Petition — Stops v. Little Horn State Bank

FILED

JAN 5 1077

a names a

MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

No. 76-46 =93 1*

ROBERT STOPS AND NORMA STOPS,

Petitioners,

Vv.

LITTLE HORN STATE BANK,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

THOMAS J. LYNAUGH

THOMAS K. SCHOPPERT

CATE, LYNAUGH, FITZGERALD & Huss

Suite 500, Midland National

Bank Building

303 North Broadway

Billings, Montana 59101

Counsel for Petitioners

as

WILSON - EPES PRINTING Co INC. - RE 7-6002 - WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001

a

EE Se CP ARE hy Nae

1. The decision below is in conflict with controlling

decisions of this Court ......................._.

2. The decision below overlooks the quasi-sovereign

status of the Crow Tribe and destroys tribal self-

EEE Se enc = PNR

3. The decision below creates confusion and con-

tradicts decisions in other jurisdictions...

a. The decision below creates jurisdictional

confusion among Indian tribes and peoples

i

b. The decision below is inconsistent with prior

federal and state court holdings...

i a a Deh

10

13

13

14

16

la

1b

lc

II

CITATIONS

CASES: Page

Annis Vv. Dewey County Bank, 334 F. Supp. 138

(D.S.D. 1971) 8,14

Arizona ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle, 418 F.2d 682

I iki 14, 15

Bad Horse v. Bad Horse, 517 P.2d 893 (Mont.

1974) .. 6

Benally v. Marcum, 553 P.2d 1270 (N.M. 1976) .... 14

Big Eagle v. Andrea, 418 F. Supp. 126 (D.S.D.

1976) ia eat ae 12

Blackwolf v. District Court, 493 P.2d 1298 (Mont.

1972) . ieciacahnatibiiiiiaeaictietaiagi aati 6

Bryan v. Itasca County, —— U.S. —~—, 96 S.Ct.

2102 (1976) ........... - die 7

Commissioner v. Brun, 174 N.W.2d 120 (Minn.

RU hotntieneibiietiaiiaeteeaticiiess ig 15

County of Beltrami v. County of Hennepin, 264

Minn. 406, 119 N.W.2d 25 (1968)... 15

Crow Tribe v. Deernose, 487 P.2d 1138 (Mont.

RE eee etot Sele OE , ....4, 6, 7, 11, 14

Dodge Vv. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 17 (D. Ariz. 1968) . 12

Fisher Vv. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976)... 6, 7, 9,

12, 13

Fransciso v. State, No. 12444-PR (Ariz., decided

I i 15

Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971)... 5, 6, 9,

11, 14, 15

Little Horn State Bank v. Stops, 555 P.2d 211

ST ENE ee at 1,9

McClanahan vy. Arizona State Taz Comm’n, 411

SI 7, 8,9, 10,11

Martin v. Denver Juvenile Court, 493 P.2d 1098

SE i ea 15

Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes,

ee 10, 11, 13

Morton Vv. Mancari, 417 U.S. Be CD piessincntennse 7

Nelson v. Dubois, 232 N.W.2d 54 (N.D. 1975) _...... 11

Schantz v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67 (8th

> er ar 11

Il

CITATIONS—Continued

Page

Security State Bank v. Pierre, 511 P.2d 325 (Mont.

RTE a ror i ae ce 6

State ex rel. Firecrow Vv. District Court, 586 P.2d

ag 6

State ex rel. Jron Bear v. District Court, 512 P.2d

1292 (Mont. 19783) - re an oS A santlinatabiaiei 6

State ex rel. McDonald vy. District Court, 496 P.2d

. % nes bee 11

State ex rel. Old Elk v. District Court, 552 P.2d

1394 (Mont. 1976) . : me 14

State Securities, Inc. v. Anderson, 506 P.2d 786

a i ~

Williams v. Lee, 319 P.2d 998 (Ariz. ss 8

Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) _....__. 8, 9, 12, 14

United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886)... 8

United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975)... 7,9

United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916) sada 8-9

CONSTITUTIONS

Montana Constitution, 1889, Ordinance I, Sec. 2... 11

Montana Constitution, 1972, Article I... 11

TREATIES

Treaty with the Crow, 1825, 7 Stat. 266 ss 10

Treaty of Fort Laramie, 1851, 11 Stat. 749 10

Treaty with the Crows, 1868, 15 Stat.649... 10, 13

STATUTES

Agreement with Crows, 1881, 22 Stat. 42 10

Agreement with Crows, 1881, 22 Stat. 157 _..__ : 10

Enabling Act of Montana, 1889, 25 Stat. 767 ___. 11

Act of April 27, 1904, 33 Stat. 352... 10

Act of June 4, 1920, 41 Stat. 751... 10

Act of May 19, 1926, 44 Stat. 566... ts 10

Act of August 15, 1953, 67 Stat.588 ssi 2, 4,5, 11, 14

IV

CITATIONS—Continued

Page

Indian Civil Rights Act, 1968, 82 Stat. 78, 25

TS eee 4,6

Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461 et

, 9

OD cicctide shiieinaibiatianibdannetiaiiiciiiatdliata aii

Indian Self-Determination Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450

NSE ec ome ape Dy a a 9

Organic Act of the Territory of Montana, 1864,

13 Stat. 85 _. sich ihatiabaeati td iaaa 11

| ° ' S| ae PS Se a OD ER TER Oo 12

EET ne Se ae ene eT 12

I 10

SS FCS ene oo eee Se 12

EERE a an ee 9,12

Ir Ps 2, 6, 7,8

I 3

a I 2

REGULATIONS

I 9,12

hg BREF eee 4

a 12

I 12

ee Beene 12

I US 12

RESOLUTIONS

Resolution 64-2 of the Crow Tribal Council ._.__ 3, 6, 12

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

No. 76-

ROBERT STOPS AND NORMA STOPS,

Petitioners,

Vv.

LITTLE Horn STATE BANK,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

Robert Stops and Norma Stops petition for a writ of

certiorari to review the opinion and judgment of the

Supreme Court of the State of Montana.

OPINIONS BELOW

The judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of

Montana is reported as Little Horn State Bank v. Robert

Stops and Norma Stops, 555 P.2d 211 (Mont. 1976), and

is reproduced as Appendix A. The Order and Memo-

randum of the District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial

District of the State of Montana in and for the County

of Big Horn is unreported and is reproduced as Ap-

pendix B.

2

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of

Montana was entered on October 7, 1976. The jurisdic-

tion of this court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Montana state courts and the sheriff

of Big Horn County have jurisdiction to enforce an order

of execution within the exterior boundaries of the Crow

Indian Reservation on personal property owned and on

wages earned by enrolled members of the Crow Tribe

who earn their income and reside within the Reserva-

tion, when the judgment was rendered off the Reservation.

TREATIES AND STATUTES INVOLVED

Section 7 of the Act of August 15, 1953, 67 Stat.

588, 590:

“The consent of the United States is hereby given

to any other State not having jurisdiction with re-

spect to criminal offenses or civil causes of action,

or with respect to both, as provided for in this Act,

to assume jurisdiction at such time and in such

manner as the people of the State shall, by affirma-

tive legislative action, obligate and bind the State

to assumption thereof.”

25 U.S.C. § 13822(a) (1970):

“The consent of the United States is hereby given

to any State not having jurisdiction over civil

causes of action between Indians or to which In-

dians are parties which arise in the areas of In-

dian country situated within such State to assume,

with the consent of the tribe occupying the particu-

lar Indian country or part thereof which would pe

affected by such assumption, such measure of juris-

diction over any or all such civil causes of action

arising within such Indian country or any part

thereof as may be determined by such State to the

Same extent that such State has jurisdiction over

other civil causes of action, and those civil laws of

such State that are of general application to private

persons or private property shall have the same

force and effect within such Indian country or part

thereof as they have elsewhere within that State.”

25 U.S.C. § 1826 (1970) :

“State jurisdiction acquired pursuant to this sub-

chapter with respect to criminal offenses or civil

causes of action, or with respect to both, shall be

applicable in Indian country only where the enrolled

Indians within the affected area of such Indian

country accept such jurisdiction by a majority vote

of the adult Indians voting at a special election

held for that purpose. The Secretary of the Interior

shall call such special election under such rules

and regulations as he may prescribe, when requested

to do so by the tribal council or other governing

body, or by 20 per centum of such enrolled adults.”

Resolution 64-2 of the Crow Tribal Council is repro-

duced as Appendix C.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The facts relevant to the question presented by the

petition are uncontroverted.

On July 15, 1970, the Little Horn State Bank of

Hardin, Montana, entered into a loan agreement with

Robert and Norma Stops. The amount of the loan was

$3,538.00. The transaction between the Little Horn

State Bank and the Stops took place in Hardin, Mon-

tana, which is located outside the exterior boundaries of

the Crow Indian Reservation. The Stops are enrolled

members of the Crow Tribe of indians and reside within

4

the exterior boundaries of the Reservation. A dispute

arose over non-payment of the loan and repossession by

the bank of certain farm machinery, which damaged the

Stops in the pursuit of their livelihood as farmers. The

bank filed an action in the State District Court in the

Thirteenth Judicial District in and for the County of

Big Horn and process was served upon the Stops at their’

home within the confines of the Crow Reservation.

The case proceeded to trial by jury, and on February

23, 1976, a judgment in favor of the bank was entered

in the amount of $3,541.24.

The Crow Tribe of Indians maintains a tribal court

of general jurisdiction pursuant to the Code of Federal

Regulations. This is commonly known as a Court of

Indian Offenses. 25 CFR 11.1 et seg. Also, on January

31, 1976, the Crow Tribal Council adopted its own Law

and Order Code which presently is being reviewed by the

Secretary of the Interior before its formal implementa-

tion.

The bank made no attempt to enforce its judgment in

tribal court.

Montana has not assumed civil or criminal jurisdic-

tion on the Crow Indian Reservation pursuant to Public

Law 280, the Act of August 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588, as

amended by portions of the Indian Civil Rights Act of

1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-22. See Crow Tribe v. Deernose,

158 Mont. 25, 487 P.2d 1133 (1971).

On February 23, 1976, a writ of execution was granted

by the state district court and the bank proceeded to

attach the wages of Robert Stops who is an employee of

the United States Park Service at Crow Agency, Mon-

tana. The situs of said employment is within the exterior

boundaries of the Reservation. On February 27, 1976,

5

the Stops filed a petition for injunctive relief in the

state district court and asked for an order restraining

the enforcement of the writ of execution. On the same

day, the district court issued a temporary restraining

order preventing the execution upon the wages or prop-

erty of the Stops pending a hearing. On March 24, 1976,

the district court issued an order and memorandum de-

cision (App. B) granting a permanent injunction against

levying or executing on the Wages or property of the

Stops within the Crow Indian Reservation.

The bank appealed the decision to the Supreme Court

of Montana. That court reversed the district court and

dissolved the injunction holding that:

1. A writ of execution from a state court may issue

within an Indian reservation as a means of enforcing a

valid state court judgment (App. A).

2. State action, in the form of a writ of execution

to enforce a judgment arising from a transaction which

occurred off-reservation, does not interfere with the

Tribe’s right to self-government.

Petitioner seeks review of the state decision by pe-

tition for writ of certiorari. In the alternative, peti-

tioner prays for summary reversal without briefing on

the merits.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1, The decision below is in conflict with controlling de-

cisions of this Court.

The holding below conflicts squarely with this Court’s

decision in Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423

(1971). There this Court, in reversing the Montana

Supreme Court, forbade the exercise of state jurisdic-

tion within “Indian country” unless the prescribed pro-

cedures of §7 of the Act of August 15, 1953, 67 Stat.

590 (hereinafter Public Law 280), as amended, 25 U.S.C.

§§ 1321-1326, are followed. But once again in the instant

case the Supreme Court of Montana has attempted to

undercut this clear Congressional mandate and to ignore

the strict scheme of Indian jurisdictional requirements.*

In Kennerly, a non-Indian creditor sued an Indian in

a Montana state court to collect a debt that arose on the

Blackfeet Reservation. The Blackfeet Tribe had at-

tempted to “concurrently” transfer jurisdiction to the

state courts in 1967. This Court held that in order for

the state to assume such jurisdiction, the state must

take the “affirmative legislative action” required by Pub-

lic Law 280. Kenneriy v. District Court, 400 U.S. at

427. Montana had not taken that action and, therefore,

this Court held the state had no jurisdiction over the suit.

Furthermore, after 1968, tribal consent was required to

enable a state to assume civil jurisdiction over litigation

against Indians on an Indian reservation. 25 US.C.

§ 1822(a) ; Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. at 482-

83.

In the instant case neither the state of Montana nor

the Crow Tribe has acted to transfer civil jurisdiction.*

? For a time the Montana Supreme Court followed the Kennerly

holding. E.g., Crow Tribe v. Deernose, 487 P.2d 1133 (Mont. 1971);

Blackwolf vy. District Court, 493 P.2d 1293 (Mont. 1972); and

Security State Bank v. Pierre, 511 P.2d 325 (Mont. 1973). The

court below then deviated from these cases in State ex rel. Fire-

crow V. District Court, 536 P.2d 190 (Mont. 1975), reversed per

curiam sub nom. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976).

Apparently, Fisher has made no impact on_tbe court below, because,

seven months later, the decision in this case was rendered.

*In 1964 the Crow Tribal Council passed Ordinance 64-2 (App.

C) which evidences a clear intent on the part of the Tribe to deny

Montana civil jurisdiction. Therefore, the questions raised in the

cases of State ex rel. Iron Bear v. District Court, 512 P.2d 1292

(Mont. 1973) and Bad Horse vy. Bad Horse, 517 P.2d 893 (Mont.

1974) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 847 (1974) are inapposite. See Fisher

V. District Court, 424 U.S. at 388, fn. 12.

7

The Montana Supreme Court once before recognized the

lack of state jurisdiction with relation to the Crow Tribe.

Crow Tribe v. Deernose, 487 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Mont.

1971).

The importance of these requirements for assumption

of state jurisdiction was underscored by this Court in

McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S.

164, 177-178 (1973), when it held that:

“Finally, it should be noted that Congress has now

provided a method whereby States may assume ju-

risdiction over reservation Indians. Title 25 U.S.C.

§ 1322(a) grants the consent of the United States

to States wishing to assume the criminal and civil

jurisdiction over reservation Indians, and 25 U.S.C.

§ 1324 confers upon the States the right to disregard

enabling acts which limit their authority over such

Indians. But the Act expressly provides that the

State must act ‘with the consent of the tribe oc-

cupying the particular Indian country,’ 25 U.S.C.

§ 1822(a) ....”

The above principal, known as pre-emption, is defined

commonly as a test to see whether the federal govern-

ment has authorized a particular state to extend its law

and civil jurisdiction into Indian country. It derives

from the plenary and exclusive power of the federal

government to deal with Indian tribes, United States

V. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975), and Morton v. Mancari,

417 U.S. 535 (1974), and to regulate and protect the

Indians and their property against unauthorized inter-

ference by a state. Bryan v. Itasca County —— USS.

. » 96 S.Ct. 2102, 2105, fn. 2 (1976).

The court below also subverted the clear meaning of

this Court’s recent decision in Fisher Vv. District Court,

424 U.S. 382 (1976). Fisher involved an adoption pro-

ceeding that was initiated in a Montana district court.

All of the parties involved were members of the Northern

a eiinaeeeenen sane ae —— — -——

8

Cheyeune Tribe. Two significant factors guided the Court

in Fisher. First, the Northern Cheyenne Tribe had been

protected consistently by federal treaties and statutes.

Secondly, no federal statute sanctioned interference with

tribal self-government, Montana never having assumed

civil jurisdiction pursuant to Public Law 280.

Both of the factors are applicable to the Crow Reserva-

tion. Subject-matter jurisdiction is just one aspect of civil

jurisdiction.’ The attachment process is also a significant

aspect which by definition necessitates a significant ju-

dicial intrusion into Indian country. McClanahan v. Ari-

zona State Tax Comm’n, supra. Nowhere does the lower

court indicate where a state court obtains the power to

execute on personal property within the Crow Reserva-

tion. Since the execution process is a law of general

application in Montana, the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25

U.S.C. § 1822(a), requires specific, affirmative state and

tribal action before that process can apply to Indians on

the Crow Reservation.*

The decision of the court below also conflicts directly

with Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). The judicial

intervention by the state district court infringes on the

right of the Crow Indians to govern themselves. This

right has been long recognized by this Court. United

States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); United States

’ It does not follow that because a state court may obtain subject

matter jurisdiction that it also obtains the right to attach personal

property of Indians within Indian country. See Annis v. Dewey

County Bank, 335 F. Supp. 133 (D.S.D. 1971). Contra State

Securities, Inc. Vv. Anderson, 506 P.2d 786 (N.M. 1973), but

see the dissent of Judge Montoya who makes this distinction.

Id. at 789-793. It is emphasized that although the court below here

relied on the latter case as an analogy, nowhere did the majority

opinion in Anderson discuss the problem of execution. See also

Williams v. Lee, 319 P.2d 998, 1002-1003 (Ariz. 1958).

* See footnote 2, supra.

Vv. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916); and United States v.

Mazurie, supra.

In Williams v. Lee, supra, this Court held that a non-

tribal-member-creditor could not institute a debt action

which arose on the Navajo Reservation against a mem-

ber-debtor in an Arizona district court. This Court

ruled that the tribal court system was the proper forum.

358 U.S. at 222-23. The test to be applied where Indian

ard state interests come into conflict is:

“Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the

question has always been whether the state action

infringed on the right of the reservation Indians to

make their own laws and be ruled by them.” 7d.

at 220.°

The Crow Tribe maintains a tribal Court of Indian Of-

fenses. 25 C.F.R. Pt. 11. It has been the recent policy

of the federal government to strengthen these tribal

procedures through Congressional authorizations and ap-

propriations.* Under these circumstances, as in Williams

v. Lee, supra, an exercise of state jurisdiction would un-

dermine the authority of the tribal courts over reserva-

tion affairs and, hence, would infringe upon the right of

the Indians to govern themselves.’

5It is submitted that in light of Kennerly v. District Court,

supra, McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, supra, and

Fisher v. District Court, supra, that this test is probably not appli-

cable to the case at bar. However, it is noted that even under the

“infringement test” which, as utilized by the lower court here, 555

P.2d at 213 (App. A, pp. 6a-7a), is completely misconstrued.

* Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1311; Indian Self-Determi-

nation Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450 et seq.; Indian Reorganization Act, 25

U.S.C. §§ 461 et seq.

* See also Fisher v. District Court, supra.

10

2. The decision below overlooks the quasi-sovereign status

of the Crow Tribe and destroys tribal self-government.

The Crow Tribe first entered into treaties with the

United States in 1825. Treaty with the Crow, 7 Stat.

266. This was followed by the Treaty of Fort Lara-

mie, 1851, 11 Stat. 749. According to the second Treaty

of Fort Laramie, 1868, 15 svat. 649, two important

federal recognitions were provided in Article II. First,

lands were “set apart for absolute and undisturbed use

and occupation of the Indians herein named.”* Sec-

ond, “no persons except herein designated and au-

thorized to do so” were allowed on those lands.° The

sanctity of the 1868 Treaty has not been altered by

subsequent legislation, and if anything, it has been re-

inforced.”°

® See McClanahan v. Arizona State Taz Comm’n, 411 U.S. at

175; Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S.

463 (1976).

* “. .. and the United States now solemnly agrees that no per-

sons, except those herein designated and authorized so to do,

and except such officers, agents, and employees of the govern-

ment as may be authorized to enter upon Indian reservations

in discharge of duties enjoined by law, shall ever be permitted

to pass over, settle upon, or reside in the territory described

in this article for the use of said Indians . . .” 15 Stat. at 650.

*°The following statutes are subsequent legislative treatment

as to the Crow Reservation. Two things are most apparent from

this legislation. None of it alters the Treaty of 1868 and most of

it provides for authorizations to conduct tribal business.

Agreement with the Crows, 1881, 22 Stat. 42 (fourth clause

—tTreaty of 1868); Agreement with the Crows, 1881, 22 Stat.

157 (refers to Treaty of 1868): Agreement with the Crows,

1890, 26 Stat. 1042 (clause 14—appropriations for tribal

council and clause 15—Treaty of 1868) ; Act of April 27, 1904,

33 Stat. 352 with Amendment (Article ViI—all former

treaties not inconsistent are still in force, and Act II, clauses

12 and 13—monies reserved for tribal purposes); Act of

June 4, 1920, 41 Stat. 751 (Sec. 18—money for expenses of

general council); Act of May 19, 1926, 44 Stat. 566 (Sec. 1S—

money for expenses of general council). The allotment period

ceased with the enactment of 25 U.S.C. § 462.

11

At present the Crow Tribe meets the two recognized

tests as recently set forth in Moe v. Confederated Salish

and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 476 (1976): that the

Crow Tribe has not abandoned its tribal organization and

that the treaties and subsequent statutes maintain an ex-

isting Indian reservation.

The State of Montana, on the other hand, as a pre-

condition to statehood, placed in its constitution a dis-

claimer of all right, title, and interest to Indian land.”

It was a provision that essentially paralleled the state’s

territorial act.”

In 1953, pursuant to Public Law 280, the State of

Montana was allowed to amend this impediment to its

assumption of civil jurisdiction over the Indian reserva-

tions in Montana.” In 1972, Montana enacted a new

constitution which reaffirmed the previous disclaimer

language. Article I, Montana Constitution (1972). As

for the Crow Reservation, the Montana Supreme Court

in Crow Tribe v. Deernose, supra, has previously recog-

nized the Crow Reservation as an “existing Indian res-

ervation.”

Nevertheless, that court in the instant case has made a

sua sponte determination that Crow tribal self-government

may be cast aside without taking heed of available tribal

remedies."* Furthermore this determination is blind to

™ The Enabling Act, 1889, 25 Stat. 676, 677, admitted Montana,

Washington, North and South Dakota. Section 4 contained the

disclaimer provision. See Ordinance No. 1, Section 2 of Montana

Constitution (1889).

Organic Act of the Territory of Montana, 1864, 13 Stat. 85.

18 State ex rel. McDonald v. District Court, 496 P.2d 78 (*Zont.

1972).

** Although it is the position of petitioner that both federal anda

tribal remedies are available, the proposition of the lower court

that it may exert state judicial intervention where a tribe is spe-

cifically not acting has never been of any consequence to this

Court. McClanahan vy. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, supra, and

Kennerly v. District Court, supra. The proposition has been re-

12

the long standing Federal Indian policy of fostering the

development of viable tribal judicial systems on reserva-

tions such as Crow.** Pursuant to 25 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 9,

the Secretary of the Interior has promulgated rules and

regulations that govern the procedures of a Court of

Indian Offenses. 25 C.F.R. Pt. 11.% The staffing and

operation of such a court is left to the Tribe. The Tribe

does have the option, with the approval of the Secretary,

to promulgate its own ordinances. 25 C.F.R. § 11.1(e).”

The Crows have enacted their own jurisdictional statute

that complements 25 C.F.R. § 11.22C.“ The laws appli-

cable to civil actions are found at 25 C.F.R. § 11.23(c).

When federal or tribal laws or customs are not appli-

cable, the substantive laws shall be decided by the tribal

court “according to the laws of the State in which the

matter in dispute may lie.” 25 C.F.R. § 11.24C covers

the enforcement of judgments in civil actions.

The Little Horn State Bank has not pursued its avail-

able tribal remedies to enforce the judgment obtained

in the state district court.” Execution of the state judg-

ment within the Reservation by the state sheriff would be

jected by other jurisdictions. See Schantz v. White Lightning,

502 F.2d 67, 69-70 (8th Cir. 1974), and Nelson v. Dubois, 232

N.W.2d 54, 57-58 (N.D. 1975).

** See Williams V. Lee, supra; Fisher v. District Court, supra; and

Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1311.

** The regulations, as promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior,

are governed by the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302. Big

Eagle v. Andrea, 418 F. Supp. 126 (D.S.D. 1976). Non-Indians who

appear in tribal courts are afforded the same protections as Indians.

See Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 17 (D. Ariz. 1968).

** There is presently pending for approval before the Secretary

of the Interior 4 Law and Order Code promulgated by the Crow

Tribe.

*8 Resolution 64-2 of the Crow Tribe (App. C).

The determination by the lower court that the tribal court

need not afford the state court judgment “full, faith and credit” is

simply premature. If it is assumed this is of significance, the

tribal court has never had the opportunity to pass on the question.

13

disregarding those judicial, protective procedures that are

afforded enrolled members and their real and personal

property as long as both are within the Reservation

boundaries. Furthermore, the state sheriff would be

clothed with jurisdictional authority which neither the

federal government nor the Crow Tribe has ever con-

templated.”

3. The decision below creates confusion and contradicts

decisions in other jurisdictions,

a. The decision below creates jurisdictional confusion

among Indian tribes and peoples within Montana.

Although Fisher v. District Court, supra, was a per

curiam decision by this Court, it was anticipated by In-

dian peoples and tribes that that decision would give some

guidance to the State of Montana in its persistent at-

tempts to judicially intervene in tribal affairs." There

are in Montana 27,000 Indian people living on seven

viable and distinct federally recognized Indian reserva-

tions: Flathead—Confederated Salish and Kootenai

Tribes; Fort Peck—Assinniboin Sioux; Fort Belknap—

Gros Ventre; Rocky Boy—Chippewa Cree; Blackfeet ;

Northern Cheyenne and Crow. Each possesses a tribal

court system and system of law and order. The State

of Montana has never affirmatively enacted any legisla-

tion in order to assume responsibilities on those reserva-

tions or to spread its laws of general applicability to

those reservations. The tribes on the reservations have

never contemplated state jurisdictional intrusions, ex-

cept the Flathead.”

20 See Articles I & II, Treaty with the Crows, 1868, 15 Stat. 649.

*1 The petitioner is also not unmindful of the recent case of Moe

v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribe, supra, which also out-

lined a restraint on the State of Montana in its efforts to tax the

personal property of Indians within the Flathead Reservation.

22 See, fn. 13, supra.

14

b. The decision below is inconsistent with prior federal

and state court holdings.

The court below is in conflict with at least two federal

courts. In Annis v. Dewey County Bank, 335 F. Supp.

133 (D.S.D. 1971), the court granted an injunction

against a sheriff who attempted to attach cattle within

the Cheyenne River Reservation. The loan for the cattle

was made off the reservation. The judgment for the

debt was rendered by the state court off the reservation.

The Annis court outlined the problems with South Da-

kota’s disclaimer statute ** and that state’s lack of af-

firmative action under Public Law 280. The court, rely-

ing on Kennerly v. District Court, supra, held that nei-

ther South Dakota nor the Tribe had complied with Con-

gressional procedures in order to obtain jurisdiction.

Specifically, the Annis court stated:

“The actual attachment by state officials must be

made on the reservation and state officials have no

jurisdiction on Indian reservations either to serve

process on an enrolled Indian or to enforce a state

court judgment.” 335 F. Supp. at 135-136.

Likewise, in Arizona ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d

683 (9th Cir. 1969), it was held that the State of Ari-

zona had no authority to exercise extradition jurisdiction

over Indian residents of the Navajo Reservation in Ari-

zona.” Relying on Williams v. Lee, supra, the court held

*8 Identical to Montana’s. See fn. 11, supra.

** The Annis court specifically quoted from Crow Tribe v. Deer-

nose, supra, that “absent specific Congressional authorization coupled

with strict compliance with its terms, state courts acquire no juris-

diction they assert.” 335 F. Supp. at 135.

*° The lower court here recently defied the instruction of Turtle

in State ex rel. Old Elk v. District Court, 552 P.2d 1394 (Mont.

1976). Old Elk involved the validity of an arrest on the Crow

Reservation. The court below ignored the treaties of the Crow

Reservation and, more importantly, the viable procedure to appre-

hend wrong-doers. 25 C.F.R. §11.2(b). The New Mexico Supreme

Court alse disagrees with Old Elk. Bennally v. Marcum, 553 P.2d

1270 (N.M. 1976).

15

that Arizona’s purported right was subservient to “the

right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and

be ruled by them.” 413 F.2d at 685.

The lower court decision also is inconsistent with nu-

merous other state jurisdictions. In Commissioner v.

Brun, 174 N.W.2d 120 (Minn. 1970), after holding that

the State of Minnesota’s personal property tax was a

debt, the court held that the inability of the State of

Minnesota to execute within the Red Lake Reservation

defeats an extension of that state’s taxing power. Id. at

126.

Recently, the Supreme Court of Arizona has held that

a county sheriff clothed with the powers of the state can-

not serve process within the Papago Reservation. Fran-

cisco V. State, No. 12444-PR (decided Sept. 28, 1976).

The court there specifically relied on the creation and ex-

istence of the Papago Reservation, the scheme of dis-

claimer of state jurisdiction in Indian country by Ari-

zona, and the instructions of Kennerly v. District Court,

supra.**

26 See also Martin v. Denver Juvenile Court, 493 P.2d 1093 (Colo.

1972), and County of Beltrami v. County of Hennepin, 264 Minn.

406, 119 N.W.2d 25 (1963).

16

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated the petitioner respectfully sub-

mits that this petition for a writ of certiorari be granted,

or, in the alternative, that the decision below be sum-

marily reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

THOMAS J. LYNAUGH

THOMAS K. ScHoppEert

CATE, LYNAUGH, FITZGERALD & Huss

Suite 500, Midland National

Bank Building

303 North Broadway

Billings, Montana 59101

Counsel for Petitioners

January 1977.

APPENDICES

la

APPENDIX A

No. 13338

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF MONTANA

1976

LITTLE HorN STATE BANK,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

—Va—

ROBERT STOPS AND NORMA STopPs,

Defendants and Respondents.

Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial

District, Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge

presiding.

Counsel of Record:

For Appellants:

Clarence T. Belue argued, Hardin, Montana

For Respondent:

Cate, Lynaugh, Fitzgerald and Huss, Billings, Mon-

tana

Thomas J. Lynaugh argued, Billings, Montana

Submitted: September 9, 1976

Decided: Oct. 7, 1976

Filed: Oct. 7, 1976

/8/ Thomas J. Kearney

Clerk

2a

Mr. Chief Justice James T. Harrison delivered the Opin-

ion of the Court.

This is an appeal from an order entering a permanent

injunction against levying or executing upon the property

of respondents within the Crowv Indian Reservation. The

injunction was ordered in the district court of Big Horn

County.

This appeal adds another chapter to the never ending

story of Indian jurisdiction. The relevant facts are as

follows:

Respondents, members of the Crow Indian Tribe resid-

ing on the Crow Indian Reservation, obtained a loan

from appellant bank located in Hardin, Montana, and

failed to repay the loan. This commercial transaction took

place at the bank which is located outside the exterior

boundaries of the Crow Indian Reservation. Process was

served upon respondents on the reservation. ‘hereafter

appellant obtained a judgment in the district court of

the thirteenth judicial district in the amount of $3,541.24.

Following this judgment on February 18, 1976, execu-

tion was issued by the district court on February 23,

1976. The writ of execution was directed to the sheriff

of Big Horn County, who proceeded to garnish the wages

of respondents earned on the reservation but within Big

Horn County. Respondents sought and obtained injunc-

tive relief against the writ of execution. Appellant seeks

to dissolve the permanent injunction and be allowed to

levy upon the respondents’ property and wages within

the reservation.

Respondents did not attack the district court’s subject

matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction at the dis-

trict court level or before this Court. Both of these issues

have been laid to rest by Mescalero Apache Tribe v.

Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 93 S.Ct. 1267, 36 L Ed 2d 114, 119,

and Bad Horse v. Bad Horse, 163 Mont. 445, 517 P.2d

3a

893, cert. den. 419 U.S. 847, 95 S.Ct. 83, 42 L Ed 2d

76.

A review of the district court’s jurisdiction had no

Indian jurisdictional dispute been involved, is useful to

this decision. It has been a long standing doctrine that

any court having jurisdiction to render a judgment also

has the power to enforce that judgment through any

order or writ necessary to carry its judgment into effect.

U.S. ex rel. Riggs v. Johnson County, 6 Wall. 166, 18

L.Ed 768 (1868); Pam-to-Pee v. United States, 187

U.S. 371, 23 S.Ct. 142, 47 L.Ed 221 (1902); Hamilton

v. Nakai, 453 F.2d 152, cert. den. 406 U.S. 945, 92 S.Ct.

2044, 32 L Ed 2d 332.

The United States Supreme Court defined “jurisdic-

tion” at p. 773 in Riggs:

“* * * Jurisdiction is defined to be the power to

hear and determine the subject matter in controversy

in the suit before the court, and the rule is univer-

sal, that if the power is conferred to render the

judgment or enter the decree, it also includes the

power to issue proper process to enforce such judg-

ment or decree. * * *

“Express determination of this court is that the

jurisdiction of a court is not exhausted by the ren-

dition of the judgment, but continues until that

judgment shall be satisfied. * * *” (Emphasis add-

ed.)

The Montana legislature enacted section 93-1106,

R.C.M. 1947, which contains language analagous to this

principle. We have interpreted section 93-1106 to confer

upon a court, having proper jurisdiction, all the means

necessary to carry the same into effect, and if the court

has the power to make an order, it has jurisdiction to

enforce that order. State ex rel. Eisenhauer v. District

Court; 54 Mont. 172, 168 P. 522.

4a

The district court initially sought to enforce its judg-

ment by a writ of execution pursuant to section 98-5801

et seq., R.C.M. 1947. A writ of execution against prop-

erty of a judgment debtor may be issued by the district

court to the sheriff of any county in the state. Section

93-5809, R.C.M. 1947. Thus, a district court has state-

wide enforcement power under that section. However,

the writ must issue to the proper sheriff, since a sheriff

has no authority to serve the writ outside of his county.

Merchants Credit Service v. Choteau Co. Bank, 112 Mont.

229, 114 P.2d 1074.

Absent the existence of the Crow Indian Reservation,

there is no question that this writ of execution would be

a valid means of enforcing the judgment of the district

court. The property subject to the writ was located with-

in Big Horn County, the writ was directed to the sheriff

of Big Horn County, and ail other essential elements of

a valid writ of execution existed.

Respondents urge us to hold that a court having juris-

diction to render a judgment does not have the power

to enforce that judgment because the property subject

to such writ is located on the Crow Indian Reservation.

In effect, they ask that the reservation be treated on an

even par with our sister states. Such a situation would

not be feasible, since the Crow Tribe does not provide

for the honoring of state court judgments, nor is the full-

faith and credit clause applicable to the tribe. Had the

judgment debtor’s property been located in a sister state,

appellant bank could have obtained a judgment in that

State by pleading the Montana judgment and showing

the jurisdictional requirements. Such a conclusion is not

available in our situation.

The task to be performed by this Court is to determine

whether or not the State action taken in this case is ac-

ceptable under the doctrines concerning state jurisdiction

over Indian reservations.

5a

The United States Supreme Court has applied different

rationale from time to time, and the recent court deci-

sions must be read as a whole to arrive at the proper test

to be applied in this case. The initial test was propounded

in Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L Ed

2d 254, which stated:

“* * * Essentially, absent governing Acts of Con-

gress, the question has always been whether the

state action infringed on the right of reservation

Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by

them.”

This test was apparently overruled by Kennerly v. Dis-

trict Court of icin 440 U.S. 423, 91 S.Ct. 480, 27

L Ed 2d 507. However, in McClanahan v. Arizona Tax

Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 36 L Ed 2d

129, 140, 141, the Court revived the Williams test stat-

ing:

“* * * It must be remembered that cases applying

the Williams test have dealt principally with situa-

tions involving non-Indians. [Citations omitted.] In

these situations, both the tribe and the State could

fairly claim an interest in asserting their respective

jurisdictions. The Williams test was designed to re-

solve this conflict by providing that the State could

protect its interest up to the point where tribal self-

government would be affected.

“* * * This Court has therefore held that ‘the ques-

tion has always been whether the state action in-

fringed on the right of reservation Indians to make

their own laws and be ruled by them.’ ”

The Court still adheres to the Williams test as evidenced

by the recent decision of Fisher v. District Court of

Montana, 44 U.S.L.W. 3940 (U.S. March 1, 1976), when

the court applied the Williams test, even though all par-

ties were members of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe, and

the litigation arose on the reservation.

6a

The Williams test is appropriate to review this appeal.

The litigation involves a member of the Crow Tribe re-

siding on the Crow Indian reservation and a nonmember,

located off the reservation. It is important to note that

the transaction in dispute arose off the reservation.

Therefore, we must determine whether state action, in

the form of a writ of execution to enforce a judgment

rendered on a transaction arising outside the reservation,

interferes with the tribe’s right to make its own rules

and be governed by them.

We hold that it does not.

The cases holding that such interference has occurred

present a combination of the transaction occurring on

the reservation and the tribal court providing jurisdic-

tion over such matters. In Williams the tribal court ex-

ercised jurisdiction over disputes over commercial trans-

actions arising on the reservation between members and

nonmembers. In Security State Bank v. Pierre, 162 Mont.

298, 511 P.2d 325, the tribal court provided for civil

litigation between members and nonmembers. In Fisher,

the most recent United States Supreme Court case so

holding, the facts relating to the child custody dispute

all arose on the reservation, and the Crow Tribe provided

for custody litigation among members (all parties were

members of the Crow Tribe). We note that in the situ-

ation at hand the Crow Tribal Court only exercises juris-

diction over civil litigation between members and non-

members if both parties so stipulate.

However, what is in issue in this case is the enforce-

ment of a valid judgment, not the proper court to initiate

the litigation. The transaction did not occur on the res-

ervation as in the above cases but outside the reserva-

tion boundaries. The subject matter jurisdiction was

within the state court, not the tribal court. The Crow

Tribe provides no means of enforcing state court judg-

Ta

ments, no method of attaching property of a state judg-

ment debtor, and is not subject to the full faith and

credit clause as sister states are. Until the Crow Tribe

has provided a means of such enforcement or acted in

some manner within this area, we fail to see how tribal

self-government is interfered with by assuring that res-

ervation Indians pay for their debts incurred off the

reservation.

The crucial fact of this appeal is that the subject

matter jurisdiction lies with the state court, not the

tribal court. In this case the tribal members elected to

leave the reservation and conduct their affairs within

the jurisdiction of the state courts. When they do so

they are submitting themselves to the laws of this state.

They cannot violate those laws and then retreat to the

sanctuary of the reservation for protection. The cases

analagous to the situation presented here are: State

Securities, Inc. v. Anderson, 84 N.M. 629, 506 P.2d 786,

789; Natewa v. Natewa, 84 N.M. 69, 499 P.2d 691, 693;

and State ex rel. Old Elk v. District Court, —— Mont.

—, 552 P.2d 1394, 33 St.Rep. 637 (1976). In all of

these cases the state court properly had jurisdiction over

the dispute at hand and process was allowed on the reser-

vation to bring the Indian defendant before the state

court.

In Natewa, the wife, a Zuni Indian living in Wiscon-

sin, brought a URESA action against her ex-husband, a

Zuni Indian residing on the Zuni Indian Reservation in

New Mexico. The New Mexico Supreme Court upheld

the New Mexico District Court’s order directing the ex-

husband to pay child support, saying:

“* * * Appellant cannot interpose his special status

as an Indian as a shield to protect him from obliga-

tions that result from his marriage to appellee which

had been entered into off the reservation. * * *”

8a

In State Securities, a corporation brought suit to re-

cover on notes contracted off the reservation by N avajo

Indians. The New Mexico Supreme Court allowed service

upon the Indians while they were on the reservation,

stating at p. 789:

“State jurisdiction does not eliminate Indian juris-

diction, it exists concurrently with it. There is no

interference with Indian self-government. * * *

“* * * Exclusive jurisdiction in Indian courts, which

do not necessarily apply state law, may result in

shielding Indians from obligations incurred off the

reservation.”

We have taken a similar position in Old Elk, holding

that a sheriff of this state may serve a warrant for the

arrest of an Indian on the reservation, when the crime

has occurred off the reservation.

The respondents elected to be governed by the laws of

this state when they left the boundaries of the reserva-

tion to obtain the loan from the appellant. This was not

a case of a nonmember choosing to transact his business

within the boundaries of the Indian reservation as in

Williams, Kennerly, and Pierre.

The United States Supreme Court stated in Mescalero

Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 93 S.Ct. 1267, 36

L Ed 2d 114, 119:

“* * * Absent express federal law to the contrary,

Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have

generally been held subject to nondiscriminatory

state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the

state.” [Citations omitted.]

Here the respondents did go beyond the boundaries of

the Crow Indian reservation and the execution statutes

are nondiscriminatory and are otherwise applicable to all

citizens of Montana.

This appeal essentially boils down to whether the ju-

risdiction granted in Mescalero is the same as that de-

fined by the United States Supreme Court in Riggs and

Pam-to-Pee, or is it merely the opportunity to render

a judgment incapable of enforcement. The latter would

be absurd. As the Court said in Pam-to-Pee, at p. 226:

“The award of execution is a part, and an essential

part, of every judgment passed by a court exercising

judicial power. It is no judgment, in the legal sense

of the term, without it. Without such an award

the judgment would be inoperative and nugatory,

leaving the aggrieved party without a remedy. It

would be merely an opinion, which would remain a

dead letter, and without any operation upon the

rights of the parties * * *.”

To avoid such an illogical situation we hold that a

writ of execution from a state court is valid within the

Indian reservation when such is a means of enforcing a

valid judgment of that court.

As we stated in Old Elk at 643:

“Individual rights, due process, impartial and ef-

fective maintenance of justice and the public con-

fidence in and respect for the courts are paramount

in the resolution of these kinds of matters. How-

ever, these rights and duties are owed to all citi-

zens not only those residing within the exterior

boundaries of an Indian reservation. The citizens

of Montana generally and Big Horn County par-

ticularly would be grossly deprived if under the

guise of individual due process they not only had

no speedy, adequate remedy, but no remedy at all.”

As stated earlier, the state court was the only forum

available to the appellant. The tribal court lacked sub-

ject matter jurisdiction. No federal jurisdiction could

be invoked, since there was no federal question, no di-

versity of citizenship, and the amount in controversy was

rs Seen? +

=

lien ri ba eames eee ot ak ee he ees eee

me me ee

10a

less than $10,000. The state court had the jurisdiction

to render its judgment, not even the respondents contest

this. Such would not be a judgment without the power

to enforce the same. The only available and peaceful

means of enforcement to the appellant was the writ of

execution from the state court. Without such, the re-

sult would be a “catch-us-off-the-reservation” situation,

which could possibly lead to breaches of the peace.

In Old Elk we held that an Indian may not violate

the criminal laws of this state while off the reservation,

and then return to the sanctuary of the reservztion and

throw up his Indian status as a shield against enforce-

ment of those criminal laws. We now hold the same is

true for the civil laws of this state.

We are not unmindful of Annis v. Dewey County Bank,

335 F.Supp. 1383 (1971) cited by respondents. The fed-

eral court cited authority from South Dakota and Minne-

sota in holding that state officials had no jurisdiction on

Indian reservations either to serve process on an enrolled

member or to enforce a state judgment. The law of this

state is directly contrary and in accord with New Mexico,

as evidenced by Old Elk. We do not agree with the law

cited by the federal court in Annis, nor do we agree with

their rationale.

or eee me ne

lla

The decision of the district court is reversed and the

injunction dissolved and vacated.

/s/ James T. Harrison

Chief Justice

We concur:

/s/ Wesley Castles

/s/ John Conway Harrison

/s/ Frank I. Haswell

Justices

/s/ Robert Sykes

HON. ROBERT SYKES, District Judge,

sitting in place of Mr.

Justice Gene B. Daly.

we ees cee eee

lb

APPENDIX B

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF MONTANA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BIG HORN

LITTLE Horn STATE BANK,

Plaintiff,

vs. _ Cause No. 8087

ROBERT STOPS AND NORMA STOPS,

Defendants.

ORDER

This matter arises upon an Order to Show Cause and

Temporary Restraining Order issued at the instance of

the defendants to which the plaintiff has filed its return

admitting the factual allegations of defendants’ petition,

and the issue raised has become submitted to the Court

upon the written briefs of the parties, all of which have

been duly considered, and

IT IS ORDERED that defendants’ petition should be,

and hereby is, granted. The plaintiff is permanently

enjoined from levying execution on the judgment entered

herein upon the property of the defendants and their

wages within the Crow Indian Reservation.

Dated this 24th day of March, 1976.

ORIGINAL SIGNED

/s/ Charles Luedke

CHARLES LUEDKE

District Judge

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff brought action in the above-entitled court upon

a promissory note which the defendants” signed at plain-

tiffs’ place of business off the Crow Indian Reservation

and secured judgment, after a jury trial, in the amount

of $3,541.24, Subsequently, the plaintiff secured a writ

of execution and served the same upon the employer of

defendant Robert Stops, being the U.S. National Park

Service, and also upon the employer of defendant Noyrina

Stops, being the U.S. Public Health Service, seeking tc

take the wages of the defendants for application upon the

judgment. Both defendants are enrolled members of the

Crow Tribe and the employment they are engaged in

takes place upon the Crow Indian Reservation, Montana.

The issue raised is whether State court process can be

utilized to enforce a State court judgment against an

Indian by execution upon his property located within the

boundaries of the reservation.

it is the position of the plaintiff that this Court has

already ruled, acting through another judge, that subject

matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction over the defendants

exists. Enforcement of the judgment, therefore, is a

concomi:ant of the jurisdiction already obtained by the

off-reservation activity of defendants.

The defendants, on the other hand, rely particularly

upon Annis v. Dewey County Bank, 335 F.Supp. 133 (1971)

in which a state court judgment was secured, arising

out of an off-reservation transaction, but enforcement on

the reservation against defendant’s property was en-

joined for lack of jurisdiction. In effect that court found

that the jurisdiction resulting from an off-reservation

setting does not pierce the reservation boundaries for en-

forcement purposes because it would constitute an in-

fringement upon the right of reservation Indians to make

their own laws and be ruled by them, which infringe-

=_———

ent is permissible only upon compliance by the state

a the Indians with on of Congress by which state

jurisdiction is extended onto the reservation. Such com-

pliance had not been accomplished as to the reservation

involved in Annis and it has not been accomplished as

to the Crow Indian Reservation.

I find the principles relied upon in Annis to be rele-

vant to this case and persuasive as to the result mandated

by the present standing of the law.

Dated this 24th day of March, 1976.

ORIGINAL SIGNED

/s/ Charles Luedke

CHARLES LUEDKE

District Judge

ec: Clarence T. Belue

Cate, Lynaugh, Fitzgerald & Huss

—

le

APPENDIX C

RESOLUTION NO. 64-2

A RESOLUTION OF THE CROW TRIBAL COUNCIL

RELATING TO JURISDICTION OVER MEMBERS OF

THE CROW TRIBE.

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court of the State of Mon-

tana has ruled that State Courts have no jurisdiction

over an Indian if an Indian commits a crime at any

place which was once a part of an Indian Reservation,

even though the Federal Government has relinguished its

title to the land where the crime was committed, and

even though the crime is made an offense by a Federal

Statute;

AND WHEREAS, TITLE TO and rights-of-way of

lands are still held by the United States in trust for the

Crow Tribe and members of the Crow Tribe upon lands

which were once a part of the Crow Indian Reservation

and the Crow Tribe has never at any time waived the

right of the members of said tribe of Indians to juris-

diction over them by relinquishing jurisdiction to the

State of Montana;

BE IT RESOLVED, by the Crow Tribal! Council that

all jurisdiction in both criminal and civil action in any

and all actions now pending in any court or hereafter

commenced in any court has not at any time been re-

linquished to any state court, and the Crow Tribal Coun-

cil hereby expressly retains jurisdiction over any and

all criminal and civil action where members of the Crow

Tribe are involved, that jurisdiction of all such actions

shall at all times be retained in the Tribal and Federal

Courts and,

WHEREAS, that the above resolution shall become

enforced and in effect immediately.

2c

PASSED, ADOPTED AND APPROVED, this 13th

day of July, 1963, by the Crow Tribal Council by ——

votes for passage and adoption and —— votes against.

Unanimous X.

/s/ John B. Cummins

Chairman

Crow Tribal Council

ATTEST:

/s/ Arlis Whiteman

Secretary

Crow Tribal Council

I do recommend

I do not recommend.

Superintendent

Crow Indian Agency

Crow Agency, Montana