Petition — Rojas v. United States

Supreme Court brief1977

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

76 » = 9 S q Bupreme Court, U. &

» FILED

et-29 Is

IN THE MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK |

Supreme Court of the United States

No. i!

GERALD ROJAS, SR.

Petitioner

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

BARRY A. COHEN, P.A.

100 Twiggs Street

Suite 4000

Tampa, Florida 33602

and

PAUL ANTINORI, JR. of

ANTINORI & THURY, P.A.

601 East Twiggs Street

Tampa, Florida 33602

Attorneys for Petitioner

FREE PRESS PUB. CO., INC., TAMPA, FLORIDA

INDEX

Page

onan Ghee eS ee aes 1

TOE .....- + 2 cent Sidon p-eee 1

QUESTIONS PRESENTED .___________________ 2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED ______-_-.._-------. 2

CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE CASE

CONCERNING FACTS MATERIAL TO

QUESTIONS PRESENTED __.__——s—_—_i—_—_i Pe ae

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ..______. 4

APPENDIX

OPINION OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

COURT OF APPEALS -_______-- sinh sibs wads A-1

DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REHEARING _ A-9

i . A-10

CITATIONS

CASES

Aldridge v United States,

51 S.Ct. 470 (Footnote #3)

Brown v United States,

338 F.2d 543 (1964) _.._______-

Conrad v Louisiana,

Dennis v United States,

70 S.Ct. 519 (Footnote #1) __.

Morford v United States,

70 S.Ct. 586 (Footnote #2) _____-

Pointer v United States,

I ca os con coco cases

Ristaino v Ross,

96 S.Ct. 1017 (1976)

Sellers v United States,

271 F.2d 475 (Footnote #3)

Swain v State of Alabama,

EEE, wo dcecnccncucuvccss

United States v Dellinger,

472 F.2d 340 (1972) _._._ _______.

CONSTITUTION

Constitution of the United States

Sixth Amendment

Fourteenth Amendment

iii

STATUTES

Page

Tits Gh. VBE. GRCGICE) oecs 85 oes ct eas 2

eh ee Ue ac ae eencucentl. a

Tis Bh, GE SHR GNG GE sk ch oe cpn an ccousaees- 2

ne Sk SE Oe eek ck os co cen eae ntnagawine 2

See SE, TG, Gee nccececanSivesess.dece. 1

MISCELLANEOUS

Supreme Court Rule 19(b) ---.------------------ .1

Supreme Court Rule 23(1)(e) --.------.-------- 3

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

NO. 75-3760

GERALD ROJAS, SR.

Petitioner

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

The Petitioner, Gerald Rojas, Sr., respectfully prays

that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the judgment

and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Fifth Circuit, which opinion was rendered on August

20, 1976, and Petition for Rehearing was denied on

October 1, 1976.

OPINION BELOW

The Opinion of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

is reported at 537 F.2d 216, attached hereto and incor-

porated herein. (Appendix 1).

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered

on August 20, 1976. The Petition for Rehearing was

denied on October 1, 1976. (Appendix 2)

This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

$1254(1) and Rule 19(b) of the Supreme Court of the

United States.

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the perfunctory voir dire of prospective

jurors, failure to inquire into germane matters of atti-

tude, coupled with the Court’s demeanor during voir

dire, deprived Petitioner of his right to a fair trial.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case involves the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution.

CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE CASE CONCERNING

FACTS MATERIAL TO QUESTION PRESENTED

The Federal Grand Jury, for the Middle District of

Florida, indicted the Petitioner in a four count indict-

ment, charging the Petitioner, Gerald Rojas, Sr., in two

counts, to-wit: in Count One with violation of Title 21,

United States Code, Section 841(a)(1) and Section

846; and in Count Four with violation of Title 21, United

States Code, Section 841(a)(2) and Title 18, United

States Code, Section 2. (Appendix 3)

The trial commenced in the Middle District of

Florida before the Honorable Daniel Thomas, visiting

Judge by designation from Alabama, and concluded on

July 17, 1975, with a finding by the jury that Petitioner

was guilty of both Count One and Count Four. The Peti-

tioner was sentenced to a term of ten (10) years.

A Motion for New Trial was timely filed and denied.

Petitioner appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-

peals, which was denied; as was the Petition for Re-

hearing.

In compliance with Rule:23(1)(e) of the Supreme

Court of The United States, the following is submitted

to this Court.

The Trial Judge. sitting in the Middle District of

Florida, Tampa Division, by designation from the

Southern District of Alabama, during a pre-trial con-

ference the day before the trial, expressed the opinion

that he “did not like the way we chose jurors in this

District because it took too much time”. Consistent

with this opinion, when voir dire commenced, the trial

Court conducting the voir dire, having denied defense

counsel’s motion to allow counsel to voir dire, addressed

the panel very generally, hurriedly and perfunctorily.

During the jury selection process the Court, while

pacing back and forth behind the bench, admonished

defense counsel in the hearing presence of the jury to

“let’s get this jury hurried up now’. When the trial

Court told defense counsel the second time in a some-

what “meaningful” way, “let’s get this jury hurried up

now” defense counsel felt compelled to comply with the

order and thus immediately, but reluctantly accepted

the panel.

The Court, in the manner above described, asked

nine general questions of the panel and then immed-

iately specifically asked each juror his name, address,

employment, marital status and employment of spouse.

The Court refused to substantially comply with the

Petitioner’s requested questions submitted in writing,

and significantly refused the following specific

questions: :

1. “41. Do you believe that merely because one

is a law enforcement officer he will always

tell the truth, or do you believe that he may

intentionally mis-represent something, exag-

gerate or not disclose when there is a duty to

disclose, like any other witness who may not

want to be completely accurate?”

2a. “63. Will you be able to give one charged with

a drug related offense, the presumption of

innocence?

2b. 64. State your feelings concerning persons

charged with drug related crimes.

2c. 65. Have you or any members of your immed-

iate family or close friends ever been arrested

or accused of any drug related offense? If so,

Pursue.”

Bobby Hornsby of Brandon, Florida, became the

foreman of the jury and it was subsequently learned

that the said foreman helped organize a project known

as Reach Out Crisis Center, which organization was to

help people on drugs. Mr. Hornsby served on the Ad-

visory Board and Board of Directors of the organiza-

tion. Mr. Hornsby has sworn, by way of affidavit, that

had he been asked questions concerning his feelings

toward drugs and other related type questions, he

would have expressed his attitude concerning the same

which would have allowed the Petitioner the oppor-

tunity to exercise a peremptory challenge.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The Opinion of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

in the case sub judice is in conflict with decisions of

this Court, Federal Appellate Courts and State Courts

on the federal question of substance.

This case presents an unfortunate situation in the

life of the Petitioner in that as a citizen of the United

States, he was denied his constitutional right to a fair

and impartial trial and thus he was denied due process

of law. If this matter is not corrected by this Court, he

will be ordered to the Federal Penitentiary for a period

of ten (10) years consistent with the order of the trial

Court.

This case is as important to the American system

of criminal justice as it is to Gerald Rojas, Sr., but for

different reasons. It is important to Gerald Rojas, Sr.,

because his freedom is in jeopardy. It is important to

the criminal justice system because the necessity to

review the entire voir dire process within the Federal

judiciary is overdue.

The hurried and perfunctory procedure manifested

in this case by the trial Court illustrates a very real

problem in the Federal judiciary. Because of insur-

mountable work loads, Courts, as the trial Court at bar,

attempt to expedite and accelerate the process resulting

in a denial of due process of law. —

This Court has long recognized the principle of law

that the trial Court “while impaneling a jury has a

serious duty to determine questions of actual bias and

a broad discretion in its rulings on challenges therefor,

and, in exercising its discretion, trial court must be

zealous to protect the rights of an accused’ and further

that the “preservation of the opportunity to prove

actual bias is a guarantee of a defendant’s right to an

impartial jury”.*

This Court recently recognized the principle of law

in Ristaino v Ross, 96 S.Ct. 1017 (1976) that demeanor

1 Dennis v United States, 70 S.Ct. 519

2 Morford v United States, 70 S.Ct. 586

is an important part of determining impartiality. Fur-

ther, this Court has long recognized the principle of

law that the peremptory challenge is one of the most

important rights secured to the accused. Pointer v

United States, 14 S.Ct. 410. Once again, this Court in

examining the voir dire process in Swain v Siate of

Alabama, 85 S.Ct. 824, 835, stated:

“Although ‘(t)here is nothing in the Constitution

of the United States which requires the Congress

(or the States) to grant peremptory challenges,’

nonetheless the challenge is ‘one of the most im-

portant of the rights secured to the accused.’ The

denial or impairment of the right is reversible error

without a showing of prejudice.”

The limited number of voir dire questions submit-

ted by the ‘Court, coupled with them calling for a yes

or no response, makes meaningful the insignificance of

the Court’s question, “is there any reason you cannot

be fair and impartial?”

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United

States v Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (1972) stated:

“The general question to veniremen whether there

is any reason they cannot be fair and impartial,

cannot be relied on to produce a disclosure of any

disqualifying state of mind.”

and furthermore, the Court pointed out that:

“... it is not necessary for defendants to show that

members of the jury were in fact prejudiced. The

focus is exclusively on whether the procedure used

for testing impartiality created a reasonable assur-

ance that prejudice would be discovered if present.”

(P. 367).

The refusal of the trial Court to ask any question

concerning the nature of the offense, either as sub-

mitted or in the Court’s own discretion, prohibited the

Petitioner from learning about the state of mind of the

prospective jurors concerning such an allegation and

what attitudes they may have concerning the issues in

the case.

In Conrad v Louisiana, 304 So.2d 318, when the

trial Court refused to ask defense counsel’s question:

“Gentlemen, we have a serious drug problem in this

state, in this country. (1) Will that and the fact

that this is a drug case in any way affect your im-

partial judgment in this case? (2) Do you feel that

a person charged with possession of a large

quantity of Marijuana, for example, should satisfy

you as to her innocence?” (numbers supplied).

the Supreme Court of Louisiana stated:

“We hold that the trial court’s disallowance of the

above-quoted questions which defendant sought to

ask prospective jurors constitutes curtailment of

voir dire examination .. .” (P. 319).

The refusal to make an inquiry with reference to

the credibility of the law enforcement officer as stated

in paragraph 41 of the questions requested by Peti-

tioner set forth in the specific questions quoted in the

facts herein was dealt with by Justice Burger in Brown

v United States, 338 F.2d 543 (1964), when, in examin-

ing the trial court’s refusal to ask of the prospective

juror, “Would you give greater credence to testimony

of law enforcement officer merely because he was an

officer as compared to any other witness.”, held:

“Although the trial court possesses a ‘broad dis-

cretion as to the questions to be asked’ on voir dire,

the exercise of that discretion is ‘subject to the

essential demands of fairness’.’’*

Justice Burger concluded that the failure to ask such a

question departed from the essential demands of fair-

ness and reversed the conviction.

As busy as Courts are, our system of criminal

justice should not and cannot tolerate rationalizing due

process principles in the name of judicial expediency.

There are other forums and ways to correct the admin-

istrative problems of the Courts, and this Court above

all must be vigilant in insuring that constitutional prin-

ciples are not diluted as part payment for “expediting

the process”.

It is submitted to this Court that perhaps more

particular guidelines are needed to insure fairness

during the voir dire process so that lower Courts are

3 Cites Aldridge v United States, 51 S.Ct. 470, and relies on

Sellers ‘v United States, 271 F.2d 4io.

not encouraged under the authority of “broad discre-

tion” to conduct a voir dire exhmination as was present

in this cause.

Respectfully submitted,

BARRY A. COHEN, P.A.

100 Twiggs Street

Suite 4000

Tampa, Florida 33602

BARKY A. COHEN

and

ANTINORI & THURY, P.A.

601 East Twiggs Street

Tampa, Florida 33602

PAUL ANTINORI, JR.

Attorneys for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that in accordance with

Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court, on the day of

October, 1976, three copies of the Petition for Writ of

Certiorari were mailed, postage prepaid, to the Solicitor

General, United States Department of Justice, Washing-

ton, D.C. 20530, and three additional copies were mailed

to United States Attorney, Federal Building, Tampa,

Florida. I further certify that all parties required to be

served have been served.

Paut ANTINORI, JR.

A-1

UNITED STATES v. ROJAS

UNITED STATES of America,

Plaintiff- Appellee,

Vv.

Gerald ROJAS, Sr.

Defendant- Appellant.

No. 75-3760.

United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

Aug. 20, 1976.

Defendant was convicted befofe the

United States District Court for the Mid-

dle District of Florida, Daniel Holcombe

Thomas, J., sitting by designation, of

possession of a controlled substance with

intent to distribute and of conspiracy to

possess cocaine with intent to distribute,

and he appealed. The Court of Appeals,

Lewis RK. Morgan, Circuit Judge, held

that district court’s refusal to ask pro-

spective jurors on voir dire to state their

feelings concerning persons charged with

drug-related crimes was not abuse of dis-

cretion, that requested instruction that

defendant’s mere physical proximity to

cocaine hidden in the common room of

house which he occupied was insufficient

to establish the element of possession

was properly refused in view of instruc-

tions given, that evidence was sufficient

to support conviction and that although

police officer's testimony that defendant

was the only occupant whom the police

had information on as selling cocaine

smacked of “informant’s hearsay,” trial

court’s admonition to jury to “Disregard

that remark,” was sufficient to obviate

need to declare a mistrial.

Affirmed.

5198

1. Jury @131(2)

Scope of voir ‘ire is committed to

the sound discretio of the trial judge,

who may choose to ask counsel to submit

proposed questions and conduct the voir

dire itself. Fed.Rules Crim.Proc. rule

24a), 18 U.S.C.A.

2. Jury @131(6)

District court’s refusal to ask pro-

spective jurors on voir dire to state their

feelings concerning persons charged with

drug related crimes, rather than relying

on careful though general questions per-

taining to possibility of bias was not

abuse of discretion and did not effect

essential fairness, notwithstanding that,

following trial, one juror stated that he

hac helped organize and had served on

organization that was designed to help

people on drugs. Fed.Rules Crim.Proc.

rule 24(a), 18 U.S.C.A.

3. Drugs and Narcotics ¢= 123

A defendant’s mere presence in an

area where narcotics are discovered is

insufficient evidence to support a convic-

tion for possession. Comprehensive

Drug Abuse Prevention and Centro! Act

of 1970, § 40K(aX1), 21 USCA.

§ 841(aX(1).

4. Criminal Law #=829(3)

Requested instruction that defend-

ant’s mere physical proximity to cocaine

hidden in the common room of residence

was insufficient to establish element of

possession was properly refused in view

of instructions given, which instructions

stated that in order to find possession

the jury must find that defendant had

either direct physical control or the pow-

er and intention to exercise dominion or

control over the cocaine. Comprehensive

Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act

of 1970, § 401(aX1), 21 USCA

§ 841(aX1).

Synopses, Syllabi and Key Number Classification

The Synopses, Syllabi and Key Number Classifi-

cation constitute no part of the opinion of the court.

A-2

5199 UNITED STATES v. ROJAS

5. Criminal Law @ 1144.13(3)

In considering argument that evi-

dence was insufficient to support convic-

tion the Court of Appeals must take the

view of the evidence most favorable to

the Government.

6. Criminal Law @552(3), 562

Test for sufficiency of the evidence,

whether it be circumstantial or direct, is

whether reasonable jurors could find the

evidence inconsistent with every hypoth-

esis of innocence.

7. Conspiracy @=44'

In view of frequency of drug trans-

actions, i. e., three sales in four days, as

well as the amounts of the cocaine in-

volved, i. e., some two and one-half ounc-

es being sold and an additional seven

ounces found in defendant’s home, the

jury, in prosecution for conspiracy to

possess cocaine with intent to distribute,

was free to infer defendant’s knowledge

and intent that the cocaine which he de-

livered to his nephew, for transfer to

undercover agents, would be redistribut-

ed; in such circumstances it was imma-

terial that defendant did not know the

identity of lower links in the chain of

distribution. Comprehensive Drug

Abuse Prevention and Control Act of

1970, § 406, 21 U.S.C.A. § 846.

8. Criminal Law @=867

Although police detective’s testimo-

ny, in response to question whether offi-

cer had determined who occupied subject

house, that defendant was the only one

at the residence whom the police had

information on as_ selling narcotics

smacked of “informant’s hearsay” trial

court’s admonition, “Disregard that re-

mark,” was sufficient to obviate the

need to declare a mistrial, especially

since such statement could not have a

substantial impact on the verdict in that

other evidence clearly pointed to defend-

ant as being a large-volume supplier of

cocaine and attention of jury was not

again directed to the remark. Compre-

hensive Drug Abuse Prevention and

Control Act of 1970, §§ 401(a1), 406, 21

U.S.C.A. §§ 841(a\(1), 846.

$. Criminal Law @1169.5(1)

General rule is that striking errone-

ously admitted evidence and admonish-

ing the jury to disregard it serves to

cure the error.

Appeal from the United States Dis-

trict Court for the Middle District of

Florida.

Before WISDOM and MORGAN, Cir-

cuit Judges, and LYNNE, District Judge.

LEWIS R. MORGAN, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Gerald Rojas, Sr. was con-

victed of possession of a controlled sub-

stance, cocaine, with intent to distribute

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(aX1) and

of conspiracy to possess cocaine with in-

tent to distribute in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 846. He assigns four grounds

as error requiring reversal. We affirm.

I. Facts.

Viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the government, Glasser v.

United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct.

457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942), the jury could

have found the following: On February

8, 1975, two Tampa, Florida undercover

police detectives, Hartzner and Larson,

met Stephen Charles Alfonso to attempt

to purchase narcotics from him. Ail-

though no narcotics transaction occurred

that day, Alfonso sold some counterfeit

money to the detectives and arranged to

meet them again at a predetermined

street intersection on February 12.

— new e --

A-3

UNITED STATES v. ROJAS 5200

At about 11:00 p. m. February 12,

Hartzner, Larson, and Alfonso met as

planned. The detectives asked whether

Alfonso could supply them with cocaine,

whereupon he left for about fifteen min-

utes and returned with a small sample of

the drug. The three agreed to meet at

the same place at 1:00 a. m. February

13 in order to complete the sale of half

an ounce of cocaine for $625.

Hartzner and Larson met Alfonso,

who was accompanied by appeilant’s

nephew Richard “Chicky” Valdez, as

scheduled. The detectives delivered $625

and Alfonso and Valdez delivered one

quarter ounce of cocaine, directing the

detectives to follow them to a new loca-

tion for delivery of the other quarter

ounce. This new location was two to

four blocks from the house at 3010 West

Laurel Street in Tampa where appellant,

his wife Melba, and his stepson Jose Gar-

cia lived. When the four met at the

new location Valdez left in an automo-

bile with the money, returned about five

minutes later, and delivered the second

quarter ounce.

The detectives next met Alfonso at his

residence about 6:40 p. m. February 15,

at which time they discussed with him

the purchase of a full ounce of cocaine.

Alfonso told the detectives that he would

have to check to see whether he could

procure an ounce and that the detectives

should meet him at a shopping center at

8:00 p. m. that evening. Alfonso then

contacted Valdez, and at about 8:00 p.

m. the two of them drove to the house

at 3010 West Laurel Street, which Val-

dez identified to Alfonso as his source’s

house. Valdez went inside the house

alone, returned a few minutes later, and

told Alfonso that “the old man” was tak-

ing a shower and that they should return

later. Alfonso and Valdez then met the

detectives, told them that their source

was taking a shower, and agreed to meet

later at Alfonso’s residence.

Alfonso and Valdez returned to the

house at 3010 West Laurel Street. Val-

dez again went inside alone, returning a

few minutes later with a quantity of

cocaine. At about 9:30 p. m. Alfonso

and Valdez met Hartzner and Larson at

Alfonso’s residence, where the detectives

delivered $1,200 and were given an

ounce of cocaine. Valdez then left to

return some extra cocaine to his source

and was followed by a police surveillance

team back tw the house at 3010 West

Laurel Street.

Later the same night Ernest Spencer,

an informant for the State Attorney’s

office at Gainesville, went to Valdez’ res-

idence with two other persons to negoti-

ate for the purchase of some cocaine.

At about 1:00 a. m. the next morning,

February 16, Valdez, Spencer, and the

others drove to the house at 3010 West

Laurel Street. Valdez went inside alone,

spoke with someone in the house, re-

turned to the car, and announced that

his “uncle’s got plenty of coke but he’s

just to [sic] plum out tonight to do any

business.” Later the same morning ap-

pellant Rojas met Valdez, Spencer, and

the others at Valdez’ residence. There

Rojas personally delivered an ounce of

cocaine to Spencer’s companions in re-

turn for $1,100. At this time the five

men discussed the possibility of further

transactions for a pound or more of co-

caine, with Valdez repeatedly stating

that, “My uncle don’t sell no bad drugs.”

On February 21 a team of law en-

forcement officers executed a search

warrant on the’ house at 3010 West Lau-

rel Street. There, concealed under the

seat of a lounge chair in the “Florida” or

living room, they discovered a bag con-

taining seven ounces of cocaine. They

also found a set of scales of a kind suit-

A-4

5201 UNITED STATES v. ROJAS

able for weighing drugs in Rojas’ and his

wife’s bedroom and a quantity of mari-

juana in the stepson’s bedroom. After

the search, as Detective Hartzner was

about to leave the house carrying the

cocaine, appellant asked him whether he

could leave “half the stash.” Hartzner

declined.

A federal grand jury indicted appel-

lant, Alfonso, and Valdez on February

27, 1975. On February 28 Alfonso plead-

ed guilty to conspiracy to possess cocaine

with intent to distribute. Valdez’ case

was severed from appellant’s, and Valdez

was convicted on the same charge July 8,

1975.

Appellant’s trial began July 15. The

principal witnesses for the government

were Hartzner, Alfonso, and Spencer;

Valdez did not testify. A government

expert testified that chemical analysis of

four cocaine samples—the two quarter

ounces purchased February 13, the ounce

purchased February 15, and the seven

ounces seized in the search February 21

—revealed such a similar and unusual

combination of cocaine and other sub-

stances that there was a “high degree of

probability” that the four samples once

had been part of a single mixture. Ap-

pellant presented evidence of an alibi for

the evening of February 15. The jury

retired for deliberation on the afternoon

of July 17 and returned its verdict of

guilty on both counts two hours later.

Appellant was sentenced to concurrent

ten-year terms, plus the mandatory spe-

cial parole term.

Il. Voir Dire.

{1,2} Appellant’s first assignment of

error complains of the district court’s re-

fusal to ask prospective jurors on the

voir dire to state their feelings concern-

ing persons charged with drug related

crimes. Appellant filed, together with

his new trial motion, an affidavit of the

jury foreman, Bobby Hornsby, which

stated that Hornsby had helped organize

and had served on an organization called

the Reach Out Crisis Center, the purpose

of which “was to help people on drugs as

well as other social type difficulties.”

The affidavit further stated that if ap-

pellant’s requested voir dire question had

been asked, Hornsby would have made

known his activities with this organiza-

tion. Appellant’s counsel state that if

this information had been elicited, they

would have excused this juror.

The district court may, of course,

choose to ask counsel to submit proposed

questions and conduct the voir dire jt-

self. Fed.R.Crim.Pro. 24a). The scope

of the voir dire is committed to the

sound discretion of the trial judge, Unit-

ed States v. Nell, 526 F.2d 1223, 1229

(5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Gassa-

way, 456 F.2d 624, 626 (5th Cir. 1972),

“subject to the essential demands of fair-

ness,” Aldridge v. United States, 283

U.S. 308, 310, 51 S.Ct. 470-471, 75 L.Ed.

1054 (1931). The experienced trial judge

in this case, after inquiring into the pro-

spective jurors’ and their families’ ac-

quaintances with the defendant and

counsel and into their familiarity with

the case from news reports, asked all

prospective jurors whether they knew of

any other reason why they could not

give both the government and the de-

fendant a fair and impartial trial.

Hornsby di not state that he knew of

any such reason. His post-trial affidavit

does not state that he was prejudiced in

any way.

Here, as in United States v. Eastwood,

489 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1973), the district

court declined to ask prospective jurors

specific questions regarding their feel-

ings about or experiences with drugs or

drugs users, but instead relied on “care-

ful though general questions pertaining

A-5

UNITED STATES v. ROJAS 5202

to the possibility of bias.” Id. at 820.

Here, as in Eastland, we think this

course did not affect the essential fair-

ness of appellant’s trial and hence did

not constitute an abuse of discretion.