Petitioners Brief — Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Dekalb County, Ga.

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a. '

[~~ Supreme Court, US.

FILED

MAR 2 1977

——

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

No. 76-700

FIREMAN’S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY,

Petitioner,

v

DEKALB COUNTY, GEORGIA, et al.,

Respondents.

BRIEF OF PETITIONER ON THE MERITS

J. ARTHUR MozLey

Attorney for Petitioner

1515 Gas Light Tower

235 Peachtree Street, N.E.

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Of Counsel:

Phillips, Hart & Mozley

1515 Light Tower

235 Peachtree Street, N.E.

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

(404) 522-2010

March 2, 1977

TABLE OF CONTENTS

a

Page

OPINTONS BELOW........----:seeeee rere: 1

JURISDICTION........--ceeee cece ceeeeeeeee: 2

STATUTES INVOLVED.........------++se0000> 2

QUESTIONS PRESENTED........------+++0+°> 3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE........------+++>: 5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT........----+-++++> 19

ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF

AUTHORITIES. ........--seccceeeeeceeeeeees 21

I. The Decision Below Is Erroneous And In

Irreconcilable Conflict With Both Federal

Common Law And Relevant State Law...... 21

A. As an aeronautical user of the Airport,

petitioner’s insured was an intended and

direct beneficiary of the duties and

obligations imposed on DeKalb County... 22

B. The decision below conflicts with

Federal Common Law........-.--+++++> 25

C. The decision below Conflicts with relevant

Beate TOW... cece ccccceccccccccccsscess 33

II. The Paramount And Overriding Interest Of

The Federal Government In Regulating All

Phases of Aeronautical Commerce Preempts

At Least To A Limited Degree Local Laws

Concerning Sovereign Immunity........---- 37

III. The Decision Below Has Resulted In An

Unconstitutional Denial Of Equal

Protection And Due Process........---+++>: 43

CONCLIIGION «oo... cc ccc cc ccc ccccccccsccceeees 47

d CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.......-.-.---++++: 48

i

\@

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

EXHIBITS:

Exhibit A—Statutes Involved................... la

Exhibit B—Log of Bird Sightings or Bird Counts

Made By F.A.A. Tower Controllers At The

BN yeahh oedd cukerveudes dagaeddss inns’ lb

Exhibit C—Written Notice Of Prior Airplane-Bird

De ie er le

Exhibit D—Letters To and From The F.A.A. and

DeKalb County Concerning The Bird Hazard

SII, 5i.0'e (oo adencdes ceendeexe ld

Exhibit E—Series of Court Orders Entered In Suit

Filed By F.A.A. Against DeKalb County

Fourteen Days After The Crash In Question,

Seeking Enforcement Of The Grant Agreements

And Alleviation Of The Bird Hazard........... le

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

American Airlines, Inc. v. City of Audubon Park,

Kentucky, 297 F.Supp. 207 (W.D.Ky. 1968) aff'd

407 F.2d 1306 (6th Cir. 1969)................... 37

American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead,

908 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 10GB)... 0. cece ccc cccenss 37

Arney v. United States, 479 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1973).. 30

Association of Data Processing Service Organizations,

Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)................ 32

Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass’n 0.

Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956)... 1.2... eee eee ee 34

ss

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Cases—Continued :

Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). ............. 32

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)....... 41, 42

Bossier Parish School Board v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847

a Ce ge ee ee i Gk ae ag 30

Briggs v. Sagers, 424 F.2d 130 (10th Cir.) cert.

denied 400 U.S. 829 (1970)............. 0. cee eee 39

Brinkerhoff-Farris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill,

ee a a. eas 44

Brown v. Merlo, 506 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1973)........... 46

Brown v. Wichita State University, 547 P.2d 1015

(Kan. 1976) appeal dismissed, —. U.S. .

ee ee nn aban wacave 46

Caroway v. City of Atlanta, 85 Ga.App. 792,

I es ce wencks 43

Chesapeake Bay Bridge and Tunnel District v.

Lauritzen, 404 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1968).......... 39

City and County of San Francisco v. Western Air

Lines, Inc. 204 Cal.App.2d 105, 22 Cal. Rptr.

NR a ad a ae a calla a dha aie we 29

City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.,

a ee a aie 37

City of Inglewood v. City of Los Angeles,

451 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1972).................. 26, 32

Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363

nines «wise uushueual 66a ane be aeas ede 25

Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)............... 32, 33, 40

il

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Cases—Continued :

Deason v. DeKalb County, 222 Ga. 63, 148 8.E.2d

I eee eds cae aay 35

DeKalb Real Estate Board, Inc. v. DeKalb County,

372 F.Supp. 748 (N.D.Ga. 1973)................. 44

DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956)........... 34

Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Town of Islip, 229 N.Y.8.2d

Be CS Is So o's ons k veep beens 606% 29

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 488 (1972)............ 44

Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)......... 3, 34

First National Bank, Henrietta, v. Small Business

Administration, 429 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1970)...... 25

Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F.Supp. 612

eR EE 45 ns Sah be ae ie wks a ¥ oon a 25, 42

Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability

Insurance Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) ................ 45

Gomez v. Florida State Employment Service, 3

417 F.2d 560 (5th Cir. 1060). .............cceees 42

Hancock County v. Williams, 230 Ga. 723, |

ee a sa aw dt eeea 36

Hebah v. United States, 428 F.2d 1334 (Ct.Cl.

REG RIOR. eS Ta ena Rae are eee 30

Henry v. Bauder, 518 P.2d 362 (Kan. 1974)......... 46

Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek

Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1988)... ...... cc cece 25, 26

Holland v. Phillips, 94 Ga.App. 361, 94 8.E.2d 503

Dc cae isaae takes hie chee eerakenels 34

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Cases—Continued :

Humphreys v. Tann, 13 CCH Avi. 18, 229

i a ee 26

Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972)..... 41

In Re Paris Air Crash, 399 F.Supp. 732

RR RS a Ean 42

Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D. 1975)..... 46

Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400

(7th Cir. 1974) cert. denied 421 U.S. 987 (1975).... 26

Laakonen v. Eighth Judicial District Court,

Pe Fat, | 46

Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968)............... 45

Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee, 521 F.2d 387

ee ee a 28

M. R. Thomason & Associates v. Wilson,

125 Ga.App. 658, 188 8.E.2d 805 (1972).......... 34

Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968)............. 38

McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961)......... 44

Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1958)... ............. 44

Moyer v. Phillips, 341 A.2d 441 (Pa. 1975).......... 46

Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527

(D.C.Cir. 1975), rev’d on other grounds

US, —..., 96 Sup.Ct. 1078 (1076). .............. 42

Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292

GS ees ee Cae Dene e eel se eas Geu's's 37

Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama State Docks

is ee Ny PE Is wv dccuye ds oncdaesuns 37

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Cases—Continued :

Pennsylvania Environmenial Council, Inc. v. Bartlett,

454 F.2d 613 (rd Cir. 1971)... 2.0... cece ween 39

Port of New York Authority v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,

259 F.Supp. 745 (E.D.N.Y. 1966)............. 28, 29

Primes v. Tyler, 331 N.E.2d 723 (Ohio 1975)........ 46

Rapp v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 264 F.Supp. 673

i hai ee ee bees die 13, 28

Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc., 45 U.S. L. Week

gg 29, 41, 42

Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)................... 44

Royster Guano v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920)...... 44

Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Crisp County, Georgia,

280 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1960) cert. denied,

ak. in bade came Kenvews 31, 36

Sheppard v. Bridges, 137 Ga. 615, 74 S.E.2d 245

i re ee 4G bee beaee es O48 34

Smith v. Ledbetter Brothers, Inc., 111 Ga.App. 238,

i es ck cnc enn cabs eave secene 34

Smith v. United States, 497 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1974).. 25

Southern Airways Co. v. DeKalb County, 102 Ga.App.

850, 118 S.E.2d 234 (1960)..... anon areunet 35, 43

State Construction Company v. Johnson, 88 Ga.App.

ks Cr ST III, hu. s-6 6 6 esate we eeevesn. 34

Town of East Haven v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,

282 F.Supp. 507 (D. Conn. 1968)................ 42

Town of New Windsor v. Ronan, 481 F.2d 450

(2nd Cir. 1973) and 329 F.Supp. 1286

EY SI 5 os ba 0 ehh G¥aee Wi0 den 60.0046 28

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Cases—Continued:

United States v. Huff, 165 F.2d 720 (5th Cir. 1948)... 30

United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203 (1970)....... 25

United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966)......... 34

Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp.,

Ee I rn bso 6 wkewenveddedeeseckaves 34

Ward v. Hudnell, 366 F.2d 247 (5th Cir. 1966)....... 18

Wilder v. State, 232 Ga. 404, 207 S.E.2d 38 (1974).... 44

Williamson v. Fortson, 376 F.Supp. 1300

et heed aku Gaie cue tolieedene es 45

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)........... 44

Constitutional Provisions:

Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution... 3

Article XI, Paragraph I of the 1945 Georgia

eee ee LON ve ees 6 ek 2

Statutes:

ees a ee el ed oa es 2

EE (Se sa eS a ae wee hey ee 41

Ge kee ey ee ee eee es 2

aes aki hivee kv ncdes 2,4, 5

ee eee ly aww eaes 2,17

eS eee oe en Peas 2

ee ee ade ee eee 2

Ne dsl eu a keen es bas 2, 22, 26, 27

Se ee nec aeeees 2, 17, 22, 26, 27

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Statutes—Continued :

i a RE ras wk ads Sneed 2,34

ae. 4a eae Teens sedate we’ 2,43

ee Pere ee eee 2

occa a doa vou taesuaca tes 2

ec uk ka pa kcepavesedanevnes 2

i se nec eeeceyies pa saee 3,35

Ga. Code § 23-1502...............0005. 3,5,21,35,43,47

a ean ES 3,43

Administrative Rules and Regulations:

wee Ce 0 23

RR ig ad Sa scaubuvievusdeatss exe 23

Legislative Materials:

H.R. Rep. No. 91-601, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970).. 24

Treatises:

4 Corbin on Contracts, Sec. 776. ..............006- 33

4 Corbin on Contracts, Sec. 777... ........0 eee eee 33

Viil

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

No. 76-700

FIREMAN’S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY,

Petitioner,

v.

DEKALB COUNTY, GEORGIA, et al.,

Respondents.

BRIEF OF PETITIONER ON THE MERITS

Petitioner Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company respect-

fully submits this brief on the merits in response to the

January 17, 1977 Order granting petitioner’s request for

a writ of certiorari and consolidating this case with Case

Nos. 76-607, 76-659 and 76-722.

OPINIONS BELOW

The en bane opinion of the Fifth Circuit Court of

Appeals, entered after rehearing, is reported at 538 F.2d

643 and is reprinted at P.A. la-6a.! The original panel

decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the

order granting rehearing en banc, are reported at 526 F.2d

1 As used herein, “P.A. ___”’ refers to pages of the Appendix attached

to Petitioner’s November 19, 1976 Petition for Writ of Certiorari,

and “‘J.A. ” refers to pages of the separate Joint Appendix filed

in all four of the consolidated cases.

1

2

679 and are reprinted at P.A. 17a-34a. The opinions of

the District Court are not reported, but are reprinted at

P.A. 35a-54a.

JURISDICTION

The original panel decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of

Appeals was entered on January 30, 1976 and respondent

DeKalb County’s timely petition for rehearing em banc

was granted on April 5y 1976. (P.A. 17a-34a.) The en banc

decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was entered

on August 25, 1976. (P.A. la-16a.) The judgment on re-

hearing en banc of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was

entered on August 25, 1976 and is reprinted at P.A.

55a-56a. The jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTES INVOLVED

The statutes and laws involved in this case were set

forth verbatim on pages 5-11 of petitioner’s petition for

writ of certiorari. Because such provisions are lengthy

they are not set out in the body of this brief. For con-

venient reference, however, the involved statutes and

laws are set forth in Exhibit A to this brief, at the pages

specified below:

Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652....... la

Airport and Airway Development Act, 49 U.S.C.

§§ 1701, 1711, 1713, 1714, 1716, and 1718...... la

Georgia Uniform Airports Law, Georgia Code

Sections 11-201, 11-205, 11-402 and 11-403..... 4a

Georgia Code Section 3-108.................. 6a

Article XI, Paragraph I of the 1945 Georgia

Ss 0-4 oN ss bw dds ode wkeepepedsarees 7a

3

Georgia Code Section 23-1501................ 7a

Georgia Code Section 23-1502................ 7a

Georgia Code Section 69-301................. 74a

Fourteenth Amendment, United States

EE RR eee 7a

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Must a Federal Court in a diversity of citizenship

case ordinarily subject to the holding of Erie R.R. v.

Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), be governed by federal

common law in determining whether private litigants

have standing as third-party beneficiaries to sue a county

for breach of safety covenants contained in Grant Agree-

ments entered into between the F.A.A. and the county

for improvement of the county airport, which safety

covenants ex facie are intended for the safety and benefit

of aeronautical users of the county airport, and, if federal

common law does apply to such issue, should not the

Federal Court in deciding such issue follow the federal

common law rulings of other Federal Courts (including

Circuit Courts of Appeals) on the question?

2. If a Federal Court in a diversity of citizenship case

should not apply federal common law in determining

whether private litigants have standing as third-party

beneficiaries to sue a county for breach of safety covenants

contained in Grant Agreements entered into between the

F.A.A. and the county for improvement of the county

airport, which safety covenants ex facie are intended for

the safety and benefit of aeronautical users of the county

airport, does not the holding of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,

304 U.S. 64 (1938), require, the Federal Court to follow

and apply the substantive law clearly and on several

4

occasions announced by the highest appellate courts of

the forum state with respect to the question at issue,

rather than the Federal Court’s concept of the law pre-

vailing in other jurisdictions, particularly when the sub-

stantive law of the forum state would have the effect of

enforcing the objectives of such safety covenants and

fostering the public policy inherent in such safety cove-

nants and in federal legislation concerning aviation and

aid to airports?

3. Is there an overriding federal interest in the regula-

tion of aeronautical interstate commerce that preempts

at least to a limited degree state laws concerning local

sovereign immunity, so that a county which has entered

into Grant Agreements with the F.A.A. under the aegis

of the Airport and Airway Development Act (49 U.S.C.

§§ 1701, et seq.) and has received significant federal fund-

ing of county airport improvements, is precluded from

asserting sovereign immunity as a bar to suits brought by

aeronautical users of the county airport, as third-party

beneficiaries, for negligent breach by the county of safety

covenants contained in the Grant Agreements, when such

safety covenants ex facie are intended for the benefit of

aeronautical users of the airport, and particularly when

the denial of sovereign immunity to the county under

such circumstances would have the effect of enforcing the

objectives of such safety covenants and fostering the

public policy inherent in the federal regulation of aviation

and would also result in*nationwide uniform interpreta-

tions of federal aviation legislation?

4. As both municipalities and counties in Georgia have

the identical authority to engage in the same proprietary

function of owning and operating public airports, and as

both municipalities and counties are eligible on an equal

5

basis for Grant Agreements and federal funds under the

Airport and Airway Development Act (49 U.S.C. §§ 1701,

et seq.), and as under Georgia law a governmental entity

in the form of a municipality has no sovereign immunity

from suits arising from municipal ownership and operation

of public airports, and as there are no rational or legiti-

mate distinctions and differences between the proprietary

function of a municipality in owning and operating a

public airport and the proprietary function of a county in

owning and operating a public airport, do the decisions

below, which provide a county with absolute sovereign

immunity, serve to create an irrational, arbitrary and

unreasonable judicial classification of the types of local

governmental entities that can’ be sued for wrongs com-

mitted during the course of operating an airport, in viola-

tion of petitioner’s equal protection and due process

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United

States Constitution, or alternatively, under the facts of

and as applied to this case, does Georgia Code Section

23-1502 in and of itself constitute an irrational, arbitrary

and unreasonable legislative classification of the types of

local governmental entities that can be sued for wrongs

committed during the course of operating an airport, in

violation of petitioner’s equal protection and due process

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United

States Constitution?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On February 26, 1973, after receiving clearances from

the F.A.A.-operated control tower, a Learjet Model 24 air-

plane, F.A.A. Registration No. N-454RN, owned by

Southeast Machinery, Inc. and operated by Machinery

Buyers Corp., made an IFR takeoff from Runway 20L at

DeKalb-Peachtree Airport, Atlanta, Georgia. The desti-

6

nation of the interstate flight was Miami, Florida. Im-

mediately after becoming airborne, and while within the

boundaries of the airport and at an altitude of approxi-

mately 400 feet, the jet engines of the airplane ingested a

large number of starlings or similar birds, resulting in

sudden loss of power in both engines, the crash and total

destruction of the airplane, and the death of all seven

persons aboard. (J.A. 139.)

The transcript of the radio communications between

the airplane and the F.A.A. ground and tower control

facilities describe best the events that occurred. (Time

references are to Greenwich Mean Time; “PDK GC”

refers to the Ground Control facility; and “PDK TWR”

refers to the Tower Control facility.)

TIME : 1451

N454RN : Ground Learjet four five four Romeo

November

PDK GC _: Lear four five four Romeo November

Peachtree Ground

N454RN : Put us on request I F R to ah Miami

Beach and we’re ready to taxi in about

five minutes

PDK GC : Lear four five four R N Roger

TIME : 1453

N454RN : Lear four fifty four R N’s I F R to Miami

TIME : 1453

PDK GC _: Lear four five four R N Peachtree Ground

taxi to runway two zero left wind zero

six zero degrees at five altimeter three

zero two zero follow the Bonanza ap-

proaching from your right front

N454RN : Roger

TIME

PDK GC

N454RN

PDK GC

N454RN

PDK GC

N454RN

TIME

N454RN

PDK TWR :

N454RN

PDK TWR :

N454RN

TIME

PDK TWR :

N454RN

TIME

PDK TWR :

N454RN

1457

Lear four five four Romeo November

clearance

Go ahead

Lear four five four Romeo November

cleared as filed maintain three thousand

expect flight Jevel four one zero within

three five miles squawk two zero four one

just before departure

Roger we’re cleared as filed to maintain

three expect four one oh in three five

miles squawk two zero four one departure

nineteen three

Lear four five four Romeo November

departure control frequency one one

niner point three contact tower one two

zero point niner when ready for de-

parture

(unintelligible, sounds like er and is

probably the last part of the word roger)

1459

How much a delay for Romeo November

sir

Well your number four for departure

Ok how much a delay for all of us

I don’t know we gonna get the first one

out right away

OK

1510

Lear ah four five four Romeo November

taxi into position and hold

Roger

1511

Lear four five four Romeo November

turn ah right heading two five zero for

vectors cleared for takeoff

Roger

TIME : 1512

PDK TWR : Lear four five four Romeo November it

appeared the ah left engine laid a pretty

good layer of smoke out of the left side

there for approximately ah three or four

hundred feet ah over

N454RN : We just hit some birds

PDK TWR : Ah roger ah you return turning to land

N454RN : Don’t believe we gonna make it

PDK TWR : Can you tell us where your going down

(J.A. 141-143.)

After the crash the remains of many dead birds were

found at or near the departure end of Runway 20L, and

bird remains and particles of protein matter were found on

the airplane windshield and center post and in the airplane

engines. Also, immediately prior to and after the crash

large flocks of birds were located in and about the Airport

boundaries and the adjacent garbage dump operated by

DeKalb County. The sole physical cause of the crash was

loss of engine power in both jet engines, resulting directly

and solely from the ingestion of birds in the engines.

(J.A. 143.)

Petitioner Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company, which

provided hull insurance to Southeast Machinery with

respect to Learjet N-454RN, paid its insured for the hull

loss and then filed this suit against respondent DeKalb

County and the United States of America to recover for

the $549,432.00 hull subrogation interest. (J.A. 144.)

Jurisdiction over DeKalb County was based on diversity

of citizenship and jurisdiction over the U.S.A. was based

on the Federal Tort Claims Act. (J.A. 138.)

As amended, the complaint against DeKalb County

alleged three principal claims: negligence; maintenance of

9

public and private nuisance; and breach of certain grant

agreements entered into between DeKalb County and the

F.A.A. concerning development of the county-owned and

operated airport. (J.A. 136-175.)

In this case and in four other cases resulting from the

catastrophe the District Court granted motions to dismiss

filed by DeKalb County, on the theory that the concept

of sovereign immunity barred any claims against DeKalb

County. (P.A. 35a-53a.)

Petitioner (and plaintiffs in the other four cases) ap-

pealed to the Fifth Cireuit Court of Appeals from the

order dismissing respondent DeKalb County, and on

January 30, 1976 the initial Fifth Cireuit panel of Circuit

Judges Godbold, Dyer and Morgan issued a decision re-

versing the District Court dismissal order. 526 F.2d 679.

This initial Fifth Cireuit decision held that DeKalb

County was entitled to sovereign immunity as to peti-

tioner’s negligence and nuisance claims, but that under

Georgia law sovereign immunity did not bar the breach of

contract claim based upon petitioner’s status as a third-

party beneficiary of the safety covenants imposed upon

DeKalb County by the F.A.A. in certain Grant Agree-

ments. Circuit Judge Dyer dissented from the portion of

the decision holding that petitioner could sue for breach

of contract. The basis for his dissent was that federal

common law applied to the breach of contract claim and

that under federal common law petitioner lacked standing

to sue as a third-party beneficiary.

Thereafter, respondent DeKalb County moved for

rehearing en bane and on April 5, 1976 rehearing en banc

was granted. 526 F.2d 688. On August 25, 1976, the Fifth

Circuit sitting en banc, in an eight to five decision, adopted

Circuit Judge Dyer’s earlier dissent and in effect ruled

2 md

SS

10

that DeKalb County was entitled to sovereign immunity

as to all of petitioner’s claims, including the breach of

contract claim. 538 F.2d 643. The five dissenting members

of the en bane Court were Chief Judge Brown and Circuit

Judges Goldberg, Ainsworth, Godbold and Morgan, and

they urged that petitioner did have standing as a third-

party beneficiary to sue for DeKalb County’s breach of

the Grant Agreements. Four of the dissenting judges of

the en bane court also argued that federal common law

did not apply to the case.

On November 19, 1976 Fireman’s Fund filed its timely

petition for writ of certiorari, which was granted by this

Court’s January 17, 1977 Order. Such Order also consoli-

dated this case (No. 76-700) with three other cases (Nos.

76-607, 76-659 and 76-722) involved in the decision below.

As the decision in question was entered with respect to

respondent DeKalb County’s motion to dismiss, it is

necessary for this Court generally to be aware of the

relevant allegations of petitioner’s complaint, which

allegations are set forth below.

Prior to the crash, DeKalb County had actual knowl-

edge that birds could be ingested into jet engines, and that

jet engine bird ingestion could cause an engine failure and

crash. DeKalb County also had actual knowledge that a

dangerous bird hazard and bird-attracting garbage dump

existed at the Airport immediately adjacent to the jet

runway, and that huge flocks of starlings and other birds

had been attracted to the open garbage dump maintained

by the County on the Airport premises. (J.A. 147.)

Pursuant to the authority and directions of Congress,

the F.A.A. prior to the crash in question had issued

Advisory Circular No. 150/522-3A, dated March 2, 1972,

11

entitled “Sird Hazards to Aircraft,” in which the F.A.A.

stated in part as follows:

“Migratory birds, particularly waterfowl, are a

hazard to aircraft due to their size and weight. In

recognition of this potential hazard, F.A.A. Air

Traffie Control and Flight Service Station facilities

issue advisory information on bird activities when

they are reported or when they have knowledge of

such activities. Information given to pilots ineludes

the position, species or size of bird if known, and their

course and altitude.’’ (J.A. 152.)

To cope with such bird hazards, the Advisory Circular

stated that the F.A.A. operates as follows:

“A.A, Air Traffie Control and Flight Service Sta-

tion facilities coordinate with airport management

for either appropriate alerting action by a Notice to

Airmen when flocks of birds are noted to remain in

the airport vicinity or for possible closing by a Notice

to Airmen when flocks roost on runways.” (J.A. 152.)

The duties of the I’.A.A. tower personnel at the Airport

are in part set forth in the Terminal Air Traffie Control

Manual, 7110.8, one of the air traffie control manuals

referred to in Part 65 of the Federal Aviation Regulations,

in which Manual the following responsibilities of air

traffic control personnel are listed:

“If you observe or are informed of any condition

which affects the safe use of a landing area:

(a) Relay the information to the airport manager

concerned,

(b) Issue a Notice to Airmen publicizing an unsafe

condition if you are unable to contact the airport

manager (of if there is no airport manager desig-

nated) and then inform the manager as soon as

practicable. . .

”?

12

“122. BIRD ACTIVITY

ADDNL S8VC

“a. Issue advisory information on the position

and, if known, species or size of birds, and their

course of flight and altitude if you believe that the

safety of flight in that area may be affected. Do this

for at least 15 minutes after receipt of such informa-

tion from pilots or from adjacent facilities unless

visual observation or subsequent reports reveal the

activity is no longer a factor.”

“1552. BIRD ACTIVITY INFORMATION

“a. Issue advisory information on pilot-reported

or radar-observed and_ pilot-verified bird activity.

Include position, species or size of birds, if known,

course of flight and altitude. (1¢)

Phraseology :

FLOCK OF (Species, if known)/(size, if known)

BIRDS, (number) O’CLOCK (number of miles)

MILES (direction) BOUND:

LAST REPORTED AT (altitude, as determined

from pilot report).

or

ALTITUDE UNKNOWN.

FLOCK OF (species, if known)/(size, if known)

BIRDS (direction) BOUND ALONG (flyway or

geographical route) :

LAST REPORTED AT (altitude, as determined

from pilot report).

or

ALTITUDE UNKNOWN.

FLOCK OF/NUMEROUS FLOCKS (species, if

known)/(size, if known) BIRDS, VICINITY

(location):

13

LAST REPORTED AT (altitude, as determined

from pilot report).

or

ALTITUDE UNKNOWN.

b. Relay bird activity information to adjacent

facilities and to F'SS’s whenever it appears it will

became a factor in their areas.”’ (J.A. 153.)

Public knowledge of the hazards of birds to aircraft

has existed at least since the 1940’s, when the F.A.A. pub-

lished a report containing detailed statistics on the col-

lision of aircraft with birds, which report was admitted

into evidence in Rapp v. Kastern Air Lines, Inc., U.S.A.,

et al., 264 F.Supp. 673 (1.D.Pa. 1967), and which report

included 1946 statistics on bird strikes by aircraft, there

being more than one such strike per day during this early

aviation period. (J.A. 155.)

DeKalb-Peachtree Airport is located in DeKalb County

on land owned by the County, and the Airport is owned,

operated, managed and maintained by the County. The

Airport has paved runways, hangars, servicing and park-

ing facilities, a control tower with radio facilities, an in-

strument landing system control center, and access to

other radio and navigational aids. The Airport is operated

by the County for the public welfare and benefit of all

citizens and 1s subject to the jurisdiction of the F.A.A.

(J.A. 156.)

DeKalb County acquired the Airport by way of quit-

claim deed from the United States General Services Ad-

ministration in 1960. Since 1966 DeKalb County has

utilized the Airport site for dumping raw garbage. Km-

ployees of DeKalb County at the Airport have observed

and reported a significant increase in the number of birds

at the Airport following the utilization of the Airport site

for raw garbage disposal. (J.A. 156.)

14

The untreated raw garbage, refuse, trash, offal, filth

and other waste material deposited by DeKalb County

on the Airport created a large area constituting an attrac-

tion to birds and causing huge flocks of birds to congre-

gate about the Airport, the runways, ends of runways

and other areas within the Airport boundaries. The attrac-

tiveness of the open garbage dump to birds was increased

by the failure of DeKalb County to remove trees, under-

growth and high grass from the area of the open garbage

dump and along the runways, which foliage provided

roosting, nesting and basking areas for the large flocks of

birds attracted to the garbage dump. The birds at times

remained, walked and ran upon said runways and ad-

jacent grass areas at the sides and ends of the runways,

and congregated in the numerous trees on and about the

Airport area. The birds when located upon the Airport

grounds often flew aloft in large flocks many times each

day as aircraft would take off, approach, land or fly near

said Airport. The flocks of birds at the Airport constituted

a continuous hazard to the safety of aircraft and to the

safety and lives of the crews and passengers therein and to

persons residing and located upon the ground in the

vicinity of the Airport. (J.A. 157-158.)

Beginning in June, 1962, the Federal Government

entered into six Grant Agreements with DeKalb County,

pursuant to which at least $1,025,224.06 was paid to the

County for the purpose of assisting the County in the

improvement and development of DeKalb-Peachtree

Airport. Associated with the various Grant Agreements

is an airport layout plan developed by DeKalb County

and approved by the F.A.A. graphically illustrating the

development and proposed development of the airport

facilities and the use of the land included within the air-

port boundaries. Such use does not include an open gar-

15

bage dump or any other dumping ground for garbage.

(J.A. 159.)

Prior to the crash in question, the F.A.A. recognized

that the existence of the open garbage dump at the Air-

port constituted an attraction to huge flocks of birds, and

that such birds constituted a definite hazard for aircraft

taking off and landing at the Airport. From March 9,

1970, to February 14, 1972, the F.A.A. communicated

with DeKalb County, both by letter and by conference,

relative to alleviation of the bird hazard caused by the

existence of the open garbage dump on the Airport site.

In February 1971, the F.A.A. was advised by DeKalb

County that the dump would be closed by August, 1972,

but DeKalb County did not close the dump and the

hazard continued. (J.A. 160.)

The Grant Agreements entered into between the F.A.A.

and DeKalb County under the Airport and Airway

Development Act imposed the following obligations on

DeKalb County:

‘The Sponsor [DeKalb County] will keep up to date

at all times an airport layout plan . . . Such airport

layout plan, and each amendment, revision, or modifi-

cation thereof, shall be subject to approval of the

I’.A.A., which approval shall be evidenced by the signa-

ture of a duly authorized representative of the F.A.A.

on the face of the airport layout plan. The Sponsor will

not make or permit the making of any changes or

alterations in the Airport or any of its facilities other

than in conformity with the airport layout plan as so

approved by the F.A.A., if such changes or alterations

might adversely affect the safety, utility, or efficiency

of the Airport.” (J.A. 161.)

As previously noted, the airport layout plan made no

mention of an open garbage dump on the Airport. The

eee

16

Grant Agreements also imposed the following specific

covenants on the County:

“The covenants shall remain in full force and effect

throughout the useful life of the facilities developed

under this Project, .. .”

“The Sponsor will operate the Airport as such for the

use and benefit of the public. . . . The Sponsor may pro-

hibit or limit any given type, kind or class of aeronauti-

cal use of the Airport if such action is necessary for the

safe operation of the Airport or necessary to serve the

civil aviation’ needs of the public.”

“The Sponsor will operate and maintain in a safe and

serviceable condition the Airport and all facilities

thereon and connected therewith which are necessary

to serve the aeronautical users of the Airport other

than facilities owned or controlled by the United States,

and will not permit any activity thereon which would

interfere with its use for airport purposes.’

“In addition, the Sponsor will not erect or permit the

erection of any permanent structure or facility which

would interfere materially with the use, operation, or

future development of the Airport, in any portion of a

runway approach area in which the Sponsor has ac-

quired, or may hereafter acquire, property interests

permitting it to so control the use made of the surface

of the land.”

. The Sponsor will not make or permit the making

of any changes or alterations in the Airport or any of its

facilities other than in conformity with the airport lay-

out plan as so approved by the F.A.A., if such changes

or alterations might adversely affect the safety, utility,

or efficiency of the Airport.”

“Insofar as is within its power and to the extent

reasonable, the Sponsor will take action to restrict the

use of land adjacent to or in the immediate vicinity of

the Airport to activities and purposes compatible with

17

normal airport operations including landing and takeoff

of aircraft.”’ (J.A. 161-163.)

DeKalb County violated the Grant Agreement cove-

nants by willfully permitting the existence of an open

garbage dump and bird hazard on the Airport site and

adjacent to Runway 20L. The covenants ex facie were

intended for the benefit and safety of aeronautical users

of the Airport, and petitioner’s insured was a third-party

beneficiary of said Grant Agreement covenants. Accord-

ingly, DeKalb County is liable for breach of such Grant

Agreement covenants. (J.A. 163.)

By reason of the existence of the open garbage dump

prior to and on February 26, 1973, the operation of the

Airport by DeKalb County constituted a public and

private nuisance and a hazard to public safety, and the

maintenance of the open garbage dump at the Airport

constituted an airport hazard as defined in 49 U.S.C.

§ 1711, and was a violation of the 49 U.S.C. § 1718(3).

(J.A. 163.)

The reckless nature of the negligence and dereliction of

duties of DeKalb — ounty is exemplified by the fact that

prior to the fatal crash in question, DeKalb County had

received notices of several airplane bird-strike and near

bird-strike incidents within the airport boundaries, but

despite this knowledge of prior incidents DeKalb County

failed to take any action at all to prevent a recurrence of

such incidents. (J.A. 170.)

The Airport is not owned, operated, managed and

maintained by DeKalb County as a governmental func-

tion or enterprise, but, instead, is owned, operated,

maintained and managed by DeKalb County as a pro-

prietary or ministerial function or enterprise. DeKalb

18

County leases substantial portions of the Airport to

private companies engaged in commercial operations for

profit; some of such leases are for fixed rental amounts

plus a percentage of the revenues or income derived by the

tenants from their commercial operations; the revenues

thus obtained by DeKalb County are not insignificant,

but are substantial; and the Airport is owned, operated,

managed and maintained by DeKalb County primarily as

a source of revenue for the County. In effect, with respect

to the ownership, operation, management and main-

tenance of the Airport, DeKalb County acts as a private

landlard and not as a governmental entity. (J.A. 170-171.)

Prior to the accident, DeKalb County purchased a

liability insurance policy providing bodily injury liability

insurance and $1,000,000.00 property damage liability

insurance with respect to the ownership, operation, man-

agement and maintenance of the Airport, and petitioner’s

claim falls within the limits of such policy. Such insurance

contains a “Waiver of Governmental Immunity” rider

which provides as follows:

“It is agreed that the Company waives any right to

deny liability under the policy or to refuse payment

within the limits thereof by reason of the non-liability

of the insured political subdivision for the wrongful or

negligent acts of its agents and employees and its im-

muni y from suit as an agency of the State performing

governmental functions.” (J.A. 171-172.)

As the rulings in question were entered on the County’s

motion to dismiss, it is axiomatic that for purposes of

decision herein the above-summarized allegations of the

complaint must be accepted as true. Ward v. Hudnell,

366 F.2d 247, 249 (5th Cir. 1966).

So that the Court will be aware that such allegations

19

are founded upon real facts, however, and so that the Court

may be made aware of the enormity of the bird hazard

that existed at the Airport as a result of the County’s

insistence upon maintaining an open garbage dump on

the Airport premises, petitioner has attached as Exhibits

to this brief some of the documentary evidence adduced

in the trial court during the process of discovery deposi-

tions, as follows:

Exhibit B—log of bird sightings or bird counts made

by F.A.A. tower controllers at the Airport.

Exhibit C—written notices of prior airplane-bird

strikes at the Airport.

Exhibit D—letters to and from the F.A.A. and

DeKalb County concerning the bird hazard

and garbage dump.

Exhibit E—series of court orders entered in suit filed

° by F.A.A. against DeKalb County fourteen days

after the crash in question, seeking enforcement

of the Grant Agreements and alleviation of the

bird hazard.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I.

The statutory and contractual covenants in question ex

facie are intended to prot. ct and provide for the safety of

aeronautical users of the Airport, and such covenants im-

posed on DeKalb County the duty to alleviate airport

hazards, to use airport premises only for purposes com-

patible with normal airport operations, and to operate

and maintain the airport in a safe and serviceable con-

dition.

Such statutory and contractual covenants were in-

tended solely and exclusively for the benefit of aeronauti-

20

cal users of the airport, such as petitioner’s insured, and

petitioner’s insured clearly falls within the class of per-

sons intended to be protected by such covenants. More-

over, petitioner’s injury is not imaginary, but is real and

immediate. And neither the Grant Agreements nor the

Airport and Airway Development Act nor the legislative

history of such Act evince any intent that petitioner’s

claims be precluded from review.

Under both Federal Common law and the law of

Georgia petitioner has standing as a third-party benefi-

ciary to sue the County for breach of the statutory and

contractual covenants in question, and the decision below

is clearly erroneous.

Il.

Aviation or aeronautical commerce is extensively and

pervasively regulated by the Federal Government, and

such federal regulation extends to and completely en-

compasses the activity of local governmental entities and

agencies in operating and maintaining public, federally

funded airports. Such federal regulation of necessity pre-

empts any local laws that would burden or conflict with

the purposes of and policies explicit in the federal regu-

lation.

By voluntarily seeking and obtaining ownership of and

operating rights to the Airport in question from the

General Services Administration, and by voluntarily

seeking and obtaining in excess of a million dollars in

federal aid under the Airport and Airway Development

Act, and by voluntarily executing Grant Agreements

with the F.A.A., DeKalb County entered a federally

regulated area of interstate commerce and subjected it-

self to federal regulation of airport activities. As a matter

of federal law DeKalb County thereby waived its sover-

21

eign immunity to the extent of private claims involving

rights and remedies implicit in the federal regulation.

To rule otherwise would impede substantially the

federally expressed concern for aviation safety (and elimi-

nation of airport hazards) explicit in the Act and Grant

Agreements, and would impose an _ unconstitutional

burden on interstate commerce and the rights of inter-

state aeronautical travellers.

Il.

Under Georgia law the statutory authority for a city or

a county to own and operate an airport is the same, and

under Georgia law the operation of an airport by either a

city or county is a proprietary—not governmental—

function. Georgia law also provides that a city has no

sovereign immunity with respect to claims arising from

the operation of an airport.

Georgia Code Section 23-1502 cannot constitutionally

be interpreted to bar petitioner’s claims against DeKalb

County, as the result of such an interpretation would be

the creation of a scheme of classification that would allow

suits against some local governmental entities for the

negligent proprietary operation of airports but would

prohibit identical suits against other local governmental

entities for the identical negligent proprietary operation

of identical airports, in violation of petitioner’s rights to

equal protection of the laws and due process.

ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITIES

I. The Decision Below Is Erroneous And In Irreconcilable

ee EE IE

State Law.

The cornerstone of the ruling below is the conclusion

. that petitioner is a mere “incidental beneficiary”’ of the

a

22

statutory and contractual duties imposed on DeKalb

County by the Grant Agreements, federal legislation, and

regulations in question, and that as an “incidental’’

rather than “intended” beneficiary petitioner has no

standing to sue for breach of contract. 526 F.2d 686-687.

In this connection, a majority of the Court below con-

cluded that the “only purpose” of the statutory and con-

tractual covenants relied upon by petitioner ‘‘was to make

sure that federal funds were effectively employed and not

wasted.”’ 526 F.2d 687.

While petitioner concedes that certain provisions of the

Federal Act and Grant Agreements in question are ob-

viously designed to guard against waste or misuse of

federal funds [see 49 U.S.C. § 1716(c)(1) (B) and (C),

§ 1718(7), (8), (9) and (10), § 1720, § 1721, §1725 and

§ 1726, and paragraph 9 of the Grant Agreement appear-

ing at page 202 of the Joint Appendix], petitioner con-

tends that the particular statutory and contractual

covenants and regulations involved in this case are quite

clearly intended solely and directly for the benefit of

aeronautical users of the Airport.

A. As an aeronautical user of the Airport, petitioner’s

insured was an intended and direct beneficiary of

the duties and obligations imposed on DeKalb

County.

49 U.S.C. § 1718 expressly provides that prior to the

grant of federal funds the recipient of such funds shall

make the following written promises, among others:

(1) The airport will be suitably operated and main-

tained ;

(2) Aerial approaches will be cleared and protected;

(3) Existing airport hazards will be mitigated, and

' : 23

! the establishment or creation of future airport hazards

z£ will be prevented; and

(4) The use of land adjacent to or in the immediate

vicinity of the airport will be restricted to activities

compatible with normal airport operations, including

landing and takeoff of aircraft.

These statutory duties on their face are related to

aviation safety, and not to the subject of possible waste

or misuse of federal funds.

The federal regulations issued to ‘flesh out” the Act

confirm that the fostering of aviation safety is one of the

primary purposes of the Act. For example, 14 CFR

§ 151.5(b)(1) specifies that an airport development proj-

ect must provide for the planning or development of an

airport that is “safe, useful, and usable.” See also 14 CFR

§ 152.5(b).

In the Grant Agreements executed pursuant to the

requirements of the Act and the regulations issued there-

under, DeKalb County specifically agreed:

(1) To operate the Airport “for the use and benefit

of the public” (J.A. 217);

(2) That it would “operate and maintain in a safe

and serviceable condition the Airport and all facilities

... which are necessary to serve the aeronautical users

of the Airport . . . and wili not permit any use thereon

which would interfere with its use for airport purposes.”’

(J.A. 218.)

(3) That it would not erect or permit the erection of

any structure or facility which would interfere material-

ly with the use or operation of the Airport (J.A. 218.);

and

(4) That it would restrict the use of land to purposes

and activities compatible with normal airport opera-

en

24

tions, including landing and takeoff of airplanes.

(J.A. 210.)

The legislative history of the Act confirms that the pur-

pose of the above-summarized statutory and contractual

duties is to provide for the safety of airport users. For

example, H.R. Rep. No. 91-601, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess.

(1970), provides:

“The problem of congestion in terms of cost and in-

convenience, as serious as it is, is secondary to the

problem of maintaining the safety of aircraft and air

travelers.”

* * *

“The basic elements of the aviation system are the

airman (pilot), vehicle (aircraft), and the airport. In

order to provide for safety, the Congress has legislated

that the airman and vehicle shall meet standards con-

sidered necessary to safety of flight and that each be

certificated by the Federal Government. However,

airports are also essential to the conduct of flight opera-

tions and conditions at an airport can seriously influence

the safety of flight.”

* * *

“Section 18 of the reported bill requires that the

Secretary receive a number of assurances prior to his

approving a project for airport development. They are

designed to assure, among other things, that airports to

which a project relates will be . . . suitably operated

and maintained. Also, requirements are included re-

specting . . . the removal or mitigation of airport

hazards, .. .” 1970 U.S. Code Cong. and Ad. News,

pp. 3051, 3058 and 3071.

The particular statutory and contractual covenants at

issue here are not intended simply to prevent a wasting

of Federal funds, but, instead, have as their primary

objective the safety of aeronautical users of public,

. 25

federally funded airports. There can be no doubt at all

that aeronautical users of the Airport were the primary

and intended beneficiaries of the contractual and statutory

covenants at issue, and that Airport aeronautical users

fall well within the class of persons intended by Congress

to be protected and benefitted by such covenants.’

B. decision below conflicts with Federal Common

Ww.

The contracts in question are “Federal” contracts, in

that the Federal Government is one of the contracting

parties and in that the contracts themselves, together

with almost all of their specific terms, are expressly au-

thorized by Federal legislation and regulations. Moreover,

the contract terms are uniform and standard nationwide,

regardless of the identity or geographical location of the

non-lederal contracting party. Last, the contracts affect

and deal with a particular area—aeronautical commerce

—that is the subject of pervasive and preemptive regula-

tion by the Federal Government.

Petitioner therefore acknowledges that there may be

cogent reasons for the application of Federal common law

‘ to the question of whether petitioner has standing as a

third-party beneficiary to sue for the County’s breach of

the Grant Agreement covenants. See United States v.

Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203 (1970); Clearfield Trust Co. »v.

United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); Smith v. United States,

497 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1974); First National Bank,

Henrietta v. Small Business Administration, 429 F.2d 280

(5th Cir. 1970); Cf., Hinderlider v. La Pluta River &

’ “adeed, it would seem that the primary purpose of all federal regu-

lation of aviation is protection of the safety of aeronautical travellers.

See the discussion of similar federal regulation of aviation, set forth

° in Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F.Supp. 612 (C.D.Cal. 1972).

Se a

26

Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). [On occasion

the lower Federal courts have found it especially appro-

priate to fashion Federal common law in cases involving

aviation or aeronautical commerce. See Kohr v. Allegheny

Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied

421 U.S. 987 (1975); and Humphreys v. Tann, 13 CCH

Avi. 18, 229 (E.D. Mich. 1976).]

Assuming, therefore, that Federal common law is

determinative of the issue at hand, the decision below

conflicts with the applicable Federal common law and is

for such reason erroneous.

In the leading case of City of Inglewood v. City of Los

Angeles, 451 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1972), the Ninth Circuit

focused on the precise question involved here, namely,

whether non-contracting parties have standing as third-

party beneficiaries to sue for breach of Grant Agreements

identical to those sub judice. 451 F.2d 954.

After reviewing the grant agreement covenants, statu-

tory provisions and legislative history, the Ninth Circuit

concluded that plaintiffs were intended beneficiaries of the

particular Grant Agreement covenants involved in that

case:

“There is a further issue for this Court to resolve—

whether or not Inglewood has standing to enforce the

Federal Aviation Administration grant agreements

with Los Angeles under the provisions of 49 U.S.C.A.

section 1716(c) (3) and 1718(4). The district court

found that sec. 1718(4) [then sec. 1110(4)] was only

intended to deal with the safety of airplanes on takeoff

or landing; that the plantiffs were not the intended

beneficiaries of the grant agreements; and that the

statutes imposed no duty on the defendant City of Los

Angeles to give ‘fair consideration’ to neighboring

residents. [C.R., pp. 372-373] Both parties on appeal

et ne Se eber

. 27

have treated the question as being whether or not the

plantiffs have standing to sue under the grant agree-

ments.

“We turn first to the question of the purpose of

sections 1716(c) (3) and 1718(4). The legislative history

is silent regarding the intention of Congress in enacting

sec. 1716(c) (3). However, the legislative history of see.

1718(4) [sec. 1110(4)] supports the theory that flight

safety was not the sole purpose of the section. Rapp v.

Kastern Air Lines, Inc., 264 F.Supp. 673 (E.D.Pa. 1967)

cited by the district court and the appellee only deals

with sec. 1718(3) [then sec. 1110(3)|. We conclude,

contrary to the District Court, from the language of

sec. 1716(c) (3) and the legislative history of sec.

1718(4) that each were intended by the Congress to

insure that the welfare of persons living close by air-

ports which were to receive government funds to engage

in development projects would receive ‘fair considera-

tion’ by the Secretary o° Transportation.” 451 F.2d

954-955. (Footnotes omitted.)

After ruling that plaintiffs possessed the requisite

‘ standing to sue (451 F.2d 955), the Ninth Circuit distin-

guished and refused to follow the third-party beneficiary

cases relied upon by the Fifth Circuit in the opinion below:

‘Los Angeles attempts to find support for its position

in a series of cases holding that third parties cannot sue

on grant agreements between airports and the Federal

Aviation Administration based upon third-party bene-

ficiary contract doctrines. Port of New York Authority

v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 259 F.Supp. 745 (E.D.N.Y.

1966); City and County of San Francisco v. Western

Air Lines, Inc., 204 Cal.App.2d 105, 22 Cal.Rptr. 216

(1962). We note that in both cases the plaintiffs were

airline companies and the provisions of the Federal

Airport Act they were attempting to enforce were not

the provisions plaintiffs are attempting to enforce in

\° this case.

28

“While we express no opinion as to the merits of

those cases, we do not find them controlling in this case.

If Los Angeles made the assurances required by sec.

1716(c) (3) and sec. 1718(4) in applying for various

grant agreements, then Inglewood must certainly be

included within the category of intended beneficiaries of

those assurances. Congress had some purpose in enact-

ing these two sections of Title 49. It is not to Los

Angeles’ benefit to be required to give the Secretary

those assurances; nor are the assurances of any inde-

pendent benefit to the Secretary. The Secretary merely

receives them for the benefit of, and in the place of, the

surrounding communities and residents of the area.

Any other interpretation of sec. 1716(c) (3) and sec.

1718(4) deprives them of any meaning or effect.”

451 F.2d 955-956. (Emphasis added.)

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has also indicated

that private, non-contracting parties ‘“‘may qualify as

intended beneficiaries” under the particular Act and type

of F.A.A. Grant Agreements involved here. Luedtke v.

County of Milwaukee, 521 F.2d 387, 391 (7th Cir. 1975).

Cf., the District Court and Circuit Court decisions in

Town of New Windsor v. Ronan, 481 F.2d 450 (2nd Cir.

1973), and 329 F.Supp. 1286 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).

And in the landmark airplane-bird ingestion case,

Rapp v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 264 F.Supp. 673 (E.D.Pa.

1967), the District Court’s judgment of tort liability in

favor of private, non-contracting parties and against the

defendant (who was a party to Grant Agreements) was

based in large part upon the defendant’s breach of duties

and obligations imposed by F.A.A. Grant Agreements

identical to the ones involved here.

The only other cases petitioner has been able to locate

dealing with the type of F.A.A. Grant Agreements in- -

volved here are Port of New York Authority v. Eastern Air

29

. Lines, Inc., 259 F.Supp. 745 (E.D.N.Y. 1966); Eastern

Air Lines, Inc. v. Town of Islip, 229 N.Y.S.2d 117 (N.Y.

Sup.Ct. 1962); and City and County of San Francisco v.

Western Air Lines, Inc., 204 Cal.App.2d 105, 22 Cal.Rptr.

216 (1962). Although all three of these cases denied third-

party beneficiary status to the plaintiffs there involved,

such cases are easily distinguishable from the case at bar.

The Port of New York Authority and Western Airlines

cases involved Grant Agreement covenants totally dif-

ferent from the ones involved here, and the plaintiffs in

those two cases were certificated air carriers who quite

obviously were not benefitted in the least by the particular

covenants they sought to enforce.

.

= «obi

.

on Cae

—: The Town of Islip case was a decision by a single state

-court trial judge who applied New York law, not Federal

. common law. Moreover, the trial judge’s ruling was

obviously influenced by his positive finding that the real

cause of the accident was plaintiff’s own negligence. See

“% 229 N.Y.S.2d 119 and 120.

Although it did not involve an F.A.A. Grant Agree-

ment, the recent decision of the Third Circuit in Rauch v.

United Instruments, Inc., 45 U.S. L. Week 2333 (3rd Cir.

1976), sheds light on the question of whether parties in

the category of petitioner’s insured are intended benefi-

caries of Federal aviation statutes and regulations. As

reported at 45 U.S. L. Week 2333, the Third Circuit held:

“In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 43 LW 4733 (1975), the

U.S. Supreme Court set forth guidelines for deciding

whether a private individual who has been injured by

a violation of a federal statute can sue under that

statute even though it does not expressly provide for a

private remedy. The first question to be considered

4 under the Cort analysis is whether the prospective

ee

Renee

30

plaintiff is one of the class for whose especial benefit

the statute was enacted. The congressional objective of

safety permeates the Federal Aviation Act, and the

fostering of safe air travel was the congressional motive

for giving the administrator the authority to prescribe

minimum safety standards governing aircraft appli-

cances. In a broad sense, Congress was seeking to assure

the personal safety of all persons who are potential

passengers or crew members of aircraft as well as those

on the ground whose lives and property might be

endangered by accidents resulting from unsafe aircraft.

These are persons who constitute the class for whose

especial benefit the safety provisions of the statute were

enacted.’’ (Emphasis added.)

Cf., Arney v. United States, 479 F.2d 653, 658 (9th Cir.

1973).

Petitioner also points out that in Hebah v. United States,

428 F.2d 1334, 1339 (Ct.Cl. 1970), the Court ruled: “It is

settled, moreover, that an intended third-party benefi-

ciary of a government contract can sue under § 1491.”

Likewise, in United States v. Huff, 165 F.2d 720 (5th Cir.

1948), third-party beneficiaries of a government lease

were allowed to sue the government for breach of the

lease.

The decision below is in direct conflict with the Federal

common law expressed in the above-cited cases. Such

decision also conflicts with other, better-reasoned decisions

of the Fifth Circuit itself.

In Bossier Parish School Board v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847

(5th Cir. 1967), the Fifth Circuit held that black children

were third-party beneficiaries of anti-discrimination cove-

nants contained in federal aid grant agreements between

the local school board and H.E.W., and that such children

had standing as third-party beneficiaries to sue the local ’*

school board for breach of such covenants. In so ruling,

31

the Fifth Circuit expressly adopted the District Court

holding that ‘“‘Defendants by their contractual assurances

have afforded rights to these federal children as third-

party beneficiaries concerning the availability of public

schools.” 370 F.2d 847.

And in Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Crisp County, Georgia,

280 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 942

(1961), the Fifth Circuit held that a private party should

be allowed to maintain a tort-damage action against a

Georgia county because the Federal Power Act and a

license granted to the County under such Act imposed a

duty on the County to protect the property of private

third parties.

In concluding that petitioner lacked standing as a

third-party beneficiary to sue for breach of the Grant

Agreement covenants, the Court below not only failed to

recognize and follow the federal common law explicit in

the cases discussed above, but applied the wrong test to

determine whether plaintiff possessed standing as a third-

party beneficiary.

The Court below held that under federal common law

the test of standing as a third-party beneficiary was

whether the “federal” contract itself clearly manifested

an intent to compensate the third party in damages in the

event of a breach. 526 F.2d 686-687. This measure or test

of standing was not distilled from decisions of this Court or

from decisions of other Federal Courts. Instead, this test of

standing was derived from the forty-four year old First

Restatement of Contracts, and it is clearly an erroneous

and inapplicable test.

Under federal common law, the true measure of stand-

ing as a third-party beneficiary is a three-pronged test:

32

(1) does plaintiff’s personal stake in the case satisfy the

concrete adverseness required by Article III of the Con-

stitution? (2) does plaintiff fall within the class of persons

or zone of interests intended to be benefitted or protected

by the contractual or statutory provisions in question?

and, (3) does the contract or statute in question preclude

suit or judicial review? See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975);

Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc.

v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397

U.S. 159, 164-165 (1970); and City of Inglewood v. City of

Los Angeles, 451 F.2d 948, 955 (9th Cir. 1972).

Petitioner’s claims herein clearly measure up to these

three yardsticks. First, petitioner’s injury is not imagi-

nary, but is real and immediate. Second, petitioner falls

within the class of persons intended to be protected by

the statutory and contractual covenants in question, as

such covenants on their face are intended to protect, and

provide for the safety of, “aeronautical users of the Air-

port.”

And third, neither the Grant Agreements nor the Air-

port and Airway Development Act, nor the legislative

history of such Act, preclude petitioner’s claims against

DeKalb County. To the contrary, allowance of petitioner’s

claims can serve only to foster and enforce the United

States’ expressed concern for aviation safety and the

public policy considerations inherent in the Act and Grant

Agreements in question.

Last, petitioner wishes to remind this Court of two

principles of ‘“‘hornbook” law concerning third-party

beneficiaries:

(1) In determining whether a contract manifests an ~

intent to benefit-a third party, the intent of the prom-

oo Scere Cet aie comets HR des

33

isee (here, the F.A.A.) must be examined, and not the

intent of the promisor (here, DeKalb County). See 4

Corbin on Contracts, Sec. 776.

(2) It is not necessary that the promisee intended to

create a “right” in the third party. All that is required

is that the promisee intended for the promisor to render

a performance that would be beneficial to the third

party. See 4 Corbin on Contracts, Sec. 777.

Under these traditional tests, and under the tests

enunciated by this Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975),

petitioner clearly has standing as a third-party beneficiary

to sue DeKalb County for breach of the statutory and

contractual covenants in question.

Cc. yo decision below Conflicts with relevant State

w.

Turning now to the relevant state law, we note initially

that the particular issues at hand here do not really

involve the Federal Government and do not really

touch upon the rights and duties of the Federal Govern-

ment. Moreover, the accident in question occurred in

Georgia and DeKalb County’s performance (and non-

performance) of the contract also occurred in Georgia.

Last, it would seem that the issues of breach vel non,

damages, and other similar issues would under any set of

circumstances be determined by local law.

Under these conditions, this Court on several occasions

has believed it appropriate to employ state law to deter-

mine the general type of issue here involved, particularly

(a) when there is no significant conflict between some

identifiaiiie federal policy and the relevant state law, and

(b) when the relevant state law would serve to foster or

enhance any federal policy implicit or explicit in the so-

34

called ‘‘Federal’”’ contract. See Wallis v. Pan American

Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966); United States v.

Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966); Bank of America National

Trust & Savings Ass’n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956).

Cf., DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956).

In any event, if federal common law does not govern

the question of whether petitioner has standing as a third-

party beneficiary to sue for breach of the Grant Agree-

ment covenants in question, then Hrie R.R. v. Tompkins,

304 U.S. 64 (1938), dictates that the substantive law of the

forum state must govern such question.

Georgia Code Section 3-108 provides: “The beneficiary

of a contract made between other parties for his benefit

may maintain an action against the promisor on said con-

tract.”

In Sheppard v. Bridges, 137 Ga. 615, 74 S.E.2d 245

(1912), the Georgia Supreme Court held that “the great

weight of authority is to the effect that if the promise is

made for the purpose of conferring a benefit on a person,

though he be not a party to the contract, or furnish the

consideration for the promise, he can bring suit upon it.”’

To the same effect are Holland v. Phillips, 94 Ga.App. 361,

94 S.E.2d 503 (1956); Smith v. Ledbetter Brothers, Inc.,

111 Ga.App. 238, 141 S.E.2d 322 (1965); M. R. Thomason

& Associates v. Wilson, 125 Ga.App. 658, 188 S8.E.2d 805

(1972); and State Construction Company v. Johnson, 88

Ga.App. 651, 656, 77 S.E.2d 240 (1953).

The Georgia law regarding third-party beneficiaries

of contracts also applies to suits against counties, and

counties are not immune from third-party beneficiary

suits. To demonstrate this point we need only refer to-

the full bench decision of the Georgia Supreme Court in

35

Deason v. DeKalb County, 222 Ga. 63, 65 148 S.E.2d 414

(1966):

“Counties are empowered to sue or be sued in any

court. Code § 23-1501, but ‘a county is not liable to

suit for any cause of action unless made so by statute.’

Code § 23-1502. However, an exception exists where a

county breaches a contract it was authorized by law to

undertake. . . . ‘Whenever a county is made liable by

statute for a demand, or is authorized by statute to

contract, and in pursuance of such power does contract,

then an action will lie against it to enforce such liability,

or to enforce any rights growing out of such contract, al-

though there is no statute expressly authorizing the

bringing of an action for such purpose. . . . In other

words, a county can always be sued upon any liability

against it created by statute, or for breach of any valid

contract which it is authorized by law to make.’

‘* ‘Liability to suit may be shown by indicating that

the claim arises . . . as an incident in the performance of

an undertaking by the county authorized by statute.’ ”

(Emphasis added.)

Petitioner also calls attention to Southern Airways Co.

v. DeKalb County, 102 Ga.App. 850, 118 S.E.2d 234 (1960)

(involving the very same airport and very same county

involved in the case at bar), where the Georgia Court of

Appeals held (102 Ga.App. 865):

“In its motion for rehearing, the county urges that

this court overlooked the decision in Purser v. Dodge

County, 188 Ga. 250 (3 8.E.2d 574), which held that a

county is not liable for a suit for any cause of action

unless made so by statute. As we construe the Uniform

Airports Act, Code Chapter 11-2, which expressly

extends its coverage to counties, as shown in the

original opinion, the county is authorized to contract

as it did here. The logical inverse inference of the act is

that, to the extent the county is authorized to contract, it

Se

36

also may be sued upon the contract for breach or for inter-

ference with performance.” (Emphasis added.)

See also Hancock County v. Williams, 230 Ga. 723, 198

S.E.2d 659 (1973) (in which the Georgia Supreme Court

upheld a death claim against a county based upon a tort

arising out of breach of contractual commitments be-

tween the county and Georgia Power Company); and

Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Crisp County, Georgia, 280

F.2d 873, 877-878 (5th Cir. 1960)cert. denied 375 U.S. 942

(1961) (in which the Fifth Circuit held: “Here the County

was under a duty imposed by the Federal Power Act to

protect the Seaboard’s property, and thus the Act created

a tort liability.’’)

From the foregoing, it cannot be denied that if federal

common law does not apply to the question at hand, then

the decision below is plainly erroneous and in irreconcil-

able conflict both with the mandate of Erie R.R. v.

Tompkins and with the decisions of the highest appellate

courts of Georgia.

Summarizing, the decision below should be reversed

because:

(a) If federal common law applies to the question

under consideration, then the decision below is in irre-

concilable conflict with federal common law, with the

decisions of other Federal Courts, and with the public

policy inherent in the Grant Agreements, the Act

itself, and the legislative history of the Act.

(b) If state law applies to the question under con-

sideration, then the decision below is in irreconcilable

conflict with the mandate of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins

and with the law of Georgia.

37

Il. The Paramount And Overriding Interest Of The

Federal Government In Regulating All Phases of

Aeronautical Commerce Preempts At Least To A

Limited Degree Local Laws Concerning Sovereign

Immunity.

From even a cursory review of the aviation laws and

regulations promulgated by the various branches of the

Federal Government, it is clear that aviation or aeronauti-

cal commerce is an extensively and pervasively federally

regulated area of commerce, and that such federal regula-

tion of necessity preempts any iocal laws that would

burden or conflict with the purposes of and_ policies

explicit in the federal regulation. See City of Burbank ».

Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973); North-

west Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 302 (1944)

(concurring opinion of Justice Jackson); American Aitr-

lines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 398 ¥.2d 369 (2d Cir.

1968); American Airlines, Inc. v. City of Audubon Park,

Kentucky, 297 F.Supp. 207, 212 (W.D.Ky. 1968), aff'd 407

F.2d 1306 (6th Cir. 1969).

As is evident from the Airport and Airway Develop-

ment Act and the declaration of congressional policy

therein, and as is also evident from the regulations issued

under such Act and from the Grant Agreements them-

selves, the pervasive federal regulation of aeronautical

commerce extends to and encompasses the activity of

local governmental entities in operating and maintaining

federally funded public airports.

In Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama State Docks

Dept., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), this Court held that when the

States granted Congress the power to regulate commerce

the States surrendered any portion of their sovereignty

that would stand in the way of such regulation (377 U.S.

38

191-192), and that the States also waived their traditional

sovereign immunity with respect to claims arising from

voluntary activity by the States in the federally regulated

area of commerce. (377 U.S. 192-198.)

Specifically, in overruling the state agency’s sovereign

immunity defense to the F.E.L.A. tort suit brought by

plaintiffs in the Parden case, this Court ruled:

“Moreover, such a result {sustaining of the sovereign

immunity defense] would bear the seeds of a substantial

impediment to the efficient working of our federalism.

States have entered and are entering numerous forms

of activity which, if carried on by a private person or

corporation, would be subject to federal regulation . . .

In a significant and increasing number of instances,

such regulation takes the form of authorization of law-

suits by private parties. To preclude this form of regu-

lation in all cases of state activity would remove an

important weapon from the congressional arsenal with

respect to a substantial volume of regulable conduct.

Where, as here, Congress by the terms and purposes of

its enactment has given no indication that it desires to

be thus hindered in the exercise of its constitutional

power, we see nothing in the Constitution to obstruct

its will.” 377 U.S. 197-198.

See also Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), where

this Court stated:

“Tn the first place, it is clear that the Federal Govern-

ment, when acting within a delegated power, may

override countervailing state interests whether these

be described as ‘governmental’ or ‘proprietary’ in

character.”’ 392 U.S. 183.

This Court in Wirtz also said:

“Tf a State is engaging in economic activities that are

validly regulated by the Federal Government when

engaged in by private persons, the State too may be

”

39

forced to conform its activities to federal regulation.”’

392 U.S. 197.

Subsequent to this Court’s ruling in Parden, supra, the

Cireuit Courts of Appeal have consistently overru'ed

sovereign immunity defenses relied upon by state agencies

engaged in various activities regulated by Congress.

Pennsylvania Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett,

454 I'.2d 613 (8rd Cir. 1971) (by engaging in activity of

paramount federal interest a state may waive its sovereign

immunity, and whether such waiver has occurred is a

question of federal law); Briggs v. Sagers, 424 F.2d 130

(10th Cir.), cert. denied 400 U.S. 829 (1970) (in the realm

of interstate commerce congressional authority is supreme

and overrides any state interest in sovereign immunity

with respect to rights and remedies implicit in federal

regulation); Chesapeake Bay Bridge and Tunnel District v.

Lauritzen, 404 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1968) (by seeking and

obtaining admission into federally regulated area of inter-

state commerce, and by obtaining permission to build and

operate bridge and tunnel across bay, state agency waived

any sovereign immunity to federal court suit for damage to

ship which struck submerged light tower).

DeKalb County was not required to seek and obtain

ownership of and operating rights to the Airport in ques-

tion from the General Services Administration. DeKalb

County was not coerced into seeking and cbtaining

$1 025,224.06 in federal aid under the Airport and Airway

Development Act. And DeKalb County was not forced

into signing Grant Agreements with the F.A.A. and in

subjecting itself to federal regulation of airport and avia-

tion activities.

DeKalb County voluntarily sought and obtained admis-

sion into a federally regulated area of interstate commerce,

40

and thereby as a matter of federal law waived its sovereign

immunity to the extent of private claims involving rights

and remedies implicit in the federal regulation. To rule

otherwise would impede substantially the federally ex-

pressed concern for aviation safety (and elimination of

airport hazards) explicit in the Act and Grant Agreements

in question.

Petitioner concedes that the above-discussed cases

involved Federal regulatory statutes that specifically

created some sort of cause of action or right to relief on

the part of aggrieved persons, and that neither the Act

nor the Grant Agreements in question here provide ex-

pressly for a private ‘‘cause of action.” Petitioner believes,

however, that with respect to the damage caused to

petitioner by DeKalb County’s maintenance of a statu-

torily proscribed airport hazard, use of land for purposes

incompatible with airport operations, and breach of

statutory and contractual covenants, a ‘private remedy”’

is implicit in the Act and Grant Agreements in question.

In Cor! v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), this Court set forth

four tests for determining whether a private remedy is

available for conduct in violation of a federal statute:

(1) Is plaintiff one of the class for whose special

benefit the statute was enacted?

(2) Is there any legislative intent, explicit or implicit,

to create or deny a private remedy?

(3) Is it consistent with the underlying purpose of

the statute to imply a private remedy for plaintiff?

(4) Is the cause of action one traditionally relegated

to state law, in an area basically the concern of the

* Petitioner wishes to point out that in paragraph No. 66 of its com-

plaint (J.A. 172), petitioner expressly, specifically and in detail,

pleaded the “waiver of immunity” discussed in this portion of

petitioner’s brief.

.

- Lebiat > inter test ec cual

41

States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a

cause of action based solely on Federal law?

Petitioner’s claim passes all of these tests.

The statutory and contractual covenants at issue are

on their face intended for the direct benefit of persons in

the category of petitioner’s insured. See pages 22-25 of

this brief, supra, and Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc.,

45 U.S. L Week 2333 (3rd Cir. 1976).

There is no legislative intent behind the Act in question

to deny a private remedy to plaintiff. Moreover, in /llinois

v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972), this Court

concluded that “federal question” jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1331 “will support claims founded upon federal

common law as well as those of a statutory origin.”” And

the Court went on to state, ‘When we deal with air and

water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a

federal common law... .”’ 406 U.S. 103. Surely the same

reasoning applies to rights related to aeronautical com-

merce and/or “Federal contracts,” such that petitioner’s

claim herein is a “‘federal’’ one falling within the Section

1331 grant of jurisdiction. See City of Milwaukee, supra,

406 U.S. 99-107.

Allowance of petitioner’s claim as an implied “private

cause of action’? would be wholly consistent with the

underlying purpose of the statutory and contractual cove-

nants at issue, which underlying purpose is the mitigation

of airport hazards and enhancement of the safety of aero-

nautical users of federally funded public airports.

And last, we are not dealing with an area of peculiar

concern only to the States. To the contrary, the issues

involved fall exclusively within the concern of Federal

legislation and Federal policy. Thus, it is not inappropriate

to infer a ‘‘Federal” cause of action. See Bivens v. Siz

42

Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,

403 U.S. 388, 392, 396-397 (1971), and Gomez v. Florida

State Employment Service, 417 F.2d 569, 575-581 (5th Cir.

1969).

Petitioner’s claim of an implied federal cause of action

is not without judicial precedents, as the lower Federal

courts have on several occasions ruled that “private’’

causes of action may be implied from various Federal

aviation statutes and regulations. Town of East Haven v.

Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 282 F.Supp. 507 (D.Conn. 1968);

Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F.Supp. 612 (C.D.Cal.

1972); In Re Paris Air Crash, 399 F.Supp. 732 (C.D.Cal.

1975). See also Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc., 45 U.S.

Law Week 2333 (3rd Cir. 1976); Nader v. Allegheny Air-

lines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527, 5387 (D.C.Cir. 1975), rev’d on

other grounds, ____ U.S. , 96 Sup. Ct. 1978 (1976).

Summarizing, by voluntarily seeking admission into

the federally regulated area of aeronautical commerce and

by voluntarily subjecting itself to federal regulation in

such area of commerce, DeKalb County as a matter of

federal law has waived any immunity against petitioner’s

implied private cause of action based upon the County’s

breach of the statutory and contractual covenants in

question.

At this juncture, we wish to point out that the cases

discussed in this portion of our brief indicate that the

waiver of immunity applies to tort suits, as well as to

suits for breach of federally imposed duties (contractual

or otherwise).

The decision below fails to apply the federal law dis-

cussed above; is in head-on conflict with the rulings of

this Court and other Federal Courts concerning waiver °

of immunity and implied federal causes of action; and if

43

allowed to stand can serve only to burden interstate

commerce and to thwart the explicit objectives of the

Act and Grant Agreements in question.

! For these reasons alone, this Court should reverse the

decision below.

Ill. The Decision Below Has Resulted In An Uncon-

a Denial Of Equal Protection And Due

ess.

Any interpretation of Georgia Code Section 23-1502

that would result in the application of sovereign immunity

to bar petitioner’s claims arising from DeKalb County’s

proprietary activity in owning and operating the airport

would work a denial of equal protection and due process

of law.

? It is clear that under Georgia law a city can be sued in

vie tort for negligence resulting from the city’s proprietary

| activity in owning and operating an airport. Caroway v.

' City of Atlanta, 85 Ga.App. 792, 70 S.E.2d 126 (1952);

? Georgia Code Section 69-301.

| It is also clear that under Georgia law DeKalb County’s

ownership and operation of the airport in question con-

stitutes a proprietary activity or function. Southern Air-

ways Co. v. DeKalb County, 102 Ga.App. 850, 118 8.E.2d

234 (1960).

And the statutory authority for either a city or a county

to engage in the proprietary activity of owning and operat-

ing an airport is the same: the Uniform Airport Law,

Georgia Code Sections 11-201, et seq.

Thus, if Code Section 23-1502 is construed to include

; proprietary activity as well as governmental activity, the

result would be a scheme of classification that would

\ allow suits against cities for negligent proprietary opera-

OP ln ate olan a

|

44

tion of airports but would prohibit identical suits against

counties for identical negligent proprietary operation of

identical airports. There is simply no legitimate or rational

basis or reason for a legislative or judicial scheme of

classification which has the effect of allowing prosecution

of the former type of suit but disallows prosecution of the

latter type of suit.

Any such legislative classification would be patently

unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection of the

laws, and any judicial ruling creating such a classification

would be equally unconstitutional. [The constitutional

guarantees of due process and equal protection apply not

only to legislative enactments, but also to judicial in-

terpretation of such enactments. Brinkerhoff-Farris Trust

& Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 680 (1930).]

This Court has held that any legislative classification

by a State “. . . must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and

must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair

and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.”’

Royster Guano v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). See

also Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1958); McGowan v.

Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71

(1971); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); DeKalb

Real Estate Board, Inc. v. DeKalb County, 372 F.Supp. 748

(N.D.Ga. 1973); Wilder v. State, 232 Ga. 404, 207 8.E.2d

38 (1974).

And in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-374

(1886), this Court summarized the equal protection guar-

antee in these now-famous words:

“Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial

in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by

public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, °

so as practically to make unjust and illegal discrimi-

45

nations between persons in similar circumstances,

material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is

still within the prohibition of the Constitution.”

More recently, in Williamson v. Fortson, 376 F.Supp.

1300, 1301 (N.D.Ga. 1974), a three-judge Federal Court

defined the equal protection test thusly:

“Courts normally subject legislation challenged under

the equal protection clause to a standard of rationality.

The state’s goal need only be reasonable, and the statute

need not be a perfect method to achieve the goal. If the

Court can conceive of a rational viewpoint that justifies

the statute, it will stand. When legislation affects

certain fundamental liberties and rights, however, it

is subjected to a stricter constitutional test—only a

compelling state interest will suffice.”

Obviously, the right to have a claim adjudicated by a

court and jury on a basis equal with others similarly

situated falls within the category of “fundamental rights

and liberties” referred to in the above quotation.

The arguments we are presenting here do not constitute

a departure from established case law, as there are several

analagous judicial decisions that support the contentions

we have outlined above.

In Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), this Court

held unconstitutional the judicial construction given by

Louisiana courts to the Louisiana Wrongful Death Act,

to the effect that legitimate children, but not illegitimate

children, could sue for the wrongful death of their mother.

The ground of decision was that such a judicial construc-

tion of the statute created arbitrary and discriminatory

classes of people who could sue for wrongful deaths, in

violation of equal p~otection guarantees.

) For identical reasons, in Glona v. American Guarantee &

-|- Lnvability Insurance Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968), this Court

LS ee

46

held unconstitutional the judicial construction given by

Louisiana courts to the Louisiana Wrongful Death Act,

to the effect that a mother could not sue for the wrongful

death of her illegitimate child. In its decision the Court

noted that “‘A law which creates an open season on illegiti-

mates in the area of automobile accidents . . .” has abso-

lutely no relevancy to any legitimate State interest.

So, too, in the case at bar a scheme of classification

that allows suits against federally funded municipal air-

ports but prohibits identical suits against federally funded

county airports is totally irrational and unrelated to any

legitimate State interest or “‘public policy.”

In a similar vein, the highest courts of several states

have recently declared that automobile guest passenger

statutes or judicial rules, under which a guest passenger

may sue for the host driver’s gross negligence, but not

for his ordinary negligence, are unconstitutional and void,

in that they serve only to create arbitrary and discrimi-

natory classifications of causes of action in contravention

of the constitutional guarantees of equal protection and

due process. See Laakonen v. Eighth Judicial District

Court, 538 P.2d 574 (Nev., 1975); Primes v. Tyler, 331

N.E.2d 723 (Ohio 1975); Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d

771 (N.D. 1975); Henry v. Bauder, 518 P.2d 362 (Kan.

1974); Brown v. Merlo, 506 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1973).

Likewise, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently

declared unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute that

provided that all causes of action survived the death of

either party, except for causes of action based on libel

and slander. Moyer v. Phillips, 341 A.2d 441 (Pa. 1975).

Cf., the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Fatzer in

Brown v. Wichita State University, 547 P.2d 1015, 1032-

1043 (Kan. 1976), appeal dismissed, ___. U.S. —__, 97

Sup.Ct. 41 (1976).

47

We believe the constitutional infirmity in the classifica-

tion scheme contended for by DeKalb County is revealed

clearly when it is realized that if the City of Decatur (the

county seat of DeKalb County), rather than DeKalb

‘County, was the owner and operator of the federally

funded airport the issue of sovereign immunity would

not be involved in this litigation.

Thus, Code Section 23-1502 cannot within the limits of

constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due

process be construed to bar the claims involved in this

litigation, and the decision of the Court below is erroneous

for this reason alone.

CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons stated herein, petitioner respect-

fully prays that this Honorable Court reverse the decision

and judgment of the Court below.

Respectfully submitted,

. ARTHUR MozLey

Attorney for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

PHILLIPS, HART & MOZLEY

1515 Gas Light Tower

235 Peachtree Street, N.E.

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

(404) 522-2010

48

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, J. ARTHUR MOZLEY, attorney for Petitioner

Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company and a member of

the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, hereby

certify that on the 2nd day of March, 1977, I served three

true copies of the foregoing Brief of Petitioner on the

Merits upon the respondents and all parties, by depositing

in a United States mailbox true copies of said petition,

with first class postage prepaid, correctly addressed to the

following, as required by Supreme Court Rule 33:

Mr. MEADE Burns

Long, Weinberg, Ansley & Wheeler

191 Lawrence

300 Cobb Federal Building

Marietta, Georgia 30060

Mr. WENDELL K. WILLARD

Harvey, Rhodes & Willard

125 Trinity Place

Decatur, Georgia 30030

Mr. Ronacp R. GLANCz

Appellate Section, Civil Division

United States Department of Justice

Washington, D. C. 20530

Mr. WitiiAM D. MALLARD, JR.

Assistant United States Attorney

P. O. Box 912

Atlanta, Georgia 30301

Solicitor General of the United States

Washington, D. C. 20530

Respectfully,

. ARTHUR MOZLEY

Attorney for Petitioner

EXHIBITS

Le Se

la

EXHIBIT A

STATUTES INVOLVED

The ‘Rules of Decision Act,” 28 U.S.C. § 1652, is

relevant to the questions presented by this petition.

That Act provides:

“The laws of the several states, except where the

Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts

of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be

regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the

courts of the United States, in cases where they

apply.”

The following portions of the Airport and Airway

Development Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1701, et seq., are also

involved:

“$ 1701. Congressional declaration of policy.

“The Congress hereby finds and declares—

“That the Nation’s airport and airway system is

inadequate to meet the current and projected

growth in aviation.

“That substantial expansion and improvement of

the airport and airway system is required to meet the

demands of interstate commerce, the postal service,

and the national defense.

“That the annual obligational authority during

the period July 1, 1970, through June 30, 1980, for

the acquisition, establishment, and improvement of

air nav.gational facilities under the Federal Aviation

Act of 1958, should be no less than $250,000,000.

“That the obligational authority during the

period July 1, 1970, through June 30, 1980, for

airport assistance under this chapter should be

$2,500,000,000.”

2a

** *

“§ 1711. Definitions.

“As used in this subchapter—

* * *

(3) ‘Airport hazard’ means any structure or ob-

ject of natural growth located on or in the vicinity

of a public airport, or any use of land near such air-

port, which obstructs the airspace required for the

flight of aircraft in landing or taking off at such

airport or is otherwise hazardous to such landing or

taking off of aircraft.”’

* * *

“§ 1713. Planning grants.

“‘(a) In order to promote the effective location and

development of airports and the development of an

adequate national airport system plan, the Secretary

may make grants of funds to planning agencies for

airport system planning, and to public agencies for

airport master planning.”

*x* * *

“§ 1714. Airport and airway development program.

“‘(a) In order to bring about, in conformity with the

national airport system plan, the establishment of a

nationwide system of public airports adequate to

meet the present and future needs of civil aero-

nautics, the Secretary is authorized to make grants

for airport development by grant agreements with

sponsors in _ ageregate amounts not less than the

following: . . .”

* * *

“§ 1716. Projection application for airport develop-

ment.

“(a) Subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of

this section, any public agency, or two or more

ublic agencies acting jointly, may submit to the

Recretary a project application, in a form and con-

taining such information, as the Secretary may pre-

scribe, setting forth the airport development pro-

posed to be undertaken. No project application shall

3a

propose airport development other than that in-

cluded in the then current revision of the national

airport system plan formulated by the Secretary

under this subchapter, and all proposed develop-

ment shall be in accordance with standards estab-

lished by the Secretary, including standards for site

location, airport layout, grading, drainage, seeding,

paving, lighting, and safety of approaches.”

** *

“(e)(1) All airport development projects shall be

subject to the approval of the Secretary, which

approval may be given only if he is satisfied that—

(A) the project is reasonably consistent with

plans (existing at the time of approval of the proj-

ect) of planning agencies for the development of

the area in which the airport is located and will

contribute to the accomplishment of the purposes

of this subchapter;

** *

“(E) all project sponsorship requirements pre-

scribed by or under the authority of this sub-

chapter have been or will be met.”

** *

“$1718. Project sponsorship requirements; com-

pliance; contracts between Secretary and

public agencies; air traffic control activi-

ties; relief of sponsors.

“As a condition precedent to his approval of an

airport development project under this subchapter,

the Secretary shall receive assurances in writing,

satisfactory to him that—

“‘(1) the airport to which the project for airport

development relates will be available for public use

on fair and reasonable terms and without unjust

discrimination;

i oe

4a

(2) the airport and all facilities thereon or con-

nected therewith will be suitably operated and

maintained, with due regard to climatic and flood

conditions;

““(3) the ae pm eqeenarnes to the airport will be

adequately clea and protected by removing,

lowering, relocating, marking, or lighting or other-

wise mitigating existing airport hazards and by

preventing the establishment or creation of future

airport hazards;

(4) appropriate action, including the adoption

of zoning laws, has been or will be taken, to the

extent reasonable, to restrict the use of land ad-

jacent to or in the immediate vicinity of the air-

port to activities and purposes compatible with

normal airport operations, including landing and

takeoff of aircraft;

** *

(8) the airport operator or owner will maintain

a fee and rental structure for the facilities and ser-

vices being provided the airport users which will

make the airport as self-sustaining as possible

under the circumstances existing at that particular

airport, taking into account such factors as the

volume of traffic and economy of collection; . . .”

The following portions of the Georgia Uniform Air-

ports Law, Georgia Code Sections 11-201, et seq., are

relevant here:

“11-201. Municipalities, etc., may acquire airports.

“Municipalities, counties, and other political sub-

divisions are hereby authorized, separately or jointly,

to acquire, establish, construct, expand, own, lease,

control, equip, improve, maintain, operate, regulate

and police airports and landing fields for the use of

5a

aircraft, either within or without the geographical

limits of such municipalities, counties, and other

political subdivisions, and may use for such purpose

or purposes any available property that is now or

may at any time hereafter be owned or controlled by

such municipalities, counties or other political sub-

divisions. . . .”

* * *

“11-205. Authority to equip, improve, establish fees

and charges, lease, etc.

“Counties, municipalities, or other political sub-

divisions which have established or may hereafter

establish airports or landing fields, or which acquire,

lease, or set apart real property for such purpose or

purposes, are hereby authorized:

“(a) To construct, equip, improve, maintain,

and operate the same, or to vest authority for the

construction, equipment, improvement, mainte-

nance, and operation thereof, in an officer, board,

or body of such political subdivisions. The expense

of such construction, equipment, improvement,

maintenance, and operation shall be a responsi-

bility of said political subdivision.

“(b) Subject to existing contracts, to adopt

regulations and establish charges, fees, and tolls

for the use of such airports or landing fields, fix

penalties for the violation of said regulations, and

establish liens to enforce payment of said charges,

fees, and tolls.

“(e) To lease such airports or landing fields to

private parties for operation or to lease or assign

to private parties for operation, space, area, im-

provements, and equipment on such airports or

landing fields: Provided in each case that in so

doing the public is not deprived of its rightful,

equal, and uniform use thereof.”

6a

** *

“11-402. Definitions.

“As used in this Chapter, unless the context

otherwise requires:

** *

(2) ‘Airport hazard’ means any overhead power

line which interferes with radio communication be-

tween a publicly-owned aircraft approaching or

leaving same, or any structure or tree which ob-

structs the aerial approaches of such an airport or is

Tae hazardous to its use for landing or taking

Oo Saad

‘11-403. Airport hazards not in public interest.

“Tt is hereby found and declared that an airport

hazard endangers the lives and property of users of

the airport and of occupants of land in its vicinity,

and also, if of the obstruction type, in effect reduces

the size of the area available for the landing, taking-

off and maneuvering of aircraft, thus tending to

destroy or impair the utility of the airport and the

public investment therein, and is therefore not in the

—_ of the public health, public safety, or general

welfare.”

Georgia Code Section 3-108, which authorizes a

breach of contract suit by a third party beneficiary,

provides:

“3-108. Parties to actions on contracts.

“As a general rule, the action on a contract,

whether express or implied, or whether by parol or

under seal, or of record, shall be brought in the name

of the party in whom the legal interest in such con-

tract is vested, and against the party who made it in

person or by ‘agent. The beneficiary of a contract

made between other parties for his benefit may

maintain an action against the promisor on said

contract.”

7a

Article XI, Paragraph I of the 1945 Georgia Consti-

tution provides the following with respect to counties:

“Each county shall be a body corporate with such

powers and limitations as may be prescribed by law.

All suits by or against a county shall be in the name

thereof; and the metes and bounds of the several

counties shall remain as now prescribed by law,

unless changed as hereinafter provided.”’ Ga. Code

Ann. 2-7801.

Georgia Code Section 23-1501 provides counties

with the following powers:

23-1501. Every county as body corporate.—

“Every county is a body corporate, with power to

sue or be sued in any court.”

Georgia Code Section 23-1502, which the courts

below construed as supplying counties with carte

blanche sovereign immunity in all cases and under all

circumstances, provides:

“23-1502. When country liable to suit.—

“A county is not liable to suit for any cause of

action unless made so by statute.”

With respect to the immunity of municipalities,

Georgia Code Section 69-301 provides:

“69-301. Municipal corporations liable for what.

“Municipal corporations shall not be liable for

failure to perform, or for errors in performing, their

legislative or judicial powers. For neglect to perform,

or for improper or unskillful performance of their

ministerial duties, they shall be liable.”

Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment of the

United States Constitution in pertinent part provides:

8a

‘*’.. nor shall any State deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor

deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws.”

eR TE ee see

6 TE et eee ore ae nee ee

EXHIBIT B

Log of Bird Sightings or Bird Counts Made By

F.A.A. Tower Controllers At The Airport.

lb

vA

ee Lae ol

*

Bb zol

26 Vaveh 1971 at pier

geaon”

Status report cn birds

S0~5h0

Ga 10 Janay AZT, a Ceconr hOl MNEl9SK veperted a bird strike on departure

Leon DeseabePoscitres Adlrport and i= adhately returned for a lradtag. this

eSreraft sustained davize to both wing tip tenks, the lesding edge of both

whags, ond casage to the engine cowlingse Prior to this eccurrence no

records were kapt of tho bird activity at this aliport. From 11 Janvary

through 8 February a shagle entry vould be nade fn our Daily Pecord of

Facility Opovations (FAA Fora 7239-8) whenever birds vera presout on the

Aiiport cud Uhuie loetbion presented a potential baserd that scqutved

radio notiftestion to avviving aud departing airemtt. From 9 February to

the provest date, a lightly sore co.vrehensive report has boon palntainod.

From the Daily Recocd of Facility Operations forms

Jamary = 20 - Large flecks of birds ea alrevet ae a

oo "

13 "

1S sd

16 "

22 «

24 Ht)

February 5 "

From supplercatal Locos oa Vind eetivily aobiects

Feoruary = 9 I0OIF Abenk $9) or wore binds oa top of even, birds

apt to Le fne,essing in weber bub most are

Jeandiag oa tha deop level that cant te sean

Prom t' a teovew ante

3230) ‘VWhsouwwents of Sleek tbels of ced 2 oe the DawdPill

Wood Wovreaty ef bbets ov cw) pece tha lewif pl

A ceuple of ther and toes vty ing tute and cat of

swalase Cocp ava

hesends of binds 49 th: Vand@§1 sven

}

VI A New Goedel y PEAS ft wdvorert Look off on 22,

“6

oN YUL

os

Ne

oc

1! r, 5 | aoe rnds of ofavlh ae %:82.°9 ativberes fran ao * a

{x Sesh Aaety Geos of tas bhids alt sited on ths rns

Pia eae abt bo vnc oly a7, the round sabuvscd te

\W

8 SG es ? ¥

(hh,

1 VG Greups ef haces. a of bieds derieting anoe and evosalay

Sharh «bro Uy oft ce Elune th hte,

9) MDD a Os ot BE reracth Med @H01

100° WN3S Ssee rel Us seats of Uleds on beth cie-s of Bii352 08

2b

Toebvurry =

10

10

ns

M

M1

M1

12

(cont'd) theushold of rusinay 27, continued movesent

1615

1139

130)

1322

)337

W395

1695

1090

302

1239

160%

1239

69

10,0

1625

9730

Va nN

1490

Several thouiond bives near tho appresch of

runway 27 and dup sea cast of runway 205,

Thousends of birds svemd the dendfii1

Avoul YOO Lir's eiveltog tie wird sock

Phoustn’s of virds cep orted the dump areca

cast bowad from Vie duno

thousenats of birds arrived fvam the cast and

Janted at tha duup

fnall Meek of birds 2 to 309 flying ovor ¢urp

Soverval theovsand birds on Sopreach end of rumay

27 ond next to runway 20L near euap

Fow hundred otarlings observed in troecs near runiey

Oe OL,

About a thoucend sturliogs on gross trea cost of

remay 22-20), aud in teces on vost southwout port

of gairteaye duap

Tieusanda of birda sround runway!27 and land rh) “re

Plocks of birds 1099 or mre jn trees east of runiuy

20L cinco 1109 15?

Lives Slock of birds gathering at dunp

Hundecd bDives soon on yeaua near wind sock

lovee fleck of birds avovund mid-field intarscetion

Lave flock of virds « 1090 or move in dunp areca

and in tices ewt ef vunwvay 20L

A wocter of b'ves Jn troos adjsecnt to curp

Aw. Scr of bivds ta tho teeces adfsecat to aGucg ares

Tououssnds of Uirds in the trous along side of aes

ZOL

Thoussnda of birds In the trees alung side ruirisy el

they are not flying

Avent 300 sterlings on and nei runcay 20),

Live f1..% of bi ay at dus p end at 20-2 7 Lute:

Aleut $09 Divds nerr the wind seek area oad fnew

U9) Lateoen runinys 20 and 2L coath of rumay

Patinate 2000 birds on dung and Peck of bivds tu

gides of rvinvay 708, noor vind soak

|

‘

:

u

Sey al) thensond birds obcerved on tha ,round ia “oe

Cua nveay, silifaw hou eroged Ulin to tus? of f ood

fry tule {yeen on > st fda of th a Ve

Me wy Pow Aa Aset

A fou tw Cred beds fa tices of vast shee of Cunp

vical sal Bivt’s cee dp Gren

Several } a" Vi Aor rowr'sy ?, aur! +t

A 1 iy a”) ,1 crensy CL int © i

wip

j +o ods ui Sleds of ceound near rercay 20%, «t vif

‘ “%

Moses of tieds ever dung end ever runcay 200

3b

.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Fobrutcy 19 1137 ~Fow hundred birds in trees on vest sido of garbaye dunp

19 J245 Wonereds of birds near vind sock

W 1395 Plock of Dlads flew across rucay 16 vur active runvay

2 31520 2099 starlings over dump areca

Lb 1430 Ware Tip Eas? iy of vires en and Sround runvay 20L

i 3 of tivds on both sides of the oost ond of runny

%.27 ond on hill en seuth sido of garbsygo dunp

20 «©7200 Vesthow eofling core visibility 1/8 fog, no birds observed

20 3302 Srall Lweaehes of Lirds in tho trees along sido runway ei,

Heavy rein the rest of tho cay

2} Poin ajl day

22 2005 A fow hundred His in tyroos adjacont to yarbage dump and

a feu hundred tn evess aren couth of runway 27

°? 117%) A Sow hundred bivdsa in trees edfjeecnt to ysrbase dicip

ae 3300 A Sow hendved Mires Leticea rockpile and runway 16 cad

A Sow ivindred vere Eorbage Guap

2? 105) Sov eal hundred birds in trees near gaybago dump areca

220 1535) Soll fleek of bivds along rumway 16 and Jarge flock

wcval thonsamnt ca south side of runuay 27

22 NG Sead) Shock of Mees botucen yumvay 207 and 20L seuth of

ruasy O-27.

22 «= 1737) Levge fleck ef blids oa Approsch end of rumwy 27

i

23 «67390 Pecks of sev val tundreds of birds flying in tho land rill

frea

73 1309 Floc’ of birés in cunp area ond a few birds crossing rurm.ay

6 at iid fleld

23 1595 Pleek of birds along runiay 20%, ot dump

e3 1715 Fleck of several buudved siavl luca at end of rurray 201,

Yh = =C2390) Few sevll flocks ov birds Ply!tag around

Yh ey Sout 590 starllocs neur wind sock

a 16° % Nevge flock of strrJings in flight over dump

ah Ibo) fey ct) thensawd livds beblveen runvay 206 and duap area

25 eet l

26 thor bed atha cud feg cally a Pow hundred birds observed

Uh a of

27 I9C0) Aloub 809 Vless eu eum y 22 woew land £111 and avout 39) bi

I lot ' t

27 1635 : tr) “7 Loves the alenoct

cf tate) & « ) - } , vi ort

‘ / 144°) & ° ) , ¢ ‘ vi 1% i A, > 4 - - iT

af igh) i ) i ¢ itid id

ef er ew) to Jiivdsa oa prorst esat of ruanay 20L

3 ) : ery ) 2 x ay <7 Iv Md of 1 J °@

en ! » ! 1 A Wels I l sock

' Mey ‘a va" )

1 ) yy 2020 i% } l ri; y 27 1: 3 2t

1 Yip Bed , 202 wisels in ig.c. at to derw

4b

‘orech

mn ~%

coClN at aI SS sD OO

Lo)

Suveral hundyed blyrds fa oreca en Jeoft sido of runcsy 27

ineurtvds of Lirds on Lath sider of runway 9

Several thoveand birds bota sides of rummy 27 erst of wenvy

Sh

Javge Pleck of birds over duwp

ak boy J oer ‘* mochoub | » | /)

Flor of aervel bire on the J d fil)

Atous $00 starlings flew over runcsy Jh

GV Li ved Virds east of airport on Jand fill

Nundreds ef birds on cxst sido of avunway 2R end 20L in cup

area

Jarge flochs of bivds eon

of runvay 2OL 1C09 to 7!

5 of runvay 27 ead cout

htout ©0090 birds all asound dwip aroa

Sesevol t nd pire long 3 y &CL at aciwip arena

Savceal tou L bhi lows j y <O%" in Curip ca avd

hundreds of birds n I incdnock

Cuverval 4 istnd bj on tl north sido qt tho ro“cn

end of ruincey 27

Several hundreds of | ty on and ayound the dcunp also in

Bae, ; a3 ‘ »*, ie) 1 "

fuesut 1000 birds ab | I ction of rvr y 16 and 27

Aporoat ly 2099 b ' nth sive of rursy 27,

also chous 200) birds uth sido of runvey 201,

tout | bira in trees nvar dunp

’ » eck of bircs wid field over ¢e ) 1 wind scoek

About 2099 birds bets Prumay rumrmys uear

Soveral bunds oad birds ty i Li9 iF nd rill areca

Atout 1000 birds over Coop

About 1050 birds in flight over dump area

About 2U90 birds over du 9

Sovowad hes cred birds penst side of vumay 7OTH07R

Ptows GO.) ll ; i y wor y 27 (aw y 2@¢ in us )

Sut > bi vel ( ° > rar

j | Wloc! ‘L. ; } : i \ Piad iy wOe on / 4

iv Ua uvor Thin « ) 14 ‘ tins in ¢ ’ 2 .

dowt «a } * hog y ta y 2/ ma this

‘ 19 ] ; 4 ‘3 A

j Go) selz 1 C } "5 } . i 4 ‘9

, } & 4 ) > ; 73) ca i

bives “are ve

i ; oF | 3s 0 north site of y 27 at} Lins

yal

7 ! t af var f, in |

f ! l + 0, } ; 1 { l of ) J /

, , i’ OL

. ] } " t 2, of remay zi tr 38

?

f ) a |

‘ } , ‘ —% 1 ‘ a f ’, i |

o

Tver

cS Lob

‘avch 10 19190 Approcch end of renvay 27 covered with starlings

10 109 sires still cover approach end of runvay 27

10 WIS Several thousand starlings at approach end of rum:ay 27

10 340 Several thousend starlings left side of tho Latersection of

runcy 27 and 20% ond Letiscen renrays 20R und 20% crass arca

10 1969) Several thousand birds near Runvay 27 beth sides

12 0.335) Several thoussnd birds on approach ond of runiay 27

ll Wh Geadl Plee%s of slavlings around airport

3200 1410 S91). fleck of starlings at tho dunp

LANL Large fleet of uterlings at tho Janding threstiold rummy 20L

il 1750) = Thouicards of Lirds on tho land £111 on piles of uncoverad

gerdtco

12 1995 = About 500 birds near runvay 202 southwest of rumay 9

32 1309 About 1009 birds betucon rua ay 202 cnd 20L southvest of runway

12 13:5 Laygo flecks of birds about 2920 to 2000 on both sidos of

rovay 27

12 WIS = ALeut 27000 Virds svound wind cock

12 UW0 9 Abou 2000 Diss sti)l wearin around the wind sock and runvay

20L end 202 in use

12 1820 About 7090 birds moar Landing threshold of runway 27

j2 1730) «= Yhourrads of blads en the Jand fill

43 1240) About 2000 bi ves on cud around tho appreach end of rumsay 27

13 C3) Alou ps blivds near eomay 27 ucot cond

13 1709) Alout 2090 birds arcund dup area

UY 1530 = About 100 birds over dunp area

1 2615 flout 2029 birds near toxiway to runway 2L

Wy 3209 ABeut 2050 birds arvund the du:p Area

A 1099) A fou Urersand birds just eat of 20L and in tha garbage dv. »

FRYCA

16 1253) A cnall Deck of sterlings, about 1000, cast of rumay 20L

16 ISeL A Cow thovesnd birds Just east of 22-20% snd in dump area

160 723) Jnvge fleck of birds about 2000 to 2000) in and around dup

erst of reieny 20,

17 1209) Savoral bendved binds obsorved right side of runvay 22 and

cay wind conk

17 W090 an SO) vives at crap near reicoy aR

YW 1732 tout 2OCO biae'’s note Gavechold of runuay 27

17 W209 May Vierceads of bires fn duo oven

13 Wed May teercats of bbavs Sa awl cvernd the deny area

i] Vw Pas tyees of Dioda aay sey 2Ol at vind cook

9 70.9 eee ts of bles juct 6 ot of sunray 20L and on uncevered

v tte Uw tn 2 Geng

tn]

ah (as trow- dhe teIsy jut aireraft) depariad on rumney 20M,

4 “Syexret& neal We Le wen 2 ow Oo reuy theveinds of bi.’s

Pte tc a8 of She oo steua oo >» ra°o slew oact, sore Sl

By te 3 Hel, Sid 2.00.9 ceath vith ethers eleoking fe “vent

Pode utently poteenatas: to ti: dep avea after a short Migs

i? 2299) alcara *s of beds Sa Lie porbage evap arca

2 3309) Ghonerots of bires La crip area

20 Mee2 Pocse'ts ef blets toto ca dup avea and rumzy 27

“) POD Thay s of Uivds 4 7.9 tren

2a 19) Sus cel iuatesd Dhs Lea Seecs erst of MR OY,

Maveh = 220 G00) Several huwhed bhids in trees ond dwap area cast of roncy

20L=2ik

. 23 UY late Meek of bres in conp area

M35 = Floctvs of bie’s on voth sides of runsuay 290, in wind sick ve2a

23. 2650) Phowsrn'’3 of Ueds to Liviice coup arent,

e have noted Uat curing porfeds of Sueleoornt vorller, rain, fo, high sired,

Sourlorstore st, Gi@e, tras the thirds Co not re..in ab the aivjort, Also, it

39 fe tud that we beve nvijucd thot isany, : cry, cry birds cre observed

to Jand ia the girbage ducp trea, but beeursce of tho terrain thoy renain out

of sight of eryonr locking cut of tio tovore Run cy 22-20L 13 cue long run isy

aad is used by most largo alrereft and jots, wo hove also noted that wien cone

of these pesa iho durp erea the birds cow out by tha thoustnes. then, whea

king pier

the Cuozting is

200 thy cash side of tha dvcp cal ov pecestriang,

tivebova are vo, tratlag mear tra woot side of Uo Oni, that most of

ta bivda whl sing La Une duap Arca, but Jet conccne como niar aud again tuy

cna oub by Lhe Uiouconds,

‘

Pilots ero cemwally eathor reluciont to report anything to tha poverneant that

Wy etn cet out of, Cunag ils because they do not tonb to Lecom luvoelved in

writing long Jettars vwl woltdeg oub Sue ite So, ve cca only report Uiab ve iwe

a

received infloscation feu Pield yowmMmeol of four siveraft tart lave had bir Js

—

strikes:

NAS9RC an Jevo Come miccy

OMS @ MeavhuresSidlsd.y Sot

. Pose = & Leokliee A Recreate

HW5O7S608 a Cessan 01,

In addition to the possible hazard tint Urose birds pres.nt to atireraft operating

at Une Potalb-Pocchivce Alvporty, ve have the protlen of consttatly issubog

‘

. tho infesortion to rosettes caw svelving Alceratt cogerding the size of tis

Mocha, the t.p2 of birds oad tiie Vee Liew on tha atrpowt, During our bi toe

vovdoes it is aloost Moo etble te re ble of 0 wen cy, vlad, scamenee auras, sol

Meavevces foe wiloetl ard Veuibiet,y Cg ceded phyeacolesy, tre portion Ue. tz

‘“wictly for Ula Ue, met ely fu ta sled verklerd to the contuch estab t' 3

o ‘ ‘ ‘ : . a ‘ ‘ ‘ef ee

oh of Fetus fost a P 6 Wa aceinge OF ole Helse sy Cw nutnde eld

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ye o ts "4 ou ' an Pid i? } iho i) » j Lat ate LG: Lie

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EXHIBIT C

Written Notice Of Prior Airplane-Bird

Strikes At The Airport.

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te. OF [7] vistT [J COheuaten ar P<) TRI CAN

eT Ddad 98 BUR? ide) COM FAC THO OR IN ConPC sr wee |MO LOCATION

Call to Mr. Janes E. Shepherd, Airports Rranch

joer

Bird sicike

orGest

at PDK on 24 June 1971, experienced a bird st, ike.

Airport Manager also advised of bird strike.

Tie | dard

11:9S a.m, 28 w%.0? 4%.

wen ate Ss

————

ee ee

aes. cares ome

1 advised Mr. Shepherd that \23ONR, a Falcon Fanjet landing on Rwy 20f

Very oe, Fe 110% TAKEN, GO HO QuEae®

a witeg the inform iutien,

8 . ene sewsiy i

S “uca V971 presets AC Tew, CP See, Ce, Sa 8, Cane

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PPA Mota 1572 (-cn ULh be SHOWS PONTIONS

———

fime nate

riven oF [) visit [ ) comerannies O2 (SX) TLLCRUONE CALL 10:30 a.m, 26 July 1971

‘ ton ; — - a — ve a

warts) or pt rents) CONTACTED OF 1m CONF TROCNCE ANO LOCATION rOuUTIMNG

“we, James fF. Addison mM. eyesoe |. ptens

Atlanta Airports O. cations Branch Uh iden. |

'

Depo. of eee Pan

Cause No

/-——_-———--

MOWARD M. HUDSON ____

- —— — nn -

suusecT

Bird Strike SE

morst — ”

{ talked with Janes £. Addison aud sdvised him that on Saturcay,

24 July, at 1892 Cees awich Time, MZ16oW, a PA 28, reported a

bird strike while on final for runway 20L.

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BEST COPY AVAILABLE

econo oF L) visig (F) ce erence ct CQ TeLerione cane |

AGI ly 1971 «

va ofa) OF PERTONI +) CONTACTEO OR Iw CONFERENCE NO LOCATION ; po Ah ae

allod by: Me. John Czar, Chief, ATCT, DeKalbtPeachtree Airport; Atlanta, semen | te wees

me alts tly, o.

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lird strike; DeXald-Peachtrce Airport; Atlanta, Georgia 19.22

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‘ic. Crar_called to report a bird strike on 24 July 1971 at 1832 Greenwich Time invo Ving

H

genecal aviation aircraft N-8463W described as a PA-28. The strike was on final approac;

‘

Ya Ruaway 201, aad Nr. Cear_advised that _the birds seemed to be flocking again. He also’

said_he_was_not_awars_of any aircraft damage. _

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mates vob bie Site gt Dy Boor on

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THe CATE

Ti tefad OF PCRDINLa) COWTACTED OM IN CONFERENCE AND LOCATION

CALLER: John Czar, Tower Chief

CALLED: Robert FF, Narris, Chief, SO-674

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Bird Strike

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King Aire 2118T landing on Runway 2R reported hitting a bird at threshold,

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7c

EXHIBIT D

Letters To and From The F.A.A. and DeKalb County

Concerning The Bird Hazard And Garbage Dump.

ld

30°

27 February 1970 Ch: a Poe

Birds

Chief, Operations Branch, S0-540

We would appreciate any assistance that your office can provide in coping

with what appears to be an increasing bird problem at this airport, The

FAA has operated the airport traffic control tower at the DeKalb-Peachtree

Airport since 1 January 1963. From that date until the latter part of

1968, we would have an occasional flock of birds that would light on the

airport, remain for a short period of time, then depart. However, since

the latter part of 1968 to this date, we have experienced what appears to

be a constantly increasing number of birds that are lighting immediately

adjacent to runway 2R-20L. Not only are there more in number, but they

show no inclination to leave the airport once they arrive.

Runway 2R-20L is our longest runway. We estimate that 95% of the jet

and large aircratt vsing this airport will use runway 2R-20L. For some

of the aircraft, this is the only runway that they can use at this airport.

Although we have received no official verbal or written complaints from

pilots, we have received some of the so-called friendly (?) snide remarks

regarding our bird sanctuary. Intermittently we receive requests that

ground vehicles be used to shoo away some of these birds. Very recently,

the pilot of a Hawker-Siddeley Di-125 jet aircraft stated that he would

hold on the ground until the birds were shooed away - after an 18 minute

delay - this particular aircraft finally departed.

It may be coincidental, but the garbage dump/land fill that is located

immediately adjacent to runway 2K-20L started in 1968. It appears that

as the garbage dump/land fill increases in size, so doco the size of

the flocks.

Unf Laan

( AOWN R, CZAR

~ Chief, ATC Tower, Chamblec, Georgia

9 March 1970

Mr. Paul S. Brayton, Superintendent

Buildings & Grounde Department

DeKalb County

Room 223, DeKalb Building

430 North McDonough Street

Docatur, Ceorgie 30030

Dear Mr. Drayton:

This agency hes reviewed the FAA Form 7460-1 that you submitted on

5 February 1970 for the proposed temporary Sanitary Department Ficld

Office to be located within the north clear zone area for Runway 20L.

An aoronautical ctudy conducted in accordance with Part 77, Federal

Aviation Regulations, has resulted in a determination that the pro-

posed construction would not exceed any standard of subpart C, Part 77,

and vould not be a hazard to air navigation from a height viewvpoiat.

However, there ie on increasing bird population in the vicinity Sf

Runway 2R-20L since sanitary £111 operations have cosmenced, which

is dotrimental to the operational capebility of the airport and

represents a noncompatible land use of county-owned land. This

situation is in direct violation of the assurances that DeKalb County

has obligated itself for in obtaining the airport and subsequent

improvements. :+ Accordingly, sanitary £111 operations near or on the

airport should be ceased immediately and no more activity by DeKalb

Covaty that might attract birds into that area should bo considered,

The land on vhich you propose to locote the tewporeary Sanitary

Department Field Office is clear zone area on which Federal-aid

Airport Program fvads have been expended. Therefore, the erection

of now buildiags or structures other than small, low-service type

buildings, such as isolated pump houscse or equipreat sheds, is

specifically prohibited. The proposed temporary ficld office would

have concentration of people at certain tines, which is aot desirable

ia clear zomes. Also, the concentration of garbage trucks and related

washing or cleaning opcretions would most likely increase the attraction

to bi:de, which fe undooirable, os outlined above. Accordingly, wo

cannot approve the proposed construction and related sanitary operations

on or noar tho DeKalb-lPoachtree Airport.

Sinceroly yours,

JANGINAL SIGMED f

Dawid C :

DAVID C. KELLEY

Chief, Atlanta Airports

Operations Branch

Mr. We Fe Manget oyyee eed 2/27/70 from Tower Chief

$O-540 w/ltr dtd 2/27/70 from Tower Chief

p-rower Chief

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

SOUTHERN REGION

.. 2 BOX 20636

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30320

15 May 1970

Honorable Clork Harrison, Jr., Chairman

DeKalo County Board of Cormissioners

556 North HeDonough Strect

Decatur, Georgia 30030

Dear Mr. Harrison:

We are concerned to learn of continued efforts to develop a sanitary

land fill within the boundery of Deiialb-Peachtree airport on land

dediceted to airport purposes.

The operation of a sanitary land £111 in close proximity to an airport

is clearly ~ncompatible wit the airport use, Sanitary land fills or

garbage dumps attracts flocks of birds to the area, Sirds aro caught

up im aireratt engines and have ccused many {natal aircraft eccidentc,.

We know that you would not want this menace to the operation of aircraft

to exist near this airport.

We also have a duty to call your attention to sone provisions of Grant

Agreerents between DeKalb County and the United States concerning the

operation of DeKalb-Veachtree Airport, as follwe:

(From Pace 5, Sponsor's Assurances, Project Application, dated 5 April

1968.)

"6. The Sponsor will operate cnd raintain in a safe and serviceable

condition the airport and oll facilities thereon an4 connected therewith

which are necessary to serve the ceronautical use: of the airport other

then faeftiities owned or controlled by the United ‘ates, and will not

permit eny cctivity thereon which would interfere with ite use for

airport purposes."

(Pege 6, last sentence of parcgraph 12.)

"The Sponsor w!]l not mike or permit the making of any chenges or

alterations in tho airport or any of ite facilities other then in con-

formity with the airport lsyout plon ar so epproved by the FAA, if such

changes or elterations wigiit adversely effect th: cafety, utility or

efficiency of the airport.”

"13. Incofer ca is within ite pover ond to the extent reasonable,

the sponsor will take action to rectrict the uce of Icnd adjacent. to or

5d

in the immediate vicinity of the airport to activities and purposes

compatible with normal airport operations including landing and takeoff

of aircraft."

A few airport sponsors in our area have tried to operate sanitary fills

or garbage dumps at their oirports. None have successfully done so,

Several locations are suffering from the results of garbage dumps on + -

adjacent lands. Several other airport sponsors have considered cetab- he

lishing garbage dumps on their airporte but have wisely changed their

plans after learning of the disadvantages of this course of action.

We do not consider the establishment of a sanitary fill on this airport

to be in keeping with your assurances to use this lend only for airport

purposes and ty operate a safe and serviceable airport. We recognize

your problem iu disposing of garbage, but we don't consider your airport

as being the proper place to do so.

Please advise us of the action you intend to take in regard to this

matter. We are enclosing copies of previous correspondence related

to this matter.

Sincerely yours,

ORIGINAL S.c

David C. Kel*y

DAVID C, KELLEY

Chief, Atlanta Airports

Operations branch

Enclosures

cc:

Fae H. F. Menget, Jr.

. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

SOUTHERN REGION

*.0. BOX 20636

23 November 1970 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30320

Honorable Clark Harrison, Jr., Chairman

DeKalb County Board of Cotyissioners 3

556 North McDonough Street 4 a

Decatur, Georgia 30030 | A ¥

Dear Mr. Harrison:

We have recently received complaints of large flocks of birds near the

rumays of DeKalb-Peachtree Airport. As you know, birds constitute a

real hezard to aircraft operating at the airport. Birds are caught in

aircraft engines, especially jet aircraft engines, and have caused many

fatal accidents,

We feel certain that you will waat to do everything possible to reduce

the dangers from thie source.

Bird hazards at this airport was the subject of our letter to you dated

15 May 1970, It was also the subject of a conference held in this

office on 1 June 1970, Those attendinz that conference included Mr. NM. P.

Manget, Maneper, DeKalb-Peachtree Airport, tir. Don Mendonsa, your Adminic-

trative acsistant, Iir. H. F. Cancron, Superintendent, DeNalb Covaty

Depertment of Sanitation, Mr. Lloyd Mayfield of this office and Mr. Robert

E. Warris of this office. Of crucial interest at this conference and in

our letter of 15 May 1970 was the operation of a sanitary land fill st

e the DeKalb Peachtree Airport. The surcation of the conference and the

letter wae that the sanitary land f11l, regardlecs of how eificiently it

was operated, was on attraction of flocks of birds. It was our conclucton

that the canitary lend {411 should be discontinucd aa soon OS, possible.

Your representatives at the mecting advised us that funds had been pro-

viced in o recent bood clection for sanitary inprovezents in the County.

It was their thinking that the eanitery land fill could and would be

moved to a different location in the near future.

We wouldarppreeiate your advicting un as to when this change can be

expected. It is our desire to worl: vith you in every way we cun to

secure sefe operstion at the Deitalb«Peachtree Airport.

Sincerely,

woud U. heros

DAVID C, IELLTY

Chief, Atlents Airports

Operations branch

cc:

itr. UW. FP, Maneet, Jr. lic. W. FF. Crmeron

« Mr. boa Mendanre Mr. e mR. Crer

7d

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

SOUTHERN REGION

16 December 1970 *.O. BOK 20816

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30970

Honorable Clark lerelaon, Jr,, Chatrean ey /° a

bekaldb County boare of Cons iselonere /* wt

556 North MeDonough Street

Decatur, Georgia 30030

Dear Mr. Harrison: !

We vefer to your letter of 30 Novenber 1970 and the lettor from

wv. Mendonsa of 9 December 1970,

, Subject matter of these letters to the proposed inatallation of a

temporary structure in the north perimeter of the Dehalh-Peschtroe

Airport for use by the sanitation employees of Delalb County, the

removal of the sanitary land C411 Crom DeKalb«Peachtree Airport

and the bird hazard at thio airport,

As wo understand it, you propouwe to erect a 40' x 80' Hutler typo

metal bublding vith dewountable seetlona ta the north clear sone of

rumvay 20L. Thie building ty to be used for a chore duration aud

will be noved when noceseary for airport develop.cat or reasons of

eafety. There ia to bo no long duration, gathering of a signitd ant

number of people, The butlding in not to violate any salety standards

of VAA or any clearances ineluded in VAR Part 77,

In view of pant corvenpondence and conferences held with menbers of

your etals concerning the eubjece of bird hagards, ve are at a loss

to understand the reworks in your letter of 30 Noverber 1970 to the

effect that your ofl lee vas unawore thac cornplaints had exasted

conceratuy the bivd hagards at DeKalb-Peachtive Alrport,. lovevor,

we are gratified to learn that Defalb County hoa wisely decided to

Close out the conticvy low £401 at DeKalvePeachtroee Aivport,

Based on the obove Assumpiions and assurances we do not object to

the construction of the Butler type building for the sanitation

workers. Provided; hovever, Le is agreed that thia building will

be removed whea the tnetrunent lending system on runvay 2R/20L haa

been cormianioned, We trust that this avrongenent will eatisiaee

torily cenclude thie matter,

We appreciate the ateps you are t kine to renov the sanitary land

fill and thereby decrease the prol {lity of atreraft aecetdents

due to bird atrihea. Pleane advise ua tf there are any question

concerntuge the arrangements,

Sincerely,

DAVID C, KELLEY

Chief, Atlanta Alrport

Operations bran Ny

9d

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION EY. MY a 7 49

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION Y nae |

SOUTHERN REGION

PO. BOx 20600

Ll Janvory 1971 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 90990

Hovuorable Clark Harrlaon, Jr., Cholrman

Delulb County Boord of Conmtastoners

556 North MeDonough Street

Decatur, Georgio 30030

Dear Mr, Harrison;

We have thie date received new complainte of bird etrikes at

DeKalb-Peachtroe Airport, We were advised by FAA Tower Chief,

Mr. Jolin R. Caar, that approximately 75 birds flew into an

aireraft landing at the oirport on thio past weekend. Lt appears

that the incidence of bird strikes at thie airport is tnereaning.

You advired us in your letter of 30 November 1970 that the eanttary

land fill located at the Dekalb-Peachtree Airport would bo closed

out o8 goon a9 planning could be completed for other facilitico,

Pleane advise us of the eatinated date for closing out the sanitary

land (411. Vor the sake of safety thie operation should be ter-

minated as seon oo possible, For confivition of the hasard thet

oxiate at thie airport due to the sanitary loud fill and the

accumulation of birds we request that you make toquirten of the

FAA Tower Chief, Me. John R. Czar, and tho alPport manager, Mr. HM. F.

Manget, Jr.

Wo will be happy to meet vith you and further advise you of thie

matter if you vo desire. We will appreciate an early reoponse to

thio request.

Ginecerely,

DAVID C, KELLUY

Chief, Atlanta Airports

Operations ra .ch

ec}

Mr. John R, Crar

air. ¥. Manget, Jr.

10d

Lh

Depo. of

Cause! 7,

Dewhulh-Pouchtree Airport now

ROOM 704 ADMINISTRATION QUILL OING

Atlantn, Ga. 30341

And M. WU0 SO eer

12 January 1971

Mr. Clark Marrison, Chairman

DeKalb County Board of Connissioners

DeKalb County Courthouse

Decatur, Georgia 30030

Dear Mr. Harrison:

This office has received o report from the Control Tower

concerning a near crash of a twin-engine Beechoraft 401

as it took off from DeKnlb-Penchtree Airport using Run-

way 2R. During take-off the aircraft struck a large

flock of etarlings damaging the plane so that the pilot

had to return imnediately to the field. About 40 dead

birds were found on the runway and an unknown number

were removed from the plane's nir scoops. This is an

occurance which we have been dreading with utmost fear

for several years.

Needless to say, this is ean extremely dangerous situation

and the Federal Aviation Administration is placing a great

deal of pressure on the Airport Monager to take positive

action to eliminate it. A copy of a letter received this

date from Mr. John Czar, Chief Air Traffie Controller, is

enclosed, Also enclosed is a copy of the DeKalb County

Sanitary Director's letter to Mr. Don Mendonsa. I am not

an expert on feathered creatures, but I do know that the

garbage cunp between Runwoy 22/20L and the Buford Highway

does attract birds which now nweber several flocks of

1000 to 2000 birds enhch. They roost in the trees nearest

the dump and in the daylight seem to alternate between

the dump and the runway.

lid

~ a

—

Mr. Clark Harrison 12 January 1971

The only solution I can see to this problem at this time

is to discontinue use of the garbage dump and to spread

at least two feet of dirt on top of the garbage which

ean be soon at periodic spots throughout the dump,

I can understand Mr. Cameron's fecling, however, the fact

remains that the weeds and shrubbery and the Red Rose Food

Plant have not changed materially in the last twenty years,

whereas, we have only had the bird problem since the garbage

dump was reactivated three or four years ago.

Any suggestions you have on solving thie problem will be

appreciated,

Yours sincerely,

on,

HM. F. Mangef\ Uri} A.A.E.

Airport Mantyer

MFMJr i nw

Enclosure (a)

ect

Mr. Arthur A. Mendonsa

Mr. H. F. Cameron, or.

Mr. Howard M. Hinton

Mr. John R, Czar

12d

OFPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRAT,ON

LZ January LU/1 Donal Poachtl Airy rt rat

DeKalbePeachtree Airport

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13d

Although all types of birds have been observed on the air-

port, doves and starlings seem to be in the majority; but,

regardless of the species, your assistance is requested in

finding a solution to this problem.

7

Af. Khoa

JOUN R. OZAR

Facility Chief

14d

ne BEST COPY AVAILABLE

SS en

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

SOUTHERN REGION

P.O. BOX 20636

3 February 1971 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30320

tir. Arthur A, tienconsa

Executive Assistant to Chairnan

Boore of Cowissfonerse

556 North MeMonouss Street

Decatur, Ceorsia ACW

Dear ht. Mendonsa:

We refer to your letter of 25 January 1971 snd other recent

corresvondence and conicrences concerning the bird problen at

Deimlb-Voachtree Aizpert. We ave mwere that cisconlicuing the

present sauiiucy loud Cill st the cirport and waking satisfactory

Tranjerents for a amy lam’ C411 regukves a reasonasle period of

time. However, we Sid the failure to be willing to osteblish a

scheduled plan of action to reliove this condition to be inconsis-

tent with the seriousness of this problew of public oalety.

Our files reflect ceveral corrunteations vith County offfcials since

March 1970 concerning this problem. Our letter of 9 Yarch 1970 to

Ir. Paul Breyton stated that the GArbage operation was inconpatible

with the operation of the Airport. A subacquent letter to Me. Clark

Nariioon cated 15 ty 1270 utreesed the sare points. You attended a

conference im thin effice on 1 june 1670 segether with Airport

Manager, I=. Monet and County Scuitarion Supervisor, tk. We. F.

Camoron, in which tats probies was discussed, Our lasting ispres-

sion of this recting was that the County had, in view of the recent

bond clectica, prosdsed removal of the land £ill operations froa

airport property as soon az practical.

In previous correspondence and confstences we have elted articles of

current @grecnents wich the County entered vith the Gaited States

concerning the operation ci this airport. At the cost of being

repetitious we will vepeat tic follewing excerpes fron pace 5,

Sponscs'as Assurances, Project Application cated 5 April 19683

"6. The Sponsor will operate and maintain in a safe-snd nere

viceable condition the airport and all facilities thereou and connected

therewith which are nececsary to serve the acronautical weers of the

airport cthor thon facilities owned or controlled by the United States,

and will not pomeit any octivity thereon which vould interfere with

ite use for aizport pw:poses."

16d

(Page 6, lost sentence of paragraph 12.)

t

"The Sponsor will not cake or permit the raking of any changes

or alterations in the aitport or any of its facilities other thaa in

conforaity with the airport layout plan as so approved by the FAA,

if such chanscs or alterations might acversely affect the safety,

utility or efficiency of the sirport."

"13. Insofar os is within its power und to the extent reasona-

able, the sponsor will tale action to restrict the use of land odjacent

to or in the irvediste vicinity of the cirport to activities and pur-

poses compatible with normal airport operations including landing and

tskeoif of aircrafc.”

We request that you reconsider your present decision concerning a

target date for the elimination of the sanitary land fill at this

airport. If the County failo to respond with a reasonable date and

{irm cormitment to rerove this hazard, we will be oblisated to study

the information available to us and set such cate. We think the

County is in a better position to establish such date.

. Failure of the County to ect within a reasonable tiie to correct this

situation vill rosult in a finding of noncompliance on the part of

the County vith its sgreements with the Unitec States. Depending oo

circumstances prevatling ct the tine of such noncompliance findings,

we may find it nececsary to reco:mend that cefsult actions be taken

against the County.

Please let us hear {ror you os soon as possible concerning the County's

present position in these matters. We will be happy to reet with the

County Board of Coszissioners to discuss thie ratter if they so cesire,

Sincerely,

DAVID C. FELLEY

Chicf£, Atlanta Airports

Operations Erauch

ec:

Honorable Clark Marrison, Jr.

tt. H. F. Cameron

pak. A. F. Mansct, at «

17d

DEPARTMc iT OF TRANSPORTATION

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

Abhi’. bite it GbRIGL

1% Willitatam Drive, Suite "Cc"

Colleye Park, Georgia 30337

28 FEB 673

Honorable A. C. Guhl, Chairman

DeKalb County Board of Commissivuners

. 4

556 McDonough Street gy 10 n

Decatur, Ceorgia wow \I7

Dear Mr. Gull:

In confirmation of your telephone conversation with the Federal

Aviation Administration Airports District Office on 27 February 1973,

this is to notify the County Commission that the dump on the DeKalb-

Peachtree Airport must be closed and covered with dirt immediately, We

also insist that any areas on the airport which serve as roosting.arcas

for birds be climinated, We further strongly recommend that the County

investigate the elimination as soon as possible of other roosting areas .

in the vicinity of the airport.

The hazard that birds attracted to the dump presents to the safe

operation of aircraft at the airport is not new, We have corresponded

with the County Cormission and other county officials about this

condition on at least cight previous occasions: 7 March 1970; 15 May

1970; 23 November 1970; 16 December 1970; 11 January 1971; 3 February

1971; 5 November 1971; and 1 February 1972, Im addition, we have met

on several occasions with County representatives to cffect the closing

of the dump,

In a letter dated 25 February i971, Mr. Arthur Mendonsa, Executive

Assistant to the Chairman, advised us that the County Commissioners had

agrecd at a Comission meeting that the dumping of raw garbage at the

airport would be terminated as of 1 August 1972, We now have information

that the dumping of garbage was not stopped as we believed, If this is

truce, the continued use of this dump would provide a basis for an FAA

determination that the DeKalb County Commission had failed to comply

with its agreements with the Federal Covernment in permitting a

hazardous condition to continue and in permitting incompatible land

uses. Further, if it is true that dumping was not stopped thus

supporting a Cinding of noncompliance, the DeKalb-Peachtree Airport

would no longer be cligible for Federal financial assistance under the

terms of the Airport and Airway Development Act, We would also withhold

payment of more than $646,000 remaining in projects 9-09-050-D704 and

9-09-050-0705,

18d

Dis

19d

EXHIBIT E

Series of Court Orders Entered In Suit Filed By F.A.A.

Against DeKalb County Fourteen Days After The

Crash In Question, Seeking Enforcement Of The

Grant Agreements And Alleviation Of The

Bird Hazard.

le

et

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GRORGTR )

ATLANTA DIVISION

/ + \

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

)

)

vi [IVIL A I

)

)

A. CC. GUML, Chairman }

WILLIAM A, WILLIAMS }

Tr. M. CALLAWAY, JR, )

HOKE CLAWVION SMITH }

ROBERT J. MORRIS )

W. M, COOLIDGE, JR, }

HNORIS A. WARD, ) 0 17 Oe

Members of the Commiset )

f Roade and Revenues of )

DeKalb County, Georgia }

( R gE R

Tha matter having c r ! ‘ before the

March 13, 1973, pur ant the plai rc’ py ati !

1 temporary restraini rder, and after iring the partie

and " Lderi ,; the viden t i her ROLRL i ‘

re le te inant ire reutrai | igo, ;

ind waate ateria at =the wKAlD Landtfi ’ t ‘ 11

ea tree Airport, without ering ‘ i it least

x (G) i ‘ [ iirt at the Tt rf ¢ ’ perat

Further, the efendant ar Lrecte ‘ or

ited t! lar i i ' } ,

but t later t in April L5,

‘

-

Tl.

rhe defendants are il directed t riet the ine f

7

the faciliti ft the oKkalb-Pea tt \irpor t propeller pe

ir ratt ana’ heli pt , ure ‘ ined i Dey tti it

ise by turbine engine~] ore Lxedwi : raft.

Lil

rhe lete lant i! ‘ t the per r f tbe ite

tates Attorney’ ffice, the Pederal Avia \ inietrat .

I Lronmental P tecti Ace , and tne ippropriate j or ent

wie Lé free ‘ to th ] port, ind L and rr Lrg

} ma lt ‘ocel i | La it t i } 1 ft ota Lr

it mea ré sll be take ) ate bird izarad at

thre DeKa li bea tre \ < t

- mote ant i ‘ Live I ! ‘ . ;

May 1, 19 , a the i ‘ ! é ati t i

ira thi L pl : ‘ i t i !

.

; ’ ; ’ )

ler : : Li i ! ti . ‘ I }

ibly there ‘ thi htter i be 0 i t i

ar ire | Lf ‘ it ‘ j | ‘ ‘ Pil ] ‘

} lé “te id ft I oT j it

’

»?} ’ ’

intime, we or, @1 Lo iT ) ‘ j i }

t ri i emed ) t i

? it | ‘

i r) a: } , ‘

i

Lila yu ev'ys

f . |

] , ‘

.

ry i ry ee

3e

oe

.

UNITED STA" 'S DISTRICT COURT

NORTIERN DIUTRICT OF GEORGIA MA)», ,,

ATLANTA DIVISION ben », 979

* CAs

b

¥} j 9 Chefs

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 i

j Crk

Plaintire CIVIL ACTION

ve. NO. 17,960

A. Cc. GUILL, ET AL.,

~“me~ eee oe

Defendanta

QRREA

Thie matter having come on for hearing before the Court

on March 28, 1973, pursuant to the defendants’ Motion for

--*

Clarification filed on March 21, 1973, and Motion to Modify or

Dissolve filed on March 20, 1973, and after hearing the parties

and considering the evidence,

It ta hereby ORDERED that defendants’ motion of March 78,

1973, to Modify or Dissolve the Tamporary Restraining Order and

Proliminary Injunetion is dented,

It ie further ORDERED that Paragraph II of the Court's

Order of March 16, 1973, ie hereby rescinded and replaced by

the following:

tr

The defendants are also directed to restrict the use of

the facilities of the DeKalb-Peachtree Airport to helicopters,

reciprocating encine-powered airplanes, and turbo-prop

airplanes equipped with Pratt and Whitney PTOA series engines,

and are enjoined from permitting ite use by other turbo-prop

airplanes and by turbine engine-powored fixed wing aircraft.

)) ;

So ORDERD, this ,\. day of | TZ. 1973.

' ;

ee ae oe Oe he

a

ALICRT J. ITNDRRSON, JR,

United States Dietrict Judge

- ee

de

UNITED STATES DICTRICT CouRT pei Tg

NORTIC'PN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

ATLANTA DIVISION ,

Fly

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff CIVIL ACTION

vs.

No. 17,9680

A. CC. GUITIL, ET AL.,

Defendants

QRRER

This matter having come on for hearing before the Court on

March "€, 1973, on Defendants’ Motion for Clarification of the

Order of March 16, 1973, and other mattors. The Order of

March 16, 1973, having boan modified by the Court on the 30th day

of March 1973, it ta further ordered that the Order of this Court

of March 16, 1973, be and the same is hereby clarified and modified

80 48 to provide as follows:

All alreraft prohibited from using DeKkalb-Peachtree Airport

by the aforesaid Order aa modified, on the ground at the DekKalb-

Peachtree Airport at tho time of the entry of said Order, shall

be permitted to make one doparture flight from said airport and

the Plaintiff, ite servants, agencies, and employees are hereby

rostraine’ and enjoined from imposing any fines, penalties or

sanctions againat the pilots or owners of the aircraft prohibited

from using the Dakalb-Peachtroe Airport, who have made only one

departure flight since the Order of this Court dated March 16,

1973, ineofar as such sanctions are sought to be imposed because

of euch departure being a violation of the restriction of the

airport.

thie ©“ day of April 1973,

he

avr ¢ ?

et

ALDERT J. IMNDRRGON, JR,

’ United Gtates District Judge

5e

bald Hl Chi S OFFICE

APR 20 1973

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ae a

NORTIMAN DIOTRICT OY GRORGIA by oy

ATLANTA DIVISION uty are

UNITED STATCS OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff CIVIL ACTION

ve. wo. 17,960

A. C. GUIIL, BT AL.,

Defendants

QBRER

It ia hereby ORDERED that Paragraph 2 of the Court's

Ordor of March 16, 1973, as amended by Order of March 30, 1973,

and modified by Order of April 5, 1973, te amended to read as

follows:

I

The defendants are directed to restrict the use of the

facilitios of the DeKalb-Peachtree Airport to helicopters,

rociprocating engine-powered aircraft, and turbo-prop aircraft

and aro enjoined from permitting ite use by turbine engine-powered

fixed wing aircraft. The term turbine engine-powered fixed wing

oireraft, as used herein, does not include turbo-prop aircraft.

Gaid Order of March 16, 1973, ae amended and modified, ia

to remain in effect until further relief or modification is sought

by either party to thie cause,

Done this w day of April 1973,

ALOPAT J. UENDERSON, JR.

United States District Judge

6e

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE

——,

j/

UNLTI) STATES DISTRICT CouRT M.\GA ° wa

NORTHERN VISTRICT OF GEORGIA [” t Clerk

ATLANTA VIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AM@RICA

VLRSUS CIVIL ACTION NO, 17,968

A, ©, GUML, et al

ORDER

On iwrch 12, 1973, the plaintiff, the United States

of Anwrica, filed a compleaine which, in substance, seeks to

enjoin che dumping of raw garbage in a lendfill adjecent to the ° |

DeKalb-Poachtreoe Airport. The plainctif{ alleges that thr waste |

material deposited by DeKalb County attracts lerge flocke of

birds, thereby creating « harard to the safety of airerett

using the airport. The conplaine further stresses the necessity

for the continued operation of the LeKalb-Peachtree Airport

a6 on integral elewent of the Atlanta area air traffic syste,

Pursuant to the plaintiff's request for a teworary

restraining order, the court conducted @ hear. ng on March 13,

1973 on the werite of the conplaint., At the conclusion thereof,

counsel for oll parties and the court agreed to the temporary

imposition of certain restrictions on the use of the airport

and the operation of the landfill in order to afford the de-

fendants an opportunity to assess the results of the utilization

of a pulverizer which was almout ready for operation at the

landfill,

Consequently, en order wae entered on March 16, 1973

which, among other things, required the defendants to cover the

garbage in the lendfill with at leest six (6) inches of dirt

at the close of each day until such time as the garbaye pulver-

izer wan ploced tn operation, The defendants were further

7e |

directed to restrict che use of the airport “to propeller-type

aircraft and helteopters” and vere enjoined "fron permitting

ite use by turbine engine-powered fixedwing elreroft." On

March 30, 1973, the order of iarch 16, 1973 was amended to

clarity the court's intent to prohibic turbo-prop airplanes,

except those equipped with Pratt and Whitney PT6A engines, and |

turbine engine-powered fixedwing aircraft, |

By agreement of counsel, these two orders were furtier

modified on April 20, 1973 eo as to perwit all turbo-prop air-

planes to use the airport, thereby prohibicing ite use only by

turbine engine-powered f{ixedwing atrerafc.

The defendants have now filed a “notion for othe,

relief or an addicional hearing", in which they seok to bave

reno «| all restrictions placed on air traffic at the Nexalb-

Peachtree Airport, tneluding “pure” jet airplanes, on che grounds |

that (1) the birds are no longer present in such large flocks |

0 a8 to be havardous to such planes, and (2) the Federal Aviation

Administration, and not Dekalb County, has the responsibility of |

eateablishing rules and regulations governing the safe operation

of the airpore facility.

In support of their firec contention, the defendants

have subaitted written statements of several pilote to the effect

that che birds are not now @ danger to jet aireraft. These

etatenwnts are un posed by the plainci(f and, corsequently,

ore a euffictent bests for removing the present reectriction on

jet traffic,

Ae « further reavon, the defendants cite the lederal

Aviation Act of 1958, which provides in pertinent part under

49 U.S.C, §13400e1

The Administrator is further authorized end

directed to prescribe air traffic rules and

regulations governing the flight of aircraft,

for the navigation, protection, and identi-

fication of the aircraft, for the prot: ction

of persons and property on the ground, and

for the efficient utilization of the navigable

air space, including rules as to safe alti-

tudes of flights, and rules for the prevention

of collision between aircraft, between air-

erait and land or water vehicles, and between

gsircraft ond atrborre objects. (emphasis added).

By this statute, Congress has pleced on the Federal

Aviation Administration the responsibility and authority to

establish necessary standards for the safety of aircraft in

and around consercial airports. Until a final determination can

be wade by the court of the effect of the current efforts of the

defendants in preventing the future congregation of birds at the

DeXalb-.ecachcree Airport, the nornal day-to-day operation of all

aircrait at che facility should be resuned under the statutory

and regulatory supervision of the Federal Aviation Administration.

This is especially true when considering the importance of the

airport to cocrnercial aviation in the Atlanta areca. The court

is of the opinion thet this purpose can best be accomplished

through the expertise of this agency of the government rather

than the cumbersome judicial process.

Accordingly, the restrictions imposed in Paragraph LI

of the order of this court of March 16, 1973, as amended by the

orders of March 30, 1973 and April 20, 1973, ere rescinded and

revoked, The reaaining provistons of said order shall remin

in full force a‘ effect until further order of the court.

So ordered this the 18th day of May, 1973.

/a/ Albert J. Henderson, Jr.

Jud,e, United States vistrict Court |

for the Northern District of coeneee

9e

FILED DIN CLERK'S opnige

> ome

YS ing7g |

_ 7 Te. ¢ ane

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT®”: ~

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA Weis

ATLANTA DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

VERSUS CIVIL ACTION NO. 17958

A. C. GUHL, et al

ORDER

Presently pending is the defendants’ motion of March

13, 1973, to dismiss for failure to state a claim, to strike

portions of the complaint, and for a more definite statement.

The motion to strike and the motion for more definite

statement are both directed at identical portions of the com-

plaint and both motions are lacking in merit.

A motion to strike under Rule 12(f) of the Feieral Rules

of Civil Procedure, is proper to delete those portions of the

complaint which are redundant, immaterial, impertinent or

scandalous. None of the statements in the complaint fall into

these categories.

Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provides that a motion for a more definite statement is available

if the petition "is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot

reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading". The

complaint here is not affected with such a defect Moreover,

two evidentiary hearings have beea held wherein the contentions

of the plaintiff have been clarified so as to place the issues

in proper perspective. Therefore, the motion for a more definite

tatement is moot and without merit.

One of the grounds on which the defeadagts move to .

dismiss is that the contract eatered into between DeKalb County

10e

and the United States in 1967 is unclear and could reasonably be

misunderstood by the parties, and, as such, is an insufficient

basis on which to base a claim for specific performance. The

court cannot agree with this contention,

inequitable nor indefinite.

The applicable portions of the contract are neither

incorporated into the contract, provides in pertinent part as

follows:

the airport in such a manner as to attract birds and thereby pose

a hazard to air navigation, is clearly inconsistent with these

The Sponsor (DeKalb County) will operate

and maintain in a safe and serviceable

condition the Airport and all facilities

thereon and connected therewith which are

necessary to serve the aeronautical users

of the Airport other than facilities owned

or controlled by the United States, and will

not permit any activity thereon which would

interfere with its use for airport purposes,

(Para, 6 - Project Application).

Insofar as is within its power and to the

extent reasonable, the Sponsor will take

action to restrict the use of the land

adjacent to or in the immediate vicinity

of the Airport to activities and purposes

compatible with normal airport operations

including lanaing and takeoff of aircraft.

(Para. 13 - Project Application).

(emphasis added).

The operation by the county of a landfill adjacent to

provisions of the contract.

set forth sufficient facts on which to base injunctive relief.

The complaint provides a detailed analysis of the operation of

the landfill which allegedly poses a threat to aircraft and human

life and is a sufficient basis for a claim for infunctive relief.

The defendants also urge that the complaint fails to

lle

Tae Project Application, which is

12e

td i GES Ets

_ STAg, CAO. Cher’:

ov

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Doom» Clerk

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

ATLANTA DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :

: CIVIL ACTION

Vv.

NO. 17968

A. C. GUHL, ET AL

CONSENT JUDGMENT

In this suit brought by the United States against the County

Commissioners of DeKalb County Georgia, in which plaintiff seeks

to enjoin the defendants from operating a garbage dump or landfill

adjacent to DeKalb-Peachtree Airport, the Court has been informed

that certain actions to increase the safety of air operations at

said airport have already been taken by defendants. These include;

1. The county has stopped using said landfill for the dumping of

putrescible wastes collected by the county.

2. Most of the landfill area has been covered with a layer of dirt

and has been seeded with grass.

3. County personnel police the area for the purpose of guarding

against other persons utilizing the landfill for the dumping of

putrescible wastes.

4. The county utilizes various sound mechanisms for the purpose

of frightening away birds.

5. A county employee patrols the airport runways whenever turbo

jet aircraft are to take off, checking the area for birds in order

to determine if it is safe for takeoff. If there are no birds in

proximity to the runway, the county employee notifies the FAA per-

sonnel] in the control tower that the airport is open for jet takeoff.

13e

.

The Court understands that defendants will continue such

of these activities as are deemed helpful in reducing the dangers

of bird flocks.

By consent of the parties and in order to further increase the

level of safety at DeKalb-Peachtree aivport, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that:

1. Defendants, their successors and agents, are permanently enjoined

from dumping raw or milled garbage or putrescible wastes on or

adjacent to DeKalb-Peachtree Airport; this is not intended to apply

to waste which is being temporarily held for processing by the

pulverizer or to pulverized waste being temporarily held for trans-

portation away from the premises for permanent disposal elsewhere.

2. Defendants, theiz successors and agents, wil) take all reasonable

precautions to insure that no dumping of raw or milled garbage or

putrescible wastes by any other person or entity takes place on or

adjacent to DeKalb-Peachtree Airport;

3. The county will operate the pulverizer so as to prevent any

accumulation of garbage and to prevent the pulverizer's being an

attraction for birds and take whatever other steps are necessary

to prevent said pulverizer and its operation from becoming an

attraction for birds;

4. Each party will bear his own costs.

Done this _}‘) day of Mah. 1976.

United States Distridt Judge

Consented to:

JOHN W. STOKES, JR.

United States Attorney

WILLIAM D. MALLARD, JR.

Assistant United States Attorney

ONT Aun ntiff

Attorney for Defendants

l4e

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Petitioners Brief — Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Dekalb County, Ga. · 429 U.S. 1060 | Frix