Petition — Hesler v. Illinois

Supreme Court, U. %

FILFp

No. ; } DEC 2S 1976

MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK '

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

Octoser Term, 1976

76-8907

JOHN HESLER and JOHN SELZER,

Petitioners,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS,

SECOND DISTRICT

JULIUS LUCIUS ECHELES

CAROLYN JAFFE

35 East Wacker Drive

Chicago, Illinois 60601

Attorneys for Petitioners.

a a SD

UNITED STATES LAW PRINTING CO., CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60618 (312) 525-6581

INDEX

PAGE

Judgments and opinions below 22.0...0......c.ccccceceeeceeeeseeeeeees 2

PU OE TE I hediiteiinirneennssissitsstatetercinieieictensensin 2

Questions presented for review 20... cece ececeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees 2

Constitutional provisions and statutes involved ........ 4

Raising the federal questions ..................2..-2.c2:ceseeeeeeeees 5

ID ETE IE — ccssccaceccnceiincininearsiiiintieaninacnetittitesieileas 6

NIE GF TEI cncssscsstaicnnentiteetaesnocateapinteaiieniiieatdnennenntiacinegs 7

Reasons for granting the writ -....2..........2--:.:::c-eceeeeeee 10

I acesttcnassaithiesiisstresetneinctibiicsinliniitiemeninpeatia 10

1. Petitioners were deprived of their constitutional

right to effective assistance of counsel where, inter alia,

trial counsel was precluded from raising the defense of

entrapment by his failure to respond to the State’s dis-

covery motion pursuant to State procedural rules, and

said same trial counsel, who was also initial counsel on

the direct appeal, failed to raise and preserve on ap-

peal the errors involved in failure to raise the defense

of entrapment or to request instructions thereon ... 10

A. This court should grant Certiorari in order to re-

examine the minimum due process standards ap-

plicable to determining the minimum caliber of

professional legal representation which the Con-

stitution requires the States to assure defendants

ph IIE TIE centssicscnstiicsecieretnpereescisttbiiiinniennianitbiines 11

il

PAGE

B. The question whether a federal constitutional right

was waived is itself a federal question, such that

this Court must look beyond the conclusions of the

State Appellate Court that certain such issues

were waived for failure to be raised below or on

the initial direct appeal. Alternatively, if such

ordinarily would be applied in the face of serious

and substantial allegations attacking the competen-

cy and effectiveness of counsel, where the grounds

for attacking counsel’s competency include his

failure to have taken various appropriate actions

before and at trial, and the alleged waiver of

numerous issues on appeal (per the appellate

court) is due to that same counsel’s failure to raise

on appeal issues which he did not choose to raise

or was precluded from raising below because of

such counsel’s lapses in certain State procedural

PI sesisisivcisnTesstisesiccineresens uialembeavebediohaatiaaniaaais

C. Additionally, petitioners were denied meaningful

appellate review and due process of law, where the

appellate court refused to consider, on the posi-

tion for rehearing prepared by counsel different

from petitioner’s trial and original appellate coun-

sel, all points not raised below or on the original

direct appeal, even though new counsel on rehear-

ing argued that former counsel, in failing so to

do, was thereby ineffective, depriving petitioners

of their constitutional right to effective assistance

Fo i ocietaaiccalesramitintesaecapsamneiediondstapcebietatahieasads

2. Entrapment was an available defense, The doe-

trine set forth by this Court in Hampton vy. United

States, ——- U.S. ——, 48 L.ld.2d 113 (1976), does not

preclude a finding of entrapment as a matter of law

in all situations where a government agent supplied

1]

1]

ili

PAGE

the contraband, subject of petitioners’ convictions. The

holding in that case was based upon a combination of

that factor plus a showing or predisposition of defen-

dants to commit such offenses. Certiorari should be

allowed to clarify the extent (if any) to which Hamp-

ton modified existing law on entrapment —.................. 16

3. The defense of entrapment may be raised as an

alternative to the defense of no guilty scienter. State

decisional law precluding same deprives petitioners of

their right to present a meaningful defense, in violation

I ETE | sictendanicesserncenstvienrvteridinetsmmeninlorcincion 17

I oe ec rk De a a ee 19

Appendices :

A Opinion of the Appellate Court, Second

District filed March 31, 1976 20000... App. 1

B Supplemental Opinion on Denial of Rehear-

rs a cealeclins App. 9

C Order denying petition for leave to appeal

filed September 29, 1976 _.................. erat Ree App. 12

AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases

Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6 Cir. 1974) ..13, 14

Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113 (D.C. Cir. 1967) 13,14

Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) — 000.0... 18

Clark v. United States, 259 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1958) 138

Goodwin v. Cardwell, 482 F.2d 521 (6 Cir. 1970) —........ 12

IV

PAGE :

Hampton v. United States, —-— U.S. ——, 48 L.Ed.2d

SEE CITI) envscnesevessssverssevsssesnesmemnsienaeeieiaaaaae 16

Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965) 0... 15

Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131 (1965) 2.0000. 18

Lee v. Hopper, 499 F.2d 456 (5 Cir. 1974) 0... 12

McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207 (8 Cir. 1974) ES)

Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (8 Cir. 1970) —.. 12

Scott v. United States, 427 F.2d 609 (D.C. Cir. 1970) 13

United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981 (9 Cir, 1975) —..17, 18

United States v. Hammonds, 425 F.2d 597 (D.C. Cir.

BIRT D —avsvensisinsssvsisnshienniscitisscoemeetnaiishaimmmiaaisaisianaEnnne nn 13

United States v. Marshall, 488 F.2d 1169 (9 Cir. 1972). 12

United States ex rel Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d

G6 CT Cig, BGG) xccenceevecicrssssecsussennsncauiaeaeee 14

Washington v. Texas, 385 U.S. 14 (1967) 22... 18

West v. Louisiana, 478 F.2d 1026 (5 Cir. 1973) ........ 14

Wilson v. Phend, 417 F.2d 1197 (7 Cir. 1969) 000... 12,13

Other Authorities

Chief Justice Burger’s article, The Special Skills of

Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certifica-

tion of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice,

42 Formpatam L. Rav. 227 (1978) ......0...0...ccccesceencsscooee 14

Supreme Court Rule 413(d), Chap. 110A, [lL Rev.Stat.

BCD cccccecvunnsvssatvstnsscemmnnutamaae seceaaaiieaa 17

In the |

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroper ‘l'erm, 1976

No.

JOIIN HESLER and JOHN SELZER,

Petitioners,

VS.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS,

SECOND DISTRICT

Petitioners, John Hesler and John Selzer, respectfully

pray that a writ of certiorari be issued to the Appellate

Court of Illinois, Second District, to review its decision

affirming judgments of conviction in The Circuit Court of

the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Llinois, ad-

judging them guilty of unlawful delivery (both petitioners)

and unlawful possession (petitioner Selzer only) of more

than 500 grams of cannabis.

Judgments and Opinions Below

On March 31, 1976, the Illinois Appellate Court, Second

District, filed its opinion affirming petitioners’ convictions,

Nos. 75-111 & 74-431 (consolidated), reported at 39 Iil.

App.3d 843, 350 N.B.2d 748 (1976). A copy of the Ap-

pellate Court’s opinion is attached hereto as Appendix <A.

That court denied a timely petition for rehearing and again

affirmed, per a ‘‘Supplemental Opinion on Denial of Re-

hearing,’’ filed on July 22, 1976, reported at 39 IIlApp.

3d 843, 350 N.K.2d 748 at 753 (1976) (attached as App. B

hereto). A petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Su-

preme Court, timely filed, No. 48783, was denied on Sep-

tember 29, 1976. (App. C)

Jurisdiction of This Court

The judgment sought to be reviewed was entered on

September 29, 1976. This petition for a writ of certiorari is

filed within 90 days from denial of the petition for leave

to appeal. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28

U.S.C. 1257(3) and Rule 22 of the Rules of this Court.

Questions Presented for Review

1. Were petitioners deprived of their constitutional

right to effective assistance of counsel, where, inter alia,

trial counsel was precluded from raising the defense of

entrapment by his failure to have responded to the State’s

discovery motion pursuant to State procedural rules, and

said same trial counsel, who was also initial counsel on the

direct appeal, failed to raise and preserve on appeal the

errors involved in failure to raise the defense of entrap-

ment or to request instructions thereon?

3

A. Should this Court grant Certiorari in order to

re-examine the min‘mum due process standards ap-

plicable to determining the minimum caliber of pro-

fessional legal representation which the Constitution

requires the States to assure defendants in criminal

trials?

Bb. Is not the question whether a federal constitu-

tional right was waived itself a federal question, such

that this Court must look beyond the conclusions of

the State Appellate Court that certain such issues

were waived for failure to be raised below or on the

initial direet appeal? Alternatively, if such ordinari-

ly would constitute waiver, can this doctrine constitu-

tionally be applied in the face of serious and substan-

tial allegations attacking the competency and effective-

ness of counsel, where the grounds for attacking coun-

sel’s competency include his failure to have taken var-

ious appropriate actions before and at trial, and the

alleged waiver of numerous issues on appeal (per the

appellate court) is due to that same counsel’s failure

to raise on appeal issues which he did not choose to

raise or was precluded by the court from raising be-

low because of such counsel’s lapses in certain pro-

cedural requirements?

2. Were petitioners denied meaningfal appellate re-

view and due process of law, where the appellate court re-

fused to consider, on the petition for rehearing prepared

by counsel different from petitioner’s trial and original

appellate counsel, all points not raised below or on the

original direct appeal, even though new counsel on rehear-

ing argued that former counsel, in failing so to do, was

thereby ineffective, depriving petitioners of their consti-

tutional right to effective assistance of counsel?

3. Does the doctrine set forth by this Court in Hampton

v. United States, ....... U.S. ......, 48 L.Ed.2d 113 (1976), pre-

elude a finding of entrapment as a matter of law in all

4

situations where a government agent supplied the contra-

band, subject of petitioners’ convictions, or was the hold-

ing in that case based upon a combination of that factor

plus a showing of predisposition of defendants to commit

such offenses? Should certiorari be allowed to clarify the

extent to which Hampton modifies existing law on the

defense of entrapment?

-

4. May the defense of entrapment be raised as an al-

ternative to the defense of no guilty scienter, and does

State decisional law precluding same deprive petitioners

of their right to present a meaningful defense, in violation

of due process of law?

Constitutional Provisions and Statutes Involved

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-

tution provides in pertinent part that:

‘Section 1. ...{NJor shal) any State deprive any

person of ... liberty ... without due process of

eR

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution

provides in pertinent part that:

‘In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy

the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his

defence.”’

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 413, Chap. 110A, Ill Rev.

Stat. 1975, provides in pertinent part:

“(«l) Defenses. Subject to constitutional limitations

. defense counsel shall inform the State of any de-

fenses which he intends to make... .”’

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 415, Chap. 110A, Ill. Rey.

Stat. 1975, provides in pertinent part:

“(v) Sanctions.

5

““(i) If... a party has failed to comply with an

applicable discovery rule or an order issued pursuant

thereto, the court may ... exclude such evidence, or

enter such other order as it deems just under the cir-

cumstances,”

Raising the Federal Questions Below

The issue as to the alleged incompetency of counsel at

trial and on the original direct appeal was raised for the

first time when present counsel was retained to pursue a

Petition for Rehearing in the Illinois Appellate Court;

however, as is evident from perusal of that court’s Sup-

plemental Opinion upon Denial of Rehearing, (App. B),

the court did not rule on the merits of said claim. Said

issue, with all its ramifications (including raising the var- —

ious Other omissions of original counsel at trial and on

the initial appeal, to demonstrate that such assistance was

not ‘‘effective’’ in the constitutional sense) was also pre-

sented to the Ilfinois Supreme Court on the petition for

leave to appeal, which was denied. (App. C.)

The question as to the extent (if any) to which this

Court’s decision in Hampton v. United States, ....... US.

ene 48 L.Ed.2d 113 (1976), alters existing law concerning

entrapment was first raised on rchearing, as the appellate

court in its initial opinion had deemed the issue waived; but

both on rehearing in the appellate court and on petition

for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, present

counsel argued that ineffective counsel rendered waiver im-

possible, urging the merits of the entrapment defense (de-

spite Hampton) to demonstrate that failure properly to

have raised and preserved the issue was indeed prejudicial.

The appellate court avoided the issue, and the Supreme

Court denied leave to appeal.

6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Prior to trial, the trial court ruled petitioners could not

present the affirmative defense of entrapment, because

defense counsel had failed to comply with Supreme Cour!

Rule 413, 7.e., failed to assert what defenses he would pre-

sent. (Tr. 123)' Petitioners, however, by their testimony,

presented evidence that they were solicited by Rich Ro

man (a government agent) to aid him prior to their know-

ing that marijuana was involved; and, when advised, were

told that they must continue te aid him, because the per-

sons they met [who were in fact agents] were armed, dan-

gerous and would cause trouble if anything went wrong.

(Tr. 332, 375) Petitioners also asserted that the marijuana

belonged to Rich Roman.

The prosecution presented no evidence that either peti-

tioner had a prior disposition to deal in, or even to pos-

sess, marijuana.

Aside from the officer’s testimony containing hearsay

us to what Roman (who did not testify) said, all evidence

presented showed that Roman, a government agent: (1)

provided the controlled substance, and (2) solicited peti-

tioners’ participation.

The defense lawyer failed to request an entrapment in-

struction. The court gave none.

On appeal, petitioners first were represented by the

same lawyer as at trial. The court affirmed, asserting,

inter alia, that petitioners could not raise entrapment on

appeal sincé it was not raised below. (App. A, p. App. 3)

'“Tr.” refers to the Transcript of Proceedings below; and “A.”

to petitioners’ Abstract filed in the Appellate Court.

7

On petition for rehearing—represented by different

(present) counsel—petitioners asserted: (a) that since

they presented evidence of entrapment, and argued entrap-

ment, the issue was not waived; (b) that prior counsel!

rendered ineffective assistance both at trial and on appeal;

and (¢) petitioners were denied a fair trial. The Appellate

Court again affirmed, writing a supplemental opinion

which held that since petitioners did not use the term ‘en-

trapment,’’ said defense cannot be raised on appeal. (App.

B, pp. App. 9-10) The court refused to consider the other

issues raised on rehearing. (App. B)

Statement of Facts

Rich Roman was an informant, who was trying to ob-

tain a benefit for himself by arranging the arrest of some

other person. (Tr, 509-10, A, 25)

On March 15, 1974, Roman met with two Lake County

Deputy Sheriffs, undercover agents, Willie R. Smith and

Richard Whitmore at a parking lot. The State presented

evidence of the officers to show that upon arriving at the

parking Jot, petitioner John Selzer was in the car belonging

to Roman. Petitioner Hesler was in a second car with Joe

Gray; Roman exited his car, walked up to the undercover

agents and then returned to his car. Petitioner Selzer

and Roman then returned to the agents’ car. Petitioner

Selzer was shown some money. Petitioner Selzer just

looked at the money. He did not count it. (Tr. 159) He

then left the car. Roman’s car drove away. During the

time the car was gone, Ilesler was in the officers’ ear and

counted money. Roman then returned in his car with de-

fendant Selzer. Roman had in the trunk of his car, for

which only he had the key, 50 pounds of marijuana. (Tr.

196-97, A. 19) He had arranged the purchase price earlier

8

that day with the agents. (Tr. 180, A. 18) The officers then

walked to Roman’s car. At this time petitioners were not

in Roman’s car. Roman opened the trunk and the agents

took out the marijuana from the trunk of Roman’s ear.

The agents arrested petitioners and also Roman and Gray.

Roman and Gray were released the next day.

Hesler testified that he first met Joe Gray by chance in a

tavern two days before the purchase and that Gray had

suggested he might make $50.00 by accompanying Gray’s

friend, Rich Roman, who was ‘‘to collect a lot of money

and ... thought there might be some trouble”; it was

agreed that Hesler’s roommate, Selzer, ‘*. . . could come

along.’’ (Tr. 309-31, A, 25-26) He did not know that mari-

juana was involved.

On the night of the purchase, Hesler testified he and

Selzer drove in the latter’s car to the Dog ’N Suds where

they met Roman and Gray. Roman took over control, in-

structing Hesler to accompany Gray in Selzer’s car and

took Selzer with him in Roman’s own vehicle to the place

of purchase. (Tr. 325-31, A. 26) When Hesler and Selzer

were alone, Selzer informed Hesler that the meeting was a

marijuana sale and that Roman and Gray had guns; that

they must cooperate or ‘‘there was going to be a lot of

trouble.’’ (Tr. 325-40, A. 26-27)

Hesler did cooperate because of the threat; he told the

police officers he could get more marijuana, and ‘‘told them

anything they wanted to hear.’’? He did this because ‘I

was seared to death and | just didn’t want to get hurt.”’

(A. 27)

Selzer corroborated Hesler. He also testified that Ro-

man told him on the drive to the parking lot that ‘‘there

was going to be a marijuana sale,” and that when he com-

9

municated this to Hesler, he rejected the matter, saying,

‘*‘no way.’’ (A. 28) Selzer also testified he did what Ro-

man told him to because he did not know how to get out

of it and he was seared. (Tr. 375)

The State presented absolutely no evidence that either

petitioner was predisposed to possess or to sell cannabis.

Petitioner Hesler was sentenced to 1 to 4 years, and peti-

tioner Selzer to 3 to 15 years.

10

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Introduction

Whether or not the defense of entrapment involves due

process consideration: if believed by the fact finder, it

would be a complete defense, but couid not be considered

due to lapses by trial and original appellate counsel. Thus

petitioners’ inability to have the jury consider this de-

fense, which otherwise would have been available, raises

serious questions of constitutional proportion.

Because the most grievous loss to petitioners at bar due

to ineffective counsel was the loss of the right to assert

the defense of entrapment, it becomes necessary to demon-

strate that such defense would have availed them, had it

properly been raised and preserved. For this reason, avail-

ability of this defense must be considered, even though con-

stitutional questions as such may not be directly involved

in such defense.

1.

Petitioners were deprived of their constitutional right to

effective assistance of counsel where, inter alia, trial coun-

sel was precluded from raising the defense of entrapment

by his failure to respond to the State’s discovery motion

pursuant to State procedural rules, and said same trial

counsel, who was also initial counsel on the direct appeal,

failed to raise and preserve on appeal the errors involved

in failure to raise the defense of entrapmen: or to request

instructions thereon.

11

A. This court should grant Certiorari in order to re-exam-

ine the minimum due process standards applicable to

determining the minimum caliber of professional legal

representation which the Constitution requires the

States to assure defendants in criminal trials.

B. The question whether a federal constitutional right

was waived is itself a federal question, such that this

Court must look beyond the conclusions of the State

Appellate Court that certain such issues were waived

for failure to be raised below or on the initial direct

appeal. Alternatively, if such ordinarily would con-

stitute waiver, this doctrine cannot constitutionally be

applied in the face of serious and substantial allegations

attacking the competency and effectiveness of counsel,

where the grounds for attacking counsel’s competency

include his failure to have taken various appropriate

actions before and at trial, and the alleged waiver of

numerous issues on appeal (per the appellate court)

is due to that same counsel’s failure to raise on appeal

issues which he did not choose to raise or was pre-

cluded from raising below because of such counsel’s

lapses in certain State procedural requirements.

C. Additionally, petitioners were denied meaningful ap-

pellate review and due process of law, where the ap-

pellate court refused to consider, on the petition for re-

hearing prepared by counsel different from petitioner’s

trial and original appellate counsel, all points not

raised below or on the original direct appeal, even

though new counsel on rehearing argued that former

counsel, in failing so to do, was thereby ineffective,

depriving petitioners of their constitutional right to

effective assistance of counsel.

12

Petitioners’ retained trial counsel * was precluded from

presenting any witnesses other than petitioners, and was

precluded from presenting the defense of entrapment as

such, as a result of sanctions imposed by the trial court

due to counsel’s failure to answer the State’s discovery

motion as to defenses to be raised. (Tr. 125) * On appeal,

the same counsel attempted to raise the defense of entrap-

ment—that it should have prevented conviction—but the

appellate court ruled that failure to have raised said de-

fense below amounted to waiver on appeal. (App. .A, p.

App. 3)

On petition for rehearing filed by present counsel, al-

though ineffective assistance of counsel! both at trial and on

appeal was presented, the court refused even to discuss

this constitutional issue. (App. B)

* Clearly, the same constitutional standards must apply in ascer-

taining the effectiveness of both retained and appointed counsel.

Wilson v. Phend, 417 F.2d 1197 (7 Cir. 1969); Goodwin v. Card-

well, 432 F.2d 521 (6 Cir. 1970); Lee v. Hopper, 499 F.2d 456

(5 Cir. 1974) ; Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736-37 (3 Cir.

1970); United States v. Marshall, 488 F.2d 1169, 1192-93 (9 Cir.

1973).

* Other instances (aside from the entrapment question and the sanc-

tions for non-compliance with discovery) wherein counsel’s per-

formance fell far below recognized standards of professional com-

petence—both of which were raised and presented to the appellate

court on petition for rehearing and to the State Supreme Court on

petition for leave to appeal—are as follows: allowing damaging

hearsay to come in without objection and without cautionary instruc-

tions limiting its purpose; and failure to object to prejudicial prose-

cution argument. It was also argued in the petitions for rehearing

and for leave to appeal that the errors thus countenanced by former

counsel deprived petitioners of a constitutionally fair trial.

13

In Points 2 & 3, infra, petitioners demonstrate that the de-

fense of entrapment was an available and viable defense

on the facts at bar.

Prior counsel’s failure to raise or to be able to raise en-

trapment below—which was held to constitute waiver on

appeal—together with the other demonstrated areas where-

in his performance fell far below minimum professional

standards, when considered as a whole,* amounts to denial

of effective assistance of counsel,

Mr. Chief Justice Burger, when sitting on the Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, commented

that reversal may be ‘‘grounded on ineffective assistance

of counsel for failing to press an essential or central ele-

ment of defense.’’ Clark yv. United States, 259 F.2d 184,

187 (D.C. Cir, 1958) (dissenting opinion). Clearly, conduct

of counsel is incompetent if it has in effect ‘blotted out

the essence of a substantial defense’? at trial or on ap-

peal. Bruce vy. United States, 379 F.2d 113, 116-17 (D.C.

Cir. 1967); accord, Scott vy. United States, 427 F.2d 609,

610 (D.C. Cir. 1970). A defendant is denied effective as-

sistance of counsel if ‘Potentially exonerating defenses

were not explored by counsel and were not developed at

trial.’’ Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6 Cir.

1974).

The formerly applied standard—requiring that a defen-

dant demonstrate that his trial was reduced to a farce,

sham or mockery before he can prevail on a claim of con-

stitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel—has increas-

ingly been rejected by the more well-reasoned and enlight-

'On a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the totality of the

alleged omissions and errors of counsel must be considered as a

whole. See United States v. Hammonds, 425 F.2d 597, 604 (D.C.

Cir. 1970); Wilson v. Phend, supra note 2, at 1199.

14

ened opinions. See, e.g., cases rejecting old test and sub-

stituting therefor such tests as: ‘‘legal assistance which

meets a minimum standard of professional representa-

tion.’’ United States ex rel Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d

634, 641 (7 Cir. 1975); West v. Louisiana, 478 F.2d 1026

(5 Cir. 1973); Bruce v. United States, supra; Beasley v.

United States, supra. In Beasley, the court formulated the

more liberal standard as follows:

“We hold that the assistance of counsel required under

the Sixth Amendment is counsel reasonably likely to

render and rendering reasonably effective assistance.

It is a violation of this standard for defense counsel to

deprive a criminai defendant of a substantial defense

by his own ineffectiveness or incompetence. ... |eita-

tions omitted; emphasis added.|] Defense counsel must

perform at least as well as a lawyer with ordinary

training and skill in the criminal law and must con-

scientiously protect his client’s interest... . Defense

counsel must investigale all apparently substantial de-

fenses available to the defendant and must assert them

ina proper and timely manner... . Defense strategy

and tactics which lawyers of ordinary training and

skill in the criminal law would not consider competent

deny a defendant the effective assistance of counsel,

if some other action would have better protected a

defendant and was reasonably foreseeable as such be-

fore trial.’’ 7d. at 696 (Emphasis added.)*®

Due to the serious problems posed to the administration

of criminal justice by allegations of incompetent counsel,

it is essential taat this Court set down some ground rules

for the State and federal courts to follow in dealing with

due process claims both of State and federal prisoners.

5 See Chief Justice Burger's article, The Special Skills of Advocacy:

Are Specialized Training and Certification of Advocates Essential to

Our System of Jusiice, 42 Forpuam L. Rev. 227 (1973).

~~. ass”

15

Indeed, one Court of Appeals has invited resolution of this

sticky problem by this Court:

‘The Supreme Court, however, has never enunciat-

ed any clear standards for courts to follow in passing

on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. As a re-

sult, cireuit courts, left without guidance, have groped

for the correet prescription to apply.’’ McQueen v.

Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 215 (8 Cir. 1974).°

To hold, as does the appellate court, that all matters not

raised below (including the entrapment defense) are

waived on appeal despite the unresolved serious allega-

tions of ineffective counsel for failure to raise them, is to

condone that which the cases agree violates whatever stan-

dard of effective assistance of counsel may be applicable:

i.e., the blotting out of a substantial defense by counsel’s

ineptitude,

Due process cannot countenance a finding of waiver in

these circumstances,

The State procedural grounds utilized by the trial and

reviewing courts herein to preclude petitioners from ef-

fective reliance on the defense of entrapment surely do

not bar this Court from considering the merits of their

substantial contentions.

‘*! This Court has] consistently held that the question

of when and how defaults in compliance with State

procedural rules can preclude our consideration of a

federal question is itself a federal question.’’ Henry v.

Mississippi, 379 U.S. 4438, 447 (1965).

“See McQucen v. Swenson, id. at 214-17, collecting recent cases

from various Circuits utilizing more liberal formulations than the

“farce-mockery”’ test.

16

Indeed, counsel’s failure to raise the entrapment defense

because of his own dereliction in failing to comply with re-

quired discovery orders virtually amounts to a ‘‘cover-up”’

by that same counsel on appeal to keep from exposing

his own serious lapses at trial.

To delineate the minimum standards of professional

competence expected of counsel defending persons accused

of crime, this Court should accept the invitation of the

Kighth Circuit to enunciate appropriate standards. Where

the courts themselves decry the lack of standards, this

Court should not hesitate to act. Certiorari should there-

fore be allowed.

2.

Entrapment was an available defense. The doctrine set

forth by this Court in Hampton v. United States, US.

onal , 48 L.Ed.2d 113 (1976), does not preclude a finding of

entrapment as a matter of law in all situations where a

government agent supplied the contraband, subjcct of pe-

titioners’ convictions. The holding in that case was based

upon a combination of that factor plus a showing of pre-

disposition of defendants to commit such offenses. Cer.

tiorari should be allowed to clarify the extent (if any) to

which Hampton modified existing law on entrapment.

The Appellate Court held that entrapment was not raised

below and thus that it could not be argued on appeal. (App.

A, p. App. 3) Moreover, in the supplemental opinion upon

denial of rehearing, the court further indicated that the

defense of entrapment was not available because in Mamp-

ton v. United States, US. —., 48 L.Bd.2d 113 (1976°

the Court ruled that the fact that a government agent sup-

plied the contraband did not per se amount to entrapment,

thus overruling a contrary rule previously applicable in

Illinois. (App. B, p. App. 11)

?

17

But I/ampton does not so hold. Rather, it holds that

where the defendant is shown to be predisposed to commit

the offense, the mere fact that the government supplied the

contraband does not in itself preclude conviction, either on

entrapment or on due process grounds.

To the extent that the Illinois courts as reflected in the

case at bar are misconstruing //ampton so as to deprive a

defendant who is not so predisposed of the entrapment de-

fense, certiorari should be allowed so that //ampton may

be clarified and not used as a sword against non-predis-

posed defendants. (At bar, of course, there was no evi-

denee that petitioners were predisposed to commit any

drug offenses.)

And since I/ampton does not so hold, the defense of en-

trapment was available to petitioners herein upon the facts

at bar. As such, their original attorney’s acts and omis-

sions which preeluded such defense from being raised at

trial or considered on appeal resulted in substantial preju-

dice to their due process right to a fair trial.

The defense of entrapment may be raised as an alternative

to the defense of no guilty scienter. State decisional law

precluding same deprives petitioners of their right to pre-

sent a meaningful defense, in violation of due process of

law.

In direct opposition to a State statute permitting incon-

sistent defenses,’ and contrary to the reasoning of United

States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981 (9 Cir. 1975), the appellate

court approved the trial court’s failure to instruct on en-

7 See committee comments to Supreme Court Rule 413(d), Chap.

LIOA, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975.

18

trapment, holding that petitioners could not avail them-

selves of this defense unless they admitted committing the

acts charged. (App. A, pp. App. 10-11) Since petitioners

alternatively claimed that they did not realize what they

were getting involved with until it was too late, the appel-

late court held the defense of entrapment in any event un-

available. (App. A, pp. App. 10-11)

We submit that the reasoning of Demma, rejected by the

Illinois courts, is not oniy persuasive but, indeed, is man-

dated by due process of law. Even if the entrapment de-

fense itself is not so mandated, once a State sees fit to

recognize it, it must rationally be applied and not with-

held on a whim. Upon the facts at bar, the jury could rea-

sonably have found either that petitioners had no culpable

mens rea or scienter in that they did not embark upon the

venture with knowledge of what was involved; or, in the

alternative, that if they did know, they were entrapped.

The state decisional law in this case to the contrary effee-

tively deprives petitioners of their right to present a mean-

ingful defense. Cf. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14

(1967); Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131 (1965); Chambers v.

Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).

The availability of the defense of entrapment ought not

depend upon the application of local procedures and de-

cisional law. Certiorari should be allowed to clarify its

availability in State criminal proceedings.

“Moreover, the court's ruling imposing the drastic sanction of

precluding the entrapment defense in response to original counsel's

failure to inform the State of possible defenses arguably operates to

deprive petitioners of a constitutionally fair trial for the additional

reason that such ruling, based on counsel's lapse, by precluding the

only complete defense, deprived petitioners of due process of law.

See pp. 13-15, supra.

19

And finally, since entrapment should be held to have been

a viable defense at bar, counsel’s failure properly to raise

or preserve the issue was prejudicial to petitioners and

contributed to their being deprived of a trial which was

constitutionally fair, as required by due process of law.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, certiorari should be allowed

to review the decision of the Illinois Appellate Court.

Respectfully submitted,

Juuius Luctus EcHELEs

CAROLYN JAFFE

Attorneys for Petitioners

APPENDIX

AMR a,

APPENDIX A

#75-11 and 74-431 (Consolidated)

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JOIN TESLER and JOHN SELZER,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the 19th Judicial Cireuit,

Lake County, Lllinois.

(Filed March 31, 1976)

MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE GUILD delivered the opinion

of the court:

The defendants herein were jointly tried for the unlawful

possession and unlawful delivery of more than 500 grams

of Cannabis. Defendant Selzer was found guilty of both

charges and was sentenced to 3-15 vears. Defendant Hesler

was found guilty of unlawful delivery only and sentenced to

1-4 years in the penitentiary.

App. 2

On the night of March 15, 1974 one Rich Roman,

described as an agent of the Lake County Sheriff’s De-

partment by both the State and the defense, set up a sale

of marijuana between John Hesler and John Selzer and two

sheriff’s deputies of Lake County. The sale took place

in Griff’s Tavern parking lot in Lake County. Hesler

drove to the scene in his car accompanied by one Joe Gray.

Rich Roman drove his vehicle to the scene accompanied

by John Selzer and the marijuana was in the trunk of

Roman’s car. The four men exited their vehicles and, at

the request of John Hesler, the detectives displayed the

money for the purchase in the sum of $6,750 to John Hesler

who counted it. The marijuana was then examined by the

detectives and the money handed to John Hesler. All four

of the men were then arrested by the detectives. At the

time of arrest John Hesler was armed with a .32 or .38

caliber pistol in his boot.

There is no dispute as to the above testimony. However,

John Selzer and John Hesler testified in their own behalf.

In substance their testimony was that John Hesler was

approached by Joe Gray and asked if he would like to

make $90. Gray told Hesler that a friend of Gray’s, Rich

Roman, had purportedly said he was going to collect a lot

of money and he wanted some other people with him. Hesler

then asked if John Selzer could come along with them.

They were subsequently called and met with Gray and

Roman and their testimony is that it was not until then

that they discovered that this was to be a sale of marijuana.

They denied that they had any part in the sale of the

marijuana but merely went along with Rich Roman and

Joe Gray.

The first contention of the defendants is that they were

entrapped. In support of this contention defendants have

cited People v. Keating (1971), 2 Ll. App. 3d 884, 889, 270

N.E.2d 164, 169:

App. 3

“The nefarious business of the sale of narcotics is not

a game governed by the rules of gentlemanly conduct

and fair play.’

Defendants contend the nefarious activity herein was on

the part of the Sheriff’s office and its agents. This issue

was not raised in the trial court and the statement of the

Supreme Court, in the case of People vy. Fleming (1971), 50

Ill.2d 141, 144, 277 N.K.2d 872, 874, applies specifically to

the facts before us:

“The defense of entrapment, of course, may not be

raised for the first time on appeal. |Citation.] The

failure to raise the question in the trial court will be

regarded as a waiver of it. To avoid this consequence

the defendant in a familiar arguinent says that the

question was not raised because of his trial counsel’s

incompetence. Fatally embarrassing to this position,

however, is the logically required rule that one may

not at once deny the commission of the offense and

claim entrapment. | Citations. |’’

We find that this contention was waived.

The defendants’ next contention is that they were not

proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. They argue that

the evidence was that they were not in possession of the

marijuana but rather that the ten bags of marijuana were

in the possession of Rich Roman, the agent of the Sheriff’s

deputies, in his car. Defendants testified that they did not

know that this was to be a sale of marijuana until they

were on their way to the meeting with the purchasers. De-

fendant Selzer testified that he went along as ‘‘we were

supposed to protect him,’’ for which each defendant was

to get $50. In People v. Embry (1960), 20 IL.2d 331, 169

N.E.2d 767, the Supreme Court, in passing on the question

of possession of drugs, cited People vy. Wheeler (1955), 5 Il.

9d 474, 126 N.E.2d 228, where the question was whether the

App. 4

defendant was in exclusive possession of stolen goods and

the court therein held that the rule that possesion must

be exclusive does not mean that the possession may not be

joint. The court stated:

“This question has never been squarely presented to

us In a case involving possession of narcotics, but

courts of other jurisdictions have held that possession

of narcotics may be joint. [Citations.| We are of the

opinion that these cases express a sound rule, To hold

otherwise would permit two or more persons to gain

inmunity from prosecution on a charge of unlawful

possession of narcotics by proving joint possession of

drugs. Such a result would be contrary to reason and

would defeat the purpose of the Uniform Narcotie

Drug Act.”? 20 [IL2d at 335-36, 169 N.B.2d at 769.

The argument of the defendants is that the agent of the

Sheriff’s deputies set up the transaction and furnished the

marijuana for which the sum of $6,750 was paid to one of

the two defendants. It is obvious that the jury did not

believe these statements of the defendants. See People vy.

Meaderds (1961), 21 Ill.2d 145, 148, 171 N.E.2d 628, 639-

40, where the court stated:

“It is next urged that the proof fails to establish de-

fendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the entire

sweep of the argument being that the testimony of

Peavey is the most reasonable and logical and that it

should be accepted over that of the arresting officers.

We find nothing in the record which shows either

injustice or error on the part of the trial court in ae-

cepting the version of the police officers as true.’

In the case before us the jury obviously accepted the ver-

sion of the arresting officers and we will not substitute our

Judgment for that of the jury in such a situation. In

further support of this argument the defendants have ob-

jected to an instruction dealing with constructive posses-

App. 5

sion, however, the defendants have failed to include all of

the instructions given. The courts of Illinois have con-

sistently held that if the abstract does not contain all of

the instructions, both those given and refused, a claim of

error based on the giving or refusal of the instruction will

not be heard. (See People v. Dailey (1968), 41 LL2d 116,

121, 242 N.K.2d 170, 173; People v. Williams (1968), 40 Ll.

2d 522, 530, 240 N.E.2d 645, 650; People v. Pruitt (1974),

16 Ill.App.3d 930, 942, 307 N.E.2d 142, 153.) Nonetheless,

we find that the giving of the instruction was proper as to

constructive possession as set forth above.

The next issue raised by the defendants is that they were

unduly restricted by the trial court in the examination of

officer Winans as to the prior arrest and record of Rich

Roman which led to his acting as an agent and informant

for the Sheriff’s department. The alleged purpose of this

cross-examination by the defendants was to diseredit the

testimony of the arresting officer, Winans. This issue was

not raised in post-trial motions of the defendants aud the

courts of Illinois have repeatedly held that where an issue

is not presented to the trial court in a post-trial motion for

its decision, it may not be raised for the first time upon

appeal. In People y. Pickett (1973), 54 Mll2d 280, 282,

296 N.E.2d 856, 857-58, the Supreme Court summarized

the rule relating to waiver of an issue by failure to raise

the same in a post-trial motion or motion for a new trial.

The court in that case also considered the question of plain

error under Rule 615(a) (Til.Rev.Stat. 1971, ch. 110A,

$615(a)). (See also, People v. Howell (1975), 60 I1.2d 117,

120, 324 N.K.2d 403, 404-05.) In the case before us we find

no reason to apply the plain error rule of 615(a). The

trial court refused to allow cross-examination of Officer

Winans regarding the first arrest of Rich Roman on the

ground that it was a collateral issue. The trial court fur-

ther advised counsel for the defendants that he could prove

App. 6

the matter by the court record relating to the first arrest

of Rich Roman. The defendants did just that and in-

troduced the record + the arrest of Rich Roman and the

subsequent dismissal of the cause by the introduction of the

record itself through the Cireuit Clerk of Lake County.

Thus, the fact that Rich Roman had been arrested and the

ease subsequently dismissed was before the jury, which

the jury could consider in reaching their verdict. Addi-

tionally, the defendant called the Assistant State’s At-

torney who had handled the first Rich Roman case who

testified as to his conversations with Officer Winans relative

to that case and stated:

‘*T asked him how information Mr. Roman was giving

him was developing. He said he was cooperating and

the information was very good, and based on that I

made the determination to nolle prosse the case of Mr.

Roman.”’

It can thus be seen that the jury was adequately informed

that Officer Winans was using Rich Roman as an informant,

and that the original case against him had been nolle

prossed at the request of Winans. This was all before

the jury for their consideration. We thus find that no error

was committed as defendants properly showed the status

of the agent Roman.

The next contention of the defendants is that the failure

of the State to call the informant Rich Roman as a witness

denied the defendants a fair trial and deprived them of

their Sixth Amendment rights of confrontation and cross-

examination. Once again we point out that this issue was

not raised in the post-trial motion and is, therefore, waived

in this appeal. Furthermore, we find that the failure of

the State to cail the informant was not plain error under

Rule 615(a) as set forth above. Nonetheless, we do ob-

serve several factors relative to this issue. The informant

App. 7

and Joe Gray were personally known to the defendants

and could have been called by them had they so desired.

There is no duty on the State to call an informant, known

or unknown to the defendants, as a witness. (People v.

Mason (1963), 28 IlL2d 396, 399, 192 N.E.2d 835, 837;

People vy. Aldridge (1960), 19 Ill.2d 176, 180, 166 N.E.2d

563, 565; People vy, lzzo (1958), 14 Ill.2d 208, 213, 151 N.E.

2d 329, 336.) The failure of the State to call either Joe

Gray or Rich Roman was pointed out to the jury in detail

hy defense counsel at trial. It is obvious that the defen-

dants did not wish to call either Rich Roman or Joe Gray

as a witness or to make either of them a witness by the

court. As counsel for the defendants has stated in his post-

trial argument:

‘To suggest that I call Mr. Rich Roman as my witness

is the ultimate in absurdities.’’

Furthermore, in commenting upon the failure of the State

to call an informant the appellate court, in People v. Aprile

(1973), 15 Ill. App.3d 327, 332, 304 N.E.2d 169, 173, stated :

‘Finally, defendant argues that the State failed to

make available the whereabouts of a named person or

otherwise make him available to the defense and that

such failure deprived him of a fair trial particularly

as it related to the defense of entrapment. It is defen-

dant’s argument that this person was an informer, in

the employ of the Hlinois Bureau of Investigation, and

the person who“set him up’ for the sale of the non-

narcotic substance to an agent of the Bureau. The

State proved its case without him and no duty we can

see devolved on the State to eall him as a witness or

have him otherwise available.”’

We therefore find that, while the issue was not raised in

post-trial motion, that because the State was able to prove

its ease without the testimony of Rich Roman or Joe Gray

App. 8

it was under no duty to call them as witnesses and that the

failure to call either of them, both known to the defendants,

was not error.

The last contention of the defendants is that the sentence

imposed is excessive. In the absence of abuse of discre-

tion in sentencing, this court will not reduce the sentences

imposed by the trial court. As the State points out, defen-

dant Hesler advised the deputy sheriffs that he could

produce 75 pounds of marijuana for them by Monday and

further advised the deputies that if they wished to purchase

marijuana in 100 pound lots they could reduce the price.

Under the circumstances and facts of this case we do not

find that the sentences imposed were excessive.

In summation, in looking at the record as a whole, and

in light of our function on review of determining only the

question of whether there is sufficient credible evidence to

prove the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and

the jury’s function to determine the credibility of the wit-

nesses and the weight to afford their testimony, we find

there was such sufficient credible evidence presented from

which the jury could conclude that defendants were proven

guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The jury obviously has

rejected the explanation by which the defendants attempt

to explain their knowledge and possession of marijuana and

has accepted the State’s evidence as true. (People v. Ward

(1975), 31 HLApp.38d 1022, 1026, 335 N.E.2d 57, 60.) From

our examination of the record as a whole it is our opinion

there is ample evidence, both credible and legally sufficient,

to establish the guilt of the defendants beyond reasonable

doubt.

AFFIRMED.

Semenrecp and Hauiert, JJ., coneur.

App. 9

APPENDIX B

74-431)

NQ. 75-111) Cons.

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF LLLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JOHN HESLER and JOHN SELZER,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the 19th Judicial Circuit,

Lake County, Illinois.

(Filed July 22, 1976)

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON

DENIAL OF REHEARING

Mr. Prestoane Justice Guiep delivered the supplemental

opinion of the court: We have considered defendants’ pe-

tition for rehearing in this case on the issue of whether

the defense of entrapment was waived at trial. Relying in

part on People v. Strong (1961), 21 IL2d 320, 172 N.K.2d

765, defendants argue that since evidence of entrapment

was presented at trial and since the theory of entrapment

was argued to the jury, the issue of entrapment was pre-

served for review.

In People v. Strong, the Supreme Court stated:

‘‘The People insist that the defense of entrapment was

not raised during the trial and cannot therefore be

App. 10

raised on appeal. This argument is not well taken,

because facts suggesting entrapment were presented

in detail and defense counsel raised the point in his

closing argument. Entrapment need not be specially

pleaded or relied upon exclusively so long as it has

been clearly suggested in the trial court. ef. People v.

Van Scoyr, 20 Ill.2d 233; People v. Outten, 13 Ill.2d

21.’’ {Emphasis added.| 21 Ill.2d at 324, 172 N.E.2d

at 767.

In the instant case, we find that the defense did present

evidence that defendants were solicited by Rich Roman to

help him in his endeavor and that neither of the defendants

had any knowledge that a marijuana sale was involved.

We further find that defense counsel argued to the jury

that the marijuana belonged to Rich Roman and that his

clients were innocent persons ‘‘shanghaied’’ to come along

and kept at the scene of the sale by threat. However, we

find that this is not a presentation of facts in detail which

clearly suggests entrapment as a defense. In fact, trial

defendants’ defense was structured upon establishing in-

sufficiency of the evidence to prove possession and delivery,

and not once was the word ‘‘entrapment’’ even mentioned.

We, therefore, adhere to our original opinion that defen-

dants had waived the issue of entrapment by failing to

raise it at trial.

In addition, attention is directed to our statement in the

original opinion that, ‘‘{| Defendants] denied that they had

any part in the sale of the marijuana. ...’’ In view of this,

and in view of defendants’ trial defense, we further note

the principle that the defense of entrapment is incompati-

ble with the denial of the commission of the acts constitut-

ing the offense. (People v. Realmo (1963), 28 Ill.2d 510,

192 N.E.2d 918.) Thus, by denying that they had com-

mitted the offense, the defendants were thereby precluded

from raising entrapment as a defense. We recognize that

this view is in conflict with the 9th Circuit Court of Ap-

App. 11

peals decision of U.S. v. Demma (9th Cir., 1975) 523 F.2d

981. However, that opinion is not binding upon this court,

and even if we desired to follow it, which we do not, since

we find its reasoning unpersuasive, we would be unable to

do so in view of the binding precedent of the highest court

of this state to the contrary. See e.g., People v. Fleming

(1971), 50 Th2d 141, 277 N.B.2d 872.

Furthermore, we observe that the holding of the court in

People v. Strong, supra,—that a conviction for sale of nar-

cotics may not stand when the narcotics are supplied by a

government informer—has been overruled by the recent

United States Supreme Court opinion of Hampton v. Unil-

cd States (1976), —...... US. —....., 48 L.Bd.2d 113, 96 S.Ct.

_, Which held that a conviction is not precluded, on en-

trapment grounds, by the fact that a government informant

supplied the contraband which defendant then sold.

Defendants also argue that they were not proven guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt, due in part to the State’s fail-

ure to rebut the affirmative defense of entrapment. Our de-

cision to adhere to our holding that defendants waived the

issue of entrapment obviates the necessity of reconsidering

this issue.

The remaining issues presented in defendants’ petition

for rehearing, which was prepared by counsel different

than the one whe represented defendants at trial and on

appeal, are not properly before this court as they raise

issues which were not argued in defendants’ initial appel-

late brief. See, ILRev.Stat. 1975, ch. 110A, §341(e) (7).

Accordingly, for the reasons stated-in the original opin-

ion, and in this supplemental opinion, we deny the petition

for rehearing. The judgments appealed from are affirmed.

APFIRMED.

Semenrecp and Hatrert, JJ., coneur.

App. 12

APPENDIX C

STATE OF ILLINOIS

OFFICE OF

CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT

Springfield 62706

September 29, 1976

Mr. Julius Lucius Echeles

Attorney at Law

35 East Wacker Drive

Chicago, Ill. 60601

No. 48783 — People State of Lllinois, respondent, v. Johu

. Hesler, et al., petitioners. Leave to appeal,

Appellate Court, Second District.

You are hereby notified that the Supreme Court today

denied the petition for leave to appeal in the above en-

titled cause.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Clell L. Woods

Clerk of the Supreme Court