Opposition — West Penn Power Co. v. Train

Supreme Court brief1977

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

Supreme Court, U, $

FILE D =

|} FEB g gg77

No. 76-567

MICHACL RODAK, Jr CL

» IK, ERK |

In the Supreme Court of the Hnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

West PENN PowER COMPANY, PETITIONER

Vv.

RUSSELL TRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE THIRD CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

DANIEL M. FRIEDMAN,

Acting Solicitor General,

PeTer R. TAFT,

Assistant Attorney General,

ALFRED T. GHIORZI,

RAYMOND N., ZAGONE,

JOHN E, VARNUM,

Attorneys,

Department of Justice,

Washington, D.C. 20530.

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

No. 76-567

West PENN Power COMPANY, PETITIONER

Vv.

RUSSELL TRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF*APPEALS FOR

THE THIRD CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. | 10a-1 14a)

is reported at 538 F. 2d 1020.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on July

30, 1976 (Pet. App. I15a), and a timely petition for

rehearing was denied on September 15, 1976 (Pet. App.

117a). The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on

October 22, 1976. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked

under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Clean Air Act violates the Due Pro-

cess Clause of the Fifth Amendment by permitting federal

enforcement of a state implementation plan that was not

(1)

2

subject to challenge on grounds of economic and techno-

logical infeasibility at the plan approval stage under

Section 307 of the Act.

2. Whether the Clean Air Act requires that federal

enforcement of a legally adopted state implementation

plan be suspended while petitioner challenges the condi-

tions of a variance granted by the State under state

administrative review procedures.

STATEMENT

On September 13, 1973, pursuant to Section | 13(a) (1) of

the Clean Air Act, 84 Stat. 1686, as amended, 42 U.S.C.

1857c-8(a)(1), the Administrator of the Environmental

Protection Agency sent petitioner a notice that Boiler No. .

33 at petitioner’s Mitchell Power Station was in violation of

the regulations of the Pennsylvania air quality

implementation plan limiting emissions of sulfur dioxide

and particulates. Petitioner filed suit in the United States

District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania

seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against this notice

of violation. Petitioner argued that the Pennsylvania

implementation plan should have permitted the use of tall

stacks as a method of meeting the sulfur dioxide restrictions

in the plan. It also contended that federal enforcement of the

Pennsylvania implementation plan should be barred

because the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental

Resources had granted petitioner a temporary variance.

'On September 19, 1973, the Pennsylvania Department of Environ-

mental Resources granted petitioner a temporary variance, extending

the compliance deadline for emission of sulfur compounds from Boiler

No. 33 to June 30, 1976, while requiring the installation of flue gas

desulfurization equipment (a scrubber) or conversion to low-sulfur fuel.

This variance has not been approved by the Environmental Protection

Agency, because the variance extended beyond July 31, 1975, the final

date for attainment of the primary ambient air quality standard for

sulfur oxides (Pet. App. Sa). See 40 C.F.R.51.15(b)(1); Train v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60.

3

The district court dismissed the action for lack of juris-

diction. The court held that, insofar as petitioner was

attacking the Pennsylvania plan, it had waived its right to

review in the federal courts by not filing a timely petition to

review the Environmental Protection Agency's approval of

the plan. The court also held that the variance granted by the

State was ineffective to bar federal enforcement of the

implementation plan because Section | 10(a) (3) of the Act,

84 Stat. 1680, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1857c-5(a)(3),

provides that variances must be submitted by the Governor

of the State to, and approved by, the Environmental Pro-

tection Agency (Pet. App. 46a-62a).

A divided court of appeals, relying on different grounds,

affirmed (Pet. App. 66a-107a). The court concluded that

petitioner was not attacking the implementation plan itself,

and that review was not affirmatively precluded. On the

other hand, the court held that no jurisdictional basis

existed for petitioner’s suit against issuance of a notice of

- violation by the Administrator. Petitioner could raise its

argument, the court stated, as a defense to any judicial

proceedings that the Administrator might commence to ob-

tain compliance with the implementation plan. On June 21,

1976, this Court denied West Penn Power Company's

petition for a writ of certiorari (No. 76-567).

On March 20, 1975, prior to the court of appeals’ de-

cision, petitioner filed a petition for review of the

Pennsylvania implementation plan insofar as it related to

control of the emissions of sulfur dioxide at its Mitchell

Power Station (Pet. App. 32a-45a). On May 19, 1975, the

court of appeals entered a stay of federal enforcement

pending its resolution of the issues raised in the petition for

review.

On July 30, 1976, the court of appeals dismissed the peti-

tion for review on the ground that the action was indis-

tinguishable from Union Electric Co. vy. Environmental

4

Protection Agency, No. 74-1542, decided June 25, 1976

(Pet. App. 110a-115a). Under the terms of a stipulated order

extending the original stay of federal enforcement, the order

staying federal enforcement of the Pennsylvania

implementation plan expired thirty days after the court of

appeals’ decision, or on August 30, 1976. On August 12,

1976, petitioner filed with the court of appeals a petition for

rehearing en banc and request for an extension of a stay of

enforcement. On September 15, 1976, the court of appeals

denied petitioner’s petition for rehearing en banc and

request for an extension of a stay of enforcement (Pet. App.

117a).

On September 23, 1976, petitioner filed in the court of

appeals a motion for stay of mandate and stay of enforce-

ment pending review by this Court. Ori September 29, 1976,

the court of appeals granted the motion for a stay of

mandate but denied the request for a stay of enforcement.

On October 12, 1976, petitioner filed with this Court an

application for a stay of enforcement pending disposition of

petition for writ of certiorari. Mr. Justice Brennan denied

the application on October 20, 1976.

ARGUMENT

1. Petitioner contends (Pet. 15-21) that the threat of

federal enforcement of the terms of a state implementation

plan submitted pursuant to the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.

1857 et seq., violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment to the extent that the target source is denied an

opportunity to raise claims of economic and technological

infeasibility at the plan approval stage under Section 307 of

the Act, 84 Stat. 1707, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1857h-5.

In Union Electric Co. v. Environmental Protection

Agency, No. 74-1542, decided June 25, 1976, this Court held

that, under the 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, the

EPA Administrator lacked authority to consider claims of

—-F

=

5

economic and technological infeasibility in reviewing state

submitted implementation plans and that such claims were

therefore not a proper subject for consideration on judicial

review of the Administrator’s decision. The Court agreed

with the Administrator “that Congress intended claims of

economic and technological infeasibility to be wholly

foreign to the Administrator’s consideration of a state

implementation plan” (slip op. 8-9). Noting that the

language of the Amendments and the legislative history

showed Congress’ awareness that some sources of pollu-

tants might have to shut down (id. at 10-11), the Court

concluded that Congress nevertheless intended to require

that primary air quality standards be met.

The Court recognized, howevei, that claims of economic

and technological infeasibility might be raised at other

meaningful times. Indeed, the Court stated that “the

Amendments do allow claims of technological and econo-

mic infeasibility to be raised in situations where consider-

ation of such claims will not substantially interfere with the

primary congressional purpose of prompt attainment of the

national air quality standards” (id. at 18). For example, it

would not frustrate the congressional purpose to allow

presentation of infeasibility claims when necessary air

quality could be achieved by apportioning the control

burden in a different manner; in such a case, a source not

solely responsible for air pollution in its vicinity could

pursue its remedies under State law. Moreover, the Court

pointed out in Union Electric that sources of pollutants

could present their views before the State agency charged

with developing the implementation plan, could seek a

variance from the State agency for submission to the

Administrator as a revision of the implementation plan,

and, in some cases, could take their claims to the state courts

(id. at 18-19).

Claims of economic or technological infeasibility may al-

so be relevant to fashioning the terms of a compliance order

6

under Section | 13(a)(4) of the Clean Air Act or to the scope

of relief afforded in a civil suit under Sections | 13(b) or 304,

84 Stat. 1706, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1857h-2. While we do

not believe that petitioner would be entitled to raise its

infeasibility claim as a defense on the merits in an

enforcement proceeding or civil action,? we believe that

petitioner could present such arguments on the question of

remedies for the violation. Thus, petitioner has had, and

may again have, opportunities to present its infeasibility

claim.

Against this background petitioner's contention that the

Due Process Clause requires leave to raise infeasibility

claims in a Section 307 proceeding for judicial review is

unpersuasive. More than five years ago, petitioner had

the opportunity to object at the State level to the pro-

visions of the implementation plan requiring it to meet

certain standards for control of sulfur oxide emissions.

After approval of the plan by the Administrator, peti-

tioner sought a variance from the appropriate state

agency but declined to comply with the conditions of

the variance it received. While petitioner complains that

a hearing on its appeal of the variance was delayed to

its detriment, it does not appear that petitioner attempted

to expedite the proceedings by mandamus or other action

in state court. Nor has petitioner demonstrated that the

other opportunities to raise an infeasibility claim would

be inadequate to protect its rights.

To the extent, therefore, that the Clean Air Act permits

consideration of infeasibility claims, a Section 307 pro-

ceeding is not an appropriate time. The purpose of a

proceeding under Section 307 is to review the decision of the

Administrator in approving or disapproving a State

‘Compare Friends of the Earth vy. Potomac Electric Power Co., 419

F. Supp. 528 (D. D.C.) with West Penn Power Co. v. Train( West Penn

1) (Pet. App. 66a-107a).

7

implementation plan. Since the Administrator is not

authorized to reject a plan because of infeasibility, and since

no adverse consequences are visited on polluters by

approval of the plan itself, consideration of such claims

would not only be pointless but would create additional

delays and impediments for a task that Congress clearly

wished to be undertaken with dispatch.

2. Petitioner contends that the Court should grant review

in order to decide whether a state-granted variance,’

without federal approval of the variance, is sufficient to

suspend federal enforcement of the implementation plan

until petitioner exhausts its opportunities under state

administrative procedures to challenge the variance at the

state level.4 The Court already has resolved that question

adversely to petitioner's position in Train v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 92:

[A] polluter is subject to existing requirements until

such time as he obtains a variance, and variances

are not available under the revision authority until

they have been approved by both the State and the

Agency. Should either entity determine that granting

the variance would prevent attainment or maintenance

‘The conditional variance issued by the Commonwealth (with which

petitioner has not complied) and the compliance order issued to West

Penn Power by EPA are consistent in that each required the company to

install a scrubber on its Mitchell Power Station in accordance with

substantially similar timetables. Indeed, the Commonwealth's variance

is actually a compliance order requiring installation of a scrubber in

accordance with a strict timetable. EPA has withdrawn its compliance

order because the compliance dates for installation of the necessary

pollution control equipment have long since passed.

‘The court of appeals previously rejected petitioner's argument on

this issue in West Penn / (Pet. App. 66a), and this Court denied West

Penn Power Company’s petition for a writ of certiorari in that case. The

issue was not directly addressed by the court of appeals in its opinion of

July 30, 1976, of which petitioner now seeks review.

8

of national air standards, the polluter is presumably

within his rights in seeking judicial review. This

litigation, however, is carried out on the polluter’s

time, not the public’s, for during its pendency the

original regulations remain in effect, and the pol-

luter’s failure to comply may subject him to a variety

of enforcement procedures. [Emphasis added. ]}

No further review of this issue is warranted.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

DANIEL M. FRIEDMAN,

Acting Solicitor General.

PeTerR R. TAFT,

Assistant Attorney General.

ALFRED T. GHIORZI,

RAYMOND N. ZAGONE,

JOHN E. VARNUM,

Attorneys.

FEBRUARY 1977.

DOJ-1!977-02

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.