Petition — McGraw-Edison Co. v. Soper

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F Supreme Court, U. S |

~ FILED

DEC 29 1976

NOON, JR., CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1976

No. 6-899

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McGRAW-EDISON COMPANY,

Petitioner,

Vv.

BETTY SOPER and JEFFSON INDUSTRIES, INC.,

Respondents.

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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Matcoutm D. Youne

1500 City National Bank Building

Omaha, Nebraska 68102

Attorney for Petitioner

COCKLE PRINTING CO., 1822 St. Mary's Ave, Omaha

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Opinion Below . sales saceniiaeihialaanain

Jurisdietion a

Questions EO RAL ae ee A

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Reasons for Granting the Writ 2.000000...

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Beefy Trail, Ine. v. Beefy King International, Inc.,

348 F. Supp. 799 (M.D. Fla. 1972) ..... saseenaticanusiiatia

Fortner Enterprises, Ine. v. U. S. Steel Corp.,

523 F. 2d 96 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96

GTE Sylvania, Ine. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537

F. 2d 980 (9th Cir. 1976) occcmwmmmmmmnnnnnnnnnnn

Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leaseo Response, Inc.,

537 F. 2d 1307 (Sth Cir. 1976) ccc cosommmmmmmnnnnnnn

Susser v. Carvel Corporation, 332 F. 2d 505 (2nd

Ungar v. Dunkin’ Donuts of America, Ine., 531 F. 2d

TB11 (Bred Cir, TTT) nnnnc.ccccsscssessscccsecon

11

. 10

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TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Page

STATUTES

298 U.S.C. Sections 1254, 13832 and 1337 cccccrinnmnnn 2

15 U.S. C. Sections 1 and 15 (Supp. V, 1975) ccc 8

In The

Supreme Court of the Auited States

October Term, 1976

No.

fa% :

Vv

McGRAW-EDISON COMPANY,

Petitioner,

V.

BETTY SOPER and JEFFSON INDUSTRIES, INC.,

Respondents.

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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

The Petitioner prays that a Writ of Certiorari be

issued to review the judgment of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Kighth Cireuit entered in the above-

entitled case on September 29, 1976, and on which a Re-

hearing and Rehearing En Bane were denied on Novem-

ber 15, 1976.

2

OPINION BELOW

The Opinion of the Eighth Cireuit Court of Appeals

is reported in 542 F.2d 1336 and is printed in Appendix

A. The pertinent portions of the judgments of the Dis-

trict Court for the Western District of Missouri, Western

Division and the pertinent portions of its Findings of

Faets and Conclusions of Law are printed in Appendix B.

JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction to review the judgment below by Writ of

Certiorari is conferred by 28 U.S.C., Seetion 1254 (1).

Jurisdiction of the Trial Court was based upon 15 U.S. C.,

Section 1 and 28 U.S.C., Sections 1332 and 1337,

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the licensing of a Franchised name in

connection with the sale of a ‘‘package” dry cleaning store

is a per se violation of the Sherman Act and automatically

illegal without the need of further inquiry as to whether

any unreasonable competitive effects result.

2. Whether a violation of the Sherman Act under the

pe’ se doctrine can be predicated on the licensing of a

Franchised name whose only relationship to the equip-

ment being sold is an advertising and promotional pro-

gram.

3. Whether a violation of the Sherman Act can be

shown in the absence of evidence of individual coercion.

4. Whether, a sale of an existing facility including

equipment and the right to use a Franchised name consti-

tutes an illegal sale in violation of the Sherman Act.

STATUTES INVOLVED

The statutory provisions involved in this appeal are

found in 15 U.S.C. Sections 1 and 15 (Supp. V, 1975), the

pertinent parts of which are as follows:

Section 1. ‘‘Every contract, combination in form of

trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or

commerce among the several states, or with foreign na-

tions, is declared to be illegal * * *’’

Section 15. ‘‘Any person who shall be injured in his

business or property by reason of anything forbidden in

the antitrust laws may sue therefor * * * and shall recover

threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of

suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee * * *.’’

*,

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In this action, Respondents as Intervenors sued Peti-

tioner in the Trial Court for damages, inter alia, for vio-

lations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Judgments on

4

the verdicts for the Intervenors were sustained by the

Eighth Cireuit Court of Appeals.

The rulings of the Trial Court as sustained by tle

Eighth Cireuit Court of Appeals were to the effect that

the sale of a dry cleaning store which included all equip-

ment, complete operating instructions, an on-going adver- -

tising and premotional program and management assis-

tance and use of a Franchise name, constituted a per Se

violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act without the

necessity of proof of individual coercion or proof of an

unreasonable restraint on competition or without the

necessity of inquiry into whether the sale in fact increased

or decreased overall competition.

A

Statement of the Facts

In 1964, Cleaning Center Sales (later called A. P.

Cleaning Center Sales or A. P.C.C.S.) a sales organiza-

tion of American Laundry Machinery Industries, a divi-

sion of the Petitioner, contracted with Robsbur, Inc., an

agency of Arnold Palmer, a well-known golfer, to license

his name and utilize his appearances in the promotion and

sale as a ‘‘package’’ of complete one-hour dry cleaning

stores. The ‘‘package” in addition to the use of the

Arnold Palmer name and his continuing promotional ac-

tivities included all things other than materials and sup-,

plies necessary to operate, including dry cleaning ma-

chinery, (manufactured not only by a division of Petitioner

but by other manufacturers), a leased Sign and Back Drop

with Arnold Palmer’s name thereon and all furniture and

fixtures, complete operating iustructions and other items

required to start up in business.

From 1964 through 1971, approximately 400 ‘‘pack-

age” stores, including those involved in this litigation,

were sold.

A. P.C.C.S.’s dealer in the Kansas City area, John

R. Jacobson, had owned and operated and sold cleaning

establishments under other trade names long prior to be-

coming a dealer for A. P.C.C.S., and in 1965 owned and

operated seven «dry cleaning establishments having no

connection with A. P.C.C.S8.

In 1965 and 1966, Jacobson purchased three ‘‘pack-

age” A.P. Cleaning Centers, and in each case executed

in his own name a lease cf the real estate, a Franchise

Agreement, a Sign and Back Drop Agreement and a Con-

ditional Sales Contract for the purchase of the equipment

and paid sales tax on the purchases.

The A. P. Cleaning Center bought in December 1965

was operated until November 1968 when it was sold as a

going business to Respondent Soper’s husband who re-

ecived a Bill of Sale (covering additional equipment not

included in the original ‘‘package”), a Bulk Sales Affi-

davit, and an assignment of the real estate lease. Soper’s

husband subsequently on March 1, 1969, assumed the re-

maining lease and franchise payments and the unpaid

portion of Jacobson’s Conditional Sale Contract.

Jacobson operated the two other stores from Novem-

ber 1965 and November 1966 until he sold them as going

6

businesses to Respondent, Jeffson Industries, Ine. in Jan-

uary of 1969 and in August, 1969.

In each sale to Jeffson Industries, Ine. all documents

refer to Jacobson as owner; each Bill of Sale included

equipment in addition to that included in the original

‘*package’’ and in each case Jeffson Industries, Ine. sev-

eral months later assumed the remaining payments due on

the Franchise, Sign and Back Drop Leases, and the unpaid

balance of the Conditional Sales Contract debt. At the

time of such sales, Jacobson was also the President and

half owner of Jeffson Industries, Ine.

During the period he held title individually, Jacobson

paid all the expenses, took all the depreciation, retained

all the income and absorbed all the operating losses. In

selling the stores, Jacobson retained all the profit on the

sales.

The Respondents, as Intervenors, sued Petitioner for

fraud and misrepresentation, violation of the Anti-Trust

Laws and for punitive damages, arising out of the sales of

these ‘‘package’’ stores on the theory that Petitioner’s

dealer was at all times Petitioner’s agent and that Peti-

tioner was bound by the agent’s statements and represen-

tations and that the sales of the operating businesses were

the sales of the Petitioner and involved a tying arrange-

ment that violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

No evidence was presented that either Respondent

Jeffson Industries, Inc. or the husband of Respondent

Soper, was compelled to accept ‘‘the tie’’ and was not in

truth attracted by the “going-business” aspects of the fran-

chise package.

~)

The Trial Court permitted the Jury to determine that

an agency existed and to award verdicts of varying amounts

on the several counts.

On the anti-trust counts submitted to the Jury, Re-

spondent Soper received a verdict of $10,000.00. Respond-

ent Jeffson Industries, Ine. received a verdict of $52,000.00.

The Trial Court entered judgments on the anti-trust ver-

dicts to Respondent Soper of $10,000.00 trebled to $30,-

000.00 plus $36,200.00 attorney’s fees and to Respondent

Jeffson Industries, Inc. $52,000.00 trebled to $156,000.00

plus attorney’s fees of $54,300.00,

The Eighth Cireuit Court of Appeals sustained the

rulings of the United States District Court of the Western

District of Missouri, holding that a per se violation of the

Sherman Act existed which in effect required no further

determination as to the issue of coercion in the individual

ease, or as to the unreasonableness of any restraint, or as

to whether or not competition was actually increased or

decreased by reason of the existence of such stores.

Rehearing and rehearing en bane were requested and

denied.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I.

If the licensing of the use of the name of

“Arnold Palmer” is a ‘‘tying product”, the re-

sultant ‘‘tying arrangement” does not necessarily

unreasonably restrain competition.

Having found a tying arrangement, the Court below

states that from this fact flows an inevitable hurt to com-

petition in the tied product market and therefore is a per se

violation of the Sherman Act.

But other Cireuits require ‘‘a case by case inquiry

under the ‘rule of reason’ to determine the competitive

effects of such restraints if the Sherman Act is to be effee-

tuated’’. GTE Sylvania Incorporated v. Continental T.V.

Inc., 537 F. 2d 980 (9th Cir. 1976).

Such a holding forecloses inquiry into whether the need

for ‘‘the protection of goodwill as embodied for example in

a valuable trademark may justify an otherwise invalid

tying arrangement’’. Susser v. Carvel Corporation, 332

F. 2d 505 (2nd Cir. 1964).

A violation of the Sherman Act under the

per se doctrine cannot be predicated on the li-

censing of a franchised name having no prior re-

lationship to the equipment.

The use of the ‘‘Arnold Palmer” name is so inter-

twined with the other elements of the ‘‘package” sale of a

one-hour dry cleaning store that it cannot be so separate

9

and distinct a marketable item as to qualify as a ‘‘tying

product’? in a tying arrangement violating the Sherman

Act, contrary to the holding of the Court below.

Prior to the inauguration of the A. P. Cleaning Store

Program, the name ‘‘Arnold Palmer’’ had no automatic

association with dry cleaning and no market penetration

in the dry cleaning equipment field. While well known in

golfing circles the Arnold Palmer name had value in selling

dry cleaning equipment only as it was advertised and pro-

moted as a part of the program incorporated in the ‘‘ pack-

age” form in which it was offered. The Petitioner’s con-

tract with Robsbur, Inc. gave Petitioner the use and

contrel of the name but limited Petitioner’s power to re-

license the name for use only as a part of the ‘‘package’’.

No buyer of dry cleaning equipment would find it of

value except as promoted and advertised in an expensive

campaign which under the contract with Robsbur, Inc. was

limited to the arrangements made in the ‘‘ package’’.

The franchise name has no value independent of the

advertising prograin with which it is associated.

See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. U. 8. Steel Corp., 523

F. 2d 961 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 8. Ct. 1100.

Il.

If the licensing of the use of the Arnold

Palmer name is a “tying product”, the resulting

‘‘tie’’ is not a violation of the Sherman Act in the

absence of proof of individual coercion.

No evidence was offered in behalf of either of the

Respondents that they were coerced into buying the so-

ealled ‘‘tying product’’, the Franchised name.

10

Other circuits have held that evidence of coercion of

each franchisee is required to substantiate a violation of

the Sherman Act. Ungar v. Dunkin’ Donuts of America,

/ne., 5381 F. 2d 1211, (3 CCA-1976). Response of Carolina

Inc. v. Leasco Response, 537 F. 2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976).

Neither Soper’s husband nor Jeffson Industries, Inc.

ever questioned if they could purchase the franchise with-

out the equipment; nor does it make sense to think they

would since each was buying an established business.

IV.

A sale of a preexisting facility including

equipment and a franchise name does not con-

stitute an illegal tie.

Both Respondents purchased their stores two to three

years after the original opening. They did not ask for or

receive new Franchise Agreements or new Sign and Back

Drop Leases which would have provided for a new five-

year term. On the contrary, they assumed the remaining

term of each as any purchaser from any non-dealer owner

elsewhere would do.

Such a sale does not constitute an illegal transaction.

Beefy Trail, Inc. v. Beefy King International, Inc., 348 F.

Supp. 799 (M.D. Fla. 1972). This well considered and

widely quoted case from a District Court in the Fifth Cir-

cuit is contrary to the position taken by the Eighth Circuit.

11

CONCLUSION

The Writ of Certiorari should be granted to resolve

the conflicts between the circuits as to the issues raised in

the Petition and to inhibit the further extension of a rule

of law which seems to lessen rather than increase economic

competition.

Respectfully submitted,

Mautcotm D. Youna

1500 City National Bank Building

Omaha, Nebraska 68102

Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Maleolm D. Young, a member of the Bar of the

Supreme Court of the United States, hereby certify that

I have served the foregoing Petition for Writ of Certio-

rari on counsel for Respondents, by depositing same in

the United States mail, postage prepaid, on December 28,

1976, addressed to Joseph A. Sherman and Paul A. Wick-

ens, Suite 820, Home Savings Building, 1006 Grand

Avenue, Kansas City, Missouri 64106 and upon Sheridan

Morgan, Two Crown Center, Suite 400, 2420 Pershing

Road, Kansas City, Missouri 64108, counsel for Respond-

ents.

Matcotm D. Youna

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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