Opposition — Davis v. United States

Supreme Court brief1976

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Davin: B. CHARNAY, PETITIONER

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INDEX

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Statute and rule imvollved ..................c.cccccccrccccscccccesscseees 2

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CITATIONS

Cases:

Bedford v. Bagshaw, 4 H. & N. 538, 157 Eng.

eee 12

Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 ............. 6

Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 ...... 9, 10

Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co.,

a GS eenneieneenene 7

Harris v. United States, 48 F.2d 771 ................... 12

Heike v. United States, 217 U.S. 423 00.0.0... 6, 7

Marsh v. Armada Corp., 533 F. 2d 978 ............... 10

Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. S13 ................... 6,7

Reg. v. Aspinall, | Q.B.D. 730, affirmed,

Bo Rs © dideterscchepetttecncinethipitinititintitinemene 12

Rex v. DeBerenger, 3 M. & S. 67, 105 Eng.

SER. SD cenerremencneeperengesgnmmeee 12

Scott v. Brown, 2 Q.B. 724 .o....ccccccccccccseceeeecceeeeees 11

Sullivan v. United States, 411 F. 2d 556 ............... il

il

Page

Cases (continued):

Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life

© CH Ga, Ge Wet © detinecicesndndinsenticnionion il

Tasby v. United States, 504 F. 2d 332 .............0000 11

Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co.,

| Pen nr ee tA a 7

TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., No. 74-

1471, decided June 14, 1976 ....c.ccccccsscscccccccscesees 13

United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S.

TUE ‘pduceceqcennchseuiinnpdennmcniliebitasibseiiedaaibiahiedmmeninnss 3

United States vy. Brown, 5 F. Supp. 81, affirmed,

on other grounds, 79 F. 2d 321, certiorari

denied sub nom. McCarthy v. United States,

BP Ns I denscciinciitteanaititisiniaciiaiainiabaitedinadintsins 12

United States v. Howard, 352 U.S. 212 ..............04 3

United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 ............... sseeee 6

Constitution, statutes and rules:

Constitution of the United States of America:

I 11

I I i 1]

Securities Excrange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881,

as amended:

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Section 9(a)(1), 1S U.S.C. 78i(a)(1) ................ 9

Section 9(aX(2), 1S U.S.C. 78i(a)(2) ............. 8,9

Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) ............. passim

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iii

Page

Constitution statutes and rule (continued):

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Securities and Exchange Commission Rule

10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10B-5 oo... eee passim

Miscellaneous:

Berle, Stock Market Manipulation, 38 Colum.

in I, See IE secitncesaadecnssnenniennninniiioniensene 12

New York Times, April 6, 1976, p. I, col. 1 _...... 2

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OcToBER TERM, 1976

No. 76-337

CHESTER C. DAVIS, PETITIONER

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 76-356

DAvipD B. CHARNAY, PETITIONER

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION |

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 27a-

57a) is reported at 537 F. 2d 341. The order of the dis-

trict court is unreported (Pet. App. 19a-24a).!

Pet. App.” refers to petitioner Davis’ appendix (No. 76-337).

References beginning with roman numberals denote the count and

paragraph numbers of the indictment. “Pet.” refers to the Davis

petition. “C. Pet.” refers to the Charnay petition (No. 76-356).

(1)

2

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

May 7, 1976. A timely petition for rehearing and sugges-

tion for rehearing en banc was denied on July 8, 1976

(Pet. App. 58a-6la). On July 28, 1976, Mr. Chief Justice

Burger extended petitioner Davis’ time for filing his peti-

tion (No. 76-337) until September 6, 1976, and the peti-

tion was filed September 3, 1976. On August 4, 1976, Mr.

Justice Rehnquist denied petitioner Charnay’s request

for an extension of time to file his petition (No. 76-356).

The petition was filed on September 7, 1976, and accord-

ingly is untimely under Rule 22(2) of this Court’s Rules.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether execution of a plan to cause the sale of large

blocks of a corporation’s stock, including short sales, for

the sole purpose of depressing the market price of that

stock in order to force a sale of the corporation's assets,

is an unlawful manipulative device which violates Section

10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act as implemented

by Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5.

STATUTE AND RULE INVOLVED

Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act, 48

Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. 78)(b) and Securities and Exchange

Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5, are set

forth at pages 2a-3a of petitioner Davis’ appendix.

STATEMENT

Petitioners and defendants Howard R. Hughes? and

Robert A. Maheu were indicted in the United States Dis-

trict Court for the District of Nevada. The indictment

2Mr. Hughes died on April 5, 1976. New York Times, April 6,

1976, p. 1, col. 1.

a

charged that the defendants had knowingly and wilfully

conspired to, and did, use manipulative and deceptive

devices involving interstate wire communications to de-

press artificially the price of the common stock of Air

West, Inc. (“Air West”), on the American Stock Exchange,

in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange

Act of 1934 (“Securities Exchange Act”), 15 U.S.C. 78)

(b) and 78ff, and Rule 10b-5S thereunder, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-

5, and of the conspiracy and wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C.

371 and 1343 (Pet. App. 8a-Ila; 1 11, 12, 13, 14).

The allegations of the indictment were as follows:4

In August 1968, defendant Hughes, who was the sole

stockholder of the Hughes Tool Company (“Hughes

Tool”) (Pet. App. 6a; I 1), instructed defendant Maheu,

the chief executive officer of Hughes/ Nevada Operations,

a company controlled by defendant Hughes and Hughes

Tool (Pet. App. 7a; I 3), and petitioner Davis, an attorney

who acted as counsel for Hughes Tool (Pet. App. 6a; I 2),

to make an offer on behalf of Hughes Tool to purchase

Air West by acquiring its assets for cash at a price designed

to yield approximately $22 per share to Air West stock-

holders (Pet. App. 7a-8a; 1 8). On or about December 28,

1968, a bare majority of Air West’s stockholders voted to

accept the Hughes Tool offer (Pet. App. 8a; | 10). That

same day, however, Air West’s board of directors rejected

the offer by a vote of 13 to I1 (Pet. App. 8a; I 10).

3A prior indictment against these defendants had been dismissed

by the district court on January 30, 1974 (Pet. App. 48a). The second

indictment, which is the subject of this appeal, was returned within

the six-month re-indictment period specified in 18 U.S.C. 3288 (Pet.

Apo. 53a).

‘The allegations of the indictment are assumed to be true for

purposes of determining whether the indictment states an offense

against the United States. United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358

U.S. 121, 126, n. 5; United States v. Howard, 352 U.S. 212, 214-215.

4

Following the rejection, petitioner Davis, and defendants

Hughes and Maheu attempted by various means to induce

the Air West directors who had voted against the Hughes

Tool offer to change their votes (Pet. App. 9a; I 13). As

part of this effort, these defendants represented to the

stockholders of Air West, and to others, that if the Hughes

Tool offer were rejected, the price of the common stock

of Air West would decline substantially (Pet. App. 9a;

I 14a).

On December 31, 1968, these defendants, with the assist-

ance of petitioner Charnay and certain other persons,

conspired to depress the market price of Air West stock

on the American Stock Exchange (Pet. App. 9a-10a;

I 14a-c). Petitioner Davis and defendants Hughes and

Maheu entered into agreements with petitioner Charnay

and with unindicted co-conspirators Herman Greenspun

and George Crockett, whereby petitioner Charnay, and

Greenspun and Crockett were to sell shares of Air West

common stock on the American Stock Exchange (Pet.

App. 10a; I 14b). Greenspun and Crockett agreed to sell

27,000 shares which they owned. Petitioner Charnay

agreed to sell “short” 59,100 shares (Pet. App. 12a;

Overt Acts, para. e, g, i). Petitioner Davis, and defendants

Hughes and Maheu agreed to reimburse petitioner Char-

nay for whatever losses he might sustain in his short sales,

and they assured Greenspun and Crockett that they would

receive $22 for each share they sold, regardless of the price

which their stock was actually sold (Pet. App. 10a;

4b).5

*Further to induce the non-approving directors to change their

votes, petitioner Davis, and defendants Hughes and Maheu, that

same day, caused telegrams to be sent to those directors threatening

them with the institution of lawsuits if they did not change their

votes (Pet. App. Ila; I 14d). The threats were carried out when,

that same day, petitioner Davis and defendants Hughes and Maheu

caused certain Air West shareholders and directors to file lawsuits

5

All these sales were effected on December 31, 1968

(except that petitioner Charnay was able to sell short only

19,100 shares) (Pet. App. 12; Overt Acts, para. e, g, i).

The sale contributed to and caused a decline that day in the

price of Air West common stock on the American Stock

Exchange from $18 per share to $15.75 (Pet. App. 10a;

I 14c).

‘Later that same day, as a result of defendants’ activi-

ties, Air West reversed its earlier position and contracted

to sell its assets to Hughes Tool (Pet. App. 12a; Overt

Acts, para. }).

The district court dismissed the indictment on the ground

that it failed to state an offense (Pet. App. 19a-24a). On

appeal by the United States, the court of appeals reversed

and remanded for further proceedings. It held (Pet. App.

4la):

Here the Government has alleged that the appellees

in selling their Air West stock purposely sought to

_ depress the market for the stock, and in fact achieved

this result, with the object and effect of deceiving the

shareholders and directors of Air West in Hughes’

takeover attempt. Such conduct falls within the type

of activity which Congress sought to prohibit in en-

acting the Securities [and Exchange] Act and which

Rule 10b-5 explicitly prohibits. It constitutes an

indictable offense.

In an order denying a petition for rehearing and sugges-

ion for rehearing en banc, the court held that the indict-

against the non-approving directors, charging that their rejection of

the Hughes Tool offer constituted a breach of the fiduciary obliga-

tion they owed to Air West’s shareholders (Pet. App. Ila; 1 14d-e).

Additionally, petitioner Davis and defendants Hughes and Maheu

caused the issuance of court orders directing the seizure of the com-

mon stock of Air West owned by the non-approving directors (Pet.

App. Ila; I 14e).

6

ment contained allegations “sufficient to charge the req-

uisite intent and scienter under Ernst & Ernst [v.

Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185]” (Pet. App. 61a).°

ARGUMENT

1. Petitioners contend that the court of appeals

erred in holding that the indictment states an offense

under Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act

(15 U.S.C. 78j(b)) and Rule 10b-5S. In the present posture

of the case, however, there is no occasion for the Court

to consider that contention.

The district court dismissed the indictment, and the

court of appeals reinstated it by reversing the dismissal.

The case thus is in the same posture as if the district

court had denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss the indict-

ment. Such an order would not be appealable (Heike

v. United States, 217 U.S. 423; Parr v. United States,

351 U.S. 513), because such interlocutory determinations

do not terminate the litigation; permitting appeals could

thus seriously delay expeditious administration of the

criminal law. Cf. United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530;

Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323.

Petitioners have shown no extraordinary circumstances

that would warrant this Court now to decide the pre-

liminary question -whether the indictment charges an

offense. Indeed, the Court may never have to decide

that question, since petitioners could be acquitted at their

trial, or, if convicted, the court of appeals could reverse

their conviction on grounds not warranting review here.

If and when petitioners are convicted and their conviction

is affirmed, the legal issue petitioners raise will have

*The court of appeals stayed its mandate until disposition of these

petitions. None of the defendants is in custody.

ees ee

a

7

been clarified and sharpened by the development of a

full record detailing the precise nature and effect of

their actions. If the Court deems the legal issue suf-

ficiently important to warrant review, that would be the

appropriate occasion therefor. Cf. Heike v. United States,

supra, 217 U.S. at 430; Parr v. United States, supra.’

2. The court of appeals correctly held that the indict-

ment charged a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.

That ruling did not rest, as petitioners state, “solely on

the basis” of some general purpose of the securities

laws (Pet. 5; C. Pet. 6), but because the court found

that the indictment “alleged that the * * * [defendants] in

selling their Air West stock purposely sought to depress

the market for the stock, and in fact achieved this

result * * *” (Pet. App. 41a). They were accordingly

engaged in a “scheme, or artifice to defraud,” and an

“act, practice, or course of business which operate{d]

* * * as a fraud or deceit” upon all other sellers of Air

West stock, as well as on its other stockholders and its

directors, within the meaning of the quoted terms as used in

"After a trial, if petitioners are convicted, this Court could

review the court of appeals’ reversal of the district court’s dismissal

of the indictment. E.g., Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co.,

261 U.S. 399, 418; Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co.,

240 U.S. 251, 257-258.

"The district court similarly characterized the allegations of the

indictment as charging the defendants with having “cause{d]

substantial blocks of a security to be sold on a national securities

exchange for the purpose of artificially depressing the market

price of the security * * * " (Pet. App. 23a).

Although petitioners state that “[a]ccording to the Court of Ap-

peals, the conduct at issue is ‘certain guarantees against trading losses.’

(28a.)” (Pet. 15; see also, C. Pet. 14), the quoted portion of the

opinion of the court of appeals refers to that court's characteriza-

tion of the first indictment, not the indictment involved in the

present case (Pet. App. 27a-28a).

8

Rule 10b-5.9 Their conduct accordingly violated Section

10(b), which makes it illegal to employ, in connection

with the purchase or sale of any security, “any manipu-

lative or deceptive device or contrivance” in contravention

of the Commission’s rules.

Petitioners contend that activities wilfully undertaken

for the purpose of raising or depressing the market price

of stock do not constitute a manipulation within the

meaning of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 unless (1)

the activities are entered into for the purpose of inducing

the purchase or sale of securities by others, and (2)

the activities give the appearance of trading but do not

involve actual transactions. As petitioners recognize (Pet.

18; C. Pet. 16), however, those are the elements which

are necessary to show a “manipulation of security prices”

in violation of Section 9(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange

Act, 48 Stat. 889, 15 U.S.C. 78i(a)(2).

If Congress had intended to limit the prohibition against

manipulative schemes and devices to those that Section 9

(a) prohibits, it would not have prohibited in Section 10(b)

those devices and contrivances that contravene the Com-

mission’s rules. Congress deliberately included in the

Act both kinds of statutory prohibition against mani-

pulative activity. It authorized the Commission to make

the judgment that investors are as seriously injured

when security prices are manipulated for a purpose

other than inducing purchases and sales of securities by

others, which Section 10(b) bars, as when the manipula-

tion has such a purpose and thus falls under Section

9(a)(2).

*Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful, in connection with the purchase

or sale of a security,

(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,

*_ es ¢ *&

(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which

operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person

***

9

Nor are Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 limited to man-

ipulative or deceitful devices based on artificial trans-

actions, such as wash sales or matched orders.

Those transactions are expressly proscribed by Section

9(aXl), 15 U.S.C. 78i(aXl). Section 10(b) was added

to the Act, as a “catchall” clause to enable the Com-

mission to deal with “‘any other cunning devices’ ”

by which markets might be manipulated. Ernst & Ernst

v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202 (quoting the testimony

of Thomas G. Corcoran, a spokesman for the drafters).

Proscribed conduct designed to deceive or defraud inves-

tors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of

securities (Ernst & Ernst, supra), may include actual

trading. Cf. Section 9(aX(2), 15 U.S.C. 78i(a)(2).

Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the decision of the

court of appeals does not conflict with the scienter

requirement of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, supra.

That case involved a private claim for damages under

Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, based on the defendant's

allegedly negligent non-feasance. The Court held that a

damage action based on these provisions will not lie

“in the absence of an allegation of intent to deceive,

manipulate, or defraud on the part of the defendant.”

425 U.S. at 187-188.

In this case, in contrast, the indictment charges that

the defendants “wilfully and knowingly” employed

“manipulative and deceptive devices” (emphasis added)

(Pet. App. 8a-9a; I 12), and that the defendants “did

devise and intend to devise a scheme and artifice to

defraud the directors and stockholders of Air West”

(emphasis added) (Pet. App. 14a, 15a; III 2, IV 2). The

indictment alleges that petitioners caused “substan-

tial blocks of * * * [Air West stock] to be sold on

a national securities exchange for the purpose of artifi-

cially depressing the market price of” (Pet. App. 23a)

a “

—

10

that stock, and that they “in fact achieved this result, with

the object and effect of deceiving the shareholders

and directors of Air West ***” (Pet. App. 4la).

The charge in this case, unlike that in Ernst & Ernst,

was wilfull and knowing misconduct, not mere negligent

non-action. As the court of appeals explained in denying

rehearing (Pet. App. 60a), it—

did not hold that scienter per se was not a required

element of the offense. Rather we noted that it

was necessary for the prosecution to show an

intentional act with “a realization on the defend-

ant’s part that he was doing a wrongful act.” [Empha-

sis added. ]

Such an intent and realization of wrongdoing are

plainly alleged.

The decision of the court of appeals does not conflict

with Marsh v. Armada Corp., 533 F. 2d 978 (C.A. 6).

In Marsh the court concluded that an alleged manipu-

lative scheme involving elimination of stock dividends

did not violate Rule 10b-5 because there had been complete

advance disclosure of the defendants’ intention to eliminate

dividends; there was, therefore, no deceit or fraud on any

persons.

In this case the defendants did not disclose their in-

tention to drive down the market price of Air West

stock (Pet. App. 44a). The alleged scheme operated as

a fraud on anyone who sold Air West stock during

the period when its price was artificially depressed as

a result of defendants’ activities (Pet. App. 10a; I 14c)

since they were the victims of petitioners’ scheme to.

drive the price down. Protection against such conduct is

the fundamental purpose of the 1934 Act (Ernst & Ernst,

supra, 425 U.S. at 195) and of Rule 10b-5 (see n. 9, supra,

p. 8, and discussion, supra, p. 9).

ase ee

4

Petitioners claim that the indictment denies their Fifth

and Sixth Amendment rights, because Rule 10b-5 does

not specify what fraud it proscribes, so that petitioners

have “no firm idea of what the government claims

[they] did that was unlawful” (Pet. 20-21: C. Pet. 18-19).'°

The Commission adopted the rule, however, precisely be-

cause it is impossible to define all of the fraudulent

and manipulative schemes devious ingenuity can con-

ceive. Rule 10b-5 prohibits “all fraudulent schemes in

connection with the purchase or sale of securities whether

* * *[njovel or atypical.” Superintendent of Insurance

v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 11, n. 7. Peti-

tioners’ alleged scheme was fraudulent because it in-

volved a secret device artificially to depress the market

price of stock.

Contrary to petitioners’ argument, there is nothing

novel in the holding of the court of appeals that a market

manipulation effected for the purpose of creating an arti-

ficial price perpetrates a fraud upon the investing public

(Pet. 15-22; C. Pet. 14-19). This holding is reflected

in English common law. In Scott v. Brown, 2 Q.B. 724

(1892), the parties had conspired to purchase shares

Petitioners’ assertion that “[i}t is impossible to find in the

indictment who it was that petitioner{s] allegedly intended to

deceive or defraud ***™” (Pet. 13; see also, C. Pet. 12-13)

ignores the allegations of the indictment that the persons defrauded

were, among others, “purchasers and sellers of Air West securities”

(Pet. App. 13a; II 2) and “directors and stockholders of Air

West” (Pet. App. I4a, 15a; III 2, IV 2), and that as a result

of defendants’ fraudulent and manipulative activities “Air

West” (stockholders who sold their stock in the declining market

* * * [received] the proceeds from their sales at artificially de-

pressed prices” (Pet. App. 10a). If petitioners require more definite

information they may seek it through a bill of particulars (Pet.

App. 47a). Accord, Tasby v. United States, 504 F. 2d 332 (C.A. 8);

Sullivan v. United States, 411 F. 2d 556 (C.A. 10).

12

in a company in order to create the appearance of a

bona fide market for the shares and that the shares were

trading at a premium. The court held the arrangement

to be a fraud. See also, Reg. v. Aspinall, | Q.B.D. 730,

affirmed, 2 Q.B.D. 48 (1876); Bedford v. Bagshaw, 4 H. &

N. 538, 157 Eng. Rep. 951 (1859); Rex v. DeBerenger,

3 M. & S. 67, 105 Eng. Rep. 536 (K.B. 1814).

Moreover, prior to the federal securities laws, manipu-

lative activities were held to be unlawful under the federal

mail fraud statute. Speaking of a defendant who used a

pool to inflate the price of a stock, a district court held:

“the substitution of an artificially stimulated and con-

trolled market for an appraisal of the stock in an open

and free market” constituted fraud. United States

v. Brown, 5 F. Supp. 81, 84 (S.D. N.Y.), affirmed on

other grounds, 79 F. 2d °321 (C.A. 2), certiorari denied

sub nom. McCarthy v. United States, 296 U.S. 650.

Similarly, in Harris v. United States, 48 F. 2d 771 (C.A.

9), a mail fraud case, the court of appeals observed that

the violator’s “primary purpose * * * was to manipulate

* * * stock upon the stock exchanges so that it would

have an apparently steadily increasing market value.”

Id. at 775. A distinguished commentator has said of that case

that “(t]he cardinal misrepresentation [was] that the

price was fixed in a free market, whereas in fact it was fixed

by defendant * * *.” Berle, Stock Market Manipulation,

38 Colum. L. Rev. 393, 397 (1938). Similarly, in the present

case, the court of appeals found that the wilfull conduct of

defendants in “representing to Air West stockholders

and directors that the market would decline if the Hughes

tender offer were rejected and their subsequent conduct in

driving down the market price without revealing that the

13

decline was not due to the free operation of market

forces * * * operate[{d] as a deceit on the market

place * * * ” (Pet. App. 44a-45a).!!

- CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons the petitions for a writ of

certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

RoserT H. Bork,

Solicitor General.

DAVID FERBER,

Solicitor to the Commission,

MELVIN A. BROSTERMAN,

Altorney,

Securities and Exchange Commission.

NOVEMBER 1976.

''Petitioners suggest that this statement by the court of appeals

is contrary to TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., No. 74-1471,

decided June 14, 1976 (Pet. 21-22, n. 7; C. Pet. 19 n.). But

Northway held only that there is no market manipulation if stock

is purchased “wholly independently for proper corporate and invest-

ment purposes * * *” (slip op. 24).

DOJ-1976-11

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