Petition — White v. Arthur Murray, Inc.
Supreme Court brief1976
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: SEP 23 i97e
No. 76-432 MICHAL ROBAL,
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1975
RENA B. WHITE
BEATRICE RICE
MYN CLEARY
GWENDOLYN LANDENBERGER
FRANCES W. KENNEDY
Petitioners,
Ve.
ARTHUR MURRAY, INC.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
William H. Henderson
208 Metropolitan Law Bldg.
431 South Third East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
: Attorney for Petitioners
Joseph C. Fratto
206 Metropolitan Law Bldg.
431 South Third East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Of Counsel.
INDEX
Page
Opinions Below......cesecseceessesesse 2
SUP Cs bo ebdmash dob 06300 6b 0 Obs 2
Constitutional Privilege Involved.... 3
Question Presented.......eecseeeeeees F
SUMCOMGS ss o'cc ee ecb eessbbetecdoosecseon 3
Reasons For Granting The Writ........ 7
Appendix A. .cccswcccceecceocccesersese AD
APPONGIX Bow scavcsccccsvccccccsscscce £6
Appendix C...cccccrcccescsccccccces -- 19
Appendix Decweeadescvvecnouoevcetecenes 21
*
Citations
Cases:
International Shoe Co. v.
owe 310
*e ev#ee#weeenenree#@e#ee#*t#eeeee#ee#e##e#te#e 8
State v. Phillips 540 P. 2d 936
*enereeenerteeenw#ee #eee#ee 7, 8
White v. Arthur Murra Inc.
545 P. ad 439 Tue 1976). 2, 10
Statutes:
26 U.S.C. L287(S).ncsevscevessese 2
28 U.S.C. DIGLES he oc 06 cece cevese 2
Utah Code 78-27-22 to 78-27-24...
eee eeeveeen eee eeenee 3, 4, 9, 19-20
Articles:
"The Utah Supreme Court and the
Rule of Law: Phillips and the
Bill of Rights in U ", Utah
Law Review, Vol. 1975, Fall,
Number 3, p- BSODeccevecscevsecesoers 8
"After The Ball", Wall Street
Journal, Pacific Coast Ed.,
March 10, WOTBccccocseseccse 9, 21-22
| IN THE |
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER, 1975
No.
RENA B. WHITE
BEATRICE RICE
MYN CLEARY
GWENDOLYN LANDENBERGER
FRANCES W. KENNEDY
Petitioners,
Vv.
ARTHUR MURRAY, INC,
PETITION FORK A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Rena B. White, Beatrice Rice, Myn
Cleary, Gwendolyn Landenberger and Frances
W. Kennedy, petition for a Writ of Certio-
rari to review the decision of the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah entered in this
case May 5, 1976, (Rehearing denied June
28, 1976) affirming the judgment of the
District Court of Utah, Third Judicial
(1)
(2)
District, that it did not have personal
jurisdiction over Arthur Murray, Inc, under
Utah Statutes (Utah Code 38-27-22 to 78-27-
24).
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah (App. A, infra pp.10-15) is~-
reported in 549 P. 2d 439 (May 5, 1976).
The District Court’s Order, Judgment and
Decree quashing the service of summons on
Arthur Murray, Inc. and dismissing petition-
ers' complaints (App. B, infra pp. 16-18) is
unreported.
JURISDICTION
The decision of the Supreme Court of
Utah was entered May 5, 1976. On May 20,
1976, petitioners were granted extention of
time for filing a Petition for Rehearing to
June 24, 1976, pursuant to Rule 76(f) Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. On June 24, 1976,
a Petition for Rehearing was duly filed
pursuant to Rule 76(e) Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
We invoke the jurisdiction of the Sup-
reme Court under 28 USC 1257(3) and 28 USC
2101(c).
(3)
CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE INVOLVED
The Due Process clause of Section l,
Amendment XIV to the Constitution of the
United States.
3 QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the Supreme Court of Utah denied
petitioners due process of law when it
affirmed the decision of the lower court
quashing service of summons on Arthur
Murray, Inc. and dismissing petitioners'
complaints in the face of Utah Statutes
providing jurisdiction of Utah's courts
"over non-resident defendants to the fullest
extent permitted by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment _to the United
States Constitution" (Utah Code 78-27-22 to
78-27-24) (App. C, infra, pp. 19-20).
STATEMENT
_ The constitutional question of the right
of petitioners under the due process clause
of Amendment Fourteen to assert jurisdic-
tion over Arthur Murray, Inc. in Utah's
courts was presented at every stage of the
proceeding.
The complaints of petitioners (identical
in pertinent parts) allege fraudulent, pre-
tensive and coersive conduct of Arthur
1s (4)
Murray, Inc. in the sale of courses of danc-
ing instruction to the petitioners and prays
for damages for same. The complaints allege
that Arthur Murray, Inc. supervised, contro-
lled and directed, and participated in this
conduct, and by such conduct subjected it-
self to jurisdiction of the District Court
of Utah under Utah's so-called "long arm
statutes" (78-27-22 to 78-27-24).
Utah Statutes (78-27-22 to 78-27-24
Utah Code) in pertinent part provides for
jurisdiction of Utah courts over non-.
residents, if non-residents transact any
business in the state or contracts to supply
services or goods in the state (78-27-24).
The Legislative mandate is that the statutes
"should be applied so as to assert juris-
diction over non-resident defendants to the
fullest extent permitted by the due process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
After due service of process on Arthur
Murray, Inc., and on December 9, 1974,
Arthur Murray, Inc. moved to quash service
of summons on the grounds that it was a
Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business at Coral Gables, Florida,
and had never done business in Utah and was
be oe ee ee eee a , ease Se ate eee) eye an.” es >, i, Oe,
* % “yh Sa J - - TAs °
(5)
not doing business. in Utah at the time and
that it did not have an office, agent or
employee within Utah, and that the court
lacks jurisdiction over Arthur Murray, Inc.
On June 27, 1975, hearing was had on
the Motion. At the hearing (and on the
Hearing for Motion for New Trial on Septem-
ber 11, 1975) the following uncontradicted
contacts between Arthur Murray, Inc. and
its Salt Lake City franchise dance studio
were shown by deposition and affidavits:
1. Arthur Murray, Inc. specifically
directed its Salt Lake City dance studio in
its fraudulent and coersive sales of dancing
lessons to petitioners, including such
minute directions as telling them:
"a. What to say.
bs. How to say it.
c. When to say it. .
d. How to overcome or reply to
negative statements.
e. When to say. nothing.
££. When to change the subject."
2. Arthur Murray, Inc.'s representa-
tive regularly visited its Salt Lake City
studio to sign and approve certificates of
awards to petitioners, There were many
such’ awards and all petitioners received
(6)
some. A representative of Arthur Murray,
Inc. regularly visited its Salt Lake City
studio to supervise and control the sales
of courses of dancing instruction.
3. Arthur Murray, Inc. directed its
Salt Lake City studio in the sale of loss
leader sales to entrap customers. It
supplied the instructions and the advertise-
ments and they were followed by the Salt Lake
studio.
4. Arthur Murray, Inc. exercised over-
riding control of all activities of the Salt
Lake studio. Arthur Murray, Inc.'s fran-
chise agreement with its Salt Lake studio
provided for tight control.
Arthur Murray, Inc. did not profer one
iota of evidence contradicting these
contacts (indeed, control) of its Salt Lake
dance studio; nor any evidence whatsoever
at the hearings.
Pursuant to subdivision 2 or Rule 2l,
Rules of the Supreme Court of the United
States, we are requesting the District
Court of Utah (the court possessed of the
record) to transmit all evidence adduced at
the District Court hearings relating to
contracts between Arthur Murray, Inc. and
its Salt Lake City franchised dance studio,
wht ak i “aie fe oy Ee Se ee gee) RR, ae a pens Pe ee ee Ce ee oh ee ee” kk Seek. ara ae
(7)
namely:
Deposition of Paul Curry
Affidavit of Marie LaTour
Arthur Murray Executive Manuel
Arthur Murray Franchise Agreements
Affidavit of Petitioners
The denial of due process to petitioners
by the Supreme Court of Utah's affirmance of
the lower court's judgment, quashing service
of summons and dismissing the complaints,
was raised by petitioners in their "Brief
of Appellants" (filed December 2, 1975),
Appellants Reply Brief "C" (filed March 19,
1976), and Petition for Rehearing (filed
June 24, 1976) in the Supreme Court of Utah.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
The refusal of the Supreme Court of Utah
to apply the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, denies the benefits
of said amendment to every person in the
State of Utah.
The hostility of the Supreme Court of
Utah to the Fourteenth Amendment is demon-
strated in State v. Phillips 540 P. 2d 936
(Utah 1975) wherein the court challenges
the validity of the adoption of the amend-
ment.
(8)
We believe that issue presented by this
petition is the most unique in decades.
Edwin Brown Firmage, Esq., professor of
Law, University of Utah, in his Law Review
article "The Utah Supreme Court and the
Rule of Law: Phillips and the Bill of
Rights in Utah", points out that the Utah
Supreme Court in Phillips is denying to the
people of Utah the benefits of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
"...the Utah Supreme Court defied or
demonstrated ignorance of over half a cen-
turn of United States Supreme Court case
law, holding to the contrary."
The Utah Supreme Court's denial of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in the instant cases is even more
aggravated than in Phillips.
For here, the Supreme Court of Utah;
1. Turns its back on this court's
decision in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) pronouncing
the minimum contacts doctrine of due process.
1 Utah Law Review, Vol. 1975, Fall,
Number 3, p. 593.
(9)
2. ‘Turns its back on the mandate of
Utah's Legislature that Utah's Courts apply
the minimum contacts doctrine "to the
fullest extent permitted by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution" (Utah Code
78-27-27).
3. Turns its back on the uncontradicted
evidence in this case showing contacts
between Arthur Murray, Inc. and its Salt
Lake City franchise, far beyond the require-
ments of the minimum contacts doctrine.
4. Turns your petitioners out of court
in their actions alleging the sordid fraud-
ulent practices of franchisers of dance
studios that have become a national scandal.”
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari
should be granted.
Respectfylly submitted,
° D
f : Attorney for Petitioners
2 after the Ball", Wall Street Journal
Pacific Coast Ed., March 10, 1972 (pertinent
parts quoted in App. D, infra, pp 21-22 ).
(10)
APPENDIX A
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Nos. 14286
14287
14288
14289
14290
RENA B. WHITE, et al
Plaintiffs and Appellants
Vv.
ARTHUR MURRAY, INC.
Defendant and Respondent
[May 5, 1976]
TUCKETT, Justice:
The plaintiffs appeal from an order of
the district court dismissing their com-
plaints on the ground that the court had
not acquired jurisdiction over the defendant.
While the plaintiffs filed separate com-
plaints, each alleging cause of action for
fraud against the defendant, the ruling
complained of by the district court is
common to each case and is dealt with here
as though it were one appeal. Plaintiffs
(11)
are residents of Salt Lake County and filed
_ their separate complaints in _1e District
Court of Salt Lake County and caused service
of summons to be made upon the defendant in
the state of Florida. Defendant is a corp-
oration organized and existing under the
laws of the state of Delaware with its
peincipal office and place of business in
Coral Gables, Florida.
After the service of summonses and
copies of the complaints upon the defendant
in the state of Florida, the defendant
appeared specially to move the court to
dismiss the complaints on the ground and
for the reason that the court had not
acquired jurisdiction over the defendant.
After a hearing on the motion, the
court below found that the defendant has
never qualified to do business in the state
of Utah, nor has it ever done business in
this state. The court further found that
an Arthur Murray Dance Studio was operated
in Salt Lake City, Utah, but that the studio
was operated by a franchisee of the defen-
dant, and except for isolated visits by
auditors of the defendant, Arthur Murray,
Inc., has not maintained an office in, done
business in, had an agent, employee or
(12)
officer or other representative in the state
of Utah, neither before, during or since the
times referred to in plaintiffs' complaints.
The court granted the defendant's motion to
quash the service of summons served on behalf
of each of the plaintiffs. During the times
mentioned in the plaintiffs' complaints an
Arthur Murray Dance Studio was operated in
Salt Lake City and was in frct operated by
a franchisee or franchisees who were not
made parties to these proceedings. The
contract entered into by the franchisee and
the defendant contains the following pertin-
ent language:
(a) The franchisee will include
provision in each enrollment agreement
or contract entered into with a student
relating to the taking of dancing les-
sons or the payment therefore substan-
tially as follows: This agreement is
made by student with the franchised
owner of the studio in which he or she
is enrolling and said franchisee is
solely responsible for the performance
of this contract and the dancing lessons
provided for herein. As student, I
understand and agree that this contract
is made by me solely with the above
(13)
studio, as seller and does not directly
or indirectly constitute an agreement
with or an obligation of Arthur Murray,
Inc., or any of its employees.
see *
(c) Franchisee agrees to use at
all times the words "a franchised studio"
whenever "Arthur Murray Studio", "Arthur
Murray Dance Studio", "Arthur Murray
School of Dancing", or any variation
thereof is used in the franchisee's
advertising or printed matter. The
franchisee agrees to use in his appoint-
ment cards, receipts, etc., wherever the
name "Arthur Murray" appears, the phrase
"Arthur Murray Dance Studio,"
"franchisee," (the blank to be filled in
with the franchisee's name).
(d) The franchisee will immediately
have the phrase "Arthur Murray Dance
Studio" | "owner and franchisee"
(the blank to be filled in with the
franchisee's name) painted on the outer
door of entrance to the franchisee's
studio or studios.
The defendant did furnish to the fran-
chisee instructional material, various forms
(14)
of advertising and promotional materials,
including dance competitions. For its
services the defendant charged the franch-
isee a percentage of the income received
from students who paid for dancing instruc-
tion. Auditors from the defendant's office
checked the books of the franchisee on an
annual or biannual basis to determine
whether the defendant was receiving the
agreed percentage. The defendant carried
on no other activity in the state of Utah,
not did it supervise or engage in the
management of the dance studio.
In order for the Utah court to acquire
jurisdiction over the defendant it could
only be accomplished on the basis of Section
78-27-24, U.C.A. 1953, which provides in
part as follows: |
Any person . . .whether or not a
citizen or a resident of this state,
who in person or through an agent does
any of the following enumerated acts,
submits himself, and if an individual,
his personal representative, to the
jurisdiction of the courts of this
state as to any claim arising from:
(1) The transaction of any busi-
ness within this state;
(15)
(2) Contacting to supply services
or goods in this state;
(3) The causing of any injury
within this estate whether tortious or
by breach of warranty; ... .
The activity of the defendant in this
State does not meet the requirements of the
above section which has been construed and
dealt with in a number of decisions by this
court.
We are of the opinion that the devision
of the district court in determining that
it had not acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant is amply supported by the record,
and the decision is affirmed. Defendant
is entitled to costs.
WE CONCUR:
F. Henri Henriod,
Chief Justice
J. Allan Crockett, o We dett, Justice
Justice Justice
MAUGHAN, Justice, concurs in the result.
1. Durham-Bush, Inc. v. Bill Hartmann
Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 30 Utah 2d 177,
515 P. 2d 92; Foreign Study League v.
Holland-America Line, 27 Utah 2d 442, 497
P. 244; Hill v. Zale Corporation, 25 Utah
2d 357, 482 P. 2d 332; Union Ski Company v.
Union Plastics Corp., No. 14065, __—P. 2d
(16) (17)
1. Arthur Murray, Inc., is a corpora-
tion organized and existing under and by
virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware,
and has its principle place of business in
Coral Gables, Florida. Arthur Murray, Inc.
APPENDIX B
THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
Nos. 222923
222924
pro ese has never qualified to do business nor has
222927 it ever done business in the State of Utah.
2. That during the time periods refer-
red to in plaintiffs' complaint, an Arthur
Murray dance studio was operated in Salt
Lake City, Utah, but that at all times
referred to in plaintiffs' complaint, said
dance studio was operated by a; franchisee
of Arthur Murray, Inc. and that but for
isolated visits into the State of Utah by
the auditors of Arthur Murray, Inc., Arthur
Murray, Inc has not meintained an office in,
done business in, had an agent, employee or
officer or other representative in the
State of Utah either before, during or
since the time periods referred to in
plaintiffs' complaint.
NOW THEREFORE, upon motion of the
defendant, Arthur Murray, Inc.:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED :
The motion of Arthur Murray, Inc., to
quash the service of the summons of each
RENA B. WHITE, et al
Plaintiffs
Vv.
ARTHUR MURRAY, INC.
Defendant
ORDER
The motion of Arthur Murray, Inc., to
quash service of summons, having come on
regularly for hearing on the 27th day of
June, 1975, at the hour of 2:00 p.m. before
the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Sr., with
William Henderson appearing on behalf of
the plaintiffs, and Philip R. Fishler
appearing on behalf of the defendant, and
the above entitled matters having been con-
solidated for purposes of this hearing, the
Court after hearing arguments of counsel
and being fully advised finds as follows:
(18)
plaintiff be and is hereby granted, and
further that each of the plaintiff's |
complaints is hereby dismissed.
Dated this llth day of July, 1975.
BY THE COURT
Stewart M. Hanson, Sr.
Judge
(19)
APPENDIX C
Relevant Provisions
UTAH CODE
78-27-22 to 78-27-24
78-27-22. Jurisdiction over non-resi-
dents~-Purpose of act.--It is declared, as
a matter of legislative determination, that
the public interest demands the state pro-
vide its citizens with an effective means
of redress against nonresident persons, who
through certain significant minimal contacts
with this state, incur obligations to citi-
zens entitled to the state's protection.
This legislative action is deemed necessary
because of technological progress which has
substantially increased the flow of commerce
between the several states resulting in
increased interaction between persons of
this state and persons of other states.
The provisions of this act, to ensure
maximum protection to citizens of this
state, should be applied so as to assert
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to
the fullest extent permitted by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
(20)
to the United States Constitution.
78-27-23. Jurisdiction over nonresidents
--Definitions.--As used in the act:
(1) The words "any person" mean any
individual, firm, company, association, or
corporation.
(2) The words "transaction of business
within this state" mean activities of a non-
resident person, his agents, or representa-
tives in the state which affect persons or
businesses within the state of Utah.
78-27-24. Jurisdiction over nonresidents
--Acts submitting person to jurisdiction. --
Any person, not withstanding section 16-10-
102, whether or not a citizen or resident
of this state, who in person or through an
agent does any of the following enumerated
acts, submits himself, and if an individual,
his personal representative, to the juris-
diction of the courts of this state as to
any claim arising from:
(1) The transaction of any business
within this state;
(2) Contracting to supply services or
goods in this state;
(3) The causing of any injury within
this state whether tortious or by breach
of warranty;
(21)
APPENDIX D
The Wall Street Journal
Pacific Coast Edition
(Excerpt )
AFTER THE BALL
Many Irate Consumers Assail Selling
Tactics of Dance Instructors
Critics Claim Some Studios Exploit
Ulterior Motives Of Pupils For Big Profits
"Gigolos & Rich Old Ladies’
os aan and out of court, a growing
number of angry consumers are claiming
that they have been bilked by dance studios.
And these complaints have created consid-
erable concern in the offices of various
regulatory authorities, including the Fed-
eral Trade Commission.
(22)
The so-called dance-studio game is by
no means a new problem for the FTC. More
than a decade ago, stories about dance
school swindles--in which light-footed,
money-hungry entrepreneurs prey upon the
lonely and the aged--were aplashed across
the front pages of the nation's newspapers,
and the FTC moved in on some of them. As
the headlines faded, however, the swindlers
waltzed on.
"They never did even slow up", says an
FTC attorney. "They've just gone around
and around and around."
The two largest studio chains, Arthur.
Murray, Inc. and the Fred Astaire organiza-
tion, vehemently deny any intentional wrong-
doing--although they concede the possibility
of exploitation is omnipresent. "The nature
of the business leads itself to exploitation,
and we try to limit it,"' says Chester F.
Casanave, head of the Astaire organization.
"Ninety percent of the schools in the country
are well run and well operated, and the
organization highly resents those people
who dor.'t take care of the store."
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on
September o2_: 1976, he deposited in the
mail in a United States Post Office, first
class postage prepaid, addressed to Strong
& Hanni, Counsel of Record for Arthur
Murray, Inc,., at their post office address,
three copies of the foregoing Petition For
Writ of Certiorari.
¢
L H. N N
Attorney for Petitioners
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