Opposition — Davis v. United States
Supreme Court brief1976
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Davin: B. CHARNAY, PETITIONER
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INDEX
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Statute and rule imvollved ..................c.cccccccrccccscccccesscseees 2
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CITATIONS
Cases:
Bedford v. Bagshaw, 4 H. & N. 538, 157 Eng.
eee 12
Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 ............. 6
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 ...... 9, 10
Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co.,
a GS eenneieneenene 7
Harris v. United States, 48 F.2d 771 ................... 12
Heike v. United States, 217 U.S. 423 00.0.0... 6, 7
Marsh v. Armada Corp., 533 F. 2d 978 ............... 10
Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. S13 ................... 6,7
Reg. v. Aspinall, | Q.B.D. 730, affirmed,
Bo Rs © dideterscchepetttecncinethipitinititintitinemene 12
Rex v. DeBerenger, 3 M. & S. 67, 105 Eng.
SER. SD cenerremencneeperengesgnmmeee 12
Scott v. Brown, 2 Q.B. 724 .o....ccccccccccccseceeeecceeeeees 11
Sullivan v. United States, 411 F. 2d 556 ............... il
il
Page
Cases (continued):
Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life
© CH Ga, Ge Wet © detinecicesndndinsenticnionion il
Tasby v. United States, 504 F. 2d 332 .............0000 11
Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co.,
| Pen nr ee tA a 7
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., No. 74-
1471, decided June 14, 1976 ....c.ccccccsscscccccccscesees 13
United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S.
TUE ‘pduceceqcennchseuiinnpdennmcniliebitasibseiiedaaibiahiedmmeninnss 3
United States vy. Brown, 5 F. Supp. 81, affirmed,
on other grounds, 79 F. 2d 321, certiorari
denied sub nom. McCarthy v. United States,
BP Ns I denscciinciitteanaititisiniaciiaiainiabaitedinadintsins 12
United States v. Howard, 352 U.S. 212 ..............04 3
United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 ............... sseeee 6
Constitution, statutes and rules:
Constitution of the United States of America:
I 11
I I i 1]
Securities Excrange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881,
as amended:
EE OF lh FI ene 8
Section 9(a)(1), 1S U.S.C. 78i(a)(1) ................ 9
Section 9(aX(2), 1S U.S.C. 78i(a)(2) ............. 8,9
Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) ............. passim
Bastia Te, GS Wks Fee ssdladiaticietistdietnsecen 3
ee — en +
iii
Page
Constitution statutes and rule (continued):
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Be Stes CTEED . nivevitenstnsisieciinennehipiniabiiiniaaiiiadaniahitiiiins 3
BD Ps SHEET pcnccansinnnsnndsstinnuteciienttinniciendineimeen 3
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule
10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10B-5 oo... eee passim
Miscellaneous:
Berle, Stock Market Manipulation, 38 Colum.
in I, See IE secitncesaadecnssnenniennninniiioniensene 12
New York Times, April 6, 1976, p. I, col. 1 _...... 2
In the Supreme Court of the United States
OcToBER TERM, 1976
No. 76-337
CHESTER C. DAVIS, PETITIONER
Vv.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
No. 76-356
DAvipD B. CHARNAY, PETITIONER
Vv.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION |
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 27a-
57a) is reported at 537 F. 2d 341. The order of the dis-
trict court is unreported (Pet. App. 19a-24a).!
Pet. App.” refers to petitioner Davis’ appendix (No. 76-337).
References beginning with roman numberals denote the count and
paragraph numbers of the indictment. “Pet.” refers to the Davis
petition. “C. Pet.” refers to the Charnay petition (No. 76-356).
(1)
2
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
May 7, 1976. A timely petition for rehearing and sugges-
tion for rehearing en banc was denied on July 8, 1976
(Pet. App. 58a-6la). On July 28, 1976, Mr. Chief Justice
Burger extended petitioner Davis’ time for filing his peti-
tion (No. 76-337) until September 6, 1976, and the peti-
tion was filed September 3, 1976. On August 4, 1976, Mr.
Justice Rehnquist denied petitioner Charnay’s request
for an extension of time to file his petition (No. 76-356).
The petition was filed on September 7, 1976, and accord-
ingly is untimely under Rule 22(2) of this Court’s Rules.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
1254(1).
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether execution of a plan to cause the sale of large
blocks of a corporation’s stock, including short sales, for
the sole purpose of depressing the market price of that
stock in order to force a sale of the corporation's assets,
is an unlawful manipulative device which violates Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act as implemented
by Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5.
STATUTE AND RULE INVOLVED
Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act, 48
Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. 78)(b) and Securities and Exchange
Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5, are set
forth at pages 2a-3a of petitioner Davis’ appendix.
STATEMENT
Petitioners and defendants Howard R. Hughes? and
Robert A. Maheu were indicted in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Nevada. The indictment
2Mr. Hughes died on April 5, 1976. New York Times, April 6,
1976, p. 1, col. 1.
a
charged that the defendants had knowingly and wilfully
conspired to, and did, use manipulative and deceptive
devices involving interstate wire communications to de-
press artificially the price of the common stock of Air
West, Inc. (“Air West”), on the American Stock Exchange,
in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (“Securities Exchange Act”), 15 U.S.C. 78)
(b) and 78ff, and Rule 10b-5S thereunder, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-
5, and of the conspiracy and wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C.
371 and 1343 (Pet. App. 8a-Ila; 1 11, 12, 13, 14).
The allegations of the indictment were as follows:4
In August 1968, defendant Hughes, who was the sole
stockholder of the Hughes Tool Company (“Hughes
Tool”) (Pet. App. 6a; I 1), instructed defendant Maheu,
the chief executive officer of Hughes/ Nevada Operations,
a company controlled by defendant Hughes and Hughes
Tool (Pet. App. 7a; I 3), and petitioner Davis, an attorney
who acted as counsel for Hughes Tool (Pet. App. 6a; I 2),
to make an offer on behalf of Hughes Tool to purchase
Air West by acquiring its assets for cash at a price designed
to yield approximately $22 per share to Air West stock-
holders (Pet. App. 7a-8a; 1 8). On or about December 28,
1968, a bare majority of Air West’s stockholders voted to
accept the Hughes Tool offer (Pet. App. 8a; | 10). That
same day, however, Air West’s board of directors rejected
the offer by a vote of 13 to I1 (Pet. App. 8a; I 10).
3A prior indictment against these defendants had been dismissed
by the district court on January 30, 1974 (Pet. App. 48a). The second
indictment, which is the subject of this appeal, was returned within
the six-month re-indictment period specified in 18 U.S.C. 3288 (Pet.
Apo. 53a).
‘The allegations of the indictment are assumed to be true for
purposes of determining whether the indictment states an offense
against the United States. United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358
U.S. 121, 126, n. 5; United States v. Howard, 352 U.S. 212, 214-215.
4
Following the rejection, petitioner Davis, and defendants
Hughes and Maheu attempted by various means to induce
the Air West directors who had voted against the Hughes
Tool offer to change their votes (Pet. App. 9a; I 13). As
part of this effort, these defendants represented to the
stockholders of Air West, and to others, that if the Hughes
Tool offer were rejected, the price of the common stock
of Air West would decline substantially (Pet. App. 9a;
I 14a).
On December 31, 1968, these defendants, with the assist-
ance of petitioner Charnay and certain other persons,
conspired to depress the market price of Air West stock
on the American Stock Exchange (Pet. App. 9a-10a;
I 14a-c). Petitioner Davis and defendants Hughes and
Maheu entered into agreements with petitioner Charnay
and with unindicted co-conspirators Herman Greenspun
and George Crockett, whereby petitioner Charnay, and
Greenspun and Crockett were to sell shares of Air West
common stock on the American Stock Exchange (Pet.
App. 10a; I 14b). Greenspun and Crockett agreed to sell
27,000 shares which they owned. Petitioner Charnay
agreed to sell “short” 59,100 shares (Pet. App. 12a;
Overt Acts, para. e, g, i). Petitioner Davis, and defendants
Hughes and Maheu agreed to reimburse petitioner Char-
nay for whatever losses he might sustain in his short sales,
and they assured Greenspun and Crockett that they would
receive $22 for each share they sold, regardless of the price
which their stock was actually sold (Pet. App. 10a;
4b).5
*Further to induce the non-approving directors to change their
votes, petitioner Davis, and defendants Hughes and Maheu, that
same day, caused telegrams to be sent to those directors threatening
them with the institution of lawsuits if they did not change their
votes (Pet. App. Ila; I 14d). The threats were carried out when,
that same day, petitioner Davis and defendants Hughes and Maheu
caused certain Air West shareholders and directors to file lawsuits
5
All these sales were effected on December 31, 1968
(except that petitioner Charnay was able to sell short only
19,100 shares) (Pet. App. 12; Overt Acts, para. e, g, i).
The sale contributed to and caused a decline that day in the
price of Air West common stock on the American Stock
Exchange from $18 per share to $15.75 (Pet. App. 10a;
I 14c).
‘Later that same day, as a result of defendants’ activi-
ties, Air West reversed its earlier position and contracted
to sell its assets to Hughes Tool (Pet. App. 12a; Overt
Acts, para. }).
The district court dismissed the indictment on the ground
that it failed to state an offense (Pet. App. 19a-24a). On
appeal by the United States, the court of appeals reversed
and remanded for further proceedings. It held (Pet. App.
4la):
Here the Government has alleged that the appellees
in selling their Air West stock purposely sought to
_ depress the market for the stock, and in fact achieved
this result, with the object and effect of deceiving the
shareholders and directors of Air West in Hughes’
takeover attempt. Such conduct falls within the type
of activity which Congress sought to prohibit in en-
acting the Securities [and Exchange] Act and which
Rule 10b-5 explicitly prohibits. It constitutes an
indictable offense.
In an order denying a petition for rehearing and sugges-
ion for rehearing en banc, the court held that the indict-
against the non-approving directors, charging that their rejection of
the Hughes Tool offer constituted a breach of the fiduciary obliga-
tion they owed to Air West’s shareholders (Pet. App. Ila; 1 14d-e).
Additionally, petitioner Davis and defendants Hughes and Maheu
caused the issuance of court orders directing the seizure of the com-
mon stock of Air West owned by the non-approving directors (Pet.
App. Ila; I 14e).
6
ment contained allegations “sufficient to charge the req-
uisite intent and scienter under Ernst & Ernst [v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185]” (Pet. App. 61a).°
ARGUMENT
1. Petitioners contend that the court of appeals
erred in holding that the indictment states an offense
under Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act
(15 U.S.C. 78j(b)) and Rule 10b-5S. In the present posture
of the case, however, there is no occasion for the Court
to consider that contention.
The district court dismissed the indictment, and the
court of appeals reinstated it by reversing the dismissal.
The case thus is in the same posture as if the district
court had denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss the indict-
ment. Such an order would not be appealable (Heike
v. United States, 217 U.S. 423; Parr v. United States,
351 U.S. 513), because such interlocutory determinations
do not terminate the litigation; permitting appeals could
thus seriously delay expeditious administration of the
criminal law. Cf. United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530;
Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323.
Petitioners have shown no extraordinary circumstances
that would warrant this Court now to decide the pre-
liminary question -whether the indictment charges an
offense. Indeed, the Court may never have to decide
that question, since petitioners could be acquitted at their
trial, or, if convicted, the court of appeals could reverse
their conviction on grounds not warranting review here.
If and when petitioners are convicted and their conviction
is affirmed, the legal issue petitioners raise will have
*The court of appeals stayed its mandate until disposition of these
petitions. None of the defendants is in custody.
ees ee
a
7
been clarified and sharpened by the development of a
full record detailing the precise nature and effect of
their actions. If the Court deems the legal issue suf-
ficiently important to warrant review, that would be the
appropriate occasion therefor. Cf. Heike v. United States,
supra, 217 U.S. at 430; Parr v. United States, supra.’
2. The court of appeals correctly held that the indict-
ment charged a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
That ruling did not rest, as petitioners state, “solely on
the basis” of some general purpose of the securities
laws (Pet. 5; C. Pet. 6), but because the court found
that the indictment “alleged that the * * * [defendants] in
selling their Air West stock purposely sought to depress
the market for the stock, and in fact achieved this
result * * *” (Pet. App. 41a). They were accordingly
engaged in a “scheme, or artifice to defraud,” and an
“act, practice, or course of business which operate{d]
* * * as a fraud or deceit” upon all other sellers of Air
West stock, as well as on its other stockholders and its
directors, within the meaning of the quoted terms as used in
"After a trial, if petitioners are convicted, this Court could
review the court of appeals’ reversal of the district court’s dismissal
of the indictment. E.g., Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co.,
261 U.S. 399, 418; Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co.,
240 U.S. 251, 257-258.
"The district court similarly characterized the allegations of the
indictment as charging the defendants with having “cause{d]
substantial blocks of a security to be sold on a national securities
exchange for the purpose of artificially depressing the market
price of the security * * * " (Pet. App. 23a).
Although petitioners state that “[a]ccording to the Court of Ap-
peals, the conduct at issue is ‘certain guarantees against trading losses.’
(28a.)” (Pet. 15; see also, C. Pet. 14), the quoted portion of the
opinion of the court of appeals refers to that court's characteriza-
tion of the first indictment, not the indictment involved in the
present case (Pet. App. 27a-28a).
8
Rule 10b-5.9 Their conduct accordingly violated Section
10(b), which makes it illegal to employ, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security, “any manipu-
lative or deceptive device or contrivance” in contravention
of the Commission’s rules.
Petitioners contend that activities wilfully undertaken
for the purpose of raising or depressing the market price
of stock do not constitute a manipulation within the
meaning of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 unless (1)
the activities are entered into for the purpose of inducing
the purchase or sale of securities by others, and (2)
the activities give the appearance of trading but do not
involve actual transactions. As petitioners recognize (Pet.
18; C. Pet. 16), however, those are the elements which
are necessary to show a “manipulation of security prices”
in violation of Section 9(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 48 Stat. 889, 15 U.S.C. 78i(a)(2).
If Congress had intended to limit the prohibition against
manipulative schemes and devices to those that Section 9
(a) prohibits, it would not have prohibited in Section 10(b)
those devices and contrivances that contravene the Com-
mission’s rules. Congress deliberately included in the
Act both kinds of statutory prohibition against mani-
pulative activity. It authorized the Commission to make
the judgment that investors are as seriously injured
when security prices are manipulated for a purpose
other than inducing purchases and sales of securities by
others, which Section 10(b) bars, as when the manipula-
tion has such a purpose and thus falls under Section
9(a)(2).
*Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful, in connection with the purchase
or sale of a security,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
*_ es ¢ *&
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person
***
9
Nor are Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 limited to man-
ipulative or deceitful devices based on artificial trans-
actions, such as wash sales or matched orders.
Those transactions are expressly proscribed by Section
9(aXl), 15 U.S.C. 78i(aXl). Section 10(b) was added
to the Act, as a “catchall” clause to enable the Com-
mission to deal with “‘any other cunning devices’ ”
by which markets might be manipulated. Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202 (quoting the testimony
of Thomas G. Corcoran, a spokesman for the drafters).
Proscribed conduct designed to deceive or defraud inves-
tors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of
securities (Ernst & Ernst, supra), may include actual
trading. Cf. Section 9(aX(2), 15 U.S.C. 78i(a)(2).
Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the decision of the
court of appeals does not conflict with the scienter
requirement of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, supra.
That case involved a private claim for damages under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, based on the defendant's
allegedly negligent non-feasance. The Court held that a
damage action based on these provisions will not lie
“in the absence of an allegation of intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud on the part of the defendant.”
425 U.S. at 187-188.
In this case, in contrast, the indictment charges that
the defendants “wilfully and knowingly” employed
“manipulative and deceptive devices” (emphasis added)
(Pet. App. 8a-9a; I 12), and that the defendants “did
devise and intend to devise a scheme and artifice to
defraud the directors and stockholders of Air West”
(emphasis added) (Pet. App. 14a, 15a; III 2, IV 2). The
indictment alleges that petitioners caused “substan-
tial blocks of * * * [Air West stock] to be sold on
a national securities exchange for the purpose of artifi-
cially depressing the market price of” (Pet. App. 23a)
a “
—
10
that stock, and that they “in fact achieved this result, with
the object and effect of deceiving the shareholders
and directors of Air West ***” (Pet. App. 4la).
The charge in this case, unlike that in Ernst & Ernst,
was wilfull and knowing misconduct, not mere negligent
non-action. As the court of appeals explained in denying
rehearing (Pet. App. 60a), it—
did not hold that scienter per se was not a required
element of the offense. Rather we noted that it
was necessary for the prosecution to show an
intentional act with “a realization on the defend-
ant’s part that he was doing a wrongful act.” [Empha-
sis added. ]
Such an intent and realization of wrongdoing are
plainly alleged.
The decision of the court of appeals does not conflict
with Marsh v. Armada Corp., 533 F. 2d 978 (C.A. 6).
In Marsh the court concluded that an alleged manipu-
lative scheme involving elimination of stock dividends
did not violate Rule 10b-5 because there had been complete
advance disclosure of the defendants’ intention to eliminate
dividends; there was, therefore, no deceit or fraud on any
persons.
In this case the defendants did not disclose their in-
tention to drive down the market price of Air West
stock (Pet. App. 44a). The alleged scheme operated as
a fraud on anyone who sold Air West stock during
the period when its price was artificially depressed as
a result of defendants’ activities (Pet. App. 10a; I 14c)
since they were the victims of petitioners’ scheme to.
drive the price down. Protection against such conduct is
the fundamental purpose of the 1934 Act (Ernst & Ernst,
supra, 425 U.S. at 195) and of Rule 10b-5 (see n. 9, supra,
p. 8, and discussion, supra, p. 9).
ase ee
4
Petitioners claim that the indictment denies their Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights, because Rule 10b-5 does
not specify what fraud it proscribes, so that petitioners
have “no firm idea of what the government claims
[they] did that was unlawful” (Pet. 20-21: C. Pet. 18-19).'°
The Commission adopted the rule, however, precisely be-
cause it is impossible to define all of the fraudulent
and manipulative schemes devious ingenuity can con-
ceive. Rule 10b-5 prohibits “all fraudulent schemes in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities whether
* * *[njovel or atypical.” Superintendent of Insurance
v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 11, n. 7. Peti-
tioners’ alleged scheme was fraudulent because it in-
volved a secret device artificially to depress the market
price of stock.
Contrary to petitioners’ argument, there is nothing
novel in the holding of the court of appeals that a market
manipulation effected for the purpose of creating an arti-
ficial price perpetrates a fraud upon the investing public
(Pet. 15-22; C. Pet. 14-19). This holding is reflected
in English common law. In Scott v. Brown, 2 Q.B. 724
(1892), the parties had conspired to purchase shares
Petitioners’ assertion that “[i}t is impossible to find in the
indictment who it was that petitioner{s] allegedly intended to
deceive or defraud ***™” (Pet. 13; see also, C. Pet. 12-13)
ignores the allegations of the indictment that the persons defrauded
were, among others, “purchasers and sellers of Air West securities”
(Pet. App. 13a; II 2) and “directors and stockholders of Air
West” (Pet. App. I4a, 15a; III 2, IV 2), and that as a result
of defendants’ fraudulent and manipulative activities “Air
West” (stockholders who sold their stock in the declining market
* * * [received] the proceeds from their sales at artificially de-
pressed prices” (Pet. App. 10a). If petitioners require more definite
information they may seek it through a bill of particulars (Pet.
App. 47a). Accord, Tasby v. United States, 504 F. 2d 332 (C.A. 8);
Sullivan v. United States, 411 F. 2d 556 (C.A. 10).
12
in a company in order to create the appearance of a
bona fide market for the shares and that the shares were
trading at a premium. The court held the arrangement
to be a fraud. See also, Reg. v. Aspinall, | Q.B.D. 730,
affirmed, 2 Q.B.D. 48 (1876); Bedford v. Bagshaw, 4 H. &
N. 538, 157 Eng. Rep. 951 (1859); Rex v. DeBerenger,
3 M. & S. 67, 105 Eng. Rep. 536 (K.B. 1814).
Moreover, prior to the federal securities laws, manipu-
lative activities were held to be unlawful under the federal
mail fraud statute. Speaking of a defendant who used a
pool to inflate the price of a stock, a district court held:
“the substitution of an artificially stimulated and con-
trolled market for an appraisal of the stock in an open
and free market” constituted fraud. United States
v. Brown, 5 F. Supp. 81, 84 (S.D. N.Y.), affirmed on
other grounds, 79 F. 2d °321 (C.A. 2), certiorari denied
sub nom. McCarthy v. United States, 296 U.S. 650.
Similarly, in Harris v. United States, 48 F. 2d 771 (C.A.
9), a mail fraud case, the court of appeals observed that
the violator’s “primary purpose * * * was to manipulate
* * * stock upon the stock exchanges so that it would
have an apparently steadily increasing market value.”
Id. at 775. A distinguished commentator has said of that case
that “(t]he cardinal misrepresentation [was] that the
price was fixed in a free market, whereas in fact it was fixed
by defendant * * *.” Berle, Stock Market Manipulation,
38 Colum. L. Rev. 393, 397 (1938). Similarly, in the present
case, the court of appeals found that the wilfull conduct of
defendants in “representing to Air West stockholders
and directors that the market would decline if the Hughes
tender offer were rejected and their subsequent conduct in
driving down the market price without revealing that the
13
decline was not due to the free operation of market
forces * * * operate[{d] as a deceit on the market
place * * * ” (Pet. App. 44a-45a).!!
- CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the petitions for a writ of
certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
RoserT H. Bork,
Solicitor General.
DAVID FERBER,
Solicitor to the Commission,
MELVIN A. BROSTERMAN,
Altorney,
Securities and Exchange Commission.
NOVEMBER 1976.
''Petitioners suggest that this statement by the court of appeals
is contrary to TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., No. 74-1471,
decided June 14, 1976 (Pet. 21-22, n. 7; C. Pet. 19 n.). But
Northway held only that there is no market manipulation if stock
is purchased “wholly independently for proper corporate and invest-
ment purposes * * *” (slip op. 24).
DOJ-1976-11
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