Opposition — American Airlines, Inc. v. World Airways, Inc.

Supreme Court brief1977

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

— Curt vu. S

~ELLED

MAR 31 3977

CORRECTED bX ir, am |

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

No. 76-1205

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.

Trans WoriLp AIRLINES, INc., Petitioners

We

WorLb Airways, INc., Respondent

BRIEF OF WORLD AIRWAYS, INC. IN OPPOSITION

TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

JERROLD ScouTt, JR.

FRANK J. CosTELLO

ZUCKERT, ScoutTT &

RASEN BERGER

888 Seventeenth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

March 31, 1977

ST NE A 8 AS

Press or Byron S. ADAMS Parintine, Inc., Wasurncton, D.C.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ME Kbnvinevedsaséwiverenacvesdéccciees 2

GOUUIURNES TUGBIINMD onc cc ccccccccccccsccccccccees 2

ROSIE GP GU GAN oo ccc sccccscccesecccesccece 2

Reasons Way THE Warr SHoutp Nor Be Grantep .. 5

I. The Court of Appeals Did Not Decide an Impor-

tant Issue of Federal Law. It Decided a Narrow

Statutory Issue, the Resolution of Which Was

Critical for World Airways and a Handful of

Other Companies But a Resolution With a Rela-

tively Minor Impact on the Overall Scheme of

Federal Air Transportation Regulation .......

II. The Court of Appeals Decision Does Not Conflict

With the Principle That Judicial Deference Is

Owed an Administrative Construction of a Stat-

ute. That Principle Is Simply Inapplicable in

SE Sc Ba Oc chao tabudsaunecas cakt sae

ag ey tl A A ier cE se SS RN se) oe Se

pa TIRE AES a ge FS en a

eg RR EER, Set ane Sen a a gy

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Air Line Pilots Association International v. CAB, 502

F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.

tn: «asx wih viet thd ipesekednadieceekss

American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 365 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir.

Ee

American Airlines, Inc. v. North American Airlines,

ee SEs EE bc Addn cencnonkccesr onsen

American Airlines, inc. v. North American Airlines,

Fel, Ee es GF CHE nin 6.0 cbs eb eesaccccdicccs

13

la

ii Table of Authorities Continued

Page

Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970) .......... 11

CAB v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316 (1961) .... 9

CAB v. Siate Airlines, 338 U.S. 572 (1950) .......... 8

Cameron v. CAB, 323 U.S. 716 (1944) .............. 9

Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. FPC., 420 U.S. 395,

D498 CIDE. oon vic kes cuisktnta eee 11

Chicago € Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steam-

ship Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948) ..........-+0ee 9

Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Na-

tional Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973) ........... 11

Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 519 F.2d 944 (D.C.

Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976) ..... 9

Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Summer field, 347 U.S. 74 (1954) 9

Diggs v. CAB, 516 F.2d 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert.

denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976) .............-e00ee- 9

Eastern Atr Lines v. CAB, 341 U.S. 901 (1951) ...... 9

Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Brothers and Co.,

y Rie Fe eee 9

Miami-London Route Investigation, 51 C.A.B. 100, 106,

m. BB URE. oxcccescsdcdedcakssueeeaeeenes 3

Moss v. CAB, 521 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. de-

ated, 436 UD. G68 (RUG) ccese casevccthbdusese 9

Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, et al., 45 U.S.L.W.

4182, 4193, n. 27 (U.S. February 23, 1977) ...... 11

Power Reactor Development Co. v. International Union

of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, 367

UB. SBG, GOB CHPUED oo vcdectucnccuneeiaeeeees 11

Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) 11

Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 262, n.11 (1974) .... 11

Transcontinental Low-Fare Route Proceeding (Docket

SOURS) nnd ivicccassccscnavessseetaganeeeeee 2,4,7

Volkswagenwork Aktiengesellschaft v. FMC, 390 U.S.

SE, SES CE vc cenicdensecéaccvteaeneeee 13

Western Air Lines v. CAB, 347 U.S. 67, reh. denied,

S00 UD. GRE CURRED ade ctbicakdeteas cane 9

Wilderness Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 866 (D.C.

Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973) .......... 12

World Airways, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways,

Inc., 391 U.S. 461, reh. denied, 393 U.S. 957 (1968),

aff’g. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. CAB,

SOD WOE Tee Cae Cis; Bed cacccescasccbdcadins

Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11 (1965) ................ 12

Table of Authorities Continued iii

P

CAB Onrpers: il

Deen awe eccccsccccs 2,4

Tk eee ceccces 3

EE 4

Cee nk. cc cccccece 12

Federal Aviation Act of 1958:

ee ec vec cccccnccccccccece 9

EEE SSS Te 8

Nee cwcccccecs 3

TE RSShS Es esccccesvevceccccccccccece 3

EE Sncescccccecsescccscceces 2, 7,10, 11, 12

ES i)

FEperaL Statute:

Ne wk cc cccecccccces 11

MISCELLANEOUS:

Civil Aeronautics Board, Interim Financial Report,

(Washington, D. C., December, 1976) ............ 5

IN THE |

Supreme Court of the United States

OctToBEeR TERM, 1976

No. 76-1205

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.

TRANS WoRLD AIRLINES, INc., Petitioners

Vv.

Wor Arways, Inc., Respondent

BRIEF OF WORLD AIRWAYS, INC. IN OPPOSITION

TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

World Airways, Inc. (World) submits this brief in

opposition to the petition of American Airlines, Inc.

and Trans World Airlines, Inc. (Petitioners) for a

writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Ap-

peals, for the District of Columbia Circuit for review

of that Court’s decision and judgment in World Air-

ways, Inc. vy. Civil Aeronautics Board, Case No 76-1072,

entered on December 8, 1976.

The opinion of the Court of Appeals, review of which

petitioners seek, is printed in Appendix I accompany-

ing their petition and has not yet been officially report-

ed.' The statement of the Civil Aeronautics Board fol-

lowing the issuance of that opinion, and Order 77-1-94

instituting the Transcontinental Low-Fare Route Pro-

ceeding (Docket 30356) in response to World’s appli-

cation are printed in Appendices I and II hereof, re-

spectively.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The Petition accurately sets forth the single, narrow

question of statutory interpretation presented to the

Court of Appeals.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case is unusual in one regard and one regard

only—there has rarely been a Civil Aeronautics Board

order that decided such a narrow legal issue. There

are no questions of fact involved, and the policy ques-

tions are limited to those in the legislative history, i.e.

it does not involve a statutery provision such as the

‘‘public interest”’ that necessarily puts the agency in a

policy making role.

The ‘‘dual certification’ question in a nutshell is

this: supplemental, i.e. charter-only, air carriers hold

their authority pursuant to Section 401(d)(3) of the

Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended; scheduled

air carriers hold their authority (which includes the

right to conduct both scheduled and charter services) *

1 References to the Court of Appeals opinion will be to the slip

opinion, cited as ‘‘Slip Op.’’

2 See Slip Op., p. 7, n. 4

pursuant to Sections 401(d) (1) or (2) ; Section 401(d)

(3) expressly precludes the holder of a scheduled (See-

tion 401(d) (1) or (2)) certificate from being granted a

supplemental certificate; absent any express prohibi-

tion, may a supplemental carrier be granted a sched-

uled certificate? A unanimous Court of Appeals panel,

finding that the legislative history confirmed the plain

meaning of the statute, answered this question in the

affirmative.

For the convenience of the Court, and to give some

balance to petitioners’ rather one-sided statement of the

case, World has set forth below a brief summary of the

history of this proceeding.

World first filed an application for transcontinental

low-fare scheduled authority in April, 1967. This was

the first time that the dual certification question had

ever been raised. Although it engendered a great deal

of support, as well as opposition, the Civil Aeronautics

Board never took any formal action and finally dismis-

sed the application as ‘‘stale’’ some six and one-half

years later. CAB Order 73-11-101 (1973). On April 2,

1975 World refiled the application together with a mo-

tion for an expedited hearing. On July 1, 1975 the

Civil Aeronautics Board, stating that World’s applica-

tion merited expedition but noting that the dual certi-

fication question had not yet been resolved, * asked for

=

* The question was raised in 1969 in the context of the appli-

cation of another supplemental carrier for an international sched-

uled route, but the Board declined to rule on the question choosing,

instead, to deny the application on substantive grounds. Miami-

London Route Investigation, 51 C.A.B. 100, 106, n. 22 (1969).

Although a number of bills were introduced that would have clari-

fied Section 401(d)(3) to clearly permit dual certification, prior

to 1976 these bills never reached the floor of Congress. The

4

briefs and oral argument on that question. CAB Order

75-T-2 (1975).

The order at issue in this case, handed down on Jan-

uary 23, 1976, found as a matter of law that a scheduled

certificate could not be issued to a supplemental air

carrier. World immediately petitioned for review in

the D.C. Circuit and that court issued its opinion on

December 8, 1976, unanimously reversing the Civil

Aeronautics Board. Nine days later the Civil Aero-

nautics Board issued a statement that ‘‘it would not

seek further review”’ and ‘“‘that its objective is to hear

as speedily as possible World’s application for author-

ity to provide scheduled transcontinental service.’’ See

Appendix I hereof.

On January 14, 1977 the Civil Aeronautics Board by

Order 77-1-94 (Appendix I1 hereof), formally insti-

tuted the Transcontinental Low-Fare Route Proceed-

ing, Docket 30356, placed World’s application at issue

in that ease and invited all other prospective applicants

to seek consolidation. Motions to consolidate transcon-

tinental applications have been filed by a number of

companies, including two other supplemental air car-

riers and three scheduled air carriers. Both petition-

ers have moved to intervene‘ (as well as a score of

1972 Congressional testimony of the then Chairman of the Civil

Aeronautics Board cited by petitioners (Petition, pp. 8-9) was

delivered in the context of one of those bills and began with the

predicate that the Board had not ruled on the question. Indeed,

as the petitioners themselves point out (Petition, p. 9), the pres-

ent Chairman testified in favor of dual certification at hearings

last year. For the disposition of the bills introduced in the 94th

Congress, see note 14, infra.

4 Technically, the petitioners are also applicants in the case

since they are seeking to put at issue certain existing restrictions

on their use of satellite airports.

5

private and public parties). The next procedural

step is an order dealing with the motions and starting

the formal hearing process.

This history demonstrates in particular the dangers

of regulatory lag, but it hardly reflects petitioners’

image of ‘‘some 15 years of history, during which no

carrier has been permitted simultaneously to hold

scheduled-carrier and supplemental-carrier certifi-

cates.’’ (Petition, p. 3) True, the statutory distinction

between scheduled and supplemental air carriers has

been in existence for fifteen years, but the dual certifi-

cation question was not even raised until the sixth year

and the Civil Aeronautics Board spent the next eight

years avoiding a resolution of that question. Similar

distortions or exaggerations are dealt with in the course

of World’s argument herein.”

REASONS WHY THE WRIT SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED

There are no important reasons for this Court to re-

view the instant case on writ of certiorari and the writ

should not be granted. The decision of the Court of

* One point not dealt with in the argument proper concerns

petitioners’ gratuitous remarks concerning the size of World

(Petition, p. 5), remarks not made to the court below. The

petitioners’ assertions to the contrary, revenue passenger miles

are not a relevant standard for comparing scheduled and charter

operations for a variety of reasons which this Court should not

be burdened with. Suffice it to say that for the twelve months

ended September 30, 1976, World had operating revenues of

$69.9 million and the entire certificated supplemental air car-

rier industry had operating revenues of $417 million. The com-

parable figures for American and TWA were, respectively, $2.1

and $2 billion in operating revenues and the smallest of the

‘‘ government-subsidized scheduled carriers’’ referenced by peti-

Pag ne —- a of $121.5 million. Civil Aeronau-

cs , Interim Financial Re » (Washi

cuban mah, port, (Washington, D.C., De-

6

Appeals does not raise an important issue of Federal

Law and does not conflict with any decisions of this

Court.

I. The Court of Appeals Did Not Decide an Important Issue

of Federal Law. It Decided a Narrow Statutory Issue, the

Resolution of Which Was Critical for World Airways and a

Handful of Other Companies But a Resolution With a Rela-

tively Minor Impact on the Overall Scheme of Federal Air

Transportation Regulation.

Petitioners do not run the risk of understatement in

their argument that the certiorari jurisdiction of this

Court should be invoked because there is an important

issue of Federal law ya

**.. regardless of whether the lower court’s inter-

pretation is correct, there can be no question that it

alters a basic element of the statutory scheme for

regulating air transportation, far transcends the

particular facts of the present case, and involves

continuing problems in the administration of a key

federal statute.’’ °

Contrast petitioners’ hyperbole with the calm analysis

of an unanimous Court of Appeals panel:

‘*At the outset, it is important to note the var-

rowness of the question before us. We are asked

merely to decide whether the Board is statutorily

foreclosed from considering a supplemental car-

rier’s application for scheduled authority. The

absence of a statutory bar does not mean, of course,

that a supplemental carrier is entitled to scheduled

authority. It does mean that its application for

such authority is to be evaluated on its merits, with

due consideration to be given to all relevant aspects

of the public interest, including the applicant’s

responsibilities as a supplemental carrier.’’ (Slip.

Op. pp. 5-6).

* Petition, at 12.

ee I Se ee

7

The question decided by the court below was not only

narrow in a legal sense, i.e., the court found that the

legislative history supported the plain meaning of Sec-

tion 401(d) (3), it was also very narrow in terms of its

policy and factual implications. At most, the court’s

ruling means that World and the seven other certifi-

cated supplemental air carriers can now apply for

scheduled certificates—and prior to the court’s ruling,

they were the only persons in the United States to

whom that privilege was denied.’ The immediate re-

sult of the ruling is that the Civil Aeronautics Board is

free to proceed with World’s application for transcon-

tinental authority, and it has done just that by choosing

not to seek further review of that ruling and by insti-

tuting the Transcontinental Low-Fare Route Proceed-

ing in Docket 30356. See Appendices I and IT hereof.

That proceeding is of considerable significance to

World, of course, and it will (hopefully) expand the

availability of transcontinental air transportation, but

it does not alter the basic scheme of Federal air trans-

portation regulation one whit.

The core of petitioners’ argument is that since this

Court granted certiorari twenty-seven years ago in a

7 Petitioners point out that while the court’s ruling permits

supplemental air carriers to hold dual certificates, scheduled air

carriers are still barred from holding supplemental certificates by

Section 401(d)(3). As correctly noted by the court below, this

is nothing more than a question of semantics since scheduled air

carriers are actually ‘‘hybrid’’ carriers, i.e. scheduled certificates

convey both scheduled and charter authority. (Slip Op. p. 7,

n. 4). In briefing the case to the court below, World cited Civil

Aeronautics Board statistics which show that more than one-half

of all U.S. air charter revenues are generated by scheduled air

carriers, and the largest domestic and international charter op-

erators are, respectively, United Airlines, and Pan American

World Airways.

8

case involving an interpretation of Section 401(d),

CAB v. State Airlines, 338 U.S. 572 (1950), it should do

so here. The State Airlines case is distinguishable for a

number of reasons: it was decided when Federal air

transportation regulation was still in its infancy; the

issue presented—namely, whether the Civil Aeronautics

Board could award routes to a carrier other than those

described in the carrier’s application—was of genuine

long-term significance to Federal regulation; the de-

cision of the court below, reversing the route award,

severely restricted the Civil Aeronautics Board’s de-

cisional flexibility; and the Civil Aeronautics Board

was the petitioner. Not one of those circumstances is

present in this case.

Petitioners’ reliance on the State Airlines case in

support of its certiorari argument is particularly ironic

since the substantative teaching of that case, namely,

that ‘‘rigid constraints on the Board’s ability to consid-

er applications on their merits are generally dis-

favored’’ (Slip Op. p. 6), is a central part of the lower

court’s decision in this case. In truth, petitioners had

nowhere else to look for support.

The last time this Court granted certiorari in a case

involving an appeal from a Civil Aeronautics Board

decision was in 1968, and that was occasioned by a

direct conflict among the circuits.* Indeed, excluding

that case and State Airlines, this Court has granted

certiorari on only seven other occasions in the thirty-

® World Airways, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,

391 U.S. 461, reh. denied, 393 U.S. 957 (1968), aff’g. Pan Amer-

ican World Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 380 F.2d 770 (2nd Cir. 1967).

The D.C. Cireuit had reached precisely the opposite result in

American Airlines, Inc. vy. CAB, 365 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1966).

— a aS a

oo

9

nine year history of the Civil Aeronautics Board.’

Even more instructive are the cases in which this Court

has denied certiorari.” In the last two years alone, this

Court has denied certiorari in cases involving: the

right of passengers to recover fares that were raised

unlawfully ; the meaning of ‘‘competition to the extent

necessary’’ in Section 102, which is the basic Congres-

sional mandate; the reviewability under Section 1006

of a Presidentially approved order that, arguably, was

issued illegally ; and approval under Section 412 of the

Mutual Aid Pact and its consistency with national

labor policy and the Railway Labor Act." These cases

put petitioners’ argument in perspective.

°CAB v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316 (1961), deter-

mining the Board’s statutory authority to modify a certificate

after its effective date and without notice and hearing; American

Airlines, Inc. v. North American Airlines, Inc., 355 U.S. 465

(1958) and American Airlines, Inc. vy. North American Airlines,

Inc., 351 U.S. 79 (1956), interpreting the meaning of ‘‘ public

interest’’ in Section 411; Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Summerfield,

347 U.S. 74 (1954) and Western Air Lines vy. CAB, 347 U.S. 67,

reh. denied 347 U.S. 924 (1954), determining the boundaries of

the Board’s subsidy authority under Section 406(b); Fastern

Air Lines v. C.A.B., 341 U.S. 901 (1951), a per curiam decision

granting certiorari and vacating the case as moot; and Chicago

& Southern Aw Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333

U.S. 103 (1948), determining the scope of the President’s powers

under Section 801 and establishing that all Presidentially ap-

proved orders are immune from judicial review.

1° This Court has denied certiorari in sixty-one cases involving

an appeal from a Civil Aeronautics Board order, beginning with

Cameron vy. CAB, 223 U.S. 716 (1944).

™ Moss v. CAB, 521 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied,

424 U.S. 966 (1976); Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 519

F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied 424 U.S. 958 (1976);

Diggs v. CAB, 516 F.2d 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied 424

U.S. 910 (1976) ; Air Line Pilots Association International vy. CAB,

502 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied 420 U.S. 972 (1975).

10

In the final analysis, petitioners are asking this Court

make an exception to the general principle that certi-

orari jurisdiction will ‘“‘be exercised sparingly, and

only in cases of peculiar gravity and general import-

ance, or in order to secure uniformity of decision.”’

Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Brothers and Co.,

240 U.S. 251, 258 (1915) (citations omitted). This is

simply not such a case.

II. The Court of Appeals Decision Does Not Conflict With the

Principle That Judicial Deference Is Owed an Adminis-

trative Construction of a Statute. That Principle Is Simply

Inapplicable in This Case.

When the Civil Aeronautics Board dismissed

World’s application on the grounds that Section 401

(d)(3), by implication rather than by its plain mean-

ing, prohibits a supplemental carrier from acquiring

scheduled authority, it was the first and only time that

the Board has ruled on this question. Petitioners’

argument that the court below failed to accord proper

deference to the Board’s construction of the statute is

tantamount to an argument that de novo statutory in-

terpretations by administrative agencies should be

immune from judicial review. The plain truth is that

deference is not owed to the Board’s interpretation,

either by the court below or by this Court.

The principle of judicial deference may well be

‘‘venerable”’ as petitioners contend, but it has far from

general applicability. This Court has clearly defined

the circumstances under which deference to an adminis-

trative construction of a statute is appropriate, and not

one of those circumstances is present in the instant

case.

First, the agency construction must involve an area

of its presumed expertise, an area of administrative

11

policy rather than a ‘‘narrow legal issue . . . peculiarly

reserved for judicial resolution’’. Piper v. Chris-

Craft Industries, et al., 45 U.S.L.W. 4182, 4193, n 27

(U.S. February 23, 1977) ; Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S.

159, 166 (1970). The two cases chiefly relied upon

by petitioners, Red Lion and Columbia Broadcasting,”

provide an example of the type of situation in which

the broad scope of the question framed,” necessitated

the application of agency expertise and the principle

of judicial deference. The case presented to the court

below, however, involves a narrow question of statu-

tery construction that begins with the literal meaning

of Section 401(d) (3), a meaning that is both clear and

unambiguous. In such circumstances expertise rests

with the courts, not with the Civil Aeronautics Board,

and the principle of deference is inapplicable. See

Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 262, n. 11 (1974).

The second circumstances giving rise to judicial

deference is when ‘‘an agency has rendered binding,

consistent, official interpretations of its statute over

a long period of time’’. Piper v. Chris-Craft, supra,

45 U.S.L.W. 4193, n. 27 (citations omitted); Cheme-

huevi Tribe of Indians vy F PC, 420 U.S. 395, 409-410

(1975) This is particularly true when the adminis-

trative interpretation is adopted soon after passage

of the legislation. See Power Reactor Development

Co. v. International Union of Electrical, Radio and

Machine Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961). The stat-

12 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969);

Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Com-

mittee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973).

18 At issue in both of these cases was the meaning of the term

**public interest’’ as used in the Communications Act. (Tit. IIT,

48 Stat. 1081, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.)

12

utory provision at issue in the court below was enacted

in 1962. The one and only interpretation of that pro-

vision by the Civil Aeronautics Board was that con-

tained in Order 77-1-88, decided on January 23, 1976.

The only other circumstance appropriate for judi-

cial deference is when there is evidence of Congres-

sional acquiesence in the administrative construction.

See Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, supra, 395 U.S.

at 381; Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11 (1965). Although

the petitioners make a passing reference to the at-

tempts to resolve the so-called ‘‘dual certification’’

question in the last Congress, they do not, and could

not, seriously allege that Congress in any way ac-

quiesced in the Civil Aeronautics Board’s construction

of Section 401(d) (3).

In sum, no deference is owed the Civil Aeronautics

Board’s construction of Section 401(d)(3), and the

court below properly refused to give such deference.”

Indeed, if the court below had accorded deference to

that construction, the resulting ‘‘judicial inertia’’

14 The petitioners note that proposed dual certification legisla-

tion was not enacted, dying when the 94th Congress adjourned

sine die. (Petition, p. 9). They fail to point out that dual cer-

tification bills actually passed in both the Senate and House as

part of measures which included other unrelated legislative pro-

posals; and that when, on October 1, 1976, conference agreement

on these other proposals could not be reached, the Congress

adjourned without taking final action.

15 Petitioners also chide the court below for failing to even

diseuss the deference issue. Suffice it to say that the D.C. Circuit

has particularlized the factors underlying the doctrine of defer-

ence, and when, as here, those factors are not present, ‘‘the maxim

of deference must inevitably bow before the principle of judicial

supremacy in matters of statutory construction.’’ Wilderness

Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 866 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied

411 U.S. 917 (1973).

13

would have frustrated the entire review process. See

Volkswagenwork Aktiengesellschaft v. FMC, 390 U.S.

261, 272 (1968), and cases cited therein.

CONCLUSION

From the foregoing it is apparent that there are no

serious issues or conflicts posed by this case which

warrant this Court’s time and attention. None of the

important reasons traditionally required by this Court

for taking review on writ of certiorari is present.

This case is remarkable only for the narrowness of

the legal issue and the amount of uncertainty gen-

erated by a statutory provision which on its face has

not a shred of ambiguity. The unanimous decision

of the court below has dispelled the uncertainty and

the Civil Aeronautics Board has indicated its agree-

ment with that decision.

WHEREFORE, Respondent respectfully requests the

writ of certiorari be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

JERROLD Scout, JR.

FRANK J. CosTELLo

ZucKERT, Scoutt &

RASENBERGER

888 Seventeenth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 298-8660

Counsel for Respondent

March 31, 1977

APPENDIX

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

WASHINGTON, D. c. 20428

For Revease :

Ow on AFTER

Contact: Alan M. Pollock Friday

202/673-5990 December 17, 1976

CAB 76-205

Statement of CAB Regarding World Airways

Pending Application

Wasurxeton, D. C. (December 17)—The Civil Aeronau-

tics Board today said it would not seek further review of

the December 8, 1976 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the D.C. Circuit in World Airways, Inc. v.C.A.B. The

Court held in that case that the Board is not foreclosed by

the Federal Aviation Act from considering applications by

supplemental carriers for regular scheduled route au-

thority.

The Board said that its objective is to hear as speedily

as possible World’s application for authoritv to provide

scheduled transcontinental service. In the event that other

parties to the litigation seek further review of the Court’s

decision, the Board will, if necessary, request leave of the

Court to proceed with a hearing on the merits of World’s

application while the legal issue is being finally resolved.

Order 77-1-94

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Board

at its office in Washington, D. C. on

the 14th day of January, 1977

Docket 30356

Transcontinental Low-Fair Route Proceeding

Docket 27693

Application of Wortp Armways for a certificate of

public convenience and necessity

Order

By Order 75-7-2, July 1, 1975, the Board announced that

it would set the application of World Airways in Docket

27693 for expedited hearing, if it first found that the Fed-

eral Aviation Act does not prohibit supplemental air car-

riers from acquiring scheduled authority. After briefs and

oral argument on this threhold question, the Board in Order

76-1-88, January 23, 1976, determined that it did not have

the legal authority to issue a route certificate to a supple-

mental air carrier without requiring the surrender of the

carrier’s supplemental authority. Accordingly, World’s

application was dismissed. The applicant appealed and on

December 8, 1976, the United States Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia Circuit reversed Order 76-1-88 and

remanded the case for hearing.

With the threshold impediment removed, the application

is hereby set for expedited hearing as announced in Order

75-7-2. Like the Chicago Midway Low-Fare Route Pro-

3a

ceeding recently set for hearing in Docket 30277,' this case

is also unique and complex but its implications are some-

what different from those of Chicago Midway. We have,

therefore, decided to follow similar procedures by issuing

a second order which will (a) define the scope of the pro-

ceeding, and (b) designate the route and rate issues to be

resolved, including the relationship of World’s fare pro-

posal to the requirements of the Domestic Passenger Fare

Investigation?

In order to expedite the case and eliminate any unneces-

sary procedural steps, all other applications, motions to

consolidate and comments regarding this order must be

filed within 30 days of the service date of this order. An-

swers to motions filed pursuant to this directive will be due

14 days thereafter. Environmental evaluations pursuant

to Part 312 of the Procedural Regulations shall be filed by

World and any other applicant for authority within 90 days

of the date of service of this order.

Accorpinc.y, It Is OrpErEp T Hart:

1. A proceeding to be known as the Transcontinental

Low-Fare Route Proceeding, Docket 30356, be and it hereby

is instituted and set for hearing before an administrative

law judge of the Board at a time and place to be designated

hereafter ;

2. The application of World Airways, Inc. in Docket

27693 be and it hereby is restored to its place on the Board’s

1 Order 76-12-149, December 28, 1976.

2 A staff evidence request will be appended to the order and the

parties will be directed to submit comments thereon prior to

the prehearing conference. All parties will be free to seek

modification or expansion of the request. Because of the need

in this case for further expert analysis of the facts and legal

issues, no staff component will become a party to the proceeding

until the second order has been issued.

4a

docket and consolidated for hearing with the proceeding

instituted by paragraph 1 above;

3. Applications, motions to consolidate and comments

regarding this order shall be filed within 30 days of the

service date of this order;

4. Answers in response to pleadings filed pursuant to

paragraph 3 above shall be filed within 14 days thereafter ;

5. World Airways and any other applicant for author-

ity shall file an environmental evaluation within 90 days of

the service date of this order; and

6. A copy of this order shall be served upon all parties

in Docket 27693.

This order shall be published in the Federal Register.

By the Civil Aeronautics Board:

Puyuuis T. Kayior

Secretary

(SEAL)

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.