Petition — Exxon Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency
Supreme Court brief1977
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DEC 9 1976
MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK
IN THE .
Supreme Court of the United States
Octroser TERM, 1976
No. 76-78 1
Exxon CORPORATION AND SHELL Or COMPANY,
Petitioners,
V.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, an independent
agency of the Executive Branch of the United
States; Russert E. Train, Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency; and JOHN
QuaRLES, Deputy Administrator of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
FREDERICK M. Rowe
EpwaRrD W. WARREN
Of Counsel: TrmotTHy 8S. Harpy
KIRKLAND, ELLIs & ROWE
oe Svan See 1776 K Street, N.W.
Janus A. Evans Washington, D.C. 20006
WruiaM D. Marr enteaed
December 9, 1976 Attorneys for Petitioners
Matcoum D. Hawk
Press or Brkon S. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D. C.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I ets a See a edeeebadnaareses é 2
EE > eve cdusoeduawdcenecdeeseueta dentate 2
SD DIED nonce chesscdccarsncecceseccss 2
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED ................ 3
SATBMENT OF THB CAG 2... ccccccccccccccccccccces 4
ReEAsons FoR GRANTING THE WRIT
I. A Conflict Exists Among the Circuits Regarding
Whether EPA’s ‘‘Effluent Limitations Guide-
lines’? Comply With Section 304(b) of the Act. 8
Ii. A Conflict Exists Among the Circuits Regarding
the Validity of EPA’s ‘‘Variance Clause’’.... 12
III. Resolution of Whether EPA Must Consider the
Competitive Effect of Its Regulations Is Neces-
sary To Avoid Discriminatory Implementation
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act... 15
EE SER a EE EO Oe MOE EE 22
CERTIFICATE OF BERVEION 2... ccc ccccccccccccccccccees 23
a a a la
pS RENE SERIE Ee er age Ke CP eo Ee eR Te 3la
I a i a a a 58a
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
American Frozen Food Institute vy. Train, 539 F.2d 107
i eee gk ee eee eee dies oe 10
American Iron and Steel Institute v. EPA, 526 F.2d
Se soda este, celee gs 9,12 -
ii Table of Authorities Continued
Page
American Meat Institute v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442 (7th
Ge Ee dud 06s ce dencesde6eeeweealeneee 10
American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, 540 F. od 1023
Sees Gs. NE 6:0 0054cnncecaniGdenssenzanel passim
American Petroleum Institute v. Train, 7 E.R.C. 1795
(D. Col. 1975), aff’d, 526 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir.1975) 7
Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 9 E.R.C. 1033 (4th
i WE ok scvucsdiccidendtaameuee eee 13, 14
Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp,
See Wk ee GE Kn patecscdckescaviesteieuns 20
CPC International Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032 (8th
Gs TD ccbndncesckous oecancescnéecadaneasens 9
E. 1. duPont deNemours and Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018
(4th Cir, 1976), cert. denied, Nos. 15- 978, 75-1473
& 75-1750 (April 19 & June 21, 1976)......... 8, 10, 12
13, 14, 15, 22
Elm City Broadcasting el v. United States, 235 F.2d
OUR Gee, SE, kn cba wae ckaeeeecaas 21
FCC v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc. (KOA), 319
eh Ee GEE cu bUc uckvuudenniauemeeen anes. 21
FCC vy. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470
ae per rrr Bi Tees 20
Gulf States Utilities Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747 (1973).. 20
Hooker Chemicals v. Train, 537 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1976) 10
Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d
Gee Ses I EE 6. ontdccdeeccesdeonseteus 19
Municipal Electric Ass’n of Massachusetts v. SEC, 413
pp ff. 8. S are en re 20
National Coal Ass’n v. FPC, 191 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir.
SD 6m0t84s0ececeonsetataciaweeetenas 21
Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 537 F.2d
ee Ce MPD akc cceenctaconnacncbaeeuuaes 13
Table of Authorities Continued iii
Page
Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckleshaus, 486 F.2d 375
(D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974) 19
Union Carbide Corp. v. Train, No. 74-1459 (4th Cir.
EE. pobedes totes cnkeeesdudeseysenenniveseaee 16
STaTuTEs:
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, 86 Stat. 816, Public Law No. 92-500, October
18, 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.
Section 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) .... 4
Section 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 .............. passim
Section 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) .......... 4
wie 301(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § Sreeontt)
A
Section 304, 33 U.S.C. § 1314 .............. passim
Section 304(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) ........ passim
Section 306, 33 U.S.C. § 1816 .............06.. 5
Section 402(a)(5), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(5) .... 9 11
Section 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) .......... 5
Section 509(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) .......... 7,15
Section 509(b)(1)(E), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (1)
Se Sec eis aes nnd Wea base eeee nc be weewkess
te icc tUen puvkeadsanuneenues s 2
Section 204, Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §824¢ ..... 20
Section 10(e), Public Utility Holding Company Act of
Se Ae Se © OEE ck.cccecncenevdesneeases 20
CoNGRESSIONAL MATERIALS:
Senate Committee on Public Works, A Legislative His-
tory of the Water Pollution C ‘ontrol Act Amend-
ments of 1972, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 1973)
(Comm. Print) TE WUE aicuveecevecedsnceoses 11
iv Table of Authorities Continued
RuLes AND REGULATIONS: _
GD CE § GEG ce cccsivtcccéccicésnasieeeee 6
GD Cae 8 OD oc osvcccvecsseesccsessuteel 3
GD CL § GEARED on ccncctecctccsccsesnesu 6, 14
GO C.F RE. § GRRE oo ccccccccccssacessesseneee 6
8 CE § GERSDGEARS Lo ccicccccceccecusscununul 6, 15
GO UL. § GOBED ..o cc ccccccuncccecscenncenmee 6
SO OC. E. § CODD oon ceccccdeccsceecesuuas le 6,18
68 C.P.B. § GIRBO-GIDSS on. ccccccccccccenecvecseal 6,15
© CPA. § GORD oo cvccccdvuccconsescs eben 6,18
SD Ved. Bog. BOUGD (1B0E) ...o cc cccccccctececdulu 5
40 Fed. Reg. 21939 ite codified at 40 C.F.R. Part
GED scccccesvscesessseneleyendcanl 3, 5,18
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OcToBER TERM, 1976
No.
Exxon CORPORATION AND SHELL O1L COMPANY,
Petitioners,
V.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, an independent
agency of the Executive Branch of the United
States; Russert E. Train, Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency; and JOHN
QuaRLES, Deputy Administrator of the Environ-
mentai Protection Agency, Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Exxon Corporation and Shell Oil Company petition
for a Writ of Certiorari to review the decision and
judgment of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in
the consolidated cases of American Petroleum Insti-
tute, et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.,
Nos. 74-1465, 74-1466, Shell Oil Company v. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, et al., No. 74-1621, and
2
Exxon, Corporation v. Environmental Protection
Agency, et al., No. 74-1622."
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (App. A, infra)
is reported at 540 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1976).
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered
on August 11, 1976. On November 1, 1976, an extension
of the time within which to file this petition for Writ
of Certiorari was granted to and including December
9, 1976. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The questions presented for review by this Court
are:
1. Whether the Administrator of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency complied with Section
304(b) of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972 when he promulgated so-
ealled ‘‘effluent limitations guidelines’’ as single-num-
ber discharge standards to be ‘‘mechanically cranked’’
into individual permits for more than 200 existing
petroleum refineries,
‘Shell and Exxon originally filed separate petitions for review
in the Fifth Cireuit Court of Appeals. These petitions, Shell Oil
Co. v. EPA, and Exxon Corp. v. EPA, were subsequently trans-
ferred to the Tenth Cireuit and consolidated with API v. EPA,
challenging the same set of EPA regulations.
| i
2. Whether the Administrator of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency complied with the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
when, in lieu of the ‘‘ guidelines for effluent limitations”
required by Section 304(»), he promulgated a so-called
‘‘variance clause’’ which provides far less individual
plant flexibility than Congress intended in the Section
402 permit-issuing process.
3. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in up-
holding EPA regulations which disadvantage refineries
with petrochemical facilities vis-a-vis their competi-
tors in the refining and organic chemical industries
on the sole ground that ‘‘nothing in the [Federal Water
Pollution Control] Act or its legislative history .. .
requires EPA to consider the competitive effect of its
regulations.”’
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED
This petition involves interpretation of EPA’s so-
called ‘‘effluent limitation guidelines’’ for existing pe-
troleum refineries, 40 Fed. Reg. 21939 (1975), codified
at 40 C.F.R. Part 419, as promulgated pursuant to the
Federal Pollution Control Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251 et seq.’ Pertinent provisions of the Act and
regulations are set forth in Appendices B and C, pps.
3la and 58a, infra.
2 Parallel United States Code citations for the sections of the Act
most frequently cited in this petition are:
Section 101—33 U.S.C. § 1251
Section 301—-33 U.S.C. § 1311
Section 304—33 U.S.C. § 1314
Section 306—33 U.S.C. § 1316
Section 402—33 U.S.C. § 1342
4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act (‘‘the Act’’) established a compre-
hensive program to control water pollution through”
regulation of industrial discharges. The Act’s ultimate
goal as set forth in §101(a) (1) is “that the discharge
of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated
by 1985.”’
To achieve this long-range objective, Congress estab-
lished a pragmatic program to upgrade the pollution
control capabilities of varying existing plants on an
orderly and equitable basis.
First, the Act declares unlawful the discharge of any
pollutant except in compliance with conditions im-
posed by the Act. §301(a). For existing plants, Con-
gress established goals for effluent limitations to be
achieved through permits calling for ‘‘application of
the best practicable control technology currently avail-
able’? by July 1, 1977, and ‘‘application of the best
available tecunclogy economically achievable’’ by July
1, 1983. §§ 301(b) (1) (A) & 301(b) (2) (A).
These goals are to be achieved in accordance with
‘guidelines for effluent limitations’’ published by the
Administrator of EPA. §304(b). Such guidelines are
to identify ‘‘the degree of effluent reduction attainable”’
and to ‘“‘specify factors to be taken into account’’ in
determining control measures and practices to be ap-
plicable to point sources. § 304(b).
Among the factors to be specified by EPA are ‘‘age
of equipment and facilities involved, the process em-
ployed, the engineering aspects of the application of
various types of control techniques, process changes,
5
the cost of achieving such effluent reduction, non-water
quality environmental impact (including energy re-
quirements), and such other factors as the Adminis-
trator deems appropriate.’”’ §304(b). The resulting
‘‘guidelines for effluent limitations’’ are then to be
used in formulating individua! plant discharge per-
mits under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimina-
tion System, to be administered principally by the
States. § 402(b).
Pursuant to its purported authority under §§ 301,
304 and 306 of the Act, EPA, on May 9, 1974, published
regulations establishing so-called ‘‘effluent limitations
guidelines’? for the petroleum refining industry. 39
Fed. Reg. 16560. Amended regulations, substantially
unchanged from those previously promuigated, were
published by EPA on May 20, 1975. 40 Fed. Reg.
21939.
Rather than providing the flexibility inherent in the
§ 304 guidelines described above, EPA’s effluent limita-
tions guidelines’’ for petroleum refineries establish
single-number discharge standards for all existing
plants directly comparabie in form and format to the
‘*standards’’ which Congress expressly prescribed in
§ 306 only for new sources. Indeed, *‘ effluent limitations
guidelines’? were designed to be ‘‘mechanically
cranked”’ into permits issued by State authorities with-
out regard to varying circumstances of individual exist-
ing refineries.
Having thus stripped the States of any significant
role in the permit-issuing process, EPA proceeded to
simulate individual plant flexibility through promul-
gation of a “‘variance eclause’’ by which exceptions
might theoretically be granted in unusual cases. Such
6
a variance would be granted only if the discharger
proves ‘‘that factors relating to the equipment or
facilities involved, the process relating to the equip-
ment or facilities involved, the process applied, or
other such factors related to such discharger are funda-
mentally different from the factors considered in the
establishment of the guidelines.’’* 40 C.F.R. § 419.12.‘
In addition, EPA’s regulations anomalously
provided discharge limits which penalize refiners
engaged in substantial organic chemicals pro-
duction. In contrast to analogous regulations for the
organic chemicals industry, which recognize and reflect
the pollutant contribution of chemicals production,
EPA’s petrochemical and integrated petroleum refin-
ing regulations actually reduce the discharge allowable
to refineries engaged in significant manufacture of or-
ganic chemicals.’ These more stringent discharge re-
strictions significantly disadvantage such refiners as
compared with their competitors in the refining and
organic chemicals industries.
* All emphases added in this petition unless otherwise noted.
*The variance provisions for the petroleum refining industry in
40 C.F.R. §§ 419.12, 419.22, 419.32, 419.42 and 419.52 are essen-
tially identical to the variance provisions promulgated by EPA for
all industry categories and subcategories. See App. C, page 58a,
infra.
° EPA’s regulations for the petroleum refining industry include
five subparts; subpart C, 40 C.F.R. §§ 419.30-419.36, is applicable
to petrochemical refineries; subpart E, 40 C.F.R. §§ 419.50-419.56,
is applicable to more complex integrated refineries with substantial
organic chemicals production. EPA’s regulations for the organic
chemical industry, 40 C.F.R. § 414, although presently subject to
reconsideration by EPA, are nonetheless still used for guidance in
issuing permits.
7
Because of these and other defects in EPA’s regu-
lations, Exxon, Shell and other refiners petitioned for
review. of EPA’s petroleum refinery ‘‘effluent limita-
tions guidelines’? under §509(b)(1)(E) of the Act.°
The Tenth Circuit decided petitioners’ case on Au-
gust 11, 1976, holding inter alia that:
(1) Despite the absence of any provision in § 301
for issuing regulations, EPA’s ‘‘promulgation of the
limitations was a reasonable exercise of a congression-
ally delegated power,”’ creating limitations that are
‘‘presumptively applicable and controlling unless re-
butted by a permit applicant.’’ 540 F.2d at 1030, Fur-
ther, despite the § 304 direction to establish guidelines,
the Tenth Circuit held that ‘‘[t]he expertise of the
Administrator is persuasive as to whether the limita-
tions be fixed in single numbers or ranges.’’ 540 F.2d
at 1031.
(2) Despite the requirement that a variance will be
granted only upon proof by the discharger of ‘‘funda-
mentally different factors,’’ the ‘‘variance’’ clause was
held to be a ‘‘valid exercise of EPA’s rule-making
authority.’’ 540 F.2d at 1033.
(3) Despite the conceded penalty for refineries en-
gaged in petrochemical and integrated operations,
EPA’s regulations were upheld on the ground that
* Petitioners also filed a protective complaint, under the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, in the United States District Court for
the District of Colorado, The District Court dismissed the com-
plaint on April 8, 1975, holding that ‘‘the issues presented in this
case are properly considered in the appropriate United States
Court of Appeals pursuant to §509(b) of the Act.’’ American
Petroleum Institute v. Train, 7 ERC 1795, 1797 (D. Col. 1975),
aff’d 526 F.2d 1342 (10th Cir. 1975). The jurisdictional issue in-
volved in API v. Train is not raised in this petition for certiorari
and was not reconsidered in American Petroleum Institute v. EPA,
540 F.2d at 1026. See n.1, supra.
8
‘‘nothing in the Act or its legislative history ... re-
quires EPA to consider the competitive effect of its
regulations.’’ 540 F.2d at 1036.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I. A CONFLICT EXISTS AMONG THE CIRCUITS RE-
GARDING WHETHER EPA’S “EFFLUENT LIMITA-
TIONS GUIDELINES” COMPLY WITH SECTION 304(b)
OF THE ACT.
On April 19 and June 21, 1976, this Court granted
the petitions and ecross-petition in H. I. duPont de-
Nemours and Co., et al. v. Train, et al., Nos. 75-978,
75-1473 and 75-1750, agreeing to review, inter alia,
whether the Administrator of EPA may promulgate
effluent limitations for existing industrial sources of
water pollution, uniform within industrial classes,
categories and subeategories, as national minimum re-
quirements under § 301 of the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act Amendments of 1972.
The duPont petitions raise this question in the con-
text of EPA regulations for the inorganic chemical
industry. The present petition raises a comparable
issue with respect to the petroleum refining industry.
The duPont cases were fully briefed and oral argu-
ment was held on December 8, 1976. Because of the
similarity of the issues presented, this Court may wish
to postpone its consideration of this portion of the
instant petition pending disposition of the duPont
cases,
The question of whether EPA has authority under
the Act to issue so-called ‘‘effluent limitations guide-
lines’? as single-number discharge standards has al-
ready been considered by seven courts of appeals. The
courts have split a number of ways in interpreting
EPA’s authority.
_— ee
9
The first court to speak, the Eighth Circuit, held
that the Act does not empower EPA’s Administrator
to promulgate effluent limitations for existing plants
under § 301. CPC International Inc. v. Train, 515
F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975). Reviewing the statutory
language and legislative history, the Eighth Circuit
determined that § 301 does not authorize promulgation
of effluent limitations by regulation, but rather that
‘*euidelines for effluent limitations,’’ not single-number
standards, were explicitly required by § 304. 515 F.2d
at 1037. }
Other courts of appeals presented with the same
issue in the context of similar regulations for other
industries have disagreed.
The Third Cireuit, in American Tron and Steel In-
stitute v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (1975), found that au-
thority for the Administrator to issue single-number
limitations under § 301 could be ‘‘inferred’’ from the
Act. 526 F.2d at 1037. The Third Cireuit reconciled
this holding with the explicit § 304 requirement for
guidelines in the following manner:
[T]he section 301 limitations represent both the
base level or minimum degree of effluent control
permissible and the ceiling (or maximum of efflu-
ent discharge) permissible nationwide within a
given eategory, and the section 304 guidelines are
intended to provide precise guidance to the per-
mit-issuing authorities in establishing a permissi-
ble level of discharge that is more stringent than
the ceiling. 526 F.2d at 1045.
Because EPA’s ‘‘effluent limitations guidelines’’ for
the iron and steel industry failed to identify a range
of feasible discharge levels and specify factors to be
taken into account for granting permits to individ-
10
ual point sources, as required by § 304, the Third
Circuit remanded to EPA. 526 F.2d at 1045-47.
In the present case, and in EF. I, duPont de Nemours
& Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1976), the
Tenth and Fourth Circuits found promulgation of
limitations under § 301 to be a reasonable exercise of
the EPA Administrator’s authority. Both courts found
EPA’s limitations to be ‘‘presumptively applicable
and controlling unless rebutted by a permit appli-
eant,”’ and accordingly upheld EPA’s single-number
effluent limitations despite the § 304 requirement that
EPA publish “regulations providing guidelines for
effluent limitations.’”? API, supra, 540 F.2d at 1030;
duPont, supra, 541 F.2d at 1028.
The Fourth Circuit in duPont ruled that ‘‘the ex-
pertise of the Administrator is persuasive as to
whether the limitations be fixed in single numbers or
ranges,’ 541 F.2d at 1029, and the Tenth Cireuit
agreed explicitly. 540 F.2d at 1031. The Tenth Cireuit
rejected, however, EPA’s claim ‘‘that the regulations
must be mechanically cranked into every permit which
may be issued,” stressing that its holding accepted the
use of single numbers only ‘“‘[fJor the purpose of
general rule-making.’’ 540 F.2d at 1031-32."
™The Seventh Circuit also found authority for EPA to issue
effluent limitations under § 301, but expressly pe ruling “4
ing whether EPA’s regulations comport with the requirement:
of "soo American Meat Institute v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 448
n. 13, 452 (7th Cir. 1975).
The Second Circuit upheld EPA’s promulgation of ‘‘ effluent
limitation guidelines’’ pursuant to §§ 301 and 304 of the Act.
Hooker Chemicals v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 628 (2d Cir. 1976).
Accord, American Frozen Food Institute v. Train, 539 F.2d 107,
129-32 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
11
This split among the circuits that have considered
whether EPA’s single-number discharge standards
comply with the requirements of §304(b) presents
serious obstacles to effective administration of the
Act. Indeed, the current uncertainty regarding EPA’s
authority and compliance with the Act continues to
impose burdens on the courts and promotes chaotic
administration of the nation’s water pollution control
program.
By promulgating single-number standards for exist-
ing plants instead of issuing the flexible ‘‘guidelines”’
required by § 304(b), EPA’s procrustean regulations
ignore significant factors that Congress intended to be
applied in granting individual discharge permits. This
EPA disregard of Congress’ intent has spawned liti-
gation in countless industries challenging EP A’s regu-
lations.
In addition, administration of the Act’s pollution
control program has been made chaotic by EPA’s
severe curtailment of the primary State role contem-
plated by the Act. Congress intended that discharge
permits be issued by the States, rather than EPA, as
soon as they have the ‘‘eapability,’’ under § 402(a) (5).
Without ‘‘meaningful local and State participation,”’
Congress recognized that “the program will founder
on the rocks of the generally inflexible, Washington
dictated approach.”* Rather than being given the
‘guidelines for effluent limitations,’ explicitly called
for by § 304, the States must now mechanically crank
*Comments of Congressman Blatnik, spokesman for the House
Publie Works Committee in the House debate on the Act, as re-
printed in Senate Comm. on Public Works, 1 A Legislative H istory
of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, at 355,
93d Cong., Ist Sess. (Jan. 1973) (Comm Print).
12
EPA’s made-in-Washington, single-number limita-
tions into each permit. In short, the dangers Congress
sought to avoid have come to pass.
EPA’s failure to follow the statutory scheme thus
severely inhibits achievement of the congressional plan
that the States play the ‘‘primary”’ role in the dis-
charge permit program, and that flexibility be pro-
vided to account for the varying circumstances of
individual existing plants. Only through review by
this Court will the nation be guaranteed the benefits
of Congress’ carefully designed plan for elimination
of all pollutant discharges by 1985.
II. A CONFLICT EXISTS AMONG THE CIRCUITS RE-
GARDING THE VALIDITY OF EPA’S “VARIANCE
CLAUSE.”
The courts of appeals have also split regarding the
validity of the ‘‘variance clause,’?’ which EPA issued
in substitution for the individual plant flexibility in-
tended by Congress in the § 304(b) ‘‘guidelines for
effluent limitations.’’ Since this split among the cir-
cuits did not arise until after the duPont decision,
certiorari has not yet been granted on this question.
The Third Circuit, the first court of appeals to speak
on this issue, found that ‘‘the variance procedure pro-
vides for less flexibility than we believe Congress con-
templated, since it permits deviations from otherwise
rigid and unitary limitations only where the cireum-
stances of the particular plant are ‘fundamentally
different’ than those from which the effluent limitation
was derived.’’ American Iron and Steel Institute v.
EPA, supra, 526 F.2d at 1046. The court did not rule
explicitly on the validity of the variance provision,
as it remanded all of the 1977 and 1983 regulations for
13
the iron and steel industry on the grounds that EPA
failed to provide the required § 304(b) guidelines.
526 F.2d at 1047.
The duPont decision found the variance clause to
be ‘‘appropriate to the regulatory process’’ and thus
‘presumptively applicable.’”’ duPont, supra, 541 F.2d
at 1028. However, the court did not rule on its ultimate
reasonableness, stating:
The administration of these provisions in prac-
tice is a matter of speculation at the present. The
question will arise when a claim for a variance is
made in a permit application. 541 F.2d at 1028.
Following du Pont, the Second Cireuit agreed that
‘‘Ti]t would be premature at this point to consider
whether the variance clause will be interpreted with
sufficient liberality to accommodate all legitimate de-
mands for flexibility.’’ Natural Resources Defense
Council v. EPA, 537 F.2d 642, 647 (1976).
A direct conflict among the circuits arose for the
first time when the Fourth Circuit, in Appalachian
Power Co. v. Train, 9 ERC 1033 (1976), invalidated a
variance clause for the steam electric power industry
identical to those considered in the previously decided
eases. The Court found the variance clause to be un-
duly restrictive because it takes into account ‘‘only
technical and engineering factors, exclusive of cost,”’
and therefore conflicts with the flexibility required by
the Act. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals set aside
and remanded variance provisions identical to those
in the instant case. 9 ERC at 1038.
Ruling after Appalachian Power, the Tenth Circuit,
in API, returned to the rationale of the previous deci-
14
sions. The court found that the variance provisions
constituted reasonable general rulemaking although it
was too early to assess their validity in operation:
‘Their interpretation and application must await
action on a variance claim asserting specific facts. We
will not speculate what the result may be.”’ API, supra,
540 F.2d at 1033.
In so holding, the Tenth Cireuit noted: ‘Again we
have an area of uncertainty. There is not only a con-
flict between circuits but also a conflict within one
circuit [i.e., the Fourth, between duPont and Appa-
lachian Power].”’ 540 F.2d at 1032.
The unsettled law on the variance clause has led to
great uncertainty among industrial dischargers and
threatens to spawn needless litigation in thousands of
individual permit application proceedings. Although
several circuits have found the variance provision’s
unduly restrictive requirement of ‘‘fundamentally dif-
ferent’’ factors inconsistent with Congress’ intent,
only one circuit, the Fourth, in Appalachian Power,
has explicitly invalidated the provision and remanded
to EPA,
The inappropriateness of EPA’s variance clause is
apparent from EPA’s own regulations. In the face
of the § 304 requirement for flexible guidelines, EPA
issued single-number limitations. In an attempt to
simulate individual plant flexibility where none actu-
ally exists, EPA added the variance clause. By its
terms, the clause would permit an exception only for
factors ‘‘fundamentally different from the factors
considered in the establishment of the guidelines.”’
49 C.F.R. § 419.12, et al. Since EPA purported to
consider even site-specific factors such as plant age,
15
size, processes and the like in development of its
‘‘effluent limitations guidelines,’’ few, if any, cireum-
stances exist in which an exception would be granted
under EPA’s clause.
In fact, as far as petitioners are aware, although
numerous variances have been requested, none has
been granted to any of the nation’s more than two
hundred petroleum refineries. Nor are petitioners
aware of requested variances being granted in any
other industry.
So long as EPA’s restrictive ‘‘variance clause’’ re-
mains in force, permit-issuing authorities will be de-
prived of discretion to resolve the vast majority of
disputed permits. Once the administrative process is
concluded, individual plants denied permits adapted
to their specific circumstances will be left with no
choice but to appeal to the appropriate court of ap-
peals under § 509(b) (1) of the Act.
In sum, although a conflict among the circuits ad-
mittedly exists on the validity of EPA’s variance
clause, certiorari has not yet been granted on this
issue, and it is not before this Court in the duPont
cases. Further postponement of a definitive resolution
of this critical question can only lead to needless liti-
gation and further delay in implementation of the
Act’s water pollution control program.
III. RESOLUTION OF WHETHER EPA MUST CONSIDER
THE COMPETITIVE EFFECT OF ITS REGULATIONS
IS NECESSARY TO AVOID DISCRIMINATORY IM-
PLEMENTATION OF THE FEDERAL WATER POLLU-
TION CONTROL ACT.
Another question of far-reaching significance for
EPA’s administration of not only § 304, but of other
provisions of the Act, is the Tenth Circuit’s holding
16
that ‘‘nothing in the Act or its legislative history
. . requires EPA to consider the competitive effect
of its regulations.”’ APJ, supra, 540 F.2d at 1036.
Without plenary consideration and reversal by this
Court, the Tenth Cireuit’s ruling on this point will
allow EPA to ignore the Act as well as established
administrative law principles which require it to con-
sider the impact of its actions on competition among
firms and industries which it regulates.
EPA acknowledges that the manufacture of organic
chemicals increases the amount of pollutants in a
plant’s discharge. This fact is apparent not only in
EPA’s “effluent limitations guidelines” for the or-
zani¢ chemicals industry, but also in numerous permits
for organic chemicals plants which provide effluent
limitations reflecting allowances for the pollutants
generated by organic chemical processes in such
plants.’
Nonctheless, when EPA promulgated regulations ap-
plicable to the identical organie chemical processes
in petrochemical and integrated refineries, it made
no comparable allowance for the pollutant load-
ings ereated by such chemical processes. 40 C.F.R.
§§ 419.30-419.36 and 419.50-419.56. Indeed, EPA’s
*The Tenth Circuit suggested that petitioners’ claims have a
“hollow ring’’ since EPA’s regulations for the organic chemicals
industry were remanded pu.» nt to a stipulation among the
parties in Union Carbide Co p. v. Train, No. 74-1459 (4th
Cir. 1976). API, supra, 540 F.2d at 1036. However, regardless
of what regulations eventually are promulgated for the organic
chemicals industry, such regulations will, like the dozens of chem-
ical plant permits already issued, undoubtedly provide allowances
for pollutants created and discharged as a result of organie chem-
ical processes, .
17
regulations for petrochemical and integrated refineries
penalize such refineries by granting them smaller dis-
charge allowances than the same refineries would have
without the additional organic chemical facilities.
Consequently, petitioners generally challenged the
underlying methodology and derivation of KPA’s
regulations, as well as EPA’s specific failure to give
any credit to the caleulated discharge levels for petro-
chemical, hydrotreating, and other processes which
contribute substantially to raw waste loading and efflu-
ent discharge.”
The inherent unfairness and resulting competitive
disadvantage of EPA’s petrochemical and integrated
refining regulations is dramatically illustrated by Shell
Oil Company’s Martinez, California, manufacturing
complex, a refinery and chemical plant with common
treatment facilities. The Martinez refinery is (i) al-
lowed to discharge little more than half the pollutants
allowable to a comparable refinery with an organic
chemicals plant having separate treatment facilities
and (ii) is actually penalized in terms of allowable dis-
charge for having added organic chemical processes to
the refinery by being granted smaller effluent allow-
ances than it would be allowed without such processes.”
© Petitioners’ challenge below to EPA’s entire methodology for
deriving its ‘‘effluent limitations guidelines’’ refutes the Tenth
Cireuit’s erroneous remark that ‘‘the refineries do not contest the
methodology, the data base, or the achievability of the limitations
for the two [petrochemical] subcategories in question.’’ 540 F.2d
at 1037. The regulations’ failure to grant any credit for most
chemical processes in petrochemical and integrated refineries was
but one of the many anomalies created by the EPA methodology
which petitioners vigorously challenged.
1 Since it is classified by EPA as a subcategory E integrated
refinery, the Martinez complex may not discharge in excess
of 1733.5 pounds of BOD per day, whereas a subcategory D
refinery of the same capacity as Shell Martinez may discharge
18
Shell’s Martinez complex is not the only example of
this discriminatory impact. Other petrochemical and
integrated refineries are subject to comparable treat-
ment, which inevitably places them at a disadvantage
vis-a-vis competitors in the refining and organic chemi-
cal industries.”
EPA argued that it would be ‘“‘absurd’”’ to consider
such economic effects (40 Fed. Reg. at 21949), and the
Tenth Circuit agreed that EPA may ignore ‘‘the com-
petitive effect of its regulations.”’ API, supra, 540
F.2d at 1036. Under these circumstances, a definitive
decision by this Court is necessary to correct EPA’s
cramped interpretation and to assure in the future
that EPA will exercise its statutory responsibility to
reconcile the environmental, economic and competi-
tive effects of its regulations.
The requirement that EPA consider the competitive
effect of its regulations is apparent from the statutory
text which repeatedly stresses the importance of eco-
nomic factors. For example, §301 requires applica-
tion of the ‘best practicable’ control technology by
1977 and the ‘best available technology economically
achievable”’ by 1983. Similarly, § 304 lists the “total
2012 pounds of BOD per day. Moreover, separate ‘‘D"’ refinery
and organic chemical plants cumulatively the same size as Martin-
ez would be allowed a total discharge of 3135 pounds per day,
well above Martinez’s 1733.5 allowance. 40 C.F.R.. §§ 419.42 &
419.52.
' For example, petitioners have calculated that if five of the
existing nine subcategory D refineries were to expand petrochem-
ical facilities and become classified in subcategory E, allocations
would decrease an average of 16%. On the other hand, subcate-
gory E refineries would gain an average of 18% in their allocation
if they were to close down petrochemical operations and apply
under the subcate,ory D allocation.
19
cost of application of technology in relation to the
effluent reduction benefits to be achieved’’ as one of
the factors to be considered in the guidelines.
Despite this statutory requirement that EPA con-
sider economie factors including the ‘‘total cost’’ of its
regulations, the Tenth Circuit failed to give any weight
to the potentially significant economic consequences
which might result from EPA’s failure to examine
either intra-industry or inter-industry competitive ef-
fects. This ruling conflicts, not only with the statute,
but also with the holdings of other courts of appeals
in similar environmental cases.
For example, the D.C. Cireuit remanded asbestos
dust standards under the Occupational Safety and
Health Act for consideration of inter-industry eco-
nomic differences. Industrial Union Dep’t., AF L-C1O
v. Ilodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 479-81 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In
so doing, the Court. stressed that, where ‘‘two indus-
tries were in competition with one another’’, and ‘‘one
industry could gain a competitive advantage over an-
other by virtue of differing standards, employers in
the disadvantaged industry [may] challenge the stand-
ards on a comparative basis... .’’ 499 F.2d at 481.
Similarly, in Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus,
486 F.2d 375, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 921 (1974), the D.C. Circuit found that Congress’
direction that EPA consider ‘‘economic cost’’ under
the Clean Air Act, means that ‘‘[t}here is, of course, a
significant and proper scope for inter-industry com-
parison in the case of industries producing substitute
or alternative products.’’
Wholly apart from these environmental law prece-
dents, the requirement that administrative agencies
20
consider competitive factors relating to cost, or more
generally to the ‘‘public interest,’’ is well-established.
For instance, in Gulf States Utilities Co. v. FPC, 411
U.S. 747 (1973), this Court told the Federal Power
Commission that its duties under § 204 of the Federal
Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824c, when approving issuance
of utility securities under a ‘‘ public interest’’ standard,
included consideration of arguments that such securi-
ties would be used to refinance existing anticompetitive
activities.
Likewise, the D.C. Circuit required the SEC to take
competitive considerations into account in authorizing
utility acquisitions under the ‘‘ public interest’’ stand-
ard of §10(e) of the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79j(e). In so holding, the court
interpreted the ‘‘publie interest’? as requiring SEC
consideration not only of whether acquisition of two
nuclear power plants by a group of New England util-
ities would lead to a concentration of control but also
of whether the acquisition would preclude competing
utilities from purchasing electricity. Municipal Elec-
tric Ass’n of Massachusetts vy. SEC, 413 F.2d 1052
(D.C. Cir. 1969).
The basic administrative law principle underlying
these decisions is also expressed in this Court’s rulings
granting standing to challenge administrative rulings
affecting competitors and permitting intervention to
companies in regulatory adjudications against compet-
ing firms.’’ Unless the ‘‘ public interest’’ and other com-
’* This Court held as early as FCC vy, Sanders Brothers Radio
Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940), that corporations have judicial
standing to challenge administrative ageney decisions concerning
their competitors, See also Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Organi-
21
parable regulatory mandates require agencies to con-
sider the competitive effect of their actions, it would
be a futile gesture to permit competitors to intervene
and seek judicial review of administrative determina-
tions.
In sum, the Tenth Circuit’s decision sanctioning
EPA’s failure to consider competitive economic fac-
tors conflicts with applicable administrative law prin-
ciples and will inevitably lead to discriminatory imple-
mentation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.
The need for corrective action by this Court is espe-
cially appropriate given the irrational EPA regula-
tions challenged here. By granting a lower allowable
discharge to refineries with than without organie chem-
ical processes, EPA’s petrochemical and integrated
refining regulations are by definition arbitrary, ca-
pricious, and appropriate for reversal and remand by
this Court.
zations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). Intervention in such situa-
tions has been accepted since FCC v. National Broadcasting Co.,
Inc. (KOA), 319 U.S. 239 (1943); see also National Coal Ass’n
v, FPC, 191 F.2d 462, 466-67 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Elm City Broad-
casting Corp. v. United States, 235 F.2d 811 (D.C, Cir. 1956).
22
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant
this petition for certiorari. If the Court should decide
to withhold action on Issue I pending disposition of
the duPont cases, the Court should nonetheless grant
certiorari on Issues II and III, neither of which is
presented in the duPont cases.
Respectfully submitted,
FrRepERICK M. Rowr
Epwarp W. WARREN
Of Counsel: Timorny S. Harpy
— . KIRKLAND, Evuis & Rowe
Jess W. Van Er’ ’
a magnet 1776 K Street, N.W.
Matcotm D. HawK :
James A. Evane Washington, D.C. 20006
WILLIAM D. Marr Attorneys for Petitioners
December 9, 1976
23
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that three printed copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit have
been mailed this 9th day of December, 1976, postage
prepaid to all petitioners below and to:
Robert H. Bork
Solicitor General
Room 5143 '
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530
Alan W. Eckert, Esq.
Environmental Protection Agency
401 M Street, S. W.
Room 511, West Tower
Washington, D. C. 20460
William Frick, Esq.
General Counsel
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D. C. 20460
Michael Graves, Esq.
Department of Justice oars
Land and Natural Resources Division
Room 2629
Washington, D. C. 20530
A. Raymond Randolph, Jr.
Deputy Solicitor General
Room 5139
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530
Epwarp W. WARREN
APPENDIX
la
APPENDIX A
American Petroleum Institute et al., Petitioners,
v.
Environmental Protection Agency et al., Respondents,
Nos. 74-1465, 74-1466, 74-1621 and 74-1622
United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit.
Aug. 11, 1976
[540 F.2d 1023]
Before Sern, Breirenstern and Doy.e, Circuit Judges.
[1026]
BreITensteEIN, Circuit Judge.
The American Petroleum Institute, an incorporated trade
association of companies in the petroleum industry, and
ten companies engaged in petroleum refining and related
activities, have petitioned for review of regulations pro-
mulgated by the Administrator of the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency under the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376. The regu-
lations are contained in 40 C.F.R. Part 419, Petroleum
Refining Point Source Category. The Administrator at
times will be referred to as EPA. The statutory references
will be those found in the Act as set out in 86 Stat. 816
et seq.' Petitioners will be referred to as Refineries.
‘The parallel U. S. Code citations for the most frequently men-
tioned sections are:
Section 101—33 U.S.C, § 1251,
Section 301—33 U.S.C. § 1311,
Section 304—33 U.S.C. § 1314,
Section 306—33 U.S.C. § 1316,
Section 402—33 U.S.C. § 1342,
Section 501—33 U.S.C. § 1361,
Section 502—33 U.S.C. § 1362,
Section 509—33 U.S.C. § 1369.
2a
Section 509(b)(1)(I) confers jurisdiction on the court
of appeals. American Petroleum Institute vy. Train, 10
Cir., 526 F.2d 1343, sustains that jurisdiction and will not
be reconsidered.
I.
Tue Acr
The Act resulted from dissatisfaction with predecessor
statutes which relied unsuccessfully on water quality stand-
ards as the primary method of pollution control. See S.
Rep. No, 92-414, 92 Cong. 2d Sess., 2 U.S. Code Cong. &
Adm. News ’72 3668, 3674. The objective of the Act ‘is
to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biologi-
cal integrity of the Nation’s waters.” §101(a). The goal
is the elimination by 1985 of ‘‘the discharge of pollutants
into the navigable waters..’’? § 101(a)(1). Seetion 301(a)
provides that ‘‘the discharge of any pollutant by any per-
son shall be unlawful” except ‘‘as in compliance’? with
specified sections of the Act. The number of dischargers
has been variously estimated from 30,000 to 70,000,
The control is by effluent limitations on discharges from
point sources. See 4301. The Act provides progressively
severe limitations. By July 1, 1977, the limitations ‘shall
require the application of the best practicable control tech-
nology currently available’? (BPT). For July 1, 1983, the
requirement is ‘the best available technology economically
achievable,’’ (BAT). For new sources, i.e., those whose
construction commences after the promulgation of perti-
nent regulations, the Act provides a ‘‘standard of per-
formance’’ reflecting ‘‘the greatest degree of effluent re-
duction which the Administrator determines to be achiev-
able through application of the best available demonstrated
control technology, processes, operating methods, or other
alternatives,’’ (BADT).
Primary enforcement of the Act is secured through the
permit system established by § 402. Discharge permits
3a
may be issued by the Administrator, § 402(a)(1), or by a
state which has adopted a permit program approved by
the Administrator. § 402(b). ‘the Administrator has veto
power over a state issued permit. § 402(d)(2). The Ad-
ministrator may withdraw approval of a state permit pro-
gram if he finds that it is not being administered in ac-
cordance with the Act. § 402(¢)(3). All permits shall com-
ply with the applicable provisions of §§ 301 (effluent limi-
tations), 306 (new source standards), and other specified
sections of the Act. See §402(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A).
The issuance or denial of a permit may be reviewed by
the“appropriate court of appeals. § 509(b)(1)(F). A vio-
lation of any conditions or limitations imposed by speci-
fied sections of the Act or by a permit may result in the
imposition of both civil and criminal penalties. § 309. ‘* Citi-
zen Suits’’ alleging violations of the Act may be brought
under § 505.
Section 304(a)(1) provides that within one year after en-
actment the Administrator [1027] must publis) ‘‘eriteria for
water quality accurately reflecting the latest scientific know-
ledge’? on enumerated subjects. Within the same period
the Administrator shall publish regulations ‘providing
guidelines for effluent limitations.’’ § 304(b). Subsection
(b)(1)(A) applies to the 1977 step and subsection (b) (2)
(A) to the 1983 step. Each subsection mandates considera-
tion of factors.
‘he Administrator did not act within the one year re-
quirements of § 304, Compliance was not within the realm
of reality. An estimated 30,000 applications for permits
were filed. EPA characterizes the Act as ‘‘incredibly com-
plex and demanding.’’ See duPont II infra. A private suit
was brought to compel compliance. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. v. Train (NRDC), 166 U.S.App.D.C.
312, 510 F.2d 692. The result was a court imposed time-
table. Ibid. at 710-714. The regulations here under attack
4a
were promulgated in May and September, 1974, and some
were amended in May, 1975.
The EPA regulations relating to industrial discharge of
pollutants have produced much litigation. Decisions to
date of various courts of appeals are, in chronological
order:
1—CPC International, Inc. v. Train, 8 Cir., 515 F.2d
1032 (Corn Wet Milling) ;
2—American Iron and Steel Institute v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 3 Cir., 526 F.2d 1027 (Iron
and Steel Manufacturing) ;
3—American Meat Institute v. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, 7 Cir., 526 F.2d 442 (Meat Prod-
ucts) ;
4—American Petroleum Institute v. Train (API 1),
10 Cir., 526 F.2d 1343 (Jurisdiction) ;
d—L. I. duPont de Nemours & Company v. Train
(duPont I), 4 Cir., 528 F.2d 1136. Filed December
30, 1975, cert. granted —— U.S. ——, 96 S.Ct. 1662,
48 L.Ed.2d 174 (Jurisdiction) ;
6—E. I. duPont de Nemours & Company v. Train
(duPont IT), 4 Cir., 541 F.2d 1018. Filed March
10, 1976, cert. granted U.S. ——. 96 S.Ct.
3165, 49 L.Ed.2d (Inorganie Chemicals) ;
7—Tanners’ Council of America, Inc. v. Train, 4 Cir.,
540 F.2d 1188. Filed March 10, 1976 (Leather
Tanning) ;
8—FMC Corporation v. Train, 4 Cir., 539 F.2d 973.
Filed March 10, 1976 (Plastic and Synthetie Ma-
terials) ;
9—Hooker Chemicals € Plastics Corp. v. Train, 2
Cir., 537 F.2d 620. Filed April 28, 1976 (Phos-
phorous Manufacturing—existing sources) ;
5a
10—Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 2
Cir., 537 F.2d 639. Filed April 28, 1976 (Phosphor-
ous Manufacturing—new sources) ;
11—Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. En-
vironmental Protection Agency, 2 Cir., 537 F. 2d
642. Filed April 28, 1976 (Variance Clauses) ;
12— American Frozen Food Institute v. Train, D.C.Cir.,
539 F.2d 107. Filed May 11, 1976 (Frozen Potato
Products); and
13—Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 4 Cir., —— F.2d
——. Filed July 16, 1976 (Steam Electric Power)
A cursory glance at the above decisions reveals the dif-
ficulties which the federal courts of appeals have had with
the Act. Popular demand for legislative action to control
water pollution is shown by the fact that on the votes
to override the presidential veto, only 12 senators and 23
representatives voted to sustain the veto. Perhaps the
pressure on Congress to do something was a major cause
of the unsatisfactory legislation. The Act is difficult to
understand, construe and apply. We can add nothing to the
comments of other courts. See Second Circuit, Hooker
Chemicals at 626-627; Third Circuit, Steel Institute, 526
F.2d at 1037 n. 14a; and Fourth Cireuit, duPont IT, at 1025-
1032.
The two volume, 1766 page, legislative history does not
help us much. The Second Cireuit has said, Hooker Chemi-
cals, at p. 627, that ‘‘[t]he legislative history compounds
the difficulty.’’ See also statements [1028] of Fourth Circuit,
duPont II, at 1027. A comparison of the discussion of the
legislative history by the Eighth Circuit in the Corn Wet
Milling case, 515 F.2d at 1039-1042 with that found in E£. I.
du Pont de Nemours and Company v. Train, W.D.Va.,
383 F.Supp. 1244, 1254-1255, highlights the problem. We
can add nothing to the explication of legislative history
6a
by the Third Circuit in the Steel Institute case, 526 F.2d
at 1043-1045, and by the Seventh Circuit in the Meat Insti-
tute case, 526 F.2d at 451-452.
In a case involving the Act before us, Train v. Colorado
Public Interest Research Group, Inc., the Supreme Court
said, US. , 96 S.Ct. 1938, 48 L.Ed.2d 434, in
a quote from United States vy. American Trucking Associa-
tions, 310 U.S. 534, 543-544, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 84 L.Ed. 1345
that ‘‘[w]hen aid to construction of the meaning of words,
as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be
no ‘rule of law’ which forbids its [legislative history’s]
use, however clear the words may appear on ‘superficial
examination.’ ’’ (Footnotes omitted). The diffieulty with
the present case is that sometimes the statutory words,
phrases, and provisions are clear and sometimes they are
not. The same can be said of the legislative history.
We consider both the statute and its legislative history.
As said by the Second Circuit, Hooker Chemicals, at p.
627: ‘‘The very magnitude of the task undertaken by Con-
gress and delegated to the EPA for fulfillment probably
accounts for the lack of clarity.’’ In the discussion which
follows, the guiding sta’ is the intent of Congress to im-
prove and preserve the quality of the Nation’s waters. All
issues must be viewed in the light of that intent.
IL.
Score Or Review
The Refineries attack generally all of the pertinent vegu-
lations on the grounds of lack of authority and of noncom-
pliance with the Act. They attack certain specific regula-
tions both on the legal ground of noncompliance with the
Act and on the factual ground that the record does not
sustain the actions of the EPA. We are concerned with
informal rule-making by EPA in the exercise of functions
delegated to it by the Act. The record consists of notice
of proposed action, comments of interested parties, agen-
— ee ee
7a
cy consideration of those comments, and ultimate promul-
gation of regulations. The regulations, to some extent,
must be anticipatory because, although improvements in
the techniques of pollutant control can be reasonably ex-
pected, we do not know what those improvements will be.
The immediate problem is the scope of judicial review.
Much has been written on this subject in the decisions
bearing on the Act before us. See e. g., Steel Institute, 526
F.2d at 1047 and Meat Institute, 526 F.2d at 452-453. Es-
sentially they rely on and adopt the principles stated in
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 416, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136, In substance it says
that the function of judicial review is to determine (1) au-
thority of the agency, (2) compliance by the agency with
the prescribed procedures, and (3) any claim that agency
action is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
Ibid. at 415-417, 91 S.Ct. 814.
On legal issues the controlling principles are well de-
fined. Trouble arises in connection with factual issues.
Overton Park says that the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706, requires ‘‘the reviewing court to en-
gage in a substantial inquiry’’, and a ‘‘probing, in-depth
review.’”’ Ibid. 401 U.S. at 415, 91 S.Ct. [814] at 823. This
is not an adoption of the Universal Camera Corp. v. Nation-
al Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct.
456, 95 L.Ed. 456, test of substantial evidence in the light
of the entire record. It does require consideration and evalu-
ation of the facts. Perhaps agency action which is not
based on substantial evidence is arbitrary and capricious.
Many of the regulations are related to EPA policy and the
presently unknowable technologies of the future for [1029]
pollution control. As was said in Permain Basin Area Rate
Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 790, 88 S.Ct. 1344, 1372, 20 L.Ed.2d
312, ‘‘the breadth and complexity of the Commission’s re-
sponsibilities demand that it be given every reasonable
opportunity to formulate methods of regulation appropri-
8a
ate for the solution of its intensely practical difficulties.’’
Our concern is with a regulatory statute which demands
preventive or curative action. Factual certainty of future
technologies is impossible. We can do no more than con-
sider whether the record facts supporting EPA action are
‘‘adequately adduced and rationally applied.’’ Note, Judi-
cial Review of the Facts in informal Rulemaking, 84 Yale
L.J. 1750, 1764.
The grounds upon which the ageney acted must be clearly
disclosed in, and sustained by, the record. The agency
must make plain its course of inquiry, its analysis, and
its reasoning. See duPont II, at p. 1026 and eases there
cited. After the fact rationalization by counsel in brief
and arguinent does not cure noncompliance by the agency
with the stated principles. Ibid. and Hooker Chemicals, at
pp. 633-634. The court may not substitute its judgment for
that of the agency. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416, 91 S.Ct.
814. If the agency’s construction of the controlling statute
is ‘sufficiently reasonable’’, it should be accepted by the
reviewing court. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 75, 95 S.Ct. 1470, 43 L.Ed.2d 731.
ITI.
Vauipitry AND Errect or Recu.ations
The Refineries say that EPA may not impose effluent
limitations on existing sources by regulation. Their posi-
tion is that effluent limitations on existing sources may be
imposed only by the permit issuer. The predicate for the
argument is that §304(b) specifically provides that EPA
shall publish ‘‘regulations, providing guidelines for efflu-
ent limitations says nothing about regulations.’’
The problem has been considered by several circuits.
The Eighth Circuit has held, CPC, 515 F.2d at 1037, that
PA may not promulgate regulations establishing effluent
limitations for existing sources. All other cireuits con-
9a
sidering the problem have held to the contrary. See Second
Cireuit, Hooker Chemicals, at p. 628; Third Cireuit, Steel
Institute, 526 F.2d at 1040-1042; Fourth Cireuit, duPont II,
at pp. 1025-32; Seventh Circuit, Meat Institute, 526 F.2d
at 449-452; and D.C. Cireuit, Frozen Food Institute, at pp.
124-32.
All of the above cases, except duPont II, considered the
problem in connection with determination of jurisdiction
of the court of appeals. Section 509(b), which provides for
judicial review of agency action, does not include action
taken under § 304. Except for CPC, the courts rejected the
argument that 4301 does not authorize the promulgation
of effluent limitations by regulation and, hence, § 509(b)
does not permit review in the court of appeals. Our situa-
tion is the same as that presented in duPont IT. Jurisdic-
tion had been decided and, in the exercise of that jurisdic-
tion, we must determine the authority of EPA to promul-
gate the regulations.
The Administrator did not meet the one-year require-
ment for the publishing of regulations ‘‘providing guide-
lines for effluent limitations.’’ § 304(b). The enormity of
the task precluded compliance. After the imposition of a
court mandated timetable, NRDC, 510 F.2d at 710-714, he
published ‘‘effluent limitations guidelines’’, and in so doing
said that the action was taken under both § 301 and § 304,
along with other sections. APT I, 526 F.2d at 1345. Nothing
in the Act forbids the combination of § 301 effluent limita-
tions with § 304 guidelines.
At the moment our concern is with authority to promul-
gate, Section 501(a) authorizes the Administrator ‘‘to pre-
scribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out his
functions under this Act.’’ His functions are ‘‘to adminis-
ter this Aect.’’ §101(d). The attainment of the congres-
sional intent to protect and preserve water purity comes
through control of pollutant discharge. Section 301(e) refers
to the establishment of effluent limitations but does [1030]
10a
not say who does the establishing. Section 502(11) defines
effluent limitations as ‘‘any restriction established by a
State or the Administrator.’’ Subsections 402(a)(1) and
(b)(1) say that permits shall comply with §¢ 301, 306, and
other sections not including § 304.
The permit issuer can be either EPA or a conforming
state. The division of authority does not determine the
authority of EPA to promulgate the regulations. The effect
of the regulations presents a separate question. For the
reasons stated in duPont II, at 1025-32, the promulga-
tion of the limitations was a reasonable exercise of a con-
gressionally delegated power. The action is reasonable and
we accept it.
IV.
EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS
The basic dispute between the Refineries and EPA is
whether the regulations are 4301 effluent limitations or
§ 304 guidelines. EPA contends that the regulations are
uniformly applicable throughout the nation and, with some
exceptions, must be mechanically cranked into each permit
by the issuer. The Refineries insist that the regulations are
guidelines for the information and consideration of, but
not binding on, the permit issuer. In essence, the conflict
concerns national uniformity versus state power and re-
sponsibility.
The Act is ambivalent, Section 101(a) refers to the ‘‘in-
tegrity of the Nation’s waters,’’ ‘‘the national goal,’’ and
‘“‘the national policy.’’ Section 101(b) declares the policy
of Congress ‘‘to recognize, preserve, and protect the pri- -
mary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, re-
duce, and eliminate pollution.’’ The legislative history
confuses, rather than clarifies, the issue.
In Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79, 84, 60 S.Ct. 34,
36, 84 L.Ed. 93, the Court said that: the ‘‘absorption of
lla
state authority is a delicate exercise of legislative policy
in achieving a wise accommodation between the needs of
central control and the lively maintenance of local institu- .
tions.’’ (Footnote omitted). The definition of the roles of
each government is essentially a matter for Congress, not
for the courts.
The Act is ineffective unless somebody fixes effluent
limitations. The Administrator has done so and we have
upheld his authority. If the limitations must be applied
automatically to each permit application, the Act destroys
rather than preserves the rights of the states which
§101(b) says that Congress protects. If each state may
go its own way, the national policy declared by § 101(a)
is inhibited. Some accommodation is necessary.
We can do no more than the Fourth Circuit did in du-
Pont IT, It said that the EPA limitations are presumptively
applicable and controlling unless rebutted by a permit ap-
plicant. At 1028. The burden is thus placed on an applicant
to convince the permit issuer that the general limitations
do not apply to his particular situation. As said by the
Fourth Circuit, Ibid. at 1028, ‘‘The balance of general
rule and narrow exceptions assures all possible uniformity
without sacrifice of the flexibility needed to adjust for
disparate plants in dissimilar circumstances.’
The Refineries insist that the permit issuer must con-
sider the factors stated in § 304(b)(1)(B) for the 1977 step
and in (b)(2)(B) for the 1983 step and exercise his dis-
cretion in applying them. We are concerned with rule-
making, not with adjudication. Our holding is that the
Administrator had authority to promulgate the limitations
for existing sources and that the effect of the regulations
so promulgated is not contrary to the Act. In partieular
instances, modification or variation may be necessary. If
that problem arises, the issues may be determined by judi-
cial review on the basis of actual facts under § 509(b)
(1)(F).
12a
V.
SrncLe NuMBERS
The regulations impose effluent limitations in terms of
single numbers rather than in a range of numbers. The
Refineries point out that § 304(b) requires EPA to publish
‘‘regulations, providing guidelines for effluent limitations.”’
The use of [1031] “guidelines’’ is said to intend a range,
not a fixed number.
The Refineries emphasize the use of the word ‘‘amounts’”’
in the §304(b)(1)(A) provision that the regulations shall
‘identify, in terms of amounts of constituents and chemi-
eal, physical, and biological characteristics of pollutants,
the degree of effluent reduction attainable * * *.’’
‘‘Amounts’’ refers to pollutants. When ‘‘amounts’’ are
determined, EPA then fixes the ‘‘degree’’ of effluent re-
duction attainable. ‘‘Degree’’ may be either a ‘‘range’’
or a single number.
The imprecise wording of § 304(b)(1)(A) and (B) makes
difficult the ascertainment of congressional intent, Congress
does not use the word ‘‘range’’ or any equivalent. The
Senate Committee Report, Leg.Hist. 1468, says that Con-
gress ‘‘expects’’ EPA ‘‘to define a range of discharge
levels,”’ and again, Ibid. that EPA ‘‘should establish the
range of best practicable levels.’’ In the face of the statu-
tory language, the statements in the Senate Report are
mystifying.
Three circuits have considered the problem. In the
Steel Institute case, 526 F.2d 1027, the Third Cireuit
treated the effluent limitations as establishing a ceiling,
fixing the maximum permissible amount of pollutant dis-
charge. Ibid. at 1044-1045. EPA determines the base by
consideration of ‘‘the numerous differences in processes
and capabilities of point sources.’’ (Footnote omitted).
Ibid. at 1045. The base is the minimum degree of effluent
control permissible and the ceiling is the maximum dis-
charge permissible. Ibid. Thus the § 304 ‘‘guidelines are
13a
intended to provide precise guidance to the permit-issuing
authorities in establishing a permissible level of discharge
that is more stringent than the ceiling.’’ Ibid. Taken literal-
ly, the Third Circuit opinion may mean that in issuing a
permit a state may not exercise the option inherent in
§ 510 of adopting a limitation more stringent than the base
which EPA has fixed.
The Second Cireuit rejected the argument that the regu-
lations are invalid because EPA failed to establish per-
missible ranges of discharges and instead promulgated
single number maximum discharge levels. The court said,
at p. 630:
‘‘'Wle * * * believe that whenever Congress spoke
of ‘ranges’ in the debates over the Act, it meant only
the spectrum comprised of varying discharge levels
on a subeategorical, rather than individual, basis. (cita-
tion omitted) Although variances are conceivable at
the permit-granting stage (citation omitted) Congress
intended that the regulations establish a single dis-
charge level for a given subcategory. This is implicit
in the Congressional choice of the superlative form
in the statutory language requiring achievement of the
degree of effluent reduction attainable by application
of ‘best’ technology.’’
In duPont II, the Fourth Cireuit disagreed with the
Third. In so doing, it pointed out, at p. 1029, that noth-
ing in the Act prohibits EPA from using single num-
bers in establishing effluent limitations. The use of a single
number permits any discharge from zero up to the allowed
amount. If a range is required, a zero discharge provision
violates the Act which has as its objective the elimination
of all pollutant discharges by 1985. Section 101(a)(1). The
court said ‘*The expertise of the Administrator is per-
suasive as to whether the limitations be fixed in single
numbers or ranges. ’’ Ibid. at 1028. It upheld the use of
l4a
single numbers in the inorganic chemicals subcategories
which were before it.
We agree with the Second and Fourth Circuits, The
promulgation of the regulations was a form of rule-making.
Rules are necessarily general. The parties confront us with
hypothetical situations. We do not know how the rules
will work out in practice. We reject the EPA claim that
the regulations must be mechanically cranked into every
permit which may be issued. We also reject the claim of
the Refineries that the permit issuer has unbridled dis-
cretion in the application of the regulations to any permit
application. The correct answer lies somewhere between
these extremes. The intent of Congress was to clean up
the Nation’s waters. This cannot be done overnight. On
the [1032] road to attainment of the no discharge objective
some flexibility is needed. The extent of that flexibility may
be determined by Congress through precise amendments to
the Act or by the courts in the decision of cases presenting
facts rather than hypotheses. For the purpose of general-
rulemaking, we accept the use of single numbers in the
effluent limitations under consideration.
VI.
VARIANCE
The Refineries attack the 1977 step variance provisions
found at 40 C.F.R. §§ 419.12, 419.22, 419.32, 419.42, and
419.52. These provisions are substantially identical to simi-
lar provisions found in each of the categories and sub-
categories covered by EPA regulations under the Act. For
the 1983 step the statute provides for variances. See § 301
(c). It does not do so for the 1977 step.
Section 419.12 is typical of the 1977 variance provisions
with which we are concerned. It says in its first sentence
that EPA in establishing limitations took into consider-
ation specified factors, including ‘‘age and size of plant,
lda
raw materials, * * * treatment technology available, energy
requirements and costs.’’ The second sentence recognizes
the possibility that ‘‘data which would affect these limita-
tions have not been available’ and that as a result, the
limitations should be adjusted for certain plants in the
industry. The third sentence says that a discharger may
submit evidence:
‘‘ftjhat factors relating to the equipment or facilities
involved, the process applied, or other such factors
related to such discharger are fundamentally different
from the factors considered in the establishment of
the guidelines.”’
The fourth sentence says that the permit issuer ‘‘will
make a written finding that such factors are or are not
fundamentally different.’’
Again we have an area of uncertainty. There is not
only a conflict between circuits but also a conflict within
one circuit. In NRDC v. EPA, the Second Circuit held, at
p. 647, that the promulgation of the variance clauses for
the 1977 step is ‘‘a valid exercise of the EPA’s rule-
making authority pursuant to §501(a).’’ The court also
said, Ibid. that the interpretation of the variance clauses
‘*should await the disclosure and development of concrete
factual controversies involving a single point source and
its permit.”’
In the Steel Institute case the Third Cireuit said, 526
F.2d at 1046:
‘*We also note that the variance procedure provides
for less flexibility than we believe Congress contem-
plated, since it permits deviations from otherwise rigid
and unitary limitations only where the circumstances
of the particular plant are ‘fundamentally different’
than those from which the effluent limitation was de-
rived.’’
l6a
The Third Circuit perhaps overlooked the fact that Con-
gress did not provide any variance procedure for the 1977
step.
In duPont II the Fourth Circuit declined to determine
the validity of the variance provisions, saying that the
administration of those provisions is presently speculative
and will arise when a claim for a variance is made in a
permit application.
In Appalachian Power Company v. Train, the Fourth
Circuit, with one judge dissenting, set aside the 1977 vari-
ance provisions applicable to a subcategory of the Steam
Electric Power Generating Point Source Category, 40
C.F.R. § 423.12(a). It interpreted the clause to mean that
‘fonly technical and engineering factors, exclusive of cost,
may be considered in granting or denying a variance.’’
At —— (footnote omitted). In so doing the court relied
on a memorandum from the EPA Assistant Administrator
for Enforcement and General Counsel to all regional ad-
ministrators. The court said that this administrative in-
terpretation distinguished the Appalachian Power case
from duPont TI,
The court further held that the 1977 limitations ‘‘ were
not intended to be applied [1033] anv less flexibily’’ than
the 1983 limitations. Ihid. p. 1028. In so acting the court did
not have before it any specific claim, grant, or denial of
a variance. It was concerned with a cena rule which
was considered on a hypothetical basis and had no regard
for an existing and specific fact situation.
The Refineries do not make clear their reasons for at-
tacking the regulatory variance regulations for the 1977
step. The statute says nothing about variances for that
step. We agree with the Second Circuit that the 1977 vari-
ance provisions are a valid exercise of EPA’s rule-making
authority under § 501(a). We also agree with duPont II
that variances are appropriate to the regulatory process
17a
at p. 1028, and that the 1977 BPT technology may
not be construed more stringently than the 1983 BAT
technology. We reject the Fourth Circuit holding that the
1977 variance provisions are ‘‘unduly restrictive’ and
hence void. Appalachian Power, at p. ——. Such a holding
forgets that Congress did not provide for any 1977
variance.
Without record support, the Refineries assert that no
variance has been granted. Even if true, the statement
proves nothing. Any permit applicant dissatisfied with
action on a variance claim may petition for review under
§ 509(b)(1)(F). From the standpoint of general rule-mak-
ing, the regulatory variance provisions for the 1977 phase
are reasonable. Their interpretation and application must
await action on a variance claim asserting specific facts.
We will not speculate what the result may be.
Vil.
1977 Step
(1) In-Plant Process Changes.
Important to determination of effluent limitations are
flow rates and concentration of discharge components. In
arriving at its regulations KPA considered in-plant flow
modifications. Refineries argue that the BPT (1977 step)
technologies can only apply to end-of-pipe treatment sys-
tems and that EPA canret consider and require in-plant
process changes.
The Act uses different language in its provisions for
the 1977 and 1983 steps. In § 304(b)(1)(A) the reference is
to ‘‘control technology’’ whereas in § 304(b)(2)(A) the
reference is to ‘‘control measures and practices’’ including
process innovations. Both sections specify ‘‘the process
employed’’ as one of the factors to be taken into consider-
ation. §§ 304(b(1)(B) and (b)(2)(B).
18a
Two circuits have wrestled with the problem. In duPont
II, at pp. 1030-31 the Fourth Circuit noted the statutory
language and rejected the argument that for the 1977 step
IXPA was confined to end-of-pipe treatment systems. In
FMC, at p. 981, the Fourth Circuit said that EPA was to
rely ‘‘principally’’ on end-of-pipe technology and that ‘‘In-
process control measures may be required, however, if
they are considered normal practice within the industry.’’
Ibid. (footnote omitted). In Hooker Chemicals, the Second
Circuit held, June 14, 1976, memo modifying original
opinion, that ‘‘no ‘in process’ changes can be mandated
for 1977 unless they may be considered normal practices
within the industry.’’ At p. 637.
Refineries make much of the statement in the House
Report, Leg.Hist. 788, that ‘‘control technology * * * means
the treatment facilities at the end of a manufacturing * * *
process rather than * * * within the manufacturing process
itself.’’ We decline to accept this statement of one chamber
of Congress. If both chambers had agreed, the language
of the statute would have been changed. Indeed, the Re-
fineries concede, see reply brief, p. 28 n. 28, and R. 7326,
that pre-treatment processes may be required if they are
normal practice within the industry.
EPA’s designation of in-plant technology for the 1977
step was based on ‘‘control practices widely used within
the petroleum refining industry.’’ Dev.Doe, 165 and R. 6065.
This conclusion is supported by record evidence. Ibid. at
70, 95 and R. 5970, 5995. We find no record support for
the claim that more than half of the Nation’s refineries
will have to make substantial and widespread internal recon-
struction to comply with the regulations. EPA has relied
[1034] principally on end-of-pipe technology in its regula-
tions for the 1977 step. Whatever in-plant modifications
may be necessary are reasonably within normal industry
practice. EPA action is within the statutory requirements.
19a
(2) Exemplary Plants.
The statutory mandate for 1977 is ‘‘best practicable con-
trol technology currently available.’’ § 301(b)(1)(A). Re-
fineries say that EPA must look to the average of the
industry and EPA says that it may look to the average of
the best technology used in the industry.
With varying language the circuits agree that EPA may
base its regulations on the results from the plants using
the best technology. See Hooker Chemicals, at p. 632; Steel
Institute, 526 F.2d at 1057, duPont II, at p. 1031; Meat
Institute, 526 F.2d at 453; and Frozen Food Institute, at
p. 132. We agree. There is no reason for us to enlarge
what has been said in the cited decisions. It is con-
ceded that at least 12 of the refineries are already in com-
pliance with the 1977 regulations. See petitioners Tech.
Brief 37, n. 23, and Reply Brief 24, n. 22. The EPA action
was proper.
(3) Granular Media Filtration.
Refineries contest the 1977 limitations for Total Sus-
pended Solids (TSS) and Oil and Grease (O&G) on the
basis that EPA has required granular media filtration and
that such technology is neither practicable nor currently
available.
Granular Media Filtration is only one of the control
practices widely and currently used within the petroleum
refining industry. Dev.Doec. 165 and 6065. The regulations
do not require the use of granular media filtration. Any
one of a number of technologies or combination of tech-
nologies may be used. Ibid.
Refineries do not contest that many plants are already
meeting the O&G limitations. EPA based its TSS limita-
tions on three exemplary plants. These met the TSS limita-
tions during 90%, 80%, and 70% of the monthly samples
during 1973 and 1974. During its reconsideration of the
20a
regulations, EPA concluded that any failures to meet the
limitations were due to improperly operated filters or use
of filters beyond design capacity.
Refineries objections to EPA’s use of data obtained after
promulgation is not well taken. The new data was not the
basis for the regulations. It serves to establish that the
I:PA technologies are both practicable and currently avail-
able. After promulgation, events indicating the truth or
falsity of agency predictions should not be ignored. Amoco
Oil Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 163 U.S.App.
D.C, 162, 501 F.2d 722, 729 n. 10. This is not a case like
duPont II where new, non-record evidence was rejected
as the sole basis for agency action, at pp. 1036-39. In the
instant case the record made before promulgation sustains
the regulations. The new data is pertinent to show the va-
lidity of the EPA actions. The 1977 TSS and O&G limita-
tions are upheld.
(4) Net or Gross Limitations.
Net limitations apply only to the excess of pollutants
discharged over the pollutants, if any, in the intake water.
(iross limitations apply to the total amount of pollutants
discharged regardless of pollutants in the intake water.
Refineries say that the limitations must be met.
In Steel Institute, the Third Circuit recognized the prob-
lem and said that ‘‘an adjustment would seem required by
cue process’’ because otherwise a plant would be penalized
‘*hecause of circumstances beyond its control.’’ 526 F.2d
at 1056. EPA has agreed that net limitations are allowable
where a source discharges to the same body of water from
which it draws its water. In 1975 EPA added a new regu-
lation, § 125.28, to its general regulations applicable to the
administration of the Act. 40 Fed.Reg. 29850. This new
regulation allows adjustment of the limitations ‘‘to reflect
credit for pollutants in the applicant’s water supply if the
2la
source of the applicant’s water supply is the same body
of water into which the [1035] discharge is made’’, if cer-
tain requirements are met. § 125.28(a).
EPA concedes that its concentrations are based on gross
limitations. The Refineries say that the concession requires
a remand. We do not agree. Section 125.28(a)(2) allows
a permit applicant to demonstrate that pollutants in the
intake water will not be removed by treatment systems
designed to reduce process wastewater pollutants to the
levels required by the applicable limitations. In an appro-
priate situation, gross will be reduced to net and a plant
will not be penalized for something which it cannot prevent.
See discussion in Appaachian Power, pp. - . From
the standpoint of general rule-making the amendment is
satisfactory. Its application may be determined in a con-
troversy arising out of specific facts.
(5) Storm Water Runoff.
During periods of rainfall, a refinery must treat not only
wastewater flow from the refinery but also storm water
runoff. The pertinent regulations, 40 C.F.R. §§ 419.12(¢) (1)
and 419.15(¢)(1) provide:
‘‘The allocation allowed for storm runoff flow *
shall be based solely on that storm flow (process area
runoff) which is treated in the main treatment system.
All additional storm runoff (from tank fields and non-
process areas), that has been segregated from the
main waste stream for discharge, shall not exceed * * *
[stated limitations].’’
These regulations are made applicable to all subparts
in Part 419.
EPA furnishes no record reference to support this regu-
lation. It relies on after-the-fact rationalization in its brief
but such rationalization is no substitute for agency action
not sustained by the record. duPont II, at pp. 1036,
22a
1037, 1038. EPA says that “ ‘process area runoff’”’ is in-
tended to encompass all ‘‘process waste water’ pollutants
as defined in 40 C.F.R. § 401.11(q).’’ EPA Br. at 110. That
regulation has general applicability to Subchapter N which
includes the regulations for the Petroleum Refining In-
dustry. In duPont II, at pp. 1032-33, the Fourth Circuit
noted that PA was preparing an amendment to § 401.11(q)
and set that regulation aside. We are not told what, if
anything, EPA has done to rewrite the regulation.
The statement in the EPA brief of how the storm runoff
regulation is intended to work is interesting but unsatis-
factory. We have no definition of the term ‘‘storm runoff.’’
The KPA brief says, p. 111, that ‘‘all storm runoff is to
he collected and monitored.’’? Taken literally this means
that the refineries will have to collect diffused surface run-
off in channels and discharge it through a discrete source.
:
There is no statutory or record support for such re-
quirement.
Sections 419.12(¢)(1), 419.15(¢)(1), and subsequent sec-
tions based thereon are set aside and remanded for re-
consideration.
(6) Variability Factors.
Even in the best treatment systems, changes occur in
ability to treat wastes. Sixteen factors which cause vari-
ability are listed in 40 Fed.Reg. 21941. EPA defines, B.R.
at 113, the daily variability factor ‘‘as the 99th percentile
probability of oceurrence value divided by the mean.’’ The
result is ‘‘the multiplier by which the long-term achievable
values must be multiplied in order to derive the value not
permitted to be exceeded.’’ Ibid. For the 30 day variability
factor the 98th percentile is used. The application of the
formula is shown at § 419.42(b) (3).
The briefs on variability disclose much rhetoric and a
turmoil of numbers. We disregard the first and struggle
with the second. Refineries claim that the use of the 99
23a
and 98 percentiles is improper. They attack EPA’s statis-
tical methodology. They say that EPA used ‘‘an insufficient
and geographically biased data base’’, API Tech. Br. at
94, and disregarded ‘‘differences among refinery subcate-
gories.’’ Ibid. at 99.
Statistical methodology is for the experts. The EPA state-
ment of its procedures and of the bases therefor found at 40
Fed.Reg. [1036] 21941-21942 convinces us that the EPA
variability factors have susbtantial record support. In pro-
mulgating the final regulations EPA analyzed data from
10 refineries with a geographical distribution which in-
eluded Virginia, Texas and California. On. petition for
reconsideration EPA rechecked the variability data from
seven refineries some of which are located in cold climates,
e.g., the Amoco refinery in Mandan, North Dakota, With
regard to the differences among the five subcategories, the
refineries furnish us with no record data showing that vari-
ability changes from one subcategory to another.
Refineries urge that ‘‘exeursions’”’ should be permitted.
An ‘‘exeursion’’ is a period when the required concentra-
tions may be exceeded. Because EPA selected the 99th
percentile, the refineries say that they must be afforded
at least four days a year, 1% of 365, when they may make
excess discharges without fear of penalty. The reasoning
does not impress us. There is always a theoretical chance
that a plant achieving the limitations on a long-term basis
will exceed the monthly and daily limits. In FMC, the
Fourth Cireuit said that: ‘‘Plant owners should not be
subjected to sanctions when they are operating a proper
treatment facility.’’ 539 at p. 986. The court went on to
say that ‘‘appropriate exeursion provisions’’ should be
incorporated in the regulations. [bid.
The Fourth Cireuit was considering a factual situation
different from that before us. On the present record we
are unconvinced that the refineries should be granted any
specific number of days during a year when they may make
24a
excess discharges. The temptation to store pollutants for
future discharge would be enticing. The permissible maxi-
mums for any one day are about twice the average daily
values for a month. See tables found in § 419.12(a) and
(b). The spread permits considerable flexibility.
The whole problem of variability factors presents a prac-
tical effort to accommodate for variations in plant opera-
tions. As technology for control of pollutant discharges
improves, the variations should lessen. The choice of statis-
tical methods lies within the sound diseretion of EPA.
IEPA has acted properly and reasonably in establishing
the variability factors before us,
(7) Petrochemical Plants.
EPA divided the petroleum refining industry into five
subeategories. Two of these, Subparts C and K, relate to
refineries which engage in petrochemical operations. Re-
fineries argue that the stringent regulations imposed on
Subparts C and FE place the plants subject thereto at a
competitive disadvantage with the organic chemicals in-
dustry and with refineries which do not conduct petro-
chemical operations. The challenge based on the organic
chemical industry has a hollow ring. The Fourth Circuit
has set aside the effluent limitations applicable to the
organic chemical industry. See Union Carbide Corp. v.
Train, 4 Cir., Nos. 74-1459 ete., order of February 10, 1976.
We do not know what will be the regulations applicable to
that industry.
Refineries’ reliance on Industrial Union Department,
AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 162 U.S.App.D.C, 331, 499 F.2d 467,
and Portland Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus, 158 U.S.
App.D.C. 308, 486 F.2d 375, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921, 94
S.Ct. 2628, 41 L.d.2d 226, is misplaced. Industrial Union
was involved with the Occupational Safety and Health Act.
With reference to industrial standards the court said, 499
F.2d at 480:
25a
‘‘Separate standards for different industries would
not appear to create opportunities for employers in
one industry to challenge their standards on the
grounds that standards for another industry were less
demanding.’’
Portland Cement was concerned with the Clean Air Act.
The court said, 486 F.2d at 389, that ‘‘the Administrator is
not required to present affirmative justifications for differ-
ent standards in different industries.”’
We find nothing in the Act or its legislative history
which requires EPA to consider the competitive effect of
its regulations. EPA did consider the comments relative
to [1037] petrochemical operations, 40 Fed.Reg. 21948-
21949, and said:
‘*Since the regulations are based upon actual per-
formance by refineries in each subcategory, it would be
absurd to attempt to modify them on the basis of
regulations designed for other industries.”’
In this attack on the regulations pertaining to petro-
chemical operations, the refineries do not contest the meth-
odology, the data base, or the achieveability of the limi-
tations for the two subcategories in question. EPA has
used the same general approach in setting the limitations
for all the categories in the petroleum industry. The record
sustains the pertinent EPA action. The regulations appli-
eable to petrochemical operations, 40 C.F.R. §§ 419.32 and
419.52 are upheld.
(8) Costs.
Section 304(b)(1)(B) requires that the FPA regulations
for the 1977 step shall specify BPT factors including ‘‘con-
sideration of the total cost of application of technology in
relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved
26a
from such spplication.’’ Refineries say that EPA did not
comply with this statutory requirement.
The Refineries’ costs of compliance with the 1977 regu-
lations will be substantial and will be reflected in increased
passed-on-costs to the consuming public. The need for, and
attainment of, societal benefits are essentially issues for
congressional determination. Congress has delegated to
EPA the task of giving ‘‘consideration’’ to ‘‘total cost’’ in
relation to ‘‘effluent reduction benefits.’’ The judicial re-
sponsibility is to determine whether EPA has complied
with the mandate.
The Senate committee recognized that ‘‘there must be a
reasonable relationship between costs and benefits if there
is to be an effective and workable program.’’ Leg.Hist.
1465. The same Committee said that ‘‘no mathematical bal-
ance can be achieved in considering relative costs and
benefits nor would any precise formula be desirable.’’ Ibid.
at 1466.
In duPont II the Fourth Cireuit rejected the argument
that benefits ‘‘must be quantified in monetary terms’’, and
said: ‘‘Nothing in the Act requires this action.’’ At p. 1030.
We agree. The judicial problem is whether EPA adequately
considered costs and benefits.
EPA estimated the capital investment costs to be 1,112
million dollars for existing sources. The Refineries esti-
mate, which includes ‘‘ Expansions of Existing Refineries’”’
is 1,558 million dollars. The annual costs for existing refin-
eries are estimated to be 449 million dollars. The Refineries’
estimate, which also includes expansion costs, is 544 milion
dollars. In the area of capital costs, the Refineries put the
expansion costs at 490 million dollars. Subtraction of this
amount from the Refineries’ total of 1,558 million produces
1,068 million, a figure slightly below that of EPA.
Refineries object that EPA used stale cost figures. Cost
inereases are inherent during a period of inflation. EPA
Zia
points out that the important consideration is not the levet
of abatement costs but rather the resulting impact on the
industry. EPA’s ‘‘Eeconomie Analysis of Proposed. Efflu-
ent Guidelines, Petroleum Refining Industry,’’ R. 5788-
5859, considers the problem both from the standpoint of
world markets and of United States markets. In doing so
EPA discusses prices, profitability, production effects, em-
ployment effects, industry growth, and balance of trade.
Although the dollar amount of the abatement costs may
be high, one commentator stated that the capital require-
ments of the regulations amount to 3.3% of the total capital
requirements of the industry. R. 5545.
Refineries urge that EPA must make a cost-benefit analy-
sis. EPA says that its cost-effectiveness analysis satisfies
the statute. Labels are neither important nor determinative.
EPA said that costs depend ‘‘essentially’’ on waste water
flow rate and prepared a table comparing costs with flow
rates. EPA computed costs for several combinations of
refinery size, waste water discharge rate, and extrapolated
costs of in-plant modifications to reduce [1038] waste water
flow. The selection of the point of diminishing returns is for
agency determination. The technical objections of the
Refineries do not impress us.
The record shows that the effluent limitations imposed by
the regulations will reduce the poliutants discharged into
the Nation’s waters. The value of the resulting benefits
is not capable of present-day determination. We are con-
vinced that EPA made a serious, careful, and compre-
hensive study of the costs which compliance will impose on
the industry. If Congress believes that the cost is too high,
it can amend the Act. All we say is that EPA has complied
with the statutory mandate.
28a
Vill.
1983 STEP
For the 1983 BAT technology EPA proposed an end-
of-pipe treatment system ‘‘based on the addition of acti-
vated carbon adsorption in fixed bed columns, to the treat-
ment system’’ proposed as 1977 BPT technology. Dev.Doc.
174, R. 6074. In so doing EPA noted that its limitations
were ‘‘based upon pilot plant data’’ and that revision may
be required ‘‘as actual performance data becomes avail-
able.’’ Ibid. The Refineries contend that the carbon adsorp-
tion technology is not available or economically achievable.
We agree.
EPA concedes in its brief, p. 138, that:
‘‘As for carbon adsorption, the Agency readily
acknowledges that it needs further development before
it will show the high degree of effectiveness in large-
scale operation that it has already shown in pilot plant
demonstrations.’’
In its response to comments that carbon adsorption had
had not been demonstrated as a proper base for 1983 limi-
tations, EPA relied on named technical articles and on
‘The BP, Mareus Hook, 1974, pilot plant study of Filtra-
tion and Activated Carbon.’’ 40 Fed. Reg. 21948-21949,
R. 17614. EPA concedes, brief p. 143, that ‘‘the BP Marcus
Hook system does not meet the BAT limitations.”’
EPA now says that the BP data was relied on only for
O&G and that these limitations have been shown achievable
by later data from a non-record refinery not using carbon
adsorption. Also EPA now claims that the TSS limitations
are based on ‘‘municipal wastewater experience.’’ Brief at
143. The record reference cited in the brief is an unidenti-
fied, illegible, handwritten sheet which means nothing to us.
29a
Examination of EPA’s record citations and appraisal
of its shifting and inconsistent rationales make it difficult
for us to discern upon what, if any, basis EPA promul-
gated the 1983 limitations. The failure of the BP plant to
achieve the limitations when placed in full-scale operation
may not be ignored. We can ascertain no reasonable basis
for the 1983 limitations. See FMC, at pp. 981, n. 16; cf.
Tanners’ Council, at p. 1196. We reject the 1983 regula-
tions because of their reliance on the carbon adsorption
technology. In the circumstances there is no need to con-
sider the other attacks of the Refineries on those regula-
tions. The questions raised, particularly those relating to
costs, should be considered by EPA on remand.
The 1983 regulations, 40 C.F.R. §§ 419.13, 419.23, 419.33,
419.43, and 419.53, are set aside.
IX.
New Sources
EPA established standards fixing the BADT technology
for new sources by adding the 1983 flow limitations to the
control technology applicable to the 1977 BPT step. The
attack of the Refineries has three bases, (1) invalidity of
the 1977 limitations, (2) unattainability of the 1983 limita-
tions by existing sources, and (3) the use of stale cost
figures.
We have upheld the 1977 limitations as supported by
the record. Hence, the fact that the new source limitations
are derivative is no ground for attack. Cf. Tanners’ Coun-
cil, at 1195. Because of our disposition of the 1983 limita-
tions, we did not reach the issue of whether the flow
reductions are attainable. Even if the 1983 flow reductions
are unattainable by existing refineries, it does not follow
that new plants could not be designed so as to incorporate
[1039] the means of attaining the lower flow rates. There is
no record support for the claim that the flow rates for new
30a
sources are unattainable. The matter of costs has been
discussed in connection with the 1977 step, see Part VII(8)
of this opinion, and need not. be considered further. The
regulations pertaining to new source standards, 40 C.F.R.
§§ 419.15, 419.25, 419.35, 419.45, and 419.55 are upheld.
X.
DISPOSITION
The following regulations, all contained in 40 C.F.R., are
severally set aside and remanded for reconsideration:
Storm water runoff (§§ 419.12(¢)(1) and 419.15(¢)(1)) and
with regard to storm water runoff only: §§ 419.22(c)(1),
419.25(e)(1), 419.32(e)(1), 419.35(¢e)(1), 419.42(e)(1),
419.45(e)(1), 419.52(e)(1), and 419.55(c)(1) and 1983 step
(§§ 419.13, 419.23, 419.33, 419.43, and 419.53).
* a * a $ % * * * *
3la
APPENDIX B
STATUTES INVOLVED
The pertinent provisions of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq., are as
follows:
§ 1251. Congressional declaration of goals and policy [Act § 101]
(a) The objective of this chapter is to restore and main-
tain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation’s waters. In order to achieve this objective it is
hereby declared that, consistent with the provisions of this
chapter—
(1) it is the national goal that the discharge of
pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by
1985;
(2) it is the national goal that wherever attainable,
an interim goal of water quality which provides for
the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and
wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the
water te achieved by July 1, 1983;
(3) it is the national policy that the discharge of
toxic polluiants in toxic amounts be prohibited;
(4) it is the national policy that Federal financial
assistance be provided to construct publicly owned
waste treatment works;
(5) it is the national policy that areawide waste
treatment management planning processes be devel-
oped and implemented to assure adequate control of
sources of pollutants in each State; and
(6) it is the national policy that a major research
and demonstration effort be made to develop technol-
ogy necessary to eliminate the discharge of pollutants
into the navigable waters, waters of the contiguous
zone, and the oceans.
32a
(b) It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, pre-
serve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights
of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to
plan the development and use (including restoration, pres-
ervation, and enhancement) of land and water resources,
and to consult with the Ac#iinistrator in the exercise of
his authority under this chapter. It is further the policy
of the Congress to support and aid research relating to
the prevention, reduction, and elimination of pollution, and
to provide Federal technical services and financial aid to
State and interstate agencies and municipalities in con-
nection with the prevention, reduction, and elimination of
pollution.
(c) It is further the policy of Congress that the Presi-
dent, acting through the Secretary of State and such na-
tional and international organizations as he determines
appropriate, shall take such action as may be necessary to
insure that to the fullest extent possible all foreign coun-
tries shall take meaningful action for the prevention, re-
duction, and elimination of pollution in their waters and
in international waters and for the achievement of goals
regarding the elimination of discharge of pollutants and
the improvement of water quality to at least the same
extent as the United States does under its laws.
(d) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chap-
ter, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency (hereinafter in this chapter called ‘‘ Administra-
tor’’) shall administer this chapter.
(e) Publie participation in the development, revision,
and enforcement of any regulation, standard, effluent limi-
tation, plan, or program established by the Administrator
or any State under this chapter shall be provided for,
encouraged, and assisted by the Administrator and the
States. The Administrator, in cooperation with the States,
shall develop and publish regulations specifying minimum
guidelines for public participation in such processes.
33a
(f) It is the national policy that to the maximum extent
possible the procedures utilized for implementing this chap-
ter shall encourage the drastic minimization of paperwork
and interagency decision procedures, and the best use of
available manpower and funds, so as to prevent needless
duplication and unnecessary delays at all levels of gov-
ernment.
§ 1311. Effluent limitations—Illegality of pollutant discharges
except in compliance with law [Act § 301]
(a) Exeept as in compliance with this section and sec-
tions 1312, 1316, 1317, and 1328, 1542, and 1344 of this
title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall
be unlawful.
Timetable for achievement of objectives
(b) In order to carry out the objective of this chapter
there shall be achieved—
(1)(A) not later than July 1, 1977, effluent limita-
tions for point sources, other than publicly owned
treatment works, (i) which shall require the applica-
tion of the best practicable control technology cur-
rently available as defined by the Administrator pur-
suant to section 1314(b) of this title, or (ii) in the
ease of a discharge into a publicly owned treatment
works which meets the requirements of subparagraph
(B) of this paragraph, which shall require compliance
with any applicable pretreatment requirements and
any requirements under section 1317 of this title; and
(B) for publicly owned treatment works in exist-
ence on July 1, 1977, or approved pursuant to section
1283 of this title prior to June 30, 1974 (for which
construction must be completed within four years of
approval), effluent limitations based upon secondary
treatment as defined by the Administrator pursuant
to section 1314(d) (1) of this title; or,
34a
(C) not later than July 1, 1977, any more stringent
limitation, including those necessary to meet water
quality standards, treatment standards, or schedules
of compliance, established pursuant to any State law
or regulations (under authority preserved by section
1370 of this title) or any other Federal law or regu-
lation, or required to implement any applicable water
quality standard established pursuant to this chapter.
(2)(A) not later than July 1, 1983, effluent limita-
tions for categories and classes of point sources, other
than publicly owned treatment works, which (i) shall
require application of the best available technology
economically achievable for such category or class,
which will result in reasonable further progress toward
the national goal of eliminating the discharge of all
pollutants, as determined in accordance with regula-
tions issued by the Administrator pursuant to section
1314(b)(2) of this title, which such effluent limitations
shall require the elimination of discharges of all pol-
lutants if the Administrator finds, on the basis of
information available to him (including information
developed pursuant to section 1325 of this title), that
such elimination is technologically and economically
achievable for a category or class of point sources as
determined in accordance with regulations issued by
the Administrator pursuant to section 1314(b)(2) of
this title, or (ii) in the case of the introduction of a
pollutant into a publicly owned treatment works which
meets the requirements of subparagraph (B) of this
paragraph, shall require compliance with any appli-
cable pretreatment requirements and any other re-
quirement under section 1317 of this title; and
(B) not later than July 1, 1983, compliance by all
publicly owned treatment works with the requirements
set forth in section 1281(g)(2)(A) of this title,
35a
Modification of timetable
(ec) The Administrator may modify the requirements of
subsection (b)(2)(A) of this section with respect to any
point source for which a permit application is filed after
July 1, 1977, upon a showing by the owner or operator of
such point source satisfactory to the Administrator that
such modified requirements (1) will represent the maxi-
mum use of technology within the economic capability of
the owner or operator; and (2) will result in reasonable
further progress toward the elimination of the discharge
of pollutants.
Review and revision of effluent limitations
(d) Any effluent limitation required by paragraph (2)
of subsection (b) of this section shall be reviewed at least
every five years and, if appropriate, revised pursuant to
the procedure established under such paragraph.
All point discharge source application of effluent limitations
(e) Effluent limitations established pursuant to this
section or section 1312 of this title shall be applied to all
point sources of discharge of pollutants in accordance with
the provisions of this chapter.
Illegality of discharge of radiological, chemical, or biological
warfare agents or high-level radioactive waste
(f) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter
it shall be unlawful to discharge any radiological, chemical,
or biological warfare agent or high-level radioactive waste
into the navigable waters.
§ 1314. Information and guidelines—Criteria development and
publication [Act § 304]
(a)(1) The Administrator, after consultation with ap-
propriate Federal and State agencies and other interested
36a
persons, shall develop and publish, within one year after
October 18, 1972 (and from time to time thereafter revise)
criteria for water quality accurately reflecting the latest
scientific knowledge (A) on the kind and extent of all
identifiable effects on health and welfare including, but not
limited to, plankton, fish, shellfish, wildlife, plant life,
shorelines, beaches, esthetics, and recreation which may be
expected from the presence of pollutants in any body of
water, including ground water; (B) on the concentration
and dispersal of pollutants, or their byproducts, through
biological, physical, and chemical processes; and (C) on
the effects of pollutants on biological community diversity,
productivity, and stability, including information on the
factors affecting rates of eutrophication and rates of or-
ganic and inorganic sedimentation for varying types of
receiving waters,
(2) The Administrator, after consultation with appro-
priate Federal and State agencies and other interested per-
sons, shall develop and publish, within one year after Octo-
ber 18, 1972 (and from time to time thereafter revise)
information (A) on the factors necessary to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
all navigable waters, ground waters, waters of the conti-
guous zone, and the oceans; (B) on the factors necessary
for the protection and propagation of shellfish, fish, and
wildlife for classes and categories of receiving waters and
to allow recreational activities in and on the water; and
(C) on the measurement and classification of water qual-
ity; and (ID) for the purpose of section 1313 of this title,
on and the identification of pollutants suitable for maximum
daily load measurement correlated with the achievement of
water quality objectives.
(3) Such criteria and information and revisions thereof
shall be issued to the States and shall be published in the
Federal Register and otherwise made available to the
publie.
37a
Effluent limitation guidelines
(b) For the purpose of adopting or revising effluent limi-
tations under this chapter the Administrator shall, after
consultation with appropriate Federal and State agencies
and other interested persons, published within one year
of October 18, 1972, regulations, providing guidelines for
effluent limitations and, at least annually thereafter, revise
if appropriate, such regulations. Such regulations shall—
(1) (A) identify, in terms of amounts of constituents
and chemical, physical, and biological characteristics
of pollutants, the degree of effluent reduction attainable
through the application of the best practicable control
technology currently available for classes and cate-
gories of point sources (other than publicly owned
treatment works); and
(B) specify factors to be taken into account in de-
termining the control measures and practices to be
applicable to point sources (other than publicly owned
treatment works) within such categories or classes.
Factors relating to the assessment of best practicable
control technology currently available to comply with
subsection (b) (1) of section 1311 of this title shall
include consideration of the total cost of application of
technology in relation to the effluent reduction benefits
to be achieved from such‘application, and shall also
take into account the age of equipment and facilities
involved, the process employed, the engineering aspects
of the application of various types of control tech-
niques, process changes, non-water quality environ-
mental impact (including energy requirements), and
such other factors as the Administrator deems appro-
priate.
(2) (A) identify, in terms of amounts of constitu-
ents and chemical, physical, and biological character-
istics of pollutants, the degree of effluent reduction
38a
attainable through the application of the best control
measures and practices achievable including treatment
techniques, process and procedure innovations, operat-
ing methods, and other alternatives for classes and
categories of point sources (other than publicly owned
treatment works); and
(B) specify factors to he taken into account in de-
termining the best measures and practices available
to comply with subsection (b) (2) of section 1311 of
this title to be applicable to any point source (other
than publicly owned treatment works) within such
categories or classes. Factors relating to the assess-
ment of best available technology shall take into ac-
count the age of equipment and facilities involved, the
process employed, the engineering aspects of the ap-
plication of various types of control techniques, process
changes, the cost of achieving such effluent reduction,
non-water quality environmental impact (including
energy requirements), and such other factors as the
Administrator deems appropriate; and
(3) Identify control measures and practices avail-
able to eliminate the discharge of pollutants from
categories and classes of point sources, taking into
account the cost of achieving such elimination of the
discharge of pollutants.
Pollution discharge elimination procedures
(c) The Administrator, after consultation, with appro-
priate Federal and State agencies and other interested per-
sons, shall issue to the States and appropriate water pollu-
tion control agencies within 270 days after October 18,
1972 (and from time to time thereafter) information on
the processes, procedures, or operating methods which
result in the elimination or reduction of the discharge of
pollutants to implement standards of performance under
section 1316 of this title. Such information shall include
39a
technical and other data, including costs, as are available
on alternative methods of elimination or reduction of the
discharge of pollutants. Such information, and revisions
thereof, shall be published in the Federal Register and
otherwise shall be made available to the public.
Secondary treatment information: alternative waste treatment
management techniques and systems
(d) (1) The Administrator, after consultation with ap-
propriate Federal and State agencies and other interested
persons, shall publish within sixty days after October 18,
1972 (and from time to time thereafter) information, in
terms of amounts of constituents and chemical, physical,
and biological characteristics of pollutants, on the degree
of effluent reduction attainable through the application of
secondary treatment.
(2) The Administrator, after consultation with appro-
priate Federal and State agencies and other interested
persons, shall publish within nine months after October 18,
1972 (and from time to time thereafter) information on
alternative waste treatment management techniques and
systems available to implement section 1281 of this title.
Identification and evaluation of nonpoint sources of pollution:
processes, procedures, and methods to control pollution
(e) The Administrator, after consultation with appro-
priate Federal and State agencies and other interested
persons, shall issue to appropriate Federal agencies, the
States, water pollution control agencies, and agencies des-
ignated under section 1288 of this title, within one year
after October 18, 1972 (and from time to time thereafter)
information including (1) guidelines for identifying and
evaluating the nature and extent of nonpoint sources of
pollutants, and (2) processes, procedures, and methods to
control pollution resulting from—
40a
(A) agricultural and silvicultural activities, includ-
ing runoff from fields and crop and forest lands;
(B) mining activities, including runoff and siltation
from new, currently operating, and abandoned surface
and underground mines;
(C) all construction activity, including runoff from
the facilities resulting from such construction ;
(D) the disposal of pollutants in wells or in subsur-
face excavations;
(E) salt water intrusion resulting from reductions of
fresh water flow from any cause including extraction
of ground water, irrigation, obstruction, and diversion ;
and
(F) changes in the movement, flow, or circulation of
any navigable waters or ground waters, including
changes caused by the construction of dams, levees,
channels, causeways, or flow diversion facilities.
Such information and revisions thereof shall be published
in the Federal Register and otherwise made available to the
public.
Guidelines for pretreatment of pollutants
(f) (1) For the purpose of assisting States in carrying
out programs under section 1342 of this title, the Adminis-
trator shall publish, within one hundred and twenty days
after October 18, 1972, and review at least annually there-
after and, if appropriate, revise guidelines for pretreat-
ment of pollutants which he determines are not susceptible
to treatment by publicly owned treatment works. Guide-
lines under this subsection shall be established to control
and prevent the discharge into the navigable waters, the
contiguous zone, or the ocean (either directly or through
publicly owned treatment works) of any pollutant which
4la
interferes with, passes through, or otherwise is incompat-
ible with such works.
(2) When publishing guidelines under this subsection,
the Administrator shall designate the category or cate-
gories of treatment works to which the guidelines shall
apply.
Test procedure guidelines
(g) The Administrator shall, within one hundred and
eighty days from October 18, 1972, promulgate guidelines
establishing test procedures for the analysis of pollutants
that shall include the factors which must be provided in
any certification pursuant to section 1341 of this title or
permit application pursuant to section 1342 of this title.
Guidelines for monitoring, reporting. enforcement, funding,
personnel, and manpower
(h) The Administrator shall (1) within sixty days after
October 18, 1972, promulgate guidelines for the purpose of
establishing uniform application forms and other minimum
requirements for the acquisition of information from own-
ers and operators of point-sources of discharge subject to
any State program under section 1342 of this title, and (2)
within sixty days from October 18, 1972, promulgate guide-
lines establishing the minimum procedural and other ele-
ments of any State program under section 1342 of this title
which shall include:
(A) monitoring requirements;,
(B) reporting requirements (including procedures
to make information available t6 the public) ;
(C) enforcement provisions; and —
(D) funding, personnel qualifications, and man-
power requirements (including a requirement that no
board or body which approves permit applications or
42a
portions thereof shall include, as a member, any per-
son who receives, or has during the previous two years
received, a significant portion of his income directly or
indirectly from permit holders or applicants for a
permit.)
Restoration and enhancement of publicly owned
fresh water lakes
(i) The Administrator shall, within 270 days after Octo-
ber 18, 1972 (and from time to time thereafter), issue such
information on methods, procedures, and processes as may
be appropriate to restore and enhance the quality of the
Nation’s publicly owned fresh water lakes.
Agreements with Secretaries of Agriculture, Army, and Interior
to provide maximurn utilization of programs to achieve and
maintain water qualiiy: transfer of funds; authorization of
appropriations
(j) (1) The Administrator shall, within six months from
October 18, 1972, enter into agreements with the Secretary
of Agriculture, the Secretary of the Army, and the Secre-
tary of the Interior to provide for the maximum utiliza-
tion of the appropriate programs authorized under other
Federal law to be carried out by such Secretaries for the
purpose of achieving and maintaining water quality
through appropriate implementation of plans approved
under section 1288 of this title.
(2) The Administrator, pursuant to any agreement un-
der paragraph (1) of this subsection is authorized to trans-
fer to the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of the
Army, or the Secretary of the Interior any funds appro-
priated under paragraphs (3) of this subsection to supple-
ment any funds otherwise appropriated to carry out appro-
priate programs authorized to be carried out by such
Secretaries.
43a
(3) There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out
the provisions of this subsection, $100,000,000 per fiscal
year for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973, and the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1974.
§ 1316. National standards of performance—Definitions [Act § 306]
(a) For purposes of this section:
(1) The term ‘‘standard of performance’’ means a stand-
ard for the control of the discharge of pollutants which
reflects the greatest degree of effluent reduction which the
Administrator determines to be achievable through appli-
cation of the best available demonstrated control technol-
ogy, processes, operating methods, or other alternatives, in-
cluding, where practicable, a standard permitting no dis-
charge of pollutants.
(2) The term ‘‘new source’’ means any source, the con-
struction of which is commenced after the publication of
proposed regulations prescribing a standard of perform-
ance under this section which will be applicable to such
source, if such standard is thereafter promulgated in
accordance with this section.
(3) The term ‘‘source’’ means any building, structure,
facility, or installation from which there is or may be the
discharge of pollutants.
(4) The term ‘‘owner or operator’’ means any person
who owns, leases, operates, controls, or supervises a source.
(5) The term ‘‘construction’’ means any placement,
assembly, or installation of facilities or equipment (includ-
ing contractual obligations to purchase such facilities or
equipment) at the premises where such equipment will be
used, including preparation work at such premises.
44a
Categories of sources; Federal standards of performance
for new sources
(b) (1) (A) The Administrator shall, within ninety days
after October 18, 1972, publish (and from time to time
thereafter shall revise) a list of categories of sources,
which shall, at the minimum, include:
pulp and paper mills;
paperboard, builders paper and board mills;
meat product and rendering processing;
dairy product processing;
grain mills;
canned and preserved fruits and vegetables processing ;
canned and preserved seafood processing ;
sugar processing ;
textile mills;
cement manufacturing;
feedlots ;
electroplating ;
organic chemicals manufacturing ;
inorganic chemicals manufacturing ;
plastic and synthetic materials manufacturing ;
soap and detergent manufacturing ;
fertilizer manufacturing;
petroleum refining ;
iron and steel manufacturing;
nonferrous metals manufacturing ;
phosphate manufacturing;
steam electric powerplants;
feroalloy manufacturing ;
leather tanning and finishing;
glass and asbestos manufacturing;
rubber processing; and
timber products processing.
(B) As soon as practicable, but in no case more than
one year, after a category of sources is included in a list
45a
under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the Adminis-
trator shall propose and publish regulations establishing
Federal standards of performance for new sources within
such category. The Administrator shall afford interested
persons an opportunity for written comment on such pro-
posed regulations. After considering such comments, he
shall promulgate, within one hundred and twenty days after
publication of such proposed regulations, such standards
with such adjustments as he deems appropriate. The Ad-
ministrator shall, from time to time, as technology and
alternatives change, revise such standards following the
procedure required by this subsection for promulgation
of such standards. Standards of performance, or revisions
thereof, shall become effective upon promulgation. In
establishing or revising Federal standards of performance
for new sources under this section, the Administrator shall
take into consideration the cost of achieving such effluent
reduction, and any non-water quality environmental impact
and energy requirements.
(2) The Administrator may distinguish among classes,
types, and sizes within categories of new sources for the
purpose of establishing such standards and shall consider
the type of process employed (including whether batch or
continuous).
(3) The provisions of this section shall apply to any
new source owned or operated by the United States.
State enforcement of standards of performance
(c) Each State may develop and submit to the Admin-
istrator a procedure under State law for applying and
enforcing standards of performance for new sources |lo-
eated in such State. If the Administrator finds that the
procedure and the law of any State require the application
and enforcement of standards of performance to at least
the same extent as required by this section, such State is
authorized to apply and enforce such standards of per-
46a
formance (except with respect to new sources owned or
operated by the United States).
Protection from more stringent standards
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter,
any point source the construction of which is commenced
after October 18, 1972, and which is so constructed as to
meet all applicable standards of performance shall not be
subject to any more stringent standard of performance
during a ten-year period beginning on the date of comple-
tion of such construction or during the period of deprecia-
tion or amortization of such facility for the purposes of
section 167 or 169 (or both) of Title 26, whichever period
ends first.
Illegality of operation of new sources in violation of applicable
standards of performance
(e) After the effective date of standards of performance
promulgated under this section, it shall be unlawful for
any owner or operator of any new source to operate such
source in violation of any standard of performance apyli-
cable to such source.
§ 1317. Toxic and pretreatment effluent standards; establishment:
revision; illegality of source operation in violation of
standards [Act § 307]
(a) (1) The Administrator shall, within ninety days after
October 18, 1972, publish (and from time to time thereafter
revise) a list which includes any toxie pollutant or combi-
nation of such pollutants for which an effluent standard
(which may include a prohibition of the discharge of such
pollutants or combination of such pollutants) will be estab-
lished under this section. The Administrator in publishing
such list shall take into account the toxicity of the pollu-
tant, its persistence, degradability, the usual or potential
presence of the affected organisms in any waters, the im-
47a
portance of the affected organisms and the nature and
extent of the effect of the toxic pollutant on such organisms.
(2) Within one hundred and eighty days after the date
of publication of any list, or revision thereof, containing
toxic pollutants or combination of pollutants under para-
graph (1) of this subsection, the Administrator, in accord-
ance with section 553 of Title 5, shall publish a proposed
effluent standard (or a prohibition) for such pollutant or
combination of pollutants which shall take into account
the toxicity of the pollutant, its persistence, degradability,
the usual or potential presence of the affected organisms in
any waters, the importance of the affected organisms and
the nature and extent of the effect of the toxic pollutant on
such organisms, and he shall publish a notice for a public
hearing on such proposed standard to be held within thirty
days. As soon as possible after such hearing, but not later
than six months after publication of the proposed effluent
standard (or prohibition), unless the Administrator finds,
on the record, that a modification of such proposed stand-
ard (or prohibition) is justified based upon a preponder-
ance of evidence adduced at such hearings, such standard
(or prohibition) shall be promulgated.
(3) If after a public hearing the Administrator finds that
a modification of such proposed standard (or prohibition)
is justified, a revised effluent standard (or prohibition) for
such pollutant or combination of pollutants shall be pro-
mulgated immediately. Such standard (or prohibition)
shall be reviewed and, if appropriate, revised at least every
three years.
(4) Any effluent standard promulgated under this sec-
tion shall be at that level which the Administrator deter-
mines provides an ample margin of safety.
(5) When proposing or promulgating any effluent stand-
ard (or prohibition) under this section, the Administrator
shall designate the category or categories of sources to
48a
which the effluent standard (or prohibition) shall apply.
Any disposal of dredged material may be included in such
a category of sources after consultation with the Secretary
of the Army.
(6) Any effluent standard (or prohibition) established
pursuant to this section shall take effect on such date or
dates as specified in the order promulgating such standard,
but in no case more than one year from the date of such
promulgation.
(7) Prior to publishing any regulations pursuant to this
section the Administrator shall, to the maximum extent
practicable within the time provided, consult with appro-
priate advisory committees, States, independent experts,
and Federal departments and agencies.
(b) (1) The Administrator shall, within one hundred and
eighty days after October 18, 1972, and from time to time
thereafter, publish proposed regulations establishing pre-
treatment standards for introduction of pollutants into
treatment works (as defined in section 1292 of this title)
which are publicly owned for those pollutants which are
determined not to be susceptible to treatment by such
treatment works or which would interfere with the opera-
tion of such treatment works. Not later than ninety days
after such publication, and after opportunity for public
hearing, the Administrator shall promulgate such pretreat-
ment standards. Pretreatment standards under this subsec-
tion shall specify a time for compliance not to exceed three
years from the date of promulgation and shall be estab-
lished to prevent the discharge of any pollutant through
treatment works (as defined in section 1292 of this title)
which are publicly owned, which pollutant interferes with,
passes through, or otherwise is incompatible with such
works.
(2) The Administrator shall, from time to time, as con-
trol technology, processes, operating methods, or other
49a
alternatives change, revise such standards following the
procedure established by this subsection for promulgation
of such standards.
(3) When proposing or promulgating any pretreatment
standard under this section, the Administrator shall desig-
nate the category or categories of sources to which such
stan ard shall apply.
(4) Nothing in this subsection shall affect any pretreat-
ment requirement established by any State or local law not
in conflict with any pretreatment standard established
under this subsection.
(c) In order to insure that any source introducing pol-
lutants into a publicly owned treatment works, which
source would be a new source subject to section 1316 of
this title if it were to discharge pollutants, will not cause
a violation of the effluent limitations established for any
such treatment works, the Adminisirator shall promulgate
pretreatment standards for the category of such sources
simultaneously with the promulgation of standards of per-
formance under section 1316 of this title for the equivalent
category of new sources. Such pretreatment standards
shall prevent the discharge of any pollutant into such treat-
ment works, which pollutant may interfere with, pass
through, or otherwise be incompatible with such works.
(d) After the effective date of any effluent standard or
prohibition or pretreatment standard promulgated under
this section, it shall be unlawful for any owner or operator
of any source to operate any source in violation of any such
effluent standard or prohibition or pretreatment standard.
§ 1342. National polluiant discharge elimination system—Permits
for discharge of pollutants [Act § 402]
(a) (1) Except as provided in sections 1328 and 1344 of
this title, the Administrator may, after opportunity for
50a
public hearing, issue a permit for the discharge of any
pollutant, or combination of pollutants, notwithstanding
section 1311(a) of this title, upon condition that such dis-
charge will meet either all applicable requirements under
sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, and 1343 of this title,
or prior to the taking of necessary implementing actions
relating to all such requirements, such conditions as the
Administrator determines are necessary to carry out the
provisions of this chapter.
(2) The Administrator shall prescribe conditions for
such permits to assure compliance with the requirements
of paragraph (1) of this subsection, including conditions
on data and information collection, reporting, and such
other requirements as he deems appropriate.
(3) The permit program of the Administrator under
paragraph (1) of this subsection, and permits issued there-
under, shall be subject to the same terms, conditions, and
requirements as apply to a State permit program and per-
mits issued thereunder under subsection (b) of this section.
(4) All permits for discharges into the navigable waters
issued pursuant to section 407 of this title, shall be deemed
to be permits issued under this title, and permits issued
under this title shall be deemed to be permits issued under
section 407 of this title, and shall continue in foree and
effect for their term unless revoked, modified, or suspended
in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
(5) No permit for a discharge into the navigable waters
shall be issued under section 407 of this title after October
18, 1972. Each application for a permit under section 407
of this title, pending on October 18, 1972, shall be deemed
to be an application for a permit under this section. The
Administrator shall authorize a State, which he determines
has the capability of administering a permit program which
will carry out the objective of this chapter, to issue permits
for discharges into the navigable waters within the juris-
5la
diction of such State. The Administrator may exercise the
authority granted him by the preceding sentence only
during the period which begins on October 18, 1972, and
ends either on the ninetieth day after the date of the first
promulgation of guidelines required by section 1314(h) (2)
of this title, or the date of approval by the Administrator
of a permit program for such State under subsection (b) of
this section, whichever date first occurs, and no such au-
thorization to a State shall extend beyond the last day of
such period. Each such permit shall be subject to such con-
ditions as the Administrator determines are necessary to
carry out the provisions of this chapter. No such permit
shall issue if the Administrator objects to such issuance.
State permit programs
(b) At any time after the promulgation of the guidelines
required by subsection (h) (2) @f section 1314 of this title,
the Governor of each State desiring to administer its own
permit program for discharges into navigable waters with-
in its jurisdiction may submit to the Administrator a full
and complete description of the program it proposes to
establish and administer under State law or under an
interstate compact. In addition, such State shall submit a
statement from the attorney general (or the attorney for
those State water pollution control agencies which have
independent legal counsel), or from the chief legal officer in
the case of an interstate agency, that the laws of such
State, or the interstate compact, as the case may be, pro-
vide adequate authority to carry out the described pro-
gram. The Administrator shall approve each such sub-
mitted program unless he determines that adequate au-
thority does not exist:
(1) To issue permits which—
(A) apply, and insure compliance with, any appli-
cable requirements of sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317,
and 1343 of this title;
4
52a
(B) are for fixed terms not exceeding five years; and
(C) can be terminated or modified for cause includ-
ing, but not limited to, the following:
(i) violation of any condition of the permit;
(ii) obtaining a permit by misrepresentation, or
failure to disclose fully all relevant facts;
(iii) change in any condition that requires either
a temporary or permanent reduction or elimination
of the permitted discharge;
(DD) control the disposal of pollutants into wells;
(2) (A) To issue permits which apply, and insure com-
pliance with, all applicable requirements of section 1318
of this title, or
(B) To inspect, monitor, enter, and require reports to at
least the same extent as required in section 1318 of this
title;
(3) To insure that the public, and any other State the
waters of which may be affected, receive notice of each
application for a permit and to provide an opportunity for
public hearing before a ruling on each such application;
(4) To insure that the Administrator receives notice of
each application (including a copy thereof) for a permit;
(5) To insure that any State (other than the permitting
State), whose waters may be affected by the issuance of a
permit may sabmit written recommendations to the per-
mitting State (and the Administrator) with respect to any
permit application and, if any part of such written ree-
ommendations are not accepted by the permitting State,
that the permitting State will notify such affected State
(and the Administrator) in writing of its failure to so
accept such recommendations together with its reasons for
so doing;
53a
(6) To insure that no permit will be issued if, in the
judgment of the Secretary of the Army acting through the
Chief of Engineers, after consultation with the Secretary
of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating,
anchorage and navigation of any of the navigable waters
would be substantially impaired therby;
(7) To abate violations of the permit or the permit pro-
gram, including civil and criminal penalties and other ways
and means of enforcement;
(8) To insure that any permit for a discharge from a
publicly owned treatment works includes conditions to re-
quire adequate notice to the permitting agency of (A) new
introductions into such works of pollutants from any
source which would be a new source as defined in section
1316 of this title if such source were discharging pollutants,
(B) new iatroductions of pollutants into such works from
a source which would be subject to section 1311 of this title
if it were discharging such pollutants, or (C) a substantial
change in volume or character of pollutants being intro-
duced into such works by a source introducing pollutants
into such works at the time of issuance of the permit. Such
notice shall include information on the quality and quan-
tity of effluent to be introduced into such treatment works
and any anticipated impact of such change in the quantity
or quality of effluent to be discharged from such_ publicly
owned treatment works; and
(9) To insure that any industrial user of any publicly
owned treatment works will comply with sections 1284(b),
1317, and 1318 of this title.
Suspension of federal program upon submission of State
program; withdrawal of approval of State program
(c) (1) Not later than ninety days after the date on
which a State has submitted a program (or revision there-
of) pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the Admin-
istrator shall suspend the issuance of permits under sub-
h4ta
section (a) of this section as to those navigable waters
subject to such program unless he determines that the
State permit program does not meet the requirements of
subsection (b) of this section or does not conform to the
guidelines issued under section 1314(h) (2) of this title. If
the Administrator so determines, he shall notify the State
of any revisions or modifications necessary to conform to
such requirements or guidelines.
(2) Any State permit program under this section shall
at all times be in accordance with this section and guide-
lines promulgated pursuant to section 1314(h) (2) of this
title.
(3) Whenever the Administrator determines after pub-
lic hearing that a State is not administering a program
approved under this section in accordance with require-
ments of this section, he shall so notify the State and, if
appropriate corrective action is not taken within a reason-
able time, not to exceed ninety days, the Administrator
shall withdraw approval of such program. The Adminis-
trator shall not withdraw approval of any such program
unless he shall first have notified the State, and made
publie, in writing, the reasons for such withdrawal.
Notification of Administrator
(d) (1) Each State shall transmit to the Administrator
a copy of each permit application received by such State
and provide notice to the Administrator of every action
related to the consideration of such permit application,
including each permit proposed to be issued by such State.
(2) No permit shall issue (A) if the Administrator within
ninety days of the date of his notification under subsection
(b) (5) of this section objects in writing to the issuance of
such permit, or (B) if the Administrator within ninety days
of the date of transmittal of the proposed permit by the
State objects in writing to the issuance of such permit as
being outside the guidelines and requirements of this
chapter.
55a
(3) The Administrator may, as to any permit applica-
tion, waive paragraph (2) of this subsection.
Waiver of notification requirement
(e) In accordance with guidelines promulgated pursu-
ant to subsection (h) (2) of section 1314 of this title, the
Administrator is authorized to waive the requirements of
subsection (d) of this section at the time he approves a
program pursuant to subsection (b) of this section for any
category (including any class, type, or size within such
category) of point sources within the State submitting such
program.
Point source categories
(f) The Administrator shall promulgate regulations
establishing categories of point sources which he deter-
mines shall not be subject to the requirements of subsection
(d) of this section in any State with a program approved
pursuant to subsection (b) of this section. The Adminis-
trator may distinguish among classes, types, and sizes
within any category of point sources.
Other regulations for safe transportation, handling, carriage,
storage, and stowage of pollutants
(g) Any permit issued under this section for the dis-
charge of pollutants into the navigable waters from a vessel
or other floating craft shall be subject to any applicable
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the depart-
ment in which the Coast Guard is operating, establishing
specifications for safe transportation, handling, carriage,
storage, and stowage of pollutants.
56a
Violation of permit conditions: restriction or prohibition upon
introduction of pollutant by source not previously utilizing
treatment works
(h) In the event any condition of a permit for discharges
from a treatment works (as defined in section 1292 of this
title) which is publicly owned is violated, a State with a
program approved under subsection (b) of this section or
the Administrator, where no State program is approved,
may proceed in a court of competent jurisdiction to restrict
or prohibit the introduction of any pollutant into such
treatment works by a source not utilizing such treatment
works prior to the finding that such condition was violated.
Federal enforcement not limited
(i) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the
authority of the Administrator to take action pursuant to
section 1319 of this title.
Public information
(j) A copy of each permit application and each permit
issued under this section shall be available to the public.
Such permit application or permit, or portion thereof, shall
further be available on request for the purposes of repro-
duction.
Compliance with permits
(k) Compliance with a permit issued pursuant to this
section shall be deemed compliance, for purposes of sections
1319 and 1365 of this title, with sections 1311, 1312, 1316,
1317, and 1343 of this title, except any standard imposed
under section 1317 of this title for a toxie pollutant in-
jurious to human health. Until December 31, 1974, in any
case where a permit for discharge has been applied for
pursuant to this section, but final administrative disposi-
tion of such application has not been made, such discharge
shall not be a violation of (1) section 1311, 1316, or 1342
57a
of this title, or (2) section 407 of this title, unless the Ad-
ministrator or other plaintiff proves that final administra-
tive disposition of such application has not been made be-
cause of the failure of the applicant to furnish information
reasonably required or requested in order to process the
application. For the 180-day period beginning on October
18, 1972, in the case of any point source discharging any
pollutant or combination of pollutants immediately prior
to such date of enactment which source is not subject to
section 407 of this title, the discharge by such source shall
not be a violation of this chapter if such a source applies
for a permit for discharge pursuant to this section within
such 180-day period.
5&a
APPENDIX C
Regulations Involved
EPA’s regulations for the Petroleum Refining Point
Source Category are at 40 C.F.R. § 419. Pertinent to this
ease are the identical preambles (‘‘variance clauses’’) in-
eluded in §§ 419.12, 419.22, 419.32, 419.42 and 419.52. Each
reads as follows:
In establishing the limitations set forth in this sec-
tion, EPA took into account all information it was able
to collect, develop and solicit with respect to factors
(such as age and size of plant, raw materials, manu-
facturing processes, pfoducts, produced, treatment
technology available, energy requirements and costs)
which can affect the industry subcategorization and
effluent levels established. It is, however, possible that
data which would affect these limitations have not been
available and, as a result, these limitations should be
adusted for certain plants in this industry. An in-
dividual discharger or other interested person may
submit evidence to the Regional Administra‘tor (or to
the State, if the State has the authority to issue
NPDES permits) that factors relating to the equip-
ment or facilities involved, the process applied, or
other such factors related to such discharger are funda-
mentally different from the factors considered in the
establishment of the guidelines. On the basis of such
evidence or other available information, the Regional
Administrator (or the State) will make a written find-
ing that such factors are or are not fundamentally
different for that facility compared to those specified
in the Development Document. If such fundamentally
different factors are found to exist, the Regional Ad-
ministrator or the State shall establish for the dis-
charger effluent limitations in the NPDES permit
either more or less stringent than the limitations
59a
established herein to the extent dictated by such funda-
mentally different factors. Such limitations must be
approved by the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency. The Administrator may approve or
disapprove such limitations, specify other limitations,
or initiate proceedings to revise these regulations.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.