Petition — McGraw-Edison Co. v. Soper
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F Supreme Court, U. S |
~ FILED
DEC 29 1976
NOON, JR., CLERK
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1976
No. 6-899
ry
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McGRAW-EDISON COMPANY,
Petitioner,
Vv.
BETTY SOPER and JEFFSON INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Respondents.
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AY
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Matcoutm D. Youne
1500 City National Bank Building
Omaha, Nebraska 68102
Attorney for Petitioner
COCKLE PRINTING CO., 1822 St. Mary's Ave, Omaha
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Opinion Below . sales saceniiaeihialaanain
Jurisdietion a
Questions EO RAL ae ee A
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Reasons for Granting the Writ 2.000000...
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Beefy Trail, Ine. v. Beefy King International, Inc.,
348 F. Supp. 799 (M.D. Fla. 1972) ..... saseenaticanusiiatia
Fortner Enterprises, Ine. v. U. S. Steel Corp.,
523 F. 2d 96 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96
GTE Sylvania, Ine. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537
F. 2d 980 (9th Cir. 1976) occcmwmmmmmmnnnnnnnnnnn
Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leaseo Response, Inc.,
537 F. 2d 1307 (Sth Cir. 1976) ccc cosommmmmmmnnnnnnn
Susser v. Carvel Corporation, 332 F. 2d 505 (2nd
Ungar v. Dunkin’ Donuts of America, Ine., 531 F. 2d
TB11 (Bred Cir, TTT) nnnnc.ccccsscssessscccsecon
11
. 10
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10
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page
STATUTES
298 U.S.C. Sections 1254, 13832 and 1337 cccccrinnmnnn 2
15 U.S. C. Sections 1 and 15 (Supp. V, 1975) ccc 8
In The
Supreme Court of the Auited States
October Term, 1976
No.
fa% :
Vv
McGRAW-EDISON COMPANY,
Petitioner,
V.
BETTY SOPER and JEFFSON INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Respondents.
st
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
The Petitioner prays that a Writ of Certiorari be
issued to review the judgment of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Kighth Cireuit entered in the above-
entitled case on September 29, 1976, and on which a Re-
hearing and Rehearing En Bane were denied on Novem-
ber 15, 1976.
2
OPINION BELOW
The Opinion of the Eighth Cireuit Court of Appeals
is reported in 542 F.2d 1336 and is printed in Appendix
A. The pertinent portions of the judgments of the Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Missouri, Western
Division and the pertinent portions of its Findings of
Faets and Conclusions of Law are printed in Appendix B.
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to review the judgment below by Writ of
Certiorari is conferred by 28 U.S.C., Seetion 1254 (1).
Jurisdiction of the Trial Court was based upon 15 U.S. C.,
Section 1 and 28 U.S.C., Sections 1332 and 1337,
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the licensing of a Franchised name in
connection with the sale of a ‘‘package” dry cleaning store
is a per se violation of the Sherman Act and automatically
illegal without the need of further inquiry as to whether
any unreasonable competitive effects result.
2. Whether a violation of the Sherman Act under the
pe’ se doctrine can be predicated on the licensing of a
Franchised name whose only relationship to the equip-
ment being sold is an advertising and promotional pro-
gram.
3. Whether a violation of the Sherman Act can be
shown in the absence of evidence of individual coercion.
4. Whether, a sale of an existing facility including
equipment and the right to use a Franchised name consti-
tutes an illegal sale in violation of the Sherman Act.
STATUTES INVOLVED
The statutory provisions involved in this appeal are
found in 15 U.S.C. Sections 1 and 15 (Supp. V, 1975), the
pertinent parts of which are as follows:
Section 1. ‘‘Every contract, combination in form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several states, or with foreign na-
tions, is declared to be illegal * * *’’
Section 15. ‘‘Any person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in
the antitrust laws may sue therefor * * * and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of
suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee * * *.’’
*,
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In this action, Respondents as Intervenors sued Peti-
tioner in the Trial Court for damages, inter alia, for vio-
lations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Judgments on
4
the verdicts for the Intervenors were sustained by the
Eighth Cireuit Court of Appeals.
The rulings of the Trial Court as sustained by tle
Eighth Cireuit Court of Appeals were to the effect that
the sale of a dry cleaning store which included all equip-
ment, complete operating instructions, an on-going adver- -
tising and premotional program and management assis-
tance and use of a Franchise name, constituted a per Se
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act without the
necessity of proof of individual coercion or proof of an
unreasonable restraint on competition or without the
necessity of inquiry into whether the sale in fact increased
or decreased overall competition.
A
Statement of the Facts
In 1964, Cleaning Center Sales (later called A. P.
Cleaning Center Sales or A. P.C.C.S.) a sales organiza-
tion of American Laundry Machinery Industries, a divi-
sion of the Petitioner, contracted with Robsbur, Inc., an
agency of Arnold Palmer, a well-known golfer, to license
his name and utilize his appearances in the promotion and
sale as a ‘‘package’’ of complete one-hour dry cleaning
stores. The ‘‘package” in addition to the use of the
Arnold Palmer name and his continuing promotional ac-
tivities included all things other than materials and sup-,
plies necessary to operate, including dry cleaning ma-
chinery, (manufactured not only by a division of Petitioner
but by other manufacturers), a leased Sign and Back Drop
with Arnold Palmer’s name thereon and all furniture and
fixtures, complete operating iustructions and other items
required to start up in business.
From 1964 through 1971, approximately 400 ‘‘pack-
age” stores, including those involved in this litigation,
were sold.
A. P.C.C.S.’s dealer in the Kansas City area, John
R. Jacobson, had owned and operated and sold cleaning
establishments under other trade names long prior to be-
coming a dealer for A. P.C.C.S., and in 1965 owned and
operated seven «dry cleaning establishments having no
connection with A. P.C.C.S8.
In 1965 and 1966, Jacobson purchased three ‘‘pack-
age” A.P. Cleaning Centers, and in each case executed
in his own name a lease cf the real estate, a Franchise
Agreement, a Sign and Back Drop Agreement and a Con-
ditional Sales Contract for the purchase of the equipment
and paid sales tax on the purchases.
The A. P. Cleaning Center bought in December 1965
was operated until November 1968 when it was sold as a
going business to Respondent Soper’s husband who re-
ecived a Bill of Sale (covering additional equipment not
included in the original ‘‘package”), a Bulk Sales Affi-
davit, and an assignment of the real estate lease. Soper’s
husband subsequently on March 1, 1969, assumed the re-
maining lease and franchise payments and the unpaid
portion of Jacobson’s Conditional Sale Contract.
Jacobson operated the two other stores from Novem-
ber 1965 and November 1966 until he sold them as going
6
businesses to Respondent, Jeffson Industries, Ine. in Jan-
uary of 1969 and in August, 1969.
In each sale to Jeffson Industries, Ine. all documents
refer to Jacobson as owner; each Bill of Sale included
equipment in addition to that included in the original
‘*package’’ and in each case Jeffson Industries, Ine. sev-
eral months later assumed the remaining payments due on
the Franchise, Sign and Back Drop Leases, and the unpaid
balance of the Conditional Sales Contract debt. At the
time of such sales, Jacobson was also the President and
half owner of Jeffson Industries, Ine.
During the period he held title individually, Jacobson
paid all the expenses, took all the depreciation, retained
all the income and absorbed all the operating losses. In
selling the stores, Jacobson retained all the profit on the
sales.
The Respondents, as Intervenors, sued Petitioner for
fraud and misrepresentation, violation of the Anti-Trust
Laws and for punitive damages, arising out of the sales of
these ‘‘package’’ stores on the theory that Petitioner’s
dealer was at all times Petitioner’s agent and that Peti-
tioner was bound by the agent’s statements and represen-
tations and that the sales of the operating businesses were
the sales of the Petitioner and involved a tying arrange-
ment that violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
No evidence was presented that either Respondent
Jeffson Industries, Inc. or the husband of Respondent
Soper, was compelled to accept ‘‘the tie’’ and was not in
truth attracted by the “going-business” aspects of the fran-
chise package.
~)
The Trial Court permitted the Jury to determine that
an agency existed and to award verdicts of varying amounts
on the several counts.
On the anti-trust counts submitted to the Jury, Re-
spondent Soper received a verdict of $10,000.00. Respond-
ent Jeffson Industries, Ine. received a verdict of $52,000.00.
The Trial Court entered judgments on the anti-trust ver-
dicts to Respondent Soper of $10,000.00 trebled to $30,-
000.00 plus $36,200.00 attorney’s fees and to Respondent
Jeffson Industries, Inc. $52,000.00 trebled to $156,000.00
plus attorney’s fees of $54,300.00,
The Eighth Cireuit Court of Appeals sustained the
rulings of the United States District Court of the Western
District of Missouri, holding that a per se violation of the
Sherman Act existed which in effect required no further
determination as to the issue of coercion in the individual
ease, or as to the unreasonableness of any restraint, or as
to whether or not competition was actually increased or
decreased by reason of the existence of such stores.
Rehearing and rehearing en bane were requested and
denied.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I.
If the licensing of the use of the name of
“Arnold Palmer” is a ‘‘tying product”, the re-
sultant ‘‘tying arrangement” does not necessarily
unreasonably restrain competition.
Having found a tying arrangement, the Court below
states that from this fact flows an inevitable hurt to com-
petition in the tied product market and therefore is a per se
violation of the Sherman Act.
But other Cireuits require ‘‘a case by case inquiry
under the ‘rule of reason’ to determine the competitive
effects of such restraints if the Sherman Act is to be effee-
tuated’’. GTE Sylvania Incorporated v. Continental T.V.
Inc., 537 F. 2d 980 (9th Cir. 1976).
Such a holding forecloses inquiry into whether the need
for ‘‘the protection of goodwill as embodied for example in
a valuable trademark may justify an otherwise invalid
tying arrangement’’. Susser v. Carvel Corporation, 332
F. 2d 505 (2nd Cir. 1964).
A violation of the Sherman Act under the
per se doctrine cannot be predicated on the li-
censing of a franchised name having no prior re-
lationship to the equipment.
The use of the ‘‘Arnold Palmer” name is so inter-
twined with the other elements of the ‘‘package” sale of a
one-hour dry cleaning store that it cannot be so separate
9
and distinct a marketable item as to qualify as a ‘‘tying
product’? in a tying arrangement violating the Sherman
Act, contrary to the holding of the Court below.
Prior to the inauguration of the A. P. Cleaning Store
Program, the name ‘‘Arnold Palmer’’ had no automatic
association with dry cleaning and no market penetration
in the dry cleaning equipment field. While well known in
golfing circles the Arnold Palmer name had value in selling
dry cleaning equipment only as it was advertised and pro-
moted as a part of the program incorporated in the ‘‘ pack-
age” form in which it was offered. The Petitioner’s con-
tract with Robsbur, Inc. gave Petitioner the use and
contrel of the name but limited Petitioner’s power to re-
license the name for use only as a part of the ‘‘package’’.
No buyer of dry cleaning equipment would find it of
value except as promoted and advertised in an expensive
campaign which under the contract with Robsbur, Inc. was
limited to the arrangements made in the ‘‘ package’’.
The franchise name has no value independent of the
advertising prograin with which it is associated.
See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. U. 8. Steel Corp., 523
F. 2d 961 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 8. Ct. 1100.
Il.
If the licensing of the use of the Arnold
Palmer name is a “tying product”, the resulting
‘‘tie’’ is not a violation of the Sherman Act in the
absence of proof of individual coercion.
No evidence was offered in behalf of either of the
Respondents that they were coerced into buying the so-
ealled ‘‘tying product’’, the Franchised name.
10
Other circuits have held that evidence of coercion of
each franchisee is required to substantiate a violation of
the Sherman Act. Ungar v. Dunkin’ Donuts of America,
/ne., 5381 F. 2d 1211, (3 CCA-1976). Response of Carolina
Inc. v. Leasco Response, 537 F. 2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976).
Neither Soper’s husband nor Jeffson Industries, Inc.
ever questioned if they could purchase the franchise with-
out the equipment; nor does it make sense to think they
would since each was buying an established business.
IV.
A sale of a preexisting facility including
equipment and a franchise name does not con-
stitute an illegal tie.
Both Respondents purchased their stores two to three
years after the original opening. They did not ask for or
receive new Franchise Agreements or new Sign and Back
Drop Leases which would have provided for a new five-
year term. On the contrary, they assumed the remaining
term of each as any purchaser from any non-dealer owner
elsewhere would do.
Such a sale does not constitute an illegal transaction.
Beefy Trail, Inc. v. Beefy King International, Inc., 348 F.
Supp. 799 (M.D. Fla. 1972). This well considered and
widely quoted case from a District Court in the Fifth Cir-
cuit is contrary to the position taken by the Eighth Circuit.
11
CONCLUSION
The Writ of Certiorari should be granted to resolve
the conflicts between the circuits as to the issues raised in
the Petition and to inhibit the further extension of a rule
of law which seems to lessen rather than increase economic
competition.
Respectfully submitted,
Mautcotm D. Youna
1500 City National Bank Building
Omaha, Nebraska 68102
Attorney for Petitioner
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Maleolm D. Young, a member of the Bar of the
Supreme Court of the United States, hereby certify that
I have served the foregoing Petition for Writ of Certio-
rari on counsel for Respondents, by depositing same in
the United States mail, postage prepaid, on December 28,
1976, addressed to Joseph A. Sherman and Paul A. Wick-
ens, Suite 820, Home Savings Building, 1006 Grand
Avenue, Kansas City, Missouri 64106 and upon Sheridan
Morgan, Two Crown Center, Suite 400, 2420 Pershing
Road, Kansas City, Missouri 64108, counsel for Respond-
ents.
Matcotm D. Youna
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