Opposition — American Airlines, Inc. v. World Airways, Inc.

Supreme Court brief1977

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcToBEeR TERM, 1976

No. 76-1205

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.

Trans WorLD AIRLINES, INc., Petitioners,

V.

Wort Airways, Inc., Respondent.

BRIEF OF INTERVENORS CITY OF OAKLAND,

BOARD OF PORT COMMISSIONERS, AND

OAKLAND CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

IN OPPOSITION TO THE PETITION

FOR CERTIORARI

J. KERWIN Rooney

Port Attorney

Port of Oakland

66 Jack London Square

Oakland, California 94607

Crom A. BEASLEY, JR.

FREDERICK A. BALLARD

505 Commerce Bldg.

1700 K St., N.W.

March 31, 1977 Washington, D.C. 20006

Press or Brron S. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D. C.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OctoBER TERM, 1976

No. 76-1205

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.

TRANS WorLD AIRLINES, INnc., Petitioners,

V.

Woritp Airways, Inc., Respondent.

BRIEF OF INTERVENORS CITY OF OAKLAND,

BOARD OF PORT COMMISSIONERS, AND

OAKLAND CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

IN OPPOSITION TO THE PETITION

FOR CERTIORARI

The City of Oakland, Board of Port Commissioners,

and Oakland Chamber of Commerce, intervenors in

the court below, submit this brief in opposition to the

petition for certiorari filed herein by American Air-

lines, Inc. and Trans World Airlines, Inc.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioners’ statement of the case is accurate in its

factual respects, but is somewhat confused by being

intertwined with argument. The sole issue in the case

is one of statutory construction, namely, whether the

1962 amendments to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958

2

(Pub. L. No. 87-528) should be construed to preclude

the Civil Aeronautics Board from issuing, under any

circumstances, a certificate for scheduled air transpor-

tation to an air carrier holding a certificate for ‘‘sup-

plemental’’ (popularly known as ‘“‘charter’’) air

transportation. The Board read the statute to tie its

hands in this respect, but the court below did not. These

intervenors submit that the court below was correct;

that, while by either construction the statute is not a

model of clarity, its improvement is appropriately for

the Congress to undertake; and that, in any event,

choice between the two constructions does not rise to

the dignity of an important question of federal law

which should be settled by this court.

This proceeding arises as follows: On April 2, 1975,

respondent World Airways, an air carrier certificated

to engage in ‘‘supplemental’’ service, filed an applica-

tion with the Civil Aeronautics Board seeking certifi-

cation to perform regularly scheduled transcontinental

service between Newark and Baltimore on the East

Coast and Ontario and Oakland, California on the

West. World contemplated a high volume service, uti-

lizing ‘‘satellite’’ airports, with a low fare. It stated

that it would not be willing to surrender its supple-

mental certificates if granted scheduled route author-

ity. On January 23, 1976, the Board dismissed World’s

application without reaching the merits, holding that

the 1962 amendments to the Federal Aviation Act of

1958 preclude issuance of a certificate for scheduled

authority to a carrier holding ‘‘supplemental’’ au-

thority, C.A.B. docket 27693, Order 76-1-88 (Jan. 23,

1976).

— en ee ee

ee ee ne _

3

Sections 401(d)(1) and (2) of the Federal Aviation

Act govern the certification of scheduled route author-

ity, that is, authority to provide individually ticketed

service on a schedule.’ These sections provide that an |

applicant must be an ‘‘air carrier’’, ‘‘fit, willing, and

able’ to provide the service, and that the requested

service must be ‘‘required by the public convenience

and necessity.’’ ‘‘Air carrier’’ is defined as a ‘‘citizen

of the United States who undertakes * * * to engage in

air transportation * * *’’, section 101 of the Act, 49

U.S.C. § 1301 (1970).

The 1962 amendments to the Act added section 401

(d) (3), authorizing certification for ‘‘supplemental air

transportation,’’ defined to include charter but not in-

dividually ticketed authority, section 101(36) of the

Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (36) (1970). This provision

(section 401(d)(3)) requires that an applicant must be

‘‘fit, willing, and able’’ to provide the service, and that

the service be ‘‘required by the public convenience and

1 Section 401(d)(1) controls the award of permanent authority,

while 401(d)(2) governs temporary authority. These sections pro-

vide in full:

(d)(1) The Board shall issue a certificate authorizing the

whole or any part of the transportation covered by the ap-

plication, if it finds that the applicant is fit, willing, and

able to perform such transportation properly, and to conform

to the provisions of this chapter and the rules, regulations,

and requirements of the Board hereunder, and that such

transportation is required by the public convenience and

necessity; otherwise such application shal] be denied.

(2) In the case of an application for a certificate to engage

in temporary air transportation, the Board may issue a cer-

tificate authorizing the whole or any part thereof for such

limited periods as may be required by the publie convenience

and necessity, if it finds that the applicant is fit, willing,

and able properly to perform such transportation and to con-

form to the provision of this chapter and the rules, regula-

tions, and requirements of the Board hereunder.

4

necessity”’; it also provides that the applicant must not

be holding ‘‘a certificate under paragraph (1) or (2)

of this subsection [section 401(d)].’’* In other words,

an air carrier holding scheduled route authority may

not also acquire supplemental authority; but the sec-

tion does not by its terms bar supplemental carriers

from acquiring scheduled authority. As stated by the

court below, ‘“‘The issue in this case thus becomes

whether the general purposes of the 1962 amendments

would be furthered by reading this converse limitation

into the Act.’’ (slip. op. 5)

L. Petitioners’ Contention That The Court Below Has Failed To

Accord Proper Deference To The Administrative Interpretation

Is Misplaced.

The primary thrust of the petition is that the court

below failed to show proper deference to the interpre-

tation adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Board of ‘‘its

own statute’. This contention would be appealing in

the context of a course of discretionary action within

the confines of the statute, but it is inapplicable to an

? Section 401(d) (3) provides in full:

(d)(3) In the case of an application for a certificate to en-

gage in supplemental air transportation, the Board may issue

a certificate, to any applicant not holding a certificate under

paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection, authorizing the

whole or any part thereof, and for such periods, as may be

required by the public convenience and necessity, if it finds

that the applicant is fit, willing, and able properly to perform

the transportation covered by the application and to conform

to the provisions of this chapter and the rules, regulations, and

requirements of the Board hereunder. Any certificate issued

pursuant to this paragraph shall contain such limitations as

the Board shall find necessary to assure that the service ren-

dered pursuant thereto will be limited to supplemental] air

transportation as defined in this chapter.

5

interpretation of the statute itself. That is a pure ques-

tion of law, as to which the courts owe no deference

to anybody. Professor Jaffe, a leading commentator on

the subject of judicial review, states:

‘The distinction between fact and law is vital to a

correct appreciation of the respective roles of the

administrative and the judiciary. The administra-

tive is the sole fact finder. * * * On the other hand,

the administrative and the judiciary share the role

of law pronouncing and law making. They are in

rtnership. The court may supersede the admin-

istrative and itself determine the a eg of law;

it is the senior partner.’’ (Emphasis supplied)

Louis L. Jaffe: Judicial Review: Question of Law,

69 Harv. L, Rev. 239 (1955).

Mr. Justice Jackson expressed this concept to sim-

ilar effect:

‘*f Administrative experience is of weight in judi-

cial review only to this point—it is a persuasive

reason for deference to the Commission in the

exercise of its discretionary powers under and

within the law. It cannot be invoked to support

action outside of the law. And what action is, and

what is not, within the law must be determined by

courts ...’’ (Emphasis supplied) (Dissenting Op.

in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 215 (1947).

It is not true, however, that the court did fail to

show ‘‘deference’’ to the Board’s interpretation. The

eare and depth with which the court considered the

problem is itself the highest form of deference. The

court simply could not reach the same conclusion. Thus,

with respect to the crucial question of the construction

of the 1962 amendments, the Board relied in part on

6

the fact that its policy prior to 1962 had been to pro-

hibit an air carrier from simultaneously holding both

scheduled and supplemental authority. The court be-

low states as to this

“With all respect, we do not find the Board’s

pre-1962 interpretation of the Act persuasive sup-

port for its reading of the 1962 amendments. It

seems reasonable to suppose that a policy formu-

lated at the time the Board was attempting to

justify an exemption of supplemental carriers

from the provisions of the Act would not survive

the establishment of a clear statutory basis for

awarding supplemental certificates. Certainly

Congress did not think the prior Board policy was

incorporated as such in the 1962 amendments: the

express prohibition in section 401(d)(3) against

acquisition of supplemental authority by a regular

carrier would not have been necessary had Con-

gress thought the Board’s policy against dual cer-

tification was being carried forward by the legis-

lation. We note, moreover, that until the instant

litigation the Board had not formally determined

the effect of the 1962 amendments upon its prior

policy.”’ (slip. op. 7, n. 5)

Throughout the court’s opinion we find the same

thoughtful and closely reasoned consideration of the

Board’s views. These intervenors submit that peti-

tioners’ argument as to lack of deference is without

substance.

II. The Question Involved Is Not An Important Question Of

Federal Law Which Should Be Settled By This Court.

Clearly it was important that the supplemental car-

riers know whether they were to be forever foreclosed

from seeking scheduled carrier status, and it was im-

portant to the Board to know the answer to that ques-

7

tion, in its administration of the Act. But the question

itself is not one of major importance, even to the

Board ; * much less is it of the degree of jurisprudential

importance justifying the attention of this court. Jus-

tice Brandeis said

‘‘The supremacy of law demands that there shall

be opportunity to have some court decide whether

an erroneous rule of law was applied .. .’’. (Con-

curring opinion in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v.

United States, 298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936).

The question of law here involved has now been de-

cided by a unanimous panel of the federal court most

experienced in reviewing the actions of the Civil Aero-

nauties Board, including the judicial history of this

very area, see American Airlines, Inc. v. C.A.B., 235

F.2d 845 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied 353 U.S. 905

(1957), and United Air Lines, Inc. v. C.A.B., 278 F.2d

446 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 364 U.S. 297 (1960). We sub-

mit that this narrow question, of first impression, has

received considerate and fully adequate attention.

Ill. The Decision Below Is Clearly Correct.

The Oakland parties submit that the decision below

is clearly correct. We do not presume to repeat, or

elaborate upon, the court’s careful analysis and lucid

opinion. We do wish, however, briefly to suggest that

the result could also have rested upon a point of con-

struction which Judge McGowan noted but did not

rely upon. He states:

‘‘The Board cited three sections which deny bene-

fits or impose additional requirements on ‘‘sup-

* The Board did not petition for certiorari.

8

plemental air carriers,’’ and found an anomaly in

the fact that a carrier holding both route and sup-

plemental authority would be, at one and the same

time, ‘‘covered and not covered’’ by these sections.

The intervening Oakland parties (the City of

Oakland, the Board of Port Commissioners, and

the Oakland Chamber of Commerce) urge us to

eliminate this ‘‘anomaly’’ by construing these pro-

visions to apply only to supplemental operations

rather than to all services performed by an air car-

rier hoiding supplemental authority. The Oakland

parties support their position by analogy to Na-

tional Association of Regulatory Utility Commis-

stoners v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1976), in

which this court held that a cable television op-

erator can be a common carrier with respect to

some activities, but a non-common carrier with

respect to others.

We find it unnecessary to pass on the validity of

the Oakland parties’ interpretation, since we fail

to see why the provisions in question raise an

anomaly at all.”’ (Slip Op. 12-13)

We add only that the Board’s refusal here to even

consider this contention is on all fours with the posi-

tion espoused by the Federal Communications Com-

mission in National Association of Regulatory Utility

Commissioners v. Federal Communications Commis-

sion, 533 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (hereinafter

Naruc). As the court there expressed it:

‘‘The Commission argues that the two-way, non-

video communications via cable, over which it has

pre-empted state and local regulation, are not com-

mon carrier communications because they are car-

ried on by entities (cable operators) previously

9

adjntignl to be non-common carriers.” 533 F.2d

**26. 49 F.C.C, 2d at 1082.

“*It has been held several times that cable systems, operating

in the characteristic broadcast retransmission mode, are not

common carriers. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,

392 U.S. 157, 169, n. 29 (1968) ....’’

The court below there rejected the Commission’s ‘‘ho-

listic view”’ of cable systems:

“However, it has long been held that ‘a common

carrier is such by virtue of his occupation’; that is,

by the actual activities he carries on. Since it is

clearly pa for a given entity to carry on many

types of activities, it is at least logical to conclude

that one can be a common carrier with regard to

some activities but not others.’’ Ibid.

The Commission in Naruc had argued that to treat

cable systems, at one and the same time, as common

carriers and ‘‘noncarriers”’

**would lead to the absurd and illogical conclusion

that the Commission has the authority to require

the capacity for access cablecasting, including non-

voice return communication, but is without au-

=" to regulate the activity.’”’ 533 F.2d 614,

n. 78.

Similarly here, the Board finds that it would be ‘‘un-

reasonable, let alone absurd”’ to allow, for example, the

same entity to be eligible for subsidy with respect to

route operations and ineligible with respect to supple-

mental operations. The remarks of the court below

with respect to the Commission’s ‘‘holistic view’’ in

Naruc are equally applicable to the Board’s theory

here:

10

**Yet the Commission offers no reason, save its

own bruised sense of symmetry, in support of this

conclusion.’’ 533 F.2d 614.

We submit that the Board’s reliance here on its ‘‘en-

tity’’ construction to sustain its conclusion is as un-

founded as was the Commission’s view of the perva-

siveness of the ‘‘noncarrier”’ entity status of TV cable

systems in Naruce.

CONCLUSION

The Oakland parties accordingly submit that the

petition for certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

J. KERWIN ROONEY

Port Attorney

Port of Oakland

66 Jack London Square

Oakland, California 94607

Ceci, A. BEASLEY, JR.

FREDERICK A, BALLARD

505 Commerce Bldg.

1700 K St., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

March 31, 1977

BALLARD, BEASLEY AND NELSON

505 Commerce Bldg.

1700 K St., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.