Petition — Richter v. Washington

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Text

Supreme Court, U. &,

~~ FILED

MAR 29 1977

MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERE

In the Supreme Cort

OF THE |

Hnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

No. 76 - 1 3 4 1

MICHAEL RAY RICHTER,

Petitioner,

vs

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

to the Supreme Court

of the State of Washington

WINSTON, CASHATT,

REPSOLD, McNICHOLS, .

CONNELLY & DRISCOLL

ROBERT H. WHALEY

PATRICK H. WINSTON

Fifth Floor

Spokane & Eastern Building

Spokane, Washington 99201

Counsel for Petitioner

Subject Index

Cpletee BERG oc ccc ccccccvcccccccccceccccceseecees

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GemOIOMD PURRMEGS occ cccccccccccccccccccccccccccs

ie og ea iene eeenedies

ED Does bud, cue dic een sede neese

Reasons for Granting the Writ ...........00eceeeeeees

ee he eee ee a. oa peat tide eueekdbede’s

Table of Authorities Cited

‘Cases

Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649

D.C. Gat. BFE) occccccccvescccccccccccccscccees

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218

IRS Ee ire oe ee

State v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67 (6th Cir. 1973) .........s0005

United States v. Bolin, 514 F.2d 554

CFEC. FOF e 0 ccc cecedoccdcvessscecsccesecccce

United States v. Heimforth, 493 F.2d 970

GEG, FPP occ cccccrcccecceccsccces: covcsocs

United States v. Rothman, 492 F.2d 1260

i Lo Bs PPPPPrererrrrrrrr rrr rrrrrrrrrire

United States Constitution:

State Statutes:

Revised Code of Washington 69.50.401(c) ...........

In the Supreme Court

OF THE

United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

No.

MICHAEL RAY RICHTER,

Petitioner,

VS.

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent.

——

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

to the Supreme Court

of the State of Washington

The Petitioner, Michael Ray Richter, respectfully prays

that a Writ of Cetiorari be issued to review the judgment of

the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, entered in the

above-entitled case on February 7, 1977.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division III, State

of Washington (Appendix A, pp. i-vi) is unreported. The

order of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington

(Appendix B, p. vii) denying review is reported, Sate of

Washington v. Richter, 88 Wn2d 1004 (1977).

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals, Division III, State

of Washington, was entered on July 28, 1976 (Appendix A,

pp. i-vi). A timely Petition for Rehearing in the Court of

Appeals was heard and denied on September 23, 1976, State

of Washington v. Richter, 15 Wn. App. 1038, (Appendix C,

pp. viii-xi). The order of the Supreme Court of the State of

Washington denying the Peitition for Review of the decision

of the Court of Appeals was entered on February 7, 1977,

State of Washington v. Richter, 88 Wn2d 1004 (1977), (Ap-

pendix B, p. vii). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked

under 28 U.S.C. §1257(3).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether a consent to search can be voluntarily given under

the test of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973),

where the party giving the consent:

(a) is a minor;

(b) is drug and alcohol intoxicated;

(c) is under arrest;

(d) is handcuffed;

(e) a the time of the consent has a firearm pointed at

him by an undercover officer who has deliberately

3

appeared intoxicated;

(f) immediately before the consent had a firearm

placed by the officer at his temple;

(g) was told he would be “blown away” if he ran;

(h) the officers conducting the search and obtaining

the consent are attired in casual clothes appearing

to be contemporaries of the defendant rather than

police officers.

STATUTES INVOLVED

The Constitutional provisions and state statutes involved

in this case are set forth in Appendix D, pp. xii-xiii.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Petitioner, Michael Ray Richter, was arrested by two

plainclothes detectives on the night of February 17, 1975 and

charged with a violation of R.C. W. 69.50.401(c), possession

of a controlled substance (Appendix D, p. xii). At that

time, he was a 19 year old minor residing with several others

in a home in Spokane, Washington. Throughout the day of

February 17, 1975, the Petitioner had been smoking marijua-

na. On that date, Deputy Sheriff Danny O’Dell and Detec-

tive Michael Massong, were acting as undercover agents with

the Spokane County Drug Abuse Unit. Earlier in the eve-

ning, they had received an anonymous tip that there would be

a large quantity of marijuana in the house where the Peti-

tioner resided. After meeting with the informant, the officers

determined that it would be impossible to obtain a search

4

warrant based on the informant’s information. Therefore,

it was decided they would approach the residence with the

informant to determine if they could gain entry without a

warrant.

Prior to arriving at the residence, the officers and inform-

ant stopped at a grocery store to buy two six-packs of beer

and a bottle of wine. When they arrived at the residence, one

officer was holding an open beer and all appeared to act as

if they had been partying. The Petitioner invited the police

officers and the informant into the residence and immediately

began rolling two marijuana cigarettes which were passed

around the room. The officers placed the beer and wine on a

table and offered it to all who were present. The two officers

accepted the marijuana cigarettes that were passed around

the room and simulated smoking. In total, four marijuana

Cigarettes were smoked. On one occasion, Deputy Massong

asked the Petitioner to roll another marijuana cigarette which

was done and thereafter smoked by all persons in the room.

After some time, the other residents of the house went to

bed, and the Petitioner and the two detectives were left alone

in the living room of the house. Officer O’Dell then deter-

mined to arrest the Petitioner. O’Dell pulled his firearm,

placed it at the right temple of the Petitioner, handcuffed

him, and placed him under arrest. At that time, he told the

Petitioner that he would “blow him away” if he ran. Shortly

after the arrest, a consent to search form was executed by the

Petitioner.

When the Petitioner signed the consent form, he was hand-

cuffed, and Officer O’Dell had his firearm pointed at the

Petitioner’s head. The Petitioner, who was under the influ-

5

ence of drugs and alcohol could not comprehend the infor-

mation on the card and told Officer Massong that he could

not read it. The Petitioner believed that if he did not sign the

consent form, the officers would have to wake up a judge to

sign a search warrant which could affect the outcome of his

case. It was his belief that the officers were high on marijuana

and alcohol and he was afraid for his physical well-being.

The Petitioner testified that he executed the consent to search

form based on his fear of the alcohol and drug effect on the

officers as well as his fear for his own physical safety.

A Motion to Supress the Evidence discovered in the search

was denied in Spokane County Superior Court after a find-

ing that the Petitioner, Michael Ray Richter’s, consent was

voluntarily given. Following the submission of briefs and

oral argument, the final judgment of the Court of Appeals,

Division III, State of Washington, was entered on July 28,

1976, affirming the Superior Court’s judgment on the Motion

to Supress. A timely Petition for Rehearing was filed and

denied on September 23, 1976. The Petition for Review was

considered by the Supreme Court of the State of Washington

without oral argument and denied on February 7, 1977.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

THE COURT BELOW DECIDED A FEDERAL

QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH

THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT.

A review of the undisputed facts in this case indicates that

the consent to search could not be voluntarily and freely given

under the “totality of all the circumstances” test announced

6

by this Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218

(1973). The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments (Appendix

D, p. xv) require that the consent not be coerced, by explicit

or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force. In this

case, there was substantial evidence of inherently coercive

tactics used by the police detectives at the time of the Peti-

tioner’s consent which under the Schneckloth test must result

in a finding that this consent was not voluntary. At the time

of the alleged consent, the Petitioner had been placed under

arrest and handcuffed. The detectives had drawn their guns

and Detective O’Dell held his gun at the right temple of the

Petitioner shortly before the consent. The police officers

deliberately appeared to have been smoking marijuana and

drinking alcohol prior to their arrest of the Petitioner and

had intentionally given the Petitioner such an impression in

order to gain acceptance in the house. Therefore, the Peti-

tioner had reason to be intimidated when the plainclothes

officers pulled their revolvers, arrested him, and obtained his

“consent” to search.

As a result of the alcohol furnished by the police officers

and the marijuana smoked in the officer’s presence, the ca-

pacity of the Petitioner to freely and voluntarily give his con-

sent was reduced. Further, Detective Massong had induced

the Petitioner to smoke more marijuana by asking him to roll

another cigarette, thereby contributing to the Petitioner’s in-

capacity to freely consent. Finally, the police officers’ use of

coercive tactics, by threatening to “blow him away” while the

drawn guns were held to his head, vitiates any doubt that the

Petitioner’s consent could be considered voluntary under the

test announced in this Court’s decision in Schneckloth. This

consent was not the product of an essentially free and uncon-

7

strained choice by the Petitioner. There is no doubt, that his

will was overborn and his capacity for self-determination

critically impaired.

The Schneckloth decision was a narrow holding. As the

Court stated:

“We hold only that when the subject of a search is not in

custody and the State attempts to justify a search on the

basis of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-

ments require that it demonstrate that the consent was,

in fact, voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or

coercion, express or implied. Voluntariness is a question

of fact to be determined from all the circumstances,

and while the subject’s knowledge of a right to refuse is

a factor to be taken in account, the prosecution is not

required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequi-

site to establishing a voluntary consent.” 412 U.S. at

248-249.

Unlike the facts in Schneckloth, this Petitioner was in

custody and had been arrested prior to the alleged consent.

The burden of proof of a voluntary consent is particularly

heavy in cases where the individual is under arrest. Judd v.

United States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1971). There, the

Court stated:

“This burden (of proving consent) on the Government

is particularly heavy in cases where the individual was

under arrest. Nonresistance to the orders or suggestions

of the police is not infrequent in such a situation; true

consent, free of fear or pressure, is not so readily to be

found. (Citation omitted) In fact, the circumstances of

the defendant’s plight may be such as to make any claim

of actual consent ‘not in accordance with human experi-

ence,’ and explainable only on the basis of ‘physical or

moral compulsion.’ ” (Citation omitted) 190 F.2d at 651.

See State v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67 (6th Cir. 1973), United

States v. Bolin, 514 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1975), United States

v. Rothman, 492 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1973), and United States

v. Heimforth, 493 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1974), where the courts

held that an arrest is a critical factor in determining whether

or not consent is voluntary.

If the restrictions placed upon the obtaining of consent to

search are to have any meaning, the circumstances of alcohol,

firearms, marijuana, arrest and threats, all attributable to the

arresting officers, must give this Court pause in condoning

and accepting the voluntariness of the consent obtained

thereby. Keeping in mind the admonition of the Court in

Judd v. United States, supra, that the burden of proof of a

voluntarv consent is particularly heavy where the individual

is under arrest, it is inconceivable that such circumstances

as are apparent from this case would be anything but coercive.

The burden of proof is on the state to prove that a consent

to search was freely and voluntarily given without force, co-

ercion, or inducement. It is submitted that the ievel of intimi-

dation and force exercised by the police officers in this case

shouid render it impossible to meet the burden of proof im-

posed upon the state to show the voluntariness of the consent.

Human experience tells us that a person cannot help but be

intimidated and overwhelmed by the combination of drawn

firearms, handcuffs, threats, and intoxicating substances.

When the state has created such an atmosphere, it cannot

then rely on a “consent” flowing therefrom to circumvent the

Fourth Amendment. If this decision of the trial court is al-

lowed to stand, police officers will have a license to use what-

ever coercive methods and tactics necessary to overcome the

Queer en

9

will of a citizen so long as a consent to search form is ulti-

mately signed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Washington

Court of Appeals, Division III, in the instant case raises a

serious constitutional question which should be reviewed by

this Court in light of the test for voluntariness established in

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). It is respect-

fully submitted that this Petition for Certioari should be

granted.

DATED, March 16, 1977.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT H. WHALEY,

PATRICK H. WINSTON

WINSTON, CASHATT,

REPSOLD, McNICHOLS,

CONNELLY & DRISCOLL

Attorneys for Petitioner

(Appendices Follow)

APPENDICES

INDEX TO APPENDICES

Appendix A

1. Opinion of Court of Appeals, Division III,

State of Washington ...........6eeeeeeees

Appendix B

1. Order Denying Petition for Review,

Supreme Court

State of Washington ............eseeeeees

Appendix C

1. Appellant’s Petition for Modification of

Opinion or in the Alternative

PPG TEE coccccccecccccceccccecese

2. Order Denying Petition for Rehearing .......

Appendix D

1. State Statutes

(a) RCW69.S0.401(C) ...... cece eee e eee

2. Constitutional Provisions

Ce FEY 00.606 ccccccccceccecse

(b) Amendment XIV ............00000e.

=<

f~

——

Appendix A

OPINION OF COURT OF APPEALS, DIVISION III,

STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON

No. 1638-III

Respondent,

Division Three

Filed July 28, 1976

MICHAEL RAY RICHTER,

)

)

)

)

)

vs. )

)

Appellant. )

McINTURFF, C. J.—Michael Ray Richter appeals from

a conviction of felony possession of a controlled substance,

marijuana. We affirm.

When two deputies concluded their informant’s tip was in-

sufficient to form probably cause for a search of Mr. Richter’s

home, the deputies purchased two six-packs of beer, a fifth of

wine, and hors d’oeuvres, and accompanied their informant

to the home to further investigate. Mr. Richter knew the in-

formant, so he invited them into the house. The beer and wine

were placed on a table in the room. Mr. Richter immediately

began to smoke marijuana, offered three or four joints to the

deputies, and exhibited a can of marijuana seeds. The arrest

was made 50 minutes later, when the deputies were alone in

the room with Mr. Richter. Mr. Richter was given Miranda

warnings and allegedly consented to a search of the premises.

A motion to suppress evidence discovered in the search was

denied after a finding that Mr. Richter’s consent was volun-

tary. We are asked to review the Court’s finding of a volun-

tary consent.

The voluntariness of a consent is a question of fact to be

determined from the totality of circumstances of each case. !

Because validity of the search presents a constitutional issue,

we will make an independent review of the entire record in

deciding the voluntariness of the consent.2 However, when

evidence is conflicting, as in the present case, the trial court's

finding of voluntary consent will be accorded great weight by

this Court.’ The burden remains on the State to affirmatively

prove consent.‘

Upon careful review of the record, we find evidence which

if believed shows Mr. Richter’s consent to be involuntary.

At the time of the consent, Mr. Richter was a minor, under

arrest, and handcuffed. A demand for consent was made by

deputies when Mr. Richter’s mind was confused from the ef-

fects of liquor, dope, and the shock of arrest. He was told of,

but was not allowed to read, his right to refuse the search. He

had been told to run so deputies could “put a bullet through

him” or “blow him away,” and had a gun held to his right

temple while the premises were being secured. A gun was still

drawn when the consent form was signed, there being other

occupants of the house to guard. Mr. Richter feared for his

own safety, believing the armed deputies to be intoxicated

'Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224, 36 L. Ed. 2nd 854, 93 S. Ct.

2041 (1973); State v. Shoemaker, 85 Wn.2d 207, 212, 533 P.2d 123 (1975).

2State v. Garske, 74 Wn.2d 901, 902-03, 447 P.2d 167 (1968); State v. Smith,

72 Wn.2d 479, 481, 434 P.2d 5 (1967).

‘State v. Smith, 72 Wn. 2d 479, 481, 343 P.2d 5 (1967).

‘Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548, 20 L. Ed. 2d 797, 88S. Ct. 1788

(1968); State v. Shoemaker, 85 Wn.2d 207, 210, 533 P.2d 123 (1975).

a ee

ili

with liquor and dope. Finally, he was told by deputies that it

would be necessary to wake, and thus anger, a magistrate to

secure a search warrant if consent was not given.

Contrary testimony shows Mr. Richter’s consent to be

voluntary. He was a high school graduate. He was given

Miranda warnings orally and in writing, was advised orally

and in writing of his right to refuse the search, and then signed

the consent form.’ Mr. Richter stated at the time of signing

that he was acquiescing in the search because he believed

deputies had sufficient cause to get a search warrant if con-

sent was refused. He was coherent, competent, and not in-

toxicated when he consented—as demonstrated by his con-

cern with deputies awakening and angering a magistrate to

get a search warrant, which he feared would prejudice the

future of his case. Finally, and most importantly, the Court

listened to the testimony of Mr. Richter, observed his de-

meanor, and disbelieved his testimony of coercion.

The trial court weighed conflicting evidence and found

the consent voluntary, which finding is entitled to great

weight on review. After reviewing the record we conclude

there is sufficient evidence to support the finding of voluntary

consent. The totality of circumstances shows that Mr. Rich-

ter made a free and unconstrained choice to allow a search

of his home. The search was inoffensive to principles of due

process, with fruits of the search being properly admissible.’

‘See State v. Shoemaker, 85 Wn.2d 207, 212, 533 P.2d 123 (1975); State v.

Smith, 72 Wn. 2d 479, 481, 434 P.2d 5 (1967).

*See State v. Lyons, 76 Wn.2d 343, 346-47, 458 P.2d 30 (1969).

'Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 93 S. Ct.

2041 (1973); Culornbe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 6 L. E4. 1037, 81 S. Ct.

1860 (1961).

iV

Mr. Richter further contends that supply of liquor to

minors was misconduct by deputies warranting suppression

of fruits of the search. We disagree.

Involved are the conflicting interests of effective crime

detection and punishment, and fair treatment of the accused.

“Limited participation”® by police in unlawful practices is to

be tolerated and recognized as lawful because “criminal activ-

ity is such that stealth and strategy are necessary weapons in

the arsenal of the police officer.”® Infiltration of drug enter-

prises through deceit and unlawful participation is a permis-

sible and often necessary means of investigation and enforce-

ment. !°

However, there is a point at which police become so en-

meshed in criminal activity through overzealous law enforce-

ment as to make prosecution of the defendant repugnant to

principles of American criminal justice.'' To affect a criminal

conviction, police misconduct must run contrary to “funda-

mental fairness” and be “shocking to the universal sense of

justice.”!2

Reviewing briefly the facts, Mr. Richter was a 19 year old

minor at the time of his arrest. Deputies brought two six-

packs of beer and a fifth of wine to Mr. Richter’s home, and

*State v. Emerson, 10 Wn. App. 235, 240, 517 P.2d 245 (1973).

*Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 2 L. Ed. 2d 848, 78 S. Ct. 819(1958).

"United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432, 36 L. Ed. 2d 366, 93 S. Ct. 1637

(1973), State v. Emerson, 10 Wn. App. 235, 238, 517 P.2d 245 (1973).

''United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32, 36 L. Ed. 2d 366, 93 S. Ct.

1637 (1973); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173, 96 L. Ed. 183, 72 S. Ct. 205

(1952).

'‘United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32, 36 L. Ed. 2d 366, 93 S. Ct.

1637 (1973).

Vv

offered the liquor to those present by placing the liquor on a

table accessible to all. The beer was used as a prop to gain the

confidence and acceptance of Mr. Richter, and to investigate

his supposed drug enterprise.

In the Prohibition era case of State v. Budreau, 156 Wash.

103, 286 P. 51 (1930), minors were allegedly used as agents in

the purchase of illegal alcohol. The court bristled at the sug-

gestion, and found the taking of “young girls to questionable

resorts and plying them with liquor” to be “contemptible

and reprehensible.”'? It was concluded that if agents were

guilty of this misconduct, “they merited condign punish-

ment.”'* However, the conduct in State v. Budreau, supra, is

not comparable today to the instant case. The officers used

the beer and wine primarily to gain entrance and then confi-

dence of the defendant and his friends. There was no proven

effort by the officers to ply Mr. Richter with intoxicants so

they could lessen his will and take advantage of an affected

condition. The court found otherwise when it declared that

the consent to search was voluntary, and that Mr. Richter

was not under the influence of liquor or drugs to the extent

he could not make a valid waiver of consent.

Offering beer to a 19 year old man is illegal in Washington

and is police misconduct, but today is not “contemptible and

reprehensible” or “shocking to the universal sense of justice”

in a degree warranting reversal of this felony conviction.

Judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.

“State v. Budreau, supra.

“State v. Budreau, supra.

Pursuant to RCW 2.06.040 as amended by Laws of 1971,

ch. 41, § 1, p. 63, this opinion will not be published.

/s/ Mclinturff, C. J.

WE CONCUR:

/s/ Munson, J.

/s/ Green, J.

ae ee Se eee “6 + eae

Appendix B

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REVIEW

THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON )

) No. 44483

Respondent, ) (1638-IID)

)

vs. ) ORDER

) DENYING

MICHAEL RAY RICHTER, ) PETITION

) FOR REVIEW

Petitioner. )

The Court having considered the petition for review of the

decision of the Court of Appeals in this cause,

It is ordered that the petition be and it is hereby denied.

Dated this 7th day of February, 1977.

By the Court:

/s/

Wright, C. J.

15 Wn. App. 1038

Appendix C

APPELLANTS PETITION FOR MODIFICATION

OF OPINION OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE

FOR A REHEARING

In the Court of Appeals of the State of Washington

Division No. III

STATE OF WASHINGTON, )

) No. 1638-III

Respondent, )

)

vs. )

) Filed August 26, 1976

MICHAEL RAY RICHTER, )

)

Appellant. )

TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUDGE AND

ASSOCIATE JUDGE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, DIVISION III:

On July 28, 1976, this Court rendered its decision affirming

the trial court’s ruling denying a Motion to Suppress Evi-

dence and upholding the finding of voluntary consent.

The Appellant in the above-entitled matter and as Peti-

tioner herein, moves that the Court modify its opinion by

reversing the judgment of the trial court in all respects, or in

the alternative grant to Appellant-Petitioner a rehearing for

the reason and on the ground, to wit:

1. This Court should reconsider its opinion that there

is sufficient evidence to support the finding of voluntary

consent in the light of certain uncontested facts in the

ix

record which show Mr. Richter’s consent to be invol-

untary.

This Petition for Rehearing is based on the records and

files in this matter, and the legal argument presented hereafter

in support of this Petition.

ARGUMENT

Appellant-Petitioner respectfully submits that there are

certain undisputed facts which the Court erroneously indi-

cated were in contest. Under Schneckloth v. Bustemonie,

412 U.S. 218, 224 (1973), the “totality of all the circum-

stances” test requires the Court to balance all the factors in

determining the voluntariness of a consent. There are certain

undisputed facts which, when taken together, indicated a lack

of voluntary consent and a “vulnerable subjective state” of

mind. These are:

1. It is undisputed that Mr. Richter was a minor, who

was under arrest and handcuffed at the time of the con-

sent. (St. 15, 16)

2. It is undisputed that Mr. Richter had been told to

run by the deputies so they could “put a bullet through

him” or “blow him away” and that they held a gun to

his right temple at the time of his consent. (St. 47, 15, 16)

In its opinion, this Court stated that if the above evidence

is believed, it would show Mr. Richter’s consent was involun-

tary. The burden of proof is on the State to prove that a

search was made voluntarily and without force or induce-

ment. State v. Garske, 74 Wn.2d 901 (1968). Further, under

State v. Greco, 52 Wn.2d 265 (1958), that burden of proof

must be met by clear and positive evidence that there was no

actual or implied coercion or that the consent was given

x

either under a physical or moral compulsion. Appellant-

Petitioner submits that the above uncontested facts are suf-

ficient to imply coercion or physical compulsion to submit

to the invalid search. Certainly, the evidence of the State

does not establish by “clear and positive evidence” that the

consent was uncoerced.

CONCLUSION

Appellant-Petitioner respectfully concludes that the un-

contested facts in the record establish conclusively that the

State has failed to meet its burden of establishing that a con-

sent to search given by a minor under arrest was free of actual

or implied coercion or physical or moral compulsion. There-

fore, Appellant-Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to

modify its opinion by reversing the judgment of the trial court

in all respects, or in the alternative grant to Appellant-Peti-

tioner a rehearing.

Respectively submitted,

/s/

ROBERT H. WHALEY

WINSTON, CASHATT, REPSOLD,

McNICHOLS, CONNELLY & DRISCOLL

Attorneys for Appellant

Se A ST ATE Re Hw em ow

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON )

) No. 1638-IIl

Respondent, )

)

)

) Division Three

vs. )

) ORDER

MICHAEL RAY RICHTER, ) DENYING

) PETITION

Appellant. ) FOR

) REHEARING

)

PETITION

The Court has considered the Petition for Rehearing. That

Petition is denied.

DATED: September 23, 1976.

/s/ J. Ben MclInturff

Chief Judge

Filed: September 23, 1976

15 Wn. App. 1038

xii xiii

Appendix D : Amendment IV of the Constitution of the United States

reads as follows:

AMENDMENT [IV.}

' “The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

RCW 6.50.40! states in part: houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable

searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-

rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported

by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the

place to be searched, and the persons or things to be

seized.”

“(c) It is unlawful for any person to possess a con-

trolled substance unless the substance was obtained di-

rectly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription or order

of a practitioner while acting in the course of his profes- |

sional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this

chapter. Any person who violates this subsection is

a Fy ; Peps \ a tng A yr —— | Amendment XIV, Section 1, of the Constitution of the

ten thousand dollars, or both, except as provided for in United States reads as follows:

subsection (d) of this section.” AMENDMENT XIV.

| “Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the

United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are

citizens of the United States and of the State wherein

they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law

which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-

zens of the United States; or shall any State deprive any

persons of life, liberty, or property, without due proc-

ess of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction

| the equal protection of the laws.”

ee

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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