Petitioners Brief — United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald

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Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OctTosEer TERM, 1976.

No. 76-645

UNITED AIR LINES, INC.,

Petitioner,

vs.

LIANE BUIX McDONALD,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.

BRIEF FOR PETITIONER UNITED AIR LINES, INC.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

i I oo. 0:06.08 bunts cee ee eee eee 1

IN ei oi ARR seep itiee i

_ Statutes Involved ............. gdeees Woebseerevecs 2

Questions Presented ........... PS Pere r reas 2

I 6 odie uid ded ¥0b cede ¥eeKes nes 3

PE onset 60460066 Wadi mevedeseaeees 3

The Decision of the Court of Appeals ............ 7

RI os oc da ite 0 Snide Coed Heepencsdcoccues ges 8

EE 6 od cee dectdedodusadvcccedeedescees 8

I. This Court’s Decision in American Pipe Man-

dates Reversal of the Decision in the Court of

RIED. 6.0 0. 6060.05.90 00 68 0.000 tmapcceevess 10

II. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion

in Denying Intervention ................++- 19

PL. \ cducnvdudvedeutetenedenrsascandcondus 25

Appendix:

Pay ees DO, EOE 6 6b 6Widiw s 6.6 0500 Cee Ns Al

ee See OE SS kv k's co rtsind cecoddundees A4

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405 (1975). .12, 22

Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 344 F. 2d 571 (2d Cir. 1965),

cert. granted 381 U. S. 933, cert. dismissed as improv-

idently granted, 384 U. S. 28 (1966) .............. 24

ALSSA v. American Airlines, 455 F. 2d 101 (7th Cir.

SD Avecocdewdebuuneseu cae ecceceteduscens 16

American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538

PD. <iviudndabemenieekisunkass 60%e% 3, 7-14, 24-25

Black v. Central Motor Lines, 500 F. 2d 407 (4th Cir.

SE Coda a cen behew ba 4h de bbae Cavan oneeenees 23

Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F. 2d 711 (7th Cir

DD cadguadiues ueasdewkasnkaeksonaeere 12, 22

Buckingham v. United Air Lines, Civ. No. 71-731-LTL

Sy es EE ecu e bende bebe desee Vane wehuees 3,19

Collins v. United Air Lines, 514 F. 2d 594 (9th Cir.

RE. ¢an'vk 605065606 aea KOREA Reon eReREbeeees 3,19

EEOC v. United Air Lines, 515 F. 2d 946 (7th Cir

SD. sntadbotcevdwesdsedensbasaud cdecoensaees 6, 23

Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 495 F. 2d 1085 (3d Cir. 1974)

cert. denied 419 U. S. 884 (1974) .............4.. 23

Inda v. United Air Lines, 405 F. Supp. 426 (N. D. Cal.

DE - 60deabecdddccanavenessceesscaceuinssan 3

IUE v. Robbins & Myers 45 U. S. L. W. 4068 (U. S.

Se, Gs Es SE: TED wove acinecudesesecanss 20

Lansdale v. United Air Lines, 437 F. 2d 454 (Sth Cir.

| BPPTTTTIPTTT LETT TT CLT TTT ete 3

iii

McDonnell Douglas Comp. v. Green, 411-U. S. 792

SUE, Haden ndedenscdcivbedctsdededvesacese 12, 18 -

Monarch Asphalt Sales Co. v. Wilshire Oil Co., 511 F. 2d

Bee CHE EE SOPED ccerccccseceececenesecese 15

NAACP v. New York, 413 U. S. 345 (1973) ......... es

Nance v. Union Carbide Corp., 540 F. 2d 718 (4th Cir.

ED 6006465 0b 00d GE b ES He Re 860400000605 068 17

Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F. 2d 496 (Sth Cir.

BPE PE CT eT Tre TT eee CT ET ET UTT Te 16, 17, 21

Pearson v. Ecological Science Corp., 522 F. 2d 171 (Sth

Cir. 1975), cert. den. 425 U. S. 912 (1976)........ 13-16

SEC v. Bloomberg, 299 F. 2d 315 (2d Cir. 1962) ...... 23

Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 309 F. Supp. 950 (N. D. Ill.

1970), 444 F. 2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied

GST Gi Ge GSE 0 Shh pee eh e tisk cowecscce 3, 4, 22

Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 56 F. R. D. 420 (N. D. I.

SOU Sad b hed een be edencdéeends iiss dvctwnsde 3,4

Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 517 F. 2d 387 (7th Cir.

SPEED incdessducemdende aieiekesd coviess 3, 5, 20, 21

United Air Lines v. Evans, No. 76-333, U. S. Supreme

< PPPPPPTT TTT eT TT TTT IT iT TTeTrTe TTT 3

Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 508 F. 2d 239

CPG, GND oh cde i rbwewes Vececs toe ceieseses 17

Wright v. Stone Container Corp., 524 F. 2d 1058 (8th

GE FFE oes cccccecccsesconccsevscscesesdess 17

iv

Statutes

Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C.:

PEED 8-6 6.44 00640000 bap ees 68-0080 setae 17

PEE nn dba nd h6p ethos de eeerbuddienee 2, 18

§ 2000e-5 (f) TL SA he ene gy ne ye ee SA 2,18

Pe Ue, es ED no canes aneepeccesctececesas 2

SOE, Se, BO 6. 6.0 0 5.4.9: 6.050600 6.006sn00eun® 6

Fed. Civ. Proc. Rule 23, 28 U.S.C. ......... 2, 9, 10, 17, 24

Fed. Civ. Proc. Rule 24, 28 U.S.C. ............ 2, 9-11, 23

_ Other |

3B Moore’s Federal Practice (1975 Supp.)............ 11

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1976.

No. 76-545.

UNITED AIR LINES, INC.,

Petitioner,

vs.

LIANE BUIX McDONALD,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.

BRIEF FOR PETITIONER UNITED AIR LINES, INC.

a OPINIONS BELOW.

The opinions and orders of the district court striking the class

action allegations (December 6, 1972), dismissing the action

after settlement with named plaintiffs and intervenors (October

3, 1975), and denying intervention to respondent (October 21,

1975), are unreported and appear in Appendix at 55, 90, and

102, respectively. The opinion of the court of appeals is reported

at 537 F. 2d 915 (7th Cir. 1976) (Appendix 104).

JURISDICTION.

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on July 1,

1976. A timely petition for rehearing and suggestion for in banc

rehearing was denied on September 1, 1976. A timely petition

2

for writ of certiorari was filed on October 19, 1976. The Court

granted the writ of certiorari on December 6, 1976. Jurisdic-

tion is conferred on this Court by 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).

STATUTES INVOLVED.

The relevant portions of Section 706(e) and (f) of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S. C.

§ 2000e-5(e), (f), are set forth below.

Sec. 706. (ce) A charge under this section shall be filed

within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment

practice occurred... .’

Sec. 706. (f)(1) .. . If a charge filed with the Commis-

sion . . . is dismissed by the Commission . . . or if within

one hundred and eighty days from the filing of such

charge . . . the Commission has not filed a civil action

under this section . . . the Commission . . . shall so notify

the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving

- of such notice a civil action may be brought against the

respondent named in the charge . . . by the person claiming

to be aggrieved... . ;

Federal Civil Procedure Rule 23, Class Actions, and Rule 24,

Interventions, are set out in an appendix to this brief, infra.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.

A class action was filed in May 1970, claiming violation of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In December 1972

the class allegations were stricken on the motion of defendant—

petitioner here. A number of the purported class members then

intervened. Respondent McDonald, although a member of the

claimed class, did not seek to intervene. In October 1975, a

final order of dismissal with prejudice was entered after settle-

ment with named plaintiffs and intervenors. Thereafter respond-

ent attempted to intervene for the purpose of appealing the

December 1972 denial of class status.

3

1. Did the statute of limitations, tolled upon filing of the class

action, commence running upon denial of class status in Decem-

ber 1972 under the doctrine of American Pipe & Construction

Co. v. Utah, 414 U. &°538 (1974)?

2. Did the district court err in denying respondent’s motion

to intervene, as the majority of the court of appeals held?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Background.

This case comes before the Court as the most recent manifes-

tation of a series of cases which have been weaving their way

through the federal courts since November 1968, arising out of

petitioner United’s long-abandoned “no-marriage” rule for female

flight attendants.’

Until November 7, 1968, it was United’s policy to terminate

stewardesses (now called “flight attendants”) upon marriage

(although transfer to an available non-flying position was per-

mitted). On that day, "Jnited entered into a formal agreement .

with the Air Line Pilots Association (“ALPA”), the collective

bargaining agent for the flight attendants, ending the “no-

marriage” rule. The agreement also provided that any flight

attendant whose employment had been terminated because of the

rule and who had registered some form of complaint about the

termination—either through the contractual grievance procedure

or through a federal or state agency—would be entitled to rein-

statement without less of seniority but without back pay. A. 20.

1. United Air Lines v. Evans, No. 76-333, now before this

Court, relates to the “no-marriage” rule. Other cases include

Lansdale v. United Air Lines, 437 F. 2d 454 (Sth Cir. 1971);

Collins v. United Air Lines, 514 F. 2d 594 (9th Cir. 1975);

Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 308 F. Supp. 959 (N. D. Til. 1970),

444 F. 2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied 404 U. S. 991

(1971), 56 F. R. D. 420 (N. D. Ill. 1972), 517 F. 2d 387 (7th

’ Cir. 1975); Inda v. United Air Lines, 405 F. Supp. 426 (N. D.

Cal. 1975); Buckingham v. United Air Lines, Civ. No. 71-731-

LTL (C. D. Cal. 1975).

4:

Several of the eligible flight attendants accepted the reinstate-

ment offer; others were not heard from; some instituted civil

actions, seeking back pay as well as reinstatement.

The first action was filed by Mary Burke Sprogis on November

27, 1968 in the Northern District of Illinois, claiming the no-

marriage rule violated the sex discrimination provisions of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

In Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F. 2d 1194 (7th Cir.

1971), cert. den. 404 U. S. 991 (1971), the court of appeals

affirmed the trial court’s holding that the no-marriage policy did

violate Title VII as discrimination in employment based on sex.

The court of appeals remanded to the district court the reserved

question whether the action—commenced as an individual suit—

could be converted to a class action after judgment.

In May 1970, while the Sprogis case was pending on appeal,

this action—filed as Romasanta v. United Air Lines*—was

commenced as a class action by another former flight attendant

apparently as a hedge against a possible adverse determination

in the court of appeals in Sprogis on the class action question.

The claimed class was the flight attendants terminated pursuant

to the no-marriage policy. A. 11. Both the Romasanta and

Sprogis cases were financed by ALPA, and plaintiffs in both

suits were represented by the same counsel. Both cases were

assigned to the same district judge.

The Romasanta case was held on the passed case calendar

pending the decision on appeal in Sprogis. A. 1. After the

court of appeals remanded Sprogis, plaintiffs moved to certify a

class in Sprogis and to consolidate the two cases. A. 23.

In June 1972, the trial court ruled that class action was not

appropriate in Sprogis and denied the plaintiffs’ motion to con-

solidate. 56 F. R. D. 420 (N. D. Ill. 1972). A. 25. No appeal

2. Carole Anderson Romasanta was plaintiff in the trial court.

The suit was ultimately settled and dismissed as to her and she was

not a party to the a below, although her name appeared in

the caption as plaintiff. Liane Buix McDonald, respondent here,

was petitioning intervenor in the trial court and appellant in the

court of appeals. See A. 104.

5

was taken by plaintiff Sprogis or any purported class member,

including respondent here, from this decision.®

After the district court refused to consolidate the two cases,

United moved to strike the class allegations in Romasanta, and

‘on December 6, 1972 this motion was granted. A. 55.

The trial court believed that the class should be limited to

those who had manifested an interest in retaining their jobs by

‘filing some protest. The legal issues had been settled in Sprogis;

four years had elapsed since the no-marriage rule had been

abrogated; and therefore the district court was concerned that

former flight attendants who had had no real interest in con-

tinued employment would now join the action solely to recover

back pay. The court stated A. 60:

In considering the equities, it does not seem fair and

reasonable to this court that it should allow a stewardess

terminated prior to November 7, 1968 to intervene here

unless she indicated in a timely manner her desire to con-

tinue working by taking some affirmative action to protest

United’s policy or seek reinstatement.*

3. The district court referred to a special master the issue

of a back pay award for Ms. Sprogis. The Court approved the

master’s award of $10,408 but denied an award of attorney fees.

After final judgment the denial of attorney fees was a ed, but

not the refusal to certify a class. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 517

F. 2d 387 (7th Cir. 1975).

4. The record disclosed that after the no-marriage rule was

abrogated a substantial number of flight attendants continued to

terminate employment on marriage. Thus, between November 7,

1968, when the rule was abrogated, and December 31, 1971, 455

flight attendants resigned assigning marriage as the reason. Another

363 went on leave of absence because of marriage and did not

return upon termination of the leave. A. 54. In court of ap-

peals, Ms. McDonald cited a stipulation between United and

the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in another case

to the effect that between 1969 and 1973 (during which period the

no-marriage rule was not in effect) 913 out of 3,599 flight attend-

ant terminations were because of marriage, Pet. Br. Ct. App. 10n.

It was thus reasonable for the district judge to require some evi-

dence of interest in continuing in the job before admitting a flight

attendant discharged four years earlier to a class where the only

issue would be the amount of back pay recovery.

J

6

The appropriate class being limited to those flight attendants

who had made some timely protest against the no-marriage

policy, the class allegations were stricken since the numerosity

requirements of Rule 23 were not met. Those who had pro-

tested the policy, and had not already settled their claims or

initiated actions elsewhere, were permitted to intervene.

Twenty-five former flight attendants sought intervention.

Respondent McDonald was not among them. Intervention was

allowed as to thirteen; eight were denied because they had

accepted reinstatement under the November 1968 agreement;

four who had instituted actions elsewhere were also denied

intervention. A. 58-60.

The named plaintiffs Romasanta and Altman® unsuccessfully

petitioned for permission to appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b)

the trial: court order of December 6, 1972. None of the indi-

viduals denied intervention made any attempt to appeal, although

the order was clearly final and appealable as to them.®

Discovery and settlement discussions followed and the initial

and intervening plaintiffs were able to settle their back pay

claims by application of the principles worked out in Sprogis.

A. 91. On October 3, 1975—almost three years after class

action status was denied—a final order dismissing the suit with

prejudice was entered, all “matters in controversy . . . having

been settled and resolved.” A. 90, 92.

Three weeks later, on October 21, 1975, respondent McDon- ©

ald first entered the scene. Ms. McDonald is a former United

flight attendant who was terminated in September 1968 under

the then existing no-marriage policy. She filed no grievance

under the collective bargaining agreement, no charge with any

state or federal agency, participated in no litigation, and had

in no manner previously made known her belated claim against

5. In October 1970 Brenda Altman, another former flight

attendant, was added as a party plaintiff.

6. An order denying intervention is final and appealable.

EEOC vy. United Air Lines, 515 F. 2d 946, 948-49 (7th Cir.

1975).

7

United. She was fully aware of the Romasanta and Sprogis

litigation and of the denial of class status in December 1972

(A. 95), but took no action of any kind until October 21, 1975.

On that day Ms. McDonald filed a motion to intervene for

purposes of appealing from the December 1972 order denying

class action status. A. 93. Submitted with the motion was an

affidavit of Ms. McDonald stating, inter alia, that she “had

previously been informed that during the course of this lawsuit,

the Court had struck the class action allegations and so excluded

me and others like me from this action. . . .” A. 95.

The trial judge denied the motion to intervene as untimely.

During hearing on the motion he expressed concern that

respondent McDonald had not sought intervention at the time

of his December 1972 order, or to appeal from or seek modi-

fication of that order. He concluded (A. 101):

Well, in my judgment, gentlemen, this is five years now

this ‘has been in litigation, and this lady has not seen fit

to come in here and seek any relief from this Court in any

way during that period of time, and litigation must end.

I must deny this motion.

Ms. McDonald then filed two notices of appeal, one appeal-

ing the denial of intervention and the other appealing the

order of December 6, 1972, denying class action status. A. 103.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals.

The court of appeals reversed in a two-one decision. The

majority held the motion to intervene was timely under Federal

Rule 24(b) since it was filed soon after respondent McDonald

was advised by the named plaintiffs that they would not appeal

the order of December 1972 denying class status. The majority

rejected United’s contention that under American Pipe & Con-

struction Co. Vv. Utah, 414 U. S. 538 (1974), the limita-

tions period started to run against Ms. McDonald in Decem-

ber 1972 when the trial court denied class status and this

limitation period had long since expired. The majority dis-

tinguished American Pipe in a footnote, on the ground that

in Title VII actions the statute was tolled upon the filing of a

charge with the Equal Employment. Opportunity Commission

(“EEOC”)—a non sequitur since the issue on appeal was

not the commencement of the tolling period, but rather when

the statute started to run again. A. 108 n.6.

Having concluded that Ms. McDonald was entitled to be an

intervenor, the majority held it had “power to examine the

adverse class ruling.” In a one paragraph examination of the

class issue (with which the district judge had wrestled through

numerous hearings and briefings), the majority decided the

order denying class action status “must be reversed.” A. 109.

Judge Pell, in dissenting, stated that under American Pipe the

statute of limitations began to run again in December 1972

upon denial of class action status, and that Ms. McDonald

had to act promptly thereafter’“if she wanted to take advantage

of this lawsuit as a forum for her claims.” A. 110. He con-

cluded by stating that since the timeliness issue was dispositive,

“I have not deemed it necessary to advert to the other issues

raised on this appeal.” A. 115.

The eight active members of the court of appeals divided

four-four on the suggestion of a rehearing in banc. A. 117.

ARGUMENT.

Summary.

American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538,

561 (1974), holds that the applicable statute of limitations is

tolled upon the filing of a class action but “only during the

pendency of a motion to strip the suit of its class action char-

acter.”

The district court here denied class action status in December

1972. The attempted intervention by respondent was properly

denied in October 1975 since the attempt came more than

9

two years after the expiration of any conceivable applicable

limitation period.

The majority of the court of appeals erroneously assumed,

contrary to American Pipe, that tolling of the limitations period

continued after class action denial and at least until the final

order of dismissal by the district court in October 1975.

- Intervention was considered timely because it was attempted

soon after respondent McDonald learned that the named plain-

tiffs and intervenors did not intend to appeal class denial after

entry of the final order.

Plaintiffs and intervenors had ne “bligation to appeal class

denial after final judgment and couid not appeal since they

had settled their claims and their complaints were dismissed

with prejudice. Respondent acquired no derivative right from

them.

The decision below, if it prevails, would frustrate settlement

after class denial since parties will be required to await

exhaustion of appellate review of class denial after final order

before knowing the limits of potential liability. The capacity

of the district court to manage suits after class denial will be

impaired.

Class actions under Title VII are subject to the requirements

of Federal Civil Procedure Rule 23, as are all class actions,

and American Pipe is not distinguishable because it involved an

anti-trust class action.

Respondent’s claimed reasons for waiting seven years after

termination of her employment, five years after commencement

of this suit and three years after denial of class action are not

plausible. Had she been interested in continued employment

with United she could have been reinstated within weeks after

her termination in September 1968.

The statute of limitations aside, the district court did not

abuse its discretion under Federal Civil Procedure Rule 24(b)

in concluding that respondent’s attempt to intervene after the

entry of the final order was not timely.

Js fom

10

I,

This Court’s Decision in American Pipe Mandates Reversal of

the Decision of the Court of Appeals.

American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538,

540 (1974), “involve[d} an aspect of the relationship between

a statute of limitations and the provisions of Fed. Rule Civ.

Proc. 23 regulating class actions in the federal courts.”

There an anti-trust class action had been commenced 11 days

before the applicable one-year statutory period expired. Seven

months later the trial court issued its order denying class action

Status, basing it upon lack of numerosity. Eight days thereafter

a number of potential class members sought to intervene.

Intervention was denied by the trial court on the theory that

denial of class status had the effect of “untolling” the statute

of limitations as though the class suit had not been filed. Since

the remaining 11 days statutory period had long expired, the

intervenors were too late.

The court of appeals disagreed and held that permissive inter-

vention was timely under Rule 24(b)(2) since, for limitations

purposes, the rights of intervenors related back to the com-

mencement of the suit. Utah v. American Pipe & Construction

Co., 473 F. 2d 580, 584 (9th Cir. 1973). Certiorari was

granted to “consider a seemingly important question affecting

the admirustration of justice.” 414 U. S. at 545.

After examining the development of Rule 23 both before

and after the 1966 amendments, this Court concluded that “at

least where class action status has been denied solely because

of failure to demonstrate that ‘the class is so numerous that

joinder of all members is impracticable,’ the commencement of

the original class suit tolls the running of the statute for all

purported members of the class who make timely motions to

intervene.” 414 U. S. at 553. (Emphasis added.)

11

In its conclusion, the Court fleshed out the concept of “timely”

and the duration of tolling (414 U. S. at 561):

[T]he commencement of the class action in this case sus-

pended the running of the limitation period only during the

pendency of the motion to strip the suit of its class action

character. The class suit brought by Utah was filed with 11

days yet to run in the period as tolled by § 5(b) [of the

Clayton Act], and the intervenors thus had 11 days after

the entry of the order denying them participation in the

suit as class members in which to move for permission to

intervene. Since their motions were filed only eight days

after the entry of Judge Pence’s order, it follows that the

motions were timely. [Emphasis added.]

Justice Blackmun’s concurrence expressed some concern lest

the decision be construed as an open invitation to revival of stale

claims.’ The concurring opinion cautioned (414 U. S. at 561):

Our decision, however, must not be regarded as encourage-

ment to lawyers in a case of this kind to frame their

pleadings as a class action, intentionally, to attract and

save members of the purported class who have slept on

their rights. Nor does it necessarily guarantee intervention

for all members of the purported class.

Referring to Rule 24(b), Justice Blackmun observed (Jd.

at 562):

Permissive intervenors may be barred, however, if the

district judge, in his discretion, concludes that the interven-

tion will “unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the

rights of the original parties.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(b).

The proper exercise of this discretion will prevent the type

of abuse mentioned above and might preserve a defendant

whole against prejudice arising from claims for which he

has received no prior notice.

It appeared to petitioner United that this decision had critical

relevance to a consideration of the propriety of the district

judge’s ruling denying Ms. McDonald’s motion to intervene

7. So described in 3B Moore’s Federal Practice Par. 23.90 at

23-1653 n.11 (1975 Supp.).

12:

five years after the suit commenced, three years after denial of

class status, and after final dismissal of the action with prejudice

upon settlement of the claims of named plaintiffs and inter-

venors. Accordingly, its importance was stressed to the court

of appeals.

The court of appeals majority opinion disposed of American

Pipe in a footnote (A. 108):.

6. See also American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah,

414 U. S. 538, 551. The specific holding in American Pipe

that the statute of limitations is tolled only during the

pendency of the motion to certify a class and begins to run

anew if the motion is denied is not applicable here. The

statute of limitations in Title VII actions is suspended once

one member of the class initiates the grievance mechanism.

See Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., [416 F. 2d 711, at

720 (7th Cir. 1969)].

The reference to Bowe was irrelevant: the holding of Bowe

and other cases, including Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,

422 U. S. 405, 414 (1975), that unnamed class members need

not exhaust administrative procedures is not in issue here.

Certainly at least one named plaintiff must pursue the admin-

istrative remedy and file a suit within the statutory period to

meet the “jurisdictional prerequisites to a federal action.”®

The issue here is not the initial tolling, but rather when the

limitations period begins running again. With respect to this

issue, the majority opinion of the court of appeals did not

explain why the tolling was not lifted in December 1972 with the

order of denial of class action status, as American Pipe appears

to require.

In concluding that the petition to intervene was timely under

Federal Rule 24(b)—permissive intervention—the majority

stated (A. 109):

8. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. §. 792, 798

(1973). Named plaintiff Romasanta did in fact meet the time re-

quirements of Title VII, both as to filing a charge with the EEOC.

within the then applicable 90 day period and initiating the suit within

the then applicable 30 day period after receipt of notice of right to

sue. Complaint. 2, 10. A. 12, 13.

-.

Ss =

13

[ijn court . . . the members may rely on the champion of

the class until he or she abdicates. In this case we believe

that abdication occurred when plaintiffs decided not to

appeal the adverse class action determination. To hold

otherwise would permit one member of the class to obtain

benefits greater than other members.

The “abdication,” held the majority, came two weeks after

the final order of dismissal of October 3, 1975, when the

individual plaintiffs who had settled their claims allegedly ad-

vised Ms. McDonald they had decided not to appeal the class

action denial of December 1972.

The vice in the majority decision is its assumption that the

class action continued after class status was denied. This is

inconsistent with American Pipe, which holds that tolling con-

tinues only until that point. If this Court’s view was that class

status would continue after denial by the district court on the

possibility that there might eventually be a successful appea! of

the denial, then its comment that interventions were timely

because they came within 11 days of the denial order is

inexplicable.

Pearson v. Ecological Science Corp., 522 F. 2d 171 (Sth

Cir. 1975), cert. den. 425 U. S. 912 (1976), followed American

Pipe in a decision which considered a number of issues relating

to the duty of the parties remaining after class denial to the

purported members excluded by the class denial. One claim was

that after class denial notice of a subsequent settlement between

the named plaintiffs and intervenors and defendant should have

been given to the proposed, but denied, class. To this the court

responded (522 F. 2d at 176-77):

The arguments of the appellants and the S.E.C. [amicus]

ignore the difference between a class action and a non-

class action. They place undeserved emphasis upon mere

allegations of class action status by individual plaint ffs,

rather than upon a judicial determination that a cause of

action does not meet the requirements of subdivisions (a)

and (b) of Rule 23 and, therefore, may not be maintained

as a Class action.

* * s e «

14

Appellants and the S.E.C. ask this court to extend the

judicial gloss on subdivision (e) of Rule 23 to encompass

the situation where as here the trial court has determined

prior to the execution of a settlement agreement that the

action may not be maintained as a class action under Rule

23. This we decline to do. As stated by the Advisory Com-

mittee’s Notes to Rule 23, “a negative determination [of

class action status] means that the action should be stripped

of its character as a class action.” Advisory Committee

Notes, supra, 39 F. R. D. at 104 [Emphasis in original.]

When here the majority of the court below spoke of the

“abdication of the champion of the class” in October 1975 to

justify respondent’s belated intervention, it clearly ignored the

fact that once the class was denied in December 1972, there

was no longer a class to champion. The named plaintiffs did not

abdicate as champions in October 1975; they were dethroned

in December 1972.

Judge Pell in dissent put the issue succinctly (A. 115):

When a class action is denied, former putative class mem-

bers may not ignore this fact and continue on the assump-

tion the suit is a class action. . . . The denial of class status

is a critical point which puts putative class members on

notice that they must act to protect their rights. The tolling

procedure established by the Supreme Court in American

Pipe . . . would have no meaning without its corollary

requirement that as soon as the class is decertified, former

class members who want relief must make “timely motions

to intervene.” (414 U. S. at 553.)°

In our view, American Pipe permits of no other reading than

that given it by the dissent. If the intervenors there had not

moved within the 11 days remaining of the suspended period,

9. Judge Pell pointed out that had Ms. McDonald acted

promptly after denial of class action and had been denied inter-

vention at that time because of her failure to protest the no-marriage

rule—the requirement which was the basis of the district court’s

holding that the action lacked the requisite numerosity—‘then that

issue would have been before this court and decided three years

ago.” A. 114.

15

their efforts would not have been “timely.” No other reading is

possible.*®

It is the fact, of course, that instead of entering into settle-

ment discussions with defendant, the named plaintiffs and inter-

venors could have persisted through full trial to judgment and

after final judgment could have appealed the denial of the class

action of December 1972. But they chose not to do so and

instead did enter into a settlement and agreed to a final order

dismissing the actions with prejudice. As a result of this they

could no longer appeal the denial of class.’ They had no duty

or obligation to respondent McDonald not to settle their claims,

and Ms. McDonald could gain no derivative rights of appeal

from them. The most she could do was hope tney might appeal,

but she had no legal right to expect it. If the limitations period

had already run against her, it could not be revived because the

individual claimants remaining after class den.al chose to settle

rather than continue the litigation.

10. Two courts of appeal have considered this corollary of

American Pipe. In Pearson v. Ecological Science Corp., 522 F. 2d

171, 178 (Sth Cir. 1975), cert. den. 425 U. S. 912 (1976), the

court concluded that any party who failed to seek intervention

after class action status denial and entry of a settlement stipulation

“can blame no one but himself if his action is now barred.” In Mon-

arch Asphalt Sales Co. v. Wilshire Oil Co., 511 F. 2d 1073 (10th

Cir. 1975), a class was certified narrower than the claimed class.

Excluded members attempted intervention but were held to be time-

barred. The argument was made that this differed from the American

Pipe situation because here a class had been certified and there

intervention had been allowed. In rejecting these contentions the

court held (511 F. 2d at 1078):

In the instant case 26 days of the suspension period

remained when class status was denied the private contractors.

The first petitions in intervention were presented 40 days there-

after. American Pipe may not be distinguished on the differ-

ences between the two cases for denial of class status, or on

the fact that there intervention was permitted and here it was

denied. The holding in American Pipe cuts both ways.

11. Counsel for named plaintiffs and intervenors stated in

open court after the final order had been entered: “They have

settled their individual claims, and consequently the original class

ae are not in a position to take the appeal.”

A. 1 :

16

- This issue was also confronted in Pearson v. Ecological

Science Corp., 522 F. 2d 171 (Sth Cir. 1975), cert. den. 425

U. S. 912 (1976). There—as here—class had been denied,

timely intervention had been allowed, an interlocutory appeal

of denial of class was attempted, and then settlement was

reached. An effort was then made to block the settlement by,

among others, a late-comer who was denied intervention as

untimely sought. Argument was made that the settlement—

which included an agreement to voluntarily withdraw a peti-

tion for writ of certiorari to review the refusal of the court of

appeals to consider the denial of class—breached the obligation

the named plaintiffs'and intervenors had to the purported class

members. The court demurred (522 F. 2d at 177):

The rule which appellants ask this court to adopt would

require that in every action in which class action certifica-

tion is denied by a district court, the named plaintiffs would

be precluded from executing a settlement of their individ-

ual claims, and would be required to litigate through ap-

pellate review of the interlocutory order denying class

action certification after a final judgment in the trial court.

Settlement is always preferred to litigation; Title VII suits

are certainly no exception to the principle. The Seventh Circuit

Court of Appeals has itself recognized this policy in an earlier

decision. “. . . As a general proposition the public interest may

indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in which each side

gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation. This is espe-

cially true within the confines of Title VII where ‘there is great

emphasis . . . on private settlement and the elimination of un-

fair practices without litigation.” ALSSA v. American Airlines,

455 F. 2d 101, 109 (7th Cir. 1972), citing Oatis v. Crown

Zellerbach Corp., 398 F. 2d 496, 498 (Sth Cir. 1968).

The majority decision here imposes the same inhibiting effect

on settlement noted in Pearson since the defendant will not know

the full breadth of the claims against it after class action denial

unless and until there is opportunity for appellate review after

final judgment. The capacity of the district court to manage suits

17

after class denial is also seriously imwaired. It is difficult to en-

courage settlement among litigants when the judge is faced with

the possibility of a renewal of the litigation even if settlement

is consummated. He will not be able to address the issues as

limited by him because he will be forced to look over his

shoulder to purported class members, unknown to the court,

who like respondent McDonald may someday appear.’* This

flies directly in the face of the express policy in favor of con-

ciliation and voluntary settlement stated in Title VII. 42 U. S. C.

§ 2000e-5(b).

There is, to our knowledge, no serious dispute with the

proposition that Federal Rule 23 applies to class actions under

Title VII. This has been repeatedly affirmed.’*

Further, we do not believe respondent McDonald would deny

that, if the limitations period began to run against her and others

12. Conceptually there is no end to the process. Ms. McDonald

claims a class broad enough to include not only flight attendants who

were terminated but also those who resigned without protest. If

this case is remanded to the trial court a class could be found

which includes those terminated, like Ms. McDonald, but excludes

those like Ms. Evans, respondent in No. 76-333, now pending

before this Court, who resigned. When that has run its cgarse and

a final order is entered, then Ms. Evans or someone in a similar

position could do just as Ms. McDonald did here and seek to start

_the whole process over again. The possibilities are limitless.

13. Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 508 F. 2d 239,

246 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. den. 421 U. S. 1011 (1975) (“The man-

datory uirements of Rule 23(a) must first be met.”); Oatis v.

Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F. 2d 496, 499 (Sth Cir. 1968) (“We

thus hold that a class action is permissible under Title VII . . . within

the following limits. First, the class action must . . . meet the require-

ments of Rule 23(a) and(b)(2).”) Wright v. Stone Container

Corp., 524 F. 2d 1058, 1062 (8th Cir. 1975) (“. . .[W]e cannot

say that the trial court abused its discretior in refusing to certify the

class under Rule 23(a).”); Nance v. Union Carbide Corp., 540 F.

2d 718, 723 (4th Cir. 1976) (“. . . [E]mployee discrimination suits

do not represent exemptions from the terms of the Rule [23(a)].”)

18

similarly situated upon denial of class action status in December

1972, any conceivable period has long since run out."*

Ms. Romasanta, the original plaintiff, received the required

statutory notice*® from the EEOC on April 17, 1970 (A. 13),

and she filed her class action on May 15, 1970—the 28th day

of the then allowable 30 day period for bringing suit under

Section 706(f). 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(f). Thus there were

two days left to the limitations period at the time the suit was

filed. Assuming the 90 day period provided under the March

1972 amendments to Title VII would be applicable at the time

the suit was dismissed in December 1972, Ms. McDonald would

have had 62 days (90 less 28) in which to move to intervene,

and if unsuccessful, to then appeal that denial.

Even if it be assumed that Ms. McDonald would at that time

have been entitled to avail herself of the entire statutory period

for filing a charge with the EEOC on the theory her obligation

to file had been tolled by the filing of a charge by Ms. Roma-

santa prior to Ms. McDonald’s termination, that period would

have been 180 days from December 6, 1972. Section 706(e),

42 U. S. C. § 2000e-S(e).

In any event, whichever period is considered —62 days under

Section 706(f) or 180 under Section 706(e)—the last day on

which Ms. McDonald could possibly have made a motion in this

case not time barred would have been June 4, 1973, almost

two and one-half years before she did in fact file a motion

to intervene.

In summary, American Pipe holds that the limitations period,

tolled upon commencement of a class action, starts running again

upon denial of class status; class actions under Title VII are

14. The EEOC in an amicus brief. filed in the court below con-

ceded that the “statute of limitations in the Romasanta and Altman

[the additional named plaintiff] charges has since run.” EEOC

Br. Ct. App. 20.

15. The procedure is outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U. S. 792, 798 (1973).

Demet ncereenenseeere at

19

not unique and the American Pipe doctrine is applicable here

as in any other class action; the limitations period expired no

later than June 4, 1973; when Ms. McDonald attempted to

intervene on October 21, 1975, the statute of limitations had

run as to her claim and her motion was untimely under Rule

24(b) (2).

Il.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion

in Denying Intervention.

There is an undertone to the majority opinion below which

suggests that an injustice would have been done respondent had

the court of anneals not reversed the district court’s ruling on

intervention. “To hold otherwise,” said the majority, “would

permit one member of the class to obtain benefits greater than

other members.” A. 108.

But this is the effect of timeliness requirements and statutes

of limitations in all litigation, including class actions.’® If the

16. The ruling below creates the anomaly that parties who

unsuccessfully brought their own suits to protest United’s former

no-marriage rule are now barred by the statute of limitations and

res judicata from being granted relief while respondent and other

purported class members at this time unknown, who have done

nothing for at least eight years, may now seek recovery. Several

former United stewardesses who had been terminated because of

the no-marriage rule filed an action in 1971 in the United States

District Court for the Central District of California. The trial court

denied relief because the plaintiffs, who had been terminated in

1966 and 1967, had not filed timely charges in accordance with the

provisions of Title VII. Buckingham v. United Air Lines, Inc.,

Civil No. 71-731-LTL. In addition, Doris Collins, who resigned in

May, 1967, filed a charge with the EEOC in November, 1971 and

instituted an action in the Western District of Washington in Novem-

ber, 1972. She was denied reiief by the trial court because her

charge was not timely filed. This action by the trial court was

affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in Collins v. United Air Lines, Inc.,

514 F. 2d 594, 596 (9th Cir. 1975). Because of the lawsuit pend-

ing at that time in the District Court, Collins was denied intervention

in this case below. And, in reliance on O75 by te — ey

j nt was ted on August 5, 197 e trial court below

or Lynn — Raymond, a purported class member who had

been allowed to intervene in 1972. This dismissal was not appealed.

20

‘intervenors in American Pipe had waited four more days the

named plaintiffs would also have “obtained greater benefits.”

Rights are created by the legislature subject to being exercised

within a proscribed period. When the period ends, the right

ends. The court majority described a consequence of limitations

periods—not a reason for ignoring them.*’

The other side of the coin is that a potential defendant has

the right to know that if claims are not asserted against it in an

expeditious manner, i.e., within the limitations period, then its

exposure is ended.**

The record here dramatically illustrates the real inequity in

this case. Respondent had no interest in further employment

with United after her termination in September 1968. If

she had she could have been back at work within a few weeks by

simply talking some action to protest the termination.

17. “In defining Title VII’s jurisdictional requirements ‘with

precision,’ . . . Congress did not leave to courts the decision as to

which delays might or might not be slight.” JUE v. Robbins & Myers,

45 U. S. L. W. 4068, 4070 (S. Ct., Dec. 20, 1976).

18. The majority opinion states that “until October 17th

[1975] defendant [United] could reasonably expect this liability

to be enforced through an appeal of the adverse class ruling.”

A. 108. This observation is completely without record support.

Once settlement discussions were started United had every reason

to believe there would be no appeal of the class issue.

One additional reason why United could assume there would be

no appeal of the class denial lies in a point made by respondent

McDonald in the lower court in justification of her assumption

named plaintiffs would appeal class denial: “. . . plaintiffs’ attorneys

are interested in obtaining a class treatment on appeal since it has

the prospect of a larger overall recovery and the resulting increased

potential for court awarded fees.” Pet. Reply Br. Ct. App., 17n.

The fact is the district court had denied attorney fees to plain-

tiff’s counsel in Sprogis on July 3, 1974, and the denial had been

affirmed by the court of appeals on June 4, 1975. Sprogis v. United

Air Lines, 517 F. 2d 387 (7th Cir. 1975). The same counsel

represented the parties in this case under the same circumstances

which led to denial of fees in Sprogis. It was thus apparent that to

the extent pursuit of attorney fees could be considered an incentive

to appeal class denial, that incentive was certainly lacking here.

Attorney fees were in fact subsequently denied in this case on the

same grounds as in Sprogis.

.

Rees — ere ee eee

21

The November 7, 1968 agreement between United and ALPA

terminating the no-marriage policy provided for reinstatement

for those flight attendants who protested. At the time of that

agreement a protest by Ms. McDonald would have been timely.

But she did nothing. She waited from September 1968 to

October 1975 to come forward to claim reinstatement and back

pay for the seven year period. The majority opinion consoles

United with the observation that “This opinion does not preclude

the defendant from mitigating liability or rebutting the damage

claim of some members of petitioner’s [McDonald] class.”

A. 110 n.8. But assembling rebuttal evidence at this late date

is an awesome burden.’®

Respondent explains her seven years of inaction in an affidavit

submitted with the intervention petition (A. 95):

At the time of discharge or soon thereafter, I learned that

other former United Air Lines stewardesses who had been

discharged pursuant to the same policy were prosecuting

grievances under the collective bargaining machinery or

had filed charges of discrimination with state and federal

agencies. Since the legality of the no-marriage policy was

being challenged in proceedings that I thought would gov-

ern my situation, I did not myself file a discrimination

charge against United or grievance under the collective

bargaining agreement.

This reason—even if plausible—does not explain why she did

not act then to get her job back under the terms of the United-

ALPA Agreement.

But the reason is not plausible. In September 1968, it was not

settled law that an individual could rely on the charge of an-

other in pursuing a claim under Title VII. Oatis v. Crown

Zellerbach, 398 F. 2d 496 (Sth Cir. 1968), had reversed a

19. The court of appeals had held in Sprogis that United had to

demonstrate that a claimant lacked reasonable diligence in seeking

other employment, and that “the burden of going forward to miti-

gate the liability, or, to rebut the damage claim, rests with the

defendant.” Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 517 F. 2d 387, 392 (7th

Cir. 1975).

22

lower court which held that class action would not lie under

Title VII where injunctive relief was sought. The appeals court

decision was issued on July 16, 1968, and was limited to

prospective relief. However unlikely, it is possible that Ms.

McDonald knew about Oatis when she was terminated in Sep-

tember 1968. But she would also have known it did not sanction

a class action for back pay—and as we have noted she could

have had prospective relief under the ALPA-United Agreement

of November 1968. It was not until October 1969 when the

Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals promulgated its decision in

Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive, 416 F. 2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969),

that there was a definitive holding that a class action would

lie under Title VII for “pecuniary” as well as injunctive relief.

416 F. 2d at 720. In fa *, this issue was not conclusively settled

until this Court’s decision in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,

422 U.S. 405, 414 (1975).

The original case of Sprogis v. United Air Lines (see supra,

at p. 4), was not brought as a class action, no doubt, because

when filed in November 1968 prospective relief was unnecessary

since the no-marriage policy had already been abrogated, and

Bowe had not yet been decided. It was only after Bowe that an

attempt was made to convert Sprogis to a class action and that

this suit was filed as a class action.

Ms. McDonald simply could not have known in September,

1968 that she could rely on actions taken by others. Her ex-

planation for seven years of inaction is inadequate. She has,

indeed, slept on her rights.

Moreover, however inexplicable is her claimed reliance in

1968 on legal doctrines not definitely established in this Court

until 1975, it is clear that Ms. McDonald did know that after

December 1972 she was no longer in this case—and yet she

still failed to act.

Her affidavit is quite candid. She states she had “previously

been informed that during the course of this lawsuit, the Court

had struck the class action allegations and so excluded me and

ss

wens os et a

23

others like me from this action and that an attempt to appeal

this ruling had not been successful.” A. 95.

Certainly the exclusion of Ms. McDonald from this suit in

1972 was a critical point for her. In NAACP v. New York, 413

U. S. 345 (1974), this Court upheld a district court’s ruling

that an attempted intervention 17 days after the would-be inter-

venors first learned of the pendency of a suit then three months

old was untimely under Rule 24. The suit had then reached a

“critical stage” and it was “incumbent upon [them] at that stage

of the proceedings, to take immediate affirmative steps to protect

their interests . . . by way of an immediate motion to intervene.”

413 U. S. at 367.”

The Court spelled out the general criteria for review of the

district court’s determination of timeliness under Rule 24 (413

U. S. at 365-66):

Intervention in a federal court suit is governed by Fed.

Rule Civ. Proc. 24. Whether intervention be claimed of

right or as permissive, it is at once apparent, from the initial

words of both Rule 24(a) and Rule 24(b), that the

application must be “timely”. If it is untimely, intervention

must be denied. Thus, the court where the action is

pending must first be satisfied as to timeliness. Although

the point to which the suit has progressed is one factor

in the determination of timeliness, it is not solely disposi-

tive. Timeliness is to be determined from all of the circum-

stances. And it is to be determined by the court in the

exercise of its sound discretion; unless that discretion is

abused, the court’s ruling will not be disturbed on review.”

20. See also SEC v. Bloomberg, 299 F. 2d 315, 320 (2d Cir.

1962) (court of appeals affirmed denial of the SEC’s motion to

intervene in a reorganization proceedings as untimely because the

SEC had waited 40 days after it was in a position to intervene); Hoots

v. Pennsylvania, 495 F. 2d 1095, 1097 (3d Cir. 1974) cert. den.

419 U. S. 884 (1974) (intervention denied because “petitioners

could not reasonably claim ignorance either of the proceedings or

the necessity for intervention at a much earlier date’).

21. The same siandards under Rule 24 apply in cases involving

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. E.g., EEOC vy. United Air Lines,

515 F. 2d 946 (7th Cir. 1975); Black v. Central Motor Lines,

500 F. 2d 407 (4th Cir. 1974).

24

As Judge Pell explained in dissenting below, where a class

action is involved the determination of when intervention “is

first appropriate relates to the question of adequacy of repre-

sentation;” for it becomes necessary for unnamed class members

to intervene at the point when their interests are no longer being

protected by the class representatives. A. 112. See Alleghany

Corp. Vv. Kirby, 344 F. 2d 571, 574 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.

granted 381 U. S. 933, cert. dismissed as improvidently

granted, 384 U. S. 28 (1966).

When class action was here denied in December 1972 and

the action was thus “stripped of its class character” under Rule

23, Ms. McDonald was required then to take “immediate

affirmative steps” to protect her interests. As the dissenting

judge below stated (A. 113):

When petitioner’s application for intervention is viewed

in the light of [the above] cases, it appears clear to me that

the motion was untimely. Petitioner admits knowledge of

the class action denial in Romasanta in 1972 and yet offers

no persuasive reason for her failure to petition to intervene

then. Once the class was denied, and the suit proceeded

as an individual action, she had no reason to believe her

interests were being represented or protected by others.

This was particularly true since the class action denial

had the effect of excluding from the case all those who,

like petitioner, had not protested the no-marriage rule.

There was no longer anyone similarly situated to petitioner

in the case.

Thus even if Ms. McDonald’s motion in October 1975 had

not been barred because of the expiration of the limitation

period, it is clear that the district judge did not abuse the

discretion vested in him under Rule 24 in finding that her

motion to intervene came too late.

The admonition of the concurrence in American Pipe is

singularly appropriate (414 U. S. at 561-62):

Our decision, however, must not be regarded as encourage-

ment to lawyers . . . to frame their pleadings as a class

eS A

25

action . . . to attract and save members of the purported

class who have slept on their rights. Nor does it necessar-

ily guarantee intervention for all members of the purported

class.

. . . The proper exercise of this discretion [by the district

judge under Rule 24(b)] will prevent the type of abuse

mentioned above and might preserve a defendant whole

against prejudice arising from claims for which he has

received no prior notice.

CONCLUSION.

For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully request that the

decision of the court of appeals be reversed and that the deci-

sion of the district court of October 21, 1975, denying the peti-

tion of respondent to intervene be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

STUART BERNSTEIN,

JAMES W. GLADDEN, JR.,

SusAN S. SHER,

231 South LaSalle Street,

Chicago, Illinois 60604,

Counsel for Petitioner.

Of Counsel:

MayER, BROWN & PLATT,

231 South LaSalle Street,

Chicago, Illinois 60604.

January 21, 1977.

RN LL TT :

Al

APPENDIX.

PARTIES.

Rule 23.

CLASS ACTIONS.

(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of

a Class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of

all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all mem-

bers is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact com-

mon to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative

parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and

(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect

the interests of the class.

(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be main-

tained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a)

are satisfied, and in addition:

(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individ-

ual members of the class would create a risk of

(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to

individual members of the class which would establish incom-

patible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or

(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the

class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the

interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications

or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their

interests; or

(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act

on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making

appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory

relief with respect to the class as a whole; or

A2

(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common

to the members of the class predominate over any questions

affecting only individual members, and that a class action is

superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient

adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the

findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in

individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate

actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning

the controversy already commenced by or against members of

the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating

the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the

difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a

class action.

(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to Be

Maintained; Notice; Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as

Class Actions.

(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an

action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by

order whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this

subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended

before the decision on the merits.

(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)

(3), the court shall direct to the members of the class the best

notice practicable under the circumstances including individual

notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable

effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court

will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified

date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include

all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any

member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter

an appearance through his counsel.

(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action

under subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable

to the class, shall include and describe those whom the court

A3

finds to be members of the class. The judgment in an action

maintained as a class action under subdivision (b) (3), whether

or not favorable to the class, shall include and specify or describe

those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c)(2) was

directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom

the court finds to be members of the class.

(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or

maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues, or

(B) a class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass

treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be

construed and applied accordingly.

(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions

to which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate

orders: (1) determining the course of proceedings or prescrib-

ing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the

presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the pro-

tection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair

conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the

court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in

the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the

opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the

representation fai and adequate, to intervene and present

claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3)

imposing conditions on the representative parties or on inter-

venors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate

therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons, and

that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar

procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order

under Rule 16, and may be altered or amended as may be

desirable from time to time.

(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dis-

missed or compromised without the approval of the court, and

notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given

to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.

A4

Rule 24.

INTERVENTION.

(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone

shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute

of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene;

or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the

property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he

is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical

matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless

tiie applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing

parties.

(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone

may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of

the United States confers a conditional right to intervene; or

(2) when an applicant’s claim or defense and the main action

have a question of law or fact in common. When a party to an

action relies for ground of claim or defense upon any statute or

executive order administered by a federal or state governmental

officer or agency or upon any regulation, order, requirement or

agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute or executive

order, the officer or agency upon timely application may be per-

mitted to intervene in the action. In exercising its discretion the

court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or

prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.

(c) Procedure. A person desiring to intervene shall serve a

motion to intervene upon the parties as provided in Rule 5. The

motion shall state the grounds therefor and shall be accompanied

by a pleading setting torth the claim or defense for which inter-

vention is sought. The same procedure shall be followed when a

statute of the United States gives a right to intervene. When the

constitutionality of an act of Congress affecting the public interest

is drawn in question in any action to which the United States or

an Officer, agency, or employee thereof is not a party, the court

shall notify the Attorney General of the United States as pro-

vided in Title 28, U. S.C. § 2403.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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