Petition — Exxon Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency

Supreme Court brief1977

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DEC 9 1976

MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

IN THE .

Supreme Court of the United States

Octroser TERM, 1976

No. 76-78 1

Exxon CORPORATION AND SHELL Or COMPANY,

Petitioners,

V.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, an independent

agency of the Executive Branch of the United

States; Russert E. Train, Administrator of the

Environmental Protection Agency; and JOHN

QuaRLES, Deputy Administrator of the Environ-

mental Protection Agency, Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

FREDERICK M. Rowe

EpwaRrD W. WARREN

Of Counsel: TrmotTHy 8S. Harpy

KIRKLAND, ELLIs & ROWE

oe Svan See 1776 K Street, N.W.

Janus A. Evans Washington, D.C. 20006

WruiaM D. Marr enteaed

December 9, 1976 Attorneys for Petitioners

Matcoum D. Hawk

Press or Brkon S. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D. C.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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EE > eve cdusoeduawdcenecdeeseueta dentate 2

SD DIED nonce chesscdccarsncecceseccss 2

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED ................ 3

SATBMENT OF THB CAG 2... ccccccccccccccccccccces 4

ReEAsons FoR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. A Conflict Exists Among the Circuits Regarding

Whether EPA’s ‘‘Effluent Limitations Guide-

lines’? Comply With Section 304(b) of the Act. 8

Ii. A Conflict Exists Among the Circuits Regarding

the Validity of EPA’s ‘‘Variance Clause’’.... 12

III. Resolution of Whether EPA Must Consider the

Competitive Effect of Its Regulations Is Neces-

sary To Avoid Discriminatory Implementation

of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act... 15

EE SER a EE EO Oe MOE EE 22

CERTIFICATE OF BERVEION 2... ccc ccccccccccccccccccees 23

a a a la

pS RENE SERIE Ee er age Ke CP eo Ee eR Te 3la

I a i a a a 58a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

American Frozen Food Institute vy. Train, 539 F.2d 107

i eee gk ee eee eee dies oe 10

American Iron and Steel Institute v. EPA, 526 F.2d

Se soda este, celee gs 9,12 -

ii Table of Authorities Continued

Page

American Meat Institute v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442 (7th

Ge Ee dud 06s ce dencesde6eeeweealeneee 10

American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, 540 F. od 1023

Sees Gs. NE 6:0 0054cnncecaniGdenssenzanel passim

American Petroleum Institute v. Train, 7 E.R.C. 1795

(D. Col. 1975), aff’d, 526 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir.1975) 7

Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 9 E.R.C. 1033 (4th

i WE ok scvucsdiccidendtaameuee eee 13, 14

Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp,

See Wk ee GE Kn patecscdckescaviesteieuns 20

CPC International Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032 (8th

Gs TD ccbndncesckous oecancescnéecadaneasens 9

E. 1. duPont deNemours and Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018

(4th Cir, 1976), cert. denied, Nos. 15- 978, 75-1473

& 75-1750 (April 19 & June 21, 1976)......... 8, 10, 12

13, 14, 15, 22

Elm City Broadcasting el v. United States, 235 F.2d

OUR Gee, SE, kn cba wae ckaeeeecaas 21

FCC v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc. (KOA), 319

eh Ee GEE cu bUc uckvuudenniauemeeen anes. 21

FCC vy. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470

ae per rrr Bi Tees 20

Gulf States Utilities Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747 (1973).. 20

Hooker Chemicals v. Train, 537 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1976) 10

Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d

Gee Ses I EE 6. ontdccdeeccesdeonseteus 19

Municipal Electric Ass’n of Massachusetts v. SEC, 413

pp ff. 8. S are en re 20

National Coal Ass’n v. FPC, 191 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir.

SD 6m0t84s0ececeonsetataciaweeetenas 21

Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 537 F.2d

ee Ce MPD akc cceenctaconnacncbaeeuuaes 13

Table of Authorities Continued iii

Page

Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckleshaus, 486 F.2d 375

(D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974) 19

Union Carbide Corp. v. Train, No. 74-1459 (4th Cir.

EE. pobedes totes cnkeeesdudeseysenenniveseaee 16

STaTuTEs:

Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of

1972, 86 Stat. 816, Public Law No. 92-500, October

18, 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.

Section 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) .... 4

Section 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 .............. passim

Section 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) .......... 4

wie 301(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § Sreeontt)

A

Section 304, 33 U.S.C. § 1314 .............. passim

Section 304(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) ........ passim

Section 306, 33 U.S.C. § 1816 .............06.. 5

Section 402(a)(5), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(5) .... 9 11

Section 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) .......... 5

Section 509(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) .......... 7,15

Section 509(b)(1)(E), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (1)

Se Sec eis aes nnd Wea base eeee nc be weewkess

te icc tUen puvkeadsanuneenues s 2

Section 204, Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §824¢ ..... 20

Section 10(e), Public Utility Holding Company Act of

Se Ae Se © OEE ck.cccecncenevdesneeases 20

CoNGRESSIONAL MATERIALS:

Senate Committee on Public Works, A Legislative His-

tory of the Water Pollution C ‘ontrol Act Amend-

ments of 1972, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 1973)

(Comm. Print) TE WUE aicuveecevecedsnceoses 11

iv Table of Authorities Continued

RuLes AND REGULATIONS: _

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8 CE § GERSDGEARS Lo ccicccccceccecusscununul 6, 15

GO UL. § GOBED ..o cc ccccccuncccecscenncenmee 6

SO OC. E. § CODD oon ceccccdeccsceecesuuas le 6,18

68 C.P.B. § GIRBO-GIDSS on. ccccccccccccenecvecseal 6,15

© CPA. § GORD oo cvccccdvuccconsescs eben 6,18

SD Ved. Bog. BOUGD (1B0E) ...o cc cccccccctececdulu 5

40 Fed. Reg. 21939 ite codified at 40 C.F.R. Part

GED scccccesvscesessseneleyendcanl 3, 5,18

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcToBER TERM, 1976

No.

Exxon CORPORATION AND SHELL O1L COMPANY,

Petitioners,

V.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, an independent

agency of the Executive Branch of the United

States; Russert E. Train, Administrator of the

Environmental Protection Agency; and JOHN

QuaRLES, Deputy Administrator of the Environ-

mentai Protection Agency, Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

Exxon Corporation and Shell Oil Company petition

for a Writ of Certiorari to review the decision and

judgment of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in

the consolidated cases of American Petroleum Insti-

tute, et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.,

Nos. 74-1465, 74-1466, Shell Oil Company v. Environ-

mental Protection Agency, et al., No. 74-1621, and

2

Exxon, Corporation v. Environmental Protection

Agency, et al., No. 74-1622."

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App. A, infra)

is reported at 540 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1976).

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered

on August 11, 1976. On November 1, 1976, an extension

of the time within which to file this petition for Writ

of Certiorari was granted to and including December

9, 1976. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked

under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The questions presented for review by this Court

are:

1. Whether the Administrator of the Environ-

mental Protection Agency complied with Section

304(b) of the Federal Water Pollution Control

Act Amendments of 1972 when he promulgated so-

ealled ‘‘effluent limitations guidelines’’ as single-num-

ber discharge standards to be ‘‘mechanically cranked’’

into individual permits for more than 200 existing

petroleum refineries,

‘Shell and Exxon originally filed separate petitions for review

in the Fifth Cireuit Court of Appeals. These petitions, Shell Oil

Co. v. EPA, and Exxon Corp. v. EPA, were subsequently trans-

ferred to the Tenth Cireuit and consolidated with API v. EPA,

challenging the same set of EPA regulations.

| i

2. Whether the Administrator of the Environ-

mental Protection Agency complied with the Federal

Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972

when, in lieu of the ‘‘ guidelines for effluent limitations”

required by Section 304(»), he promulgated a so-called

‘‘variance clause’’ which provides far less individual

plant flexibility than Congress intended in the Section

402 permit-issuing process.

3. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in up-

holding EPA regulations which disadvantage refineries

with petrochemical facilities vis-a-vis their competi-

tors in the refining and organic chemical industries

on the sole ground that ‘‘nothing in the [Federal Water

Pollution Control] Act or its legislative history .. .

requires EPA to consider the competitive effect of its

regulations.”’

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

This petition involves interpretation of EPA’s so-

called ‘‘effluent limitation guidelines’’ for existing pe-

troleum refineries, 40 Fed. Reg. 21939 (1975), codified

at 40 C.F.R. Part 419, as promulgated pursuant to the

Federal Pollution Control Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C.

§§ 1251 et seq.’ Pertinent provisions of the Act and

regulations are set forth in Appendices B and C, pps.

3la and 58a, infra.

2 Parallel United States Code citations for the sections of the Act

most frequently cited in this petition are:

Section 101—33 U.S.C. § 1251

Section 301—-33 U.S.C. § 1311

Section 304—33 U.S.C. § 1314

Section 306—33 U.S.C. § 1316

Section 402—33 U.S.C. § 1342

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollu-

tion Control Act (‘‘the Act’’) established a compre-

hensive program to control water pollution through”

regulation of industrial discharges. The Act’s ultimate

goal as set forth in §101(a) (1) is “that the discharge

of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated

by 1985.”’

To achieve this long-range objective, Congress estab-

lished a pragmatic program to upgrade the pollution

control capabilities of varying existing plants on an

orderly and equitable basis.

First, the Act declares unlawful the discharge of any

pollutant except in compliance with conditions im-

posed by the Act. §301(a). For existing plants, Con-

gress established goals for effluent limitations to be

achieved through permits calling for ‘‘application of

the best practicable control technology currently avail-

able’? by July 1, 1977, and ‘‘application of the best

available tecunclogy economically achievable’’ by July

1, 1983. §§ 301(b) (1) (A) & 301(b) (2) (A).

These goals are to be achieved in accordance with

‘guidelines for effluent limitations’’ published by the

Administrator of EPA. §304(b). Such guidelines are

to identify ‘‘the degree of effluent reduction attainable”’

and to ‘“‘specify factors to be taken into account’’ in

determining control measures and practices to be ap-

plicable to point sources. § 304(b).

Among the factors to be specified by EPA are ‘‘age

of equipment and facilities involved, the process em-

ployed, the engineering aspects of the application of

various types of control techniques, process changes,

5

the cost of achieving such effluent reduction, non-water

quality environmental impact (including energy re-

quirements), and such other factors as the Adminis-

trator deems appropriate.’”’ §304(b). The resulting

‘‘guidelines for effluent limitations’’ are then to be

used in formulating individua! plant discharge per-

mits under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimina-

tion System, to be administered principally by the

States. § 402(b).

Pursuant to its purported authority under §§ 301,

304 and 306 of the Act, EPA, on May 9, 1974, published

regulations establishing so-called ‘‘effluent limitations

guidelines’? for the petroleum refining industry. 39

Fed. Reg. 16560. Amended regulations, substantially

unchanged from those previously promuigated, were

published by EPA on May 20, 1975. 40 Fed. Reg.

21939.

Rather than providing the flexibility inherent in the

§ 304 guidelines described above, EPA’s effluent limita-

tions guidelines’’ for petroleum refineries establish

single-number discharge standards for all existing

plants directly comparabie in form and format to the

‘*standards’’ which Congress expressly prescribed in

§ 306 only for new sources. Indeed, *‘ effluent limitations

guidelines’? were designed to be ‘‘mechanically

cranked”’ into permits issued by State authorities with-

out regard to varying circumstances of individual exist-

ing refineries.

Having thus stripped the States of any significant

role in the permit-issuing process, EPA proceeded to

simulate individual plant flexibility through promul-

gation of a “‘variance eclause’’ by which exceptions

might theoretically be granted in unusual cases. Such

6

a variance would be granted only if the discharger

proves ‘‘that factors relating to the equipment or

facilities involved, the process relating to the equip-

ment or facilities involved, the process applied, or

other such factors related to such discharger are funda-

mentally different from the factors considered in the

establishment of the guidelines.’’* 40 C.F.R. § 419.12.‘

In addition, EPA’s regulations anomalously

provided discharge limits which penalize refiners

engaged in substantial organic chemicals pro-

duction. In contrast to analogous regulations for the

organic chemicals industry, which recognize and reflect

the pollutant contribution of chemicals production,

EPA’s petrochemical and integrated petroleum refin-

ing regulations actually reduce the discharge allowable

to refineries engaged in significant manufacture of or-

ganic chemicals.’ These more stringent discharge re-

strictions significantly disadvantage such refiners as

compared with their competitors in the refining and

organic chemicals industries.

* All emphases added in this petition unless otherwise noted.

*The variance provisions for the petroleum refining industry in

40 C.F.R. §§ 419.12, 419.22, 419.32, 419.42 and 419.52 are essen-

tially identical to the variance provisions promulgated by EPA for

all industry categories and subcategories. See App. C, page 58a,

infra.

° EPA’s regulations for the petroleum refining industry include

five subparts; subpart C, 40 C.F.R. §§ 419.30-419.36, is applicable

to petrochemical refineries; subpart E, 40 C.F.R. §§ 419.50-419.56,

is applicable to more complex integrated refineries with substantial

organic chemicals production. EPA’s regulations for the organic

chemical industry, 40 C.F.R. § 414, although presently subject to

reconsideration by EPA, are nonetheless still used for guidance in

issuing permits.

7

Because of these and other defects in EPA’s regu-

lations, Exxon, Shell and other refiners petitioned for

review. of EPA’s petroleum refinery ‘‘effluent limita-

tions guidelines’? under §509(b)(1)(E) of the Act.°

The Tenth Circuit decided petitioners’ case on Au-

gust 11, 1976, holding inter alia that:

(1) Despite the absence of any provision in § 301

for issuing regulations, EPA’s ‘‘promulgation of the

limitations was a reasonable exercise of a congression-

ally delegated power,”’ creating limitations that are

‘‘presumptively applicable and controlling unless re-

butted by a permit applicant.’’ 540 F.2d at 1030, Fur-

ther, despite the § 304 direction to establish guidelines,

the Tenth Circuit held that ‘‘[t]he expertise of the

Administrator is persuasive as to whether the limita-

tions be fixed in single numbers or ranges.’’ 540 F.2d

at 1031.

(2) Despite the requirement that a variance will be

granted only upon proof by the discharger of ‘‘funda-

mentally different factors,’’ the ‘‘variance’’ clause was

held to be a ‘‘valid exercise of EPA’s rule-making

authority.’’ 540 F.2d at 1033.

(3) Despite the conceded penalty for refineries en-

gaged in petrochemical and integrated operations,

EPA’s regulations were upheld on the ground that

* Petitioners also filed a protective complaint, under the Admin-

istrative Procedure Act, in the United States District Court for

the District of Colorado, The District Court dismissed the com-

plaint on April 8, 1975, holding that ‘‘the issues presented in this

case are properly considered in the appropriate United States

Court of Appeals pursuant to §509(b) of the Act.’’ American

Petroleum Institute v. Train, 7 ERC 1795, 1797 (D. Col. 1975),

aff’d 526 F.2d 1342 (10th Cir. 1975). The jurisdictional issue in-

volved in API v. Train is not raised in this petition for certiorari

and was not reconsidered in American Petroleum Institute v. EPA,

540 F.2d at 1026. See n.1, supra.

8

‘‘nothing in the Act or its legislative history ... re-

quires EPA to consider the competitive effect of its

regulations.’’ 540 F.2d at 1036.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. A CONFLICT EXISTS AMONG THE CIRCUITS RE-

GARDING WHETHER EPA’S “EFFLUENT LIMITA-

TIONS GUIDELINES” COMPLY WITH SECTION 304(b)

OF THE ACT.

On April 19 and June 21, 1976, this Court granted

the petitions and ecross-petition in H. I. duPont de-

Nemours and Co., et al. v. Train, et al., Nos. 75-978,

75-1473 and 75-1750, agreeing to review, inter alia,

whether the Administrator of EPA may promulgate

effluent limitations for existing industrial sources of

water pollution, uniform within industrial classes,

categories and subeategories, as national minimum re-

quirements under § 301 of the Federal Water Pollu-

tion Control Act Amendments of 1972.

The duPont petitions raise this question in the con-

text of EPA regulations for the inorganic chemical

industry. The present petition raises a comparable

issue with respect to the petroleum refining industry.

The duPont cases were fully briefed and oral argu-

ment was held on December 8, 1976. Because of the

similarity of the issues presented, this Court may wish

to postpone its consideration of this portion of the

instant petition pending disposition of the duPont

cases,

The question of whether EPA has authority under

the Act to issue so-called ‘‘effluent limitations guide-

lines’? as single-number discharge standards has al-

ready been considered by seven courts of appeals. The

courts have split a number of ways in interpreting

EPA’s authority.

_— ee

9

The first court to speak, the Eighth Circuit, held

that the Act does not empower EPA’s Administrator

to promulgate effluent limitations for existing plants

under § 301. CPC International Inc. v. Train, 515

F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975). Reviewing the statutory

language and legislative history, the Eighth Circuit

determined that § 301 does not authorize promulgation

of effluent limitations by regulation, but rather that

‘*euidelines for effluent limitations,’’ not single-number

standards, were explicitly required by § 304. 515 F.2d

at 1037. }

Other courts of appeals presented with the same

issue in the context of similar regulations for other

industries have disagreed.

The Third Cireuit, in American Tron and Steel In-

stitute v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (1975), found that au-

thority for the Administrator to issue single-number

limitations under § 301 could be ‘‘inferred’’ from the

Act. 526 F.2d at 1037. The Third Cireuit reconciled

this holding with the explicit § 304 requirement for

guidelines in the following manner:

[T]he section 301 limitations represent both the

base level or minimum degree of effluent control

permissible and the ceiling (or maximum of efflu-

ent discharge) permissible nationwide within a

given eategory, and the section 304 guidelines are

intended to provide precise guidance to the per-

mit-issuing authorities in establishing a permissi-

ble level of discharge that is more stringent than

the ceiling. 526 F.2d at 1045.

Because EPA’s ‘‘effluent limitations guidelines’’ for

the iron and steel industry failed to identify a range

of feasible discharge levels and specify factors to be

taken into account for granting permits to individ-

10

ual point sources, as required by § 304, the Third

Circuit remanded to EPA. 526 F.2d at 1045-47.

In the present case, and in EF. I, duPont de Nemours

& Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1976), the

Tenth and Fourth Circuits found promulgation of

limitations under § 301 to be a reasonable exercise of

the EPA Administrator’s authority. Both courts found

EPA’s limitations to be ‘‘presumptively applicable

and controlling unless rebutted by a permit appli-

eant,”’ and accordingly upheld EPA’s single-number

effluent limitations despite the § 304 requirement that

EPA publish “regulations providing guidelines for

effluent limitations.’”? API, supra, 540 F.2d at 1030;

duPont, supra, 541 F.2d at 1028.

The Fourth Circuit in duPont ruled that ‘‘the ex-

pertise of the Administrator is persuasive as to

whether the limitations be fixed in single numbers or

ranges,’ 541 F.2d at 1029, and the Tenth Cireuit

agreed explicitly. 540 F.2d at 1031. The Tenth Cireuit

rejected, however, EPA’s claim ‘‘that the regulations

must be mechanically cranked into every permit which

may be issued,” stressing that its holding accepted the

use of single numbers only ‘“‘[fJor the purpose of

general rule-making.’’ 540 F.2d at 1031-32."

™The Seventh Circuit also found authority for EPA to issue

effluent limitations under § 301, but expressly pe ruling “4

ing whether EPA’s regulations comport with the requirement:

of "soo American Meat Institute v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 448

n. 13, 452 (7th Cir. 1975).

The Second Circuit upheld EPA’s promulgation of ‘‘ effluent

limitation guidelines’’ pursuant to §§ 301 and 304 of the Act.

Hooker Chemicals v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 628 (2d Cir. 1976).

Accord, American Frozen Food Institute v. Train, 539 F.2d 107,

129-32 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

11

This split among the circuits that have considered

whether EPA’s single-number discharge standards

comply with the requirements of §304(b) presents

serious obstacles to effective administration of the

Act. Indeed, the current uncertainty regarding EPA’s

authority and compliance with the Act continues to

impose burdens on the courts and promotes chaotic

administration of the nation’s water pollution control

program.

By promulgating single-number standards for exist-

ing plants instead of issuing the flexible ‘‘guidelines”’

required by § 304(b), EPA’s procrustean regulations

ignore significant factors that Congress intended to be

applied in granting individual discharge permits. This

EPA disregard of Congress’ intent has spawned liti-

gation in countless industries challenging EP A’s regu-

lations.

In addition, administration of the Act’s pollution

control program has been made chaotic by EPA’s

severe curtailment of the primary State role contem-

plated by the Act. Congress intended that discharge

permits be issued by the States, rather than EPA, as

soon as they have the ‘‘eapability,’’ under § 402(a) (5).

Without ‘‘meaningful local and State participation,”’

Congress recognized that “the program will founder

on the rocks of the generally inflexible, Washington

dictated approach.”* Rather than being given the

‘guidelines for effluent limitations,’ explicitly called

for by § 304, the States must now mechanically crank

*Comments of Congressman Blatnik, spokesman for the House

Publie Works Committee in the House debate on the Act, as re-

printed in Senate Comm. on Public Works, 1 A Legislative H istory

of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, at 355,

93d Cong., Ist Sess. (Jan. 1973) (Comm Print).

12

EPA’s made-in-Washington, single-number limita-

tions into each permit. In short, the dangers Congress

sought to avoid have come to pass.

EPA’s failure to follow the statutory scheme thus

severely inhibits achievement of the congressional plan

that the States play the ‘‘primary”’ role in the dis-

charge permit program, and that flexibility be pro-

vided to account for the varying circumstances of

individual existing plants. Only through review by

this Court will the nation be guaranteed the benefits

of Congress’ carefully designed plan for elimination

of all pollutant discharges by 1985.

II. A CONFLICT EXISTS AMONG THE CIRCUITS RE-

GARDING THE VALIDITY OF EPA’S “VARIANCE

CLAUSE.”

The courts of appeals have also split regarding the

validity of the ‘‘variance clause,’?’ which EPA issued

in substitution for the individual plant flexibility in-

tended by Congress in the § 304(b) ‘‘guidelines for

effluent limitations.’’ Since this split among the cir-

cuits did not arise until after the duPont decision,

certiorari has not yet been granted on this question.

The Third Circuit, the first court of appeals to speak

on this issue, found that ‘‘the variance procedure pro-

vides for less flexibility than we believe Congress con-

templated, since it permits deviations from otherwise

rigid and unitary limitations only where the cireum-

stances of the particular plant are ‘fundamentally

different’ than those from which the effluent limitation

was derived.’’ American Iron and Steel Institute v.

EPA, supra, 526 F.2d at 1046. The court did not rule

explicitly on the validity of the variance provision,

as it remanded all of the 1977 and 1983 regulations for

13

the iron and steel industry on the grounds that EPA

failed to provide the required § 304(b) guidelines.

526 F.2d at 1047.

The duPont decision found the variance clause to

be ‘‘appropriate to the regulatory process’’ and thus

‘presumptively applicable.’”’ duPont, supra, 541 F.2d

at 1028. However, the court did not rule on its ultimate

reasonableness, stating:

The administration of these provisions in prac-

tice is a matter of speculation at the present. The

question will arise when a claim for a variance is

made in a permit application. 541 F.2d at 1028.

Following du Pont, the Second Cireuit agreed that

‘‘Ti]t would be premature at this point to consider

whether the variance clause will be interpreted with

sufficient liberality to accommodate all legitimate de-

mands for flexibility.’’ Natural Resources Defense

Council v. EPA, 537 F.2d 642, 647 (1976).

A direct conflict among the circuits arose for the

first time when the Fourth Circuit, in Appalachian

Power Co. v. Train, 9 ERC 1033 (1976), invalidated a

variance clause for the steam electric power industry

identical to those considered in the previously decided

eases. The Court found the variance clause to be un-

duly restrictive because it takes into account ‘‘only

technical and engineering factors, exclusive of cost,”’

and therefore conflicts with the flexibility required by

the Act. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals set aside

and remanded variance provisions identical to those

in the instant case. 9 ERC at 1038.

Ruling after Appalachian Power, the Tenth Circuit,

in API, returned to the rationale of the previous deci-

14

sions. The court found that the variance provisions

constituted reasonable general rulemaking although it

was too early to assess their validity in operation:

‘Their interpretation and application must await

action on a variance claim asserting specific facts. We

will not speculate what the result may be.”’ API, supra,

540 F.2d at 1033.

In so holding, the Tenth Cireuit noted: ‘Again we

have an area of uncertainty. There is not only a con-

flict between circuits but also a conflict within one

circuit [i.e., the Fourth, between duPont and Appa-

lachian Power].”’ 540 F.2d at 1032.

The unsettled law on the variance clause has led to

great uncertainty among industrial dischargers and

threatens to spawn needless litigation in thousands of

individual permit application proceedings. Although

several circuits have found the variance provision’s

unduly restrictive requirement of ‘‘fundamentally dif-

ferent’’ factors inconsistent with Congress’ intent,

only one circuit, the Fourth, in Appalachian Power,

has explicitly invalidated the provision and remanded

to EPA,

The inappropriateness of EPA’s variance clause is

apparent from EPA’s own regulations. In the face

of the § 304 requirement for flexible guidelines, EPA

issued single-number limitations. In an attempt to

simulate individual plant flexibility where none actu-

ally exists, EPA added the variance clause. By its

terms, the clause would permit an exception only for

factors ‘‘fundamentally different from the factors

considered in the establishment of the guidelines.”’

49 C.F.R. § 419.12, et al. Since EPA purported to

consider even site-specific factors such as plant age,

15

size, processes and the like in development of its

‘‘effluent limitations guidelines,’’ few, if any, cireum-

stances exist in which an exception would be granted

under EPA’s clause.

In fact, as far as petitioners are aware, although

numerous variances have been requested, none has

been granted to any of the nation’s more than two

hundred petroleum refineries. Nor are petitioners

aware of requested variances being granted in any

other industry.

So long as EPA’s restrictive ‘‘variance clause’’ re-

mains in force, permit-issuing authorities will be de-

prived of discretion to resolve the vast majority of

disputed permits. Once the administrative process is

concluded, individual plants denied permits adapted

to their specific circumstances will be left with no

choice but to appeal to the appropriate court of ap-

peals under § 509(b) (1) of the Act.

In sum, although a conflict among the circuits ad-

mittedly exists on the validity of EPA’s variance

clause, certiorari has not yet been granted on this

issue, and it is not before this Court in the duPont

cases. Further postponement of a definitive resolution

of this critical question can only lead to needless liti-

gation and further delay in implementation of the

Act’s water pollution control program.

III. RESOLUTION OF WHETHER EPA MUST CONSIDER

THE COMPETITIVE EFFECT OF ITS REGULATIONS

IS NECESSARY TO AVOID DISCRIMINATORY IM-

PLEMENTATION OF THE FEDERAL WATER POLLU-

TION CONTROL ACT.

Another question of far-reaching significance for

EPA’s administration of not only § 304, but of other

provisions of the Act, is the Tenth Circuit’s holding

16

that ‘‘nothing in the Act or its legislative history

. . requires EPA to consider the competitive effect

of its regulations.”’ APJ, supra, 540 F.2d at 1036.

Without plenary consideration and reversal by this

Court, the Tenth Cireuit’s ruling on this point will

allow EPA to ignore the Act as well as established

administrative law principles which require it to con-

sider the impact of its actions on competition among

firms and industries which it regulates.

EPA acknowledges that the manufacture of organic

chemicals increases the amount of pollutants in a

plant’s discharge. This fact is apparent not only in

EPA’s “effluent limitations guidelines” for the or-

zani¢ chemicals industry, but also in numerous permits

for organic chemicals plants which provide effluent

limitations reflecting allowances for the pollutants

generated by organic chemical processes in such

plants.’

Nonctheless, when EPA promulgated regulations ap-

plicable to the identical organie chemical processes

in petrochemical and integrated refineries, it made

no comparable allowance for the pollutant load-

ings ereated by such chemical processes. 40 C.F.R.

§§ 419.30-419.36 and 419.50-419.56. Indeed, EPA’s

*The Tenth Circuit suggested that petitioners’ claims have a

“hollow ring’’ since EPA’s regulations for the organic chemicals

industry were remanded pu.» nt to a stipulation among the

parties in Union Carbide Co p. v. Train, No. 74-1459 (4th

Cir. 1976). API, supra, 540 F.2d at 1036. However, regardless

of what regulations eventually are promulgated for the organic

chemicals industry, such regulations will, like the dozens of chem-

ical plant permits already issued, undoubtedly provide allowances

for pollutants created and discharged as a result of organie chem-

ical processes, .

17

regulations for petrochemical and integrated refineries

penalize such refineries by granting them smaller dis-

charge allowances than the same refineries would have

without the additional organic chemical facilities.

Consequently, petitioners generally challenged the

underlying methodology and derivation of KPA’s

regulations, as well as EPA’s specific failure to give

any credit to the caleulated discharge levels for petro-

chemical, hydrotreating, and other processes which

contribute substantially to raw waste loading and efflu-

ent discharge.”

The inherent unfairness and resulting competitive

disadvantage of EPA’s petrochemical and integrated

refining regulations is dramatically illustrated by Shell

Oil Company’s Martinez, California, manufacturing

complex, a refinery and chemical plant with common

treatment facilities. The Martinez refinery is (i) al-

lowed to discharge little more than half the pollutants

allowable to a comparable refinery with an organic

chemicals plant having separate treatment facilities

and (ii) is actually penalized in terms of allowable dis-

charge for having added organic chemical processes to

the refinery by being granted smaller effluent allow-

ances than it would be allowed without such processes.”

© Petitioners’ challenge below to EPA’s entire methodology for

deriving its ‘‘effluent limitations guidelines’’ refutes the Tenth

Cireuit’s erroneous remark that ‘‘the refineries do not contest the

methodology, the data base, or the achievability of the limitations

for the two [petrochemical] subcategories in question.’’ 540 F.2d

at 1037. The regulations’ failure to grant any credit for most

chemical processes in petrochemical and integrated refineries was

but one of the many anomalies created by the EPA methodology

which petitioners vigorously challenged.

1 Since it is classified by EPA as a subcategory E integrated

refinery, the Martinez complex may not discharge in excess

of 1733.5 pounds of BOD per day, whereas a subcategory D

refinery of the same capacity as Shell Martinez may discharge

18

Shell’s Martinez complex is not the only example of

this discriminatory impact. Other petrochemical and

integrated refineries are subject to comparable treat-

ment, which inevitably places them at a disadvantage

vis-a-vis competitors in the refining and organic chemi-

cal industries.”

EPA argued that it would be ‘“‘absurd’”’ to consider

such economic effects (40 Fed. Reg. at 21949), and the

Tenth Circuit agreed that EPA may ignore ‘‘the com-

petitive effect of its regulations.”’ API, supra, 540

F.2d at 1036. Under these circumstances, a definitive

decision by this Court is necessary to correct EPA’s

cramped interpretation and to assure in the future

that EPA will exercise its statutory responsibility to

reconcile the environmental, economic and competi-

tive effects of its regulations.

The requirement that EPA consider the competitive

effect of its regulations is apparent from the statutory

text which repeatedly stresses the importance of eco-

nomic factors. For example, §301 requires applica-

tion of the ‘best practicable’ control technology by

1977 and the ‘best available technology economically

achievable”’ by 1983. Similarly, § 304 lists the “total

2012 pounds of BOD per day. Moreover, separate ‘‘D"’ refinery

and organic chemical plants cumulatively the same size as Martin-

ez would be allowed a total discharge of 3135 pounds per day,

well above Martinez’s 1733.5 allowance. 40 C.F.R.. §§ 419.42 &

419.52.

' For example, petitioners have calculated that if five of the

existing nine subcategory D refineries were to expand petrochem-

ical facilities and become classified in subcategory E, allocations

would decrease an average of 16%. On the other hand, subcate-

gory E refineries would gain an average of 18% in their allocation

if they were to close down petrochemical operations and apply

under the subcate,ory D allocation.

19

cost of application of technology in relation to the

effluent reduction benefits to be achieved’’ as one of

the factors to be considered in the guidelines.

Despite this statutory requirement that EPA con-

sider economie factors including the ‘‘total cost’’ of its

regulations, the Tenth Circuit failed to give any weight

to the potentially significant economic consequences

which might result from EPA’s failure to examine

either intra-industry or inter-industry competitive ef-

fects. This ruling conflicts, not only with the statute,

but also with the holdings of other courts of appeals

in similar environmental cases.

For example, the D.C. Cireuit remanded asbestos

dust standards under the Occupational Safety and

Health Act for consideration of inter-industry eco-

nomic differences. Industrial Union Dep’t., AF L-C1O

v. Ilodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 479-81 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In

so doing, the Court. stressed that, where ‘‘two indus-

tries were in competition with one another’’, and ‘‘one

industry could gain a competitive advantage over an-

other by virtue of differing standards, employers in

the disadvantaged industry [may] challenge the stand-

ards on a comparative basis... .’’ 499 F.2d at 481.

Similarly, in Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus,

486 F.2d 375, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417

U.S. 921 (1974), the D.C. Circuit found that Congress’

direction that EPA consider ‘‘economic cost’’ under

the Clean Air Act, means that ‘‘[t}here is, of course, a

significant and proper scope for inter-industry com-

parison in the case of industries producing substitute

or alternative products.’’

Wholly apart from these environmental law prece-

dents, the requirement that administrative agencies

20

consider competitive factors relating to cost, or more

generally to the ‘‘public interest,’’ is well-established.

For instance, in Gulf States Utilities Co. v. FPC, 411

U.S. 747 (1973), this Court told the Federal Power

Commission that its duties under § 204 of the Federal

Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824c, when approving issuance

of utility securities under a ‘‘ public interest’’ standard,

included consideration of arguments that such securi-

ties would be used to refinance existing anticompetitive

activities.

Likewise, the D.C. Circuit required the SEC to take

competitive considerations into account in authorizing

utility acquisitions under the ‘‘ public interest’’ stand-

ard of §10(e) of the Public Utility Holding Company

Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79j(e). In so holding, the court

interpreted the ‘‘publie interest’? as requiring SEC

consideration not only of whether acquisition of two

nuclear power plants by a group of New England util-

ities would lead to a concentration of control but also

of whether the acquisition would preclude competing

utilities from purchasing electricity. Municipal Elec-

tric Ass’n of Massachusetts vy. SEC, 413 F.2d 1052

(D.C. Cir. 1969).

The basic administrative law principle underlying

these decisions is also expressed in this Court’s rulings

granting standing to challenge administrative rulings

affecting competitors and permitting intervention to

companies in regulatory adjudications against compet-

ing firms.’’ Unless the ‘‘ public interest’’ and other com-

’* This Court held as early as FCC vy, Sanders Brothers Radio

Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940), that corporations have judicial

standing to challenge administrative ageney decisions concerning

their competitors, See also Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Organi-

21

parable regulatory mandates require agencies to con-

sider the competitive effect of their actions, it would

be a futile gesture to permit competitors to intervene

and seek judicial review of administrative determina-

tions.

In sum, the Tenth Circuit’s decision sanctioning

EPA’s failure to consider competitive economic fac-

tors conflicts with applicable administrative law prin-

ciples and will inevitably lead to discriminatory imple-

mentation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.

The need for corrective action by this Court is espe-

cially appropriate given the irrational EPA regula-

tions challenged here. By granting a lower allowable

discharge to refineries with than without organie chem-

ical processes, EPA’s petrochemical and integrated

refining regulations are by definition arbitrary, ca-

pricious, and appropriate for reversal and remand by

this Court.

zations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). Intervention in such situa-

tions has been accepted since FCC v. National Broadcasting Co.,

Inc. (KOA), 319 U.S. 239 (1943); see also National Coal Ass’n

v, FPC, 191 F.2d 462, 466-67 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Elm City Broad-

casting Corp. v. United States, 235 F.2d 811 (D.C, Cir. 1956).

22

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant

this petition for certiorari. If the Court should decide

to withhold action on Issue I pending disposition of

the duPont cases, the Court should nonetheless grant

certiorari on Issues II and III, neither of which is

presented in the duPont cases.

Respectfully submitted,

FrRepERICK M. Rowr

Epwarp W. WARREN

Of Counsel: Timorny S. Harpy

— . KIRKLAND, Evuis & Rowe

Jess W. Van Er’ ’

a magnet 1776 K Street, N.W.

Matcotm D. HawK :

James A. Evane Washington, D.C. 20006

WILLIAM D. Marr Attorneys for Petitioners

December 9, 1976

23

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that three printed copies of the

foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit have

been mailed this 9th day of December, 1976, postage

prepaid to all petitioners below and to:

Robert H. Bork

Solicitor General

Room 5143 '

Department of Justice

Washington, D. C. 20530

Alan W. Eckert, Esq.

Environmental Protection Agency

401 M Street, S. W.

Room 511, West Tower

Washington, D. C. 20460

William Frick, Esq.

General Counsel

Environmental Protection Agency

Washington, D. C. 20460

Michael Graves, Esq.

Department of Justice oars

Land and Natural Resources Division

Room 2629

Washington, D. C. 20530

A. Raymond Randolph, Jr.

Deputy Solicitor General

Room 5139

Department of Justice

Washington, D. C. 20530

Epwarp W. WARREN

APPENDIX

la

APPENDIX A

American Petroleum Institute et al., Petitioners,

v.

Environmental Protection Agency et al., Respondents,

Nos. 74-1465, 74-1466, 74-1621 and 74-1622

United States Court of Appeals,

Tenth Circuit.

Aug. 11, 1976

[540 F.2d 1023]

Before Sern, Breirenstern and Doy.e, Circuit Judges.

[1026]

BreITensteEIN, Circuit Judge.

The American Petroleum Institute, an incorporated trade

association of companies in the petroleum industry, and

ten companies engaged in petroleum refining and related

activities, have petitioned for review of regulations pro-

mulgated by the Administrator of the Environmental Pro-

tection Agency under the Federal Water Pollution Control

Act Amendments of 1972. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376. The regu-

lations are contained in 40 C.F.R. Part 419, Petroleum

Refining Point Source Category. The Administrator at

times will be referred to as EPA. The statutory references

will be those found in the Act as set out in 86 Stat. 816

et seq.' Petitioners will be referred to as Refineries.

‘The parallel U. S. Code citations for the most frequently men-

tioned sections are:

Section 101—33 U.S.C, § 1251,

Section 301—33 U.S.C. § 1311,

Section 304—33 U.S.C. § 1314,

Section 306—33 U.S.C. § 1316,

Section 402—33 U.S.C. § 1342,

Section 501—33 U.S.C. § 1361,

Section 502—33 U.S.C. § 1362,

Section 509—33 U.S.C. § 1369.

2a

Section 509(b)(1)(I) confers jurisdiction on the court

of appeals. American Petroleum Institute vy. Train, 10

Cir., 526 F.2d 1343, sustains that jurisdiction and will not

be reconsidered.

I.

Tue Acr

The Act resulted from dissatisfaction with predecessor

statutes which relied unsuccessfully on water quality stand-

ards as the primary method of pollution control. See S.

Rep. No, 92-414, 92 Cong. 2d Sess., 2 U.S. Code Cong. &

Adm. News ’72 3668, 3674. The objective of the Act ‘is

to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biologi-

cal integrity of the Nation’s waters.” §101(a). The goal

is the elimination by 1985 of ‘‘the discharge of pollutants

into the navigable waters..’’? § 101(a)(1). Seetion 301(a)

provides that ‘‘the discharge of any pollutant by any per-

son shall be unlawful” except ‘‘as in compliance’? with

specified sections of the Act. The number of dischargers

has been variously estimated from 30,000 to 70,000,

The control is by effluent limitations on discharges from

point sources. See 4301. The Act provides progressively

severe limitations. By July 1, 1977, the limitations ‘shall

require the application of the best practicable control tech-

nology currently available’? (BPT). For July 1, 1983, the

requirement is ‘the best available technology economically

achievable,’’ (BAT). For new sources, i.e., those whose

construction commences after the promulgation of perti-

nent regulations, the Act provides a ‘‘standard of per-

formance’’ reflecting ‘‘the greatest degree of effluent re-

duction which the Administrator determines to be achiev-

able through application of the best available demonstrated

control technology, processes, operating methods, or other

alternatives,’’ (BADT).

Primary enforcement of the Act is secured through the

permit system established by § 402. Discharge permits

3a

may be issued by the Administrator, § 402(a)(1), or by a

state which has adopted a permit program approved by

the Administrator. § 402(b). ‘the Administrator has veto

power over a state issued permit. § 402(d)(2). The Ad-

ministrator may withdraw approval of a state permit pro-

gram if he finds that it is not being administered in ac-

cordance with the Act. § 402(¢)(3). All permits shall com-

ply with the applicable provisions of §§ 301 (effluent limi-

tations), 306 (new source standards), and other specified

sections of the Act. See §402(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A).

The issuance or denial of a permit may be reviewed by

the“appropriate court of appeals. § 509(b)(1)(F). A vio-

lation of any conditions or limitations imposed by speci-

fied sections of the Act or by a permit may result in the

imposition of both civil and criminal penalties. § 309. ‘* Citi-

zen Suits’’ alleging violations of the Act may be brought

under § 505.

Section 304(a)(1) provides that within one year after en-

actment the Administrator [1027] must publis) ‘‘eriteria for

water quality accurately reflecting the latest scientific know-

ledge’? on enumerated subjects. Within the same period

the Administrator shall publish regulations ‘providing

guidelines for effluent limitations.’’ § 304(b). Subsection

(b)(1)(A) applies to the 1977 step and subsection (b) (2)

(A) to the 1983 step. Each subsection mandates considera-

tion of factors.

‘he Administrator did not act within the one year re-

quirements of § 304, Compliance was not within the realm

of reality. An estimated 30,000 applications for permits

were filed. EPA characterizes the Act as ‘‘incredibly com-

plex and demanding.’’ See duPont II infra. A private suit

was brought to compel compliance. Natural Resources De-

fense Council, Inc. v. Train (NRDC), 166 U.S.App.D.C.

312, 510 F.2d 692. The result was a court imposed time-

table. Ibid. at 710-714. The regulations here under attack

4a

were promulgated in May and September, 1974, and some

were amended in May, 1975.

The EPA regulations relating to industrial discharge of

pollutants have produced much litigation. Decisions to

date of various courts of appeals are, in chronological

order:

1—CPC International, Inc. v. Train, 8 Cir., 515 F.2d

1032 (Corn Wet Milling) ;

2—American Iron and Steel Institute v. Environmental

Protection Agency, 3 Cir., 526 F.2d 1027 (Iron

and Steel Manufacturing) ;

3—American Meat Institute v. Environmental Pro-

tection Agency, 7 Cir., 526 F.2d 442 (Meat Prod-

ucts) ;

4—American Petroleum Institute v. Train (API 1),

10 Cir., 526 F.2d 1343 (Jurisdiction) ;

d—L. I. duPont de Nemours & Company v. Train

(duPont I), 4 Cir., 528 F.2d 1136. Filed December

30, 1975, cert. granted —— U.S. ——, 96 S.Ct. 1662,

48 L.Ed.2d 174 (Jurisdiction) ;

6—E. I. duPont de Nemours & Company v. Train

(duPont IT), 4 Cir., 541 F.2d 1018. Filed March

10, 1976, cert. granted U.S. ——. 96 S.Ct.

3165, 49 L.Ed.2d (Inorganie Chemicals) ;

7—Tanners’ Council of America, Inc. v. Train, 4 Cir.,

540 F.2d 1188. Filed March 10, 1976 (Leather

Tanning) ;

8—FMC Corporation v. Train, 4 Cir., 539 F.2d 973.

Filed March 10, 1976 (Plastic and Synthetie Ma-

terials) ;

9—Hooker Chemicals € Plastics Corp. v. Train, 2

Cir., 537 F.2d 620. Filed April 28, 1976 (Phos-

phorous Manufacturing—existing sources) ;

5a

10—Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 2

Cir., 537 F.2d 639. Filed April 28, 1976 (Phosphor-

ous Manufacturing—new sources) ;

11—Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. En-

vironmental Protection Agency, 2 Cir., 537 F. 2d

642. Filed April 28, 1976 (Variance Clauses) ;

12— American Frozen Food Institute v. Train, D.C.Cir.,

539 F.2d 107. Filed May 11, 1976 (Frozen Potato

Products); and

13—Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 4 Cir., —— F.2d

——. Filed July 16, 1976 (Steam Electric Power)

A cursory glance at the above decisions reveals the dif-

ficulties which the federal courts of appeals have had with

the Act. Popular demand for legislative action to control

water pollution is shown by the fact that on the votes

to override the presidential veto, only 12 senators and 23

representatives voted to sustain the veto. Perhaps the

pressure on Congress to do something was a major cause

of the unsatisfactory legislation. The Act is difficult to

understand, construe and apply. We can add nothing to the

comments of other courts. See Second Circuit, Hooker

Chemicals at 626-627; Third Circuit, Steel Institute, 526

F.2d at 1037 n. 14a; and Fourth Cireuit, duPont IT, at 1025-

1032.

The two volume, 1766 page, legislative history does not

help us much. The Second Cireuit has said, Hooker Chemi-

cals, at p. 627, that ‘‘[t]he legislative history compounds

the difficulty.’’ See also statements [1028] of Fourth Circuit,

duPont II, at 1027. A comparison of the discussion of the

legislative history by the Eighth Circuit in the Corn Wet

Milling case, 515 F.2d at 1039-1042 with that found in E£. I.

du Pont de Nemours and Company v. Train, W.D.Va.,

383 F.Supp. 1244, 1254-1255, highlights the problem. We

can add nothing to the explication of legislative history

6a

by the Third Circuit in the Steel Institute case, 526 F.2d

at 1043-1045, and by the Seventh Circuit in the Meat Insti-

tute case, 526 F.2d at 451-452.

In a case involving the Act before us, Train v. Colorado

Public Interest Research Group, Inc., the Supreme Court

said, US. , 96 S.Ct. 1938, 48 L.Ed.2d 434, in

a quote from United States vy. American Trucking Associa-

tions, 310 U.S. 534, 543-544, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 84 L.Ed. 1345

that ‘‘[w]hen aid to construction of the meaning of words,

as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be

no ‘rule of law’ which forbids its [legislative history’s]

use, however clear the words may appear on ‘superficial

examination.’ ’’ (Footnotes omitted). The diffieulty with

the present case is that sometimes the statutory words,

phrases, and provisions are clear and sometimes they are

not. The same can be said of the legislative history.

We consider both the statute and its legislative history.

As said by the Second Circuit, Hooker Chemicals, at p.

627: ‘‘The very magnitude of the task undertaken by Con-

gress and delegated to the EPA for fulfillment probably

accounts for the lack of clarity.’’ In the discussion which

follows, the guiding sta’ is the intent of Congress to im-

prove and preserve the quality of the Nation’s waters. All

issues must be viewed in the light of that intent.

IL.

Score Or Review

The Refineries attack generally all of the pertinent vegu-

lations on the grounds of lack of authority and of noncom-

pliance with the Act. They attack certain specific regula-

tions both on the legal ground of noncompliance with the

Act and on the factual ground that the record does not

sustain the actions of the EPA. We are concerned with

informal rule-making by EPA in the exercise of functions

delegated to it by the Act. The record consists of notice

of proposed action, comments of interested parties, agen-

— ee ee

7a

cy consideration of those comments, and ultimate promul-

gation of regulations. The regulations, to some extent,

must be anticipatory because, although improvements in

the techniques of pollutant control can be reasonably ex-

pected, we do not know what those improvements will be.

The immediate problem is the scope of judicial review.

Much has been written on this subject in the decisions

bearing on the Act before us. See e. g., Steel Institute, 526

F.2d at 1047 and Meat Institute, 526 F.2d at 452-453. Es-

sentially they rely on and adopt the principles stated in

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.

402, 416, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136, In substance it says

that the function of judicial review is to determine (1) au-

thority of the agency, (2) compliance by the agency with

the prescribed procedures, and (3) any claim that agency

action is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

Ibid. at 415-417, 91 S.Ct. 814.

On legal issues the controlling principles are well de-

fined. Trouble arises in connection with factual issues.

Overton Park says that the Administrative Procedure

Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706, requires ‘‘the reviewing court to en-

gage in a substantial inquiry’’, and a ‘‘probing, in-depth

review.’”’ Ibid. 401 U.S. at 415, 91 S.Ct. [814] at 823. This

is not an adoption of the Universal Camera Corp. v. Nation-

al Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct.

456, 95 L.Ed. 456, test of substantial evidence in the light

of the entire record. It does require consideration and evalu-

ation of the facts. Perhaps agency action which is not

based on substantial evidence is arbitrary and capricious.

Many of the regulations are related to EPA policy and the

presently unknowable technologies of the future for [1029]

pollution control. As was said in Permain Basin Area Rate

Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 790, 88 S.Ct. 1344, 1372, 20 L.Ed.2d

312, ‘‘the breadth and complexity of the Commission’s re-

sponsibilities demand that it be given every reasonable

opportunity to formulate methods of regulation appropri-

8a

ate for the solution of its intensely practical difficulties.’’

Our concern is with a regulatory statute which demands

preventive or curative action. Factual certainty of future

technologies is impossible. We can do no more than con-

sider whether the record facts supporting EPA action are

‘‘adequately adduced and rationally applied.’’ Note, Judi-

cial Review of the Facts in informal Rulemaking, 84 Yale

L.J. 1750, 1764.

The grounds upon which the ageney acted must be clearly

disclosed in, and sustained by, the record. The agency

must make plain its course of inquiry, its analysis, and

its reasoning. See duPont II, at p. 1026 and eases there

cited. After the fact rationalization by counsel in brief

and arguinent does not cure noncompliance by the agency

with the stated principles. Ibid. and Hooker Chemicals, at

pp. 633-634. The court may not substitute its judgment for

that of the agency. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416, 91 S.Ct.

814. If the agency’s construction of the controlling statute

is ‘sufficiently reasonable’’, it should be accepted by the

reviewing court. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-

cil, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 75, 95 S.Ct. 1470, 43 L.Ed.2d 731.

ITI.

Vauipitry AND Errect or Recu.ations

The Refineries say that EPA may not impose effluent

limitations on existing sources by regulation. Their posi-

tion is that effluent limitations on existing sources may be

imposed only by the permit issuer. The predicate for the

argument is that §304(b) specifically provides that EPA

shall publish ‘‘regulations, providing guidelines for efflu-

ent limitations says nothing about regulations.’’

The problem has been considered by several circuits.

The Eighth Circuit has held, CPC, 515 F.2d at 1037, that

PA may not promulgate regulations establishing effluent

limitations for existing sources. All other cireuits con-

9a

sidering the problem have held to the contrary. See Second

Cireuit, Hooker Chemicals, at p. 628; Third Cireuit, Steel

Institute, 526 F.2d at 1040-1042; Fourth Cireuit, duPont II,

at pp. 1025-32; Seventh Circuit, Meat Institute, 526 F.2d

at 449-452; and D.C. Cireuit, Frozen Food Institute, at pp.

124-32.

All of the above cases, except duPont II, considered the

problem in connection with determination of jurisdiction

of the court of appeals. Section 509(b), which provides for

judicial review of agency action, does not include action

taken under § 304. Except for CPC, the courts rejected the

argument that 4301 does not authorize the promulgation

of effluent limitations by regulation and, hence, § 509(b)

does not permit review in the court of appeals. Our situa-

tion is the same as that presented in duPont IT. Jurisdic-

tion had been decided and, in the exercise of that jurisdic-

tion, we must determine the authority of EPA to promul-

gate the regulations.

The Administrator did not meet the one-year require-

ment for the publishing of regulations ‘‘providing guide-

lines for effluent limitations.’’ § 304(b). The enormity of

the task precluded compliance. After the imposition of a

court mandated timetable, NRDC, 510 F.2d at 710-714, he

published ‘‘effluent limitations guidelines’’, and in so doing

said that the action was taken under both § 301 and § 304,

along with other sections. APT I, 526 F.2d at 1345. Nothing

in the Act forbids the combination of § 301 effluent limita-

tions with § 304 guidelines.

At the moment our concern is with authority to promul-

gate, Section 501(a) authorizes the Administrator ‘‘to pre-

scribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out his

functions under this Act.’’ His functions are ‘‘to adminis-

ter this Aect.’’ §101(d). The attainment of the congres-

sional intent to protect and preserve water purity comes

through control of pollutant discharge. Section 301(e) refers

to the establishment of effluent limitations but does [1030]

10a

not say who does the establishing. Section 502(11) defines

effluent limitations as ‘‘any restriction established by a

State or the Administrator.’’ Subsections 402(a)(1) and

(b)(1) say that permits shall comply with §¢ 301, 306, and

other sections not including § 304.

The permit issuer can be either EPA or a conforming

state. The division of authority does not determine the

authority of EPA to promulgate the regulations. The effect

of the regulations presents a separate question. For the

reasons stated in duPont II, at 1025-32, the promulga-

tion of the limitations was a reasonable exercise of a con-

gressionally delegated power. The action is reasonable and

we accept it.

IV.

EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS

The basic dispute between the Refineries and EPA is

whether the regulations are 4301 effluent limitations or

§ 304 guidelines. EPA contends that the regulations are

uniformly applicable throughout the nation and, with some

exceptions, must be mechanically cranked into each permit

by the issuer. The Refineries insist that the regulations are

guidelines for the information and consideration of, but

not binding on, the permit issuer. In essence, the conflict

concerns national uniformity versus state power and re-

sponsibility.

The Act is ambivalent, Section 101(a) refers to the ‘‘in-

tegrity of the Nation’s waters,’’ ‘‘the national goal,’’ and

‘“‘the national policy.’’ Section 101(b) declares the policy

of Congress ‘‘to recognize, preserve, and protect the pri- -

mary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, re-

duce, and eliminate pollution.’’ The legislative history

confuses, rather than clarifies, the issue.

In Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79, 84, 60 S.Ct. 34,

36, 84 L.Ed. 93, the Court said that: the ‘‘absorption of

lla

state authority is a delicate exercise of legislative policy

in achieving a wise accommodation between the needs of

central control and the lively maintenance of local institu- .

tions.’’ (Footnote omitted). The definition of the roles of

each government is essentially a matter for Congress, not

for the courts.

The Act is ineffective unless somebody fixes effluent

limitations. The Administrator has done so and we have

upheld his authority. If the limitations must be applied

automatically to each permit application, the Act destroys

rather than preserves the rights of the states which

§101(b) says that Congress protects. If each state may

go its own way, the national policy declared by § 101(a)

is inhibited. Some accommodation is necessary.

We can do no more than the Fourth Circuit did in du-

Pont IT, It said that the EPA limitations are presumptively

applicable and controlling unless rebutted by a permit ap-

plicant. At 1028. The burden is thus placed on an applicant

to convince the permit issuer that the general limitations

do not apply to his particular situation. As said by the

Fourth Circuit, Ibid. at 1028, ‘‘The balance of general

rule and narrow exceptions assures all possible uniformity

without sacrifice of the flexibility needed to adjust for

disparate plants in dissimilar circumstances.’

The Refineries insist that the permit issuer must con-

sider the factors stated in § 304(b)(1)(B) for the 1977 step

and in (b)(2)(B) for the 1983 step and exercise his dis-

cretion in applying them. We are concerned with rule-

making, not with adjudication. Our holding is that the

Administrator had authority to promulgate the limitations

for existing sources and that the effect of the regulations

so promulgated is not contrary to the Act. In partieular

instances, modification or variation may be necessary. If

that problem arises, the issues may be determined by judi-

cial review on the basis of actual facts under § 509(b)

(1)(F).

12a

V.

SrncLe NuMBERS

The regulations impose effluent limitations in terms of

single numbers rather than in a range of numbers. The

Refineries point out that § 304(b) requires EPA to publish

‘‘regulations, providing guidelines for effluent limitations.”’

The use of [1031] “guidelines’’ is said to intend a range,

not a fixed number.

The Refineries emphasize the use of the word ‘‘amounts’”’

in the §304(b)(1)(A) provision that the regulations shall

‘identify, in terms of amounts of constituents and chemi-

eal, physical, and biological characteristics of pollutants,

the degree of effluent reduction attainable * * *.’’

‘‘Amounts’’ refers to pollutants. When ‘‘amounts’’ are

determined, EPA then fixes the ‘‘degree’’ of effluent re-

duction attainable. ‘‘Degree’’ may be either a ‘‘range’’

or a single number.

The imprecise wording of § 304(b)(1)(A) and (B) makes

difficult the ascertainment of congressional intent, Congress

does not use the word ‘‘range’’ or any equivalent. The

Senate Committee Report, Leg.Hist. 1468, says that Con-

gress ‘‘expects’’ EPA ‘‘to define a range of discharge

levels,”’ and again, Ibid. that EPA ‘‘should establish the

range of best practicable levels.’’ In the face of the statu-

tory language, the statements in the Senate Report are

mystifying.

Three circuits have considered the problem. In the

Steel Institute case, 526 F.2d 1027, the Third Cireuit

treated the effluent limitations as establishing a ceiling,

fixing the maximum permissible amount of pollutant dis-

charge. Ibid. at 1044-1045. EPA determines the base by

consideration of ‘‘the numerous differences in processes

and capabilities of point sources.’’ (Footnote omitted).

Ibid. at 1045. The base is the minimum degree of effluent

control permissible and the ceiling is the maximum dis-

charge permissible. Ibid. Thus the § 304 ‘‘guidelines are

13a

intended to provide precise guidance to the permit-issuing

authorities in establishing a permissible level of discharge

that is more stringent than the ceiling.’’ Ibid. Taken literal-

ly, the Third Circuit opinion may mean that in issuing a

permit a state may not exercise the option inherent in

§ 510 of adopting a limitation more stringent than the base

which EPA has fixed.

The Second Cireuit rejected the argument that the regu-

lations are invalid because EPA failed to establish per-

missible ranges of discharges and instead promulgated

single number maximum discharge levels. The court said,

at p. 630:

‘‘'Wle * * * believe that whenever Congress spoke

of ‘ranges’ in the debates over the Act, it meant only

the spectrum comprised of varying discharge levels

on a subeategorical, rather than individual, basis. (cita-

tion omitted) Although variances are conceivable at

the permit-granting stage (citation omitted) Congress

intended that the regulations establish a single dis-

charge level for a given subcategory. This is implicit

in the Congressional choice of the superlative form

in the statutory language requiring achievement of the

degree of effluent reduction attainable by application

of ‘best’ technology.’’

In duPont II, the Fourth Cireuit disagreed with the

Third. In so doing, it pointed out, at p. 1029, that noth-

ing in the Act prohibits EPA from using single num-

bers in establishing effluent limitations. The use of a single

number permits any discharge from zero up to the allowed

amount. If a range is required, a zero discharge provision

violates the Act which has as its objective the elimination

of all pollutant discharges by 1985. Section 101(a)(1). The

court said ‘*The expertise of the Administrator is per-

suasive as to whether the limitations be fixed in single

numbers or ranges. ’’ Ibid. at 1028. It upheld the use of

l4a

single numbers in the inorganic chemicals subcategories

which were before it.

We agree with the Second and Fourth Circuits, The

promulgation of the regulations was a form of rule-making.

Rules are necessarily general. The parties confront us with

hypothetical situations. We do not know how the rules

will work out in practice. We reject the EPA claim that

the regulations must be mechanically cranked into every

permit which may be issued. We also reject the claim of

the Refineries that the permit issuer has unbridled dis-

cretion in the application of the regulations to any permit

application. The correct answer lies somewhere between

these extremes. The intent of Congress was to clean up

the Nation’s waters. This cannot be done overnight. On

the [1032] road to attainment of the no discharge objective

some flexibility is needed. The extent of that flexibility may

be determined by Congress through precise amendments to

the Act or by the courts in the decision of cases presenting

facts rather than hypotheses. For the purpose of general-

rulemaking, we accept the use of single numbers in the

effluent limitations under consideration.

VI.

VARIANCE

The Refineries attack the 1977 step variance provisions

found at 40 C.F.R. §§ 419.12, 419.22, 419.32, 419.42, and

419.52. These provisions are substantially identical to simi-

lar provisions found in each of the categories and sub-

categories covered by EPA regulations under the Act. For

the 1983 step the statute provides for variances. See § 301

(c). It does not do so for the 1977 step.

Section 419.12 is typical of the 1977 variance provisions

with which we are concerned. It says in its first sentence

that EPA in establishing limitations took into consider-

ation specified factors, including ‘‘age and size of plant,

lda

raw materials, * * * treatment technology available, energy

requirements and costs.’’ The second sentence recognizes

the possibility that ‘‘data which would affect these limita-

tions have not been available’ and that as a result, the

limitations should be adjusted for certain plants in the

industry. The third sentence says that a discharger may

submit evidence:

‘‘ftjhat factors relating to the equipment or facilities

involved, the process applied, or other such factors

related to such discharger are fundamentally different

from the factors considered in the establishment of

the guidelines.”’

The fourth sentence says that the permit issuer ‘‘will

make a written finding that such factors are or are not

fundamentally different.’’

Again we have an area of uncertainty. There is not

only a conflict between circuits but also a conflict within

one circuit. In NRDC v. EPA, the Second Circuit held, at

p. 647, that the promulgation of the variance clauses for

the 1977 step is ‘‘a valid exercise of the EPA’s rule-

making authority pursuant to §501(a).’’ The court also

said, Ibid. that the interpretation of the variance clauses

‘*should await the disclosure and development of concrete

factual controversies involving a single point source and

its permit.”’

In the Steel Institute case the Third Cireuit said, 526

F.2d at 1046:

‘*We also note that the variance procedure provides

for less flexibility than we believe Congress contem-

plated, since it permits deviations from otherwise rigid

and unitary limitations only where the circumstances

of the particular plant are ‘fundamentally different’

than those from which the effluent limitation was de-

rived.’’

l6a

The Third Circuit perhaps overlooked the fact that Con-

gress did not provide any variance procedure for the 1977

step.

In duPont II the Fourth Circuit declined to determine

the validity of the variance provisions, saying that the

administration of those provisions is presently speculative

and will arise when a claim for a variance is made in a

permit application.

In Appalachian Power Company v. Train, the Fourth

Circuit, with one judge dissenting, set aside the 1977 vari-

ance provisions applicable to a subcategory of the Steam

Electric Power Generating Point Source Category, 40

C.F.R. § 423.12(a). It interpreted the clause to mean that

‘fonly technical and engineering factors, exclusive of cost,

may be considered in granting or denying a variance.’’

At —— (footnote omitted). In so doing the court relied

on a memorandum from the EPA Assistant Administrator

for Enforcement and General Counsel to all regional ad-

ministrators. The court said that this administrative in-

terpretation distinguished the Appalachian Power case

from duPont TI,

The court further held that the 1977 limitations ‘‘ were

not intended to be applied [1033] anv less flexibily’’ than

the 1983 limitations. Ihid. p. 1028. In so acting the court did

not have before it any specific claim, grant, or denial of

a variance. It was concerned with a cena rule which

was considered on a hypothetical basis and had no regard

for an existing and specific fact situation.

The Refineries do not make clear their reasons for at-

tacking the regulatory variance regulations for the 1977

step. The statute says nothing about variances for that

step. We agree with the Second Circuit that the 1977 vari-

ance provisions are a valid exercise of EPA’s rule-making

authority under § 501(a). We also agree with duPont II

that variances are appropriate to the regulatory process

17a

at p. 1028, and that the 1977 BPT technology may

not be construed more stringently than the 1983 BAT

technology. We reject the Fourth Circuit holding that the

1977 variance provisions are ‘‘unduly restrictive’ and

hence void. Appalachian Power, at p. ——. Such a holding

forgets that Congress did not provide for any 1977

variance.

Without record support, the Refineries assert that no

variance has been granted. Even if true, the statement

proves nothing. Any permit applicant dissatisfied with

action on a variance claim may petition for review under

§ 509(b)(1)(F). From the standpoint of general rule-mak-

ing, the regulatory variance provisions for the 1977 phase

are reasonable. Their interpretation and application must

await action on a variance claim asserting specific facts.

We will not speculate what the result may be.

Vil.

1977 Step

(1) In-Plant Process Changes.

Important to determination of effluent limitations are

flow rates and concentration of discharge components. In

arriving at its regulations KPA considered in-plant flow

modifications. Refineries argue that the BPT (1977 step)

technologies can only apply to end-of-pipe treatment sys-

tems and that EPA canret consider and require in-plant

process changes.

The Act uses different language in its provisions for

the 1977 and 1983 steps. In § 304(b)(1)(A) the reference is

to ‘‘control technology’’ whereas in § 304(b)(2)(A) the

reference is to ‘‘control measures and practices’’ including

process innovations. Both sections specify ‘‘the process

employed’’ as one of the factors to be taken into consider-

ation. §§ 304(b(1)(B) and (b)(2)(B).

18a

Two circuits have wrestled with the problem. In duPont

II, at pp. 1030-31 the Fourth Circuit noted the statutory

language and rejected the argument that for the 1977 step

IXPA was confined to end-of-pipe treatment systems. In

FMC, at p. 981, the Fourth Circuit said that EPA was to

rely ‘‘principally’’ on end-of-pipe technology and that ‘‘In-

process control measures may be required, however, if

they are considered normal practice within the industry.’’

Ibid. (footnote omitted). In Hooker Chemicals, the Second

Circuit held, June 14, 1976, memo modifying original

opinion, that ‘‘no ‘in process’ changes can be mandated

for 1977 unless they may be considered normal practices

within the industry.’’ At p. 637.

Refineries make much of the statement in the House

Report, Leg.Hist. 788, that ‘‘control technology * * * means

the treatment facilities at the end of a manufacturing * * *

process rather than * * * within the manufacturing process

itself.’’ We decline to accept this statement of one chamber

of Congress. If both chambers had agreed, the language

of the statute would have been changed. Indeed, the Re-

fineries concede, see reply brief, p. 28 n. 28, and R. 7326,

that pre-treatment processes may be required if they are

normal practice within the industry.

EPA’s designation of in-plant technology for the 1977

step was based on ‘‘control practices widely used within

the petroleum refining industry.’’ Dev.Doe, 165 and R. 6065.

This conclusion is supported by record evidence. Ibid. at

70, 95 and R. 5970, 5995. We find no record support for

the claim that more than half of the Nation’s refineries

will have to make substantial and widespread internal recon-

struction to comply with the regulations. EPA has relied

[1034] principally on end-of-pipe technology in its regula-

tions for the 1977 step. Whatever in-plant modifications

may be necessary are reasonably within normal industry

practice. EPA action is within the statutory requirements.

19a

(2) Exemplary Plants.

The statutory mandate for 1977 is ‘‘best practicable con-

trol technology currently available.’’ § 301(b)(1)(A). Re-

fineries say that EPA must look to the average of the

industry and EPA says that it may look to the average of

the best technology used in the industry.

With varying language the circuits agree that EPA may

base its regulations on the results from the plants using

the best technology. See Hooker Chemicals, at p. 632; Steel

Institute, 526 F.2d at 1057, duPont II, at p. 1031; Meat

Institute, 526 F.2d at 453; and Frozen Food Institute, at

p. 132. We agree. There is no reason for us to enlarge

what has been said in the cited decisions. It is con-

ceded that at least 12 of the refineries are already in com-

pliance with the 1977 regulations. See petitioners Tech.

Brief 37, n. 23, and Reply Brief 24, n. 22. The EPA action

was proper.

(3) Granular Media Filtration.

Refineries contest the 1977 limitations for Total Sus-

pended Solids (TSS) and Oil and Grease (O&G) on the

basis that EPA has required granular media filtration and

that such technology is neither practicable nor currently

available.

Granular Media Filtration is only one of the control

practices widely and currently used within the petroleum

refining industry. Dev.Doec. 165 and 6065. The regulations

do not require the use of granular media filtration. Any

one of a number of technologies or combination of tech-

nologies may be used. Ibid.

Refineries do not contest that many plants are already

meeting the O&G limitations. EPA based its TSS limita-

tions on three exemplary plants. These met the TSS limita-

tions during 90%, 80%, and 70% of the monthly samples

during 1973 and 1974. During its reconsideration of the

20a

regulations, EPA concluded that any failures to meet the

limitations were due to improperly operated filters or use

of filters beyond design capacity.

Refineries objections to EPA’s use of data obtained after

promulgation is not well taken. The new data was not the

basis for the regulations. It serves to establish that the

I:PA technologies are both practicable and currently avail-

able. After promulgation, events indicating the truth or

falsity of agency predictions should not be ignored. Amoco

Oil Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 163 U.S.App.

D.C, 162, 501 F.2d 722, 729 n. 10. This is not a case like

duPont II where new, non-record evidence was rejected

as the sole basis for agency action, at pp. 1036-39. In the

instant case the record made before promulgation sustains

the regulations. The new data is pertinent to show the va-

lidity of the EPA actions. The 1977 TSS and O&G limita-

tions are upheld.

(4) Net or Gross Limitations.

Net limitations apply only to the excess of pollutants

discharged over the pollutants, if any, in the intake water.

(iross limitations apply to the total amount of pollutants

discharged regardless of pollutants in the intake water.

Refineries say that the limitations must be met.

In Steel Institute, the Third Circuit recognized the prob-

lem and said that ‘‘an adjustment would seem required by

cue process’’ because otherwise a plant would be penalized

‘*hecause of circumstances beyond its control.’’ 526 F.2d

at 1056. EPA has agreed that net limitations are allowable

where a source discharges to the same body of water from

which it draws its water. In 1975 EPA added a new regu-

lation, § 125.28, to its general regulations applicable to the

administration of the Act. 40 Fed.Reg. 29850. This new

regulation allows adjustment of the limitations ‘‘to reflect

credit for pollutants in the applicant’s water supply if the

2la

source of the applicant’s water supply is the same body

of water into which the [1035] discharge is made’’, if cer-

tain requirements are met. § 125.28(a).

EPA concedes that its concentrations are based on gross

limitations. The Refineries say that the concession requires

a remand. We do not agree. Section 125.28(a)(2) allows

a permit applicant to demonstrate that pollutants in the

intake water will not be removed by treatment systems

designed to reduce process wastewater pollutants to the

levels required by the applicable limitations. In an appro-

priate situation, gross will be reduced to net and a plant

will not be penalized for something which it cannot prevent.

See discussion in Appaachian Power, pp. - . From

the standpoint of general rule-making the amendment is

satisfactory. Its application may be determined in a con-

troversy arising out of specific facts.

(5) Storm Water Runoff.

During periods of rainfall, a refinery must treat not only

wastewater flow from the refinery but also storm water

runoff. The pertinent regulations, 40 C.F.R. §§ 419.12(¢) (1)

and 419.15(¢)(1) provide:

‘‘The allocation allowed for storm runoff flow *

shall be based solely on that storm flow (process area

runoff) which is treated in the main treatment system.

All additional storm runoff (from tank fields and non-

process areas), that has been segregated from the

main waste stream for discharge, shall not exceed * * *

[stated limitations].’’

These regulations are made applicable to all subparts

in Part 419.

EPA furnishes no record reference to support this regu-

lation. It relies on after-the-fact rationalization in its brief

but such rationalization is no substitute for agency action

not sustained by the record. duPont II, at pp. 1036,

22a

1037, 1038. EPA says that “ ‘process area runoff’”’ is in-

tended to encompass all ‘‘process waste water’ pollutants

as defined in 40 C.F.R. § 401.11(q).’’ EPA Br. at 110. That

regulation has general applicability to Subchapter N which

includes the regulations for the Petroleum Refining In-

dustry. In duPont II, at pp. 1032-33, the Fourth Circuit

noted that PA was preparing an amendment to § 401.11(q)

and set that regulation aside. We are not told what, if

anything, EPA has done to rewrite the regulation.

The statement in the EPA brief of how the storm runoff

regulation is intended to work is interesting but unsatis-

factory. We have no definition of the term ‘‘storm runoff.’’

The KPA brief says, p. 111, that ‘‘all storm runoff is to

he collected and monitored.’’? Taken literally this means

that the refineries will have to collect diffused surface run-

off in channels and discharge it through a discrete source.

:

There is no statutory or record support for such re-

quirement.

Sections 419.12(¢)(1), 419.15(¢)(1), and subsequent sec-

tions based thereon are set aside and remanded for re-

consideration.

(6) Variability Factors.

Even in the best treatment systems, changes occur in

ability to treat wastes. Sixteen factors which cause vari-

ability are listed in 40 Fed.Reg. 21941. EPA defines, B.R.

at 113, the daily variability factor ‘‘as the 99th percentile

probability of oceurrence value divided by the mean.’’ The

result is ‘‘the multiplier by which the long-term achievable

values must be multiplied in order to derive the value not

permitted to be exceeded.’’ Ibid. For the 30 day variability

factor the 98th percentile is used. The application of the

formula is shown at § 419.42(b) (3).

The briefs on variability disclose much rhetoric and a

turmoil of numbers. We disregard the first and struggle

with the second. Refineries claim that the use of the 99

23a

and 98 percentiles is improper. They attack EPA’s statis-

tical methodology. They say that EPA used ‘‘an insufficient

and geographically biased data base’’, API Tech. Br. at

94, and disregarded ‘‘differences among refinery subcate-

gories.’’ Ibid. at 99.

Statistical methodology is for the experts. The EPA state-

ment of its procedures and of the bases therefor found at 40

Fed.Reg. [1036] 21941-21942 convinces us that the EPA

variability factors have susbtantial record support. In pro-

mulgating the final regulations EPA analyzed data from

10 refineries with a geographical distribution which in-

eluded Virginia, Texas and California. On. petition for

reconsideration EPA rechecked the variability data from

seven refineries some of which are located in cold climates,

e.g., the Amoco refinery in Mandan, North Dakota, With

regard to the differences among the five subcategories, the

refineries furnish us with no record data showing that vari-

ability changes from one subcategory to another.

Refineries urge that ‘‘exeursions’”’ should be permitted.

An ‘‘exeursion’’ is a period when the required concentra-

tions may be exceeded. Because EPA selected the 99th

percentile, the refineries say that they must be afforded

at least four days a year, 1% of 365, when they may make

excess discharges without fear of penalty. The reasoning

does not impress us. There is always a theoretical chance

that a plant achieving the limitations on a long-term basis

will exceed the monthly and daily limits. In FMC, the

Fourth Cireuit said that: ‘‘Plant owners should not be

subjected to sanctions when they are operating a proper

treatment facility.’’ 539 at p. 986. The court went on to

say that ‘‘appropriate exeursion provisions’’ should be

incorporated in the regulations. [bid.

The Fourth Cireuit was considering a factual situation

different from that before us. On the present record we

are unconvinced that the refineries should be granted any

specific number of days during a year when they may make

24a

excess discharges. The temptation to store pollutants for

future discharge would be enticing. The permissible maxi-

mums for any one day are about twice the average daily

values for a month. See tables found in § 419.12(a) and

(b). The spread permits considerable flexibility.

The whole problem of variability factors presents a prac-

tical effort to accommodate for variations in plant opera-

tions. As technology for control of pollutant discharges

improves, the variations should lessen. The choice of statis-

tical methods lies within the sound diseretion of EPA.

IEPA has acted properly and reasonably in establishing

the variability factors before us,

(7) Petrochemical Plants.

EPA divided the petroleum refining industry into five

subeategories. Two of these, Subparts C and K, relate to

refineries which engage in petrochemical operations. Re-

fineries argue that the stringent regulations imposed on

Subparts C and FE place the plants subject thereto at a

competitive disadvantage with the organic chemicals in-

dustry and with refineries which do not conduct petro-

chemical operations. The challenge based on the organic

chemical industry has a hollow ring. The Fourth Circuit

has set aside the effluent limitations applicable to the

organic chemical industry. See Union Carbide Corp. v.

Train, 4 Cir., Nos. 74-1459 ete., order of February 10, 1976.

We do not know what will be the regulations applicable to

that industry.

Refineries’ reliance on Industrial Union Department,

AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 162 U.S.App.D.C, 331, 499 F.2d 467,

and Portland Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus, 158 U.S.

App.D.C. 308, 486 F.2d 375, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921, 94

S.Ct. 2628, 41 L.d.2d 226, is misplaced. Industrial Union

was involved with the Occupational Safety and Health Act.

With reference to industrial standards the court said, 499

F.2d at 480:

25a

‘‘Separate standards for different industries would

not appear to create opportunities for employers in

one industry to challenge their standards on the

grounds that standards for another industry were less

demanding.’’

Portland Cement was concerned with the Clean Air Act.

The court said, 486 F.2d at 389, that ‘‘the Administrator is

not required to present affirmative justifications for differ-

ent standards in different industries.”’

We find nothing in the Act or its legislative history

which requires EPA to consider the competitive effect of

its regulations. EPA did consider the comments relative

to [1037] petrochemical operations, 40 Fed.Reg. 21948-

21949, and said:

‘*Since the regulations are based upon actual per-

formance by refineries in each subcategory, it would be

absurd to attempt to modify them on the basis of

regulations designed for other industries.”’

In this attack on the regulations pertaining to petro-

chemical operations, the refineries do not contest the meth-

odology, the data base, or the achieveability of the limi-

tations for the two subcategories in question. EPA has

used the same general approach in setting the limitations

for all the categories in the petroleum industry. The record

sustains the pertinent EPA action. The regulations appli-

eable to petrochemical operations, 40 C.F.R. §§ 419.32 and

419.52 are upheld.

(8) Costs.

Section 304(b)(1)(B) requires that the FPA regulations

for the 1977 step shall specify BPT factors including ‘‘con-

sideration of the total cost of application of technology in

relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved

26a

from such spplication.’’ Refineries say that EPA did not

comply with this statutory requirement.

The Refineries’ costs of compliance with the 1977 regu-

lations will be substantial and will be reflected in increased

passed-on-costs to the consuming public. The need for, and

attainment of, societal benefits are essentially issues for

congressional determination. Congress has delegated to

EPA the task of giving ‘‘consideration’’ to ‘‘total cost’’ in

relation to ‘‘effluent reduction benefits.’’ The judicial re-

sponsibility is to determine whether EPA has complied

with the mandate.

The Senate committee recognized that ‘‘there must be a

reasonable relationship between costs and benefits if there

is to be an effective and workable program.’’ Leg.Hist.

1465. The same Committee said that ‘‘no mathematical bal-

ance can be achieved in considering relative costs and

benefits nor would any precise formula be desirable.’’ Ibid.

at 1466.

In duPont II the Fourth Cireuit rejected the argument

that benefits ‘‘must be quantified in monetary terms’’, and

said: ‘‘Nothing in the Act requires this action.’’ At p. 1030.

We agree. The judicial problem is whether EPA adequately

considered costs and benefits.

EPA estimated the capital investment costs to be 1,112

million dollars for existing sources. The Refineries esti-

mate, which includes ‘‘ Expansions of Existing Refineries’”’

is 1,558 million dollars. The annual costs for existing refin-

eries are estimated to be 449 million dollars. The Refineries’

estimate, which also includes expansion costs, is 544 milion

dollars. In the area of capital costs, the Refineries put the

expansion costs at 490 million dollars. Subtraction of this

amount from the Refineries’ total of 1,558 million produces

1,068 million, a figure slightly below that of EPA.

Refineries object that EPA used stale cost figures. Cost

inereases are inherent during a period of inflation. EPA

Zia

points out that the important consideration is not the levet

of abatement costs but rather the resulting impact on the

industry. EPA’s ‘‘Eeconomie Analysis of Proposed. Efflu-

ent Guidelines, Petroleum Refining Industry,’’ R. 5788-

5859, considers the problem both from the standpoint of

world markets and of United States markets. In doing so

EPA discusses prices, profitability, production effects, em-

ployment effects, industry growth, and balance of trade.

Although the dollar amount of the abatement costs may

be high, one commentator stated that the capital require-

ments of the regulations amount to 3.3% of the total capital

requirements of the industry. R. 5545.

Refineries urge that EPA must make a cost-benefit analy-

sis. EPA says that its cost-effectiveness analysis satisfies

the statute. Labels are neither important nor determinative.

EPA said that costs depend ‘‘essentially’’ on waste water

flow rate and prepared a table comparing costs with flow

rates. EPA computed costs for several combinations of

refinery size, waste water discharge rate, and extrapolated

costs of in-plant modifications to reduce [1038] waste water

flow. The selection of the point of diminishing returns is for

agency determination. The technical objections of the

Refineries do not impress us.

The record shows that the effluent limitations imposed by

the regulations will reduce the poliutants discharged into

the Nation’s waters. The value of the resulting benefits

is not capable of present-day determination. We are con-

vinced that EPA made a serious, careful, and compre-

hensive study of the costs which compliance will impose on

the industry. If Congress believes that the cost is too high,

it can amend the Act. All we say is that EPA has complied

with the statutory mandate.

28a

Vill.

1983 STEP

For the 1983 BAT technology EPA proposed an end-

of-pipe treatment system ‘‘based on the addition of acti-

vated carbon adsorption in fixed bed columns, to the treat-

ment system’’ proposed as 1977 BPT technology. Dev.Doc.

174, R. 6074. In so doing EPA noted that its limitations

were ‘‘based upon pilot plant data’’ and that revision may

be required ‘‘as actual performance data becomes avail-

able.’’ Ibid. The Refineries contend that the carbon adsorp-

tion technology is not available or economically achievable.

We agree.

EPA concedes in its brief, p. 138, that:

‘‘As for carbon adsorption, the Agency readily

acknowledges that it needs further development before

it will show the high degree of effectiveness in large-

scale operation that it has already shown in pilot plant

demonstrations.’’

In its response to comments that carbon adsorption had

had not been demonstrated as a proper base for 1983 limi-

tations, EPA relied on named technical articles and on

‘The BP, Mareus Hook, 1974, pilot plant study of Filtra-

tion and Activated Carbon.’’ 40 Fed. Reg. 21948-21949,

R. 17614. EPA concedes, brief p. 143, that ‘‘the BP Marcus

Hook system does not meet the BAT limitations.”’

EPA now says that the BP data was relied on only for

O&G and that these limitations have been shown achievable

by later data from a non-record refinery not using carbon

adsorption. Also EPA now claims that the TSS limitations

are based on ‘‘municipal wastewater experience.’’ Brief at

143. The record reference cited in the brief is an unidenti-

fied, illegible, handwritten sheet which means nothing to us.

29a

Examination of EPA’s record citations and appraisal

of its shifting and inconsistent rationales make it difficult

for us to discern upon what, if any, basis EPA promul-

gated the 1983 limitations. The failure of the BP plant to

achieve the limitations when placed in full-scale operation

may not be ignored. We can ascertain no reasonable basis

for the 1983 limitations. See FMC, at pp. 981, n. 16; cf.

Tanners’ Council, at p. 1196. We reject the 1983 regula-

tions because of their reliance on the carbon adsorption

technology. In the circumstances there is no need to con-

sider the other attacks of the Refineries on those regula-

tions. The questions raised, particularly those relating to

costs, should be considered by EPA on remand.

The 1983 regulations, 40 C.F.R. §§ 419.13, 419.23, 419.33,

419.43, and 419.53, are set aside.

IX.

New Sources

EPA established standards fixing the BADT technology

for new sources by adding the 1983 flow limitations to the

control technology applicable to the 1977 BPT step. The

attack of the Refineries has three bases, (1) invalidity of

the 1977 limitations, (2) unattainability of the 1983 limita-

tions by existing sources, and (3) the use of stale cost

figures.

We have upheld the 1977 limitations as supported by

the record. Hence, the fact that the new source limitations

are derivative is no ground for attack. Cf. Tanners’ Coun-

cil, at 1195. Because of our disposition of the 1983 limita-

tions, we did not reach the issue of whether the flow

reductions are attainable. Even if the 1983 flow reductions

are unattainable by existing refineries, it does not follow

that new plants could not be designed so as to incorporate

[1039] the means of attaining the lower flow rates. There is

no record support for the claim that the flow rates for new

30a

sources are unattainable. The matter of costs has been

discussed in connection with the 1977 step, see Part VII(8)

of this opinion, and need not. be considered further. The

regulations pertaining to new source standards, 40 C.F.R.

§§ 419.15, 419.25, 419.35, 419.45, and 419.55 are upheld.

X.

DISPOSITION

The following regulations, all contained in 40 C.F.R., are

severally set aside and remanded for reconsideration:

Storm water runoff (§§ 419.12(¢)(1) and 419.15(¢)(1)) and

with regard to storm water runoff only: §§ 419.22(c)(1),

419.25(e)(1), 419.32(e)(1), 419.35(¢e)(1), 419.42(e)(1),

419.45(e)(1), 419.52(e)(1), and 419.55(c)(1) and 1983 step

(§§ 419.13, 419.23, 419.33, 419.43, and 419.53).

* a * a $ % * * * *

3la

APPENDIX B

STATUTES INVOLVED

The pertinent provisions of the Federal Water Pollution

Control Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq., are as

follows:

§ 1251. Congressional declaration of goals and policy [Act § 101]

(a) The objective of this chapter is to restore and main-

tain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the

Nation’s waters. In order to achieve this objective it is

hereby declared that, consistent with the provisions of this

chapter—

(1) it is the national goal that the discharge of

pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by

1985;

(2) it is the national goal that wherever attainable,

an interim goal of water quality which provides for

the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and

wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the

water te achieved by July 1, 1983;

(3) it is the national policy that the discharge of

toxic polluiants in toxic amounts be prohibited;

(4) it is the national policy that Federal financial

assistance be provided to construct publicly owned

waste treatment works;

(5) it is the national policy that areawide waste

treatment management planning processes be devel-

oped and implemented to assure adequate control of

sources of pollutants in each State; and

(6) it is the national policy that a major research

and demonstration effort be made to develop technol-

ogy necessary to eliminate the discharge of pollutants

into the navigable waters, waters of the contiguous

zone, and the oceans.

32a

(b) It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, pre-

serve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights

of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to

plan the development and use (including restoration, pres-

ervation, and enhancement) of land and water resources,

and to consult with the Ac#iinistrator in the exercise of

his authority under this chapter. It is further the policy

of the Congress to support and aid research relating to

the prevention, reduction, and elimination of pollution, and

to provide Federal technical services and financial aid to

State and interstate agencies and municipalities in con-

nection with the prevention, reduction, and elimination of

pollution.

(c) It is further the policy of Congress that the Presi-

dent, acting through the Secretary of State and such na-

tional and international organizations as he determines

appropriate, shall take such action as may be necessary to

insure that to the fullest extent possible all foreign coun-

tries shall take meaningful action for the prevention, re-

duction, and elimination of pollution in their waters and

in international waters and for the achievement of goals

regarding the elimination of discharge of pollutants and

the improvement of water quality to at least the same

extent as the United States does under its laws.

(d) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chap-

ter, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection

Agency (hereinafter in this chapter called ‘‘ Administra-

tor’’) shall administer this chapter.

(e) Publie participation in the development, revision,

and enforcement of any regulation, standard, effluent limi-

tation, plan, or program established by the Administrator

or any State under this chapter shall be provided for,

encouraged, and assisted by the Administrator and the

States. The Administrator, in cooperation with the States,

shall develop and publish regulations specifying minimum

guidelines for public participation in such processes.

33a

(f) It is the national policy that to the maximum extent

possible the procedures utilized for implementing this chap-

ter shall encourage the drastic minimization of paperwork

and interagency decision procedures, and the best use of

available manpower and funds, so as to prevent needless

duplication and unnecessary delays at all levels of gov-

ernment.

§ 1311. Effluent limitations—Illegality of pollutant discharges

except in compliance with law [Act § 301]

(a) Exeept as in compliance with this section and sec-

tions 1312, 1316, 1317, and 1328, 1542, and 1344 of this

title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall

be unlawful.

Timetable for achievement of objectives

(b) In order to carry out the objective of this chapter

there shall be achieved—

(1)(A) not later than July 1, 1977, effluent limita-

tions for point sources, other than publicly owned

treatment works, (i) which shall require the applica-

tion of the best practicable control technology cur-

rently available as defined by the Administrator pur-

suant to section 1314(b) of this title, or (ii) in the

ease of a discharge into a publicly owned treatment

works which meets the requirements of subparagraph

(B) of this paragraph, which shall require compliance

with any applicable pretreatment requirements and

any requirements under section 1317 of this title; and

(B) for publicly owned treatment works in exist-

ence on July 1, 1977, or approved pursuant to section

1283 of this title prior to June 30, 1974 (for which

construction must be completed within four years of

approval), effluent limitations based upon secondary

treatment as defined by the Administrator pursuant

to section 1314(d) (1) of this title; or,

34a

(C) not later than July 1, 1977, any more stringent

limitation, including those necessary to meet water

quality standards, treatment standards, or schedules

of compliance, established pursuant to any State law

or regulations (under authority preserved by section

1370 of this title) or any other Federal law or regu-

lation, or required to implement any applicable water

quality standard established pursuant to this chapter.

(2)(A) not later than July 1, 1983, effluent limita-

tions for categories and classes of point sources, other

than publicly owned treatment works, which (i) shall

require application of the best available technology

economically achievable for such category or class,

which will result in reasonable further progress toward

the national goal of eliminating the discharge of all

pollutants, as determined in accordance with regula-

tions issued by the Administrator pursuant to section

1314(b)(2) of this title, which such effluent limitations

shall require the elimination of discharges of all pol-

lutants if the Administrator finds, on the basis of

information available to him (including information

developed pursuant to section 1325 of this title), that

such elimination is technologically and economically

achievable for a category or class of point sources as

determined in accordance with regulations issued by

the Administrator pursuant to section 1314(b)(2) of

this title, or (ii) in the case of the introduction of a

pollutant into a publicly owned treatment works which

meets the requirements of subparagraph (B) of this

paragraph, shall require compliance with any appli-

cable pretreatment requirements and any other re-

quirement under section 1317 of this title; and

(B) not later than July 1, 1983, compliance by all

publicly owned treatment works with the requirements

set forth in section 1281(g)(2)(A) of this title,

35a

Modification of timetable

(ec) The Administrator may modify the requirements of

subsection (b)(2)(A) of this section with respect to any

point source for which a permit application is filed after

July 1, 1977, upon a showing by the owner or operator of

such point source satisfactory to the Administrator that

such modified requirements (1) will represent the maxi-

mum use of technology within the economic capability of

the owner or operator; and (2) will result in reasonable

further progress toward the elimination of the discharge

of pollutants.

Review and revision of effluent limitations

(d) Any effluent limitation required by paragraph (2)

of subsection (b) of this section shall be reviewed at least

every five years and, if appropriate, revised pursuant to

the procedure established under such paragraph.

All point discharge source application of effluent limitations

(e) Effluent limitations established pursuant to this

section or section 1312 of this title shall be applied to all

point sources of discharge of pollutants in accordance with

the provisions of this chapter.

Illegality of discharge of radiological, chemical, or biological

warfare agents or high-level radioactive waste

(f) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter

it shall be unlawful to discharge any radiological, chemical,

or biological warfare agent or high-level radioactive waste

into the navigable waters.

§ 1314. Information and guidelines—Criteria development and

publication [Act § 304]

(a)(1) The Administrator, after consultation with ap-

propriate Federal and State agencies and other interested

36a

persons, shall develop and publish, within one year after

October 18, 1972 (and from time to time thereafter revise)

criteria for water quality accurately reflecting the latest

scientific knowledge (A) on the kind and extent of all

identifiable effects on health and welfare including, but not

limited to, plankton, fish, shellfish, wildlife, plant life,

shorelines, beaches, esthetics, and recreation which may be

expected from the presence of pollutants in any body of

water, including ground water; (B) on the concentration

and dispersal of pollutants, or their byproducts, through

biological, physical, and chemical processes; and (C) on

the effects of pollutants on biological community diversity,

productivity, and stability, including information on the

factors affecting rates of eutrophication and rates of or-

ganic and inorganic sedimentation for varying types of

receiving waters,

(2) The Administrator, after consultation with appro-

priate Federal and State agencies and other interested per-

sons, shall develop and publish, within one year after Octo-

ber 18, 1972 (and from time to time thereafter revise)

information (A) on the factors necessary to restore and

maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of

all navigable waters, ground waters, waters of the conti-

guous zone, and the oceans; (B) on the factors necessary

for the protection and propagation of shellfish, fish, and

wildlife for classes and categories of receiving waters and

to allow recreational activities in and on the water; and

(C) on the measurement and classification of water qual-

ity; and (ID) for the purpose of section 1313 of this title,

on and the identification of pollutants suitable for maximum

daily load measurement correlated with the achievement of

water quality objectives.

(3) Such criteria and information and revisions thereof

shall be issued to the States and shall be published in the

Federal Register and otherwise made available to the

publie.

37a

Effluent limitation guidelines

(b) For the purpose of adopting or revising effluent limi-

tations under this chapter the Administrator shall, after

consultation with appropriate Federal and State agencies

and other interested persons, published within one year

of October 18, 1972, regulations, providing guidelines for

effluent limitations and, at least annually thereafter, revise

if appropriate, such regulations. Such regulations shall—

(1) (A) identify, in terms of amounts of constituents

and chemical, physical, and biological characteristics

of pollutants, the degree of effluent reduction attainable

through the application of the best practicable control

technology currently available for classes and cate-

gories of point sources (other than publicly owned

treatment works); and

(B) specify factors to be taken into account in de-

termining the control measures and practices to be

applicable to point sources (other than publicly owned

treatment works) within such categories or classes.

Factors relating to the assessment of best practicable

control technology currently available to comply with

subsection (b) (1) of section 1311 of this title shall

include consideration of the total cost of application of

technology in relation to the effluent reduction benefits

to be achieved from such‘application, and shall also

take into account the age of equipment and facilities

involved, the process employed, the engineering aspects

of the application of various types of control tech-

niques, process changes, non-water quality environ-

mental impact (including energy requirements), and

such other factors as the Administrator deems appro-

priate.

(2) (A) identify, in terms of amounts of constitu-

ents and chemical, physical, and biological character-

istics of pollutants, the degree of effluent reduction

38a

attainable through the application of the best control

measures and practices achievable including treatment

techniques, process and procedure innovations, operat-

ing methods, and other alternatives for classes and

categories of point sources (other than publicly owned

treatment works); and

(B) specify factors to he taken into account in de-

termining the best measures and practices available

to comply with subsection (b) (2) of section 1311 of

this title to be applicable to any point source (other

than publicly owned treatment works) within such

categories or classes. Factors relating to the assess-

ment of best available technology shall take into ac-

count the age of equipment and facilities involved, the

process employed, the engineering aspects of the ap-

plication of various types of control techniques, process

changes, the cost of achieving such effluent reduction,

non-water quality environmental impact (including

energy requirements), and such other factors as the

Administrator deems appropriate; and

(3) Identify control measures and practices avail-

able to eliminate the discharge of pollutants from

categories and classes of point sources, taking into

account the cost of achieving such elimination of the

discharge of pollutants.

Pollution discharge elimination procedures

(c) The Administrator, after consultation, with appro-

priate Federal and State agencies and other interested per-

sons, shall issue to the States and appropriate water pollu-

tion control agencies within 270 days after October 18,

1972 (and from time to time thereafter) information on

the processes, procedures, or operating methods which

result in the elimination or reduction of the discharge of

pollutants to implement standards of performance under

section 1316 of this title. Such information shall include

39a

technical and other data, including costs, as are available

on alternative methods of elimination or reduction of the

discharge of pollutants. Such information, and revisions

thereof, shall be published in the Federal Register and

otherwise shall be made available to the public.

Secondary treatment information: alternative waste treatment

management techniques and systems

(d) (1) The Administrator, after consultation with ap-

propriate Federal and State agencies and other interested

persons, shall publish within sixty days after October 18,

1972 (and from time to time thereafter) information, in

terms of amounts of constituents and chemical, physical,

and biological characteristics of pollutants, on the degree

of effluent reduction attainable through the application of

secondary treatment.

(2) The Administrator, after consultation with appro-

priate Federal and State agencies and other interested

persons, shall publish within nine months after October 18,

1972 (and from time to time thereafter) information on

alternative waste treatment management techniques and

systems available to implement section 1281 of this title.

Identification and evaluation of nonpoint sources of pollution:

processes, procedures, and methods to control pollution

(e) The Administrator, after consultation with appro-

priate Federal and State agencies and other interested

persons, shall issue to appropriate Federal agencies, the

States, water pollution control agencies, and agencies des-

ignated under section 1288 of this title, within one year

after October 18, 1972 (and from time to time thereafter)

information including (1) guidelines for identifying and

evaluating the nature and extent of nonpoint sources of

pollutants, and (2) processes, procedures, and methods to

control pollution resulting from—

40a

(A) agricultural and silvicultural activities, includ-

ing runoff from fields and crop and forest lands;

(B) mining activities, including runoff and siltation

from new, currently operating, and abandoned surface

and underground mines;

(C) all construction activity, including runoff from

the facilities resulting from such construction ;

(D) the disposal of pollutants in wells or in subsur-

face excavations;

(E) salt water intrusion resulting from reductions of

fresh water flow from any cause including extraction

of ground water, irrigation, obstruction, and diversion ;

and

(F) changes in the movement, flow, or circulation of

any navigable waters or ground waters, including

changes caused by the construction of dams, levees,

channels, causeways, or flow diversion facilities.

Such information and revisions thereof shall be published

in the Federal Register and otherwise made available to the

public.

Guidelines for pretreatment of pollutants

(f) (1) For the purpose of assisting States in carrying

out programs under section 1342 of this title, the Adminis-

trator shall publish, within one hundred and twenty days

after October 18, 1972, and review at least annually there-

after and, if appropriate, revise guidelines for pretreat-

ment of pollutants which he determines are not susceptible

to treatment by publicly owned treatment works. Guide-

lines under this subsection shall be established to control

and prevent the discharge into the navigable waters, the

contiguous zone, or the ocean (either directly or through

publicly owned treatment works) of any pollutant which

4la

interferes with, passes through, or otherwise is incompat-

ible with such works.

(2) When publishing guidelines under this subsection,

the Administrator shall designate the category or cate-

gories of treatment works to which the guidelines shall

apply.

Test procedure guidelines

(g) The Administrator shall, within one hundred and

eighty days from October 18, 1972, promulgate guidelines

establishing test procedures for the analysis of pollutants

that shall include the factors which must be provided in

any certification pursuant to section 1341 of this title or

permit application pursuant to section 1342 of this title.

Guidelines for monitoring, reporting. enforcement, funding,

personnel, and manpower

(h) The Administrator shall (1) within sixty days after

October 18, 1972, promulgate guidelines for the purpose of

establishing uniform application forms and other minimum

requirements for the acquisition of information from own-

ers and operators of point-sources of discharge subject to

any State program under section 1342 of this title, and (2)

within sixty days from October 18, 1972, promulgate guide-

lines establishing the minimum procedural and other ele-

ments of any State program under section 1342 of this title

which shall include:

(A) monitoring requirements;,

(B) reporting requirements (including procedures

to make information available t6 the public) ;

(C) enforcement provisions; and —

(D) funding, personnel qualifications, and man-

power requirements (including a requirement that no

board or body which approves permit applications or

42a

portions thereof shall include, as a member, any per-

son who receives, or has during the previous two years

received, a significant portion of his income directly or

indirectly from permit holders or applicants for a

permit.)

Restoration and enhancement of publicly owned

fresh water lakes

(i) The Administrator shall, within 270 days after Octo-

ber 18, 1972 (and from time to time thereafter), issue such

information on methods, procedures, and processes as may

be appropriate to restore and enhance the quality of the

Nation’s publicly owned fresh water lakes.

Agreements with Secretaries of Agriculture, Army, and Interior

to provide maximurn utilization of programs to achieve and

maintain water qualiiy: transfer of funds; authorization of

appropriations

(j) (1) The Administrator shall, within six months from

October 18, 1972, enter into agreements with the Secretary

of Agriculture, the Secretary of the Army, and the Secre-

tary of the Interior to provide for the maximum utiliza-

tion of the appropriate programs authorized under other

Federal law to be carried out by such Secretaries for the

purpose of achieving and maintaining water quality

through appropriate implementation of plans approved

under section 1288 of this title.

(2) The Administrator, pursuant to any agreement un-

der paragraph (1) of this subsection is authorized to trans-

fer to the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of the

Army, or the Secretary of the Interior any funds appro-

priated under paragraphs (3) of this subsection to supple-

ment any funds otherwise appropriated to carry out appro-

priate programs authorized to be carried out by such

Secretaries.

43a

(3) There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out

the provisions of this subsection, $100,000,000 per fiscal

year for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973, and the fiscal

year ending June 30, 1974.

§ 1316. National standards of performance—Definitions [Act § 306]

(a) For purposes of this section:

(1) The term ‘‘standard of performance’’ means a stand-

ard for the control of the discharge of pollutants which

reflects the greatest degree of effluent reduction which the

Administrator determines to be achievable through appli-

cation of the best available demonstrated control technol-

ogy, processes, operating methods, or other alternatives, in-

cluding, where practicable, a standard permitting no dis-

charge of pollutants.

(2) The term ‘‘new source’’ means any source, the con-

struction of which is commenced after the publication of

proposed regulations prescribing a standard of perform-

ance under this section which will be applicable to such

source, if such standard is thereafter promulgated in

accordance with this section.

(3) The term ‘‘source’’ means any building, structure,

facility, or installation from which there is or may be the

discharge of pollutants.

(4) The term ‘‘owner or operator’’ means any person

who owns, leases, operates, controls, or supervises a source.

(5) The term ‘‘construction’’ means any placement,

assembly, or installation of facilities or equipment (includ-

ing contractual obligations to purchase such facilities or

equipment) at the premises where such equipment will be

used, including preparation work at such premises.

44a

Categories of sources; Federal standards of performance

for new sources

(b) (1) (A) The Administrator shall, within ninety days

after October 18, 1972, publish (and from time to time

thereafter shall revise) a list of categories of sources,

which shall, at the minimum, include:

pulp and paper mills;

paperboard, builders paper and board mills;

meat product and rendering processing;

dairy product processing;

grain mills;

canned and preserved fruits and vegetables processing ;

canned and preserved seafood processing ;

sugar processing ;

textile mills;

cement manufacturing;

feedlots ;

electroplating ;

organic chemicals manufacturing ;

inorganic chemicals manufacturing ;

plastic and synthetic materials manufacturing ;

soap and detergent manufacturing ;

fertilizer manufacturing;

petroleum refining ;

iron and steel manufacturing;

nonferrous metals manufacturing ;

phosphate manufacturing;

steam electric powerplants;

feroalloy manufacturing ;

leather tanning and finishing;

glass and asbestos manufacturing;

rubber processing; and

timber products processing.

(B) As soon as practicable, but in no case more than

one year, after a category of sources is included in a list

45a

under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the Adminis-

trator shall propose and publish regulations establishing

Federal standards of performance for new sources within

such category. The Administrator shall afford interested

persons an opportunity for written comment on such pro-

posed regulations. After considering such comments, he

shall promulgate, within one hundred and twenty days after

publication of such proposed regulations, such standards

with such adjustments as he deems appropriate. The Ad-

ministrator shall, from time to time, as technology and

alternatives change, revise such standards following the

procedure required by this subsection for promulgation

of such standards. Standards of performance, or revisions

thereof, shall become effective upon promulgation. In

establishing or revising Federal standards of performance

for new sources under this section, the Administrator shall

take into consideration the cost of achieving such effluent

reduction, and any non-water quality environmental impact

and energy requirements.

(2) The Administrator may distinguish among classes,

types, and sizes within categories of new sources for the

purpose of establishing such standards and shall consider

the type of process employed (including whether batch or

continuous).

(3) The provisions of this section shall apply to any

new source owned or operated by the United States.

State enforcement of standards of performance

(c) Each State may develop and submit to the Admin-

istrator a procedure under State law for applying and

enforcing standards of performance for new sources |lo-

eated in such State. If the Administrator finds that the

procedure and the law of any State require the application

and enforcement of standards of performance to at least

the same extent as required by this section, such State is

authorized to apply and enforce such standards of per-

46a

formance (except with respect to new sources owned or

operated by the United States).

Protection from more stringent standards

(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter,

any point source the construction of which is commenced

after October 18, 1972, and which is so constructed as to

meet all applicable standards of performance shall not be

subject to any more stringent standard of performance

during a ten-year period beginning on the date of comple-

tion of such construction or during the period of deprecia-

tion or amortization of such facility for the purposes of

section 167 or 169 (or both) of Title 26, whichever period

ends first.

Illegality of operation of new sources in violation of applicable

standards of performance

(e) After the effective date of standards of performance

promulgated under this section, it shall be unlawful for

any owner or operator of any new source to operate such

source in violation of any standard of performance apyli-

cable to such source.

§ 1317. Toxic and pretreatment effluent standards; establishment:

revision; illegality of source operation in violation of

standards [Act § 307]

(a) (1) The Administrator shall, within ninety days after

October 18, 1972, publish (and from time to time thereafter

revise) a list which includes any toxie pollutant or combi-

nation of such pollutants for which an effluent standard

(which may include a prohibition of the discharge of such

pollutants or combination of such pollutants) will be estab-

lished under this section. The Administrator in publishing

such list shall take into account the toxicity of the pollu-

tant, its persistence, degradability, the usual or potential

presence of the affected organisms in any waters, the im-

47a

portance of the affected organisms and the nature and

extent of the effect of the toxic pollutant on such organisms.

(2) Within one hundred and eighty days after the date

of publication of any list, or revision thereof, containing

toxic pollutants or combination of pollutants under para-

graph (1) of this subsection, the Administrator, in accord-

ance with section 553 of Title 5, shall publish a proposed

effluent standard (or a prohibition) for such pollutant or

combination of pollutants which shall take into account

the toxicity of the pollutant, its persistence, degradability,

the usual or potential presence of the affected organisms in

any waters, the importance of the affected organisms and

the nature and extent of the effect of the toxic pollutant on

such organisms, and he shall publish a notice for a public

hearing on such proposed standard to be held within thirty

days. As soon as possible after such hearing, but not later

than six months after publication of the proposed effluent

standard (or prohibition), unless the Administrator finds,

on the record, that a modification of such proposed stand-

ard (or prohibition) is justified based upon a preponder-

ance of evidence adduced at such hearings, such standard

(or prohibition) shall be promulgated.

(3) If after a public hearing the Administrator finds that

a modification of such proposed standard (or prohibition)

is justified, a revised effluent standard (or prohibition) for

such pollutant or combination of pollutants shall be pro-

mulgated immediately. Such standard (or prohibition)

shall be reviewed and, if appropriate, revised at least every

three years.

(4) Any effluent standard promulgated under this sec-

tion shall be at that level which the Administrator deter-

mines provides an ample margin of safety.

(5) When proposing or promulgating any effluent stand-

ard (or prohibition) under this section, the Administrator

shall designate the category or categories of sources to

48a

which the effluent standard (or prohibition) shall apply.

Any disposal of dredged material may be included in such

a category of sources after consultation with the Secretary

of the Army.

(6) Any effluent standard (or prohibition) established

pursuant to this section shall take effect on such date or

dates as specified in the order promulgating such standard,

but in no case more than one year from the date of such

promulgation.

(7) Prior to publishing any regulations pursuant to this

section the Administrator shall, to the maximum extent

practicable within the time provided, consult with appro-

priate advisory committees, States, independent experts,

and Federal departments and agencies.

(b) (1) The Administrator shall, within one hundred and

eighty days after October 18, 1972, and from time to time

thereafter, publish proposed regulations establishing pre-

treatment standards for introduction of pollutants into

treatment works (as defined in section 1292 of this title)

which are publicly owned for those pollutants which are

determined not to be susceptible to treatment by such

treatment works or which would interfere with the opera-

tion of such treatment works. Not later than ninety days

after such publication, and after opportunity for public

hearing, the Administrator shall promulgate such pretreat-

ment standards. Pretreatment standards under this subsec-

tion shall specify a time for compliance not to exceed three

years from the date of promulgation and shall be estab-

lished to prevent the discharge of any pollutant through

treatment works (as defined in section 1292 of this title)

which are publicly owned, which pollutant interferes with,

passes through, or otherwise is incompatible with such

works.

(2) The Administrator shall, from time to time, as con-

trol technology, processes, operating methods, or other

49a

alternatives change, revise such standards following the

procedure established by this subsection for promulgation

of such standards.

(3) When proposing or promulgating any pretreatment

standard under this section, the Administrator shall desig-

nate the category or categories of sources to which such

stan ard shall apply.

(4) Nothing in this subsection shall affect any pretreat-

ment requirement established by any State or local law not

in conflict with any pretreatment standard established

under this subsection.

(c) In order to insure that any source introducing pol-

lutants into a publicly owned treatment works, which

source would be a new source subject to section 1316 of

this title if it were to discharge pollutants, will not cause

a violation of the effluent limitations established for any

such treatment works, the Adminisirator shall promulgate

pretreatment standards for the category of such sources

simultaneously with the promulgation of standards of per-

formance under section 1316 of this title for the equivalent

category of new sources. Such pretreatment standards

shall prevent the discharge of any pollutant into such treat-

ment works, which pollutant may interfere with, pass

through, or otherwise be incompatible with such works.

(d) After the effective date of any effluent standard or

prohibition or pretreatment standard promulgated under

this section, it shall be unlawful for any owner or operator

of any source to operate any source in violation of any such

effluent standard or prohibition or pretreatment standard.

§ 1342. National polluiant discharge elimination system—Permits

for discharge of pollutants [Act § 402]

(a) (1) Except as provided in sections 1328 and 1344 of

this title, the Administrator may, after opportunity for

50a

public hearing, issue a permit for the discharge of any

pollutant, or combination of pollutants, notwithstanding

section 1311(a) of this title, upon condition that such dis-

charge will meet either all applicable requirements under

sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, and 1343 of this title,

or prior to the taking of necessary implementing actions

relating to all such requirements, such conditions as the

Administrator determines are necessary to carry out the

provisions of this chapter.

(2) The Administrator shall prescribe conditions for

such permits to assure compliance with the requirements

of paragraph (1) of this subsection, including conditions

on data and information collection, reporting, and such

other requirements as he deems appropriate.

(3) The permit program of the Administrator under

paragraph (1) of this subsection, and permits issued there-

under, shall be subject to the same terms, conditions, and

requirements as apply to a State permit program and per-

mits issued thereunder under subsection (b) of this section.

(4) All permits for discharges into the navigable waters

issued pursuant to section 407 of this title, shall be deemed

to be permits issued under this title, and permits issued

under this title shall be deemed to be permits issued under

section 407 of this title, and shall continue in foree and

effect for their term unless revoked, modified, or suspended

in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.

(5) No permit for a discharge into the navigable waters

shall be issued under section 407 of this title after October

18, 1972. Each application for a permit under section 407

of this title, pending on October 18, 1972, shall be deemed

to be an application for a permit under this section. The

Administrator shall authorize a State, which he determines

has the capability of administering a permit program which

will carry out the objective of this chapter, to issue permits

for discharges into the navigable waters within the juris-

5la

diction of such State. The Administrator may exercise the

authority granted him by the preceding sentence only

during the period which begins on October 18, 1972, and

ends either on the ninetieth day after the date of the first

promulgation of guidelines required by section 1314(h) (2)

of this title, or the date of approval by the Administrator

of a permit program for such State under subsection (b) of

this section, whichever date first occurs, and no such au-

thorization to a State shall extend beyond the last day of

such period. Each such permit shall be subject to such con-

ditions as the Administrator determines are necessary to

carry out the provisions of this chapter. No such permit

shall issue if the Administrator objects to such issuance.

State permit programs

(b) At any time after the promulgation of the guidelines

required by subsection (h) (2) @f section 1314 of this title,

the Governor of each State desiring to administer its own

permit program for discharges into navigable waters with-

in its jurisdiction may submit to the Administrator a full

and complete description of the program it proposes to

establish and administer under State law or under an

interstate compact. In addition, such State shall submit a

statement from the attorney general (or the attorney for

those State water pollution control agencies which have

independent legal counsel), or from the chief legal officer in

the case of an interstate agency, that the laws of such

State, or the interstate compact, as the case may be, pro-

vide adequate authority to carry out the described pro-

gram. The Administrator shall approve each such sub-

mitted program unless he determines that adequate au-

thority does not exist:

(1) To issue permits which—

(A) apply, and insure compliance with, any appli-

cable requirements of sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317,

and 1343 of this title;

4

52a

(B) are for fixed terms not exceeding five years; and

(C) can be terminated or modified for cause includ-

ing, but not limited to, the following:

(i) violation of any condition of the permit;

(ii) obtaining a permit by misrepresentation, or

failure to disclose fully all relevant facts;

(iii) change in any condition that requires either

a temporary or permanent reduction or elimination

of the permitted discharge;

(DD) control the disposal of pollutants into wells;

(2) (A) To issue permits which apply, and insure com-

pliance with, all applicable requirements of section 1318

of this title, or

(B) To inspect, monitor, enter, and require reports to at

least the same extent as required in section 1318 of this

title;

(3) To insure that the public, and any other State the

waters of which may be affected, receive notice of each

application for a permit and to provide an opportunity for

public hearing before a ruling on each such application;

(4) To insure that the Administrator receives notice of

each application (including a copy thereof) for a permit;

(5) To insure that any State (other than the permitting

State), whose waters may be affected by the issuance of a

permit may sabmit written recommendations to the per-

mitting State (and the Administrator) with respect to any

permit application and, if any part of such written ree-

ommendations are not accepted by the permitting State,

that the permitting State will notify such affected State

(and the Administrator) in writing of its failure to so

accept such recommendations together with its reasons for

so doing;

53a

(6) To insure that no permit will be issued if, in the

judgment of the Secretary of the Army acting through the

Chief of Engineers, after consultation with the Secretary

of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating,

anchorage and navigation of any of the navigable waters

would be substantially impaired therby;

(7) To abate violations of the permit or the permit pro-

gram, including civil and criminal penalties and other ways

and means of enforcement;

(8) To insure that any permit for a discharge from a

publicly owned treatment works includes conditions to re-

quire adequate notice to the permitting agency of (A) new

introductions into such works of pollutants from any

source which would be a new source as defined in section

1316 of this title if such source were discharging pollutants,

(B) new iatroductions of pollutants into such works from

a source which would be subject to section 1311 of this title

if it were discharging such pollutants, or (C) a substantial

change in volume or character of pollutants being intro-

duced into such works by a source introducing pollutants

into such works at the time of issuance of the permit. Such

notice shall include information on the quality and quan-

tity of effluent to be introduced into such treatment works

and any anticipated impact of such change in the quantity

or quality of effluent to be discharged from such_ publicly

owned treatment works; and

(9) To insure that any industrial user of any publicly

owned treatment works will comply with sections 1284(b),

1317, and 1318 of this title.

Suspension of federal program upon submission of State

program; withdrawal of approval of State program

(c) (1) Not later than ninety days after the date on

which a State has submitted a program (or revision there-

of) pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the Admin-

istrator shall suspend the issuance of permits under sub-

h4ta

section (a) of this section as to those navigable waters

subject to such program unless he determines that the

State permit program does not meet the requirements of

subsection (b) of this section or does not conform to the

guidelines issued under section 1314(h) (2) of this title. If

the Administrator so determines, he shall notify the State

of any revisions or modifications necessary to conform to

such requirements or guidelines.

(2) Any State permit program under this section shall

at all times be in accordance with this section and guide-

lines promulgated pursuant to section 1314(h) (2) of this

title.

(3) Whenever the Administrator determines after pub-

lic hearing that a State is not administering a program

approved under this section in accordance with require-

ments of this section, he shall so notify the State and, if

appropriate corrective action is not taken within a reason-

able time, not to exceed ninety days, the Administrator

shall withdraw approval of such program. The Adminis-

trator shall not withdraw approval of any such program

unless he shall first have notified the State, and made

publie, in writing, the reasons for such withdrawal.

Notification of Administrator

(d) (1) Each State shall transmit to the Administrator

a copy of each permit application received by such State

and provide notice to the Administrator of every action

related to the consideration of such permit application,

including each permit proposed to be issued by such State.

(2) No permit shall issue (A) if the Administrator within

ninety days of the date of his notification under subsection

(b) (5) of this section objects in writing to the issuance of

such permit, or (B) if the Administrator within ninety days

of the date of transmittal of the proposed permit by the

State objects in writing to the issuance of such permit as

being outside the guidelines and requirements of this

chapter.

55a

(3) The Administrator may, as to any permit applica-

tion, waive paragraph (2) of this subsection.

Waiver of notification requirement

(e) In accordance with guidelines promulgated pursu-

ant to subsection (h) (2) of section 1314 of this title, the

Administrator is authorized to waive the requirements of

subsection (d) of this section at the time he approves a

program pursuant to subsection (b) of this section for any

category (including any class, type, or size within such

category) of point sources within the State submitting such

program.

Point source categories

(f) The Administrator shall promulgate regulations

establishing categories of point sources which he deter-

mines shall not be subject to the requirements of subsection

(d) of this section in any State with a program approved

pursuant to subsection (b) of this section. The Adminis-

trator may distinguish among classes, types, and sizes

within any category of point sources.

Other regulations for safe transportation, handling, carriage,

storage, and stowage of pollutants

(g) Any permit issued under this section for the dis-

charge of pollutants into the navigable waters from a vessel

or other floating craft shall be subject to any applicable

regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the depart-

ment in which the Coast Guard is operating, establishing

specifications for safe transportation, handling, carriage,

storage, and stowage of pollutants.

56a

Violation of permit conditions: restriction or prohibition upon

introduction of pollutant by source not previously utilizing

treatment works

(h) In the event any condition of a permit for discharges

from a treatment works (as defined in section 1292 of this

title) which is publicly owned is violated, a State with a

program approved under subsection (b) of this section or

the Administrator, where no State program is approved,

may proceed in a court of competent jurisdiction to restrict

or prohibit the introduction of any pollutant into such

treatment works by a source not utilizing such treatment

works prior to the finding that such condition was violated.

Federal enforcement not limited

(i) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the

authority of the Administrator to take action pursuant to

section 1319 of this title.

Public information

(j) A copy of each permit application and each permit

issued under this section shall be available to the public.

Such permit application or permit, or portion thereof, shall

further be available on request for the purposes of repro-

duction.

Compliance with permits

(k) Compliance with a permit issued pursuant to this

section shall be deemed compliance, for purposes of sections

1319 and 1365 of this title, with sections 1311, 1312, 1316,

1317, and 1343 of this title, except any standard imposed

under section 1317 of this title for a toxie pollutant in-

jurious to human health. Until December 31, 1974, in any

case where a permit for discharge has been applied for

pursuant to this section, but final administrative disposi-

tion of such application has not been made, such discharge

shall not be a violation of (1) section 1311, 1316, or 1342

57a

of this title, or (2) section 407 of this title, unless the Ad-

ministrator or other plaintiff proves that final administra-

tive disposition of such application has not been made be-

cause of the failure of the applicant to furnish information

reasonably required or requested in order to process the

application. For the 180-day period beginning on October

18, 1972, in the case of any point source discharging any

pollutant or combination of pollutants immediately prior

to such date of enactment which source is not subject to

section 407 of this title, the discharge by such source shall

not be a violation of this chapter if such a source applies

for a permit for discharge pursuant to this section within

such 180-day period.

5&a

APPENDIX C

Regulations Involved

EPA’s regulations for the Petroleum Refining Point

Source Category are at 40 C.F.R. § 419. Pertinent to this

ease are the identical preambles (‘‘variance clauses’’) in-

eluded in §§ 419.12, 419.22, 419.32, 419.42 and 419.52. Each

reads as follows:

In establishing the limitations set forth in this sec-

tion, EPA took into account all information it was able

to collect, develop and solicit with respect to factors

(such as age and size of plant, raw materials, manu-

facturing processes, pfoducts, produced, treatment

technology available, energy requirements and costs)

which can affect the industry subcategorization and

effluent levels established. It is, however, possible that

data which would affect these limitations have not been

available and, as a result, these limitations should be

adusted for certain plants in this industry. An in-

dividual discharger or other interested person may

submit evidence to the Regional Administra‘tor (or to

the State, if the State has the authority to issue

NPDES permits) that factors relating to the equip-

ment or facilities involved, the process applied, or

other such factors related to such discharger are funda-

mentally different from the factors considered in the

establishment of the guidelines. On the basis of such

evidence or other available information, the Regional

Administrator (or the State) will make a written find-

ing that such factors are or are not fundamentally

different for that facility compared to those specified

in the Development Document. If such fundamentally

different factors are found to exist, the Regional Ad-

ministrator or the State shall establish for the dis-

charger effluent limitations in the NPDES permit

either more or less stringent than the limitations

59a

established herein to the extent dictated by such funda-

mentally different factors. Such limitations must be

approved by the Administrator of the Environmental

Protection Agency. The Administrator may approve or

disapprove such limitations, specify other limitations,

or initiate proceedings to revise these regulations.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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