possession from which they are
taken.
Als
the context of federal court injunction of state civil pro-
ceedings, the District Court injunction was an unwarranted
exercise of federal supervision over the state courts of Ohio.
Specifically, appellants say that the District Court correctly
determined to apply Younger analysis to the case at hand,
but incorrectly stated the test set down by the Supreme
Court in Younger and thus failed to consider whether the
state court action had been initiated in bad faith or with
inient to harass as it must be, according to appellants, before
a federal court injunction would be appropriate.
Appellees argue in the alternative that Younger-
Huffman’ analysis should not apply, but that “extraordinary
circumstances, bad faith and harassment” are present suf-
ficient to satisfy Younger-Huffman and to make this a
proper case for federal court injunction. The District Court
undertook to apply Younger-Huffman but reached the alter-
native conclusion urged by appellees—that this is the excep-
tional situation wherein federal intervention is appropriate.
We agree, in line with Inter-Faith Committee v. Notting-
ham, supra, 542 F.2d 652 (6th Cir. 1976), and the decisions
of this and other circuits cited therein, that Younger-
Huffman analysis is the correct approach to determining
whether the injunction should have issued in this case. We
hold that the District Court erred, however, in its character-
ization and application of the Younger-Huffman test.
ITI.
This circuit has joined the growing number of circuits
that have looked to Younger as a guide for determining
when a federal court may properly enjoin state civil pro-
ceedings. See Inter-Faith Committee v. Nottingham, supra,
542 F.2d 652 (6th Cir. 1976), and Sixth Circuit cases cited
- 3. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975), discussed
infra.
Al9g
therein. To date, the Supreme Court has sanctioned this
development in the context of a “quasi-criminal” civil nui-
sance proceeding, but the court has made “. . . no general
pronouncements upon the applicability of Younger to all
civil litigation.” Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607
(1975). In support of the decision to apply Younger to ap-
praise the propriety of federal court injunction of state civil
proceedings, this court stated in Inter-Faith, supra:
Although the Supreme Court has left open the ap-
plicability of Younger-Huffman doctrine to general
civil litigation, Huffman, supra, 95 S.Ct. at 1208, 1209,
bolstering us in our application of Younger-Huffman
doctrine to bar federal court interference with pending
state court civil proceedings are this court’s oft-ex-
pressed reluctance to interfere in state court proceed-
ings, see, e.g., Littleton v. Fisher, 530 F.2d 691, 693 (6th
Cir. 1976), King v. Jones, 450 F.2d 478 (6th Cir. 1971),
vacated as moot, 405 U.S. 911, 92 S.Ct. 956, 30 L.Ed.2d
780 (1972), Appalachian Volunteers, Inc. v. Clark, 432
F.2d 530 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 939
(1971), and other courts’ application of Younger-
Huffman doctrine to bar interference in state court
civil proceedings.
542 F.2d 654 (6th Cir. 1976).
Inter-Faith, decided by this court after the filing of
briefs in the instant case, is dispositive of the question of
whether the strict Younger-Huffman requirements for fed-
eral court injunctive relief should be applied to the facts
here presented. In Inter-Faith, the state proceeding against
which a federal court injunction was sought was a purely
civil action for an order restraining mass picketing and
marching in a labor dispute. This court, speaking through
Judge Peck, stated that federal courts are reluctant to inter-
A20
fere with state proceedings and will exercise “equitable
restraint” when called on to enjoin state civil action where
the parties have adequate remedy for their constitutional
grievances in the state courts.
The same principles of federalism, equity and comity
which underlie federal court reluctance to interfere in state
criminal proceedings apply with substantial force when the
federal court is asked to enjoin state civil proceedings.
Although we recognize that the states may have a partic-
ularly acute interest in the unencumbered execution of
their criminal laws,‘ this court finds that Younger-Huffman
adequately embodies the principle of equitable restraint in
a test which is appropriately applied to assess the wisdom
of federal court injunction of state civil, as well as of state
criminal proceedings.
The ruling of this court in Inter-Faith is in accord with
the overwhelming weight of authority in other circuits.
See, e.g., Ahrensfeld v. Stephens, 528 F.2d 193, 197 (7th
Cir. 1975); Anonymous v. Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, 515 F.2d 427, 432-34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 863 (1975); Goodrich v. Supreme Court of the State
of South Dakota, 511 F.2d 316, 317 (8th Cir. 1975); Cleaver
v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940, 943 (9th Cir. 1974); Douglas-
Guardian Warehouse Corp. v. Posey, 486 F.2d 739, 742-43
(10th Cir. 1973); Roy v. Jones, Chief Justice, 484 F.2d 96,
98 (3rd Cir. 1973); American Radio Association v. Mobile
Steamship Association, 483 F.2d 1, 6-7 (5th Cir. 1973); Duke
v. State of Texas, 477 F.2d 244, 251-52 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974); Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769,
771-73 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974);
Cousins v. Wigoda, 463 F.2d 603, 606 (7th Cir. 1972),
stay denied, 409 U.S. 1201 (1972).
4. See Stewart, J. concurring in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37, 55 n. 2 (1971). See also Huffman, supra, at 603-05.
a er
A21
Appellees insist that the strict standards of Younger-
Huffman should not be applied because neither Younger
nor Huffman dealt with a fully-litigated state court judg-
ment or conviction. This argument misconceives the nature
of Younger-Huffman analysis. It is the form of relief re-
quested (injunction of pending state court proceedings),
not the particular right being asserted (here, full faith and
credit for a “final judgment”) which triggers Younger-
Huffman inquiry at the threshold. The fact .. appellees
may have a “final judgment” needing federal court protec-
tion does not alter the holding of Inter-Faith that the
Younger-Huffman criteria must be present before a United
States District Court in this circuit may properly intervene
by injunction in state civil proceedings.
IV.
In Huffman, Justice Rehnquist reviewed the holding of
Younger in these terms:
{In Younger] [w]e reaffirmed the requirement of
Fenner v. Boykin that extraordinary circumstances
must be present to justify federal injunctive relief
against state criminal prosecutions. Echoing Fenner,
we stated that a movant must show not merely the
“irreparable injury” which is a normal prerequisite
for an injunction, but also must show that the injury
would be “ ‘great and immediate.’ ” 401 U.S., at 46. The
opinion also suggested that only in extraordinary situa-
tions could the necessary injury be shown if the prose-
cution was conducted in good faith and without an
intent to harass. Id., at 54. 420 U.S. at 601.
The District Court in the case at hand made no specific
findings on the question of ‘‘good faith” or the intentions
of the plaintiffs in the Ohio state court action. As indicated
in the foregoing quotation from Huffman, in the absence of
A22
a showing of bad faith or intent to harass on the part of
the state court plaintiff, the party seeking federal court
injunctive intervention bears a great burden to prove the
quality of injury necessary under Younger. Normally, it
would be incumbent on the federal trial court applying
Younger-Huffman to make a finding on the issue of good
or bad faith and harassment. Here, however, the failure
of the District Court to address the issue of good or bad
faith does not require this court to remand for reconsidera-
tion, because by no construction of the record have appellees
established the kind of “great and immediate” injury con-
templated by Younger-Huffman.
The District Court concluded that appellees’ constitu-
tional right to full faith and credit was “in jeopardy of
immediate loss by the very act of continuing the state
proceeding” in Ohio. As the court explained, it is the es-
sence of full faith and credit that appellees avoid having
to “relitigate” the District of Columbia action in the courts
of Ohio.
It cannot be said, on the facts of this case, that appel-
lees are in “great and immediate” danger of losing their
full faith and credit rights. It is elementary that in order
for a litigant to invoke judicial protection for full faith and
credit rights an appearance must be made at some point
in a court to raise full faith and credit as a defense to further
proceedings. As yet, there has been no judicial resolution
(other than by the District Court in the present case) of
the question whether the District of Columbia dismissal on
statute of limitations grounds precludes the Ohio court ac-
tion on principles of full faith and credit or res judicata.
It appears to this court that appellees’ real objection is not
that the Ohio proceedings deny the protection of the full
faith and credit clause, but that it is a violation of full faith
and credit for appellees to be required to appear in the
-_ ee ee
A23
Ohio courts and raise as a defense the full faith and credit
for the District of Columbia dismissal.
The availability of adequate state court remedies is a
critical factor in determining whether extraordinary in-
junctive relief should issue from the federal court. See,
e.g., Inter-Faith, supra, at 3-4; O’Neill v. Battisti, 472 F.2d
789, 791 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub. nom., Heitzler
v. O'Neill, Chief Justice, 411 U.S. 964 (1973); King v.
Jones, 450 F.2d 478, 479-80 (6th Cir. 1971), vacated as
moot, 405 U.S. 911 (1972); Scott v. Hill, 449 F.2d 634, 640-
41 (6th Cir. 1971); Appalachian Volunteers, Inc. v. Clark,
432 F.2d 530, 537 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 US.
939 (1971); Coogan v. Cincinnati Bar Association, 431 F.2d
1209, 1211 (6th Cir. 1970). The Supreme Court, in At-
lantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers, 398 U.S. 281 (1970), stated the general rule:
Proceedings in state courts should normally be al-
lowed to continue unimpaired by intervention of the
lower federal courts, with relief from error, if any,
through the state appellate courts and ultimately this
Court. 398 U.S. at 287.
An adequate remedy at law exists in the state courts
of Ohio for the appellees in this case.’ The action pend-
ing in the state court is an action for money damages
only. No preliminary or permanent equitable relief is
demanded. Should the appellees be wronged by the state
5. We are not informed of the current procedural posture
of the Ohio Common Pleas Court action, but in light of the District
Court’s injunction, and the fact that no party has indicated to
the coutrary on this appeal, we are confident that appellees still
have opportunity under the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure to
raise their defenses if they wish to do so. In any event, it was
appellees’ choice to proceed in the District Court, rather than raise
their full faith and credit claim in the Ohio state courts, and they
may not avoid the standards of Younger by failing to comply
with the rules of procedure under Ohio law. See Huffman, supra,
at 611 n. 22.
A24
trial court’s ruling on the appellees’ full faith and credit
claim, appeal would lie through the State appellate courts.
Ohio Const. Art. IV, § 3 (Court of Appeals); Ohio Const.
Art. IV, § 2 (Supreme Court of Ohio). Review of the full
faith and credit claim may then be obtained in the Su-
preme Court of the United States. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S.
281, 296 (1970); Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 189-90
(1947). Should a verdict be entered against them by the
Court of Common Pleas, the appellees may obtain a stay
of the entire judgment pending appellate court review.
Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, 62(B).®
It is the essence of the Younger-Huffman barrier to
federal court intervention that state courts be free to dis-
pose of constitutional issues which arise in civil litigation
over which they have jurisdiction. Huffman. supra, at
609; Inter-Faith, supra, at 654. The District Court’s analy-
sis runs counter to this principle by authorizing the sub-
stitution of a federal forum for the state forum in every
case where full faith and credit is available to a party as
a defense in pending state court proceedings. By the rea-
soning of the District Court, the mere necessity that a liti-
gant be required to raise full faith and credit as a defense
in state court litigation would be a deprivation of the right
to full faith and credit sufficient to give rise to a cause of
action for injunctive relief in federal court under § 1983.
Under this theory the party bringing the § 1983 action
would have a right to do what appellees did in the pres-
ent case—litigate in the federal court whether he in fact
has a judgment entitled to full faith and credit protec-
6. We express no.view on the merits of appellees’ full faith
and credit claim. This is for the courts of Ohio to determine in
the first instance. Similarly, the question raised on this appeal
regarding the effect to be given the decision of the Supreme
Court of Ohio in Brown v. Lamb, 36 Ohio St. 2d 8 (1973), need
not be reached by this court.
ee eee oe
A25 .
tion. Federal injunction of the pending state proceedings
would not avoid litigation of this question; it simply would
shift the forum from a state to a federal court.
There is not the slightest reason for this court to doubt
the ability or willingness of the state judges of Ohio to
determine the “res judicata or full faith and credit effect
due the District of Columbia proceedings between the par-
ties herein. In Robb v. Connally, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1883),
the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice John
Marshall Harlan, said: -
Upon the State courts, equally with the courts of the
Union, rests the obligation to guard, enforce, and pro-
tect every right granted or secured by the Constitu-
tion of the United States and the laws made in pur-
suance thereof, whenever those rights are involved in
any suit or proceeding before them; for the judges of
the State courts are required to take an oath to sup-
port that Constitution, and they are bound by it, and
the laws of the United States made in pursuance
thereof, and all treaties made under their authority,
as the supreme law of the land, “anything in the Con-
stitution or laws of any State to the contrary not-
withstanding.” If they fail therein, and withhold or
deny rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, the party
aggrieved may bring the case from the highest court
of the State in which tle question could be decided
to this court for final and conclusive determination.
There is a hint of apprehension in appellees’ brief
that they might not receive a warm reception in the Ohio
Court of Common Pleas.’ Presented with the contention
7. We doubt any basis for this apprehension. This court is
confident that appellees can and will be accorded a fair trial on
the merits of their case in the Court of Common Pleas of Lucas
County, Ohio.
A26
that federal intervention was necessary because appeal
through the state Courts might be doomed to failure, the
Supreme Court in Huffman had this to say:
[W]e are of the opinion that the considerations
of comity and federalism which underlie Younger per-
mit no truncation of the exhaustion . requirement
merely because the losing party in the state court of
general jurisdiction believes that his chances of suc-
cess on appeal are not auspicious. Appellee obviously
believes itself possessed of a viable federal claim, else
it would not so assiduously seek to litigate in the Dis-
trict Court. Yet, Art. VI of the United States Con-
stitution declares that “the Judges in every State shall
be bound” by the Federal Constitution, laws, and
treaties. Appellee is in truth urging us to base a rule
on the assumption that state judges will not be faith-
ful to their constitutional responsibilities. This we
refuse to do. The District Court should not have en-
tertained this action, seeking preappeal interference
with a state judicial proceeding, unless appellee es-
tablished that early intervention was justified under
one of the exceptions recognized in Younger. (Foot-
note omitted.) Huffman, supra, at 610-11.
As we noted in Inter-Faith, supra:
Interference in state civil proceedings like inter-
ference in state criminal or quasi-criminal proceed-
ings, would preclude state courts “the opportunity to
resolve federal issues arising in [state] courts,” Huff-
man, supra, 95 S.Ct. at 1211, and would “. . . be in-
terpreted as reflecting negatively upon the state
court’s ability to enforce constitutional principles.”
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462, 94 S.Ct. 1209,
1217, 39 L.Ed.2d 505, 516 (1974). See Cicero v. Ol-
giati, 410 F.Supp. 1080, 1089-1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
eed i ve a
<A en alban de meee?
A27
Such interference would seem exactly counter to the
firmly held position of this court in regard to state
courts generally and in regard to the courts of the
states of this circuit particularly. 542 F.2d 654 (6th
Cir. 1976).
V.
Even if this were an appropriate case for an injunction
to restrain Russell M. Brown from proceeding with his
litigation in the State courts of Ohio, it was error for the
District Court to issue an injunction against State judicial
officers in the absence of a compelling reason to do so.
Compare O’Neill v. Battisti, supra, 472 F.2d at 791.
The injunction was directed against all five named
defendants. The first four were: the Honorable George
N. Kiroff, individually and as Judge of the Common Pleas
Court of Lucas County, Ohio; the Honorable Reno R. Riley,
Jr., presiding judge of that court; Robert Kopf, individually
and as Clerk of the court; and Jack Wagner, individually
and as Lucas County Court Administrator.
Russell M. Brown, the plaintiff in the State court liti-
gation, was the fifth defendant named in the complaint.
If an injunction was necessary, it should have been issued
against Brown, the litigant, and not against the State trial
judge, the presiding judge, and court personnel. It was a
violation of fundamental principles of State-federal rela-
tions for a federal judge to enjoin two State judges and
their court personnel, when an injunction against the liti-
gant would have accomplished the same purpose.
VI.
We also conclude that the District Court erred in en-
joining Brown, the plaintiff in the Court of Common Pleas,
from proceeding with his litigation in that court.
A28
The District Court held that the present case falls
within the “relitigation exception” to the federal anti-
injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, which provides as fol-
lows:
§ 2283. Stay of State court proceedings
A court of the United States may not grant an
injunction to stay proceedings in a State Court except
as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
effectuate its judgments. June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat.
968.
We recognize that a federal court may enjoin proceed-
ings in a State court “where necessary in aid of its juris-
diction or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” See e.g.,
Mapp v. Board of Education of the City of Chattanooga,
341 F.Supp. 193 (E.D. Tenn. 1972), aff'd, 477 F.2d 851 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1022 (1973); International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Nix,
512 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1975).°
The right of the United States District Court to enjoin
proceedings in a state court is based upon principles of
equity deeply rooted in our system of jurisprudence. In
Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence (5th Ed. 1941), Vol. 1,
§ 253 at 503, this rule of equity is stated as follows:
{T]he court will interfere and restrain the defen-
dant’s further prosecution of successive actions at law,
and will thus establish and quiet the plaintiff’s right,
when all the questions of law and fact involved in these
actions have already been fully determined in the
8. See also opinion of three-judge District Court in Her-
nandez v. Danaher, 405 F.Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1975), probable ju-
risdiction noted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3702.
~ OD ee re nee ee
A29
plaintiff's favor by some former judicial proceeding
between the same parties.
No basis for equitable relief, justifying an injunction
against further proceedings in the State court, is established
on the record in the present case. As set forth in Part IV
of this opinion, there is no finding by the District Court of
bad faith. Further, appellees are not subjected to harass-
ment or irreparable injury by having to raise their defenses
in the Ohio court. We reemphasize that the Supreme Court
of Ohio has remanded the case to the State trial court for
further proceedings. No reason is shown why the appellees
cannot and will not be accorded a fair trial on the merits
of their case in the Court of Common Pleas of Lucas County,
Ohio, wkere the full faith and credit, res judicata and
collateral estoppel defenses presumably remain available
to them.
Further, on the present state of the record, it is not
demonstrated conclusively that, as stated by Pomeroy, su-
pra: “All the questions of law and fact ... have al-
ready been determined . . . by some former judicial pro-
ceeding between the same parties.” As stated by Judge
Gewin in International Association of Machinists & Aero-
space Workers v. Nix, supra, 512 F.2d at 129-30:
In view of the clear considerations of federalism
supporting the Anti-Injunction Act, federal courts
must proceed with caution in enforcing injunctions
against state court proceedings. See American Radio
Assoc. v. Mobile Steamship Assoc., Inc., 483 F.2d 1
(5th Cir. 1973). The purpose of § 2283 is to “avoid
unseemly conflict between the state and the federal
courts.” NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 146,
92 S.Ct. 373, 378, 30 L.Ed.2d 328, 335 (1971). See
also Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 92 St.Ct. 2151,
A30
32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972); Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Gas
Co., 309 U.S. 4, 60 S.Ct. 215, 84 L.Ed. 537 (1940);
Signal Properties, Inc. v. Farha, 482 F.2d 1136 (5th
Cir. 1973); Vernitron Corp. v. Benjamin, 440 F.2d 105
(2d Cir. 1971); Euge v. Smith, 418 F.2d 1296 (8th
Cir. 1969) (Blackmun, J.): The Act does not em-
body a mere “principle of comity” but rather mandates
an express and unequivocal limitation on the power
of federal courts. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281,
80 S.Ct. 1739, 26 L.Ed.2d 234 (1970); Amalgamated
Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 75
S.Ct. 452, 99 L.Ed. 600 (1955). Furthermore, the sensi-
tive nature of federal interference with state court
proceedings requires that the statute be strictly con-
strued. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Engineers, supra; Leiter Minerals, Inc.
v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 77 S.Ct. 287, 1 L.Ed.2d
267 (1957); Signal Properties, Inc. v. Farha, supra.
Cf. Southern California Petroleum Corp. v. Harper,
273 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1960).
In order to affirm the district court’s injunction,
we must determine that it falls within one of the
three Congressional exceptions to the Act. Atlantic
Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers, supra; Amalgamated Clothing Workers v.
Richman Bros., supra; Tampa Phosphate R. R. Co.
v. Seaboard Coast Line R. R. Co., supra. The
injunction, in other words, must be “expressly au-
thorized by Act of Congress,” “necessary in aid of
[the district court’s] jurisdiction,” or [necessary] “to
protect or effectuate [the district court’s] judgments.”
ee ees
A31
A consistent theme of our opinions is that federal
courts may enjoin the relitigation in state court of
issues that federal courts have fully and finally adju-
dicated. (Footnotes omitted, emphasis supplied.)
In the present case there is an unresolved question
as to whether there has been a full and final adjudication
of all the questions of law and fact in the District of
Columbia litigation. The decision of the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia was that Brown’s suit in
that jurisdiction was barred by the three year District
of Columbia statute of limitations. Brown v. Lamb, su-
pra, 414 F.2d 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The question of
whether the District of Columbia decision forecloses the
right of Brown to proceed with his litigation in the Ohio
courts is an issue to be decided by the State courts.
The posture of the present case is unusual. A civil
rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is invoked as a vehicle
to attack the jurisdiction of the Ohio Court of Common
Pleas to proceed with the trial of litigation in obedience
to the mandate of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
In Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), the Su-
preme Court held that § 1983 is an exception to the federal
anti-injunction statute. However, the Court was careful
to emphasize:
In so concluding, we do not question or qualify
in any way the principles of equity, comity, and
federalism that must restrain a federal court when
asked to enjoin a state court proceeding. These prin-
ciples, in the context of state criminal prosecutions,
were canvassed at length last Term in Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, and its companion cases. They
are principles that have been emphasized by this Court
many times in the past. Fenner v. Boykin, 271 US.
A32
240; Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 USS.
89; Beal v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 312 US. 45;
Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387; Williams v. Miller,
317 U.S. 599; Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S.
157; Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117; Cameron v.
Johnson, 390 U.S. 611. Today we decide only that
the District Court in this case was in error in hold-
ing that, because of the anti-injunction statute, it was
absolutely without power in this § 1983 action to enjoin
a proceeding pending in a state court under any cir-
cumstances whatsoever. 407 U.S. at 243.
We hold that the peculiar posture of this litigation
takes the case out of the class of proceedings traditionally
dealt with under the “relitigation exception” to § 2283.
See, United States v. Ford Motor Company, 522 F.2d 962
(6th Cir. 1975). We do not reach the question of whether
the principles of Younger-Huffman should be applied in
all situations involving § 2283 and the “relitigation excep-
tion” thereto.
The District Court erred in its determination that ap-
pellees faced “great and immediate” danger as a conse-
quence of having to submit their full faith and credit
defense to the Ohio state courts. Younger-Huffman coun-
sels the exercise of great restraint when a litigant seeks
federal court intervention in state court proceedings which
themselves provide a ready forum for vindication of the
rights at issue. We hold that appellees have not presented
a proper case for federal court injunction.
This is not a case in which the District Court should
retain jurisdiction pending a decision by the Ohio courts.
The United States District Court and the United States
Court of Appeals do not sit in review of the decisions
of State courts. See Coogan v. Cincinnati Bar Association,
supra, 431 F.2d 1209.
A33
Nor is this a case where the doctrine of abstention
requires retention of jurisdiction by the District. In Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union v. Bozardt, 539 F.2d 340, 342
(4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, ........ ee , 45 U.S.L.W.
3427 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1976), the Fourth Circuit said:
Abstention is generally held to be appropriate in cases
in which both state and federal questions arise, and
it is recognized that an action pending in state court
will likely resolve state law questions which are dis-
positive of the federal cleim.: Harris County Comm’rs
Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 95 S.Ct. 870, 43 L.Ed.2d
32 (1975). However, the Younger bar to federal inter-
vention involves different considerations; it is recog-
nized that when both state and federal questions are
properly presented before a state court in pending
state criminal proceedings, see Younger, supra, or in
certain pending state civil proceedings, see Huffman
v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d
482 (1975), principles of comity and federalism require
that the federal courts not be permitted to interfere
in the ongoing state proceedings. The underlying con-
sideration of the Younger rule is the recognition that
any federal claim properly asserted in and rejected
by the state court is subject to review by the United
States Supreme Court. 420 U.S. at 605, 95 S.Ct. 1200.
Since the federai claim will eventually be subject to
consideration by the Supreme Court, abstention ap-
pears to have no application to cases in which Younger
bars relief. In this regard, the Supreme Court has
stated that “[u]nlike those situations where a federal
court merely abstains from decision on federal ques-
tions until the resolution of underlying or related state
law issues .. . Younger v. Harris contemplates the
outright dismissal of the federal suit, and the presenta-
A34
tion of all claims, both state and federal, to the state
courts.” Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577, 93 S.Ct.
1689, 1697, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973).
The District Court’s order of permanent injunction
is vacated and its judgment reversed, but without prejudice
to any rights the parties may have to proceed in the
state courts of Ohio. The costs of this appeal are taxed
against Lamb Ente’ ises, Inc.
McCree, Circuit Judge (Concurring). I concur in the
decision of the court, which requires the permanent injunc-
tion to be vacated.
I agree with Part V of the majority opinion, because
the issuance of an injunction directed personally against
two state court judges and two state court employees was,
on the facts of this case, an improper interference in the
operations of the state courts. See Smith v. Martin, 542
F.2d 688 (6th Cir. 1976). The complaint against them
should have been dismissed.
I do not believe, however, that the allegations in the
complaint set forth a violation by the remaining defendant,
Russell Brown, of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 and of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the Constitution, Art. IV, § 1, cogniz-
able under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A private party like Brown
who initiates in a state court an action that may be subject
to the defense of res judicata does not thereby violate
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, which imposes a duty
only upon the state. Because we have determined that
the defendants who are judicial officers and their support-
ing personnel may not, on these facts be properly enjoined,
and because the complaint does not state a claim against
the private defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, I would
reverse the judgment of the district court.
ee
Ce ane Ren reed mee Be BR BA nee etn
ie Onis te dnande
one 6 meen oe
A35
Accordingly, I find it unnecessary to discuss the ap-
plicability of the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971), and Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975),
to injunctions against the maintenance of purely civil ac-
tions to which the state or its agents are not parties.
- Cf. Louisville Area Interfaith Committee for United Farm
Workers v. Nottingham Liquors, Ltd., 542 F.2d 652 (6th
Cir. 1976). Nor is it necessary to decide whether there
is a relitigation exception to the Younger-Huffman doc-
trine, as there is a relitigation exception to the doctrine’s
statutory analogue, the federal anti-injunction statute, 28
U.S.C. § 2283.
A36
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
(Filed January 31, 1977)
Nos. 75-2450-54
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
LAMB ENTERPRISES, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
V.
JUDGE GEORGE N. KIROFF, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: PuHi.Luips, Chief Judge, and McCree and ENGEL,
Circuit Judges.
JUDGMENT
APPEAL from the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Ohio.
THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the record
from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio and was argued by counsel.
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF. It is now here
ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment
of the said District Court in this cause be and the same
is hereby reversed, but without prejudice te any rights
the parties may have to proceed in the state courts of
Ohio. The order of permanent injunction is vacated.
It is further ordered that Defendants recover from
Lamb Enterprises, Inc. the costs on appeal, as itemized
A37
below, and that execution therefor issue out of said District
Court if necessary.
ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT.
/s/ JounN P. HEHMAN
Clerk
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Article IV, Section 1, United States Constitution [Full
Faith and Credit].
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State
to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of
every other State. And the Congress may by general
Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
Article VI, Clause 2, United States Constitution [Su-
preme Law of the Land].
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
28 U.S.C. §1738 [Full Faith and Credit].
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of
any such State, Territory or Possession, or copies thereof,
shall be proved or admitted in other courts within the
United States and its Territories and Possessions by the
A38
attestation of the clerk and seal of the court annexed,
if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge
of the court that the said attestation is in proper form.
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies
thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith
and credit in every court within the United States and
its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or
usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession
from which they are taken. (Emphasis added. )
42 U.S.C. §1983 [Constitutional Rights].
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Terri-
tory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
28 U.S.C. $1651. Writs
(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established
by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appro-
priate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agree-
able to the usages and principles of law.
28 U.S.C. $1343. Civil Rights and Elective Franchise.
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by
any person:
& a o a .
A39
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any
State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage,
of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Consti-
tution of the United States or by any Act of Congress
providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States;
28 U.S.C. §2283 [Exception to the Anti-Injunction
Statute].
A court of the United States may not grant an injunc-
tion to stay proceedings in a State Court except as ex-
pressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary
in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments. (Emphasis added. )
28 U.S.C. §1983. Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Terri-
tory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.