Petition — Van Winkle v. McLucas
Supreme Court brief1977
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MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK
In The
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1976
Case No. 26-2215
MARTIN L. VAN WINKLE,
Petitioner,
v.
JOHN J. McLUCAS,
Secretary Of The Air Force,
Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
GERALD L. TURNER
Cross & Turner
Suite 4, Talbott Tower
Dayton, Ohio 45402
Counsel for Petitioner
COURT INDEX PRESS, INC. — 2/5 E. Ninth Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 — (513) 241-1460
INDEX
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI .
OPINION BELOW
JURISDICTION Cer ak ne oe
QUESTION PRESENTED
FEDERAL STATUTORY PROVISION
INVOLVED
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of the Facts
B. Statement of the Case
C. How the Issue Arose
REASONS WHY A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
SHOULD BE GRANTED
1. ‘The permissibility of the District Court's
discretionary grant of interest on the back pay and
allowances to which a wrongfully discharged fed-
eral employee has been held entitled is a sub-
stantial federal question which requires examina-
tion of the spirit and intent of the Federal Back
Pay Act of 1966, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 5596. Whether
Congress intended that this broadly remedial stat-
ute be so construed is an issue which has not yet
been resolved by this Court, yet is of pressing
concern to the nation’s 2.8 million federal civilian
employees.
2. Whether the Government has acted in such
“manifest bad faith” as to constitute a taking of
Petitioner's property for which just compensation
nu Oo +} =|} O
is constitutionally required is a substantial fed-
eral question which, if answered in the affirmative,
validates the District Court's award of interest on
the back pay to which an aggrieved federal em-
ployee has been held entitled.
CONCLUSION
APPENDIX
A. Finding of Fact, Opinion and Conclusions
of Law, U.S. District Court
B. Opinion, United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit
C. Judgment, United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit
Page
13
17
la
lla
l4a
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: Page
Aird v, United States, 116 F.Supp. 281 one Pa.,
1953) 7 cae
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S, 134 (1974)... 15
Chambers v. United States, 34 F.P. 12985 (1969) 1]
Ciambelli v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 680 (1974) 1]
Fischer v. Haeberle, 80 F. Supp. 652 pnanenes
1948) | iss ae
Fitzgerald v. United States Civil Service Commis-
sion, 407 F.Supp. 380 (D.C.D.C. 1975) 1]
Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 381 F.Supp. 191 (D. Conn.
1974), aff'd. —— F.2d —— (2d Cir. 1975) 1]
J. L. Simmons Co, v. United States, 412 F.2d 1360,
1387 (Ct. Cl. 1969) 15
Lezin v. United States, 120 Ct. Cl. 724, 98 T.S.
574 (1951) e | 1]
Marshfield Steel Co. v, N.L.R.B., 324 F.2d 333, 54
L.R.R.M. 2648 (8th Cir., 1963) 7 10-11
Republic Steel Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 7 (1940) 10
Ripley v. United States, 220 U.S. 491 (1911) 13
Terry v. United States, 101 Sete 165 (Ct. Cl.
1951) | eee tes ccs > ae
United States v. Dinerstein, 362 F.2d 852 (2d Cir.,
EE Ln 2s pe kaa Py Pes ee rae |
United States v. Klamath Indians, 304 U.S. 119,
123 (1938) 7 13
IV.
Other Authorities: | Page
A.F.R. 40-771 14
Executive Order 11478 ! ll
Lloyd-LaFollette Act 1]
Rule 31 (A), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 15
Sutherland Statutory Construction, 4th Ed., Vol. 3,
Sec. 60.01 p. 29 9
‘Title 5, United States Code, Section 5596 2, 3, 7, 8
Title 5, United States Code, Section 5596 (b) (1) 8
‘litle 5, United States Code, Section 7151 ll
Litle 5, United States Code, Section 7701 7, Il
Tithe 28, United States Code, Section 1254 (1) 2
litle 28, United States Code, Section 1346 (a) (2) 1]
In The
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1976
Case No.
MARTIN L. VAN WINKLE,
Petitioner,
v.
JOHN J. McLUCAS,
Secretary Of The Air Force,
Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner, MARTIN L. VAN WINKLE, respectfully
prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
entered in this proceeding on June 25, 1976, reversing
Petitioner's entitlement to interest at the rate of eight
percent (8%) per annum on all back pay and allowances
which relief was granted when the District Court deter-
mined that the Petitioner was improperly removed from
his position as an Air Force Auditor.
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, a copy of
which is set forth as Appendix “A” to this petition, is
reported as Van Winkle v. McLucas, 397 F.Supp. 733
(1975). A copy of the opinion of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, a copy of which is set
forth as Appendix “B” to this petition, is reported as Van
Winkle v. McLucas, 537 F.2d 246 (1976).
JURISDICTION
‘The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit, which is sought to be reviewed, a copy of
which is set forth as Appendix “C”’ to this petition, was
entered on June 25, 1976. The present Petition for Writ
of Certiorari is being filed within ninety (90) days (plus an
additional sixty (60) days obtained through leave of court)
ot the aforementioned judgment.
Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of the Court under
Title 28, United States Code, Section 1254 (1).
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit erred in vacating that portion of Petitioner's relief
granted by the District Court which awarded Petitioner
interest at the rate of eight per cent (8%) per annum on all
back pay and allowances, such vacation being made on the
grounds that the Federal Back Pay Act. 5 U.S.C. Section
5596, did not authorize an award of interest among the
remedies which it did provide.
3
FEDERAL STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED
TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 5596
BACK PAY DUE TO UNJUSTIFIED PERSONNEL
ACTION
*... (b) An employee of an agency who, on the basis
of an administrative determination or a timely appeal,
is found by appropriate authority under applicable
law or regulation to have undergone an unjustified or
unwarranted personnel action that has resulted in
the withdrawal or reduction of all or a part of the pay,
allowances, or differentials of the employee —
(1) is entitled, on correction of the personnel action,
to receive for the period for which the personnel action
was in effect an amount equal to all or any part of the
pay, allowances, or differentials, as applicable, that the
employee normally would have earned during that
period if the personnel action had not occurred, less
any amounts earned by him through other employ-
ment during that period; and
(2) for all purposes, is deemed to have performed
service for the agency during that period, except that
the employee may not be credited, under this section,
leave in an amount that would cause the amount of
leave to his credit to exceed the maximum amount of
the leave authorized for the employee by law or regu-
lation.
(c) The Civil Service Commission shall prescribe
regulations to carry out this section .. .”
4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement Of The Facts
On June 16, 1970, the Petitioner, MARTIN VAN
WINKLE, was a veteran preference career employee who
in some 27 years of service had been recognized by numer-
ous awards, commendations and other honors and had
gained high regard by Air Force personnel in the auditing
and allied professions. On that day, a notice of proposed
removal from service containing three charges was sent to
the Petitioner and he was removed from his auditor posi-
tion. In accordance with Air Force Regulations a hearing
on the charges was held in October, 1970. The Hearing
Examiner issued findings in December, 1970, holding that
the Plaintiff's rights under Air Force Regulations had been
violated, with such violation constituting fatal procedural
error to the removal proceedings.
Although Air Force Regulations do not provide for an
appeal from a finding of fatal procedural error, Air Force
and civilian staff personnel surreptitiously presented an ex
parte appeal of the Examiner's procedural finding and his
finding of the merits of the case to Headquarters, United
States Air Force. Additionally, the personnel bringing the
charges against Petitioner, separately and secretly commu-
nicated with deciding officials in the appeal chain to the
end of influencing their decision. While the aforemen-
tioned activity was being clandestinely carried out, the
charging official secretly brought command influence upon
the deciding official to urge them to arrive at the “correct”
decision. The net effect of all the aforementioned activi-
ties was to violate yet another Air Force Regulation which
requires that a written decision from the deciding official be
handed down within ten days of the Examiner's report.
It was only after personnel at Air Force Headquarters in-
5
formed the Wright Patterson personnel that the procedural
findings of the Examiner were correct that the Petitioner
was restored to civilian employment on May 13, 1971, or
six months after he should have been reinstated.
Undaunted by their reversals, the Air Force again pro-
posed a notice of removal on the same day Petitioner was re-
instated and incorporated the same fatal procedural errors
into the second proceedings. One of the offshoots of the
ex parte appeal was the determination by the Judge Advo-
cate General of the United States Air Force that charges
2 and 3 were invalid procedurally and could not be used
against the Petitioner. The Air Force personnel simply
substituted the language of charges 2 and 3 with new
language and plunged maliciously forward. Petitioner was
unaware of the results of the appeal but argued neverthe-
less that charges 2 and 3 were invalid. A hearing was again
held in February, 1972, wherein the second Examining
Officer found that charges 2 and 3 again created fatal pro-
cedural error. Unhappy with these findings, the Air Force
Command again appealed where there was no appeal and
again sought to exercise Command influence upon the
decision makers. Furthermore, in order to buttress their
attempts to see to the removal of Petitioner, Air Force Staff
Management personnel made recommendations to decid-
ing personnel contra to Air Force Regulations. Finally, as
a culminating act truly in the spirit of what had gone be-
fore, the Air Force decision-maker maliciously ignored all
findings of the Hearing Examiner including that of ‘‘pro-
cedurally effective to a fatal degree’’ and found against
Petitioner on all three counts and thereby causing Peti-
tioner to again be removed.
As an additional outgrowth of the above described ac-
tivity, yet another Air Force Regulation was violated when.
the malefactors not wanting their deceitful conduct re-
6 -
vealed, failed to place copies of all secret communications
and appeals in the Petitioner's file. As will be stated shortly,
these omissions were to have further ramifications on Pe-
titioner’s case at the District Court level.
The aforementioned decision to perpetuate Petitioner's
removal was appealed to the Civil Service Commission,
Chicago Region (November, 1972) and the Board of Ap-
peals and Review of the Civil Service Commission (March
1973) where the Air Force decision was upheld in each
instance.
B. Statement Of The Case
On October 9, 1973, Petitioner filed his complaint in
United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio. Due to further Air Force resistance and dilatoriness,
the case was characterized by much delay. At one point
default judgment was issued against the Air Force when
they refused to produce copies of the secret appeals and
communications which they said had never existed or no
longer existed. After much delay the Air Force produced
the requested documents and they were permitted rein-
statement.
On cross motions for summary judgment, the District
Court found that Petitioner’s evidence revealed ‘‘an almost
wholesale disregard for the procedural and substantive
rights afforded . . .” Petitioner and that the decision of the
Board of Appeals and review of the Civil Service Commis-
sion could not “be allowed to stand in the face of sub-
stantial prejudice . . .” to the Petitioner. The District
Court, per Judge Rubin, determined that Petitioner “must
be reinstated, together with all back pay and allowances,
rights and benefits, including interest at eight percent
(8%) per annum on such back pay and allowances”. Ad-
ditionally, The Finding of Fact, Opinion and Conclusions
7
of Law contained in Appendix “A”’ readily bear out all the
factual assertions made hereinbefore.
The sole issue appealed by the Air Force was whether the
Federal Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596, was properly inter-
preted by the Federal District Judge as authorizing not
only an award of back pay but also an award of interest
thereon. Issues were briefed and oral argument was held
before a three judge panel. Sadly, the Honorable William
E. Miller died on April 12, 1976, and did not participate in
the decision. On June 25, 1976, a decision reversing the
award of interest was entered by the remaining two Circuit
Judges.
C. How The Issue Arose
The cause of action which afforded the Petitioner access
to the Federal District Court arises under Title 5, Unitec
States Code, Section 5596 (Federal Back Pay Act) and
Section 7701 (Veterans Preference Act) . |
The relief available under Section 5596 was first called
into question by the Air Force’s Motion to Alter and/or
Amend which followed the District Court’s finding of fact,
opinion and conclusions of law. The Federal District
Court Judge found that § 5596 contained ample authority
for the award of interest. Interpretation of § 5596 was
the sole question for review by the Court of Appeals in this
matter.
REASONS WHY A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
SHOULD BE GRANTED
1. The permissibility of the District Court's dis-
cretionary grant of interest on the back pay and
allowances to which a wrongfully discharged federal
employee has been held entitled is a substantial fed-
eral question which requires examination of the spirit
and intent of the Federal Back Pay Act of 1966, 5
U.S.C. Sec. 5596. Whether Congress intended that
this broadly remedial statute be so construed is an issue
which has not yet been resolved by this Court, yet is of
pressing concern to the nation’s 2.8 million federal
civilian employees.
The holding of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
bars the District Court's grant of interest on Petitioner's
accumulated earnings under the Back Pay Act misconstrues
the intent of Congress as manifested by the language of the
relevant statute, the iinplementing regulations of the Civil
Service Commission, and the legislative history. ‘The act
provides explicitly that “. . . on correction of the personnel
action” the employee is entitled to “an amount equal to all
or any part of the pay, allowances, or differentials” (em-
phasis supplied) he would have earned had the adverse
personnel action not occurred, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 5596 (b) (1).
Where, as here, a person has been denied his just compen-
sation for five years because of official obstinancy and sub-
terfuge, the only appropriate way in which he can recover
“an amount equal to all” of it is to be granted interest on
the amount wrongfully withheld. Otherwise, the inexor-
able erosion of the dollar due to inflation, an economic fact
of life of which Congress cannot be deemed to be unaware,
will make it impossible for him to recoup “‘all’’ of his
9
wrongfully withheld earnings. By phrasing the provision
in the disjunctive, Congress vested broad discretion in the
Civil Service Commission and in the court to determine
when an award of interest is appropriate so as to return
to a reinstated employee “all” of his accumulated earnings.
This interpretation is lent further support by the legis-
lative history of the Back Pay Act. ‘The House Committee
Report states specifically that:
“.., no attempt is made to define or ennumerate the
specific types of corrective action which may be taken
with respect to the correction of unjustified and unwar-
ranted personnel action.’ (House Report No. 32 on
H.R. 1647, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at p. 2)
That the bill is clearly intended as a broad remedial
measure and as such should be liberally construed, See
Sutherland Statutory Construction, 4th Ed., Vol. 3., Sec.
60.01 p. 29, is substantiated by language in the Senate
Report:
“... an employee is entitled to be made whole when-
ever an erroneous personnel action which has termi-
nated or reduced his compensation is corrected by
appropriate authority.” Senate Report No. 1062 on
H.R. 1647, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. (Emphasis supplied)
In addition, the Senate Report cites with apparent approval
the letter of John W. Macy, Chairman of the United States
Civil Service Commission in which he states that the bill
would not “restrict or define the nature of the corrective
actions’.
There is no suggestion in the entire legislative history
of the statute that the relief afforded is narrowly limited so
as to bar the remedy of interest. The thrust of the legis-
lative history is clearly to the contrary. Congress vested
broad discretion in the Civil Service Commission and in
10
the courts to fashion the intricacies of the remedy. No
attempt was made to catalogue all available remedies. It
is specious to argue that Congress purported to effectuate
its policies by defining the entire gamut of remedies ap-
plicable to an infinite variety of situations. Nor has the
Civil Service Commission so interpreted its Congressional
mandate, as is evidenced by Mr. Macy's letter cited above.
The Civil Service Commission, the agency entrusted with
administration of the Back Pay Act, has recognized and
made explicit in its regulations implementing the act that
full compensation is required:
The employee will be made whole financially for pay
and employment rights lost or diminished because of
the improper action.” Fed. Personnel Manual, Sub-
chapter 8, Back Pay, p. 550-23 (emphasis supplied)
Use of the word “diminished” compels consideration of the
effects of external factors such as inflation on the employee's
withheld earnings. It is to be presumed that the regula-
tions mean what they say when they specify that an em-
ployee is to “be made whole financially’, a command
which cannot be effectuated unless consideration is given
to the imposition of interest to neutralize the effect of
inflation.
It is scarcely unprecedented for courts to provide reme-
dies not specifically ennumerated in a statute where the
congressional purpose is clearly expressed. When enacting
legislation Congress does so with the knowledge that statu-
tory interpretation is a matter peculiarly within the pro-
vince and expertise of the courts. Persuasive evidence of
the courts’ willingness to provide remedies where given a
broad grant of authority can be found in the labor-manage-
ment area. Courts have approved the NLRB's practice of
awarding back pay, Republic Steel Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 311
U.S. 7 (1940); interest, Marshfield Steel Co. v. N.L.R.B.,
11
324 F.2d 333, 54 L.R.R.M. 2648 (8th Cir., 1963); and
attorneys’ fees and costs, Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 381
F.Supp. 191 (D. Conn. 1974), aff'd. —— F.2d —— (2d
Cir. 1975) in appropriate circumstances though not spe-
cifically called for by enabling legislation.
Although cases in the labor-management area involve
private parties, courts have not shied away from fashioning
remedies where relief was sought against the sovereign
under a broad congressional mandate. Sec. 14 of the Vet-
erans Preference Act, 5 U.S.C. 7701, has been interpreted
to authorize back pay awards, Fischer v. Haeberle, 80 F.
Supp. 652 (E.D.N.Y. 1948), Lezin v. United States, 120
Ct. Cl. 724, 98 T.S. 574 (1951), and recently in Fitzgerald
v. United States Civil Service Commission, 407 F.S. 380
(D.C.D.C. 1975), it was held that Sec. 14 likewise author-
izes the award of attorneys’ fees and costs in appropriate
cases. Chambers v. United States, 34 F.P. 12985 (1969),
has held that Executive Order 11478, and Title 5 U.S.C.
7151 conferred jurisdiction on the Court of Claims under
the Tucker Act. 28 U.S.C. 1346 (a) (2) to entertain a suit
for back pay by an applicant for federal employment who
allegedly was denied employment solely for racial reasons.
Ciambelli v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 680 (1974) , has held
that the 5 U.S.C. 5596 requirement that the government
make whole wrongfully dismissed employees means that in
calculating back pay the employee is not to be denied the
benefits of any interim upgrading of his position.
Until the beginning of the twentieth century federal em-
ployees had very little protection from arbitrary dismissal
from service. However, since the stage was set by the
Lloyd-LaFollette Act in 1912, procedural safeguards relat-
ing to adverse personnel action have been granted to almost
all federal employees in the competitive service. Congress
passed the Back Pay Act and its predecessors in recognition
12
of the fact that it is in the interest of the public and of the
sovereign to protect employees from arbitrary action and
official abuse. Back pay is a remedy designed not only to
vindicate the private rights of a wronged employee but also
to serve the public interest in maintaining an efficient,
smoothly functioning civil service, which cannot be had
unless employee morale and well-being are assured. Thus,
the wrong to which Petitioner has been subjected is a public
wrong for which Congress has manifested its intent that he
be fully compensated.
Through passage of the Back Pay Act Congress con-
templated the establishment of a speedy, efficient procedure
by which the expense and delay accompanying the hearing
of private relief bills would be obviated. Such intent was
frustrated by the government in its circuitous disposition
of the Van Winkle case. A procedure which, had the Air
Force complied with its own regulations, would have been
terminated almost six years ago is still in litigation today.
Yet now the government argues that an employee whose
wages were wrongfully withheld due to the Air Force's
deliberate obfuscation and flagrant disregard of Petitioner's
procedural and substantive rights should not be made
“whole” as Congress has commanded. To let stand the
Court of Appeal’s reversal of the District Court's interest
award would be tantamout to rewriting the statute so as to
eliminate the words “equal to all”. A statute should, if
possible, be construed so as to give effect to all of its provi-
sions and to avoid rendering any part superfluous, void or
insignificant. See United States v. Dinerstein, 362 F.2d
852 (2d Cir., 1966). In order to give effect to the statutory
purpose back pay must be computed by reconstructing
the economic life of the discharged employee so that he
will regain the same financial status he would have attained
had he not been subject to the unjustified dismissal. Con-
13
gress could not have been more explicit on this point. An
award of interest in a case of this kind is not only appro-
priate, it is imperative to preserve the Congressional pur-
pose.
2. Whether the Government has acted in such
“manifest bad faith” as to constitute a taking of Peti-
tioner’s property for which just compensation is con-
stitutionally required is a substantial federal question
which, if answered in the affirmative, validates the
District Court's award of interest on the back pay to
which an aggrieved federal employee has been held
entitled.
An equally apposite ground for the imposition of interest
on the award lies in the exception to the doctrine that
recovery of interest from the sovereign is a matter of legis-
lative grace. When the Government takes private property
pursuant to its power of eminent domain the Fifth Amend-
ment bars it from raising its talisman of sovereign immu-
nity. “Just compensation” must be paid, which necessarily
comprehends payment of sums in the nature of interest.
United States v. Klamath Indians, 304 U.S. 119, 123
(1938) .
In Ripley v. United States, 220 U.S. 491 (1911) the
Supreme Court found that if the Government acted in
“manifest bad faith”, the person with whom the Govern-
ment had contracted was entitled to full compensation for
the loss occasioned thereby. The Court indicated, how-
ever, that an inference of bad faith may only be drawn
where the findings are so clear as “to be plain beyond con-
troversy”. Id., at 496.
Here there is a substantial and convincing foundation
upon which a judicial conclusion of bad faith may rest.
14
As the District Judge found in this case, the command of
the Air Force practiced ‘‘an almost wholesale disregard for
the procedural and substantive rights afforded” Petitioner
by (1) attempting to appeal where no appeal was per-
mitted; (2) attempting an ex parte appeal contrary to
A.F.R. 40-771, (Effective 29 March, 1968), paragraph
29(b) (Although Air Force regulations required that a
decision be entered within 10 days after a removal hearing,
the Air Force delayed more than 150 days before entering
judgment so as to buy time to make its first furtive, illegal
appeal.) ; (3) seeking to exercise command influence; (4)
withholding documents in violation of A.F.R. 40-771, para-
graph 10, (Effective 1 May 1971); (5) accepting recom-
mendations from Air Force management contrary to A.F.R.
40-771, paragraph 20 (b) ; and (6) ignoring the examiner's
procedural findings in attempts to overrule his merit find-
ings.
The District Judge further found that Petitioner:
“... convincingly demonstrated his inability to obtain
an unbiased review of the merits of his case within the
hierarchy of the Air Force and civilian personnel di-
vision.” 397 F. Supp. at 738.
The decision of the Board of Appeals had been “tainted
by the deliberate withholding of evidence pertinent to. . .
Plaintiff's removal” with resultant “substantial prejudice”
to him. 397 F.Supp. at 738. (Emphasis supplied) . Only after
the District Court issued a default judgment did the Air
Force produce documents which it had previcusly asserted
had been destroyed or had never existed at all. Asa direct
result of the Air Force's failure to cooperate with discovery
procedures the original trial date had to be rescheduled so
that final judgment was not entered until eight months
later.
c_=
15
The above is only one of many incidents which demon-
strate that the Air Force's startling disdain for its own regu-
lations in this case was paralleled only by its disdain for the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Air Force was late
in filing its Memorandum Contra to Petitioner's Motions
for Summary Judgment. It was nearly a month late in
filing its Reply Memorandum to its own Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment, so that the Court refused to entertain that
document. It was likewise late in filing its Motion to Alter,
Amend, and/or Clarify Judgment of the Court. Lastly, it
failed to file its brief with the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit within forty days after the date
on which the record was filed, as specified by Rule 31 (A),
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Although none of the above incidents would be deemed
egregious if standing alone, the unseemly policy of pro-
crastination and violation of administrative and judicial
procedures which emerges from this litany of governmental
transgressions “must shock the conscience of anyone fa-
miliar with even the rudimentary concepts of good faith
and fair dealings .. . .” so as to meet the test of bad faith
set forth in J. L. Simmons Co. v. United States, 412 F.2d
1360, 1387 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
The Fifth Amendment gives Petitioner a legitimate
claim of entitlement to a property interest in his employ-
ment. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). The
bad faith action of the Air Force caused a taking of Peti-
tioner’s property — his employment — as surely as if it had
taken his land or his automobile. The Air Force’s bad
faith actions caused years of delay in Petitioner's reinstate-
ment.
The case of Aird v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 281
(E.D.Pa., 1953) involved similar facts. Aird, a seaman,
was wrongfully discharged from the S.S. Walt Whitman
16
in 1942. His case was in litigation for over 10 years. In
1951 the United States finally admitted that the discharge
had been wrongful. The Court granted interest at 4%
per annum on the award.
In an earlier case, Terry v. United States, 101 F. Supp.
165 (Ct.Cl. 1951), an Army officer sued for recovery of
withheld pay and allowances. The Court of Claims found
that certain bonds had been wrongfully withheld and that
the officer was entitled to a money judgment equivalent in
value to the bonds plus interest at 214% interest per
annum.
The Air Force’s conduct herein set forth amounts to
“manifest bad faith — plain beyond controversy”. The
denial of Petitioner's contractual employment rights con-
stituted a taking under the Fifth Amendment. Clearly,
Petitioner is entitled to “just compensation” as fashioned
by the District Court. The granting of interest on a back
pay award is such “just compensation”.
17
CONCLUSION
The “make whole” principle of the Back Pay Act and
the requirement of “just compensation’’ for bad faith
taking work to similar ends. The Back Pay Act permits an
aggrieved employee to be made whole. The bad faith rule
permits a party who contracts with the Government and
is damaged by the Government's bad faith breach amount-
ing to a Fifth Amendment taking to be similarly “made
whole’. The District Court's award of interest on the back
pay award is therefore authorized by both Congressional
enactment and Constitutional precept.
Respectfully submitted,
GERALD L. TURNER
Cross & Turner
Suite 4, Talbott Tower
Dayton, Ohio 45402
Counsel for Petitioner
APPENDIX A
MARTIN VAN WINKLE, III,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN L. McLUCAS, Secretary, etc., et al.,
Defendants,
Civ. No. 4537
United States District Court,
S. D. Ohio, W. D.
June 13, 1975
FINDING OF FACT, OPINION AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
CARL B. RUBIN, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court upon cross-motions
for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Plaintiff herein seeks review
of a final decision by the Civil Service Commission sustain-
ing his removal from the Federal service as an Auditor
GS-13, Logistics Systems Division at Wright-Patterson Air
Force Base. In accordance with Rule 52 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court does submit herewith
its findings of fact, opinion and conclusions of law.
I
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiff Martin Van Winkle, on November 1, 1969,
was a veteran preference career employee who had had
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some twenty-seven years of creditable service. He had ex-
perienced an illustrous career as an auditor, recognized by
numerous awards, commendations and other honors. His
reputation as an auditor was held in high regard by Air
Force personnel in the auditing and allied professions.
Until such date, Mr. Van Winkle enjoyed an unblemished
and enviable work history."
2. On November 1, 1969, the plaintiff was apprehended
outside the base exchange at Wright-Patterson Air Force
Base with t®o stereo tape cartridges having a retail value
of $8.10, which he had removed from such exchange with-
out payment. At the time of apprehension, plaintiff iden-
tified himself as a retired Air Force Senior Master Sergeant
residing in Madison, Georgia. Plaintiff did not identify
himself as an auditor employed at the Wright-Patterson
Air Force Base with a residence in Xenia, Ohio. Both his
prior military service and his legal residence in Madison,
Georgia, were correct statements of fact.
3. On November 6, 1969, the Base Commander for
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base ordered him barred from
the base, except for medical or religious services, for a
period of at least twelve months. At a subsequent time, it
was discovered that the plaintiff was a civilian employee
of the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base and his supervisor
was informed of the incident.
4. On June 16, 1970, a notice of proposed removal from
service was sent to plaintiff charging (1) theft of govern-
ment property, (2) the deliberate withholding of material
facts in connection with an official investigation concerning
' The foregoing has been taken from the analysis, findings and recom-
mendations of D. E. Simones, Appeals and Grievances Examiner, dated
March 31, 1972. The Court adopts such findings in the absence of
any contrary evidence.
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the theft of government property, and (3) the failure to
comply with written instructions from the Base Com-
mander.
5. In accordance with appropriate Air Force regula-
tions, a hearing was held on October 2 and October 7,
1970. On December 11, 1970, the hearing examiner issued
findings holding that plaintiff's rights under A.F.R. 40-771
had been violated. Such violation constituted fatal proced-
ural error to the removal proceedings.
6. Air Force Regulation 40-771, paragraph 30 (b) (6)
effective March 29, 1968, provides that an examiner may
reverse removal actions upon the finding of a fatal pro-
cedural error. The Regulation contemplates no further
review, thus procedural rulings are final. This was well
understood by the Air Force and civilian staff personnel of
the 2750th AB, Wg and Headquarters Air Force Logistics
Command at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. Air Force
Regulation 40-771, paragraph 29(b), provides that any
person directly responsible for taking the action complained
against is prohibited either directly or indirectly from
making separate comments or recommendations to the de-
ciding official. Nevertheless, arguing against both the
examiner's procedural finding and his findings on the
merits of the case, an ex parte appeal was taken to Head-
quarters, United States Air Force, on December 24, 1970.
7. Air Force Regulation 40-771, paragraphs 30 (a) (3)
and 18(b), (c) and (d) , required a written decision within
ten days of the examiner’s report or a written explanation
or request for extension furnished to the employee. The
plantiff’s attorney's secretary was notified by telephone that
the written decision would be delayed on December 24,
1970. The nature of the delay was not explained.
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8. On March 16, 1971, Headquarters, Department of
the Air Force, the Chief of Civilian Personnel Programs
Division, replied to the request for review as follows:
1. ‘The examiner was correct in ruling that the
action was fatally defective and the ruling was sus-
tained;
2. ‘The examiner's merit recommendation could
be accepted or the charge reinstated;
3. ‘The second cause of action, causing deliberate
concealment of material facts, was not valid because
of the lack of duty to assist in or cooperate with an
official investigation;
4. ‘The third charge was recommended not to be
reinstated on the ground that there was no connection
between the plaintiff's civilian job status and his vio-
lation of the Commander's’ Order directed to his re-
tired military status.
9. On March 25, 1971, Brig. Gen. T. E. Hoxie, Com-
mander of Headquarters Air Force Logistics Command
(and deciding officer in charge of the plaintiff's case) ,
requested Maj. Gen. John L. Locke, Assistant Deputy Chief
of Staff, Logistics Personnel, to again review the examiner's
decision. General Locke did so and on April 19, 1971,
forwarded the Van Winkle file to Maj. Gen. James S.
Chaney, Judge Advocate General of the United States Air
Force, for Personnel Review. On May 4, 1971, General
Locke notified General Hoxie the procedural finding of
the examiner was correct and not subject to review. On
the same day the 2750th AB Wg was notified of this ruling
and the letter of March 16, 1971, was ordered implemented.
Reinstitution of the second and third charges of the original
removal action was made expressly dependent upon advice
from the Air Force Logistics Command.
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10. On May 13, 1971, plaintiff was restored to his
civilian employment status and on the same day served
with proposed notice of removal, charging (1) theft of
government property; (2) falisification of material facts in
connection with an official investigation; and (3) miscon-
duct off duty.
11. Air Force Regulation 40-771 was revised, effective
May |, 1971. Paragraph 10 A.F.R. 40-771 requires the
civilian personnel officer to establish a file containing all
documents pertinent to the case. All documents relating
to the ex parte appeal and recommendations contained in
the answers thereto were requested by the plaintiff on May
21, 1971. The only decuments released to the plaintiff were
edited portions of the letters of December 24, 1970, March
16, 1971, and May 4, 1971. Documents tending to show
violations of A.F.R. 40-771, paragraph 29(b), (effective
29 March 1968) as they related to the previous action were
not included within the file or released to the plaintiff.
12. On February |, 1972, a hearing was held before D.
E. Simones, Appeal and Grievance Examiner. On March
$1, 1972, Mr. Simones issued his analysis, findings and
recommendations, holding that Charges 2 and 3 were not
appropriate causes of action and could not be used to sup-
port the removal. Mr. Simones further found that the
factual validity of Charge 1, to wit, theft of government
property, was sustained. He recommended that plaintiff
be restored to his employment with a disciplinary action
no more severe than a reprimand.
13. Paragraph 20(b) A.F.R. 40-771 provides the de-
ciding official must not under any circumstances accept
comments or recommendations from any person directly
responsible for taking the action appealed or who repre-
sented management in the hearing or gave testimony in
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the processing of the case. During the course of testimony
in the second hearing, Col. Stanley L. Anderson, Chief,
Logistics Systems Division, Air Force Audit System, and the
person responsible for the removal action, admitted having
engaged in conversation with Maj. Gen. L. C. Teubner,
Auditor General of the Air Force, as to the disposition of
the removal action between the notice of proposed removal
and the notice of decision to remove.
14. On April 14, 1972, Gen. Rafalko, Commander of
the 2750th AB Wg appealed the examiner's finding to
General Hoxie, Commander, Headquarters Air Force
Logistics Systems. General Hoxie agreed that an error had
been committed and forwarded the appeal file to Head-
quarters, USAF on April 20, 1972. On May 12, 1972,
Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, found no pro-
cedural error with the charges and remanded the file to
the hearing examiner for “clarification.”
15. On June 20, 1972, the examiner clarified his opin-
ion as follows:
“A. The findings of procedural deficiency on two
of the three charges was not intended to preclude a
first level decision based upon merit. Accordingly,
the finding that those two charges were ‘procedurally
defective to a fatal degree’ should not be construed to
mean that the entire action was to be found fatally
defective on procedural grounds.
B. The Report was intended also to show that the
two defective p sol were found to be without merit
because they did not constitute appropriate causes of
action.”
16. The Examiner's “clarification” in no manner al-
tered his previous finding that Charges 2 and 3 were “pro-
cedurally defective to a fatal degree.” Nevertheless on
June 30, 1972, the case file was forwarded to the Command-
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ing Officer, 63rd AB Gp, Norton Air Force Base, Cali-
fornia, for review and first level decision. On July 21,
1972, Col. Ralph W. Mistrot, Commander of the 63rd AB
Gp, rendered a decision disagreeing with the finding of
the hearing examiner as to all three counts and forwarded
the file to Maj. Gen. Tuebner, Auditor General of the Air
Force, for first level decision.
17. On June 14, 1972, Maj. Gen. Tuebner, Auditor
General of the United States Air Force, issued a decision
concurring with the finding and comments of the Com-
mander, 63rd AB Gp, and disagreeing with the hearing
examiner. The plaintiff was precluded from appeal to
Headquarters, USAF, on the ground that the decision of
May 12, 1972, had previously determined no procedural
error was present.
18. The decision was submitted for review by the Chi-
cago Region of the Civil Service Commission. Following a
hearing on September 26, 1972, the Chicago Region upheld
General Tuebner’s decision on November 2, 1972.
19. On November 20, 1972, the plaintiff appealed to
the Board of Appeal and Review of the Civil Service Com-
mission. On March 22, 1972, the Chicago Region was
affirmed by the Civil Service Commission. This action
followed.
Il
OPINION
The standard which the Court must apply to the case
before it is set forth in Baum v. Zuchert, 342 F.2d 145
(6th Cir. 1965) and Gass v. Ruegg, 379 F.2d 216 (6th Cir.
1967) , which stated:
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The function of a reviewing court in cases involving
the discharge of civil service employees is a limited
one. Powell v. Brannan, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 16, 196 F.2d
871, 873. The judicial function is to determine
whether there has been substantial compliance with
applicable procedures and statutes, and not to review
the administrative determination as to the wisdom or
good judgment of the agency exercising discretion.
Hargett v. Summerfield, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 85, 243
F.2d 29, 32, cert. denied 353 U.S. 970, 77 S.Ct. 1060,
| L.Ed.2d 1137. The courts will not examine into the
merits of the dismissal. Ellis v. Mueller, 108 U.S.App.
D.C. 174, 280 F.2d 722, 5 L.Ed.2d 104; Green v.
Baughman, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 187, 243 F.2d 610, 613,
cert, denied 355 U.S. 819, 78 S.Ct. 25, 2 L.Ed.2d 35.”
342 F.2d at 147; 379 F.2d at 218.
[1] In the absence of convincing evidence challenging
the validity of the certified administrative record, the Court
will not look beyond it. Tomlin v. U. S. Medical Center,
360 F.Supp. 353 (S.D.Ohio 1974); Handy v. Gayler, 364
F.Supp. 676 (D.Md. 1973); Thompson v. Department of
Justice, 372 F.Supp. 762 (N.D.Cal.1974) ; Spencer v. Schles-
inger, 374 F.Supp. 840 (D.D.C. 1974); Baca v. Butz, 376
F.Supp. 1005 (D.C.N.Mex.1974) ; Johnson v. United States
Postal Service, 364 F.Supp. 37 (N.D.Fla.1973); Cates v.
Johnson, 377 F.Supp. 1145 (W.D.Pa.1974) .
[2] Where it appears, however, that substantial devi-
ations from applicable procedures and statutes have resulted
from employer actions not included within the certified
administrative record, the presumption of its validity is
overcome.
[3] This is such a case. The evidence submitted by the
plaintiff reveals an almost wholesale clisregard for the pro-
cedural and substantive rights afforded the _plaintiff-
employee under A.F.R. 70-771. A.F R. 40-771 was also
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intended to establish within the Civilian Personnel Branch
of the Air Force hearing examiners whose purpose it was to
hear appeals in personnel matters independently of the
management officials whose decisions they reviewed. While
the merit findings and recommendations of the examiners
are not binding upon the Air Force Command, there is
no appeal provided under A.F.R. 40-771 from an exam-
iner’s finding of ‘fatal procedural defects.” During the
prosecution of this removal action it was not only the
merit findings of the Appeals and Grievance Examiners
which were totally disregarded.
The command of the Air Force has: (1) attempted an
appeal where no appeal is permitted (Findings of Fact 6
and 14); (2) atte apted an ex parte appeal contrary to
A.F.R. 40-771, (Effective 29 March 1968), paragraph 29
(b) (Findings of Fact 6 and 9); (3) sought to exercise
command influence (Findings of Fact 9 and 14); (4) with-
held documents in violation of A.F.R. 40-771, paragraph
10, (Effective 1 May 1971), (Finding of Fact 11); (5)
accepted recommendations from Air Force management
contrary to A.F.R. 40-771, paragraph 20 (b), (Finding of
Fact 13); and (6) Ignored the examiner's procedural find-
ings in attempts to overrule his merit findings (Finding of
Fact 16). The plaintiff has convincingly demonstrated his
inability to obtain an unbiased review of the merits of his
case within the rierarchy of the Air Force and civilian
personnel division.
The decision of the Board of Appeals and Review of the
Civ.1 Service Commission has likewise been tainted by
the deliberate withholding of evidence pertinent to pro-
cedures employed in the plaintiff's removal. It cannot be
allowed to stand in the fact of substantial prejudice to the
plaintiff during earlier proceedings.
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Ill
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. The Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 and 28 U.S.C. § 1361.
B. The Air Force did not substantially comply with the
requirements of Air Force Regulation 40-771 (Effective
29 March 1968), paragraphs 18 (b) (c) and (d), 29(b),
30 (a) (3) and 30 (b) (6).
C. The Air Force did not substantially comply with the
requirements of Air Force Regulation 40-771 (Effective |
May 1968), paragraphs 10, 20(b), (e) and (f).
D. The plaintiff was improperly removed from his
position as an Air Force Auditor and must be reinstated,
together with all back pay and allowances, rights and bene-
fits including interest at eight percent (8%) per annum on
such back pay and allowances.
Let judgment issue in accordance with the foregoing.
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APPENDIX B
No. 75-2145
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For The Sixth Circuit
Martin L. VAN WINKLE,
Shaper ApPEAL from the
Plaintif-Appellee,) United States Dis-
Vv. trict Court for the
Southern District of
L. McL ‘ .
JOHN cLucas Ohio.
Defendant-A ppellant.
Decided and Filed June 25, 1976.
Before: Epwarps, Peck and MILter,* Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam. The sole qu.stion posed by this appeal is
whether the federal Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596 (b) (1)
(1970) , was propertly interpreted by the federal District
Judge as authorizing not only an award of back pay but
also an award of interest thereon. The statute in question
(with the language specifically relied upon by the District
Judge emphasized) reads as follows:
(b) An employee of an agency who, on the basis
of an administrative determination or a timely a
is found by appropriate authority under applicab erie
or regulation to have undergone an unjustified and
unwarranted personnel action that has resulted in the
* Honorable William E. Miller died on April 12, 1976, and did not
participate in this decision.
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withdrawal or reduction of all or a part of the pay,
allowances, or differentials of the employee—
(1) is entitled, on correction of the personnel
action, to receive for the period for which the per-
sonnel action was in effect an amount equal to all
or any part of the pay, allowances, or differentials,
as applicable, that the employee normally would
have earned during that period if the personnel
action had not occurred, less any amounts earned
by him through other empiovment during that
period . . .
5 U.S.C. § 5596 (b) (1) (1970).
The facts in this case show that a civilian Air Force em-
ployee of some long standing, then employed at the Wright
Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, as an auditor, was dis-
covered in the process of shoplifting $16.20 worth of stereo
tape cartridges from the Base PX. The Air Force, feciing
such activity to be inconsistent with the responsibilities of
an auditor, undertook to fire him but apparently never
managed to accomplish the discharge within the rules of
procedure which had been created. At a result, on his
suit for reinstatement and back pay, the District Judge
awarded him same, an award which the Air Force has now,
albeit with expressed reluctance, accepted. The District
Judge also ordered the government to pay 8% interest
on all of the accumulated back pay.
The government's position on this appeal is that the
Back Pay Act is quite detailed in relation to what the Civil
Service Commission may award the federal employee in
the event of wrongful discharge, but it does not include
interest. The District Judge reasoned that when the statute
provided for ‘an amount equal to all . . . of the pay” of
which the employee had been deprived by his discharge,
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particularly in a period of inflation, the provision of inter-
est should be regarded as authorized.
The government's contention, on the other hand, is that
under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, a Congressional
statute waiving immunity cannot be construed to include
the right of the courts to award interest unless the statute
specifically says so. In this regard the government relies
upon United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 341 U.S.
48 (1951); United States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel Co.,
329 U.S. 585 (1947); United States v. Goltra, 312 US.
203 (1941). This Circuit has expressed a similar view in
Gray v. Dukedom Bank, 216 F.2d 108 (6th Cir. 1954) .
We believe that the award of interest must be reversed.
The Back Pay Act is quite detailed in the relief it affords.
Obviously, Congress could have added the award of interest
to the remedies which it did provide. Since the Back Pay
Act creates a cause of action against the sovereign which
did not previously exist, a strict construction of the sta-
tutory remedy is generally held to be required. United
States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel Co., supra.
The judgment of the District Court in awarding interest
is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
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APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 75-2145
MARTIN L. VAN WINKLE,
Plainuff-Appellee,
v.
JOHN L. McLUCAS,
Defendant- Appellant.
Before: Evwakxps, Peck and Mitver, Circuit Judges.
JUDGMENT
Filed June 25, 1976
AppreaAt from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio.
‘Tuts Cause came on to be heard on the record from the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio and was argued by counsel.
On ConsipERATION WHEREOF, It is now here ordered and
adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the said
District Court in this cause be and the same is hereby va-
cated as to awarding interest and remanded for further
proceedings.
Each party to pay own costs on appeal.
ENTERED BY ORDER
OF THE COURT
/s/ John P. Hehman
Clerk
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