Petition — Jack Sanders Corp. v. United States

Supreme Court brief1977

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FILED

DEC 29 1976

MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

Supreme Court, U.S, |

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

no. ZG = j j 25

JACK SANDERS CORPORATIOI.,

Petitioner

VERSUS

TEE UNITED STATES,

Defendant

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO REVIEW

DECISION OF UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS

EDWARD H. KEILER

ATTORNEY OF RECORD

SAM O.BUCKLEY

KEILER & BUCKLEY

OF COUNSEL

9017 Jefferson Highway

River Ridge Louisiana 70123

ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER

INDEX

Page

1. Table of Authorities ii

2. Petition for certiorari 1

ae Opinion of Court of Claims

to be reviewed 1

bd. Jurisdiction for Review 3

c.Questions presented for

Review 7 3

d.Statutes and Regulations

Involved 1h.

e. Statement of case 14

f. Jurisdiction of Court

of Claims 16

g. Argument 18

3. APPENDIX

| h. Decision of Corps of Engineer

oe Board of Contract Appeals 22

i. Court of Claims Opinion 39

j. Court of Claims Opinion on

Motion to Amend and

Rehearing 42

(ii)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

ARMED SERVICES PROCUREMENT

REGULATION 7.603.27, _?

227

THE SAME AS 32 CFR 7.603 4

CASES

VICTORY CONSTRUCTION CO., INC.

VERSUS THE UNITED STATES, 510

F2d 1379 (1975) §,11,19

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

NO.

JACK SANDERS CORPORATION,

Petitioner

VERSUS

TH& UNITED STATES,

Defendant

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO REVIEW

DECISION OF UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

TO THE KONORABLE THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME

COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

COMES NOW Jack Sanders Corporation

and petitions this Hcnorable Court for a

writ of Certiorari to review the final

judgment of the Court of Claims in the

2. 3.

cause entitled Jack Sanders Corporation The Final Judgment of The Court of Claims.

versus The United States, being Number - ; The Board's decision is attached as

75 on the Docket of that Court. Appendix I. The Court of Claims Order dated

This case came to the Court of Claims . Penge June 25, 1976, is attached as Appendix 2, and

on appeal under Rule 163 (b) (2) for review The Court of Claims Order dated September 30,

under The Wunderlich Act of a decision of 1976, is attached as Appendix 3.

the Corps of Engineers Board of Contract JURISDICTION FOR REVIEW

Appeals dated July 31, 1974 being ENG. BCA A writ of certiorari to review The Final

NO. 3363 styled Appeal of Jack Sanders Order of fhe Court of Claims dated September

Corporation, Contracts DACW 64-71-C-0022 30, 1976, is sought pursuant to jurisdiction

— DACW 64-71-0023 and DACW 61,-71-002i,, conferred by 28 U.S.C.A. 1255 (1) which reads

The Court of Claims first entered en as follows:

ambiguous order dated ‘une 25 1976, aifirming 1255. Coury of Slaine; certiorari:

! t

the Engineer Board's decision (which was in

Cases in the Court of Claims may be

favor of the Defendant) and remanding for reviewed by The Supreme Court by tie

entry of Judgment in favor of plaintifi. iat te css af onreketeadl granted on

On Rehearing and Motion to Amend Judgment, - , 4 he “oie one Centos States ey the

Tne Court of Claims<«entered its Order dated , QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

September 30, 1976, affirming the Engineer The principal dietion presented for

Board's decision, which, in éffect, is now review is the correct interpretation of the

Armed Services Procurement Regulations clause

Le

designated ASPR 7-603.27 Variations in

Estimated Quantities, which is required

to be included in Government procurement |

contracts where payment is made based on

estimated quantity items. This clause,

which is also codified as 32 CFR 7.603.

27 (1968), reads as follows:

Where the quantity of a pay item in

this contract is an estimated quantity

and where the actual quantity of such

pay item varies more than fifteen per-

cent (15%) above or below the estimat-

ed quantity stated in this contract, an

cuntbeble adjustment in the contract

price shall be made upon demand of

either party. The equitable adjustment

shall be dased upon any increase or

decrease in costs due solely to the

variation above one hundred fifteen

percent (115%) or below eighty-five

percent (85%) of the estimated quanti-

ty. If the quantity variation is such

as to cguse an increase in the time

necessary for completion, the Contract-

ing Officer shall, upon receipt of a

tten request for an extension of

time within ten (10) days from the

beginning of such delay, or within

such further period of time which may

be granted by the Contracting Officer

prior to the date of final settlement of

the contract ascertain the facts and

make such adjustment for extending

the completion date as in his judgment

the findings justify.

The interpretation of this clause has

been presented to the Court of Claims twice;

5.

once in the case at bar and earlier in

1975 in the case of Victory Construction

Co.,inc. vs. United States. 510 F 2d

1379 (1975).

One panel of the Court of Claims

construed the clause one way and another

panel gives it an entirely different

interpretation. This is an important

provision of Government procurement law

and we request that this Court accept

the case to resolve the conflict between

the two panels of the Court of Claims

so that Government procurement people

and the contractors dealing with them

will know how a contractor will be paid

when he bids on estimated quantities

and experiences adjustable overruns within

the meaning of the Variation in Estimated

Quantities clause. ies

In the case at bar the plaintiff

contraetor bid on advertised procurements

for the removal of debris from specified

geographical areas following Hurricane

Celia. He was required to base his

bids on Government estimates of the quantities

of debris to be removed from each geo-

graphical area. He was a successful bidder

on three contracts; San Patricio County,

Texas, Contract DACW 64-71-C-0022; City

of Portland, Texas, Contract DACW 64-71-

C-0023; and City of Rockport, Texas,

Contract DACW 64-71-C-0024,; all awarded

August 7, 1970. All contracts had the

same bidding instructions, terms and

conditions, including a variation in

estimated quantities clause which appears

as a note at the botton of the page cor-

taining pay items (standard form 36

continuation sheet), reading as follows:

Variations in Quantities: The quantities

shown in the schedule of the bid form

will serve as a basis for completion

7°

of bids for the purpose of determining

the low bidder. Payment will be made

at the unit price for the actual quantity

of work performed under each item be

it more or less than the quantity

estimated. However, if the actual

quantity 1302 S more than one hundred

percent (1 above or thirty percent

below the estimated mm Pe | stated

in this contract, an equitable adjstment

in the contract unit price shall be

made upon demand of either party.

The contractor experienced substantial

Overruns Over and above estimated quantities

plus one hundred percent (100%) above

estimated quantities on the three contracts

as well as increased costs in removing

the debris represented by these overruns,

'and has attempted to recover these increased

costs pursuant to the Variation in Estimated

Quantities clause.

It became immediately apparent that

the Variation in Estimated Quantities

clause appearing in the contracts wes a

deviant clause not found in the Armed

Service Procurement Regulations and

differing in two important particulars

from the standard clause therein contained

(ASPR 7-603.27 (1968) above set forth).

First, the contract clause increased

the permissable variation above estimated

quantities to 100% as:against 15% in the

standard clause.

Second, the contract clause omitted

that part of the standard clause which

prevdes the manner in which an equitable

. adjustment is to be determined which reads:

"..eeeThe equitable adjustment shall

be based upon.any increase or decrease

in costs due solely to the variation

above....percent or below....percent

of the estimated quantity....

The increase in the permissable variation

did not become an issue. The contractor

understood that if, as in the San Patricio

contract, the estimated quantity was 35, 000

cubic yards, and he bid $3.70 per cubic yard,

9. -

he would be paid $3.70 per cubic yard

for the first 70,000 cubic yards and

only the yardage above 70,000 cubic

yards would be subject to a possible

price adjustment under the variation

in estimated quantities clause.

The Government representatives,

from the Contracting Officer to the

Assistant Attorney General for the Civil

Division, have all taken the same position.

The question of how to arrive at

an equitable adjustment of the contract

price, however, was a horse of a different

color, where no one agreed with anyone |

else.

he Contracting Officer paid the

contractor the contract unit price which

was bid on the Estimated Quantities for

all actual quantities delivered on all

three contracts; and in his Contracting

Officers decision, he left the parties

at that status quo.

10.

The contractor appealed to the Corps

of Engineers Board of Contract Appeals

asking that the contract unit prices

be increased on quantities in excess of

100% above Estimated Quantities to the

extent that his unit costs increased on

these quantities as compared with the unit

costs on the Estimated Quantities plus

100% above Estimated Quantities.

The Government filed a counterclaim

before the Corps of Engineers Board of

Contract Appeals contending that the

contract unit prices should be reduced

by determining the average unit costs

for all yardage, to which should be

added -10% of such unit costs for profit,

and thatthis figure would be the equitably

adjusted price for the quantities in

excess of 100% above Estimated Quantities.

The Corps of Engineers Board of

Sounwact Appeals decision, which is now

the decision of The Court of Claims is

to reprice the unit price of quantities

in excess of 100% above Estimated Quantities

so as to convert that part of thecontract

to a cost plus a percentage of cost contract.

The same legal question was presented

to another panel of the Court of Claims

in Victory Construction Co., Inc. versus

The United State 10 F. 2d 1379

Tiere the Government sought reduction of

the unit prices on five pay items bid

on estimated quantities where the contract

contained the 1967 standard variation in

estimated quantities clause (32 CFR 7.603.

27 (1967), which also contained no language

indicating how to go about arriving at

an equitable adjustment. That panel

of the Court looked to the 1968 revision

of the standard variation in quantities

12.

clause, above quoted, for guidance ir

interpretation and said that it was

clear from the language used tl.at the

clause does not contemplate a repricins

of the contract price merely tecsuse

tuere is a variation in quantities by

more t.an 15% and that any repricings

would be confined to the cost differentiels

directly attributable to the volune deviation

greater than 15%. Thus this panel of

‘the Court of Cleims reversed Tie Corps

of Enginners Board Contract A»peals and

refused to reduce the contract unit rrices

on any of the overrun items which were

bid on estimated quantities on tue basis

that the Government failed to show any

decrease in costs due solely to the variation

in quantities in excess of 15% above

estimated qantities.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

The contractor in the Victory case

was not seeking an increase in the contract

prices so the court was not called upon

to determine whether he would have been

entitled to an increase in the contract

price if he had shown an increase in

his costs attributable to overrun exceeding

15% of estimated quantities.

Comparing the Victory case to the

case at bar. the Government failed to

show a decrease in costs attributable

to the volume overrun in both cases,

but got a price reduction in the case

at bar. Further, the contractor in

the case at bar affirmatively proved

a cost increase directly attributable

to the volume overrun in excess of 100%

above estimated quantities precisely

in accordance with the criteria laid

down in the Victory case.

Another similarity in the cases

is that in both cases the Government

14.

seeks to penalize an efficient contractor

who keeps his costs down by repricing

his contract price to give him only «sis

eost plus an arbitrary proportion of

his costs as profit on overrun quantities.

STATUTES AND REGULATION INVOLVED

The only statute involved is 32

CFR 7.603.27 (1968) which is the same

as ASPR 7.603.27 as above set out in its

entirety.

STATEMENT OF CASE

The basic facts are set forth a bove.

The plaintiff proved, and the Corps of

Engineers Board of Contract Appeals

found, that the plaintiff contractor

had increased costs due solely to volume

overruns on quantities on his three contracts

as follows:

(a) San Patricio county - contract No.

DACW 0022, $1.70 per cu. y@. on 107,972

cu. yds.

15.

(b) City of Portland - contract No. DACW

0023, $3.05 per cu. yd. on 7,477 cu. yds.

(c) City of Rockport - contract No. DACW

0024, .21 per cu. yd. on 41,273 yds.

Consistent with the interpretation

of the variation in Estimated Quantity

Clause in The Victory Construction Case,

Supra, and by the plain unambiguous wording

of the Variation in Estimated Quantities

Clause, these increased costs due solely

to the variation in quantities above 100%

of estimated quantities, should be added

to. the contract price on the three contracts

resulting in the f¥llowing final contract

prices.

(a) San Patricio County - contract 0022;

$3.70 per cu. yd. on first 70,000 cu.

yds., $3.70 + $1.70 or $5.40 per cu. yd.

on the overrun of 107,972 cu. yds. Since

the contractor has already been paid

$3.70 per cu. yd. for this yardage, the

government owes the contractor $1.70

16.

17.

41 USCA 321,322.

per cu. yd. on 107,972 cu. yds. The facts with respect to the costs

(b) City 6f Portland - contract 0023; incurred by the plaintiff - contractor

$3.50 per cu. yd. on first 50.000 cu. were Stipulated after audit by the con-

yds., $3.50 + $3.05 or $6.55 per cu. yd. tractor's auditor. The C.P.A. also

on overrun 7,477 cu. yds. Since the allocated the costs attributable to

contractor has been paid $3.50 per cu. estimated quantities plus 100% above

yd. for this yardage, the government estimated quantities, often called first

owes. the contractor $3.05 per wi: ya. costs in the record; and costs attributable

on 7,477 cu. yds. to quantities in excess of 100% above

an - ° -

(c) City of “ockport - contract 0024; estimated quantities, often called second

0,000 cu. yds.;

$3.07 per cu. yd. on first 10, vows costs in the record. Since the plaintiff

dx $3.28 per cu. yd. on overrun

$3.07 + .21 or $3.26 Pe 4 corporation had no other contracts

; contractor has |

41,273 cu. yds. Since the a before or since these three contracts.

; ; . for this

been paid $3.07 per cu. yd ’ it was relatively easy to accurately

} “owes the contractor

yardage, the government ‘owe determine and allocate these costs. The

-21 per cus yd. for 41,273 cu. yds.

JURISDICTION OF TEE COURT OF CLAIMS

Engineer Board accepted the stipulated

costs and the allocation of costs and

This case arose from. contracts having found such other facts as were necessary

a disputes clause which is subject to i eeiiied: Ghimedits tne sens

judicial review under the Wunderlich Act,

18.

came to the Court of Claims on a question

of law only, namely, the application of

the Variation in Estimated Quantity clause

to the facts found by the Board.

the case came on for hearing before

The Court of Claims-on Cross Motion for

Summary Judgment under the Court of Claim

Rule 163 (b)(2).

: ARGUMENT

The argument in support of plaintiff

contractor's position is inherent in

the facts heretofore set forth. There

is. to our knowledge,no precedent except

The Victory Construction Company case

heretofore cited.

The Variation in Estimated Quantities

Clause states in plain language that the

adjustment shall be based upon any increase

or decrease in costs due solely to the

variation....-.

If there is an increase in costs

19.

due to the variation, the contractor

is entitled to have such increase in

costs added to the contract price he

bid for the work on the effected adjustable

quantities. If there is a decrease in

costs due to the variation, the Government

is entitled to have the decrease sub-

tracted from the contract price on such

eifected adjuw table quantities. If there

is neither an increase or a decrease.

the contract price stays the same.

That is the holding of Victory Con-

struction Company Inc ted Ver

United States, 510 F. 2d 1379 (1975).

RESPECTFULLY,

EDWARD ‘i. tSotom

ATTORNEY OF RECORD

SAM 0. BUCKLEY

KEILER & BUCKLEY

OF COUNSEL

9047 Jefferson Highway

a

20.

RIVER RIDGE, LOUISIANA

ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER

JACK SANDERS CORPORATION

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, EDWARD H. KEILER, Attorney of

Record for the petition,Jack Sanders

Corporation, hereby certify that I have

this day mailed, air mail postage prepaid,

3 true copies of the foregoing petition

for certiorari, to The Honorable Solicitor

General, Department of Justice, Washington.

D.C. 20530 and 3 true copies of this

foregoing petition for certiorari to

Hon. Rex E. Lee, Assistant Attorney

General, Civil Division, Department of

Justice,Washington, D.C. 20530, and three

true copies of the foregoing petition

for certiorari to Honorable Gerald L.

Schrader, Attorney, Civil Division,

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

20530 as service on the defendant, the

United State of America and its counsel

of record in:this case.

This the 28th day of December 1976

21.

| ae? ae

EDWARD H. KEILFR

22

la

APPENDIX 1

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Office of the Chief of Engineers

Washington, D.C. 20314

Before the Corps of Engineers Board of

Contract Appeals

Eng BCA No. 3363

Appeal of

JACK SANDERS CORPORATION

Contract Nos. DACW: 4-71-C-0022.

0023 & 0024

APPEARANCES FOR APPELLANT:

Keiler & Buckley

Edward H. Keiler, Esq.

Sam O. Buckley, Esq.

New Orleans, Louisiana

APPEARANCES FOR GOVERNMENT:

Charles J. Sheridan, Esq.

_Chief Trial Attorney

Washington, D. C.

Cecil E. Reinke, Esq.

Richard J. Hoffman, Esq.

_ Galveston, Texas

<5

2a

OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE JELLICO

The question in this appeal requires that we deter-

mine the unit price to be applied to quantities in ex-

cess of those provided for in the Variation in Es-

timated Quantities provision of the contract.

The three contracts from which the dispute arises

were for removal and disposal of debris caused by

Hurricane CELIA which struck the Gulf Coast of Tex-

as in the summer of 1970. The contract provisions per-

tinent to the dispute are identical in each of the three

contracts. The only differences in the contracts relate

to the geographical area to be cleaned up. the es-

timated quantity of material to be removed and dis-

posed of in each geographical area, and the price bid

under each of the three contracts. Contract No.

DACW64-71-C-0002 calls for cleanup of San Patricio

County, Texas, Contract No. DACW64-71-C-0023 of the

city of Portland, Texas, and Contract No. DACW64-71-

C-0024 of the city of Rockport, Texas. We shall

hereinafter refer to the three contracts simply as the

San Patricio, Portland and Rockport contracts.

The format of contract used was entitled “Contract

for Dismantling, Demolition or Removal", apparently

in an attempt to follow the format provided in the

Armed Services Procurement Regulations, para-

graph 16-404, which is entitled “Contracts for Dis- -

mantling, Demolition or Removal of Improvements”.

ASPR 16-404 and its implementing subparagraphs do

not prescribe inclusion of a “Variation in Estimated

Quantities” clause. However, on the face of the bid pay

schedule in the present contracts was printed the

following “Variation in Estimated Quantities” clause:

24

3a

Variations in Quantities: The quantities

shown in the schedule of the bid form will

serve as a basis for completion of bids for the

purpose of determining the low bidder. Pay-

ment will be made at the unit price for the ac-

tual quantity of work performed under each

item be it more or less than the quantity es-

timated. However, if the actual quantity

varies more than one hundred percent (100%)

above or thirty percent (30%) below the es-

timated quantity stated in this contract, an

equitable adjustment in the contract unit price

shall be made upon demand of either party.

Appellant strongly maintains that the “Variations

in Estimated Quantities” clause prescribed in ASPR

7-603.27 for construction contracts should have been

inserted in the contracts and that the contracts should

be read as if it had been inserted. If the ASPR construc-

tion clause is applicable it would contain a sentence

not present in the contracts in dispute which reads:

The equitable adjustment shall be based

upon any increase or decrease in costs due

solely to the variations above..... percent or

below .... percent of the estimated quantity.

We do not perceive any real difference, in the con-

text of the present dispute, between the Variation in

Estimated Quantities provision printed on the face of

the pay schedules and that prescribed by ASPR 7-

603.27. Whichever is applicable, the dispute is with

respect to which cubic yards of debris removed and

disposed of are adjustable as beyond the permissible

2S

4a

percentage (100%) of the clause. There is testimony in

the record that a government official at a pre-bid con-

ference informed bidders that unit prices would be ad-

justed only upwards, not downwards. We do not

believe that testimony credible. Even if believed. such

an assertion by a government official will not prevail

over the clear intent of the contract language that the

adjustment machinery may be invoked for the benefit

of either party.

Appellant contends that the basic contract units and

the non-adjustable overrun are those removed and dis-

posed of first. The government would treat all units re-

moved and disposed of as fungible, giving no iden-

tifiable status to any of them in frame of time. These

abstractly stated concepts should become clearer as

we deal with specific facts and figures relevant to each

of the three contracts. Before we turn to those facts and

figures, other ccnt. act provisions bearing on the dis-

pute will be mentioned.

The government places great emphasis upon the

fact that the Technical Provisions describes the Scope

of the work in the following broad terms:

The work covered by this section consists of

furnishing all labor, material and equipment

and performing all work necessary for

removal of all designated debris in or on all

city streets, including side walks or if no side

walk exists 15° back of curb on each side of the

street, and in or on all alleys within the boun-

daries indicated in the schedule and designat-

.

26

5a

ed on drawings and other areas including

private property that may bedesignated.....

All debris larger than six (6) inches max-

imum dimension will be removed. It may be

necessary for the contractor to return to any

given area several times to leave it in an

acceptable condition....

The area from which debris is to be removed

is the entire area within the corporate city

limits, as applicable.

Also, the SPECIAL CONDITIONS contain a provi-

sion which has some influence upon the decision

which we reach. It provides:

PERFORMANCE SCHEDULE: Work shall

commence within 24 hours after receipt of the

notice to proceed by the Contractor and shall

be completed within 15 calendar days after

work commences. This allowable perform-

ance time shall be extended on a proportional

basis for actual quantities in excess of es-

timated quantities stated in the schedules.

There was no “Changed Conditions” provision in

the contract.

The parties have agreed by stipulation to many of

the detailed facts and figures pertinent to the dispute.

Except as otherwise stated, the facts and figures

hereinafter recounted are embraced within the

stipulations of the parties.

ZT

6a

Each contract contained two bid items as follows:

i. Remove and Dispose of Debris within the [geo-

graphical location] as described in the Technical

Provisions.

2. Furnish equipment and operator at dump site.

Appellant originally claimed under both bid items.

but the parties have agreed that separate treatment of

Bid Item No. 2 is unnecessary because of its relative

insignificance and have merged it and its attendant

costs into the dispute under Bid Item No. 1. Such an ap-

proach simplified presentation and consideration of

the case and will make no appreciable difference in the

outcome.

San Patricio Contract

This contract, like the other two, was awarded on 7

August 1970. The contract unit price was $3.70 per

cubic yard, the estimated quantity 35,000. On 28 Au-

gust 1970, appellant had removed and disposed of 70.-

000 cubic yards of debris. However, the debris

generated from the hurricane had not been exhausted.

Appellant continued to remove and dispose of debris

through 10 October 1970. A total of 177,972 cubic yards

of debris was disposed of. Therefore, there are 107,972

cubic yards for which the contract unit price is subject

to adjustment.

Appellant’s total costs under this contract were

$362,079.30. A certified public accountant made an

analysis of these costs and allocation as between the

2g

7a

period prior and subsequent to 28 August 1970. He

determined the “prior” costs to be $70,498.58 and the

“subsequent” costs to be $291,580.72. The government

questions the allocation of certain items of cost as

between the two periods but, because of its position as

to the proper method to be used to compute the price

adjustment of the 107,972 cubic yards beyond the 70.-

000 provided for in the original estimate plus the 100°7

subject to the Variation in Estimated Quantities

clause, did not make its own allocation as between

costs prior and subsequent to 28 August 1970. The

items challenged are of no great consequence, relating

only to overhead type items, whereas practically all of

the costs incurred were direct in nature.

Using the CPA's allocation, appellant contends that

its costs for the first 70,000 cubic yards was $1.00 per

cubic yard ($70,498.98 ; 70,000) and that its costs for the

last 107,972 cubic yards was $2.70 ($291,580.12 + 107.-

972). Appellant contends that, since it made a profit of

$2.70 per cubic yard [the contract price ($3.70) less its

costs ($1.00)] on the first 70,000 cubic yards, that profit

should be continued for the last 107,972 cubic yards

and that the adjusted price for that yardage should be

$5.40 ($2.70 profit plus its cost of $2.70). This is the

basis for appellant's claim. Total contract earnings

would be:

70,000 cubic yards @ $3.70 259,000.00

107,972 cubic yards @ 5.40 983,048.80

842,048.80

The government challenges the claim on several

grounds. Its most vehement challenge is to the con-

24

8a

cept that the first 70,000 cubic yards of debris removed

and disposed of is identifiable as the 35.000 contract

quantity plus the 35,000 as to which price is not ad-

justable because of the Variation in Quantities clause.

In other words, the government contends that the con-

tracts do not contemplate price adjustments based

upon comparison of costs expended in removal and

disposal of the initial estimated quantities of debris

plus 100% thereof with the cost expended under the

contracts for removal of the remaining debris. The

government argues that the contracts contemplated

cleanup of an entire geographical area, and not merely

removal of a certain amount of debris. Under its con-

cept, it is not exclusively the cubic yards of debris

removed subsequent to the first estimated quantities

plus 100% that are subject to equitable adjustment.

Rather, the overrun quantities should be considered to

be distributed merely throughout the entire scope of

work under each contract. Because of the large over-

run quantities it became possible for appellant to

achieve the initial contract estimate plus 100% over-

run with use of large equipm x .:t at relatively low cost.

As the debris became smaller and less isolated near

the end of the job, its removal became more and more

difficult and costly.

According to the government, the way to arrive atan

equitable adjustment under this contract, and the

other two, is to determine the total costs incurred by

the appellant for material, labor and performance, in-

cluding overhead; to add to this an appropriate factor

for profit; and then divide the total contract cost plus

allowable profit by the number of cubic yards of debris

removed under the contract to arrive at what would be

Se’

9a.

an equitable price per cubic yard for the work. The es-

timated quantity of debris to be removed under each

contract plus 100% thereof should be paid at the

specified unit price. The remainder, i.e.. the number of

cubic yards subject to equitable adjustment, should be

paid at the determined adjusted equitable price. In

attempting to apply this formula, the government

makes the following calculation for the San Patricio

contract:

Start with total stipulated cost $362.079.30

Divide by total cubic yards 177.972

Equals the cost per cubic yard 2.03

Multiply by the yards of overrun | 107,972

Equals the cost of overrun 219,183.16

Add suggested 10% profit __ 21,918.32

Equals the total payment for overrun $241,101.48

Divide by yards in overrun 107,972

Equals suggested equitable price $ 2.23

The total contract earnings would be:

70,000 cubic yards @ $3.70 259,000.00

107,972 cubic yards @ $2.23 241,101.48

500,101.48

Portland Contract

This contract also was awarded on 7 August 1970.

The contract unit price was $3.50 per cubic yard and

the estimated quantity of debris 25.000 cubic yards. On

28 August 1970, appellant had removed and disposed

of 50.000 cubic yards. Performance continued and was

3/

10a

completed on 4 September 1970. A total of 57,477 cubic

yards was disposed of, making 7.477 cubic yards sub-

ject to adjustment.

Appellant's total costs were $111.413.79. This

amount was broken down by appellant's CPA as $77.-

039.00 incurred before and $34,374.79 after 28 August

1970. Under appellant's theory. its costs for the first

50,000 cubic yards was $1.54 per cubic yard ($77,039.00

+ 50,000) and for the last 7.477 cubic yards was $4.59

(34,374.79 + 7,477). Appellant contends that. since it

made a profit of $1.96 per cubic yard [the contract price

($3.50) less its cost ($1.54)] on the first 50,000 cubic

yards, that profit should be continued for the last 7.477

cubic yards and that the adjusted price for that yar-

dage should be $6.55 ($1.96 profit plus its cost of $4.59).

Total contract earnings would be:

50,000 cubic yards @ $3.50 $175,000.00

7,477 cubic yards @ 6.55 48,974.35

$223,974.35

Using reasoning similar to that for the San Patricio

contract, the government would calculate the adjusted

price for 7,477 cubic yards as follows:

Start with total stipulated cost $111,413.79

Divide by total cubic yards 57.477

Equals the cost per cubic yard 1.94

Multiply by yards in overrun 7,477

Equals cost of overrun 14,505.38

Add suggested 10% profit __1,450.54

Equals the total payment for overrun $ 15,955.92

Divide by yards in overrun 7,477

Equals suggested equitable price $ 2.13

lla

Total contract earnings would be:

50,000 cubic yards @ $3.50 $175.000.00

7.477 cubic yards @ 2.13 _15.955.92

190.955.92

Rockport Contract

This contract also was awarded on 7 August 1970.

The contract unit price was $3.07 per cubic yards and

the estimated quantity of debris 5,000 cubic yards. On

14 August 1970, appellant had removed and disposed

of 10,000 cubic yards. Performance continued and was

completed on 7 October 1970. A total of 51.273 cubic

yards was disposed of, making 41.273 subject to ad-

justment.

Appellant’s total costs were $109,627.06. This

amount was broken down by appellant's CPA as $19.-

100.07 incurred before and $90,527.99* after 14 August

1970. Under appellant's theory. its cost for the first 10.-

000 cubic yards was $1.91 per cubic yard ($19,100.07 :

10,000) and for the last 41,273 cubic yards was $2.12*

(90,527 : 41,273). Appellant contends that since it made

a profit of $1.16 on the first 10,000 cubic yards, that

profit should be continued for the last 41,273 cubic

yards and that the adjusted price for that yardage

should be $3.28 ($1.16 profit plus its costs of $2.12). The

total contract earnings would be:

10,000 cubic yards @ $3.07 $ 30,700.00

41,273 cubic yards @ 3.28 135,375.44

166,075.44

* There are mathematical errors in these computations made by

appellant. but since they do not affect the resuit of our F decision we

leave them as presented.

4s

i2a

Using reasoning similar to that for the other two

contracts. the government would calculate the ad-

justed price for 41.273 cubic yards as follows:

Start with total stipulated cost $109.627.06

Divide by total cubic yards 51,273

Equals the cost per cubic yards 2.14

Multiply by the yards in overrun 41,273

Equals the cost of overrun 88,324.22

Add suggested 10% profit _ 8,832.42

Equals the total payment for overrun $ 97,156.64

Equals suggested equitable price $ 2.35

The total contract earnings would be:

10,000 cubic yards @ $3.07 $30,700.00

41,273 cubic yards @ 2.35 _97.156.64

127,856.64

DECISION

While the matter is not entirely free from doubt, we

have come to the conclusion that appellant's, rather

than the government’s, theory better identifies the

yardage of debris which is subject to adjustment.

We start with the thought that, except for inclusion

of the Variation in Quantities clause in the contract.

appellant would have been entitled to be paid at the

contract unit price, no more and no less, for each of the

cubic yards disposed of. When a price adjustment

comes into play we find it a more logical concept to ap-

ply the adjustment after the basic contract concept has

been applied rather than to introduce an artificial con-

3¢

13a

cept of fungibility of all the material as the govern-

ment would have us do. Such an artificia] concept will

often be necessary because of difficulties in allocating

costs to units produced as to time of production. but

the difficulties of allocation in the present case are

very minor.

We are persuaded that appellant's reading of the

contract as to which units are adjustable is more com-

patible with the literal terms of the contract. This con-

clusion is reinforced by the fact that it is consistent

with the way time is to be adjusted for overrun quan-

tities. The contract provides that the time for per-

formance is to be extended on a proportional basis for

actual quantities in excess of estimated quantities

stated in the schedule. This approach is inconsistent

with the government's theory that the contract. as

written, gives recognition to the fact that the easy

quantities were to be achieved first and the harder

quantities later. If this theory prevailed in the writing

of the contract document, then it should have been con-

templated that the overrun quantities would have

taken more time than the original quantities for per-

formance. To be consistent more than a proportional

time extension would be provided for overruns.

We have determined that we accept appellant's

theory of the case. We do so only because we consider

ourselves bound by a literal construction of the con-

tract. We are well aware that the government's theory

of the case is the more equitable one because it was un-

doubtedly true that the first debris removed was the

easiest and that removal became more difficult near

the end for a number of reasons. However. we must

Am

14a

apply the contractas we find it since we have no power

of reformation. If an inequitable result prevails. it is

because the wrong contract was made to begin with.

Furthermore. the inequity was not mitigated by inclu-

sion of a Changed Conditions clause.

While we accept appellant's identification of the

units to be adjusted, we do not accept its suggest-

ed manner of repricing those adjustable units.

Appellant's suggested manner of adjusting the ad-

justable overrun would continue its profit per unit

earned during the early part of the work to the units

performed during the more difficult later stages of the

work. We do not accept such an obviously inequitable

approach. While we have indicated that we feel bound

to accept what may be an inequitable application of

the basic contract as written, we are not obliged to ex-

tend that interpretation in making the adjustment. In-

deed, we are precluded from doing so for the contract

itself calls for an equitable adjustment. Perhaps, the

inequitableness of appellant's contention as to how

the adjustment is to be made is best illustrated by en-

visioning the reverse of the situation which occurred

here. Suppose that a contractor were shown to have

suffered a loss on the original, unadjusted quantities.

It is inconceivable that the loss should be imposed on

repriced quantities. The unit price for the adjustable

quantities should be based upon the reasonable cost of

such quantities plus a fair profit.

We are not fully satisfied with our record as a basis

for repricing the price for the adjustable units. The

proof both of the reasonable cost and of a rate of fair

profit for performing this cleaning work is unsatisfac-

S56

15a

tory. Nevertheless, we make the best of the record that

we have by accepting the government's unrefuted

suggestion as to profit rate and appellants CPAs

“prior” and “subsequent” cost allocations. While the

government has cast some doubt upon these

allocations, it has not attempted to make similar

allocations of its own and, in any event, the items as to

which it raised questions are not substantia] in the

final figures.

We fix appellant's earnings on the adjustable units

under the three contracts as:

San Patricio cost $291.580.72

107.972 cubic yards profit + _ 29,158.07

earnings $320,738.79

first 70.000 cubic _259.000.00

yards

Total contract earnings $579,738.79

-ortland cost $ 34,374.79

7,477 cubic yards profit __3,437.48

earnings $ 37,812.27

first 50,000 cubic 175,000.00

yards

Total contract earnings $212,812.27

Rockport cost $ 90,527.99

41,273 cubic yards profit __ 9,052.80

earnings 99,580.79

first 10,000 cubic 30,700.00

yards

Total contract earnings ;, $130.280.79

27

16a

Recapitulating the total contract earnings are com-

puted as follows:

o

Appellant Government Board

San Patricio $ 842.048.80 $500.101.48 $579.738.79

Portland 223.974.35 190,955.92 212,812.27

Rockport 166,075.44 127,856.64 130,280.79

$1,232,098.59 $818,914.04 $922.831.85

The appeal is allowed in part and denied in part as

indicated above.

Date: 31 July 1974

/s/ JOHN P. JELLICO

JOHN P. JELLICO

Administrative Judge

Chairman of Board

/s/ JOHN H. RYAN /s/ HORACE C. REOSTI

JOHN H. RYAN HORACE C. REOSTI

Administrative Judge Administrative Judge

Member of Board Member of Board

3x

17a

I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Corps

of Engineers Board of Contract Appeals Decision No.

3363, appeal of JACK SANDERS CORPORATION. un-

der Contract Nos. DACW64-71-C-0022, 0023 & 0024.

Date:

FRANCES H. ACETO

Recorder

37

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS

NO 79-75

JACK SANDERS CORPORATION

VERSUS

THE UNITED STATES

Sam 0. Buckley, attorney of record.

for plaintiff, Keiler & Buckley. of counsel.

Gerald Schrader,with whom was Assistant

Attorney General, Rex E. Lee, for defendant.

Before COWEN, Chief Judge. DURFEE

Senior Judge. and SKELTON, Judge.

ORDER

This case comes before the court

on the parties’ cross motions for summary

judgment under Rule 163 (b)(2) in a case

involving a review under the Wunderlick

Act of a decision rendered by the Corps

of Engineers Board of Yontract Appeals.

Plaintiff was awarded three contracts

for removal and disposal of debris caused

40

by hurricane "Celia"., which struck the Gulf

Coast in 1970. The actual quantities of

debris removed by plaintiff substantially

exceeded the quantities estimated in the cone

tracts. The sole issue’is the amount of

the equitable adjustment to which plaintiff

is entitled for removal of the excess.

and the answer requires only an interpreta-

tion of the "Variations in Quantities"

clause of the contracts. Thus, the case

involves a question of law with no factual

disputes.

Upon consideration of the Motions and

briefs and after hearing oral argument,

the court finds that the decision of the

Board is supported by substantial evidence

and is correct as a matter of law.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the decision

of the Board is affirmed in all respects;

plaintiff‘s motion for summary judgment

is denied; defendant's cross motion for

4 |

summary judgment is also denied, and its

counterclaim is dismissed.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is

hereby remanded to the trial judge in order

to give the parties an opportunity to enter

into a stipulation for the entry of a

judgment in favor of plaintiff in accordance

with the deeision of the Board; provided,

howeyer, that if no such stipulation is

entered into within 30 days from the date

of this order, the trial judge shall

remand the case to the Board in order that

it may make an administrative determination

cf the amount of the equitable adjustment

due plaintiff on the contracts pursuant to

the Board's decision of July 31, 1974.

BY THE COURT

S/ WILSON COWEN

Chief Judge

June 25, 1976

42

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS

NO. 79-75

JACK SANDERS CORPORATION

VERSUS

THE UNITED STATES

SAM O.BUCKLEY,attorney of record, ior

plaintiif, Keiler & Buckley, of counsel.

Gerald Schrader, with whom was Assistant

Attorney General Rex E. Lee, for defendant.

BEFORE COWEN, Chief Judge, DURFEE, Senior

Judge, and SKELTON, Judge.

ORDER

This case comes before the court on Defen-

dant's Motion for an Order Amending the

court's order of June 25, 1976, and Plaintiff's

Motion for Re-hearing. The motions of both

parties state that in their briei and

argument to the court, they tailed to

properly explain or clarify the effect of

43

the decision of the Corps of Engineers

Board of Contract Appeals and consequently,

that no final judgment can be entered in

conformity with the court's order.

Upon consideration of the parties’

motions, the court finds that:

1. On the three contracts the total

contract price which the contracting

officer allowed and paid to plaintiff was

the sum of $1,017,074.01, less a discount

of $50,853.71 withheld by the contract-

ing officer because of prompt payment by

the government, or a total net payment

of $966,220.30.

2. In support of its counterclaim

in the hearing before the Board, the

government contended as follows:

Should the Board determine the

Appellant to be entitled to an

increase in contract price, under

any of the concerned contracts

then the United States believes

that it would upon payment of

such monies within the discount

period be entitled to a 5%

“4

prompt payment discount. On the

other hand, should the Board reach

an equitable adjustment decreasing

contract prices, the United States

would expect to allow Appellant a

credit equal to the prompt payment

discount and recover only 95% of

the determined reduction.

3. In the hearing before the court

and in its Motion to Amend the Order of

June 25, 1976, the Government took an

entirely different position regarding the

Claimed cash discount. Before the court

the government contends that if the Board's

determination of the adjusted contract

price is adopted, the amounts found by

the Board should be further reduced by

a discount of 5 percent. Even if it

should be decided that the contractual

provision covering cash discounts is

applicable to the adjusted contract

prices, the court finds that this conten-

tion is erroneous and rejects it, because

it fails to credit the contractor with

4S

the previously deducted discount and

would impose the discount for prompt

payment twice: once upon the original

payments made by the contracting officer,

and again upon the basis of the Board's

decision.

ie ‘Ls > The plaintiff admits that it

has been paid the contract price as

stated in- paragraph 1 above, but has

not admitted. that the government is

entitded: ten any discount on the "total. :

contract earnings"..as determined by the.

Poar@efceoyeih Sis Lsavomaz rot edscrtnos

$.-There ig.no,indi¢ggtion in the ;.

Board's: decision, that it. made- any

determination.as) to. the: applicability...

of the cash, discount. proyision;of the ,

contracts te the adjusted contract |

prices, found byothe. Board. .::: a

On. theibasiscof the foregoing. it

is'heveby «.) ositiciue sv

ve corms 6 ood BEST COPY AVAILABLE

46

ORDERED that the: courts order and

judgment of June 25, 1976 is hereby

amended in its entirety to read as

follows:

This case somes before the court

on the parties’ cress motions for summary

judgment under Rule 163 (b) (2) in a

case involving a review under the Wunder-

lich Act of a decision rendered by the

Corps of Engineers Board of Contract =

Appeals. Plaintiff was awarded three

contracts for removal and disposal of

debris caused by hurricane "Celia, *

which struck the Gulf Coast in 1970.

The actual quantities of debris removed

by plaintiff substantially exceeded the

quantities estimated in the contracts.

The sole issue is the amount of the

equitable adjustment to which plaintiff

and defendant are entitled for removal

of the excess, and the answer requires

47

only an interpretation of the "Varia-

tions in Quantities" clause of the contr-

acts. Thus, the case involves a question

oi law with no factual disrutes.

Upon consideration of the motions

and briefs of the parties and after hear-

ing oral argument, the court finds that

the decision of the Board as to the.

contractor's earnings on the adjustable

units under the three contracts is

Supported by substantial evidence and

is correct as a matter of law.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the

decision of the Board is affirmed and

the case is remanded to the Corps of

Engineers Board of Contract Appeals

which is instructed to determine:

1. Whether the cash discount

provision of the contract has any

application to the adjusted contract

price of the three contracts, and if so.

how it is to be applied to each contract.

4&

2. The amount wf the equitable

adjustment to which the government is

entitled under the Board's decision on

the San Patricio and Rockport contracts.

3. The amount ot the equitable

adjustment to which plaintiff is entitled

under the Board's decision on the Portland

contract.

4. The net amount which the govern-

ment is entitled to recover on its

counterclaim.

Pursuant to Rule 149, court proceed-

ings shall be stayed for a period not to

exceed 6 months in order to enable the

Board to make the determinations stated

above. Defendant's attorney is designated

to advise the court, by letter to the

trial judge, with a copy to orposing

counsel, of the status of the proceedings

on remand at intervals of “O uays or less.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that except as

4G

Stated above, the defendant's Motion to

Alter or Amend the Judgment of June 25,

1976, and Plaintiff's Motion for Rehearing

are each hereby denied.

BY THE COURT

September 30, 1976 s/ wILSoN ‘COWEN

Chief Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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