Petition — Pappageorge v. California

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JAN 26 1977

IN THE a:

SUPREME COURT #20"

OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1977

No. 76710381

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE

OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

GEORGE PAPPAGEORGE,

Defendant and Petitioner,

APPEAL FROM

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

JAMES JOSEPH LEWIS

16133 Ventura Boulevard

Penthouse

Encino, California 91315

(213) 783-0222 or 783-0225

Attorney for Petitioner

GEORGE PAPPAGEORGE

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1977

No.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE

OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

GEORGE PAPPAGEORGE,

Defendant and Petitioner.

APPEAL FROM

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

JAMES JOSEPH LEWIS

16133 Ventura Boulevard

Penthouse

Encino, California 91316

(213) 783-0222 or 783-0225

Attorney for Petitioner

GEORGE PAPPAGEORGE

TOPICAL INDEX

Table of Authorities

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

ARGUMENT

I, THERE CAN BE NO FAIR TRIAL

WHERE THERE IS TENUOUS CIR-

CUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, A

COMPLETELY SUSPICIOUS EYE

WITNESS ACCOUNT, TAINTED BY

FAVORS, GLARINGLY IRRELEV-

ANT AND HIGHLY DAMAGING

EVIDENCE ADMITTED, AND

THERE IS A DEFENSE COUNSEL

WHO 1S OVER EXTENDED IN HIS

WORKLOAD, AND WHO REJECTS

DEFENDANT'S PLEAS TO PUT ON

FOUR OR MORE WITNESSES WITH

CRITICALLY IMPORTANT TESTI-

MONY AND FAILED TO RAISE,

(ACCORDING TO THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL),

AN ISSUE OF RELEVANCY CON-

CERNING DYNAMITE; ALTHOUGH

NONE OF THESE FACTORS OR

EVEN ANY TWO OR THREE OF

THESE FACTORS STANDING

ALONE WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE

GROUNDS FOR ORDERING A NEW

i,

Il,

Ill,

IV.

TRIAL, NONETHELESS, WHEN

WEIGHTED TOGETHER, THEIR

CUMULATIVE EFFECT OUTWEIGHS

THEIR INDIVIDUALLY JUSTIFIED

ALLOWANCE BY A TRIAL COURT.

THE DECISION OF THE CALIFOR-

NIA COURT HAS OVERLOOKED

THE DECISION OF THE UNITED

STATES SUPREME COURT IN

THE CASE OF DOYLE v. OHIO,

96 S.CT. 2240 (1976) AND WHICH

IS CONTROLLING ON IMPORTANT

ISSUES IN THIS CASE.

THERE IS ADDITIONAL POST-

TRIAL EVIDENCE WHICH CASTS

STRONG DOUBT ON CREDIBILITY

CF RONALD HAYWARD, THE

ALLEGED EYEWITNESS.

ALL EVIDENCE RELATING TO

EXPLOSIVES SHOULD HAVE

BEEN EXCLUDED AND FAILURE

TO DO SO RESULTED IN PRE-

JUDICIAL ERROR BY THE TRIAL

COURT.

A.

The Prejudicial Effect of

the Evidence Far Outweighs

Whatever Probative Value

It May Have Had, and Under

Evidence Code §1101, All

References to Appellant's

Involvement with Explosives

Should Have Been Excluded,

ii,

6

16

18

18

18

The Objection to Ad-

mission of This Evidence

Was Properly Raised at

Trial and the Issue Has

Thus Been Preserved

for Appellate Review.

THERE IS INADEQUATE COR-

ROBORATION OF RONALD

HAYWARD'S TESTIMONY AS

REQUIRED BY PENAL CODE

SECTION 1111.

A.

Appellant's Purchase of the

Handcuffs May Not Serve as

Corroboration Because It Is

an Activity Equally Consis-

tent with Innocence as with

Guilt.

There Is No Evidence to

Establish Appellant's

Possession of the Hand-

cuffs Used in the Carson's

Bar Robbery, But Even if

Possession Is Shown, There

Is No Evidence to Establish

Appellant's Exclusive

Dominion and Control Over

Them,

iii.

24

28

30

31

Others Had Access to

Handcuffs, Whatever

Their Serial Number

Was. There Was No

Exclusive Possession

and Control By Mr.

Pappageorge.

No Evidence Established

Appellant's Possession of

the Candelabra, Therefore,

They Cannot Corroborate

Hayward's Testimony.

Alvin Timmons Testified

That Appellant's Wife,

Deceased at the Time of

Trial, Delivered Candel-

abra to Timmon's Residence,

The Photographs of These

Candelabra Were Taken At

Timmon's House. No Evi-

dence Adduced at Trial Ever

Placed the Candelabra In

Appellant's Possession or

in Appellant's Home. The

Only Alleged Link to Mr.

Pappageorge Is the Alleged

Delivery by Mrs. Pappa-

george,

iv.

32

34

Vi.

E.

Appellant's Knowledge of

Part of the Contents

Located in the Back Seat

of a Car Not Owned By

Him Does Not Establish

His Knowledge of the

Contents of a Closed and

Covered Suitcase Found

Inside the Trunk of That

Car. 36

The Paper Stamped

"Carson's" Cannot Cor-

roborate Ronald Hayward's

Testimony Because It Was

Observed in a Public Access

Area and Appellant's Ex-

clusive Possession of the

Paper Was Not Established. 39

There Exists No Other

Independent Testimony

Which Connects Appellant

to the Crimes Committed

By Hayward and Moran, 40

THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL

ERROR IN COMMENTING ON

APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO

PRODUCE CERTAIN WITNESSES

AND RAISE CERTAIN DEFENSES,

GIVEN THE SLIGHT WEIGHT OF

THE EVIDENCE AGAINST

APPELLANT. 45

Ve

Vi, APPELLANT WAS PREJUDICED

BY THE FAILURE OF DEFENSE

COUNSEL TO PURSUE CERTAIN

DEFENSES, PRESERVE OBJEC-

TIONS FOR APPEAL, AND, IN

GENERAL, RENDER EFFECTIVE

REPRESENTATION, 49

CONCLUSION 53

APPENDICES

EXHIBITS "A" "B" and "C"

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Doyle v. Ohio (1976)

96 S.Ct. 2240 7, 16, 17, 45, 49

Griffin v. California (1964)

380 U.S. 609 45, 46

People v. Allums (1975)

47 Cal. App. 3d 654 19

People v. Bisogne (1971)

4 Cal. 3d 582 22

People v. Cannady (1972)

8 Cal. 3d 379 24

People v. Carter (1973)

46 Cal. App. 3d 260 19

vi.

People v. Delgado (1973)

32 Cal. App. 3d 242 19, 20

People v. Edwards (1969)

71 Cal. 2d 1096 39, 40

People v. Enos (1973)

34 Cal, App. 3d 25 19

People v. Gordon (1973)

10 Cal. 3d 460 42

People v. Hathcock (1973)

8 Cal. 3d 599 40

People v. Ronald Frederick Hayward,

Case No. A131866, June 20, 1975 10

People v. Ibarra (1963)

60 Cal, 2d 460 50

People v. Jenkins (1973)

34 Cal. App. 3d 893 35, 43, 44

People v. Kageler (1973)

32 Cal. App. 3d 738 42

People v. Krivda (1971)

5 Cal. 3d 357, vacated, 409 U.S. 33,

aff'd 8 Cal, 3d 623 (1972) 39

People v. Mardian (1975)

47 Cal. App. 3d 16 29, 30, 43, 44

People v. Martin (1972)

28 Cal. App. 3d 956 24

vii.

People v. Martinez (1975)

14 Cal. 2d 533

People v. Medina (1974)

41 Cal. App. 3d 438 16, 40, 46,

People v. Norwood (1972)

26 Cal. App. 3d 148

People v. Perry (1972)

7 Cal. 3d 756

People v. Randono (1973)

32 Cal. App. 3d 164 41,

People v. Ruscoe (1976)

54 Cal. App. 3d 1005 36, 41,

People v. Rvthford (1975)

14 Cal. 3d 399, 121 Cal. Rptr. 261,

534 P.2d 1341

People v. Stanworth (1974)

11 Cal. 3d 588

People v. Stephenson (1974)

10 Cal. 3d 652

People v. Talley (1967)

65 Cal. 2d 830

People v. Tewksbury (1976)

15 Cal. 3d 953

People v. Thurman (1972)

28 Cal. App. 3d 725

viii.

42,

42,

43,

14,

41,

49

47

25

43

43

44

15

49

49

22

42

42

a ar

People v. Vargas (1973)

9 Cal. 3d 470 45

United States v. Kahan

(S.D.N.Y. 1972) 350 F.Supp. 784 39

Winkie v, Turlock Irrigation District

(1938) 24 Cal. App. 2d 1 16, 48

Statutes

California Evidence Code,

Section 352 20, 52

Section 353 24

Section 353(a) 24

Section 403 25, 51, 52

Section 1101 18

California Penal Code,

Sections 182(1), 209, 211, 1538.5 2

Section 245-A 10, 11

Section 459 2, 10

Section 1111 28

Section 12021 11

ix.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1977

No.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE

OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

GEORGE PAPPAGEORGE,

Defendant and Petitioner.

PETITION FOR

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To The Honorable Warren E. Berger,

Chief Justice and to The Honorable Associate

Justices of the Supreme Court of the United

States of America:

Appellant hereby petitions for a hearing

to consider the decision of the Court of Appeal

of the State of California, Second Appellate

District, Division Four, filed in this action on

August 30, 1976, affirming the conviction of

Defendant - Appellant in the Trial Court; and

1,

the decision of the Supreme Court of California,

rendered October 28, 1976.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Five-count amended information charging

defendant with (count I) the kidnapping of Donovan

Hargens for the purpose of robbery, in violation

of Pen. Code §209, a felony, committed on 4

April 1972; (count II) burgiary of an inhabited

dwelling house, occupied by Donovan Hargens,

in violation of Pen. Code §459, a felony, com-

mitted on 4 April 1972; (count III) robbery on

4 April 1972 of Donovan Hargens, in violation

of Pen. Code §211, a felony; (count IV) robbery

on 10 April 1972 of Robert Laske and Robert

Baumgartner, in violation of Pen. Code §211,

a felony; and (count V) conspiracy to violate

Pen, Code §§ 211, 209 and 459, in violation of

Pen. Code §182, subd. (1). Defendant pled not

guilty, and a jury trial resulted in a hung verdict,

9-3. Defendant was tried again before a jury,

which resulted in his being found guilty on all

ccunts, with a finding of first degree as to count

Il, IlandIV, Defendant was given concurring

sentences on all counts, with a stay of execution

being granted as to count V, until completion of

sentences on counts I and IV, following which

the stay was to become permanent, Defendant

appealed from the judgment, from the denial of

his motion for a new trial, and from denial of

his Pen, Code §1538.5 motion. However, since

defendant's brief on appeal did not mention either

2.

motion, the Appellate Court considered each

matter abandoned on appeal.

Appellant filed a petition for rehearing

by the Court of Appeal, on the same issues set

forth in this petition, on September 10, 1976.

Such petition for rehearing was denied on

September 15, 1976. A Petition for Hearing

filed October 7, 1976 was denied by the Supreme

Court of California on October 28, 1976,

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

In the first jury trial, a co-defendant,

one Kenneth M. Moran in Department 118 before

the Hon, Leslie W. Light, was found guilty of

the substantive counts, and another co-defendant,

one Sidney Bartolatta, was acquitted.

The following in substance is the recita-

tion of facts by the Court of Appeal: According

to the evidence, Donovan Hargens owned ''Don's

Market" located in Pasadena. On April 4, 1972,

at approximately 1:45 P,M., he took the store's

receipts and drove to a bank to deposit them.

(The evidence indicated that this was his usual

procedure which he had followed for many years

ona daily basis.) Inthe bank parking lot he

was held up by a man who was about 5'11"' tall,

well-built and fairly strong looking, a "hippie"

sort of person with "'tattletale gray'' hair.

Hargens could not say whether the man was, or

was not, Ronald Hayward.

3.

Hargens wore glasses and had poor

vision without them. Somehow, his glasses

were knocked off of his nose when Hargens was

placed face down in his own car and driven to

his house, where another car and male driver

quickly appeared. Thereafter, the two men

handcuffed Hargens to his car's steering wheel,

placed a gag in his mouth, and removed the

cable from his car's battery. The newest

arrival entered Hargens' house and removed a

number of items from it, putting them into the

second automobile. The man who could have

been Hayward remained with Hargens most of

the time. Later Hargens freed himself and

found that many things were missing from his

house, including his wife's fur.

On April 10, 1972, Baumgartner was

employed as a bartender at Carson's Cocktail

Lounge in Pasadena. On that date, he arrived

at the bar at 7:00 a.m. and opened the rear door

to be met by a man with a pistol. Inside the

premises was the robber's "accomplice" and

Mr. Laske, the clean-up man employed by the

bar. The two robbers took money from the

bar's safe and from Baumgartner. The man

with the gun was about 5'-9"' or 5'-10"' tall,

weighed approximately 160 pounds, had dark

skin, and hair down to about his collar. After

the hold-up, the robbers hand-cuffed Laske and

Baumgartner to the bar rail, using what might

be ''Detective Special Romo” handcuffs.

Additional facts are: Mr. Harold Borek,

owner of a Pasadena pawnshop, which had two

or more employees in 1972, had dealt with

4,

Mr. Pappageorge for about twenty (20) years

and sold items to him at cost. He apparently

knew Mr. Pappageorge as a constant familiar

customer (R.T. 615 et seq. - "R.T." herein

referring to the Reporter's Transcript on

Appeal),

The two witnesses, Ronald Hayward and

Alvin Timmons, were both convicted felons

(R.T. 678 and R.T. 690-691, respectively).

The alleged crimes occurred on April

4 and 10, 1972; the co-conspirator Ronald

Hayward told the police about these crimes about

one year later (R,T. 645-649) and no criminal

charges were filed until one year and two months

thereafter. Inthe meantime Mrs. Pappageorge

died. (See our referenced hereinbelow, )

Another witness, Mr. Kodie, died (R.T. 604-

605).

ARGUMENT

I,

THERE CAN BE NO FAIR TRIAL

WHERE THERE IS TENUOUS CIR-

CUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, A

COMPLETELY SUSPICIOUS EYE

WITNESS ACCOUNT, TAINTED BY

FAVORS, GLARINGLY IRRELEV-

ANT AND HIGHLY DAMAGING

EVIDENCE ADMITTED, AND

THERE IS A DEFENSE COUNSEL

WHO IS OVER EXTENDED IN HIS

WORKLOAD, AND WHO REJECTS

DEFENDANT'S PLEAS TO PUT ON

FOUR OR MORE WITNESSES WITH

CRITICALLY IMPORTANT TESTI-

MONY AND FAILED TO RAISE,

(ACCORDING TO THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL),

AN ISSUE OF RELEVANCY CON-

CERNING DYNAMITE; ALTHOUGH

NONE OF THESE FACTORS OR

EVEN ANY TWO OR THREE OF

THESE FACTORS STANDING

ALONE WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE

GROUNDS FOR ORDERING A NEW

TRIAL, NONETHELESS, WHEN

WEIGHTED TOGETHER, THEIR

CUMULATIVE EFFECT OUTWEIGHS

THEIR INDIVIDUALLY JUSTIFIED

ALLOWANCE BY A TRIAL COURT,

In the following statement, there is ex-

amined the question of whether all the points

raised inthis Brief, with a few new ones in this

section, do not constitute such an overwhelming

abuse of defendant's right to a fair and impartial

trial as to undermine the adversarial nature of

a criminal proceeding so as to leave the form,

but excising the substance, thereby producing a

sham trial.

Mr. Henry Poyet died November 17, 1976,

at the age of 78; he was the attorney in the first

jury trial, wherein the dynamite evidence was

excluded, upon his objection. He was associated

as trial counsel in the second case, and Mr, John

Marshall, of approximately the same age, was

made co-counsel, because of the health of Mr.

Poyet. Atthat time, Mr. Marshall claimed he

had over 45 criminal cases pending, going to

trial, etc., inthe Criminal Courts Building in

downtowu Los Angeles. Several times prior to,

and during the second trial, George Pappageorge

requested that certain individuals, named here-

after, be called as witnesses, because they had

information concerning the critical issues in the

case: one John Weigel, one Larry Johnson, one

Sam Carbone, one Percy Lanestry. As is

pointed out hereinbelow, under Doyle v. Ohio,

96 S.Ct. 2240 (1976), if it is improper for a

prosecuting attorney to comment on the failure

of defendant to take the stand, then it should be

improper and prejudicial for him to comment on

the failure of witnesses to be called, where

defense counsel is at fault for them not being

called and not the defendant. (This may be

highly unusual, but how else does a trusting

7.

defendant protect himself from a sophisticated,

overwhelmingly charming defense attorney who

wants to get through the case as quickly as

possible ?)

I am informed and believe and on this

information and belief allege that if Larry

Johnson were called he would testify that on the

day that George Pappageorge, Kenneth Moran,

and Ronald Hayward drove to the New York Loan

Company, it was a hot day, and the car air

conditioner was on. Mr. Pappageorge rented

out a limousine, sometimes for as high as $500

a day, to various movie or picture companies,

and they rode in this car to the pawn shop. The

parking space was very small, and everyone

kidded Mr. Pappageorge that he could not park

the car in that small space, but he did. Mr.

Johnson will testify that this occurred after he

moved his shop into the gas station of George

Pappageorge, which was May 5, 1972. Mr.

Johnson shall further testify that on that trip to

that store, Mr. Pappageorge purchased hand-

cuffs. (End of statement under information and

belief. )

In the testimony of the owner of the New

York Loan Company, he stated that he remem-

bered Mr. Pappageorge coming in and buying a

set of handcuffs. He did not say that he re-

membered Mr. Pappageorge coming in several

times, or even more than onetime. For some

reason counsel did not cross-examine and elicit

this information. Upon retrial, Mr. Borak's

memory may be a little clearer than it was at

the trial; he may recall that there was only one

8.

purchase in the late spring and early summer

of 1972.

Ronald Hayward was the only direct

evidence that linked George Pappageorge to the

alleged crimes. Inthe Probation and Sentence

Hearing Reporter's Transcript, dated 4/2/75,

People v. Hayward, Case No. A550 968, which

hearing was held in Pasadena Branch of the

Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, it

is stated therein that Hayward's testimony was

given with the expectation for leniency: Cf,

RT 27, lines 12-22 and 24-28; RT 31, line 14;

RT 32, lines 1-13; RT 34, lines 3-13, 16-18

and; page 35; page 36, 37 and 38. Furthermore,

testimony given by Deputy District Attorney John

Watson, who was the trial prosecutor in both

trials of George Pappageorge, stated that Ronald

Hayward was the principal witness. Cf. Proba-

tion and Sentence Reporter's Transcript (here-

after referred to as P & § RT for convenience)

24, line 17.

At this hearing, Deputy District Attorney

John Watson testified in behalf of Ronald Hayward,

for the purpose of obtaining probation for Mr.

Hayward,

(The first trial of George Pappageorge

commenced November 14, 1974, and was de-

clared a mistrial on December 17, 1974. On

June 5, 1975, the second trial commenced, and

the jury rendered its verdict on June 17, 1975.)

For some reason, although Mr. Marshall was

made aware of this transcript, no attempt was

made on his part to obtain it prior to the start of

9.

the second trial on June 5, 1975. Iam informed

and believe and on this information and belief

allege that: In fact, George Pappageorge offered

to obtain the transcript, but Mr. Marshall

represented unequivocally that it was not needed.

It is interesting to note that the Probation

and Sentence Hearing in Pasadena concerned a

judgment of that Court which was announced on

January 7, 1974, finding defendant guilty for

assault with a deadly weapon upon the person of

Mr. Pudinsky, the Chief of the California High-

way Patrol. Pen. Code §245-A, and first degree

burglary, Pen. Code §459. Sentence at that

time was imposed, but appeal was taken and Mr.

Hayward was allowed to be free on bail.

While Mr. Hayward was on bail, he con-

tinued a life of crime, including the ingesting of

three different kinds of drugs on over 35 differ-

ent occasions: Cf. P & § RT 27, 28, 29, 35, 39,

30: lines 23-24; P & S RT 40: lines 17-28;

P&S RT 28,

It is interesting to note that Mr. Henry

Poyet was present in Court during the Probation

and Sentence Hearing. Cf. P & S RT 3-4.

On June 20, 1975, in Case No, A131866,

Department NW'"'R", before the Hon. Harry V.

Peetris, Judge presiding, Superior Court,

County of Los Angeles, People v. Ronald

Frederick Hayward, Mr. Hayward appeared for

a plea with Mr. John Watson, Deputy District

Attorney, appearing as the prosecutor for the

County of Los Angeles! Needless to say, a plea

10.

was entered of guilty to a violation of §12021

Pen. Code (Possession of Firearms by Previ-

ously Convicted Felon, (Pen. Code §245A,

January 7, 1974)). (Possession of firearms

was alleged to have taken place on February 5,

1975).

The Court then sentenced defendant to

one year in the County Jail to run concurrent

with time served in State Prison.

The plea was taken in the Van Nuys

Superior Court, which is 17 miles from down-

town Los Angeles, where Mr. Watson had his

office. The plea was taken three days after

the jury convicted George Pappageorge, and it

is common knowledge that a plea may be ad-

vanced, or may be continued, for the purposes

of bargaining. Apparently this pleas was

entered as a result of a bargain, three days

after George Pappageorge was convicted,

As aconclusion, the testimony of Ron

Hayward should be given little or no weight.

It appears to have been purchased.

An interesting question to ask is why did

not Mr. Poyet, or Mr. Marshall, obtain a

transcript of that Probation and Sentence Hearing

on April 2, 1975, and use it to impeach both the

credibility of Ronald Hayward and the motivation

of the Deputy District Attorney, Mr. John Watson.

In the first jury trial of George Pappa-

george, a co-defendant, Mr. Bartolatta, was

acquitted; it was Ronald Hayward's testimony

11.

which the jury weighed, in determining Mr.

Bartolatta's guilt. There was no evidence of

dynamite concerning Mr. Bartolatta. Appar-

ently the jury disbelieved Ronald Hayward con-

cerning Mr. Bartolatta.

The Court of Appeal in its decision

missed the most important point: There were

two trials; the first trial ended in a 9-3 decision

and in the first trial, there was no evidence con-

cerning dynamite. The deputy district attorney

erred when he stated all the evidence to be intro-

duced at the second trial was introduced at the

first trial. Please reference Reporter's Tran-

script, 646. (Reporter's Transcript is here-

after referred to as RT for convenience). Cf.

footnote 1, infra, p. 21.

Granted the tenuous nature of the evidence

against George Pappageorge -- questionable

evidence whether the handcuffs used were those

purchased by George Pappageorge; a piece of

paper observed at a distance of several feet

behind the shop of George Pappageorge, which

could have been a check stolen from Carson's;

the candelabra stolen from Hargens, which was

not of a unique design but could have come from

the Hargens home; the fur from the Hargens

home found in a suitcase, in the trunk of a car

owned by Mr. Ken Moran!: to allow in such

evidence concerning the dynamite was tantamount

to shutting the door of the jury's mind before the

facts so described were testified. A strong

argument can be made that the jury would have

acquitted George Pappageorge, because Mr.

Bartolatta was acquitted. If no dynamite evi-

dence had come in, and if Mr. Marshall, the

12.

overstretched, overworked lawyer who predom-

inated the second trial and who claimed to have

45 cases going at the same time in the Superior

Court of downtown Los Angeles, had taken the

trouble to put on the defense witnesses recom-

mended by George Pappageorge, a jury could

conceivably have returned an acquittal 6f George

Pappagerorge.

In a letter dated June 1, 1976, from John

H. Marshall to George Pappageorge, he stated

as follows: "I say Judge Dibbs today who told

me he had just been reversed by the District

Court of Appeals on the very same grounds we

have raised on your appeal in another case. He

offered to bet me that your case would be re-

versed. He commented that the Brief we had

filed was exceptionally well written and raised

the issues very clearly and feels as I have said

that the District Court of Appeals will probably

reverse,"' Later on in the letter, he reminds

Mr. Pappageorge that certain legal fees had not

been paid. Needless to say, within the next

60 days, Mr. Marshall did not utilize the oppor-

tunity for oral argument before the Court of

Appeal. This even though, in the same letter,

of June 1, 1976, he states:

"Before you get your hopes to (sic)

high, I do want to tell you that the

case which is the Morriss case is

causing the District Attorney all

kinds of problems and they are on

the Attorney General's nec! to seek

a review of that case in the Supreme

Court. If that happens we might be

13.

back where we started, but only

time will tell. "

This case of George Pappageorge re-

presents an extreme example of a strange chain

of circumstances locking unexpectedly into their

bazarre places, culminating in a conviction,

where the jury more probably than not, would

have acquitted of the crime charged and convicted

of the crime that was not charged: an alleged

possession of dynamite. (The Moran automobile

was drivento Mr. Pappageorge's station for new

brakes. No evidence was introduced that Mr.

Pappageorge knew the dynamite was in the car

when the car was driven to the station. )

The failure of Deputy District Attorney

John Watson to advise either the Court or the

defense that a plea bargain had been reached

with the unnamed co-defendant Ronald Hayward

in the matter pending before the Criminal Court

in Van Nuys, California, which plea bargain was

performed June 20, 1975, was tantamount to that

error proscribed by the Supreme Court of

California in People v. Ruthford, 14 Cal. 3d

399, 121 Cal. Rptr. 261, 534 P.2d 1341 (1975).

In that case, the Court stated:

".he intends that the prosecutor

engaged in prejudicial misconduct

by failing to disclose to defense

counsel the principal motivation

for the adverse testimony of a

key prosecution witness and by

forestalling defense counsel's

awareness of such motivation

14,

through misrepresentation made to

the Court. We conclude that

prosecutor was guilty of prejudicial

misconduct which denied defendant

a fair trial and accordingly reverse

the judgment, "

George Pappageorge respectfully submits

to this Honorable Court that if the jury had known

that three days after the jury verdict was to come

in Ronald Hayward and Deputy District Attorney

John Watson would be entering into a plea bargain

in a courthouse 17 miles from the courthouse that

John Watson usually operated in, it is respectfully

submitted that the jury would have acquitted

George Pappageorge. For the failure to reveal

this to defense counsel during the presentation

of the defense case, may have prejudiced defend-

ant inthis regard: Attorney John Marshall may

have then believed it was necessary to obtain

those witnesses, and put the same on the stand,

as requested by George Pappageorge, in order to

reveal facts about Ronald Hayward's character,

which would have shown that he was lying. It

certainly would have helped, and the failure to

present this knowledge to counsel, concerning

these alleged crimes, the subject of the plea

bargain on June 20, 1975, was tantamount to

that error found grievous in People v. Ruthford,

supra.

15.

Il.

THE DECISION OF THIS COURT

HAS OVERLOOKED THE DECI-

SION OF THE UNITED STATES

SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE

OF DOYLE v. OHIO, 96S8.CT.

2240 (1976) AND WHICH IS CON-

TROLLING ON IMPORTANT

ISSUES IN THIS CASE.

Appellant did not have to prove his inno-

cence by presenting the 5 witnesses (See P, 47-

48, infra) about whose absence the prosecutor

commented, See Winkie v. Turlock Irrigation

District, 24 Cal, App. 2d (1938) discussing im-

permissibility of comment where witnesses are

equally available to both parties. The District

Attorney is charged by statute to seek and

obtain justice, not convictions - the prosecutor

instead chose to rely on Appellant's failure to

produce non-material witnesses as a way to

"fill an evidentiary gap, '' which is forbidden

by the ruling in People v. Medina, 41 Cal. App.

3d 438 (1974),

In Doyle v. Ohio, supra, the Supreme

Court disapproved use during trial of defendant's

silence maintained after Miranda warnings had

been given.

16.

In the instant case, defendant's exercise

of the right to be passive, to make the District

Attorney prove his case beyond a reasonable

doubt, proved too tempting to the zealous prose-

cutor. The closing argument of the prosecutor

made the exercise of this right appear to be a

cover-up, a sign of consciousness of guilt, and

prejudicially "filled the evidentiary gap" in this

razor-thin case with a bridgework of brick-bat

comments manifesting evasion, furtiveness and

stone-walling it by Mr. Pappageorge. It was a

neat trick -- but not a clean one. Without com-

ments about failure to produce witnesses, only

suggestion and innuendo was left in the prosecu-

tor's case in chief. |

Given the slight strength of the tenuous,

if at all, corroboration and use of accomplice

testimony and based upon the emphasis of

Doyle v. Ohio, 96 S,Ct, 2240 (1976) the use was

prohibited, highly prejudicial and the conviction

must be set aside.

III.

THERE IS ADDITIONAL POST-

TRIAL EVIDENCE WHICH CASTS

STRONG DOUBT ON CREDIBILITY

OF RONALD HAYWARD.

Ronald Hayward's testimony and the evi-

dence regarding someone else's dynamite (which

Mr. Pappageorge never, solely possessed) are

17.

the sine qua non for the conviction of Mr. Pappa-

george. Incorporated by reference as though

fully set forth herein are these statements con-

cerning Ronald Hayward and his plea bargain of

June 20, 1975, stated hereinabove in Section I.

IV.

ALL EVIDENCE RELATING TO

EXPLOSIVES SHOULD HAVE

BEEN EXCLUDED AND FAILURE

TO DO SO RESULTED IN PRE-

JUDICIAL ERROR BY THE TRIAL

COURT.

A. The Prejudicial Effect of

the Evidence Far Outweighs

Whatever Probative Value

It May Have Had, and Under

Evidence Code §1101, All

References to Appellant's

Involvement with Explosives

Should Have Been Excluded,

Evidence Code §1101 provides, in part:

"(b) Nothing in this section prohibits

the admission of evidence that a per-

son committed a crime, civil wrong,

or other act when relevant to prove

some fact (such as motive, oppor-

tunity, intent, preparation, plan,

18.

knowledge, identity, or absence of

mistake or accident) other than his

disposition to commit such acts. . ."'

Where proffered evidence concerns other

crimes, it should be scrutinized with great care

in light of its inherently prejudicial effect, and

should be received only when its connection to

the crime charged is clearly perceived. People

v. Enos, 34 Cal. App. 3d 25 (1973),

Evidence of prior convictions or of prior

acts not resulting in a conviction is admissable

to prove a material fact such as motive, intent,

knowledge, or possession of means useful or

necessary for the commission of the crime

charged. People v. Carter, 46 Cal. App. 3d

260 (1973). People v. Enos, supra.

Probative value depends upon the extent

to which evidence tends to prove an issue by

logic and reasonable inference, the importance

of the issue to the case, and the necessity of

proving the issue by means of this particular

piece of evidence. People v. Delgado, 32 Cal.

App. 3d 242 (1973).

Prejudicial effect refers to the likelihood

that a jury will convict a person because of his

bad record, bad moral character, or disposition

to commit crimes. People v. Allums, 47 Cal.

App. 3d 654 (1975); People v. Delgado, supra.

Indeed, the duty to balance probative

value against the danger of undue prejudice is the

duty of the trial court, and the court must exclude

19,

the proffered evidence if the probative value is

substantially outweighed by the probability that

its admission will create substantial danger of

undue prejudice. People v. Delgado, supra,

32 Cal. App. 242 (1973); Evidence Code §352,

In the case at bar, evidence concerning

the explosives in Kenneth Moran's automobile

does not in any way provide evidence of a

material fact (such as motive, intent, or knowl-

edge) relevant to the crimes charged, The trial

court admitted this evidence solely to prove the

motivation and state of mind of Ronald Hayward.

(See RT 734-744). The court recognized that the

explosives could not establish a conspiracy for

the crimes charged, nor could they be used to

infer that Appellant knew of items in the car

other than the explosives (RT 742-744).

The Court's decision to admit was ex-

plained in terms of credibility:

"As to the issue of the state of

mind of Hayward, I think there

is a very real issue of credibility

involved. I think that it is neces-

sary that the jury have some

explanation as to whay Mr. Hayward

is talking about when he's talking

about the deal he made with the

police to get an OR release, for

whatever value it might have.

"It may well react against him as

well as for him, but I think the jury

is entitled to that explanation, and

20.

I feel that limited relevancy out-

weighs the prejudicial effect that

it might have if given with the

proper limiting instruction. "'

(RT 743).

Thus, this "limited relevancy" establishes

limited probative value. The real issue becomes

the extent of the prejudicial effect of the evidence.

The substantial prejudicial effect seems

apparent. At Appellant's first trial, no evidence

of the explosives was admitted (RT 736). 1/

Kenneth Moran, the co-defendant in the first trial

was convicted; the jury was unable to decide

upon Mr. Pappageorg's guilt or innocence. In

the second trial, after a recognition of its limited

relevancy, the evidence was admitted, and

Appellant was convicted. The prejudicial effect

1/

~ Contrary to the assertion of the attorney

general (RB 29), the reference in the record on

page 646 to the fact that ''in the last trial we

went into every excruciating detail, and the

reason was at the defense insistence," this

statement does not refer to admitting evidence

of the explosives. A careful reading in context

reveals that this refers to admitting evidence

about Hayward's assault on Walter Pudinski, the

California Highway Patrol Commissioner (RT

646 and 647; in lines 1-10 and especially lines

11-12). It does not refer to introduction of

evidence of dynamite. (See especially RT 646;

lines 7-10). No evidence of dynamite was intro-

duced at the first trial. .

21.

ae a

occurred notwithstanding the trial judge's limit

ing instructions.

The California Supreme Court in People

v. Bisogne, 4 Cal. 3d 582 (1971), disapproved the

admission of evidence against defendant of an

unrelated criminal act involving a deceased

co-defendant. The evidence was admitted

pursuant to the prosecution's desire to add

credibility to certain witnesses of the robbery

with which defendant was charged. The Court

acknowledged that the prejudicial effect out-

weighed any provative value:

" . . relevance [of the evidence of

the shootout] to defendant's partici-

pation in the robbery is entirely too

attenuated to justify its admission

against him. The prejudicial effect

of associating defendant with a per-

son who engaged in violent conduct

on a totally unrelated occasion far

outweighed its probative value to

show that Borrell and, by inference,

defendant, perpetrated the Long

Beach robbery together. (See

Evidence Code §352,)'' (First

bracketed matter added for clarity. )

In People v. Talley, 65 Cal. 2d 830 (1967),

two defendant's were tried on burglary counts.

Each defendant made statements which implic-

ated the other, thus these statements were

prejudicial. However, as to defendant Elwood,

the error was held harmless because he had

been found in possession of the stolen items.

22.

As to defendant Curtis, the court stated:

'(Curtis') extrajudicial

confession to the burglary at the

dress shop had some tendency to

incriminate him with respect to

the burglary at Giljohann's store

since loot from both was

together at Elwood's house.

The evidence of Curtis' guilt of

the burglary at Giljohann's store

is not strong, and in our opinion

the beneficiary of the error in

admitting Curtis' statements has

not proved beyond a reasonable

doubt that the error did not con-

tribute to the verdict against him

on the count charging the burglary

at Giljohann's store (citation

omitted)."' 65 Cal.2d 830 at 841.

In the instant case, the Court need not

even speculate as to the prejudicial effect re-

sulting from the trial judge admitting the

evidence of explosives: Appellant's conviction

effectively confirms the prejudice. Moreover,

because the rest of the evidence against

Appellant is circumstantial, proof of Appellant's

guilt "is not strong.'' The People have failed

to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that

the error has not contributed to Appellant's

conviction, thus his conviction should be set

aside,

23.

B. The Objection to Ad-

mission of This Evidence

Was Properly Raised at

Trial and the Issue Has

Thus Been Preserved

for Appellate Review.

It is well settled that objections not

raised at trial cannot be made for the first time

in appeal. People v. Cannady, 8 Cal. 3d 379

(1972). People v. Martin, 28 Cal.App. 3d 956

(1972); Evidence Code §353(a).

Appellant's trial counsel interposed

objections before Alvin Timmons began to

testify (RT 522-525). Admittedly, the exact

scope and emphasis of counsel's objections is

clouded; nonetheless there was express dis-

agreement with the admission of certain state-

ments declared "hearsay to this defendant. "'

(RT 524). The objection was reaffirmed during

Timmon's testimony (RT 539-542). The issue

having been brought to the attention of the trial

court, it may be reviewed upon appeal.

Evidence Code §353.

Nor may any objection be deemed waived

simply because Appellant's counsel chose to

refer to the explosives during his cross-examina-

tion of Timmons. Once atrial Court has

admitted certain evidence, it would constitute

unwise trial tactics indeed to simply ignore it.

Appellant's counsel did not withdraw his motion

to strike, thus the objection remained.

24,

Moreover, even if this issue was waived

or not properly raised, this Court may note any

errors where the interest of justice required it.

See, People v. Norwood, 26 Cal. App. 3d 148

(1972). Giventhe highly prejudicial nature of

this evidence, and given the adverse effect it in

all likelihood had upon Appellant's case, the

Court should at least examine the contention of

error.

In any event, Appellant's counsel argued

for exclusion under Evidence Code Section 403.

Both defense counsel and the district attorney

argued with reference to both Hayward's and

Timmons' testimony and the apparent purpose

of defense counsel was to exclude all references

to explosives (RT 733-741). The issue has thus

been preserved for appellate review,

The numbing effect produced by the

revelation of the farce involving the dynamite

and Mr. Pappageorge effectively blinded the

trial court concerning the quantum of evidence,

or lack of it, produced by the Prosecutor: At

page 16, lines 11-14 inclusive, Transcript of

Probation and Sentence hearing entitled:

"Advisement of Right to Appeal, '' on Friday,

November 14, 1975, the trial judge states, in

part:

"The court must also recog-

nize that the other individuals that

Mr. Pappageorge masterminded in

this conspiracy are doing their time

25.

on substantially the same evidence

upon which Pappageorge was con-

victed. . ."

With all due respect to the Court, how can the

Court make this statement when in the first trial,

a hung-jury regarding Mr. Pappageorge, the

dynamite was never mentioned to the trier of

fact? EXHIBIT ‘A’.

If the alleged facts concerning the

dynamite farce had no effect on the jury, note

the Court's depiction of the effect of the knowl-

edge on the Probation Department and Evaluation

Committee at Chino State Prison for 90 day

study, at page 9, (Ibid. ):

"To some extent, I believe

both the probation officer and the

Department of Corrections may

have been swayed by the contents

of the report of the prior conduct

concerning the explosives. . ."’

The cumulative effect of 1) the alleged

facts regarding the dynamite and 2) the

accomplice's testimony, together form the

"substantial evidence" upon which Mr. Pappa-

george was convicted and the Court recognized

this, at page 9, lines 7 through 21, inclusive,

(Ibid. ):

"Tl recognize that the testi-

mony upon which you were convicted

in this case rested to a great extent

upon the testimony of those who were

26.

accomplices in the conspiracy, of

those that you aided and abetted in

the commission of the crime;.. ."'

With the utmost respect to the trial

Court, it is observed that the Court's next

statement is almost a tacit recognition of the

abased theory of guilt which went out with the

"Star Chamber" and "the rack and the screw" -

the theory of guilt by association, at page 9,

lines 21 through 24, inclusive, (Ibid. ):

"that perhaps to your dying

day you will regret that you ever

became involved with the individuals

who have been named as codefendants

in this case, some of whom have

been sentenced;...'

The Court then proceeds to discuss Mr.

Pappageorge's allegedly questionable testimony.

But let us stop here. Would Mr. Pappageorge

have needed to testify at all if the dynamite

farce had been excluded from the trier of fact?

The only difference between the first and second

trial was the introduction of the alleged facts of

the dynamite farce.

Additionally, Mr. Marshall protested

that the dynamite evidence was immaterial, and

thus objected to its relevancy. He further pro-

tested that it was prejudicial to Mr. Pappageorge

(RT 586, lines 1-5; RT 733; RT 740). Although

the objections thus raised were not articulated

as clearly as they might have been, nonetheless

the objections were thus raised. However, the

27.

oa il

Court, although taking these under advisement,

never did strike the dynamite testimony. Mr.

Pappageorge contends the court should not have

let it in, and at the least should have ordered it

stricken. Even this would not have eliminated

the overwhelming prejudice created by the

dynamite testimony. To refuse to strike such

testimony was error, and no limiting instruction

could reverse the prejudicial effect. This is

especially true where, as here, the alleged

corroborating evidence was so tenuous, it would

be a superhuman feat to be a juror and ignore

this dynamite testimony.

V.

THERE IS INADEQUATE COR-

ROBORATION OF RONALD

HAYWARD'S TESTIMONY AS

REQUIRED BY PENAL CODE

SECTION 1111.

Penal Code §1111 provides in relevant

part:

"A conviction can not be had upon

the testimony of an accomplice

unless it be corroborated by such

other evidence as shall tend to

connect the defendant with the

commission of the offense; and

the corroboration is not sufficient

28.

if it merely shows the commission

of the offense or the circumstances .

thereof, "'

A. Appellant's Purchase of the

Handcuffs May Not Serve as

Corroboration Because It Is

an Activity Equally Consis-

tent with Innocence as with

Guilt.

The prosecutor aileged that four items

served as corroboration of the existence of a

conspiracy and the connecting link between

Mr. Pappageorge and the conspiracy:

iaitaane oe eee Pepennee op The purchase of handcuffs is an entirely

legal activity. Regardless of Appellant's ex-

2. The candelabra stolen from the planation for doing so, he had every right to

Hargens; purchase the four pairs of Detective Special

Romo handcuffs from the New York Loan

3. The fur coat Timmons found in ‘ Company in Pasadena. No criminal purpose is

attached to this activity unless the testimony of

accomplice Ronald Hayward is used and this the

court cannot do. The purchase of handcuffs,

as a legal activity, cannot serve as corrobora-

tion of Hayward's testimony.

the suitcase; and

4, The "Carson's" imprint observed .

by Robert Hawkins.

It is submitted that none of these items

constitutes the ‘independent evidence which,

without aid or assistance from the testimony

of the accomplice, tends to connect the defend-

ant with the crime charged'' People v. Mardian,

47 Cal. App. 3d 16 (1975).

In People v. Mardian, supra, 47 Cal.

App. 3d 16 (1975), at page 42 the Court stated in

part:

'. ,.Corroborating evidence is in-

sufficient if it does no more than

cast a grave suspicion upon the

accused or merely connects him

with the crime's perpetrators...

1!

(In this case, with dope stored in a suit-

case at a friend's house, the contents were

observed by a babysitter, the woman of the house

and defendant's ex-wife. )

29. .

30.

(Here, the defendant was seen carrying

an attache case into the house. This activity

is equally consistent with innocent behavior,

therefore, it can't corroborate. To be valid,

it needs aid from the immunity witness to link

the defendant to the crime. But the other 2

witnesses who observed the contents will cor-

roborate because they saw the defendant in actual

possession of the contraband. )

B. There Is No Evidence to

Establish Appellant's

Possession of the Hand-

cuffs Used in the Carson's

Bar Robbery, But Even if

Possession Is Shown, There

Is No Evidence to Establish

Appellant's Exclusive

Dominion and Control Over

Them,

Harold Borek, proprietor of the Pasadena

pawn shop, testified that he sold 4 pairs of Romo

handcuffs to Appellant. Mr. Borek was unable

to say when the sale occurred. (See RT 618,

lines 16-19; R'R.617, lines 7-11; RT 621, lines

12-27; and Mr. Borek did not know when he had

to reorder, RT 624} lines 2-4). Mr. Borek did

not know what serial humbers were on the items

sold. He could only say that he gave Appellant

the top four boxes from his case, that these

probably were the first four boxes from the most

recent shipment of handcuffs, and that maybe the

31.

serial numbers had been packed in sequential

order. Furthermore, others in store sold

handcuffs (RT 621, lines 10-11), Either

Moran or Hayward could have bought other cuffs!

Thus, only by drawing inference upon inference

may one conclude that Appellant received the

pair of handcuffs which eventually were used in

the robbery at Carson's (serial number M8236).

C. Others Had Access to

Handcuffs, Whatever

Their Serial Number

Was. There Was No

Exclusive Possession

and Control By Mr.

Pappageor ge.

Assuming arguendo that Appelland did

receive the handcuffs numbered "M8236, " there

remains the serious problem of Appellant's

control over them. Appellant testified that he

kept the handcuffs on an open shelf at his gas

station. Furthermore, Appellant, Hayward,

Robert Hawkins, and Donald Hargens all testi-

fied to the presence of Hayward and/or Moran

at Appellant's business, and their occasional

assisting with the work in the Winter-Spring of

1972, If the handcuffs were on an open shelf,

then either Moran or Hayward could easily have

acquired a pair or two without Appellant's

knowledge; not through Mr. Pappageorge's

deliberate action, but through his inaction in

leaving them on open shelves. No evidence

32.

adduced at trial, other than accomplice Hayward's

testimony, renders this theory inherently implaus-

ible, which provides possession with a rational

explanation consistent with innocence,

Thus, the mere fact that Appellant may

have possessed a certain pair of handcuffs can-

not serve as corroboration of the accomplice.

Appellant's investigator found an identical

set with the questioned serial number on it.

This raises some interesting questions, not the

least of which is the possibility of the inaccuracy

of the number-raising device employed by Det.

Warner, and the possibility of duplicated serial

numbers by the manufacturer (a not unheard of

occurrence),

33.

D. No Evidence Established

Appellant's Possession of

the Candelabra, Therefore,

They Cannot Corroborate

Hayward's Testimony.

Alvin Timmons Testified

That Appellant's Wife,

Deceased at the Time of

Trial, Delivered Candel-

abra to Timmon's Residence,

The Photographs of These

Candelabra Were Taken At

Timmon's House. No Evi-

dence Adduced at Trial Ever

Placed the Candelabra In

Appellant's Possession or

in Appellant's Home. The

Only Alleged Link to Mr.

Pappageorge Is the Alleged

Delivery by Mrs. Pappa-

george,

The Prosecutor made much of the absence

of witnesses called by the defense. Reversing

this argument, if the police knew about these

crimes one year after their commission, why

was prosecution delayed nearly one and 1/2 more

years; the result has been the loss of possible

witnesses' testimony through death, departure

from the State of California, etc. (The Court

may take judicial notice of the date of death of

Mrs. Anna Pappageorge of Monrovia, California,

on October 7, 1973 as listed in the official records

of the Registrar-Recorder of the County of

34.

Los Angeles. See Exhibit ''B"’ attached. )

It is doubtful that the candelabra, because

they were won in a horseshoe contest over 25

years ago, were terribly distinctive in any degree.

(Contest prizes tend to be less than expensive. )

It is no wonder that the witness was so hazy and

speculative in her attempt at identification.

In People v. Jenkins, 34 Cal. App. 3d 893

(1973), the Court of Appeal for the Second District,

the court reviewed the following:

A truckload of stolen suits were in defend-

ant's truck. The only items in the truck were

these stolen suits. When questioned by the police

at the scene, defendant said, ‘You didn't catch

me driving it did you?"' "No." ''Then I have

nothing to worry about.'' Accomplice testified

to defendant's participation. Because defendant

(1) had possession of (2) recently stolen property

this sufficed as corroboration. Mr. Pappageorge

was not shown to have possession, and the wedding

was eight months after the robbery - not a recent

event! The inference (it was Hargen's candelabra)

based on inference (Mrs. Pappageorge arrived with

the candelabra, ergo, Mr. Pappageorge possessed

them) based on inference (if Mr. Pappageorge

possessed them, it must have come from a non-

recent robbery) is too tenuous a thread to connect

Mr. Pappageorge to the robbery and the inferential

establishment of possession in Mr. Pappageorge.

Jenkins indicates possession must be recent,

There are many plausible explanations such

as Mr. Pappageorge traded auto parts for the

35.

candelabra, without knowing they were stolen,

or without having taken part in the burglary-

robbery.

In People v. Ruscoe, 54 Cal. App. 3d

1005 (1976) the Court of Appeal upheld conviction

of grand theft after a contest rigging "scheme"

based on recent possession of Five Thousand

Dollars ($5,000) and the cumulative effect of

defendants' testimony and the giving of false or

misleading statements to the police. But the

possession occurred within a short time after

the theft. This distinguishes the instant case

from Ruscoe, because Mr. Pappageorge's

alleged inferential possession occurred, if at

all, eight months after the crime. The candel-

abra cannot serve as evidence corroborative of

the accomplice testimony.

E. Appellant's Knowledge of

Part of the Contents

Located in the Back Seat

of a Car Not Owned By

Him Does Not Establish

His Knowledge of the

Contents of a Closed and

Covered Suitcase Found

Inside the Trunk of That

Car.

Alvin Timmons testified that: Appellant

requested Timmons to remove certain items

from a Simca car owned by Kenneth Moran.

36.

lll

Appellant specifically stated that these items Indeed, the trial court dismissed the

' were explosives. Timmons further testified . prosecuting attorney's contention that the suit-

that: Appellant made this request because: | case gave rise to an inference of Appellant's

Moran's wife had left the Simca at Appellant's | knowledge of it and the contents thereof. (See

station for brake repair work (an entirely | RT 736-738 and 743-744. )

innocent act).

Furthermore, even assuming Appe}lant

According to Timmon's testimony, knew of the suitcase and the coat therein, there

Appellant never mentioned the suitcase or its again is lacking the immediate possession of

contents; he spoke only of the dynamite and the recently stolen property required by the courts.

location of the car key. Timmons found the Appellant's possession, if any, was only by way

suitcase in the trunk, whereas much of the of bailment of the car to Appellant in his scope

contraband was located in the back seat. of business. Timmons, however, was unable

Furthermore, Timmons found the suitcase the | to state when Appellant approached him with the

next day and discovered the contents only be- request, stating it was some time in 1972.

: cause he believed the case might hold dynamite ° Such equivocation cannot establish that this coat

caps. was "recently" stolen. Thus, given the ques-

tionable possession and the indefinite time

. The only person to question Timmons ; frame, and the accidental nature of the place-

about the suitcase was Moran after he was re- menc allegedly at the station, Appellant cannot

leased from jail, some time after the dynamite be charged with knowledge of the suitcase and

was dumped. According to Timmons, Moran the fur coat. Consequently, the fur coat can-

specifically asked about the suitcase and ex- not serve as corroboration of the accomplice

pressed concern for its contents, —a valuable testimony.

fur coat’ (RT 539). Apparently Appellant had

inquired only of the location of the dynamite.

(See Reporter's Transcript 533-534),

Nothing in either Hayward's or Timmon's

testimony establishes or suggests that Appellant

knew of the suitcase or the fur coat inside.

Merely because Appellant knew of obvious con-

tents of Moran's car, on bailment to Appellant

for a legitimate purpose, cannot even by infer-

. ence establish that Appellant knew of the suitcase

in the trunk and its contents.

. 37. : 38.

F, The Paper Stamped

"Carson's" Cannot Cor-

roborate Ronald Hayward's

Testimony Because It Was

Observed in a Public Access

Area and Appellant's Ex-

clusive Possession of the

Paper Was Not Established.

Robert Hawkins testified that he observed

a pale green piece of paper in the large trash bin

behind Appellant's business. He also saw a rub-

ber stamp imprint bearing the name "'Carson's"

and possibly the words ''For Deposit Only. "

He was approximately one foot away from the

paper when he observed it. He did not pick it

up and examine it and could not say that the

piece of paper was, infact, acheck, Hawkins

further testified that Ronald Hayward was

present at Appellant's business at this time,

helping him (Appellant) move.

One's trash remains within one's posses-

sion until it has been mingled with other trash

and has lost its identity and meaning. People v.

Edwards, 71 Cal.2d 1096 (1969).

However, such rationale applies only

where the trash has been within defendant's con-

trol and subject to defendant's reasonable ex-

pectation of privacy. See, e.g.: United States

v. Kahan, 350 F.Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);

People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357 (1971); vacated,

409 U.S. 33 (1972), aff'd 8 Cal. 3d 623 (1972);

39.

People v. Edwards, 71 Cal. 3d 1096 (1969).

Neither situation exists here. The trash bin

Hawkins spoke of was a large commercial-type

bin, in back of Appellant's business, and with-

in easy and unrestricted access to anyone. It

was the type which may be changed to other

locations. This free access automatically

negatives any assumption that the contents of the

trash bin are impliedly in Appellant's possession,

Without a showing of this piece of paper in

Appellant's possession, it may not be used to

corroborate the accomplice testimony. See,

People v. Hathcock, 8 Cal. 3d 599 (1973);

People v. Medina, 41 Cal. App. 3d 438 (1974)

(discussion of defendant's actual possession of

the murder weapon as corroboration).

G. There Exists no Other

Independent Testimony

Which Connects Appellant

to the Crimes Committed

By Hayward and Moran.

In the absence of specific factors such as

possession of an instrumentality of the crime,

possession of recently stolen goods, or evidence

of flight by the defendants, courts will look to

any other independent testimony to corroborate

an accomplice.

For example, in People v. Hathcock, 8

Cal. 3d 599 (1973), the court found adequate

corroboration based, inter alia, upon a coroner's

40.

report which verified the accomplice's descrip-

tion of the murder. In People v. Tewksbury,

15 Cal. 3d 972 (1976) adequate corroboration

was found in witnesses whose "testimony of the

corpus delicti and the time, place and manner

of the commission" of the cgime was consistent

with the accomplice's testimony. 15 Cal. 3d at

972. The court also noted that a possible

murder weapon was found in defendant's former

residence six days after the crime, and a sur-

viving victim of the robberies testified that one

of the assailants was armed with a similar gun.

In People v. Randono, 32 Cal. App. 3d 164

(1973), corroboration was established by a

witness who received false information from

defendant. This corroboration was in addition

to the testimony of witnesses who actually

observed the liquor (obtained by false pretenses)

sitting in the storeroom of defendant's premises.

The witness also testified that the seventy (70)

cases he observed were gone when he came

back two weeks later and that they could not

have been "'used up" in that short time period.

The court held the possession coupled with the

unusual usage constituted corroboration.

A defendant's words, conduct, declara-

tions or testimony may corroborate the accom-

plice. People v. Tewksbury, 15 Cal.3d 972

(1976); People v. Ruscoe, 54 Cal. App. 3d 1005

(1976), Inthe instant case, there is no evidence

of Appellant's words, or conduct, or declarations

which corroborate Hayward, nor does his testi-

mony establish his criminal proclivity. Cf.

People v. Ruscoe, supra. (Defendant's

41.

explanation for his threats and for his fraudulent

scheme did not have to be believed by the jury;

and that testimony combined with false statements

to the police constituted adequate corroboration. )

Thus, there exists no independent testi-

mony linking Appellant to the crime or establish-

ing in him exclusive possession of any instru-

mentality or fruits of the robberies. Accomplice

Hayward's testimony stands uncorroborated and

Appellant's conviction must be reversed.

The rational of the requirement of Penal

Code §1111 lies in the inherent lack of trust-

worthiness in testimony given with the expecta-

tion of leniency or immunity. People v.

Tewksbury, 15 Cal. 3d 970 (1976); People v.

Gordon, 10 Cal. 3d 460 (1973). Thus, sufficiency

of the corroborating evidence is established if it

tends to connect the defendant with the crime in

a manner which reasonably satisfies the jury that

the testifying accomplice is telling the truth.

People v. Thurman, 28 Cal. App. 3d 725 (1972),

An "accomplice" includes anyone who may

be liable for prosecution for the same offense for

which the defendant is being tried. People v.

Kageler, 32 Cal. App. 3d 738 (1973). A grant of

immunity will not dissipate the requirement of

corroboration. See, People v. Perry, 7 Cal.

3d 756 (1972); People v. Randono, 32 Cal. App.

3d 164 (1973).

To corroborate the testimony of an

accomplice, the prosecution must produce

independent evidence which, without aid or

42.

assistance from the testimony of the accomplice,

tends to connect the defendant with the crime

charged. People v. Perry, supra, 7 Cal. 3d

756 (1972).

The corroboration must do more than

raise conjecture or a suspicion of guilt. It

need not go to every element of an accomplice's

testimony; it may be circumstantial; and it may

be slight and entitled to little weight when stand-

ing alone. People v, Perry, supra; People v.

Randono, supra, 32 Cal. App. 3d 164 (1973).

Corroborating evidence is insufficient if

it does no more than cast a grave suspicion upon

the accused, or merely connect him with the

crime's perpetrators. People v. Mardian, 47

Cal. App. 3d 16 (1975),

Moreover, each item alone may be in-

sufficient, but the cumulative effect may be

sufficient to corroborate. People v. Ruscoe,

54 Cal. App. 3d 1005 (1976).

Certain specific facts have consistently

been held to be sufficient corroboration:

1. Defendant's possession of recently

stolen property (People v. Jenkins, 34 Cal. App.

3d 893 (1973))

2. Evidence of flight or attempts to

escape (People v. Perry, 7 Cal. 3d 756 (1972))

3. Attempts to conceal identity or

whereabouts (People v. Perry, supra. )

43.

Se +

eS —<—

In People v. Ruscoe, supra, 54 Cal. App.

3d 1005 (1976), defendant was convicted of grand

theft after "rigging" a radio contest. The disc

jockey was charged as as an accomplice to the

scheme, and testified as to the operation of their

plan. Corroboration was found in: defendant's

possession of a large amount of cash the same

week the contest prize money had been paid to

his girlfriend; defendant's giving false state-

ments concerning the origin of the cash when

he was arrested; defendant's signing to release

the money to his girlfriend knowing of its illegal-

ity; and defendant's own testimony of his involve-

ment inthe scheme. The court indicated that

the jury was not required to believe defendant's

explanation for his involvement.

In People v. Jenkins, supra, 34 Cal.App.

3d 893 (1973), defendant was apprehended with a

truckload of recently stolen suits. An accomplice

testified that defendant participated in the theft

and the court held that the defendant's possession

of the recently stolen property was adequate

corroboration.

Significantly, if the defendant's activity

is equally consistent with innocent behavior,

such activity cannot serve to corroborate an

accomplice's testimony. People v. Mardian,

47 Cal. App. 3d 16 (1975).

In the case at bar, the evidence may cast

suspicion upon Appellant, or it may connect him

with the crime's perpetrators, (Mardian, supra)

but it does not constitute independent evidence

sufficient to corroborate the accomplice

44,

Hayward's testimony.

Vi.

THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL

ERROR IN COMMENTING ON

APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO

PRODUCE CERTAIN WITNESSES

AND RAISE CERTAIN DEFENSES,

GIVEN THE SLIGHT WEIGHT OF

THE EVIDENCE AGAINST

APPELLANT.

The leading case of Griffin v. California,

380 U.S. 609 (1964) established that a defendant's

failure to testify at trial could not consitutionally

be the subject of comment by the prosecutor,

California specifically incorporated the rule in

People v. Vargas, 9 Cal. 3d 470 (1973). Appell-

ant acknowledges that this rule does not extend

to comments on the state of the evidence or on

the defense's failure to introduce material

evidence or to call logical witnesses. People

v. Vargas, supra.

However, the United States Supreme

Court has recently expanded the scope of this

rule in Doyle v. Ohio, 96 S.Ct. 2240 (1976).

There the Court disapproved use during trial of

a defendant's silence maintained after Miranda

warnings had been given. In essence the

defendant's exercise of his rights was being used

45.

against him in the later criminal proceedings.

Thus the general rule is that a defendant's

exercise of his rights may not be used against

him for impeachment or as a basis upon which

to infer guilt.

Likewise, a defendant has the right to

have the prosecution bear the burden of estab-

lishing his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Knowing this, a defendant may choose not to

testify or may choose to put on a limited defense.

Comment on the former strategy is constitution-

ally proscribed. Griffin v. United States, supra.

Comment on the latter strategy, equally based

upon the same expectation of rights, ought not to

be allowed, at least where such comment is

shown to be prejudicial. For example, in

People v. Medina, 41 Cal. App. 3d 438 (1974), the

court discussed the extent to which a prosecutor's

comment may have been prejudicial. Two

guidelines were posited:

Re The seriousness of the error and

26 The impact of the error upon the

jury's consideration of the evidence in light of

the strength of the case against the defendant.

The Court suggested the primary question

to ask was, would the prosecutor's comment

serve to fill an evidentiary gap in the prosecu-

tion's case? The Court further stated:

"Arguably, any case in which sub-

stantially all of the direct evidence

against the defendants is the

46.

testimony of accomplices, which

must be viewed with distrust, is

aclose case. This one was

especially close in view of the

many other factors which called

into question the credibility of

these witnesses.'' 41 Cal. App. 3d

at 463,

In the case at bar, Appellant had a right

to expect the prcsecutor to prove his case be-

yond a reasonable doubt. Appellant was not

required to produce any evidence or witnesses.

He chose to explain his defense, and to subject

himself to cross-examination. The prosecutor,

in turn, chose to rely on Appellant's failure to

produce non-material witnesses as a way to ''fill

an evidentiary gap’ in his owncase, [Note well -.

these are not the same witnesses Defendant

asked his Counsel to call to testify ! ]

Most of the evidence in this case came

from accomplices or other witnesses whose

credibility was in question. Thus, like People

v. Medina, supra, this is a close case, especi-

ally in view of the inadequate corroboration and

the prejudicial error in admitting evidence con-

cerning the explosives.

The prosecutor commented on at least

9 witnesses Appellant could have called: Ken

Moran, the original co-defendant; previous

customers of Appellant; merchants who sold

handcuffs to Appellant; the holder of a deposit

refund check issued by Appellant and cashed at

47.

Carson's Bar; and Appellant's daughter who

married in 1972 (RT 819, 860, 866, 867).2/

Comment upon one party's failure to

produce witnesses is permissible unless these

witnesses are equally available to both parties.

Winkie v. Turlock Irrigation District, 24 Cal.

App. 2d (1938).

Each of these witnesses was available to

the prosecution either by request or by subpoena.

The prosecution discovered at trial the loaction

of the merchants from whom Appellant purchased

handcuffs, and could have brought them into

Court. The prosecution could have recalled

the bartender from Carson's Bar to ask about

the deposit checks. The prosecution could have

obtained through discovery Appellant's business

records indicating the name of prior customers.

Appellant did not have to prove his innocence by

presenting these peopte. The prosecutor, how-

ever, chose to rely upon Appellant's exercise of

his right to not prove his innocence and to use

the exercise of that right to fill the gaps in his

own case.

2 /

~ Indeed, the prosecutor received excuipatory

information from Appellant during cross-ex-

amination but chose not to pursue it, even after

asking Appellant to produce certain paperwork

in court. RT 753-755.

48,

Appellant relied upon the prosecutor's Ibarra, 60 Cal.2d 460 (1963).

burden to prove him guilty; that reliance was

used against him and, based upon the emphasis In the case at bar, Appellant has been

of Doyle v. Ohio, 96 S.Ct. 2240 (1976), such prejudiced by counsel's failure to object to

use cannot be permitted. certain evidence, thus losing any appeal rights.

For example, People's exhibit 10 (Invoice from

Moreover, given the slight strength of Mitchell Mogol, Inc., RT 615) patently does not

the corroboration and the use of accomplice fall within the business exception to the hearsay

testimony, the prosecutor's error was highly J ule. Counsel made no objection to its intro-~

prejudicial and Appellant's conviction must be duction, nor did he cross-examine on the validity

reversed. of the invoice (RT 615 - 628), As this invoice

was the only way of establishing the probable

serial numbers on the handcuffs sold to Appellant,

VI. without such objection, Appellant is precluded

from seeking appellate review and thus a valu-

APPELLANT WAS PREJUDICED J able defense was lost.

BY THE FAILURE OF DEFENSE

COUNSEL TO PURSUE CERTAIN Secondly, Robert Hawkins' testimony

DEFENSES, PRESERVE OBJEC- : concerning the piece of paper stamped

TIONS FOR APPEAL, AND, IN | "Carson's'' which he observed in the trash also

GENERAL, RENDER EFFECTIVE was Clearly hearsay: the print on the paper was

REPRESENTATION. being offered to establish the truth of its con-

tents. This paper and the ''Carson's" imprint

was Offered as corroboration of Hayward's

testimony. Failure to object resulted in the

loss of another crucial defense in that Appellant

is precluded from attacking the evidence on

A defendant bears the burden of estab-

lishing his counsel's ineffectiveness. People

v. Stanworth, 11 Cal. 3d 588 (1974). Proof of appeal.

the ineffectiveness must be demonstrable ;

reality and not a speculative matter. People v. Next, counsel arguably did not properly

Stephenson, 10 Cal. 3d 652 (1974). Moreover, object to Timmon's testimony concerning the

inn seamed cemet enbabiteh: Chat coandal Gan explosives and Appellant's connection with them.

ignorant of the facts or the law, resulting in Arguably the objection was made not pursuant to

withdrawal of a crucial defense, reducing the Evidence Code Section 352 but on the grounds of

trial to a "farce anda sham." People v. . hearsay absent establishment of the conspiracy.

Martinez, 14 Cal. 3d 533 (1975); People v. Counsel made this argument only inferentially

49, : 50.

without articulating the correct law behind it

(RT 523-525, 539-543). This is not merely a

question of trial tactics, but of ignorance of the

elements of the case and the applicable law.

Counsel argued under section 403 of the Evidence

Code when the record clearly shows he was con-

cerned with the prejudicial effect versus the

probative value. See, e.g., RT 540, lines 26-

27; 740, lines 2-8.

In addition, counsel failed to object to

the myriad details elicited by the prosecutor

concerning the quantity, quality and attempted

destruction of the explosives in Moran's car

(RT 528-530; 532-533), Introduction of this

evidence patently was irrelevant and served

only to prejudice the jury, especially in light of

its having been excluded at the first trial.

As a fourth example, defense counsel

made no objections whatsoever to the prosecu-

tor's thinly veiled suggestion that the handcuffs

purchased by Appellant's witness bearing the

same serial numbers as the ones used in the

Carson's robbery were tampered with or altered.

Failure to object is particularly heinous in light

of there being no independent set of handcuffs

against which the jury could compare. The

prosecutor's inflammatory insinuations were

obviously out of line and required some comment

to reduce the prejudicial effect. Appellant can-

not appeal the prosecutor's misconduct because

no objection was given, thus still another valu-

able defense was lost.

51.

This is not a case where Appellant, a

layman, could be expected to object to the court

about the inadequacy of the legal representation.

First of all, Appellant cannot reasonably be

expected to know the workings of the hearsay

rule. Secondly, Appellant cannot reasonably

be expected to know the significance and implica-

tion of sections 352 and 403 of the Evidence Code,

In short, these errors were errors of law of

which Appellant would have no knowledge.

Significantly, however, one counsel was

a family friend of Appellant (RT 689, lines 9-

13) and as such reasonably occupied a position

of trust more extensive than usual in an attorney-

client relationship. Reference is hereby made

to Exhibit ''C'' attached hereto and incorporated

by reference as though fully set forth herein,

which is page 4 of ''Advisement of Right to

Appeal, " the transcript of the Probation and

Sentence hearing of Mr. Pappageorge, which

occurred on Friday, November 14, 1975. With

this greater trust, Appellant would be more

likely to refrain from criticism or questioning

of his friend-attorney and the co-counsel. Thus

Appellant was not able to freely object to

counsel's conduct, even assuming Appellant was

cognizant of the legal mistakes made.

Thus, the record abounds in instances of

counsel's failure to pursue vital issues of law

which patently were crucial to Appellant's de-

fense. This, coupled with this being an ex-

tremely close case where any error could be

prejudicial to Appellant, denied Appellant

effective representation of counsel.

52.

Finally, none of the witnesses (the few

who were still alive when this matter was

finally prosecuted (almost 2-1/2 years after the

robberies)) who could have exonerated or ex-

plained defendant's behavior as exculpatory were

called to testify. Assuming, arguendo, they

were available, why weren't they called?

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Petitioner

respectfully urges this court to reverse

Petitioner's conviction and to grant any other

relief this court may find just and appropriate.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES JOSEPH LEWIS

Attorney for

GEORGE PAPPAGEORGE

53.

the past, although maybe I didn't know everything; but, on tho

other hand, he's entitled to that consideration, I respectfully

submit, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What Mr. Watson says is substantially correct:

That other than a financial loss, should bail be set ona appeal

and the defendant escapes the jurisdiction of the court, there

is no further penalty other than that which has already been

imposed that could be imposed on the defendant for his failure

to appear at the time and place required by the court for furthe

proceedings on appeal.

The court must also recognize that the other

individuals that Mr. Pappageorge masterminded in this conspiracy

are doing their time on substantially the same evidence upon |

which Pappageorge was convicted. The court must also recognize

that Donovan Hargens had really no appeal or no bail on appeal

from the kidnap-robbery-burglary when Pappageorge's handcuffs

had him handcuffed to the steering wheel of that car and his

house was being burglarized. All of the appeals of Mr. Hargens

at that time went unheeded by those who actively participated

in the robbery. The law requires that these acts be irputod

to Mr. Pappageorce as the aider and abettor and co-conspirator

in this action.

Tne request for bail on appeal will be denied.

MR. MARSHALL: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. POYET: Thank you, Your Honor.

o-2@0o"-=

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EXHIBIT “A.

George C. Pappageorge

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aco CENCE BEFORE

. mmennaihieatininpinctigniai ssitniaatile.~ sassitilitiaednadatie

: | May it please the court, it has been ry privilege

3 benf My i "k . . 2 in life to know a great many men, but I must say this in all

ae Nabi: i 7 i . i 3 | candor standing before Your Honor, and I want to express how

3 a} ah aS sisi 4 I fecl inwardly and outwardly and based upon my evaluation of

mmah ¥i a : $ Pappageorge over a period of many years. it is unfortunate

A | = |e : 6 that we find ourselves in this situation here, but this is the

; Py fe : : 3 way it is.

R 4 | ae ao | 8 I myself know that Pappageorge ‘s a good man,

t . | at |i bah ’ 9 personally, throughout the years. He's always been practical,

3 ye : 7 | : ; < ; 10 | punctual on everything that he has done. I know of no occasion

: ; 3 salt i ; st a4 2 1. | where he has taken unjust or unfair advantage of any living

Sis at - Is 3 E i | f @ 2 soul, to my personal knowledge. Also I know that he is a

3 be if : | ; , ; 13 tireless worxer. I knew his mother, his sister and his fanily

ie ie | se) : E | = ou personally, myself; and I know that from the days he left ;

Hf tae = a Ss ; ‘ z i 15 | back East and came out here to settle down in Pasadena that

ey + : F i amt 16 he has worked unceasingly as a man. |

“BLE ans se . s|5 ;|° i #? 17 Personally, I never have found him wanting. He

He ae : TH i ; - has been gracious and considerate with people that he worked

ath ae a : 1) | with. He has always aspired to do things in what I call a

aS (a3 ; bs. if , #! 20 noble and altruistic manner. And to see a aonentsen of this

eg ary “y is cars i “e ' Peal 21 kind is hard for me personally, myself. I personaliy like

age scat £85 23 43 9° Pappageorge. I know he's a good man and I know that no matter

esp |" * io. = =e ‘ 22 what Your Honor does that he will profit by this experience

24 that he finds hinself in. Ue's got his matters over there

25 that are being worked out. .

26, He needs to go ahead, and no matter what's done .

BEST COPY AVAILABLE | 4 o- hore -- I'll spvak now on the guestion of his keeping con- - ¢

‘ oR fieence with any order that Your Honor might placa upon him -- %

° : ° “a

SE — —

*

EXHIBIT. ‘C .

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