Petition — Van Winkle v. McLucas

Supreme Court brief1977

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MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

In The

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1976

Case No. 26-2215

MARTIN L. VAN WINKLE,

Petitioner,

v.

JOHN J. McLUCAS,

Secretary Of The Air Force,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

GERALD L. TURNER

Cross & Turner

Suite 4, Talbott Tower

Dayton, Ohio 45402

Counsel for Petitioner

COURT INDEX PRESS, INC. — 2/5 E. Ninth Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 — (513) 241-1460

INDEX

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI .

OPINION BELOW

JURISDICTION Cer ak ne oe

QUESTION PRESENTED

FEDERAL STATUTORY PROVISION

INVOLVED

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Statement of the Facts

B. Statement of the Case

C. How the Issue Arose

REASONS WHY A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

SHOULD BE GRANTED

1. ‘The permissibility of the District Court's

discretionary grant of interest on the back pay and

allowances to which a wrongfully discharged fed-

eral employee has been held entitled is a sub-

stantial federal question which requires examina-

tion of the spirit and intent of the Federal Back

Pay Act of 1966, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 5596. Whether

Congress intended that this broadly remedial stat-

ute be so construed is an issue which has not yet

been resolved by this Court, yet is of pressing

concern to the nation’s 2.8 million federal civilian

employees.

2. Whether the Government has acted in such

“manifest bad faith” as to constitute a taking of

Petitioner's property for which just compensation

nu Oo +} =|} O

is constitutionally required is a substantial fed-

eral question which, if answered in the affirmative,

validates the District Court's award of interest on

the back pay to which an aggrieved federal em-

ployee has been held entitled.

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX

A. Finding of Fact, Opinion and Conclusions

of Law, U.S. District Court

B. Opinion, United States Court of Appeals for

the Sixth Circuit

C. Judgment, United States Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit

Page

13

17

la

lla

l4a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

Aird v, United States, 116 F.Supp. 281 one Pa.,

1953) 7 cae

Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S, 134 (1974)... 15

Chambers v. United States, 34 F.P. 12985 (1969) 1]

Ciambelli v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 680 (1974) 1]

Fischer v. Haeberle, 80 F. Supp. 652 pnanenes

1948) | iss ae

Fitzgerald v. United States Civil Service Commis-

sion, 407 F.Supp. 380 (D.C.D.C. 1975) 1]

Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 381 F.Supp. 191 (D. Conn.

1974), aff'd. —— F.2d —— (2d Cir. 1975) 1]

J. L. Simmons Co, v. United States, 412 F.2d 1360,

1387 (Ct. Cl. 1969) 15

Lezin v. United States, 120 Ct. Cl. 724, 98 T.S.

574 (1951) e | 1]

Marshfield Steel Co. v, N.L.R.B., 324 F.2d 333, 54

L.R.R.M. 2648 (8th Cir., 1963) 7 10-11

Republic Steel Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 7 (1940) 10

Ripley v. United States, 220 U.S. 491 (1911) 13

Terry v. United States, 101 Sete 165 (Ct. Cl.

1951) | eee tes ccs > ae

United States v. Dinerstein, 362 F.2d 852 (2d Cir.,

EE Ln 2s pe kaa Py Pes ee rae |

United States v. Klamath Indians, 304 U.S. 119,

123 (1938) 7 13

IV.

Other Authorities: | Page

A.F.R. 40-771 14

Executive Order 11478 ! ll

Lloyd-LaFollette Act 1]

Rule 31 (A), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 15

Sutherland Statutory Construction, 4th Ed., Vol. 3,

Sec. 60.01 p. 29 9

‘Title 5, United States Code, Section 5596 2, 3, 7, 8

Title 5, United States Code, Section 5596 (b) (1) 8

‘litle 5, United States Code, Section 7151 ll

Litle 5, United States Code, Section 7701 7, Il

Tithe 28, United States Code, Section 1254 (1) 2

litle 28, United States Code, Section 1346 (a) (2) 1]

In The

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1976

Case No.

MARTIN L. VAN WINKLE,

Petitioner,

v.

JOHN J. McLUCAS,

Secretary Of The Air Force,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner, MARTIN L. VAN WINKLE, respectfully

prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the judgment

of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

entered in this proceeding on June 25, 1976, reversing

Petitioner's entitlement to interest at the rate of eight

percent (8%) per annum on all back pay and allowances

which relief was granted when the District Court deter-

mined that the Petitioner was improperly removed from

his position as an Air Force Auditor.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, a copy of

which is set forth as Appendix “A” to this petition, is

reported as Van Winkle v. McLucas, 397 F.Supp. 733

(1975). A copy of the opinion of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, a copy of which is set

forth as Appendix “B” to this petition, is reported as Van

Winkle v. McLucas, 537 F.2d 246 (1976).

JURISDICTION

‘The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Sixth Circuit, which is sought to be reviewed, a copy of

which is set forth as Appendix “C”’ to this petition, was

entered on June 25, 1976. The present Petition for Writ

of Certiorari is being filed within ninety (90) days (plus an

additional sixty (60) days obtained through leave of court)

ot the aforementioned judgment.

Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of the Court under

Title 28, United States Code, Section 1254 (1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit erred in vacating that portion of Petitioner's relief

granted by the District Court which awarded Petitioner

interest at the rate of eight per cent (8%) per annum on all

back pay and allowances, such vacation being made on the

grounds that the Federal Back Pay Act. 5 U.S.C. Section

5596, did not authorize an award of interest among the

remedies which it did provide.

3

FEDERAL STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED

TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 5596

BACK PAY DUE TO UNJUSTIFIED PERSONNEL

ACTION

*... (b) An employee of an agency who, on the basis

of an administrative determination or a timely appeal,

is found by appropriate authority under applicable

law or regulation to have undergone an unjustified or

unwarranted personnel action that has resulted in

the withdrawal or reduction of all or a part of the pay,

allowances, or differentials of the employee —

(1) is entitled, on correction of the personnel action,

to receive for the period for which the personnel action

was in effect an amount equal to all or any part of the

pay, allowances, or differentials, as applicable, that the

employee normally would have earned during that

period if the personnel action had not occurred, less

any amounts earned by him through other employ-

ment during that period; and

(2) for all purposes, is deemed to have performed

service for the agency during that period, except that

the employee may not be credited, under this section,

leave in an amount that would cause the amount of

leave to his credit to exceed the maximum amount of

the leave authorized for the employee by law or regu-

lation.

(c) The Civil Service Commission shall prescribe

regulations to carry out this section .. .”

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Statement Of The Facts

On June 16, 1970, the Petitioner, MARTIN VAN

WINKLE, was a veteran preference career employee who

in some 27 years of service had been recognized by numer-

ous awards, commendations and other honors and had

gained high regard by Air Force personnel in the auditing

and allied professions. On that day, a notice of proposed

removal from service containing three charges was sent to

the Petitioner and he was removed from his auditor posi-

tion. In accordance with Air Force Regulations a hearing

on the charges was held in October, 1970. The Hearing

Examiner issued findings in December, 1970, holding that

the Plaintiff's rights under Air Force Regulations had been

violated, with such violation constituting fatal procedural

error to the removal proceedings.

Although Air Force Regulations do not provide for an

appeal from a finding of fatal procedural error, Air Force

and civilian staff personnel surreptitiously presented an ex

parte appeal of the Examiner's procedural finding and his

finding of the merits of the case to Headquarters, United

States Air Force. Additionally, the personnel bringing the

charges against Petitioner, separately and secretly commu-

nicated with deciding officials in the appeal chain to the

end of influencing their decision. While the aforemen-

tioned activity was being clandestinely carried out, the

charging official secretly brought command influence upon

the deciding official to urge them to arrive at the “correct”

decision. The net effect of all the aforementioned activi-

ties was to violate yet another Air Force Regulation which

requires that a written decision from the deciding official be

handed down within ten days of the Examiner's report.

It was only after personnel at Air Force Headquarters in-

5

formed the Wright Patterson personnel that the procedural

findings of the Examiner were correct that the Petitioner

was restored to civilian employment on May 13, 1971, or

six months after he should have been reinstated.

Undaunted by their reversals, the Air Force again pro-

posed a notice of removal on the same day Petitioner was re-

instated and incorporated the same fatal procedural errors

into the second proceedings. One of the offshoots of the

ex parte appeal was the determination by the Judge Advo-

cate General of the United States Air Force that charges

2 and 3 were invalid procedurally and could not be used

against the Petitioner. The Air Force personnel simply

substituted the language of charges 2 and 3 with new

language and plunged maliciously forward. Petitioner was

unaware of the results of the appeal but argued neverthe-

less that charges 2 and 3 were invalid. A hearing was again

held in February, 1972, wherein the second Examining

Officer found that charges 2 and 3 again created fatal pro-

cedural error. Unhappy with these findings, the Air Force

Command again appealed where there was no appeal and

again sought to exercise Command influence upon the

decision makers. Furthermore, in order to buttress their

attempts to see to the removal of Petitioner, Air Force Staff

Management personnel made recommendations to decid-

ing personnel contra to Air Force Regulations. Finally, as

a culminating act truly in the spirit of what had gone be-

fore, the Air Force decision-maker maliciously ignored all

findings of the Hearing Examiner including that of ‘‘pro-

cedurally effective to a fatal degree’’ and found against

Petitioner on all three counts and thereby causing Peti-

tioner to again be removed.

As an additional outgrowth of the above described ac-

tivity, yet another Air Force Regulation was violated when.

the malefactors not wanting their deceitful conduct re-

6 -

vealed, failed to place copies of all secret communications

and appeals in the Petitioner's file. As will be stated shortly,

these omissions were to have further ramifications on Pe-

titioner’s case at the District Court level.

The aforementioned decision to perpetuate Petitioner's

removal was appealed to the Civil Service Commission,

Chicago Region (November, 1972) and the Board of Ap-

peals and Review of the Civil Service Commission (March

1973) where the Air Force decision was upheld in each

instance.

B. Statement Of The Case

On October 9, 1973, Petitioner filed his complaint in

United States District Court for the Southern District of

Ohio. Due to further Air Force resistance and dilatoriness,

the case was characterized by much delay. At one point

default judgment was issued against the Air Force when

they refused to produce copies of the secret appeals and

communications which they said had never existed or no

longer existed. After much delay the Air Force produced

the requested documents and they were permitted rein-

statement.

On cross motions for summary judgment, the District

Court found that Petitioner’s evidence revealed ‘‘an almost

wholesale disregard for the procedural and substantive

rights afforded . . .” Petitioner and that the decision of the

Board of Appeals and review of the Civil Service Commis-

sion could not “be allowed to stand in the face of sub-

stantial prejudice . . .” to the Petitioner. The District

Court, per Judge Rubin, determined that Petitioner “must

be reinstated, together with all back pay and allowances,

rights and benefits, including interest at eight percent

(8%) per annum on such back pay and allowances”. Ad-

ditionally, The Finding of Fact, Opinion and Conclusions

7

of Law contained in Appendix “A”’ readily bear out all the

factual assertions made hereinbefore.

The sole issue appealed by the Air Force was whether the

Federal Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596, was properly inter-

preted by the Federal District Judge as authorizing not

only an award of back pay but also an award of interest

thereon. Issues were briefed and oral argument was held

before a three judge panel. Sadly, the Honorable William

E. Miller died on April 12, 1976, and did not participate in

the decision. On June 25, 1976, a decision reversing the

award of interest was entered by the remaining two Circuit

Judges.

C. How The Issue Arose

The cause of action which afforded the Petitioner access

to the Federal District Court arises under Title 5, Unitec

States Code, Section 5596 (Federal Back Pay Act) and

Section 7701 (Veterans Preference Act) . |

The relief available under Section 5596 was first called

into question by the Air Force’s Motion to Alter and/or

Amend which followed the District Court’s finding of fact,

opinion and conclusions of law. The Federal District

Court Judge found that § 5596 contained ample authority

for the award of interest. Interpretation of § 5596 was

the sole question for review by the Court of Appeals in this

matter.

REASONS WHY A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

SHOULD BE GRANTED

1. The permissibility of the District Court's dis-

cretionary grant of interest on the back pay and

allowances to which a wrongfully discharged federal

employee has been held entitled is a substantial fed-

eral question which requires examination of the spirit

and intent of the Federal Back Pay Act of 1966, 5

U.S.C. Sec. 5596. Whether Congress intended that

this broadly remedial statute be so construed is an issue

which has not yet been resolved by this Court, yet is of

pressing concern to the nation’s 2.8 million federal

civilian employees.

The holding of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Sixth Circuit that the doctrine of sovereign immunity

bars the District Court's grant of interest on Petitioner's

accumulated earnings under the Back Pay Act misconstrues

the intent of Congress as manifested by the language of the

relevant statute, the iinplementing regulations of the Civil

Service Commission, and the legislative history. ‘The act

provides explicitly that “. . . on correction of the personnel

action” the employee is entitled to “an amount equal to all

or any part of the pay, allowances, or differentials” (em-

phasis supplied) he would have earned had the adverse

personnel action not occurred, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 5596 (b) (1).

Where, as here, a person has been denied his just compen-

sation for five years because of official obstinancy and sub-

terfuge, the only appropriate way in which he can recover

“an amount equal to all” of it is to be granted interest on

the amount wrongfully withheld. Otherwise, the inexor-

able erosion of the dollar due to inflation, an economic fact

of life of which Congress cannot be deemed to be unaware,

will make it impossible for him to recoup “‘all’’ of his

9

wrongfully withheld earnings. By phrasing the provision

in the disjunctive, Congress vested broad discretion in the

Civil Service Commission and in the court to determine

when an award of interest is appropriate so as to return

to a reinstated employee “all” of his accumulated earnings.

This interpretation is lent further support by the legis-

lative history of the Back Pay Act. ‘The House Committee

Report states specifically that:

“.., no attempt is made to define or ennumerate the

specific types of corrective action which may be taken

with respect to the correction of unjustified and unwar-

ranted personnel action.’ (House Report No. 32 on

H.R. 1647, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at p. 2)

That the bill is clearly intended as a broad remedial

measure and as such should be liberally construed, See

Sutherland Statutory Construction, 4th Ed., Vol. 3., Sec.

60.01 p. 29, is substantiated by language in the Senate

Report:

“... an employee is entitled to be made whole when-

ever an erroneous personnel action which has termi-

nated or reduced his compensation is corrected by

appropriate authority.” Senate Report No. 1062 on

H.R. 1647, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. (Emphasis supplied)

In addition, the Senate Report cites with apparent approval

the letter of John W. Macy, Chairman of the United States

Civil Service Commission in which he states that the bill

would not “restrict or define the nature of the corrective

actions’.

There is no suggestion in the entire legislative history

of the statute that the relief afforded is narrowly limited so

as to bar the remedy of interest. The thrust of the legis-

lative history is clearly to the contrary. Congress vested

broad discretion in the Civil Service Commission and in

10

the courts to fashion the intricacies of the remedy. No

attempt was made to catalogue all available remedies. It

is specious to argue that Congress purported to effectuate

its policies by defining the entire gamut of remedies ap-

plicable to an infinite variety of situations. Nor has the

Civil Service Commission so interpreted its Congressional

mandate, as is evidenced by Mr. Macy's letter cited above.

The Civil Service Commission, the agency entrusted with

administration of the Back Pay Act, has recognized and

made explicit in its regulations implementing the act that

full compensation is required:

The employee will be made whole financially for pay

and employment rights lost or diminished because of

the improper action.” Fed. Personnel Manual, Sub-

chapter 8, Back Pay, p. 550-23 (emphasis supplied)

Use of the word “diminished” compels consideration of the

effects of external factors such as inflation on the employee's

withheld earnings. It is to be presumed that the regula-

tions mean what they say when they specify that an em-

ployee is to “be made whole financially’, a command

which cannot be effectuated unless consideration is given

to the imposition of interest to neutralize the effect of

inflation.

It is scarcely unprecedented for courts to provide reme-

dies not specifically ennumerated in a statute where the

congressional purpose is clearly expressed. When enacting

legislation Congress does so with the knowledge that statu-

tory interpretation is a matter peculiarly within the pro-

vince and expertise of the courts. Persuasive evidence of

the courts’ willingness to provide remedies where given a

broad grant of authority can be found in the labor-manage-

ment area. Courts have approved the NLRB's practice of

awarding back pay, Republic Steel Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 311

U.S. 7 (1940); interest, Marshfield Steel Co. v. N.L.R.B.,

11

324 F.2d 333, 54 L.R.R.M. 2648 (8th Cir., 1963); and

attorneys’ fees and costs, Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 381

F.Supp. 191 (D. Conn. 1974), aff'd. —— F.2d —— (2d

Cir. 1975) in appropriate circumstances though not spe-

cifically called for by enabling legislation.

Although cases in the labor-management area involve

private parties, courts have not shied away from fashioning

remedies where relief was sought against the sovereign

under a broad congressional mandate. Sec. 14 of the Vet-

erans Preference Act, 5 U.S.C. 7701, has been interpreted

to authorize back pay awards, Fischer v. Haeberle, 80 F.

Supp. 652 (E.D.N.Y. 1948), Lezin v. United States, 120

Ct. Cl. 724, 98 T.S. 574 (1951), and recently in Fitzgerald

v. United States Civil Service Commission, 407 F.S. 380

(D.C.D.C. 1975), it was held that Sec. 14 likewise author-

izes the award of attorneys’ fees and costs in appropriate

cases. Chambers v. United States, 34 F.P. 12985 (1969),

has held that Executive Order 11478, and Title 5 U.S.C.

7151 conferred jurisdiction on the Court of Claims under

the Tucker Act. 28 U.S.C. 1346 (a) (2) to entertain a suit

for back pay by an applicant for federal employment who

allegedly was denied employment solely for racial reasons.

Ciambelli v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 680 (1974) , has held

that the 5 U.S.C. 5596 requirement that the government

make whole wrongfully dismissed employees means that in

calculating back pay the employee is not to be denied the

benefits of any interim upgrading of his position.

Until the beginning of the twentieth century federal em-

ployees had very little protection from arbitrary dismissal

from service. However, since the stage was set by the

Lloyd-LaFollette Act in 1912, procedural safeguards relat-

ing to adverse personnel action have been granted to almost

all federal employees in the competitive service. Congress

passed the Back Pay Act and its predecessors in recognition

12

of the fact that it is in the interest of the public and of the

sovereign to protect employees from arbitrary action and

official abuse. Back pay is a remedy designed not only to

vindicate the private rights of a wronged employee but also

to serve the public interest in maintaining an efficient,

smoothly functioning civil service, which cannot be had

unless employee morale and well-being are assured. Thus,

the wrong to which Petitioner has been subjected is a public

wrong for which Congress has manifested its intent that he

be fully compensated.

Through passage of the Back Pay Act Congress con-

templated the establishment of a speedy, efficient procedure

by which the expense and delay accompanying the hearing

of private relief bills would be obviated. Such intent was

frustrated by the government in its circuitous disposition

of the Van Winkle case. A procedure which, had the Air

Force complied with its own regulations, would have been

terminated almost six years ago is still in litigation today.

Yet now the government argues that an employee whose

wages were wrongfully withheld due to the Air Force's

deliberate obfuscation and flagrant disregard of Petitioner's

procedural and substantive rights should not be made

“whole” as Congress has commanded. To let stand the

Court of Appeal’s reversal of the District Court's interest

award would be tantamout to rewriting the statute so as to

eliminate the words “equal to all”. A statute should, if

possible, be construed so as to give effect to all of its provi-

sions and to avoid rendering any part superfluous, void or

insignificant. See United States v. Dinerstein, 362 F.2d

852 (2d Cir., 1966). In order to give effect to the statutory

purpose back pay must be computed by reconstructing

the economic life of the discharged employee so that he

will regain the same financial status he would have attained

had he not been subject to the unjustified dismissal. Con-

13

gress could not have been more explicit on this point. An

award of interest in a case of this kind is not only appro-

priate, it is imperative to preserve the Congressional pur-

pose.

2. Whether the Government has acted in such

“manifest bad faith” as to constitute a taking of Peti-

tioner’s property for which just compensation is con-

stitutionally required is a substantial federal question

which, if answered in the affirmative, validates the

District Court's award of interest on the back pay to

which an aggrieved federal employee has been held

entitled.

An equally apposite ground for the imposition of interest

on the award lies in the exception to the doctrine that

recovery of interest from the sovereign is a matter of legis-

lative grace. When the Government takes private property

pursuant to its power of eminent domain the Fifth Amend-

ment bars it from raising its talisman of sovereign immu-

nity. “Just compensation” must be paid, which necessarily

comprehends payment of sums in the nature of interest.

United States v. Klamath Indians, 304 U.S. 119, 123

(1938) .

In Ripley v. United States, 220 U.S. 491 (1911) the

Supreme Court found that if the Government acted in

“manifest bad faith”, the person with whom the Govern-

ment had contracted was entitled to full compensation for

the loss occasioned thereby. The Court indicated, how-

ever, that an inference of bad faith may only be drawn

where the findings are so clear as “to be plain beyond con-

troversy”. Id., at 496.

Here there is a substantial and convincing foundation

upon which a judicial conclusion of bad faith may rest.

14

As the District Judge found in this case, the command of

the Air Force practiced ‘‘an almost wholesale disregard for

the procedural and substantive rights afforded” Petitioner

by (1) attempting to appeal where no appeal was per-

mitted; (2) attempting an ex parte appeal contrary to

A.F.R. 40-771, (Effective 29 March, 1968), paragraph

29(b) (Although Air Force regulations required that a

decision be entered within 10 days after a removal hearing,

the Air Force delayed more than 150 days before entering

judgment so as to buy time to make its first furtive, illegal

appeal.) ; (3) seeking to exercise command influence; (4)

withholding documents in violation of A.F.R. 40-771, para-

graph 10, (Effective 1 May 1971); (5) accepting recom-

mendations from Air Force management contrary to A.F.R.

40-771, paragraph 20 (b) ; and (6) ignoring the examiner's

procedural findings in attempts to overrule his merit find-

ings.

The District Judge further found that Petitioner:

“... convincingly demonstrated his inability to obtain

an unbiased review of the merits of his case within the

hierarchy of the Air Force and civilian personnel di-

vision.” 397 F. Supp. at 738.

The decision of the Board of Appeals had been “tainted

by the deliberate withholding of evidence pertinent to. . .

Plaintiff's removal” with resultant “substantial prejudice”

to him. 397 F.Supp. at 738. (Emphasis supplied) . Only after

the District Court issued a default judgment did the Air

Force produce documents which it had previcusly asserted

had been destroyed or had never existed at all. Asa direct

result of the Air Force's failure to cooperate with discovery

procedures the original trial date had to be rescheduled so

that final judgment was not entered until eight months

later.

c_=

15

The above is only one of many incidents which demon-

strate that the Air Force's startling disdain for its own regu-

lations in this case was paralleled only by its disdain for the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Air Force was late

in filing its Memorandum Contra to Petitioner's Motions

for Summary Judgment. It was nearly a month late in

filing its Reply Memorandum to its own Motion for Sum-

mary Judgment, so that the Court refused to entertain that

document. It was likewise late in filing its Motion to Alter,

Amend, and/or Clarify Judgment of the Court. Lastly, it

failed to file its brief with the United States Court of Ap-

peals for the Sixth Circuit within forty days after the date

on which the record was filed, as specified by Rule 31 (A),

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Although none of the above incidents would be deemed

egregious if standing alone, the unseemly policy of pro-

crastination and violation of administrative and judicial

procedures which emerges from this litany of governmental

transgressions “must shock the conscience of anyone fa-

miliar with even the rudimentary concepts of good faith

and fair dealings .. . .” so as to meet the test of bad faith

set forth in J. L. Simmons Co. v. United States, 412 F.2d

1360, 1387 (Ct. Cl. 1969).

The Fifth Amendment gives Petitioner a legitimate

claim of entitlement to a property interest in his employ-

ment. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). The

bad faith action of the Air Force caused a taking of Peti-

tioner’s property — his employment — as surely as if it had

taken his land or his automobile. The Air Force’s bad

faith actions caused years of delay in Petitioner's reinstate-

ment.

The case of Aird v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 281

(E.D.Pa., 1953) involved similar facts. Aird, a seaman,

was wrongfully discharged from the S.S. Walt Whitman

16

in 1942. His case was in litigation for over 10 years. In

1951 the United States finally admitted that the discharge

had been wrongful. The Court granted interest at 4%

per annum on the award.

In an earlier case, Terry v. United States, 101 F. Supp.

165 (Ct.Cl. 1951), an Army officer sued for recovery of

withheld pay and allowances. The Court of Claims found

that certain bonds had been wrongfully withheld and that

the officer was entitled to a money judgment equivalent in

value to the bonds plus interest at 214% interest per

annum.

The Air Force’s conduct herein set forth amounts to

“manifest bad faith — plain beyond controversy”. The

denial of Petitioner's contractual employment rights con-

stituted a taking under the Fifth Amendment. Clearly,

Petitioner is entitled to “just compensation” as fashioned

by the District Court. The granting of interest on a back

pay award is such “just compensation”.

17

CONCLUSION

The “make whole” principle of the Back Pay Act and

the requirement of “just compensation’’ for bad faith

taking work to similar ends. The Back Pay Act permits an

aggrieved employee to be made whole. The bad faith rule

permits a party who contracts with the Government and

is damaged by the Government's bad faith breach amount-

ing to a Fifth Amendment taking to be similarly “made

whole’. The District Court's award of interest on the back

pay award is therefore authorized by both Congressional

enactment and Constitutional precept.

Respectfully submitted,

GERALD L. TURNER

Cross & Turner

Suite 4, Talbott Tower

Dayton, Ohio 45402

Counsel for Petitioner

APPENDIX A

MARTIN VAN WINKLE, III,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOHN L. McLUCAS, Secretary, etc., et al.,

Defendants,

Civ. No. 4537

United States District Court,

S. D. Ohio, W. D.

June 13, 1975

FINDING OF FACT, OPINION AND

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

CARL B. RUBIN, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court upon cross-motions

for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. The Plaintiff herein seeks review

of a final decision by the Civil Service Commission sustain-

ing his removal from the Federal service as an Auditor

GS-13, Logistics Systems Division at Wright-Patterson Air

Force Base. In accordance with Rule 52 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court does submit herewith

its findings of fact, opinion and conclusions of law.

I

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Plaintiff Martin Van Winkle, on November 1, 1969,

was a veteran preference career employee who had had

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some twenty-seven years of creditable service. He had ex-

perienced an illustrous career as an auditor, recognized by

numerous awards, commendations and other honors. His

reputation as an auditor was held in high regard by Air

Force personnel in the auditing and allied professions.

Until such date, Mr. Van Winkle enjoyed an unblemished

and enviable work history."

2. On November 1, 1969, the plaintiff was apprehended

outside the base exchange at Wright-Patterson Air Force

Base with t®o stereo tape cartridges having a retail value

of $8.10, which he had removed from such exchange with-

out payment. At the time of apprehension, plaintiff iden-

tified himself as a retired Air Force Senior Master Sergeant

residing in Madison, Georgia. Plaintiff did not identify

himself as an auditor employed at the Wright-Patterson

Air Force Base with a residence in Xenia, Ohio. Both his

prior military service and his legal residence in Madison,

Georgia, were correct statements of fact.

3. On November 6, 1969, the Base Commander for

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base ordered him barred from

the base, except for medical or religious services, for a

period of at least twelve months. At a subsequent time, it

was discovered that the plaintiff was a civilian employee

of the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base and his supervisor

was informed of the incident.

4. On June 16, 1970, a notice of proposed removal from

service was sent to plaintiff charging (1) theft of govern-

ment property, (2) the deliberate withholding of material

facts in connection with an official investigation concerning

' The foregoing has been taken from the analysis, findings and recom-

mendations of D. E. Simones, Appeals and Grievances Examiner, dated

March 31, 1972. The Court adopts such findings in the absence of

any contrary evidence.

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the theft of government property, and (3) the failure to

comply with written instructions from the Base Com-

mander.

5. In accordance with appropriate Air Force regula-

tions, a hearing was held on October 2 and October 7,

1970. On December 11, 1970, the hearing examiner issued

findings holding that plaintiff's rights under A.F.R. 40-771

had been violated. Such violation constituted fatal proced-

ural error to the removal proceedings.

6. Air Force Regulation 40-771, paragraph 30 (b) (6)

effective March 29, 1968, provides that an examiner may

reverse removal actions upon the finding of a fatal pro-

cedural error. The Regulation contemplates no further

review, thus procedural rulings are final. This was well

understood by the Air Force and civilian staff personnel of

the 2750th AB, Wg and Headquarters Air Force Logistics

Command at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. Air Force

Regulation 40-771, paragraph 29(b), provides that any

person directly responsible for taking the action complained

against is prohibited either directly or indirectly from

making separate comments or recommendations to the de-

ciding official. Nevertheless, arguing against both the

examiner's procedural finding and his findings on the

merits of the case, an ex parte appeal was taken to Head-

quarters, United States Air Force, on December 24, 1970.

7. Air Force Regulation 40-771, paragraphs 30 (a) (3)

and 18(b), (c) and (d) , required a written decision within

ten days of the examiner’s report or a written explanation

or request for extension furnished to the employee. The

plantiff’s attorney's secretary was notified by telephone that

the written decision would be delayed on December 24,

1970. The nature of the delay was not explained.

4a

8. On March 16, 1971, Headquarters, Department of

the Air Force, the Chief of Civilian Personnel Programs

Division, replied to the request for review as follows:

1. ‘The examiner was correct in ruling that the

action was fatally defective and the ruling was sus-

tained;

2. ‘The examiner's merit recommendation could

be accepted or the charge reinstated;

3. ‘The second cause of action, causing deliberate

concealment of material facts, was not valid because

of the lack of duty to assist in or cooperate with an

official investigation;

4. ‘The third charge was recommended not to be

reinstated on the ground that there was no connection

between the plaintiff's civilian job status and his vio-

lation of the Commander's’ Order directed to his re-

tired military status.

9. On March 25, 1971, Brig. Gen. T. E. Hoxie, Com-

mander of Headquarters Air Force Logistics Command

(and deciding officer in charge of the plaintiff's case) ,

requested Maj. Gen. John L. Locke, Assistant Deputy Chief

of Staff, Logistics Personnel, to again review the examiner's

decision. General Locke did so and on April 19, 1971,

forwarded the Van Winkle file to Maj. Gen. James S.

Chaney, Judge Advocate General of the United States Air

Force, for Personnel Review. On May 4, 1971, General

Locke notified General Hoxie the procedural finding of

the examiner was correct and not subject to review. On

the same day the 2750th AB Wg was notified of this ruling

and the letter of March 16, 1971, was ordered implemented.

Reinstitution of the second and third charges of the original

removal action was made expressly dependent upon advice

from the Air Force Logistics Command.

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10. On May 13, 1971, plaintiff was restored to his

civilian employment status and on the same day served

with proposed notice of removal, charging (1) theft of

government property; (2) falisification of material facts in

connection with an official investigation; and (3) miscon-

duct off duty.

11. Air Force Regulation 40-771 was revised, effective

May |, 1971. Paragraph 10 A.F.R. 40-771 requires the

civilian personnel officer to establish a file containing all

documents pertinent to the case. All documents relating

to the ex parte appeal and recommendations contained in

the answers thereto were requested by the plaintiff on May

21, 1971. The only decuments released to the plaintiff were

edited portions of the letters of December 24, 1970, March

16, 1971, and May 4, 1971. Documents tending to show

violations of A.F.R. 40-771, paragraph 29(b), (effective

29 March 1968) as they related to the previous action were

not included within the file or released to the plaintiff.

12. On February |, 1972, a hearing was held before D.

E. Simones, Appeal and Grievance Examiner. On March

$1, 1972, Mr. Simones issued his analysis, findings and

recommendations, holding that Charges 2 and 3 were not

appropriate causes of action and could not be used to sup-

port the removal. Mr. Simones further found that the

factual validity of Charge 1, to wit, theft of government

property, was sustained. He recommended that plaintiff

be restored to his employment with a disciplinary action

no more severe than a reprimand.

13. Paragraph 20(b) A.F.R. 40-771 provides the de-

ciding official must not under any circumstances accept

comments or recommendations from any person directly

responsible for taking the action appealed or who repre-

sented management in the hearing or gave testimony in

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the processing of the case. During the course of testimony

in the second hearing, Col. Stanley L. Anderson, Chief,

Logistics Systems Division, Air Force Audit System, and the

person responsible for the removal action, admitted having

engaged in conversation with Maj. Gen. L. C. Teubner,

Auditor General of the Air Force, as to the disposition of

the removal action between the notice of proposed removal

and the notice of decision to remove.

14. On April 14, 1972, Gen. Rafalko, Commander of

the 2750th AB Wg appealed the examiner's finding to

General Hoxie, Commander, Headquarters Air Force

Logistics Systems. General Hoxie agreed that an error had

been committed and forwarded the appeal file to Head-

quarters, USAF on April 20, 1972. On May 12, 1972,

Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, found no pro-

cedural error with the charges and remanded the file to

the hearing examiner for “clarification.”

15. On June 20, 1972, the examiner clarified his opin-

ion as follows:

“A. The findings of procedural deficiency on two

of the three charges was not intended to preclude a

first level decision based upon merit. Accordingly,

the finding that those two charges were ‘procedurally

defective to a fatal degree’ should not be construed to

mean that the entire action was to be found fatally

defective on procedural grounds.

B. The Report was intended also to show that the

two defective p sol were found to be without merit

because they did not constitute appropriate causes of

action.”

16. The Examiner's “clarification” in no manner al-

tered his previous finding that Charges 2 and 3 were “pro-

cedurally defective to a fatal degree.” Nevertheless on

June 30, 1972, the case file was forwarded to the Command-

7a

ing Officer, 63rd AB Gp, Norton Air Force Base, Cali-

fornia, for review and first level decision. On July 21,

1972, Col. Ralph W. Mistrot, Commander of the 63rd AB

Gp, rendered a decision disagreeing with the finding of

the hearing examiner as to all three counts and forwarded

the file to Maj. Gen. Tuebner, Auditor General of the Air

Force, for first level decision.

17. On June 14, 1972, Maj. Gen. Tuebner, Auditor

General of the United States Air Force, issued a decision

concurring with the finding and comments of the Com-

mander, 63rd AB Gp, and disagreeing with the hearing

examiner. The plaintiff was precluded from appeal to

Headquarters, USAF, on the ground that the decision of

May 12, 1972, had previously determined no procedural

error was present.

18. The decision was submitted for review by the Chi-

cago Region of the Civil Service Commission. Following a

hearing on September 26, 1972, the Chicago Region upheld

General Tuebner’s decision on November 2, 1972.

19. On November 20, 1972, the plaintiff appealed to

the Board of Appeal and Review of the Civil Service Com-

mission. On March 22, 1972, the Chicago Region was

affirmed by the Civil Service Commission. This action

followed.

Il

OPINION

The standard which the Court must apply to the case

before it is set forth in Baum v. Zuchert, 342 F.2d 145

(6th Cir. 1965) and Gass v. Ruegg, 379 F.2d 216 (6th Cir.

1967) , which stated:

8a

The function of a reviewing court in cases involving

the discharge of civil service employees is a limited

one. Powell v. Brannan, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 16, 196 F.2d

871, 873. The judicial function is to determine

whether there has been substantial compliance with

applicable procedures and statutes, and not to review

the administrative determination as to the wisdom or

good judgment of the agency exercising discretion.

Hargett v. Summerfield, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 85, 243

F.2d 29, 32, cert. denied 353 U.S. 970, 77 S.Ct. 1060,

| L.Ed.2d 1137. The courts will not examine into the

merits of the dismissal. Ellis v. Mueller, 108 U.S.App.

D.C. 174, 280 F.2d 722, 5 L.Ed.2d 104; Green v.

Baughman, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 187, 243 F.2d 610, 613,

cert, denied 355 U.S. 819, 78 S.Ct. 25, 2 L.Ed.2d 35.”

342 F.2d at 147; 379 F.2d at 218.

[1] In the absence of convincing evidence challenging

the validity of the certified administrative record, the Court

will not look beyond it. Tomlin v. U. S. Medical Center,

360 F.Supp. 353 (S.D.Ohio 1974); Handy v. Gayler, 364

F.Supp. 676 (D.Md. 1973); Thompson v. Department of

Justice, 372 F.Supp. 762 (N.D.Cal.1974) ; Spencer v. Schles-

inger, 374 F.Supp. 840 (D.D.C. 1974); Baca v. Butz, 376

F.Supp. 1005 (D.C.N.Mex.1974) ; Johnson v. United States

Postal Service, 364 F.Supp. 37 (N.D.Fla.1973); Cates v.

Johnson, 377 F.Supp. 1145 (W.D.Pa.1974) .

[2] Where it appears, however, that substantial devi-

ations from applicable procedures and statutes have resulted

from employer actions not included within the certified

administrative record, the presumption of its validity is

overcome.

[3] This is such a case. The evidence submitted by the

plaintiff reveals an almost wholesale clisregard for the pro-

cedural and substantive rights afforded the _plaintiff-

employee under A.F.R. 70-771. A.F R. 40-771 was also

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intended to establish within the Civilian Personnel Branch

of the Air Force hearing examiners whose purpose it was to

hear appeals in personnel matters independently of the

management officials whose decisions they reviewed. While

the merit findings and recommendations of the examiners

are not binding upon the Air Force Command, there is

no appeal provided under A.F.R. 40-771 from an exam-

iner’s finding of ‘fatal procedural defects.” During the

prosecution of this removal action it was not only the

merit findings of the Appeals and Grievance Examiners

which were totally disregarded.

The command of the Air Force has: (1) attempted an

appeal where no appeal is permitted (Findings of Fact 6

and 14); (2) atte apted an ex parte appeal contrary to

A.F.R. 40-771, (Effective 29 March 1968), paragraph 29

(b) (Findings of Fact 6 and 9); (3) sought to exercise

command influence (Findings of Fact 9 and 14); (4) with-

held documents in violation of A.F.R. 40-771, paragraph

10, (Effective 1 May 1971), (Finding of Fact 11); (5)

accepted recommendations from Air Force management

contrary to A.F.R. 40-771, paragraph 20 (b), (Finding of

Fact 13); and (6) Ignored the examiner's procedural find-

ings in attempts to overrule his merit findings (Finding of

Fact 16). The plaintiff has convincingly demonstrated his

inability to obtain an unbiased review of the merits of his

case within the rierarchy of the Air Force and civilian

personnel division.

The decision of the Board of Appeals and Review of the

Civ.1 Service Commission has likewise been tainted by

the deliberate withholding of evidence pertinent to pro-

cedures employed in the plaintiff's removal. It cannot be

allowed to stand in the fact of substantial prejudice to the

plaintiff during earlier proceedings.

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Ill

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. The Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 and 28 U.S.C. § 1361.

B. The Air Force did not substantially comply with the

requirements of Air Force Regulation 40-771 (Effective

29 March 1968), paragraphs 18 (b) (c) and (d), 29(b),

30 (a) (3) and 30 (b) (6).

C. The Air Force did not substantially comply with the

requirements of Air Force Regulation 40-771 (Effective |

May 1968), paragraphs 10, 20(b), (e) and (f).

D. The plaintiff was improperly removed from his

position as an Air Force Auditor and must be reinstated,

together with all back pay and allowances, rights and bene-

fits including interest at eight percent (8%) per annum on

such back pay and allowances.

Let judgment issue in accordance with the foregoing.

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APPENDIX B

No. 75-2145

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For The Sixth Circuit

Martin L. VAN WINKLE,

Shaper ApPEAL from the

Plaintif-Appellee,) United States Dis-

Vv. trict Court for the

Southern District of

L. McL ‘ .

JOHN cLucas Ohio.

Defendant-A ppellant.

Decided and Filed June 25, 1976.

Before: Epwarps, Peck and MILter,* Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam. The sole qu.stion posed by this appeal is

whether the federal Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596 (b) (1)

(1970) , was propertly interpreted by the federal District

Judge as authorizing not only an award of back pay but

also an award of interest thereon. The statute in question

(with the language specifically relied upon by the District

Judge emphasized) reads as follows:

(b) An employee of an agency who, on the basis

of an administrative determination or a timely a

is found by appropriate authority under applicab erie

or regulation to have undergone an unjustified and

unwarranted personnel action that has resulted in the

* Honorable William E. Miller died on April 12, 1976, and did not

participate in this decision.

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withdrawal or reduction of all or a part of the pay,

allowances, or differentials of the employee—

(1) is entitled, on correction of the personnel

action, to receive for the period for which the per-

sonnel action was in effect an amount equal to all

or any part of the pay, allowances, or differentials,

as applicable, that the employee normally would

have earned during that period if the personnel

action had not occurred, less any amounts earned

by him through other empiovment during that

period . . .

5 U.S.C. § 5596 (b) (1) (1970).

The facts in this case show that a civilian Air Force em-

ployee of some long standing, then employed at the Wright

Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, as an auditor, was dis-

covered in the process of shoplifting $16.20 worth of stereo

tape cartridges from the Base PX. The Air Force, feciing

such activity to be inconsistent with the responsibilities of

an auditor, undertook to fire him but apparently never

managed to accomplish the discharge within the rules of

procedure which had been created. At a result, on his

suit for reinstatement and back pay, the District Judge

awarded him same, an award which the Air Force has now,

albeit with expressed reluctance, accepted. The District

Judge also ordered the government to pay 8% interest

on all of the accumulated back pay.

The government's position on this appeal is that the

Back Pay Act is quite detailed in relation to what the Civil

Service Commission may award the federal employee in

the event of wrongful discharge, but it does not include

interest. The District Judge reasoned that when the statute

provided for ‘an amount equal to all . . . of the pay” of

which the employee had been deprived by his discharge,

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particularly in a period of inflation, the provision of inter-

est should be regarded as authorized.

The government's contention, on the other hand, is that

under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, a Congressional

statute waiving immunity cannot be construed to include

the right of the courts to award interest unless the statute

specifically says so. In this regard the government relies

upon United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 341 U.S.

48 (1951); United States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel Co.,

329 U.S. 585 (1947); United States v. Goltra, 312 US.

203 (1941). This Circuit has expressed a similar view in

Gray v. Dukedom Bank, 216 F.2d 108 (6th Cir. 1954) .

We believe that the award of interest must be reversed.

The Back Pay Act is quite detailed in the relief it affords.

Obviously, Congress could have added the award of interest

to the remedies which it did provide. Since the Back Pay

Act creates a cause of action against the sovereign which

did not previously exist, a strict construction of the sta-

tutory remedy is generally held to be required. United

States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel Co., supra.

The judgment of the District Court in awarding interest

is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

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APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 75-2145

MARTIN L. VAN WINKLE,

Plainuff-Appellee,

v.

JOHN L. McLUCAS,

Defendant- Appellant.

Before: Evwakxps, Peck and Mitver, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

Filed June 25, 1976

AppreaAt from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Ohio.

‘Tuts Cause came on to be heard on the record from the

United States District Court for the Southern District of

Ohio and was argued by counsel.

On ConsipERATION WHEREOF, It is now here ordered and

adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the said

District Court in this cause be and the same is hereby va-

cated as to awarding interest and remanded for further

proceedings.

Each party to pay own costs on appeal.

ENTERED BY ORDER

OF THE COURT

/s/ John P. Hehman

Clerk

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