Petition — Richter v. Washington
Supreme Court brief1977
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Supreme Court, U. &,
~~ FILED
MAR 29 1977
MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERE
In the Supreme Cort
OF THE |
Hnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1976
No. 76 - 1 3 4 1
MICHAEL RAY RICHTER,
Petitioner,
vs
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
to the Supreme Court
of the State of Washington
WINSTON, CASHATT,
REPSOLD, McNICHOLS, .
CONNELLY & DRISCOLL
ROBERT H. WHALEY
PATRICK H. WINSTON
Fifth Floor
Spokane & Eastern Building
Spokane, Washington 99201
Counsel for Petitioner
Subject Index
Cpletee BERG oc ccc ccccccvcccccccccceccccceseecees
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GemOIOMD PURRMEGS occ cccccccccccccccccccccccccccs
ie og ea iene eeenedies
ED Does bud, cue dic een sede neese
Reasons for Granting the Writ ...........00eceeeeeees
ee he eee ee a. oa peat tide eueekdbede’s
Table of Authorities Cited
‘Cases
Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649
D.C. Gat. BFE) occccccccvescccccccccccccscccees
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
IRS Ee ire oe ee
State v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67 (6th Cir. 1973) .........s0005
United States v. Bolin, 514 F.2d 554
CFEC. FOF e 0 ccc cecedoccdcvessscecsccesecccce
United States v. Heimforth, 493 F.2d 970
GEG, FPP occ cccccrcccecceccsccces: covcsocs
United States v. Rothman, 492 F.2d 1260
i Lo Bs PPPPPrererrrrrrrr rrr rrrrrrrrrire
United States Constitution:
State Statutes:
Revised Code of Washington 69.50.401(c) ...........
In the Supreme Court
OF THE
United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1976
No.
MICHAEL RAY RICHTER,
Petitioner,
VS.
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent.
——
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
to the Supreme Court
of the State of Washington
The Petitioner, Michael Ray Richter, respectfully prays
that a Writ of Cetiorari be issued to review the judgment of
the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, entered in the
above-entitled case on February 7, 1977.
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division III, State
of Washington (Appendix A, pp. i-vi) is unreported. The
order of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington
(Appendix B, p. vii) denying review is reported, Sate of
Washington v. Richter, 88 Wn2d 1004 (1977).
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, Division III, State
of Washington, was entered on July 28, 1976 (Appendix A,
pp. i-vi). A timely Petition for Rehearing in the Court of
Appeals was heard and denied on September 23, 1976, State
of Washington v. Richter, 15 Wn. App. 1038, (Appendix C,
pp. viii-xi). The order of the Supreme Court of the State of
Washington denying the Peitition for Review of the decision
of the Court of Appeals was entered on February 7, 1977,
State of Washington v. Richter, 88 Wn2d 1004 (1977), (Ap-
pendix B, p. vii). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. §1257(3).
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether a consent to search can be voluntarily given under
the test of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973),
where the party giving the consent:
(a) is a minor;
(b) is drug and alcohol intoxicated;
(c) is under arrest;
(d) is handcuffed;
(e) a the time of the consent has a firearm pointed at
him by an undercover officer who has deliberately
3
appeared intoxicated;
(f) immediately before the consent had a firearm
placed by the officer at his temple;
(g) was told he would be “blown away” if he ran;
(h) the officers conducting the search and obtaining
the consent are attired in casual clothes appearing
to be contemporaries of the defendant rather than
police officers.
STATUTES INVOLVED
The Constitutional provisions and state statutes involved
in this case are set forth in Appendix D, pp. xii-xiii.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Petitioner, Michael Ray Richter, was arrested by two
plainclothes detectives on the night of February 17, 1975 and
charged with a violation of R.C. W. 69.50.401(c), possession
of a controlled substance (Appendix D, p. xii). At that
time, he was a 19 year old minor residing with several others
in a home in Spokane, Washington. Throughout the day of
February 17, 1975, the Petitioner had been smoking marijua-
na. On that date, Deputy Sheriff Danny O’Dell and Detec-
tive Michael Massong, were acting as undercover agents with
the Spokane County Drug Abuse Unit. Earlier in the eve-
ning, they had received an anonymous tip that there would be
a large quantity of marijuana in the house where the Peti-
tioner resided. After meeting with the informant, the officers
determined that it would be impossible to obtain a search
4
warrant based on the informant’s information. Therefore,
it was decided they would approach the residence with the
informant to determine if they could gain entry without a
warrant.
Prior to arriving at the residence, the officers and inform-
ant stopped at a grocery store to buy two six-packs of beer
and a bottle of wine. When they arrived at the residence, one
officer was holding an open beer and all appeared to act as
if they had been partying. The Petitioner invited the police
officers and the informant into the residence and immediately
began rolling two marijuana cigarettes which were passed
around the room. The officers placed the beer and wine on a
table and offered it to all who were present. The two officers
accepted the marijuana cigarettes that were passed around
the room and simulated smoking. In total, four marijuana
Cigarettes were smoked. On one occasion, Deputy Massong
asked the Petitioner to roll another marijuana cigarette which
was done and thereafter smoked by all persons in the room.
After some time, the other residents of the house went to
bed, and the Petitioner and the two detectives were left alone
in the living room of the house. Officer O’Dell then deter-
mined to arrest the Petitioner. O’Dell pulled his firearm,
placed it at the right temple of the Petitioner, handcuffed
him, and placed him under arrest. At that time, he told the
Petitioner that he would “blow him away” if he ran. Shortly
after the arrest, a consent to search form was executed by the
Petitioner.
When the Petitioner signed the consent form, he was hand-
cuffed, and Officer O’Dell had his firearm pointed at the
Petitioner’s head. The Petitioner, who was under the influ-
5
ence of drugs and alcohol could not comprehend the infor-
mation on the card and told Officer Massong that he could
not read it. The Petitioner believed that if he did not sign the
consent form, the officers would have to wake up a judge to
sign a search warrant which could affect the outcome of his
case. It was his belief that the officers were high on marijuana
and alcohol and he was afraid for his physical well-being.
The Petitioner testified that he executed the consent to search
form based on his fear of the alcohol and drug effect on the
officers as well as his fear for his own physical safety.
A Motion to Supress the Evidence discovered in the search
was denied in Spokane County Superior Court after a find-
ing that the Petitioner, Michael Ray Richter’s, consent was
voluntarily given. Following the submission of briefs and
oral argument, the final judgment of the Court of Appeals,
Division III, State of Washington, was entered on July 28,
1976, affirming the Superior Court’s judgment on the Motion
to Supress. A timely Petition for Rehearing was filed and
denied on September 23, 1976. The Petition for Review was
considered by the Supreme Court of the State of Washington
without oral argument and denied on February 7, 1977.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
THE COURT BELOW DECIDED A FEDERAL
QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH
THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT.
A review of the undisputed facts in this case indicates that
the consent to search could not be voluntarily and freely given
under the “totality of all the circumstances” test announced
6
by this Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973). The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments (Appendix
D, p. xv) require that the consent not be coerced, by explicit
or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force. In this
case, there was substantial evidence of inherently coercive
tactics used by the police detectives at the time of the Peti-
tioner’s consent which under the Schneckloth test must result
in a finding that this consent was not voluntary. At the time
of the alleged consent, the Petitioner had been placed under
arrest and handcuffed. The detectives had drawn their guns
and Detective O’Dell held his gun at the right temple of the
Petitioner shortly before the consent. The police officers
deliberately appeared to have been smoking marijuana and
drinking alcohol prior to their arrest of the Petitioner and
had intentionally given the Petitioner such an impression in
order to gain acceptance in the house. Therefore, the Peti-
tioner had reason to be intimidated when the plainclothes
officers pulled their revolvers, arrested him, and obtained his
“consent” to search.
As a result of the alcohol furnished by the police officers
and the marijuana smoked in the officer’s presence, the ca-
pacity of the Petitioner to freely and voluntarily give his con-
sent was reduced. Further, Detective Massong had induced
the Petitioner to smoke more marijuana by asking him to roll
another cigarette, thereby contributing to the Petitioner’s in-
capacity to freely consent. Finally, the police officers’ use of
coercive tactics, by threatening to “blow him away” while the
drawn guns were held to his head, vitiates any doubt that the
Petitioner’s consent could be considered voluntary under the
test announced in this Court’s decision in Schneckloth. This
consent was not the product of an essentially free and uncon-
7
strained choice by the Petitioner. There is no doubt, that his
will was overborn and his capacity for self-determination
critically impaired.
The Schneckloth decision was a narrow holding. As the
Court stated:
“We hold only that when the subject of a search is not in
custody and the State attempts to justify a search on the
basis of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments require that it demonstrate that the consent was,
in fact, voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or
coercion, express or implied. Voluntariness is a question
of fact to be determined from all the circumstances,
and while the subject’s knowledge of a right to refuse is
a factor to be taken in account, the prosecution is not
required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequi-
site to establishing a voluntary consent.” 412 U.S. at
248-249.
Unlike the facts in Schneckloth, this Petitioner was in
custody and had been arrested prior to the alleged consent.
The burden of proof of a voluntary consent is particularly
heavy in cases where the individual is under arrest. Judd v.
United States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1971). There, the
Court stated:
“This burden (of proving consent) on the Government
is particularly heavy in cases where the individual was
under arrest. Nonresistance to the orders or suggestions
of the police is not infrequent in such a situation; true
consent, free of fear or pressure, is not so readily to be
found. (Citation omitted) In fact, the circumstances of
the defendant’s plight may be such as to make any claim
of actual consent ‘not in accordance with human experi-
ence,’ and explainable only on the basis of ‘physical or
moral compulsion.’ ” (Citation omitted) 190 F.2d at 651.
See State v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67 (6th Cir. 1973), United
States v. Bolin, 514 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1975), United States
v. Rothman, 492 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1973), and United States
v. Heimforth, 493 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1974), where the courts
held that an arrest is a critical factor in determining whether
or not consent is voluntary.
If the restrictions placed upon the obtaining of consent to
search are to have any meaning, the circumstances of alcohol,
firearms, marijuana, arrest and threats, all attributable to the
arresting officers, must give this Court pause in condoning
and accepting the voluntariness of the consent obtained
thereby. Keeping in mind the admonition of the Court in
Judd v. United States, supra, that the burden of proof of a
voluntarv consent is particularly heavy where the individual
is under arrest, it is inconceivable that such circumstances
as are apparent from this case would be anything but coercive.
The burden of proof is on the state to prove that a consent
to search was freely and voluntarily given without force, co-
ercion, or inducement. It is submitted that the ievel of intimi-
dation and force exercised by the police officers in this case
shouid render it impossible to meet the burden of proof im-
posed upon the state to show the voluntariness of the consent.
Human experience tells us that a person cannot help but be
intimidated and overwhelmed by the combination of drawn
firearms, handcuffs, threats, and intoxicating substances.
When the state has created such an atmosphere, it cannot
then rely on a “consent” flowing therefrom to circumvent the
Fourth Amendment. If this decision of the trial court is al-
lowed to stand, police officers will have a license to use what-
ever coercive methods and tactics necessary to overcome the
Queer en
9
will of a citizen so long as a consent to search form is ulti-
mately signed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Washington
Court of Appeals, Division III, in the instant case raises a
serious constitutional question which should be reviewed by
this Court in light of the test for voluntariness established in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). It is respect-
fully submitted that this Petition for Certioari should be
granted.
DATED, March 16, 1977.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT H. WHALEY,
PATRICK H. WINSTON
WINSTON, CASHATT,
REPSOLD, McNICHOLS,
CONNELLY & DRISCOLL
Attorneys for Petitioner
(Appendices Follow)
APPENDICES
INDEX TO APPENDICES
Appendix A
1. Opinion of Court of Appeals, Division III,
State of Washington ...........6eeeeeeees
Appendix B
1. Order Denying Petition for Review,
Supreme Court
State of Washington ............eseeeeees
Appendix C
1. Appellant’s Petition for Modification of
Opinion or in the Alternative
PPG TEE coccccccecccccceccccecese
2. Order Denying Petition for Rehearing .......
Appendix D
1. State Statutes
(a) RCW69.S0.401(C) ...... cece eee e eee
2. Constitutional Provisions
Ce FEY 00.606 ccccccccceccecse
(b) Amendment XIV ............00000e.
=<
f~
——
Appendix A
OPINION OF COURT OF APPEALS, DIVISION III,
STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON
No. 1638-III
Respondent,
Division Three
Filed July 28, 1976
MICHAEL RAY RICHTER,
)
)
)
)
)
vs. )
)
Appellant. )
McINTURFF, C. J.—Michael Ray Richter appeals from
a conviction of felony possession of a controlled substance,
marijuana. We affirm.
When two deputies concluded their informant’s tip was in-
sufficient to form probably cause for a search of Mr. Richter’s
home, the deputies purchased two six-packs of beer, a fifth of
wine, and hors d’oeuvres, and accompanied their informant
to the home to further investigate. Mr. Richter knew the in-
formant, so he invited them into the house. The beer and wine
were placed on a table in the room. Mr. Richter immediately
began to smoke marijuana, offered three or four joints to the
deputies, and exhibited a can of marijuana seeds. The arrest
was made 50 minutes later, when the deputies were alone in
the room with Mr. Richter. Mr. Richter was given Miranda
warnings and allegedly consented to a search of the premises.
A motion to suppress evidence discovered in the search was
denied after a finding that Mr. Richter’s consent was volun-
tary. We are asked to review the Court’s finding of a volun-
tary consent.
The voluntariness of a consent is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of circumstances of each case. !
Because validity of the search presents a constitutional issue,
we will make an independent review of the entire record in
deciding the voluntariness of the consent.2 However, when
evidence is conflicting, as in the present case, the trial court's
finding of voluntary consent will be accorded great weight by
this Court.’ The burden remains on the State to affirmatively
prove consent.‘
Upon careful review of the record, we find evidence which
if believed shows Mr. Richter’s consent to be involuntary.
At the time of the consent, Mr. Richter was a minor, under
arrest, and handcuffed. A demand for consent was made by
deputies when Mr. Richter’s mind was confused from the ef-
fects of liquor, dope, and the shock of arrest. He was told of,
but was not allowed to read, his right to refuse the search. He
had been told to run so deputies could “put a bullet through
him” or “blow him away,” and had a gun held to his right
temple while the premises were being secured. A gun was still
drawn when the consent form was signed, there being other
occupants of the house to guard. Mr. Richter feared for his
own safety, believing the armed deputies to be intoxicated
'Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224, 36 L. Ed. 2nd 854, 93 S. Ct.
2041 (1973); State v. Shoemaker, 85 Wn.2d 207, 212, 533 P.2d 123 (1975).
2State v. Garske, 74 Wn.2d 901, 902-03, 447 P.2d 167 (1968); State v. Smith,
72 Wn.2d 479, 481, 434 P.2d 5 (1967).
‘State v. Smith, 72 Wn. 2d 479, 481, 343 P.2d 5 (1967).
‘Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548, 20 L. Ed. 2d 797, 88S. Ct. 1788
(1968); State v. Shoemaker, 85 Wn.2d 207, 210, 533 P.2d 123 (1975).
a ee
ili
with liquor and dope. Finally, he was told by deputies that it
would be necessary to wake, and thus anger, a magistrate to
secure a search warrant if consent was not given.
Contrary testimony shows Mr. Richter’s consent to be
voluntary. He was a high school graduate. He was given
Miranda warnings orally and in writing, was advised orally
and in writing of his right to refuse the search, and then signed
the consent form.’ Mr. Richter stated at the time of signing
that he was acquiescing in the search because he believed
deputies had sufficient cause to get a search warrant if con-
sent was refused. He was coherent, competent, and not in-
toxicated when he consented—as demonstrated by his con-
cern with deputies awakening and angering a magistrate to
get a search warrant, which he feared would prejudice the
future of his case. Finally, and most importantly, the Court
listened to the testimony of Mr. Richter, observed his de-
meanor, and disbelieved his testimony of coercion.
The trial court weighed conflicting evidence and found
the consent voluntary, which finding is entitled to great
weight on review. After reviewing the record we conclude
there is sufficient evidence to support the finding of voluntary
consent. The totality of circumstances shows that Mr. Rich-
ter made a free and unconstrained choice to allow a search
of his home. The search was inoffensive to principles of due
process, with fruits of the search being properly admissible.’
‘See State v. Shoemaker, 85 Wn.2d 207, 212, 533 P.2d 123 (1975); State v.
Smith, 72 Wn. 2d 479, 481, 434 P.2d 5 (1967).
*See State v. Lyons, 76 Wn.2d 343, 346-47, 458 P.2d 30 (1969).
'Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 93 S. Ct.
2041 (1973); Culornbe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 6 L. E4. 1037, 81 S. Ct.
1860 (1961).
iV
Mr. Richter further contends that supply of liquor to
minors was misconduct by deputies warranting suppression
of fruits of the search. We disagree.
Involved are the conflicting interests of effective crime
detection and punishment, and fair treatment of the accused.
“Limited participation”® by police in unlawful practices is to
be tolerated and recognized as lawful because “criminal activ-
ity is such that stealth and strategy are necessary weapons in
the arsenal of the police officer.”® Infiltration of drug enter-
prises through deceit and unlawful participation is a permis-
sible and often necessary means of investigation and enforce-
ment. !°
However, there is a point at which police become so en-
meshed in criminal activity through overzealous law enforce-
ment as to make prosecution of the defendant repugnant to
principles of American criminal justice.'' To affect a criminal
conviction, police misconduct must run contrary to “funda-
mental fairness” and be “shocking to the universal sense of
justice.”!2
Reviewing briefly the facts, Mr. Richter was a 19 year old
minor at the time of his arrest. Deputies brought two six-
packs of beer and a fifth of wine to Mr. Richter’s home, and
*State v. Emerson, 10 Wn. App. 235, 240, 517 P.2d 245 (1973).
*Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 2 L. Ed. 2d 848, 78 S. Ct. 819(1958).
"United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432, 36 L. Ed. 2d 366, 93 S. Ct. 1637
(1973), State v. Emerson, 10 Wn. App. 235, 238, 517 P.2d 245 (1973).
''United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32, 36 L. Ed. 2d 366, 93 S. Ct.
1637 (1973); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173, 96 L. Ed. 183, 72 S. Ct. 205
(1952).
'‘United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32, 36 L. Ed. 2d 366, 93 S. Ct.
1637 (1973).
Vv
offered the liquor to those present by placing the liquor on a
table accessible to all. The beer was used as a prop to gain the
confidence and acceptance of Mr. Richter, and to investigate
his supposed drug enterprise.
In the Prohibition era case of State v. Budreau, 156 Wash.
103, 286 P. 51 (1930), minors were allegedly used as agents in
the purchase of illegal alcohol. The court bristled at the sug-
gestion, and found the taking of “young girls to questionable
resorts and plying them with liquor” to be “contemptible
and reprehensible.”'? It was concluded that if agents were
guilty of this misconduct, “they merited condign punish-
ment.”'* However, the conduct in State v. Budreau, supra, is
not comparable today to the instant case. The officers used
the beer and wine primarily to gain entrance and then confi-
dence of the defendant and his friends. There was no proven
effort by the officers to ply Mr. Richter with intoxicants so
they could lessen his will and take advantage of an affected
condition. The court found otherwise when it declared that
the consent to search was voluntary, and that Mr. Richter
was not under the influence of liquor or drugs to the extent
he could not make a valid waiver of consent.
Offering beer to a 19 year old man is illegal in Washington
and is police misconduct, but today is not “contemptible and
reprehensible” or “shocking to the universal sense of justice”
in a degree warranting reversal of this felony conviction.
Judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.
“State v. Budreau, supra.
“State v. Budreau, supra.
Pursuant to RCW 2.06.040 as amended by Laws of 1971,
ch. 41, § 1, p. 63, this opinion will not be published.
/s/ Mclinturff, C. J.
WE CONCUR:
/s/ Munson, J.
/s/ Green, J.
ae ee Se eee “6 + eae
Appendix B
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REVIEW
THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON )
) No. 44483
Respondent, ) (1638-IID)
)
vs. ) ORDER
) DENYING
MICHAEL RAY RICHTER, ) PETITION
) FOR REVIEW
Petitioner. )
The Court having considered the petition for review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in this cause,
It is ordered that the petition be and it is hereby denied.
Dated this 7th day of February, 1977.
By the Court:
/s/
Wright, C. J.
15 Wn. App. 1038
Appendix C
APPELLANTS PETITION FOR MODIFICATION
OF OPINION OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE
FOR A REHEARING
In the Court of Appeals of the State of Washington
Division No. III
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 1638-III
Respondent, )
)
vs. )
) Filed August 26, 1976
MICHAEL RAY RICHTER, )
)
Appellant. )
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUDGE AND
ASSOCIATE JUDGE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, DIVISION III:
On July 28, 1976, this Court rendered its decision affirming
the trial court’s ruling denying a Motion to Suppress Evi-
dence and upholding the finding of voluntary consent.
The Appellant in the above-entitled matter and as Peti-
tioner herein, moves that the Court modify its opinion by
reversing the judgment of the trial court in all respects, or in
the alternative grant to Appellant-Petitioner a rehearing for
the reason and on the ground, to wit:
1. This Court should reconsider its opinion that there
is sufficient evidence to support the finding of voluntary
consent in the light of certain uncontested facts in the
ix
record which show Mr. Richter’s consent to be invol-
untary.
This Petition for Rehearing is based on the records and
files in this matter, and the legal argument presented hereafter
in support of this Petition.
ARGUMENT
Appellant-Petitioner respectfully submits that there are
certain undisputed facts which the Court erroneously indi-
cated were in contest. Under Schneckloth v. Bustemonie,
412 U.S. 218, 224 (1973), the “totality of all the circum-
stances” test requires the Court to balance all the factors in
determining the voluntariness of a consent. There are certain
undisputed facts which, when taken together, indicated a lack
of voluntary consent and a “vulnerable subjective state” of
mind. These are:
1. It is undisputed that Mr. Richter was a minor, who
was under arrest and handcuffed at the time of the con-
sent. (St. 15, 16)
2. It is undisputed that Mr. Richter had been told to
run by the deputies so they could “put a bullet through
him” or “blow him away” and that they held a gun to
his right temple at the time of his consent. (St. 47, 15, 16)
In its opinion, this Court stated that if the above evidence
is believed, it would show Mr. Richter’s consent was involun-
tary. The burden of proof is on the State to prove that a
search was made voluntarily and without force or induce-
ment. State v. Garske, 74 Wn.2d 901 (1968). Further, under
State v. Greco, 52 Wn.2d 265 (1958), that burden of proof
must be met by clear and positive evidence that there was no
actual or implied coercion or that the consent was given
x
either under a physical or moral compulsion. Appellant-
Petitioner submits that the above uncontested facts are suf-
ficient to imply coercion or physical compulsion to submit
to the invalid search. Certainly, the evidence of the State
does not establish by “clear and positive evidence” that the
consent was uncoerced.
CONCLUSION
Appellant-Petitioner respectfully concludes that the un-
contested facts in the record establish conclusively that the
State has failed to meet its burden of establishing that a con-
sent to search given by a minor under arrest was free of actual
or implied coercion or physical or moral compulsion. There-
fore, Appellant-Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to
modify its opinion by reversing the judgment of the trial court
in all respects, or in the alternative grant to Appellant-Peti-
tioner a rehearing.
Respectively submitted,
/s/
ROBERT H. WHALEY
WINSTON, CASHATT, REPSOLD,
McNICHOLS, CONNELLY & DRISCOLL
Attorneys for Appellant
Se A ST ATE Re Hw em ow
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON )
) No. 1638-IIl
Respondent, )
)
)
) Division Three
vs. )
) ORDER
MICHAEL RAY RICHTER, ) DENYING
) PETITION
Appellant. ) FOR
) REHEARING
)
PETITION
The Court has considered the Petition for Rehearing. That
Petition is denied.
DATED: September 23, 1976.
/s/ J. Ben MclInturff
Chief Judge
Filed: September 23, 1976
15 Wn. App. 1038
xii xiii
Appendix D : Amendment IV of the Constitution of the United States
reads as follows:
AMENDMENT [IV.}
' “The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
RCW 6.50.40! states in part: houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.”
“(c) It is unlawful for any person to possess a con-
trolled substance unless the substance was obtained di-
rectly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription or order
of a practitioner while acting in the course of his profes- |
sional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this
chapter. Any person who violates this subsection is
a Fy ; Peps \ a tng A yr —— | Amendment XIV, Section 1, of the Constitution of the
ten thousand dollars, or both, except as provided for in United States reads as follows:
subsection (d) of this section.” AMENDMENT XIV.
| “Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States; or shall any State deprive any
persons of life, liberty, or property, without due proc-
ess of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
| the equal protection of the laws.”
ee
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.