Amicus Brief — United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans

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mas No. 76-333

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

UNITED AIR LINES, INC.,

Petitioner,

Vv.

CAROLYN J. EVANS,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court

of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF THE

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT ADVISORY COUNCIL,

AIRLINE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS CONFERENCE,

AND AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION

PEYTON H. Moss

POLETTI FREIDIN PRASHKER

FELDMAN & GARTNER

1185 Avenue of the Americas

Of Counsel: New York, New York 10036

RICHARD SCHOOLMAN

1185 Avenue of the Americas

New York, New York 10036

DouGLas S. MCDOWELL

ROBERT E. WILLIAMS

1747 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

WILGON -. EPES PRINTING Co.. INC. - RE 7-6002 - WASHINGTON. D. C. 20001

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

No. 76-333

UNITED AIR LINES, INC.,

Petitioner,

Vv.

CAROLYN J. EVANS,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court

of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO SUBMIT BRIEF AS

AMICI CURIAE

To the Honorable, the Chief Justice and the Associate

Justices of the United States Supreme Court

Pursuant to Rule 42(3) of the Rules of this Court,

the Equal Employment Advisory Council, the Airline

Industrial Relations Conference, and the Air Trans-

port Association respectfully move this Court for

leave to file the accompanying brief as Amici Curiae

in support of the position of the petitioner, United

Air Lines, in this case. In support of this motion

the above-named associations show as follows:

2

1. This motion for leave to file is necessary under

Rule 42(3) because counsel for the respondent has

advised that consent for the filing of this brief would

not be granted. Counsel for the petitioner has given

his written consent, which has been filed with the

Clerk of the Court.

2. The questions presented for review in this case

raise issues of substantial importance to the Amici

Curiae. The first question concerns the proper ap-

plication of a neutral date-of-hire seniority system

under the terms of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq). In this case

the Court must consider whether the reemployment

of a former employee with new date-of-hire seniority

under a neutral seniority system permits the resur-

rection of that employee’s time-barred claim for loss

of seniority and pay arising from termination of

that employee’s prior employment. The petitioner

also raises the question whether the collateral or

lingering effects of a prior act of discrimination are,

in themselves, acts of discrimination against an em-

ployee, permitting the filing of a charge at any time

in the future regardless of how long ago the prior

act of discrimination occurred.

3. The Equal Employment Advisory Council

(“EEAC”) is a voluntary, non-profit association, or-

ganized as a corporation under the laws of the Dis-

trict of Columbia. Its membership includes a broad

spectrum of employers from throughout the United

States, including both individual employers and trade

and industry associations. The principal goal of

EEAC is to represent and promote the common in-

terest of employers and the general public in the de-

velopment and implementation of sound government

3

policies, procedures and requirements pertaining to

nondiscriminatory employment practices.

Because of this interest, the EEAC sought and was

granted permission to file a brief as Amicus Curiae

in Electrical Workers, IUE, Local 790 v. Robbins &

Meyers, Inc., (U.S. Sup. Ct. No. 75-1264), which also

involved issues concerning Title VII’s statute of limi-

tations. Similarly, the EEAC has filed amicus curiae

briefs in other cases now pending before this court.

See 7'.1.M.E.-D.C., Inc. v. Rodriquez (Docket No. 75-

672); Hast Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v.

Jesse Rodriquez, et al (No. 75-718).

4. The Air Industrial Relations Conference (“AIR

Conference”) is an unincorporated voluntary associa-

tion of air carriers formed to facilitate the exchange

of ideas and information among air carriers concern-

ing industrial relations matters, to provide support

and information services to air carriers in the in-

dustrial relations area, and to represent the member

carriers with respect to legislative, judicial and ad-

ministrative matters related to or affecting labor re-

lations in the airline industry. The airlines’ agree-

ments establishing AIR Conference have been ap-

proved by the Civil Aeronautics Board, pursuant to

Section 412 of the Federal Aviation Act,’ and, upon

review, by the Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia Circuit.’ AIR Conference presently has 21

* CAB Orders 73-6-96 (June 22, 1973), 73-9-15 (September

6, 1973), and 76-5-12 (May 5, 1976).

* Air Line Dispatchers Assn. Vv. Civil Aeronautics Board,

506 F.2d 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 988

(1975).

4

members, including most of the U.S. trunk and local

service air carriers.’

5. The Air Transport Association (“ATA”) is an

organization of major domestic and international U.S.

airlines employing hundreds of thousands of em-

ployees in the airline industry throughout their route

systems.* Various constituent members of the ATA

have been parties defendant in litigation in lower

federal courts throughout the country in cases which

have raised new and important questions concerning

* Present members of AIR Conference include: Air New

England, Inc., Alaska Airlines, Inc., Aloha Airlines, Inc.,

American Airlines, Inc., Continental Air Lines, Inc., Eastern

Air Lines, Inc., The Flying Tiger Line, Inc., Frontier Airlines,

Inc., Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., Hughes Airwest, National Air-

lines, Inc., North Central Airlines, Inc., Northwest Airlines,

Inc., Ozark Air Lines, Inc., Piedmont Airlines, Reeve Aleutian

Airways, Inc., Texas International Airlines, Inc., United Air-

lines, Inc., Western Airlines, Inc. and Wein Air Alaska, Inc.

Trans World Airlines, Inc. also is a member of AIR Confer-

ence but is filing a separate motion and brief amicus curiae

on its own behalf.

* Present members of the ATA include: Air Canada, Alaska

Airlines, Inc., Allegheny Airlines, Inc., Aloha Airlines, Inc.,

American Airlines, Inc., Braniff International, CP Air, Con-

tinental Air Lines, Inc., Eastern Air Lines, Inc., The Flying

Tiger Line, Inc., Frontier Airlines, Inc., Hawaiian Air,

Hughes Airwest, National Airlines, Inc., North Central

Airlines, Inc., Northwest Airlines, Inc., Ozark Air Lines, Inc.,

Piedmont Airlines, Southern Airways, Inc., Texas Interna-

tional Airlines, Inc., United Airlines, Inc., Western Air Lines,

Inc., Wein Air Alaska, Inc. Delta Air Lines, Inc., Pan Ameri-

can World Airways, Inc. and Trans World Airlines, Inc. also

are ATA members but are filing separate motions and briefs

amicus curiae on their own behalf.

5

the statute of limitations of Title VII and neutral

seniority systems.

The views of certain members of ATA have been

accepted previously by this Court in. another Title

VII case. See Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v.

Wetzel, et al., (No. 75-1245).

6. The Amici Curiae and their constituent mem-

bers have hundreds of thousand of employees who are

covered by the provisions of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964. Most of these employees—and

particularly airline flight personnel—also are covered

by neutral date-of-hire seniority systems similar to

that involved in these proceedings. Seniority systems

such as these govern many aspects of such employees’

professional careers with their employers. The Court’s

decision in this case could have a major impact on

these companies, their employees, and their relations

with their employees’ collective bargaining representa-

tive. Accordingly, the Amici Curiae have a direct

interest in the issue presented here for the Court’s

consideration.

7. The associations joining this motion have a

broad knowledge of issues concerning the application

of Title VII and its limitations period to seniority

systems such as that involved in this case. Because of

this background, the associations joining herein are

uniquely situated to brief this Court on the practical,

as well as the legal, aspects of the issues presented

here.

6

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully moved that the

above-named associations be granted leave to submit

the accompanying brief as Amici Curiae in this case.

Respectfully submitted,

PEYTON H. Moss

' POLETTI FREIDIN PRASHKER

FELDMAN & GARTNER

1185 Avenue of the Americas

New York, New York 10036

Of Counsel:

RICHARD SCHOOLMAN

1185 Avenue of the Americas

New York, New York 10036

DouGLas S. MCDOWELL

ROBERT E. WILLIAMS

1747 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

INDEX

I. EVANS I CORRECTLY APPLIED TITLE

VIl’S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO BAR

EVANS’S PRESENT CLAIM AND FRANKS

v. BOWMAN DOES NOT REQUIRE OR

COUNTENANCE THE DECISION REACHED

Fe PINE IT sectcstensenieinscitasitinnsesceiiitiisicenstiathiiansilésanes

Il. THE PURPOSES DESIGNED TO BE SERVED

BY THE TITLE VII STATUTE OF LIMITA-

TIONS AND OTHER PRACTICAL AND

EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS REQUIRE

REVERSAL OF EVANS II _0

I. Sccchivtiasiniensnsiisiteatintuaiibiseaiitasiliseaidinaiiaidaiuis

10

11

11

16

21

Il

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases: Page

Bowe Vv. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th

aril: III scicsceentenetieiiiemuieieiemshetieetaaliaaiiiaitaceatibladenstiaiaas 17

Collins v. United Air Lines, 514 F.2d 594 (9th Cir.

SD Neeteaneditistaeccceiasiaticdiaeecaiaatnieaal 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18

Evans Vv. United Air Lines, Inc., F.2d ——,

12 FEP 288 (7th Cir. 1976) (“Evans I”; af-

firming district court) .....4, 6, 7,9, 11, 12, 13, 19, 20, 21

Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc., 534 F.2d 1247

(1976) (“Evans II”; reconsidering Evans I and

reversing district court) —..........00000...... 3, 8-11, 13, 15-21

Franks v. Bowman, 424 U.S. 747 (1976) ....8-11, 13-16, 21

Hecht v. Cooperative for American Relief Every-

where, 351 F. Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ......... 17

Johnson V. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S.

I een ooe 17

Local Lodge No. 1424, 1.A.M. Vv. N.L.R.B., 362 U.S.

I I cect diehard taideniaitmamieananatiaiiale 17,18

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

ER ae aed ES a EPS = aE TS 17

Waters Vv. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309

(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, U.S. ——, 44

USLW 3670 (1976) ................00... saseaieasiaiiasenicastanieiatiale 6,11

National Labor Relations Board Decisions:

Bowen Products Corporation, 113 NLRB 731

Ee Soe eae een Sane 18, 20

Statutes:

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

2000 (e), et seq.

TE ae eee ae me 16

I 8,9, 10, 13, 14

es 17

EEE RS een mene Serre 17

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

—_— No. 76-333

UNITED AIR LINES, INC.,

Petitioner,

V.

CAROLYN J. EVANS,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court

of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF THE

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT ADVISORY COUNCIL,

AIRLINE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS CONFERENCE,

AND AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE

This brief is submitted pursuant to Rule 42(2)

and (3) of this Court. The Equal Employment Ad-

visory Council (“EEAC”), the Airline Industrial Re-

lations Conference (“AIR Conference’), and the Air

Transport Association (“ATA”), the Amici Curiae

1

2

herein, have a substantial interest in the outcome of

this case. As indicated more fully in the accompany-

ing motion to file this brief, the Amici and their

members or constituents, have hundreds of thousands

of employees throughout the country who are covered

by the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964. Most of these employees—and particu-

larly airline flight personnel—are also covered by col-

lective bargaining agreements containing neutral

(late-of-hire seniority systems which govern many as-

pects of such employees’ professional careers with

their employers. As such, the Amici Curiae have a

direct interest in the basic issue here presented for

the Court’s consideration, to wit:

Whether or not the rehiring of a formerly ter-

minated employee and the assignment to her of

her new date-of-hire place in her employer’s neu-

tral date-of-hire seniority system (instead of

awarding her seniority based upon her original

date-of-hire) constitutes a new discriminatory

act in violation of Title VII or perpetuates the

effect of her prior allegedly unlawful termina-

tion so as to revive her right to litigate the legal

propriety of that termination otherwise long

since barred by Title VII’s applicable statute of

limitations.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

An employee’s place in a date-of-hire seniority sys-

tem will generally govern, among other things, each

employee’s job assignments, compensation, eligibility

for transfer or promotion, liability to layoff, and or-

der of recall throughout his or her employment. Thus

the correctness of an employee’s place in that seniority

system is of great importance not only to the in-

dividual employee involved but also to his or her

fellow employees whose relative seniority positions

and future opportunities will be affected by any al-

teration in the seniority order. It is equally impor-

tant to the employer who may, under the decision

below,’ be held liable to an employee because of any

damages suffered from the employee’s allegedly

wrongful placement in the seniority system. Like-

wise, the employees’ collective bargaining representa-

tive also has a stake in the integrity of the seniority

system contained in its contract with the employer.

The Evans II decision below treats as a litigable

claiin an entirely discrete, non-discriminatory sen-

iority assignment upon rehire as the perpetuation of

a claimed prior unlawful termination long since

barred by the statute of limitations. In so doing,

the decision destroys Title VII’s statute of limita-

tions in rehire and similar situations; promotes un-

certainty in one of the most sensitive areas of em-

ployee relations—seniority; abrogates the Congres-

sional policy of prompt resolution of discrimination

claims; and subjects employers to liability of un-

known extent resulting from future claims for dam-

ages caused by allegedly unlawful placement in sen-

iority systems which, under Evans II, may remain

latent but alive throughout the claimant’s employ-

ment, subject to assertion or non-assertion at the

claimant’s whim.

For these reasons, employers and their employees

have a vital interest in the reversal of this case

1 Evans Vv. United Air Lines, Inc., 534 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir.

1976) (“Evans II”).

4

and in a decision from this Court which—while pre-

serving each employee’s right to challenge an al-

legedly discriminatory act (including the propriety

of his or her place in a neutral seniority system)

within the statutory time fixed by Congress—effectu-

ates the time limits within which Congress has re-

quired such challenges to be made. Such a decision

would uphold the Congressional policies described

above and protect the legitimate interest of em-

ployers and fellow employees in the correctness and

reliability of the seniority systems which govern their

relationships and opportunities.

THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW

A) The Facts

As set forth in detail in Evans v. United Air Lines,

Ine., F.2d ——, 12 FEP 288 (7th Cir. 1976)

(“Evans I’), between November 1966 and February

1968 Evans was a stewardess for United Air Lines

(“UAL”). At that time UAL required married

stewardesses to resign their employment, and in

February 1968 Evans was involuntarily terminated

by UAL, because of her marriage. On November 7,

1968, UAL discontinued its policy of requiring stew-

ardesses to remain unmarried. After her termination

in February 1968 Evans had no employment relation-

ship of any kind with UAL until February 1972.

On February 16, 1972, four years after her termi-

nation, Evans—never having filed any charge of dis-

crimination against UAL—was again hired by UAL

as a stewardess. She was given the regular training

for newly hired stewardesses which she completed on

March 16, 1972. Evans was then assigned seniority

in UAL’s admittedly non-discriminatory date-of-hire

seniority system as of her 1972 date of hire, as were

all the other new hires who completed the training

with her. In accordance with its policy of giving both

men and women seniority credit only for “continuous

time in service,” UAL did not give Evans seniority

credit for her prior employment as a stewardess.

On February 21, 1973—five years after her origi-

nal termination, four years after UAL had eliminated

its no-marriage-for-stewardesses policy, and at least

eleven months after Evans had been re-employed and

received her new seniority place in a sexually neutral

and non-diseriminatory seniority system (see above)

—Evans filed a charge with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) claiming that

her 1968 termination was an unlawful discriminatory

practice based on sex and demanding the “seniority

and back pay” that she lost by reason of that termi-

nation [Appenuix (hereinafter “App.’’) 21]. Follow-

ing receipt of an EEOC “right to sue” letter, Evans

filed suit against UAL to obtain seniority credit for

her pre-termination employment and other requested

relief.

B) Evans I

UAL moved to dismiss that suit on the ground that

Evans’s 1973 EEOC charge was untimely by many

years since, before 1972, Title VII then required such

a charge to be filed within 90 days of the alleged

discriminatory practice, viz., the 1968 termination; *

that Evans had lost both employment and seniority

* Even if the 1972 extension of the limitation period to 180

days were applicable to this suit, Evans’s charge would still

have been untimely. See pp.-2-4, above.

A-S

6

as of that date; that she thereafter had no employ-

ment relationship of any kind with UAL until Feb-

ruary 1972; and that her 1972 rehire as a new em-

ployee did not alter those facts since the two employ-

ments were entirely separate. Evans claimed that

her charge was timely since UAL’s refusal to accord

her upon rehire in 1972 seniority credit for her pre-

termination service perpetuated up to the time of

suit the prior unlawful 1968 termination. The Dis-

trict Court agreed with UAL and dismissed the com-

plaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit in Evans I affirmed the District

Court (Cummings, J., dissenting) (see App. 20-30).

The majority in Evans I, citing Waters v. Wiscon-

sin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.

den. U.S. , 44 USLW 3670 (1976), and

Collins v. United Air Lines, 4) F.2d 594 (9th Cir.

1975), held that, since UAL’s 1972 assignment of

seniority to Evans was itself a non-discriminatory

act based on UAL’s admittedly non-discriminatory

policy of allowing seniority only for “continuous serv-

ice,” that assignment did not perpetuate any alleged

past discrimination against Evans “in the sense re-

quired to constitute a violation of Title VII” (App.

27). It specifically adopted the Ninth Circuit’s rul-

ing in Collins, supra, that “the alleged unlawful

act or practice—not merely its effects—. . . must

have occurred within [the statutory period] preced-

ing the filing of charges before the EEOC” (App. 25-

26; emphasis supplied). Holding that Evans’s 1972

rehire did not alter the fact that the 1968 termina-

tion was a separate and completed act, the Court

concluded that since there was “no continuing dis-

criminatory practice with respect to Evans, her only

————

7

basis for charging discrimination as a result of

United’s no-marriage policy is the termination in

1968” and a suit based on that was barred by Title

VII’s statute of limitations (App. 27-28). Given the

discrete nature of the first and second Evans em-

ployments, Evans I appears clearly correct.*

* Judge Cummings’s dissent was based upon his view that

the application of UAL’s non-discriminatory policy of allow-

ing seniority credit only for “continuous service” gave “col-

lateral effect to [a] past act of discrimination,” which discrim-

ination was “the proximate cause of the disparity complained

of by plaintiff” (App. 27, 28). The dissent ignored the fact

that for the four years between her termination and her re-

hire Evans had failed to file any charge with respect to

her 1968 termination and the further fact that 90 days after

that termination Evans had lost any right to do so. Judge

Cummings concluded, howevers that her rehire (as a new

employee) in 1972 revived that theretofore expired right

simply because, upon rehire, UAL applied to Evans the same

“continuous service” seniority policy it applies to every

flight attendant, maie or female (App. 23-24, including ftnote

4).

Judge Cummings accepted with equanimity the holding of

Collins v. UAL, supra, that Mrs. Collins should lose her

“termination-for-marriage” suit against UAL because she

had failed to challenge her .-rmination within the 90-dzy

period and UAL had never rehired her. At the same time he

permitted Mrs. Evans to win her “termination-for-marriage”

suit against UAL (although she too had failed to challenge her

termination within the 90-day period) only because UAL

had been unwary enough to rehire her and thus—according

to Judge Cummings—to revive her obviously barred claim

(see App. 30). He dismissed as inconsequential the chilling

effect that success for his view would almost certainly have

on the rehire of former employees (see App. 25, 30, majority

ftnote 5 and dissent ftnote 2).

Judge Cummings also ignored the possibility UAL might

have been subject to serious challenges by other employees

rca vic\

8

C) Evans II

Thereafter, petitions for rehearing by the panel

and en banc were filed, during the consideration of

which this Court decided Franks v. Bowman, 424 U.S.

747 (1976). “In view of [that] decision” (App. 35),

the panel which had decided Evans I reheard the

case and reversed its opinion (see Evans II, supra).

For all practical purposes, the statements of facts

and of the contentions of the parties in Evans I and

Evans II are identical. However, in describing UAL’s

contention that “the only legally cognizable injury to

Evans was her termination of employment and sen-

iority in 1968,” the court in Evans II added, gra-

tuitously and apparently with no support in the rec-

ord, that “[i]n this respect United’s argument would

appear to rest, sub silentio, on the protection afforded

bona fide seniority systems by section 2000e-2(h)”

(App. 36).‘ The Court then summarized UAL’s re-

if it had disregarded for Mrs. Evans the “continuous service”

seniority requirement which it applied to all other persons

with breaks in service.

* UAL had no need for the alleged “protection” of Section

703(h) since its whole position was unassailable without it:

(1) Evans was terminated in February 1968 and her employ-

ment and seniority then ceased; (2) it is well settled that

discriminatory termination is a coinpleted act at the time

thereof and must be complained about within the statutory

period; (3) Evans did not complain within that period; (4)

Evans was not an employee of UAL for the next four years

and had no employee rights or benefits of any kind; (5) when

Evans was rehired in 1972 it was as a new employee; (6)

all new employees, male and female, receive seniority as of

date of hire: therefore, Evans suffered no discrimination by

9

maining contentions as arguing that (1) since UAL’s

“continuous time-in-service” seniority policy is neu-

tral with regard to sex, that policy does not violate

Title VII and any actionable injury to Evans “stems

from her termination in February, 1968, whereby

she lost her initial seniority’; and that, (2) since

her time to complain against that termination and

loss began to run in 1968, any cOmplaint about that

loss was long since barred in 1973 (App. 37; em-

phasis supplied).

The court, having itself injected Section 703(h)

into the Evans II case, then proceeded to consider

the holding of Franks v. Bowman with respect to

that Section. It correctly paraphrased Franks as hold-

ing that Section 703(h) did not preclude the grant

of retroactive seniority under a facially neutral sen-

iority system “as a form of relief’ where the in-

dividual complainants “could prove” that they had

been the actual victims “of discriminatory hiring

practices” (App. 37; emphasis supplied). The re-

mainder of the court’s comments about Franks con-

sists of references to discrimination as a “complex

and pervasive phenomenon” and to the Title VII ob-

jective of “make whole” relief (App. 38).

Asserting that it was “in the context of” that

analysis of Franks that the court must consider

whether or not Evans’s complaint was filed “within

90 days of a violation of Title VII,” the court stated

that that depended upon whether Section 703(h) “may

be used to interpose a legal bar to Evans’s theory

the 1972 seniority award. No resort to Section 703(h) is

necessary to establish UAL’s case (see Evans I, supra,

passim).

10

that the perpetuation of past discrimination through

United’s current seniority policy constitutes a con-

tinuing violation of Evans’s Title VII rights” (App.

39).° The court recited the obvious facts that a

“seniority policy that credits only continuous time-

in-service” necessarily adversely affects rehired em-

ployees as against those continuously employed; that

thus a previously terminated employee who is later

rehired will encounter these adverse effects; and that

such rehired employees might include one previously

improperly terminated. The court then leapt to the

conclusion that the routine application to a rehired

employee of an unexceptionable seniority policy (ap-

plicable to every employee, male or female, long-term,

new hire, or rehire) constitutes unlawful “perpetua-

tion” of the previous unlawful termination. It cited

the “teaching of Franks” as confirming “these hold-

ings” and concluded that, therefore, Section 703 (h)

“cannot be used” to bar Evans’s claim (App. 40),

although UAL had never claimed it did (see page 9

above). Accordingly, the Circuit Court reversed its

earlier position and decided that Evans’s claim con-

cerning her 1968 termination could be maintained.

THE POSITION OF THE AMICI CURIAE

It is the position of the Amici Curiae that the

decision in Evans II is incorrect and must be re-

versed. In misconstruing this Court’s decision in

Franks v. Bowman, the Seventh Circuit effectively

repeals Title VII’s statute of limitations in cases

of barred claims of alleged discriminatory employ-

°> The significance of the court’s injection of Section 703 (h)

into the case now becomes apparent.

ei mem

11

ment termination followed by later rehire in contra-

vention of Congress’s obvious intent that charges of

discrimination be brought and resolved promptly (see

Point I, below). In addition, the decision, if allowed

to stand, necessarily leads to illogical and inequitable

differentiations in termination cases and is inconsist-

ent with important practical and equitable considera-

tions in matters of seniority in ways which will ad-

versely affect both employers and employees (see Point

II, below).

Evans’s suit is barred because she did not file a

timely charge with the FEOC concerning “the under-

lying legal wrong” about which she now complains—

her involuntary termination in 1968 for violation of

UAL’s no-marriage policy for stewardesses.’ Her re-

hire in 1972 did not revive her previously barred

claim and every logical, practical, and equitable con-

sideration, as well as proper principles of judicial

administration and economy, support the conclusion

that her present seniority is proper and legal, and

Franks v. Bowman does not require that it be dis-

turbed.

ARGUMENT

I. EVANS I CORRECTLY APPLIED TITLE VII’S

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO BAR EVANS’S

PRESENT CLAIM AND FRANKS v. BOWMAN

DOES NOT REQUIRE OR COUNTENANCE THE

DECISION REACHED IN EVANS IL.

As set forth at pages 6-7, above, Evans I, relying

upon Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, supra, and

Collins v. United Air Lines, Inc., supra, held that

Evans’s 1968 termination was a separate and dis-

* See, Franks v. Bowman, supra, 424 U.S. at 758.

12

tinct act, a complaint about the alleged discrimina-

tory nature of which had to be filed within the 90

day period then required by Title VII, Section 706(e),

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). It further held that failure

so to file a charge within that statutory period ex-

tinguished Evans’s right thereafter to litigate any

claim she previously had had as to the propriety of

that termination.

Based upon that reasoning, the court rejected

Evans’ contention that UAL’s assignment of 1972

seniority to her on the occasion of her rehire in that

year constituted a current violation of Title VII be-

cause, by denying her the seniority lost upon her

prior termination, UAL continued into the present the

illegality of that termination. Evans I held, with

Collins, that the discriminatory act actually com-

plained of must have occurred within the statutory

period in order to support a suit based thereon and

that a non-discriminatory act which was merely an

“effect” of the prior barred violation could not bring

forward into the present the basic underlying legal

wrong of which she actually was complaining.’ Since

the rationale and basis for the conclusions reached

in Evans I are compellingly contained therein, it

seems unnecessary to elaborate upon them here.“

7 While Evans seeks to state her claim in terms of “a con-

tinuing violation,” it is logically impossible to conceive of

it in “continuing” terms. It can really only be stated as the

revival of an extinguished claim by virtue of the occurrence

of a discrete and separate circumstance (in this case rehire)

which happens to involve a nondiscriminatory act which is

different in its scope and consequences because of the prior

termination but is otherwise entirely unconnected with it.

*It is, however, interesting—and probably not without

significance—to note the similarity between the emphasis in

13

Franks v. Bowman not only does not require the

contrary conclusion to Evans I which the Seventh

Circuit, in Evans II, considered that it did, but, in

fact, supports that court’s original decision. In com-

pletely abandoning its first opinion, the Seventh Cir-

cuit stated that “[t]he teaching of Franks’ confirmed

its holdings in Evans II that, since the application

of a non-discriminatory continuous time-in-service

seniority policy to a rehired employee previously ter-

minated on time-barred discriminatory grounds ad-

versely affects that employee because of the prior

termination, application of that seniority policy “is

deemed to be discriminatory.” Thus, although “fac-

ially neutral,” the application of such a seniority

policy makes Evans “the victim of current discrimi-

nation” (App. 37, 39, 40). But Franks “teaches”

no such things.

First, Franks teaches that Section 703 (h)—[ which

the Evans II panel, not UAL, invoked (see pages 8-9,

above) ] provides that operation of a facially neutral

seniority system is not a violation of Title VII merely

because it perpetuates the effects of pre-Act dis-

crimination. This Court concluded that Section 703

(h) was “only a definitional provision” aimed at

“defining what is and what is not an illegal dis-

criminatory practice” if post-Act operation of a sen-

iority system is challenged as perpetuating the effects

of pre-Act discrimination (see 424 U.S. at 758, 761).

In other words, as described by Mr. Justice Powell

Collins and Evans I upon the centrality of the “alleged unlaw-

ful act or practice—not merely its effects” and the concept

of “the underlying legal wrong” subsequently relied on by this

Court in reaching its decision as to remedy in Franks v.

Bowman.

14

(concurring in at least this aspect of the decision),

this Court held that Section 703(h) insulates “an

otherwise bona fide seniority system from a challenge

that it amounts to a discriminatory practice because

it perpetuates the effects of pre-Act discrimination”

(id. at 781; emphasis supplied. )°

Second, it teaches that if an individual can prove

that he or she was a victim of a discriminatory re-

fusal to hire that individual may, if appropriate,

receive, among other things, an adjusted “rightful”

place in the seniority system as a remedy for the

proven discrimination. This Court held that, since

the “underlying legal wrong” about which the plain-

tiffs were complaining was the prior discriminatory

refusal to hire and not the “alleged operation of a

racially discriminatory seniority system,” Section 703

(h), as the Court had interpreted it, did not prohibit

seniority adjustments within the seniority system,

as a matter of remedy, “once an illegal discrimina-

tory practice occurring after the effective date of

the Act is proved—as in the instant case, a dis-

criminatory refusal to hire” (id. at 758, 762; all

emphasis supplied). Thus, under Franks, the critical

factor must be the ability to prove the prior dis-

criminatory practice. Nowhere does Franks “teach”,

*It is apparent throughout the Franks opinion that when

the Court is speaking of a bona fide seniority system or of

“the existing seniority system” it is speaking of a system,

like the UAL one in this case, which was non-discriminatory

in langauge and application, was not the result of an intention

to discriminate on any prohibited ground, and in which peti-

tioners sought, as Evans does here, the seniority they would

have enjoyed were it not for the discriminatory acts about

which they were complaining (see 428 U.S. at 758).

15

or even intimate, either that the routine assignment

of actual date of hire (or rehire) seniority in a fa-

cially neutral seniority system itself constitutes a

violation of Title VII or that such routine assignment

“perpetuates” an otherwise barred “underlying legal

wrong” so as to “unbar’”’ it.”

The clear implication of the Franks decision is

that the operation of any bona fide seniority system

is not itself a violation of Title VII, but that if a

prior substantive Title VII violation can be proven

(which Evans’s by reason of untimeliness cannot)

appropriate adjustments in the successful complain-

ant’s place within that system may be made to

remedy that prior violation. By reviving Evans’s

long-barred claim of prior illegal termination by

means of calling the routine operation of a bona

fide system Sf unlawful “perpetuation” of that pre-

vious discrimination, Evans II has converted the

availability of a remedy into the substance of a

wrong. By this reasoning, the court has perverted

Franks from a salutary vindicater of the Congres-

sional objective of providing “make whole” relief for

“Such results are particularly difficult to accept in the

Evans case where suit upon her termination was (like the

complainant’s in Collins v. UAL, supra) clearly barred 90

days after the termination. Thereafter, no employment rela-

tionship existed between Evans and UAL nor did any right to

complain to the EEOC about the former relationship. How

then can the routine act of conferring date-of-hire seniority

upon Evans, as upon any other rehire, itself become an unlaw-

ful employment practice as to her alone when she had long

since forfeited her right to complain about the prior termina-

tion? Or how can that routine non-discriminatory act “per-

petuate” as to Evans a prior discrimination as to which she

had long since lost her right to sue? That could be nothing

but “revival” and Franks v. Bowman permits no such thing.

16

still viable “underlying legal wrongs” into an instru-

ment for frustrating the Congressional provision that

discrimination charges should be brought and dis-

posed of promptly [see Title VII, § 703(g) ; 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2 (h) ].

In Franks, this Court ordered events correctly:

if a plaintiff could prove the underlying legal wrong,

then a Court might order changes in plaintiff’s place

in a seniority system. But Evans II has turned

Franks vy. Bowman upside down. There, the Seventh

Circuit held that if a plaintiff seeks a change in her

place in a seniority system assigned pursuant to a

non-discriminatory policy but unsatisfactory to her

because of a prior but barred underlying legal wrong,

then the plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations

and litigate her case about that underlying wrong.

If the “rationale” of Evans II prevails, there is no

effective statute of limitations for cases of alleged

prior discriminatory acts followed by later hire or

rehire—a result never contemplated by this Court in

Franks v. Bowman.

For the above reasons, Evans Il—decided on a

ground not urged by UAL, entirely unsupported by

Franks v. Bowman, conducive to future reluctance to

hire or rehire, and impossible to reconcile with Title

VII’s statute of limitations—should be reversed by

this Court.

Il. THE PURPOSES DESIGNED TO BE SERVED BY

THE TITLE VII STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND

OTHER PRACTICAL AND EQUITABLE CONSID-

ERATIONS REQUIRE REVERSAL OF EVANS IL.

It has long been recognized that the purpose of

Title VII’s relatively short statute of limitations is to

0 a EC

ee ee ee

——a——eeeeeeeeeeeeeeee ee aaa

17

require the prompt filing and resolution of charges

of discrimination in order to serve everyone’s valid

“interests in prohibiting the prosecution of stale

[claims]” [see, e.g., Johnson v. Railway Express

Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 464 (1975) ; Hecht v. Coopera-

tive for American Relief Everywhere, 351 F. Supp.

305, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)]. Such prompt filing not

only facilitates effective investigation of the alleged

discrimination while memories are still fresh and

witnesses and evidence current and available but also

encourages prompt disposition of the same with con-

sequent stabilization of the employment situation in-

volved in the complaint to the advantage of the com-

plainant, the challenged employer, and his other em-

ployees [see Local Lodge No. 1424, 1.A.M. v. N.L.R.B..,

362 U.S. 411, 419 (1960)] That Congress intended

and still intends to put a sharp limit upon the period

within which an aggrieved person can prosecute a

discrimination claim or be forever barred therefrom

is established by the fact that when Congress re-

vised Title VII in 1972 it extended the period within

which discrimination charges must be filed from 90

to 180 days, but it did not abolish it [compare 78

Stat. 253 (1964) with 86 Stat. 103 (1972); see

Local Lodge No. 1424, 1.A.M. v. N.L.R.B., supra, at

428-429].

As noted above (see pages 11-12), Evans II ef-

fectively repeals Title VII’s statute of limitations for

filing charges with the EEOC ™ at least in cases of

"The timely filing requirement of Title VII are widely

held to be “jurisdictional” in nature [see, e.g. McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1978); Bowe v.

Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969);

Collins v. United Air Lines, Inc., supra, 514 F.2d at 596].

18

alleged discriminatory terminations followed by re-

hire after the expiration of the statutory period of

limitations. It does so by considering the formerly

aggrieved person’s new, but allegedly wrongful, place

in a neutral seniority system to constitute a continua-

tion of the previously barred unlawful termination as

long as that allegedly wrongful place is not altered

so as to remove any lingering effects from the prior

termination.” This not only abrogates the Congres-

sional intent embodied in the statute of limitations

but also has other illogical and undesirable effects.

First, it illogically—and ironically—accords to un-

lawfully terminated employees who are fortunate

enough to be rehired after the expiration of the

statutory period of limitations apparently unlimited

rights to litigate the legality of their previous ter-

mination. By sharp contrast, the filing rights of less

fortunate employees identically terminated but not

rehired are limited to the 180 days statute of limita-

tions period after which their rights to complain are

forever extinguished (compare Evans II with Col-

lins v. UAL, supra). This is not only grossly unfair

#2 According to Evans II it is the allegedly wrongful senior-

ity date which effectuates the “continued” discrimination. The

assignment of that date took place in March 1972 but the

Seventh Circuit held timely Evans’s complaint to the EEOC

which was not filed until five months more than the allowed

180 days after the alleged discriminatory seniority assignment

occurred. Therefore, it is apparent that under Evans II the

continued existence of the seniority place prevents the run-

ning of the limitations period on both the allegedly wrongful

seniority place and the underlying legal wrong. [but ef.

Bowen Products Corporation, 113 NLRB 731, 732-733 (1955),

cited with approval by this Court in Local Union 1424, 1.A.M.

v. N.L.R.B., supra, at 420, including ftnote 12].

X\\

19

and entirely unsupportable as a legal position. It is

also almost guaranteed to discourage employers from

rehiring formerly terminated employees more than

180 days after their termination where there is any

possibility that they may consider their prior ter-

mination to be tainted by unlawful discrimination

(see Evans I majority opinion, App. 25; but see

dissent, App. 30). Such a result is clearly not in

the interest of the employer, the employees, or the

general public.

Second, it leaves unsettled for an indefinite but

apparently unlimited period the correctness and re-

liability of the seniority order governing the most

essential aspects of the business lives of all employees

covered by neutral date-of-hire seniority systems. If

Evans II stands, any rehired employee, such as Evans,

given seniority from his or her actual rehire date may

at any time thereafter throughout his or her em-

ployment, challenge the propriety of that seniority on

the basis of a prior allegedly discriminatory, but time-

barred termination, and force a rearrangement of the

seniority order on which his or her fellow employees

had up to then reasonably relied for the future. No

appropriate public policy is served by permitting the

existence of such an open-ended disruptive right.

Third, the unlimited right of a rehired employee

to challenge at any time during his or her employ-

ment the alleged discriminatory nature of a remote

act which somehow adversely affected his or her

place in a neutral date-of-hire seniority system, sub-

jects the employer of any rehired employee to liability

of unknown, and indeed unknowable, extent result-

ing from future claims for damages caused by al-

legedly unlawful placement in seniority systems. Such

20

claims, under Evans II, may remain latent but alive

throughout the claimant’s employment, subject to as-

sertion or non-assertion at the claimant’s whim (see

Bowen Products Corporation, supra, 113 NLRB at

732). Here again, there is no rational] justification

for such a result and no appropriate public policy

is served thereby.

Finally, Evans Il1—(as distinguished from Evans

I, which also avoids all the above-described illogical

and undesirable results)—promotes the absence of

finality in cases of alleged discriminatory termina-

tions and encourages belated and dubious challenges

to the propriety of ostensibly non-discriminatory as-

signments of seniority in an admittedly neutral date-

of-hire seniority system. As a result, Evans II un-

dermines accepted principles of judicial administra-

tion and economy. It also needlessly directs judicial

attention to suits involving long barred claims of

prior discrimination somehow related to present non-

discriminatory acts, rather than to suits concerning

present discrimination not yet remedied.

a Owe

21

CONCLUSION

Evans I was correctly decided. Its replacement by

Evans II was improvidently effectuated by virtue of

a misconstruction of Franks v. Bowman. <Accord-

ingly, Evans II should be reversed with appropriate

directions to accomplish the dismissal of the com-

plaint herein.

Respectfully submitted,

PEYTON H. Moss

POLETTI FREIDIN PRASHKER

FELDMAN & GARTNER

1185 Avenue of the Americas

New York, New York 10036

Attorney for the Amici Curiae

Of Counsel:

RICHARD SCHOOLMAN

1185 Avenue of the Americas

New York, New York 10036

DouGLas S. MCDOWELL

ROBERT E. WILLIAMS

1747 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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