Petition — Marine Development Corp. v. Heiman

Supreme Court brief1976

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Court, U. $.

FILED

auG 3 1976

IN THE MICAAEL RODAK, JR..CLERS

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

w...76-160 4

MARINE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

Vv

MRS. ALANA G. HEIMAN, in Her Own Right; SANDRA JEAN HEIMAN, by

MRS. ALANA G. HEIMAN, Her Mother and Next Friend; and H. MAURICE

MITCHELL and JOSEPH W. GELZINE, Co-Administrators in Succession

With Will Annexed of the Estate of Max Heiman, Deceased; BOATEL

COMPANY, INC.; KOHLER CO. and MEDLIN MARINE, INC.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To the United States Circuit Court of Appeals

for the Eighth Circuit

MICHAEL E. HALE

1500 Union National Plaza

Little Rock, Arkansas 72201

Counsel for Petitioner

SA eae 2 ARTS

St. Louis Law Printing Co., Inc., 812 Olive Street 63101 314-231-4477

SS

INDEX

Page

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Appendix A—Order Denying Petition for Rehearing of

Se Ge UD Hy TD 6 he eis occ es eeseaeesens A-1

Appendix B—Mandate of the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-

peals Handed Down April 14, 1976 .............. A-2

Appendix C—Order Granting Petition for Rehearing of

Marine Issued February 17, 1976 ................ A-4

Appendix D—Order Vacating and Setting Aside Court's

Order of January 30, 1976 Dated February 2, 1976 .. A-6

Appendix E—Order Denying Petition for Rehearing of

Marine Filed January 30, 1976 ..............445. A-7

Appendix F—Panel Opinion of the Eighth Circuit Filed

PPP Peer re Teer T yy Tee eT eT ee A-8

Appendix G—Memorandum Opinion of Judge Eisele Filed

fl errr errr reer Ceres A-28

Appendix H—Judgment Filed of Record March 14, 1975 A-31

Appendix I—Memorandum Cpinion of Judge Eisele Filed

Oe TS TD Fa FD 65 6 och ceeds cesccceencs A-35

Appendix J—Finding From the Bench by Judge Eisele on

Th CEE 666 kb se 4 Neda bbN C68 4e 6d 6568 A-57

CITATIONS

Cases

Brown v. General Motors Corp., 355 F.2d 814 (4th Cir.

1966) cert. denied 386 U.S. 1036 (1967) ........

Jacobson v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp., 409 F.2d 1263,

a eg ects ae

Kerber v. American Machine & Foundry Co., 411 F.2d

ee, Mee Ge UME oie sciences eeceesscs

Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir.

Wo 6 Sena ste de Vee a suns occa ee Pee Ce uae

Marker v. Universal Oil Prod. Co., 250 F.2d 603 (10th

SR te, Ce eral ec ge ee aN

Posey v. Clark Equip. Co., 409 F.2d 560 (7th Cir.) cert.

Gentes 396 US. 940 (1969) ... 0... ccc ccc ccees

Standhardt v. Flintkote Co., 508 P.2d 1283 (1973) ......

Walker v. Stauffer Chem. Corp., 19 Cal App 3d 671, 96

SE OUTED sc fone nccevacebeceucceusdnes

Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176 (Sth Cir. 1971)

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

eee SE.

MARINE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

.

MRS. ALANA G. HEIMAN, in Her Own Right; SANDRA JEAN HEIMAN, by

MRS. ALANA G. HEIMAN, Her Mother and Next Friend; and H. MAURICE

MITCHELL and JOSEPH W. GELZINE, Co-Administrators in Succession

With Will Annexed of the Estate of Max Heiman, Deceased; BOATEL

COMPANY, INC.; KOHLER CO. and MEDLIN MARINE, INC..,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To the United States Circuit Court of Appeals

for the Eighth Circuit

CITATIONS TO OPINIONS BELOW

The Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Eighth Circuit and the Opinion of the United States District

Court, Eastern District of Arkansas, Western Division, are un-

reported. The Order of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals

_—

rendered May 7, 1976 denying the Petition for Rehearing with

suggestion for rehearing en banc filed by Medlin Marine, Inc. is

printed in Appendix A. The opinion of the Eighth Circuit

sitting en banc rendered April 14, 1976, is printed in Appendix

B. The Order of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rendered

February 17, 1976, granting Marine Development Corpora-

tion’s Petition for Rehearing en banc is printed in Appendix C.

The Order of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rendered Feb-

ruary 2, 1976, setting aside its Order of January 30, 1976 is

printed in Appendix D. The Order of the Eighth Circuit ren-

dered January 30, 1976, is printed in Appendix E. The panel

opinion of the Eighth Circuit Court filed January 13, 1976, is

printed in Appendix F.

The findings, opinions and judgment of the United States

District Court, Eastern District, Western Division, are printed

as follows:

Memorandum Opinion of Judge Garnett Thomas Eisele

filed of record May 5, 1975, is printed ia Appendix G.

Judgment filed of record March 14, 1975 is printed in Ap-

pendix H.

Memorandum Opinion of Judge Garnett Thomas Eisele

filed of record on March 7, 1975, is printed in Ap-

pendix I.

Findings from‘the Bench by Judge Eisele on March 4,

1975, is printed in Appendix J.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals by Per

Curiam Order dated April 14, 1976 was entered on May 14,

1976. Timely Petition for Rehearing en banc filed by Medlin

Marine, Inc. was denied on May 7, 1976. The jurisdiction of

this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals erred in affirm-

ing the lower court’s ruling in an admiralty case that Marine De-

velopment Corporation, a component part manufacturer, had

a “duty to warn” the manufacturer of the completed product,

Boatel Company, Inc., of a potential danger based upon hypo-

thetical facts (which were not the facts of the case as found by

the trial judge) even though the Court found the component

parts were not defective, that the air conditioning system was

not designed by Marine Development Corperation (but by

Boatel alone) and that Boatel knew that carbon monoxide gases

were lethal and dangerous.

STATEMENT

This is an admiralty case brought pursuant to Rule 9(h) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by the Estate of Max

Heiman, deceased, Mrs. Alana Heiman and Sandra Heiman

against Boatel Company, Inc. (Boatel),' the designer and manu-

facturer of a forty-seven foot Islander yacht purchased by Max

Heiman; Medlin Marine Company, Inc. (Medlin), the selling

franchise dealer; Kohler Co.,* the manufacturer and seller of a

gasoline powered generator which was incorporated into the

design of the yacht; and Marine Development Corporation

(Marine), the manufacturer of air conditioning component parts,

which were sold to Boatel to be used in the air conditioning sys-

tem on the Heiman yacht.

' Judgment was taken against Boatel by default, which is bank-

rupt.

* Judgmeat was entered in favor of Kohler in the lower court

and affirmed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en

banc. Medlin appealed the court's judgment that Kohler was not

liable, but neither argued or briefed the issue on appeal.

— een

Alana Heiman and Sandra Heiman sustained personal in-

juries and Max Heiman died due to inhalation of carbon mon-

oxide on the night of September 1, 1973, while they were sleep-

ing on board the yacht with the air conditioning running on the

Arkansas River just north of Little Rock, Arkansas.

Expert testimony disclosed that carbon monoxide produced

by the generator was exhausted out the stern of the boat. Im-

mediately above the exhaust outlet were four drain holes in-

corporated into an overhang on the stern. The carbon mon-

oxide was drawn back into the engine compartment through

the four drain holes becaus- of the vacuum created by the gaso-

line powered generator’s need for air for combustion purposes.

The engine compartment was separated from the living quarters

by a non-airtight wall. The return air vent for the forward air

conditioning system was placed in the equipment room which

was connected primarly with the engine room by a conduit on

the starboard side. When operating, the air conditioning unit

pulled air from the engine compartment, which in turn intro-

duced dangerous amounts of carbon monoxide in the living

space.

Recovery was sought against the defendants on the basis of

negligence, breach of implied warranties and strict liability.

Being in admiralty, the case was tried before the Honorable

Judge G. Thomas Eisele. At the close of the evidence, the

Court made separate findings of facts and conclusions of law.

The manufacturer, Boatel, being in default, was found negligent

and also strictly liable. The seller, Medlin, was found liable in

strict liability. The Court found that the generator manu-

facturer, Kohler, had no duty to warn and, therefore, was not

liable. The air conditioning component part manufacturer,

Marine, was found liable for negligent failure to warn. The

trial court apportioned fault between Boatel and Marine, finding

80% attributable to Boatel and 20% to Marine. The Court

further found that the fault of Medlin and Marine was equal.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Argument will be based on the trial court's findings, since

the Eighth Circuit Court Mandate merely affirmed the Judg-

ment of the lower court. By this action the Eighth Circuit failed

to decide an important question of federal law which has not

been, but should be, settled by this Court.

Marine first contends that it is not liable for failure to warn

as a matter of law, based upon the trial court’s own findings.*

The trial court erroneously held Marine liable for failure to warn

based upon hypothetical facts which were not the facts of the

case as so found by the trial court. Marine submits that the

trial court, just the same as a jury, cannot hold a defendant

liable on facts which were not found to be the facts in the

case, especially where the conclusions are contrary to the trial

court’s own findings. Standhardt v. Flintkote Co., 508 P.2d 1283

(1973).

The trial court specifically found that the carbon monoxide

re-entered the engine compartment of the Heiman yacht through

four holes in the transom and that the four holes were a defect

which made the boat inherently dangerous. The four holes

were designed and manufactured by Boatel alone, and no one

but Boatel knew of the four holes. The four holes constituted a

defect in the boat and were the basis for finding liability against

Boatel and Medlin. The trial court further found that Boatel

alone designed and installed the air conditioning system as it

was found in the Heiman yacht in direct violation of the clear

and unambiguous installation instructions of Marine. The

Court further found that if the air conditioning components

furnished by Marine had been properly installed in accordance

with Marine’s instructions, the Heimans would not have been

harmed. The trial court specifically found that there were no

* The findings of fact as to Marine are found in Appendix J,

page A-57.

/ — 6 —

defects in the component parts sold to Boatel by Marine. The

liability of Marine for failure to warn was predicated on the

finding that Marine knew or should have known that carbon

monoxide might during the life of the vessel escape from either

the generator motor or the two propulsion engines due to acci-

dent or ordinary wear and tear. The trial court found that the

foregoing possible fact situation created a duty on Marine’s

part to warn of any hazard to life and health which might fore-

seeably result from the improper location of its equipment.

The holding of the trial court was clearly erroneous in that

the trial court’s conclusions of law are based upon facts which

were not the actual facts in the case as so found by the trial

court itself. The trial court found that there were no leaks in

the exhaust system in the Heiman yacht. To hold Marine liable,

the Court therefore based its findings upon hypothetical facts

concerning a possible leak in order to find any foreseeable duty

to warn. By doing so, the trial court has completely ignored its

finding of fact concerning the emission of carbon monoxide out

of the boat and then back through the four holes into the tran-

som, which was not foreseeable as to Marine.

Secondly, Marine had no duty to warn. Marine respectfully

submits that the duty to warn is imposed on the manufacturer

of a completed product and not upon the manufacturer (like

Marine) of component parts which undergo substantial change

by the manufacturer before the completed product is sold to

the ultimate consumer. The only cases Marine has found con-

Struing the issue of duty to warn involved manufacturers of

completed products and not component part manufacturers,

when the component parts were found not to be defective. The

duty to warn is imposed upon Boatel, the manufacturer, not

upon Marine. See Jacobson v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp.,

409 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1969): Walker y. Stauffer Chem.

Corp., 19 Cal App 3d 671, 96 Cal.Rptr. 803 (1971); Restate-

ment (Second) of Torts, 402A caveats (2) and (3) and com-

ments. There is no duty to warn of obvious dangers whether the

| aaa

eas Winns

cause of action is stated in terms of negligence or strict liability

theory. Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176 (Sth Cir.

1971); Posey v. Clark Equip. Co., 409 F.2d 560 (7th Cir.),

cert. denied 396 U.S. 940 (1969): Larsen v. General Motors

Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); W. Prosser, The Law

of Torts 649 (4th ed. 1971); Restatement (Second) of Torts

$ 388 comment k; Kerber v. American Machine & Foundry

Co., 411 F.2d 419, 421-422 (8th Cir. 1969); Restatement (Sec-

ond) of Torts, § 402A comments i, /.

The installation of the air conditioning system by Boatel in

such a manner as to allow the introduction of carbon monoxide

into the return intake was an obvious danger and the manufac-

turer is entitled to assume that his product will not be used in

an obvicusly dangerous manner. Marker v. Universal Oil Prod-

ucts Co., 250 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1957); Brown v. General

Motors Corp., 355 F.2d 814 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 386

U.S. 1036 (1967). This is so a fortiori where the product fur-

nished is a non-defective component part to be incorporated

into an air coditioning system by knowledgeable technicians and

engineers employed by the manufacturer, Boatel. Jacobson v.

Colorado Fuel & lron Corp., supra.

Kohler, the manufacturer of the gasoline generator, was not

found to be liable for failure to warn. Yet it was Kohler’s gen-

erator that produced the carbon monoxide. How can it be said

that Kohler could not reasonably foresee leaks in its own ex-

haust system and have no duty to warn, but Marine could?

Kohler, like Marine, had furnished installation instructions, but

no warnings. If Kohler had no duty to warn. neither does Ma-

rine, for the reason that the danger was obvious and the com-

ponent parts used underwent substantial change and were in-

stalled into a completed product manufactured by Boatel, alone.

The duty to warn was that of Boatel—the manufacturer.

For the foregoing reasons, Marine’s motion for a directed

verdict should have been granted.

CONCLUSION

A Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be granted to de-

termine whether the doctrine of “duty to warn” extends to in-

clude manufacturers of component parts, which are found not

to be defective and have undergone substantial change by the

manufacturer before the completed product is sold to the ulti-

mate consumer in order to have uniformity of decisions among

the courts of appeal.

The Opinion of the trial court which was affirmed by the

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, has erroneously extended the

law of products liability to include not only the seller and manu-

facturer of the product, but also all of the component part

manufacturers on the theory of failure to warn. The duty im-

posed upon Marine in this case is contrary to law and policy

reasoning. The policy reasoning for not holding a component

part manufacturer liable is stated in Walker v. Stauffer Chem.

Corp., supra, as follows:

“We do not believe it realistically feasible or necessary to

the protection of the public to require the manufacturer

and supplier of a standard chemical ingredient such as

bulk sulfuric acid, not having control over the subsequent

compounding, packaging or marketing of the item even-

tually causing injury to the ultimate consumer, to bear the

responsibility for that injury. The manufacturer (seller) of

the product, causing the injury is so situated as to afford

necessary protection. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,

supra, 24 Cal.2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436.”

Respectfully submitted

MICHAEL E. HALE

1500 Union National Plaza

Little Rock, Arkansas 72201

Counsel for Petitioner

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

United States Court of Appeals

for the Eighth Circuit

75-1258 September Term, 1975

Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, etc. et al.,

Appellees,

vs.

Medlin Marine, Inc., Appeals from the

Appellant. United States Dis-

75-1383 trict Court for the

Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, etc., et al., Easterr District of

Appellees, Arkansas.

—--~--

VS.

Medlin Marine, Inc.,

Appellant. |

The Court having considered petition for rehearing en banc

filed by counsel for appellant and, being fully advised in the

premises, it is ordered that the petition for rehearing en banc

be, and it is hereby, denied.

Considering the petition for rehearing en banc as a petition

for rehearing, it is ordered that the petition for rehearing also

be, and it is hereby, denied.

May 7, 1976

a * oo

APPENDIX B

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

No. 75-1258 September Term, 1975

Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, etc., et al., -

Appellees,

VS. —

Medlin Marine, Inc.,

Appellant.

No. 75-1287

Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, etc., et al.,

ie Appellees,

Marine Development Corp., Appeals from _ the

Appellant. | United States District

No. 75-1383 Court for the Eastern

Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, etc., et al., | District of Arkansas.

Appellees,

vs. —

Medlin Marine, Inc.,

Appellant.

No. 75-1384

Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, etc., et al.,

Appellees,

VS. se

Marine Development Corp.,

Appellant. |

Before Gibson, Chief Judge, Lay, Heaney, Bright, Ross,

Stephenson, Webster, and Henley, Circuit Judges

Per Curiam

The prior panel opinion filed in these cases January 13,

1976 is ordered withdrawn.

—

~~ oe

The judgment of the United States District Court for the East-

ern District of Arkansas is hereby affirmed by an equally divided

Court.

April 14, 1976

(See attached sheet for cost information.)

A true copy.

Attest:

ROBERT C. TUCKER

Clerk, U. S. Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit.

May 14, 1976

APPENDIX C

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

No. 75-1258 September Term, 1975

Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, etc., et al., )

Appellees,

VS. PPS

Medlin Marine, Inc.,

Appellant.

No. 75-1287

Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, etc., et al.,

nm Appellees,

Marine Development Corp., Appeals from. the

| AGGOREM. | viaseed Sates Blesiet

No. 75-1383

; Court for the Eastern

Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, etc., et al., aay

District of Arkansas.

Appellees,

VS.

Medlin Marine, Inc.,

Appellant.

No. 75-1384

Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, etc., et al.,

“ Appellees,

Marine Development Corp.,

Appellant. /

The court has carefully considered petition for rehearing with

suggestions for rehearing en banc filed by counsel for appellant

Marine Development Corporation. Being fully advised in the

premises it is now here ordered that the petition for rehearing

—_—* =

with suggestions for rehearing en banc be, and it is hereby,

granted.

These cases are to be re-submitted to the court en banc at a

session of the court to be later determined.

February 17, 1976

—* va

APPENDIX D

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

75-1287 September Term, 1975

Mrs. Alana G. Heiman in her own right, >

et al.,

Appellees,

vs.

Marine Development Corporation, Appeals from the

Appellant. | United States Dis-

75-1384 ' trict Court for the

Mrs. Alana G. Heiman in her own right, | Eastern District of

et al., Arkansas

Appellees,

VS.

Marine Development Corporation,

Appellant. ’

On the Court’s own motion it is now here ordered that our

order of January 30, 1976, denying petition for rehearing en

banc and rehearing be, and it is hereby, vacated and set aside.

February 2, 1976

APPENDIX E

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

75-1287 September Term, 1975

Mrs. Alana G. Heiman in her own right, )

et al.,

Appellees,

VS.

Marine Development Corp., Appeals from the

Appellant. , United States Dis-

75-1384 trict Court for the

Mrs. Alana G. Heiman in her own right, | Eastern District of

et al., Arkansas

Appellees,

VS.

Marine Development Corp.,

Appellant.

The Court having considered petition for rehearing en banc

filed by counsel for appellant and, being fully advised in the

premises, it is ordered that the petition for rehearing en banc

be, and it is hereby, denied.

Considering the petition for rehearing en banc as a petition

for rehearing, it is ordered that the petition for rehearing also

be, and it is hereby, denied.

January 30, 1976

—*

APPENDIX F

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

Nos. 75-1258, 75-1287, 75-1383 and 75-1384

No. 75-1258

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Arkansas

Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, in her own right; Sandra Jean Heiman,

by Mrs. Alana G. Heinian, her mother and next friend, and

H. Maurice Mitchell and Joseph W. Gelzine, Co-Adminis-

trators in Succession with Will Annexed of the Estate of

Max Heiman, Deceased,

Appellees,

Boatel Company, Inc., Marine Development Corporation,

and

Kohler Co.,

Appellee,

and

Medlin Marine, Inc.,

Appellant.

—

No. 75-1287

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Arkansas

Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, in her own right; Sandra Jean Heiman,

by Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, her mother and next friend; and

H. Maurice Mitchell and Joseph W. Gelzine, Co-Adminis-

trators in Succession with Will Annexed of the Estate of

Max Heiman, Deceased,

Appellees,

Boatel Company, Inc.,

Marine Development Corporation,

Appellant,

and

Medlin Marine, Inc. and Kohler Co.

No. 75-1383

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Arkansas

Mrs. Alana G. Heiman in her own right; Sandra Jean Heiman,

by Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, her mother and next friend, and

H. Maurice Mitchell and Joseph W. Gelzine, Co-Adminis-

trators in Succession with Will Annexed of the Estate of

Max Heiman, Deceased,

Appellees,

v.

Boatel Company, Inc., Marine Development Corporation,

Kohler Co. and Medlin Marine, Inc.,

Appellant.

— A-10 —

No. 75-1384

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Arkansas

Mrs. Alana G. Heiman in her own right; Sandra Jean Heiman,

by Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, her mother and next friend; and

H. Maurice Mitchell and Joseph W. Gelzine, Co-Adminis-

trators in Succession with Will Annexed of the Estate of

Max Heiman, Deceased,

Appellees,

v.

Boatel Company, Inc., and Marine Development Corporation,

. Appellant,

Medlin Marine, Inc. and Kohler Co.

Submitted: October 17, 1975

Filed: January 13, 1976

Before Clark, Associate Justice,* Lay and Ross, Circuit

Judges.

Lay, Circuit Judge.

This is an admiralty case brought by the Estate of Max

Heiman, deceased, Mrs. Alana Heiman and Sandra Heiman

against Boatel Company, Inc. (Boatel), the manufacturer of a

yacht purchased in August, 1972 by Max Heiman. Boatel’s

retail franchise dealer, Medlin Marine, Inc. (Medlin), the air-

conditioning unit manufacturer, Marine Development Corp.

* Associate Justice Tom C. Clark, Unit

Retired, sitting by designation. nited States Supreme Court

— A-11 —

(Marine), and the generator manufacturer, Kohler Company,

were also sued.' The plaintiffs sought damages for the death of

Max Heiman and for personal injuries to Mrs. Heiman and their

daughter, Sandra, due to inhalation of carbon monoxide on

September 1, 1973 while the Heimans slept on the yacht with

the airconditioner running.

The evidence disclosed that the gasoline-powered generator

created carbon monoxide and exhausted it at the stern below

the water line. Immediately over the boat's exhaust outlet were

four drainage holes which due to an overhang were not visible

when the boat was in the water. The generator’s need for air

tended to create a vacuum, causing the exhausted fumes to be

sucked through the four holes back into the engine compart-

ment. The boat's engine compartment was separated from the

living quarters by a non-airtight wall. Boatel installed the

air-conditioning unit near a passage leading to the engine

compartment. When operating, the unit pulled air from that com-

partment, thereby introducing dangerous amounts of carbon

monoxide into the living quarters.

Recovery was sought on the basis of negligence, breach of

implied warranty and strict liability. The case was tried to

the court, the Honorable Judge G. Thomas Eisele. The court's

findings on liability were that:

|. Boatel, the yacht manufacturer, was negligent and was

also liable in strict liability;

2. Marine Development, the airconditioning unit manufac-

turer, was negligent for failure to warn;

3. Medlin Marine, the retailer, was liable in strict liability,

but was not negligent since there was no evidence that Medlin

knew or should have known of the holes over the exhaust; and

' The defendants cross-complained against each other. Plaintiff

dismissed its complaint against defendant Kohler, but the cross-com-

plaints against Kohler remained.

— A-12 —

4. Kohler, the generator manufacturer, had no duty to warn

and was not otherwise negligent.

The court apportioned the fault between Boatel and Marine,

finding that 80% was attributable to Boatel and 20% Marine.

The court held that Medlin was entitled to indemnity against

Boatel for its entire liability. The court further found that the

fault of Medlin and Marine was equal and denied any indemnity

between those parties. Medlin and Marine appeal. Boatel, a

bankrupt, did not defend below and takes no part in this appeal.

The principal issues on appeal are 1) the sufficiency of evi-

dence to sustain Marine’s liability for negligent failure to warn;

2) the question of indemnity between Medlin and Marine; and

3) whether the wrongful death damages awarded were based

on proper evidence and were not otherwise excessive.”

Marine’s Liability: Duty to Warn

At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Eisele filed detailed find-

ings of fact and conclusions. The court found that the air-

conditioning unit was not mechanically or otherwise physically

defective; that Boatel installed the airconditioning unit in viola-

tion of the installation instructions furnished by Marine; that

there is nothing inherently dangerous in the use of properly

installed airconditioning systems; and that had Boatel installed

the system in accord with the instructions, the Heimans would

not have been harmed.

Nonetheless, the trial court found Marine liable for its failure

to warn Boatel and the Heimans of the potential consequences

of improperly installing its airconditioning components. The

trial court found:

* Medlin noticed an appeal of the trial court's judgment that

Kohler was not liable, but neither argued nor briefed this issue on

appeal. Therefore we deem the appeal on this issue abandoned.

er ee eee

— A-13 —

. . . Marine Development Corporation knew or should

have known that there were significant openings from the

engine compartment into the living spaces . . . and that

. carbon monoxide might, during the life of the vessel,

be found in the engine compartment in dangerous concen-

trations.

Marine Development also knew or should have known

that if the forward cooling unit were installed as it was in

the equipment room it could and would, under certain fore-

seeable circumstances, draw air from the engine compart-

ment and circulate it throughout the living areas of the

boat.

Of all the parties to this action, Marine is and should

be the most knowledgeable with respect to the effects of

air-conditioning systems and their operations. It has more

than 50 percent of all the air-conditioning business in the

class of boats and yachts of the approximate size of the

Heiman vessel.

It has held itself out as a specialist in marine air-con-

ditioning . . .

The court further found:

Marine, being so intimately associated with boat manufac-

turers and boat designers, knew or should have known that

such manufacturers. for their own convenience and for de-

sign purposes, might install the cooling unit so as to have

the effect of pumping air from the engine compartment.

The potential seriousness of the injury which might re-

sult is obvious. In addition, there is no practical impedi-

ment to its ability to give an adequate warning. Carbon

monoxide is odorless. colorless, and tasteless. It is insidi-

ous and subtle in its operation and effect. If there is any

risk of it being introduced into a living space, a warning

of that risk should obviously be given.

— A-14—

The record reveals substantial evidence supporting these find-

ings. We cannot say under the circumstances that the findings

are clearly erroneous. It has long been held that a manufacturer

is liable for foreseeable misuses of its product and for failure

to warn of those misuses. See Griggs v. Firestone Tire & Rub-

ber Co., 513 F.2d 851 (8th Cir. 1975); Hoppe v. Midwest Con-

veyor Co., 485 F.2d 1196, 1201 (8th Cir. 1973); Larsen v.

General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 504-05 (8th Cir. 1968).

The trial court correctly pointed out the basic distinction be-

tween the duty to give adequate instructions for the installation

and use of a product and the duty to warn of hazards which

might result from failure to follow those instructions. See Buf-

fington v. Amchem Products, Inc., 489 F.2d 1053, 1054-55

(8th Cir. 1974); Ross v. Up-Right, Inc., 402 F.2d 943, 948

(Sth Cir. 1968): L. Frumer & M. Friedman, Products Liability

§ 8.05[1] (1975). Thus, there can be no argument that the in-

stallation instructions were an adequate warning of the poten-

tial danger from improper installation of the unit.

Marine further urges that it had no duty to warn since Boatel

had similar knowledge, and that the dangers of improper in-

stallation were common knowledge. It is also urged that a

warning would have been futile since even after this accident,

Boatel failed to relocate airconditioning units on similar boats.

We think the evidence is sufficient to make these questions of

fact, rather than of law.

The trial court found that Marine had superior knowledge

of the operation of the air conditioning unit, that it held itself

out to the public as a specialist in marine air conditioning and

that it was totally familiar with boat construction. From this,

the court reasonably inferred that Marine should have known

of the danger that an improperly installed unit would act as a

pump, drawing the gases from the engine compartment, whereas

Boatel did not possess such expertise and knowledge. The ques-

— A-15 —

tion of whether a warning to the boat manufacturer would have

been futile is also a question to be resolved by the fact finder. A

similar question arose in Post v. American Cleaning Equipment

Corp., 437 S.W.2d 516 (Ky. 1969), which involved an injury

from an industrial vacuum cleaner bearing the instructions “only

use on 115 volts AC or DC”. The plaintiff plugged the unit

into a 220 DC outlet and the issue was the adequacy of the in-

structions. In reversing a directed verdict for the defendant, the

Kentucky Supreme Court stated:

It is no answer to say that appellant would have attached

the machine to a 220 DC outlet anyway. since he did so

in face of the directions which were furnished. Maybe he

would have, but the facts at hand make that a question of

conjecture. One thing seems certain—IF the dire conse-

quences of using 220 DC had been plainly and adequately

posted—the appellee would prevail as a matter of law. The

fact that reasonable differences of view may be reached as

to the adequacy of the warning here makes this a jury

onme. ...

437 S.W.2d at 521.

We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the

trial court's finding that Marine Development Corporation was

liable in both strict liability and “negligence”.

Indemnification

The court denied indemnification to Medlin, the retailer, as

against Marine Development, the air conditioner manufacturer.’

It did so even though Medlin was liable only under strict lia-

* The Court also denied Marine's claim for indemnification

against Medlin. Although Marine appealed from this judgment, it

was neither argued nor briefed on appeal and therefore is waived

and abandoned.

—_

bility, while Marine's liability was based on negligence. The

court reasoned that strict liability implied fault and thus con-

sidered the question as one of contribution rather than indemni-

fication, concluding that the fault of Marine and Medlin was

equal.

The Restatement of Restitution provides:

A person who, without personal fault, has become sub-

ject to tort liability for the unauthorized and wrongful

conduct of another, is entitled to indemnity from the other

for expenditures properly made in the discharge of such

liability.

Restatement. Restitution § 96 (1937).

The difference between primary and secondary liability is

not based on a difference in degrees of fault. It rests rather

on the nature of the legal obligation owed by the wrongdoer to

the injured party. See Tromza v. Tecumseh Products Co., 378

F.2d 601, 605-06 (3rd Cir. 1967).

We find no authority which would alter the traditional tests

of indemnity under the circumstances. Medlin’s responsibility

is secondary when compared to Marine’s. This is obvious from

the finding that Medlin’s fault is based only on strict liability

and that none of Medlin’s personnel knew or should have known

the danger involved. Medlin’s liability is vicarious and Marine

must make Medlin whole.

We therefore find that the court erred in denying Medlin

indemnity against Marine.

Damages

The trial court awarded the administrators of the decedent's

estate the following amounts:

—_<

Alana G. Heiman, wife, $443,762.07,

Sandra Jean Heiman, daughter, $41,536.33,

Judith Heiman Samuel, daughter, $21,000.00,

Estate of Max A. Heiman, $5,906.85.

Marine and Medlin attack this verdict on the grounds that

the trial court erred 1) in its method of determining contribution

as an element of damage; 2) in admitting Mrs. Heiman’s testi-

mony concerning her living expenses subsequent to Mr. Hei-

man’s death on the issue of contribution; 3) in considering a

5% to 6% managerial fee for the operation of apartments

owned by Mr. Heiman; 4) in considering the decedent's tax

records while he was employed by the Gus Blass Company; 5)

in allowing an inflationary factor; and 6) in awarding excessive

damages.

In awarding damages the trial court relied on the elements

of damage in admiralty wrongful death cases set forth in Sea-

Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974).*

4 There the Court observed:

Recovery for loss of support has been universally recognized,

and includes all the financial contributions that the decedent

would have made to his dependents had he lived. Similarly,

the overwhelming majority of state wrongful-death acts and

courts interpreting the Death on the High Seas Act have per-

mitted recovery for the monetary value of services the decedent

provided and would have continued to provide but for his

wrongful death. Such services include, for example, the nur-

ture, training, education, and guidance that a child would have

received had not the parent been wrongfully killed. Services the

decedent performed at home or for his spouse are also com-

pensable.

Compensation for loss of society, however, presents a closer

question. The term “society” embraces a broad range of mu-

tual benefits each family member receives from the others’

continued existence, including love, affection, care, attention,

companionship, comfort, and protection. Unquestionably, the

deprivation of these benefits by wrongful death is a grave loss

to the decedent's dependents,

*~ * ~ * * * ws

Finally, in addition to recovery for loss of support, services,

and society, damages for funeral expenses may be awarded un-

—Y

The basic attack relates to the damages awarded by reason

of the alleged money contributions. Defendants contend that

the award was excessive due to Mr. Heiman’s deteriorating fi-

nancial position. To aid our discussion we set forth in the

margin the relevant part of Judge Eisele’s detailed findings and

conclusions.”

In assessing damages for wrongful death a trier of fact must

make a reasonable extrapolation from the evidence of the

amount necessary as compensation for the loss. At best this

can only be an estimate of actual damage projected over a per-

son's life expectancy. The trier of fact has a duty to consider

the totality of the decedent’s personality, work habits and char-

acter, his past and present earnings as well as his proven ca-

pacity to earn. All relevant evidence, past and present, which

provides insight to the fact finder may be considered in arriving

- a eres me rg remedy in circumstances where

ent s dependents have either paid for the fun

liable for its payment. 4 eines

414 U.S. at 584-86, 591.

4 — found:

though the status of Mr. Heiman’s economic conditi

the time of his death, based as it was upon income heim .

a and from apartment complexes located in Arkansas and

lorida, was precarious and deteriorating, it is likely that, had

holdings. 7 ae have salvaged at least some small part of his

. . . [A] fair interpretation of the evidence forces th

to find that, had Mr. Heiman lived, he would have re

combination of great effort and extremely good fortune to sal-

vage even as much as a fourth of his overall holdings and that

realistically, it is more probable that, had he lived, Mr. Hei-

man would only have been able to extricate himself from his

financial difficulties without any net personal obligation, sal-

vaging only a small, perhaps even nominal, amount of his

business holdings. The Court must analyze the probable “con-

tributions” element of damages with this finding in mind.

The evidence chatty establishes that Mr. Heim

é an wa

of business and executive ability. Before 1965 he had held

positions of responsibility with one of the largest department

— A-19 —

at a just verdict. To urge that one should not consider past in-

come and past employment as reflected by tax returns, or that

it is improper to consider uncompensated endeavors which

might have contributed to growth in future net worth is to sug-

gest verdicts based on incomplete evidence. To urge in a

wrongful death case that the deceased's future earning capacity

must be measured only in terms of his actual income at the time

of his death ignores reality and benefits only the wrongdoer. The

law of compensation does not function within such narrow con-

straints. We similarly disregard the attack on admission of the

evidence of Mrs. Heiman’s expenses after the accident. These

were all relevant factors to be considered. The trial court, as

any trier of fact, was entitled to make reasonable inferences

from all of the evidence.

We have more difficulty with the admitted testimony of the

economist. In Riha v. Jasper Blackburn Corp., 516 F.2d 840

(8th Cir. 1975), this court reversed a jury verdict where an

economist had projected a specific annual inflation rate over a

stores ir the State of Arkansas. the Gus Blass Company. The

evidence from his W-2 forms indicates that his average an-

nual income for the last three years he was with the Gus Blass

Company (1963, 1964 and 1965) was in excess of $20,000.00.

The compensation for performing similar services in 1975

would obviously be considerably in excess of that figure. . .

This. then, is another of the bases upon which the Court's

decision concerning the amount and the probability of future

contributions must be predicated.

When Mr. Heiman got seriously involved in the real estate.

motel and apartment building ventures, he devoted most of his

time to personally overseeing such operations. He maintained

an oftice with a secretary at the Holcomb Heights Apartments.

It is true that he had on-the-site employees who looked after

the routine operations, the collection of rents and maintenance.

But, with the exception of the Fair Park Gardens, which were un-

der a management arrangement with Block Realty Company. he

contributed a considerable amount of his time to the overall

management of the properties. The evidence indicates that.

had Mr. Heiman not been performing these services. he would

have had the alternative of contracting for such services with

some real estate management company. The usual fee for

— A-20 —

person's work expectancy. We held this to be unduly speculative

when the exact income was projected to the year 2005. Riha

was followed by Johnson v. Serra, 52i F.2d 1289 (8th Cir.

1975), where in a wrongful death action we excluded testimony

of an economist’s projection of an eight per cent inflation rate

over the decedent's work expectancy to the year 2002. In both

cases, we followed the Sixth Circuit's decision in Bach v. Penn-

sylvania Central Transportation Co., 502 F.2d 1117 (6th Cir.

1974). We approved language from Bach which indicated that

“[slome consideration of probabilities is inevitable in any fair

award of damages.” 516 F.2d at 845, quoting 502 F.2d at

1122.

Our opinions in Riha and Johnson were not intended to pre-

clude use of economists as experts to testify on probable wage

increases over reasonable periods of time or on inflationary or

deflationary factors of the past and their general relevance to

the future. In Riha we held, consistent with Nebraska law and

such services would run in the neighborhood of five to six

percent of the gross receipts. Of course, such a firm would

have had to pay the management expenses and wages of the

on-the-site employees out of its fees. Looking at Mr. Heiman’s

tax records covering his various operations over a period of

years, the Court finds that he was performing services which,

had they been contracted, would have required the payment

of at least $20,000 per year over and above the management

and employee expense actually experienced.

. . Looking at both Mrs. Heiman’s testimony as to her

actual expenses since Mr. Heiman’s death and the tax records

and other records kept by Mr. Heiman reflecting contributions

prior to his death, the Court finds that on an average Mr. Hei-

man was contributing just under $30,000 to the living ex-

pense requirements of the entire family. In making this de-

termination, the Court has disregarded certain items, such as

jewelry expenditures, from the figures testified to by Mrs. Hei-

man on the one hand, and, on the other hand, has reduced the

figures revealed by Mr. Heiman’s records by the amounts of

the insurance premiums, the boat expense, and certain other

expeises. Had he lived, Mr. Heiman’s own living expenses

would have had to be defrayed out of the total living expense

contributions. Furthermore, if, as the Court suspects, financial

— A-21 —

prior federal cases, that the precise mathematical projection by

the economist using an inflation factor of seven per cent to the

year 2005 was too conjectural. We held that the expert wit-

ness was not competent to testify, within any acceptable range

of probability, that a precise inflationary rate would continue

for so long. The rate of inflation depends on many collateral

considerations such as war and peace, tax rates, the state of the

general economy, interest rates and myriad other extrapolations.

The science of economics is too imprecise at present for its

experts to offer more than speculative guesses as to the state of

the economy for the future. As we stated in Johnson:

Inflationary forecasts of economists are, of course, only

personal opinions, even when based on past trends. It must

be recognized that trends may often be faulty indicators

of the future as well as the present and that economists

have fared only slightly better than fortune tellers and

soothsayers in foretelling the future. Economic factors op-

erate at varying degrees of intensity in our economy, and

it seems there are as many explanations of past trends and

predictions of future trends as there are economists. We

could be entering into an inflationary cycle with its attend-

circumstances would have required Mr. Heiman to accept em-

ployment from a third-party employer, he would, of course,

have had to pay state and federal income taxes on his com-

pensation, a sit, tion which would be entirely different from

the tax situation which had existed in the years immediately

prior to his death where, because of the nature of his invest-

ments and the tax laws involved, he was not required to pay

such taxes.

The court is convinced that, had Mr. Heiman lived, he and

his family would have had to cut down somewhat on their

overall style of living but would still have been able to live

most comfortably.

From all the evidence, the Court finds that through one

method or another Mr. Heiman, had he lived, would have been

able to provide and would in fact have provided contributions

and su to the other members of his family (i.c., excluding

himself) in the sum of $22,500.00 per year, measured in 1975

dollars, over the remaining working years of his life.

— A-22 —

ant depreciation of the dollar or into a deflationary era,

as in the 1930's. Both possibilities are to a considerable

extent speculative and conjectural.

521 F.2d at 1294.

The dangers of allowing the expert to make such “guesses”,

even though subjected to cross-examination, is that it leads

to protracted litigation of collateral issues without reasonable

boundaries and allows unreliable conjecture to be conveyed in

terms of mathematical certainty.

Consistent with our rulings in Riha and Johnson, we think

that in the instant case it was error for the trial court to receive

into evidence the economist’s projection of Mr. Heiman’s con-

tributions over his work life expectancy using a 5% % inflation

rate. Whether this error requires a reversal and remand to the

district court, however, necessitates further analysis.

In the present case the trial judge, rather than a jury, served

as the trier of fact. The essential difference between a bench

trial and a jury trial is that the trial judge's verdict is supported

by specific findings of fact which must withstand analysis under

the clearly erroneous test. As such, a trial judge’s conclusion

is more vulnerable on review than the jury verdict which will

be sustained upon demonstration of substantial evidence to sup-

port the verdict. See Oil Screw Noah's Ark v. Bentley & Felton

Corp., 322 F.2d 3, 5-6 (Sth Cir. 1963); cf. Jackson v. Hart-

ford Accident & Indemnity Co., 422 F.2d 1272, 1278 (8th Cir.

1970) (concurring opinion, Lay, J.). The jury's methodology

in reaching its verdict is, of course, inherent in the verdict and

is not subject to collateral attack. Chicago, R. 1. & Pac. R. R.

v. Speth, 404 F.2d 291 (8th Cir. 1968).

| Nonetheless, in the instant case, the trial judge has set forth

his factual findings, which clearly show that the court rejected

the economist’s analysis and applied his own understanding and

— A-23 —

experience of inflationary impact on future contributions. Judge

Eisele in rejecting the economist’s testimony used a 542% pres-

ent value discount rate and then applied an inflationary factor

of 4%, resulting in a discount of the projected earnings by

142%. The economist estimated loss of future contributions to

Mrs. Heiman as $760,276; Judge Eisele’s figure was $350,910.

The fundamental question is thus whether the trier of fact

may use his own understanding and experience in arriving at a

damage figure where “expert” evidence as to the precise cal-

culation, factors and result involved in the equation would be

inadmissible.

In our prior opinions we have approved the following lan-

guage from Bach:

Even though no expert testimony on inflation and future

increases was admitted, it was still error for the district

court to charge the jury that it should not consider “future

increases or decreases in the purchasing power of money.”

Cf. Willmore v. Hertz Corporation, 437 F.2d 357 (6th

Cir. 1971). Inflation is a fact of life within the common

experience of all jurors. Admittedly, if the jury considers

this issue without expert testimony, their calculations will

be even more imprecise. There is always a chance that the

verdict may be too generous. But if jurors should be pro-

hibited from applying their common knowledge of inflation

in reaching a verdict, the party entitled to recovery could

be grievously under-compensated. The court can always

rectify an exorbitant verdict through its power of remittitur.

See 6A Moore’s Federal Practice € 59.05[3].

502 F.2d at 1122, quoted in 516 F.2d 845.

Thus we are committed to the rule that although an expert

witness may not project an inflationary rate over a person's

life expectancy, the trier of fact may consider future increases

—A-24—

or decreases in the purchasing power of money. As indicated

in Bach, even though a jury's opinion, like the economist's, may

be imprecise, the ultimate check on their extrapolation is whether

the verdict is exorbitant. Thus, we hold in the present case it

was not error for the trial court, sitting as a trier of fact, to con-

sider an inflationary impact on the damage award based on his

own understanding and experience. The remaining question

we must face then is whether the damage award is excessive.

The fundamental tests of whether a verdict is excessive are

whether it falls within the reasonable range of the evidence and

whether it is shocking to the conscience. Krall v. Crouch Bros.,

Inc., 473 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1973); O’Brien v. Stover.

443 F.2d 1013, 1018-19 (8th Cir. 1971); Solomon Dehydrat-

ing Co. v. Guyton, 294 F.2d 439, 447-48 (8th Cir.). cert.

denied, 368 U.S. 929 (1961). The first is an objective test, the

latter a subjective evaluation by the judges of this court. As

we have discussed the verdict falls within a reasonable range

of the evidence. The projected earnings of the deceased were

established at $22,500 whereas there was evidence that in the

past Heiman earned more than this. Further, in evaluating the

totality of this proof and the circumstances surrounding Mr.

Heiman’s contributions to his wife and family, we do not find

the verdict shocking.

The judgments for the plaintiffs are affirmed as against Ma-

rine and Medlin; the judgment denying the cross-complaint of

Medlin against Marine is reversed and the district court is di-

rected to enter judgment in favor of Medlin on its claim for in-

demnity against Marine; the judgment in favor of Kohler on

the cross-complaint is affirmed. Costs of plaintiffs and Medlin

shall be assessed to Marine; Kohler shall pay its own costs.

Ross, Circuit Judge, Dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. The result reached by the majority

gives proof to the old saw that hard cases make bad law. The

—_< =

death and injuries in this case were the result of negligence and

defective design of the Heiman yacht by Boatel; however, Boatel

is bankrupt and unable to respond in damages. Under the law

of strict liability and implied warranty the dealer who acted as

an intermediary between Boatel and the decedent Medlin is

liable, even though it cannot be said that Medlin was at fault

in any traditional sense of the word. In this case it is harsh that

Medlin cannot be indemnified by Boatel, but that should not be

justification to stretch the law of torts in order to impose lia-

bility on a party who is just as innocent of fault: Marine De-

velopment, the manufacturer of the air conditioning components.

The components supplied by Marine Development were not

defective, and had they been installed as the manufacturer in-

structed, they would not have been dangerous. However, Boatel

installed the air conditioning sysiem on the Heiman yacht in

such a way that one cooling unit's air intake was from the

engineroom, and not surprisingly. the engineroom air contained,

at the time of the accident, carbon monoxide.

There is no duty to warn of obvious dangers under either

negligence or strict liability theory. Ward v. Hobart Manufactur-

ing Co., 450 F.2d 1176, 1188 (Sth Cir. 1971); Posey v. Clark

Equipment Co., 409 F.2d 560, 563 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,

396 U.S. 940 (1969); W. Prosser, The Law of Torts 649 (4th

ed. 1971): Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388, comment k;

see Kerber v. American Machine & Foundry Co., 411 F.2d 419,

421-422 (8th Cir. 1969); Restatement (Second) of Torts, §

402A, comments i, j. As Chief Judge Gibson stated in Larsen

v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 505 (8th Cir. 1968),

cited by the majority:

Almost any chattel or commodity is capable of inflicting

injury; knives cut, axes split, dynamite explodes, food

spoils, poison kills. Where the danger is obvious and

known to the user, no warning is necessary and no liability

— A-26 —

attaches for an injury occurring from the reasonable haz-

ards attached to the use of chattels or commodities, but

where the dangerous condition is latent it should be dis-

closed to the user, and non-disclosure should subject the

maker or supplier to liability for creating an unreasonable

risk.

I believe that as a matter of law Marine Development was not

liable here, because the installation of the air conditioner in a

manner which permitted the introduction of carbon monoxide

into the unit's air intake was an obvious danger and a manu-

facturer is entitled to assume that his product will not be used

in an obviously dangerous manner. Marker v. Universal Oil

Products Co., 250 F.2d 603, 606-607 (10th Cir. 1957); see

Brown v. General Motors Corp., 355 F.2d 814, 819-821 (4th

Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1036 (1967). This is so

a fortiori where the product is merely a component which is to

be incorporated into a system by technicians and engineers, as

Boatel’s personnel were here. Jacobson v. Colorado Fuel &

Iron Corp., 409 F.2d 1263, 1273 (9th Cir. 1969). The ma-

jority has come dangerously close to making the manufacturer

an insurer in this case. 1 would reverse on the issue of Marine

Development's liability.

I also dissent from the affirmance of the award of over half

a million dollars in damages. It is inconceivable to me how—

when “economists have fared only slightly better than fortune

tellers and soothsayers” and the prediction of inflationary or de-

flationary trends by an expert is “to a considerable extent specu-

lative and conjectural” —we can allow a federal judge to do what

the acknowledged experts in the field cannot; that is to project

a specific annual inflation rate over a person's life expectancy.

As we recognized most recently in Johnson v. Serra, 521 F.2d

1289, 1295-1296 (8th Cir. 1975): “The federal circuits that

have faced the issue in cases involving federally created claims,

governed by federal rather than state law, have for the most

—_

part rejected * * * trial court consideration of future inflationary

trends in damage assessment.” (Footnote omitted.) In Johnson

we indicated we would probably follow the majority rule in a

case applying federal law, such as this admiralty claim. John-

son v. Serra, supra, 521 F.2d at 1295. The majority goes fur-

ther today than we went in Riha v. Jasper Blackburn Corp., 516

F.2d 840, 843-845 (8th Cir. 1975). Certainly it goes further

than we said we would go in Johnson.

I also have grave doubts about some of the matters considered

by the trial court in computing the contributions Mr. Heiman

would have made to his family. These included: 1) considera-

tion of the salary the decedent had earned eight to ten years

before his death in a business unrelated to his livelihood at the

time of the accident, 2) consideration of a “management fee” of

5-6% of the value of apartments owned and operated by the de-

cedent after finding that he probably would have lost 75% of

those real estate holdings, had he lived, 3) considering living

expenses of the Heiman family which were incurred after Mr.

Heiman’s death in order to show what the decedent would

have been able to contribute.

Under the circumstances, I do not think an award of over

$512,000 was appropriate. Accordingly, | would remand this

case to the district court with directions to dismiss Marine De-

velopment as a defendant and for reconsideration of the ques-

tion of damages.

A true copy.

Attest

Clerk, U. S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit

— A-28 —

APPENDIX G

In the United States District Court

Eastern District of Arkansas

Western Division

Mrs. Alana G. Heiman in her own right; Sandra Jean Heiman,

by Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, her Mother and Next Friend: and

H. Maurice Mitchell and Joseph W. Gelzine, Co-Administra-

tors in Succession with Will Annexed of the Estate of Max

Heiman, Deceased

Plaintiffs

v. No. LR-73-C-261

Boatel Company, Inc., Marine Development Corporation, and

Medlin Marine, Inc.

Defendants

Kohler Co.

Third-Party Defendant

Memorandum Opinion

The defendants, Medlin Marine, Inc. and Marine Development

Corporation, have now submitted very able briefs to the Court,

arguing their differing views concerning the law of indemnity

and contribution as applied to the findings and conclusions

heretofore made by the Court. The issues tendered have be-

come of utmost important to the parties because of the bank-

ruptcy of the defendant manufacturer, Boatel Company.

The very strong and immediate reaction of the Court upon

reading the briefs of these two parties is that neither result con-

tended for would work justice in this case. On the contrary,

to accept the position of either would, in the opinion of the

— A-29 —

Court, result in an extremely unjust apportionment of the finan-

cial responsibility arising out of the joint and several liability

of these defendants to the plaintiffs. It is true that the Court

has heretofore apportioned the fault predicated upon negligence

as between the two defendants held to be negligent, i.e., Boatel

and Marine Development, but it has not made any determina-

tion of the comparative fault between the defendant Medlin

and the defendant Marine, or any other defendant. The basic

fallacy of Marine’s position is that Medlin, because of its legal

relationship with Boatel, should at the very least stand in the

shoes of Boatel in terms of any apportionment of fault. From

all that has been said in open court and in the prior Memo-

randum Opinion, it should be quite clear that, on any scale, the

fault of Boatel far exceeded that of Medlin. On the other hand,

the error of Medlin is in assuming, because of the Court’s find-

ing that Medlin’s liability was one based simply upon Medlin’s

legal position as the retailer of the boat, that Medlin is “without

fault”. The truth is that the law of strict liability implies fault.

Medlin chu.< to deal with Boatel and to place the latter’s prod-

ucts in the hands of the public. In other words, Medlin sells

to the public instrumentalities which, if they are defective, have

a great potential for harm. The policy of the law is indeed re-

flected in the very theory of strict liability.

After analyzing the precedents cited by both Medlin and

Marine the Court is convinced that we are dealing with a prob-

lem of contribution among tortfeasors rather than the question

of tort indemnity. [The problem, however, is that we are called

upon to compare the fault of one held liable on a theory of

strict liability with the fault of another held liable on a theory

of negligent failure to warn.]

One thing is clear from the facts of the case: the principal

“culprit”, the principal wrongdoer in this tragedy, was obviously

Boatel. Whether you examine Boatel’s responsibility on the

basis of strict liability, implied warranty, or negligence, that

— A-30 —

liability and its predominating causative relationship to the

death and injuries here is obvious, clear and certain. If it is

open to the Court to determine where the loss should rest as

between the two other defendants whose fault is so much less,

relatively, than Boatel, then the Court would find it most diffi-

cult to find greater fault on the part of one than the other,

viewing “fault” in the light of the facts and the policies and

attitudes reflected in the law concerning negligence and strict

liability.

After examining the precedents submitted, the Court has

concluded that it is open to the Court to apportion the loss be-

tween the two financially responsible defendants in accordance

with the facts of the case. Those facts have been adequately

found and treated by the Court from the bench and in the

prior written memorandum. From a review thereof, the Court

concludes that the fault of Marine and Medlin is equal.

Dated this Sth day of May, 1975.

/s/ GARNETT THOMAS EISELE

United States District Judge

Filed May 5, 1975

— A-31 —

APPENDIX H

In the United States District Court

Eastern District of Arkansas

Western Division

Alana G. Heiman; Sandra Jean Heiman; and H. Maurice Mit-

chell and Joseph W. Gelzine, Co-Administrators in Succes-

sion with Will Annexed of the Estate of Max A. Heiman, De-

ceased,

Plaintiffs,

VS. No. LR-73-C-261

Boatel Company, Inc.; Marine Development Corporation; Med-

lin Marine, Inc.; and Kohler Co.,

Defendants.

Judgment

On February 5, 1975, the above cause comes on for trial in

admiralty before the Court, the plaintiffs appearing by their

counsel, Henry Woods and Steele Hays, the defendant Medlin

Marine, Inc. by its counsel, William H. Sutton, the defendant

Marine Development Corporation by its counsel, Phillip Car-

roll, and the defendant Kohler Co. by its counsel, William R.

Overton and Gordon S. Rather, Jr. The defendant Boatel Com-

pany, Inc. does not appear and has not filed a responsive plead-

ing in this cause. All parties present having announced ready

for trial, the plaintiffs’ counsel announces in open court that

it desires to dismiss its cause of action against Kohler Co., which

the Court thereupon entered with prejudice, but the cause con-

tinues against Kohler on the cross claims of defendants Medlin,

Marine, Inc. and Marine Development Corporation.

— A-32 —

Testimony began on February 5, 1975, continued through

February 11, 1975, and resumed on February 26, 1975, con-

tinued through March 4, 1975, at which point all the parties

rested. The Court thereupon made its findings of fact and dic-

tated them into the record in open court and on March 7, 1975,

a Memorandum Opinion was filed by the Court. Since the

filing of such Memorandum Opinion, it has come to the atten-

tion of the Court that it misunderstood the testimony concern-

ing the future life and work expectancies of the decedent;

such future work expectancy is found to be 21.6 years and

such future life expectancy is found to be 22.6 years. Based

upon the findings of fact and the Memorandum Opinion, it is

the judgment and order of the Court that the plaintiffs H. Mau-

rice Mitchell and Joseph W. Gelzine, Co-Administrators of the

Estate of Max A. Heiman, deceased, do have and recover from

the defendants Medlin Marine, Inc., Marine Development Cor-

poration and Boatel Company, Inc., on behalf of the wife, ch:’-

dren and estate of Max A. Heiman, the following amounts:

Alana G. Heiman, wife ............ $443,762.07

Sanda Jean Heiman, daughter ....... 41,536.33

Judith Heiman Samuel, daughter ...... 21,000.00

Estate of Max R. Heiman ........... 5,096.85

Judgment is therefore entered jointly and severally on behalf

of said co-administrators against defendants Medlin Marine,

Inc., Marine Development Corporation and Boatel Company,

Inc. in the amounts set forth above.

In open court, the attorneys for all parties agreed that Sandra

Jean Heiman had attained her majority while this action was

pending and the Court does therefore find that she is now en-

titled to have judgment individually in her own right and that

the style of this action has been arnended accordingly.

It Is Further Ordered and Adjudged that Alana G. Heiman,

for her personal injuries, do have and recover the sum of

— A-33 —

Twenty Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety-three and 50/100

Dollars ($20,893.50) from Medlin Marine, Inc., Marine De-

velopment Corporation and Boatel Company, Inc., and judg-

ment is hereby entered jointly and severally against those de-

fendants for such amount.

It Is Further Ordered and Adjudged that Sandra Jean Heiman,

for her personal injuries, do have and recover the sum of Seven-

teen Thousand Five Hundred Thirty-seven and 88/100 Dollars

($17,537.88) from Medlin Marine, Inc., Marine Development

Corporation and Boatel Company, Inc., and judgment is hereby

entered jointly and severally against those defendants for such

amount.

It Is Further Ordered and Adjudged that each of the above

amounts for which judgment was granted shall bear interest at

the rate allowed by the laws of the State of Arkansas in accord-

ance with 28 U.S.C.A. § 1961. It was agreed in open court by

the attorneys for all parties to this action that each of the above

amounts for which judgment was granted shall bear interest

from March 12, 1975.

The cross complaints by Marine Development Corporation

and Medlin Marine, Inc. against Kohler Co. are dismissed. The

relative degree of fault between the defendants Boatel Company,

Inc. and Marine Development Corporation is assessd as follows:

Boatel Company, Inc. 80%

Marine Development Corporation 20%

Medlin Marine, Inc. is hereby granted a judgment in in-

demnity against the defendant Boatel Company, Inc. for all

amounts for which judgment against Medlin Marine, Inc. has

been awarded herein in favor of the plaintiffs. The Court how-

ever reserves all questions of indemnity and contribution as be-

tween Marine Development Corporation and Medlin Marine,

Inc. for future determination.

ws 2 epee:

— A-34 — | — A-35 —

Costs are awarded in favor of the plaintiffs and defendant

Kohler Co. APPENDIX I

GARNETT THOMAS EISELE

United States District Judge In the United States District Court

Date: March 14, 1975 Eastern District of Arkansas

Western Division

Approved as to Form:

(Illegible) Mrs. Alana G. Heiman in Her Own Right; Sandra Jean Hei-

Attorney for Plaintiffs man, by Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, Her Mother and Next

WILLIAM H. SUTTON Friend; and H. Maurice Mitchell and Joseph W. Gelzine, Co-

Attorney for Defendant Administrators in Succession With Will Annexed of the Es-

Medlin Marine, Inc. tate of Max Heiman, Deceased,

PHILLIP CARROLL - De ian anes vomaine

Attorney for Defendant

Marine Development Corporation Boatel Company, Inc., Marine Development Corporation, and

WILLIAM R. OVERTON Medlin Marine, Inc.,

Attorney for Defendant Defendants,

Kohler Co. Kohler Co.,

Third-Party Defendant.

Memorandum Opinion

Although the trial of this cause lasted about ten days, most

of the basic facts are undisputed as will be revealed by an ex-

amination of the record. Because of the pressure of time and

judicial business, the Court must content itself with making the

essential findings with respect to disputed issues of fact and the

necessary conclusions of law, providing in the process only a

minimum of background information.

On September 1, 1973, Mr. Max Heiman, Mrs. Alana Hei-

man, his wife, and Miss Sandra Heiman, his daughter, went

on an outing in Mr. Heiman’s 47 ft. Islander yacht on the Arkan-

sas River. On leaving the Little Rock Yacht Club, Mr. Hei-

man radioed Mr. Harry Ehrenberg, who was upriver in his own

Nr

— A-36 —

boat and who had previously recommended a beach rendezvous

site to Mr. Heiman. Mr. Heiman asked Mr. Ehrenberg how to

get to the site, which was located one-quarter to one-half mile

past Palarm Creek on the way up the river. Mr. Ehrenberg

advised that it was somewhat difficult to find, and he therefore

volunteered to take his runabout out onto the river and lead

Mr. Heiman to the island where other boats had already assem-

bied. This he did, and Mr. Heiman brought his boat to the

island and beached it to the south of the other yachts. There

were approximately five boats in all that were beached along

the east side of the island. Mr. Heiman’s was the southernmost.

The bow of the boat rested on a very gentle slope in a manner

which did not lower the rear of the boat more than two or three

inches further down in the water than it would be if floating

free.

That evening before dinner, the Heimans came ashore and vis-

ited others on the boats to the north of them. The various

groups then returned to their own boats to dine. After dinner

the Heimans watched a football game and thereafter Mr. Hei-

man came ashore again and walked his dog. He told Mr. Ehren-

berg that he did not wish to go fishing the next day, but intended

to rest. The Heimans retired about 10:30 on the evening of

September 1.

On the morning of September 2, the Ehrenbergs and others in

the group were fishing and visiting up and down the line of

boats and getting ready for a fish fry. Later on, Mrs. Ehren-

berg became concerned since she had not observed any activity

on the Heiman boat. She insisted that Mr. Ehrenberg go over

to the boat to invite them to join the others. Mr. Sam Winstead

and Mr. Ehrenberg boarded the Heiman yacht, but could not

arouse anyone or open the door. Mr. Winstead pried the slid-

ing glass door open with a screwdriver, and he and Mr. Ehren-

berg rushed in. Mr. Winstead turned off the generator, and they

both then ran out for air. They immediately re-entered and

—_—<

found Mr. and Mrs. Heiman on the two beds in the rear living

compartment. Mr. Heiman was apparently dead. They man-

aged to get the Heimans out on the open deck. Mrs. Heiman

rolled her eyes and Sandra spoke once, but each then lapsed

back into a coma. Since Mr. Winstead had the fastest boat, the

Heimans were placed upon it and it returned with them to the

Little Rock Yacht Club. The Heiman yacht was piloted back

to the Little Rock Yacht Club by Mr. Dick Herget, who

entered the Heiman vessel with a deputy sheriff. Everyone was

instructed not to disturb anything on the boat. When the boat

was back at the Little Rock Yacht Club, Mr. Herget locked it

and delivered the keys to Mr. Buddy Payne. Mr. Payne kept

the boat locked thereafter, only opening it at the direction of

the attorneys.

Contributory Negligence of Mr. and Mrs. Max Heiman and

Sandra Heiman

The defendants have contended that Mr. and Mrs. Max Hei-

man and Sandra Heiman were contributorially negligent. A

contrary finding has already been made of record in open court.

An additional point, probably, needs to be made. The defend-

ants suggest that if the craft is anchored in open water it will

weather-vane with the wind and this would avoid the precise

problem which occasioned the death of Mr. Heiman and the

injuries of Mrs. Heiman and Miss Sandra Heiman. The short

answer to this is that all who were involved in the manufacture,

sale and operation of such craft knew, and know, that they will

be frequently beached for recreational purposes rather than

anchored in open water. Further, if the carbon monoxide haz-

ard was known, or should have been known, and the safeguard

against same was to be the requirement that the boat always

be anchored in open water where it could freely pivot 360

degrees, then obviously a clearcut instruction and warning to

this effect would be required. None was given or suggested.

— A-38 —

Boatel Liability

The Court made most of its findings of fact and conclusions

of law with respect to the liability of the various parties in open

court the day after the conclusion of the trial. The following

findings and conclusions are supplementary to those stated from

the bench and must be read in conjunction therewith to be

properly understood.

The defendant Boatel Company, Inc. sold its product, the 47

ft. Islander, to the defendant Medlin Marine, Inc. in defective

condition, unreasonably dangerous to the potential purchaser

and likely users. At the time of the sale, Boatel was engaged in

the business of selling boats and yachts, and the 47 ft. Islander

yacht which was sold by it to Medlin Marine, Inc. and thence

to Mr. Max Heiman was a standard production item. As was

expected, the boat did reach the purchaser, Mr. Max Heiman,

and the other likely users of that boat, without substantial

change in the condition from that which existed at the time

it left the manufacturing plant in Mora, Minnesota. The prod-

uct was so dangerous and hazardous, as delivered to Medlin Ma-

rine and as delivered to Mr. Max Heiman, that no prudent man-

ufacturer or seller would have marketed it had it been aware of

the defective conditions and their potential. The defective con-

ditions have heretofore been stated in open court, and those

conditions were proximate causes of the death of Mr. Max

Heiman and the injuries sustained by Mrs. Alana Heiman and

Miss Sandra Heiman.

Kohler Liability

On the day after the completion of the trial, the Court made

findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to various

liability issues. It concluded that Marine Development Corpora-

tion was liable to the plaintiffs, but it did not make a determina-

— A-39 —

tion as to the liability of the Kohler Company. Rather, the Court

on that occasion made certain factual findings concerning the

role of the Kohler Company, but expressly reserved the issue

of Kohler’s liability for further study. At this time the Court

supplements its findings of fact and conclusions of law with re-

spect to Kohler’s liability as follows:

The third-party defendant, Kohler Company, knew, or had

reason to know or believe, that its gasoline-driven generator

would be installed in the engine compartment of a boat man-

ufactured by Boatel and, further, that such boat would have

sizeable holes or openings in the forward wall of the engine

compartment. Kohler also knew, or had reason to know or be-

lieve, that its generator unit might very likely be integrated with,

and used together with, a recirculating air conditioning system.

Kohler also knew, or had reason to know or to believe, that

leaks do occasionally develop in the exhaust systems of marine

generator engines resulting in the direct discharge of carbon

monoxide into the engine compartment. It also knew that these

leaks could occur through accident or ordinary wear and tear.

And, of course, it is undisputed that Kohler sold the engine

that produced the carbon monoxide that resulted in the death

and injuries in this case, and Kohler was fully aware of the fact

that its engine would produce carbon monoxide and that that

gas was potentially lethal.

The only real liability question in connection with Kohler is

whether it had a duty to warn and, then, if it did have such a

duty which it failed to discharge, was the breach of that duty

a proximate cause of the death and injuries in this case?

There was evidence in this case that carbon monoxide in the

engine compartment would probably diffuse and flow through

the openings in the engine compartment forward wall whether

there was an air conditioning system on the boat or not. There

is even testimony that if there were lethal concentrations of car-

bon monoxide in the engine compartment that lethal concen-

0

— A-40 —

trations would eventually build up in the living compartments

even in the absence of an air conditioning system. In the Court's

judgment, however, the evidence did not, and does not, sup-

port a finding that concentrations of carbon monoxide which

would be hazardous to life or health would penetrate into the

living areas of a boat in the absence of an improperly installed

air conditioning system.' When the generator engine is oper-

ating, it creates a negative pressure in the engine compartment

since it demands a source of air and oxygen. Of course, if there

were a sufficient leak directly from the exhaust system into the

engine compartment, positive pressures could be created which

could result in an outflow of carbon monoxide into the living

quarters.

The key question here is whether the Kohler Company had

reason to know, understand, and believe that the presence of

carbon monoxide in the engine compartment could be poten-

tially hazardous to the occupants and users of the boat in the

living compartments of the boat. If so, it could be argued that

it should have warned against any foreseeable circumstance

which would permit the introduction of carbon monoxide into

that engine compartment, and, again if it had that knowledge,

then it should warn the manufacturer and the potential users

of the potential, through accident or wear and tear, of a leak

developing in the exhaust system within the engine compart-

ment, and it would also have a duty to warn the boat manu-

facturer not to create entryways from outside of the boat in

the vicinity of the exhausts which would permit the reintroduc-

tion of the carbon monoxide into the engine compartment.

Here, Kohler argues, in effect, that it gave such a warning when

its manual stated, “never put inlets in the transom”. It has al-

ready been stated in open court that this language would avail

' It should be noted, and the Court so finds, that there is no

significant difference in the airflow situation in the case of a properly

installed recirculating air conditioning and heating system from that

which obtains in the complete absence of an air conditioning and

heating system.

ek ees

om Ant <-

Kohler little because, taken in appropriate context, it obviously

referred to the proper construction of the ventilation system,

and the inlet ventilators, which are designed to operate while

the boat is in motion, obviously would not work if installed

on the transom. But, even assuming the language was intended

to guard against the very thing that Boatel in fact did here.

was it adequate as a warning as contrasted to its adequacy as a

construction instruction. If this were the sole issue, the Court

would have to resolve it against Kohler in the same fashion that

it resolved a similar argument against Marine Development Cor-

poration, because, clearly, the language does not suggest in

any way the potential hazard to life and health that might re-

sult from the failure to follow the instruction.

All this brings us back to the most difficult question: “know-

ing that carbon monoxide might be in the engine compartment

as a result of the operation of its generator engine at some

time during the life of the boat. and knowing that there were

Openings from the engine compartment communicating di-

rectly with the living areas of the boat, did Kohler have a duty

to warn Boatel not to put holes in the exterior of the boat in

the vicinty of the engine exhausts, which holes would directly

communicate with the engine compartment, and to further point

out that to do so might have the effect of producing death or

injuries to those occupying the living spaces of the boat. The

answer to this question must turn on the further question: did

Kohler know, or should it have known, that an air conditioning

system, improperly installed, or however installed, might pump

carbon monoxide out of the engine compartment and into the

living areas of the boat.” On the basis of the evidence, the

Court must find that Kohler did not know of this effect (indeed.

none of the parties did until after the accident) and it further

finds and concludes that it had no duty to know, or reason to

know, of this potential. To hold otherwise would charge the

manufacturer of a generator with the unreasonable requirement

of having to be intimately aware of the tendencies and propen-

ee ee

—_.

sities and nature of a// appliances and systems that might take

electric energy from a generating unit. The Court concludes,

while recognizing that the question here is a close one, that the

law does not go that far and, therefore, that Kohler had no duty

to warn Boatel which could form a predicate for liability against

it in this case.

Upon the basis of the same analysis, the Court must con-

clude that Kohler had no duty to warn or recommend that the

bilge blower be operated continuously when the generator en-

gine or the other engines were operating and the boat was nof

under way. Until the post-accident analysis of this case. at any

rate, the purpose and function of the bilge blower was consid-

ered by all to be simply a method of ventilating the engine com-

partment for the purpose of eliminating potentially explosive

fumes. It was not conceived by anyone that it would have any

relationship to the potential carbon monoxide problem.

Damages

The United States Supreme Court in Sea-Land Services, Inc.

v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 584, states that, under the maritime

wrongful-death remedy, the decedent's dependants may recover

damages “for the loss of support. services, and society. as well

as funeral expenses”. It then goes on to discuss these elements

of damages:

“Recovery for loss of support has been universally recog-

nized, and includes all the financial contributions that the

decedent would have made to his dependents had he lived.

Similarly, the overwhelming majority of state wrongful-

death acts and courts interpreting the Death on the High

Seas Act have permitted recovery for the monetary value

of services the decedent provided and would have con-

tinued to provide but for his wrongful death. Such services

include, for example, the nurture, training, education, and

—_—~

guidance that a child would have received had not the

parent been wrongfully killed. Services the decedent per-

formed at home or for his spouse are also compensable.

“Compensation for loss of society, however, presents a

closer question. The term ‘society’ embraces a broad range

of mutual benefits each family member receives from the

others’ continued existence, including love, affection, care,

attention, companionship, comfort, and protection. Un-

questionably, the deprivation of these benefits by wrongful

death is a grave loss to the decedent's dependents.”

. * * * * * *

“Finally, in addition to recovery for loss of support,

services, and society, damages for funeral expenses may be

awarded under the maritime wrongful-death remedy in

circumstances where the decedent's dependents have either

paid for the funeral or are liable for its payment.”

As a footnote to its discussion of “loss of society,” the Court

made it clear that this element should not be confused with

mental anguish or grief which are not compensable under the

maritime wrongful-death remedy. It states that loss of society

“entails the loss of positive benefits,” while mental anguish or

grief “represents an emotional response to the wrongful death.”

A “dependent” for our purposes may be such beyond his or

her legal majority and may be such independent of the legal

responsibilities imposed by state law. This is particularly so

with respect to certain “unfinished business” in the maturation

process such as advanced, college-level education. Where the

evidence discloses the intent and ability to pursue such an edu-

cation on the part of a child of the decedent and the con-

comitant determination to, and ability to, provide such educa-

tional opportunities on the part of the decedent himself, then

that child would remain a “dependant” for such purposes until

completion of the educational process.

— A-44 —

A. Contributions

From the evidence it is clear beyond question that Mr. Hei-

man was an exceptional person and an ideal husband and father.

He occupied an important place in the civic and business life

of the Little Rock community and the highest positions of lay

leadership in his church. He was devoted to his wife and his

daughters and always put their interests first. He was concerned

with their welfare and did his utmost to shield them from life’s

difficulties and vicissitudes. He had an intense personal interest

in the education of the daughters. He was a “family man” in

the sense that his whole life revolved about his wife and daugh-

ters. The members of the family spent much more of their

“free” time enjoying the companionship of each other than one

would expect in the average family.

Although the status of Mr. Heiman’s economic condition at

the time of his death, based as it was upon income from a motel

and from apartment complexes located in Arkansas and Florida,

was precarious and deteriorating, it is likely that, had he lived,

he would have salvaged at least some small part of his holdings.

Mr. Heiman had broad family and personal contacts with in-

fluential and wealthy businessmen throughout the country, and

he also had what appears to be an unusual ability to borrow

money, considering the status of his overall financial condition.

This is dramatically illustrated by the evidence indicating that

he had arranged an additional $100,000 loan just a few days

nrior to his death.

Nevertheless, a fair interpretation of the evidence forces the

Court to find that, had Mr. Heiman lived, he would have needed

a combination of great effort and extremely good fortune to

salvage even as much as a fourth of his overall holdings and

that, realistically, it is more probable that, had he lived, Mr.

Heiman would only have been able to extricate himself from

his financial difficulties without any net personal obligation,

salvaging only a small, perhaps even nominal, amount of his

cane ein ea

— A-45 —

business holdings. The Court must analyze the probable “con-

tributions” element of damages with this finding in mind.

Mr. Heiman can be considered a victim of the times in the

sense that practically all of the overall financial conditions and

circumstances affecting the success of such investments went

sour at about the same time. Beyond that, he possibly did not

retrench when he should have. His concern for and interest in

his family, and his hope, based more upon wish than reality, led

him into the practice of using cash flow from depreciation as

the basis for contributions to his family and his own living ex-

penses. As a result, when conditions began to approach the

critical stage, he did not have the necessary reserves to fall back

upon to tide him over. This left him with only one possible

recourse: to borrow more, and this alternative would itself be-

come increasingly more difficult.

The evidence clearly establishes that Mr. Heiman was a man

of business and executive ability. Before 1965 he had held

positions of responsibility with one of the largest department

stores in the State of Arkansas, the Gus Blass Company. The

evidence from his W-2 forms indicates that his average annual

income for the last three years he was with the Gus Blass Com-

pany (1963, 1964 and 1965) was in excess of $20,000. The

compensation for performing similar services in 1975 would

obviously be considerably in excess of that figure. The evidence

of his ability to command executive-level compensation from

third-party employers is clear and convincing. This, then, is

another of the bases upon which the Court's decision concern-

ing the amount and probability of future contributions must be

predicated.

When Mr. Heiman got seriously involved in the real estate,

motel and apartment building ventures, he devoted most of his

time to personally overseeing such operations. He maintained

an office with a secretary at the Holcomb Heights Apartments.

It is true that he had on-the-site employees who looked after

— A-46 —

the routine operations, the collection of rents, and maintenance.

But, with the exception of the Fair Park Gardens, which were

under a management arrangement with Block Realty Company,

he contributed a considerable amount of his time to the overall

management of the properties. The evidence indicates that, had

Mr. Heiman not been performing these services, he would have

had the alternative of contracting for such services with some

real estate management company. The usual fee for such serv-

ices would run in the neighborhood of five to six percent of the

gross receipts. Of course, such a firm would have had to pay

the management expenses and wages of the on-the-site employees

out of its fees. Looking at Mr. Heiman’s “tax records” covering

his various operations over a period of years, the Court finds

that he was performing services which, had they been con-

tracted, would have required the payment of at least $20,000

per year over and above the management and employee expense

actually experienced.

It is clear from the evidence that Mrs. Heiman had no knowl.

edge of her husband's business affairs prior to his death, and it

is also clear that Mr. Heiman shielded her from even the routine

responsibilities of paying household bills and expenses. There-

fore, she personally kept no records of, and has no knowledge

of, the contributions made to her and the family prior to Mr.

Heiman’s death. The executors have found records kept by Mr.

Heiman, however, which provide some insight into the con-

tributions made to the family over recent years. In addition,

Mrs. Heiman has kept an accurate record of her expenses since

Mr. Heiman’s death, and has testified that those expenditures

have been in line with, and certainly not more than, those in-

curred in prior years. Looking at both Mrs. Heiman’s testi-

mony as to her actual expenses since Mr. Heiman’s death and the

tax records and other records kept by Mr. Heiman reflecting

contributions prior to his death, the Court finds that on an

average Mr. Heiman was contributing just under $30,000 to

the living expense requirements of the entire family. In making

rte tem Oe ee

—_S

this determination, the Court has disregarded certain items, such

as jewelry expenditures, from the figures testified to by Mrs. Hei-

man on the one hand, and, on the other hand, has reduced the

figures revealed by Mr. Heiman’s records by the amounts of the

insurance premiums, the boat expense, and certain other ex-

penses. Had he lived, Mr. Heiman’s own living expenses

would have had to be defrayed out of the total living expense

contributions. Furthermore, if, as the Court suspects, financial

circumstances would have required Mr. Heiman to accept em-

ployment from a third-party employer, he would, of course, have

had to pay state and federal income taxes on his compensation,

a situation which would be entirely different from the tax

situation which had existed in the years immediately prior to

his death where, because of the nature of his investments and

the tax laws involved, he was not required to pay such taxes.

The Court is convinced that, had Mr. Heiman lived, he and

his family would have had to cut down somewhat on their over-

all style of living but would still have been able to live most

comfortably.

From all the evidence, the Court finds that through one

method or another Mr. Heiman, had he lived, would have been

able to provide and would in fact have provided contributions

and support to the other members of his family (i.e., excluding

himself) in the sum of $22,500.00 per year, measured in 1975

dollars, over the remaining working years of his life.

The plaintiffs put in evidence experience tables showing a

23.3 year life expectancy for a 48-year-old man. There was

evidence indicating that Mr. Heiman had in the past suffered a

heart attack, but there is no indication that he was not enjoying

reasonably good health just prior to his death. From the evi-

dence the Court finds that Mr. Heiman would have lived 21

more years and that he would have remained active as an

economic producer for 20 years, calculated from the date of

his death.

—_e

Since the Court is convinced that decedent would have paid

the full costs of his daughters’ college educations, it is obvious

that during those years when such payments would be required,

less would be available for the support of Mrs. Heiman. This

situation would reverse, however, when the daughters had com-

pleted their educations and were either married or “on their

own”.

B. Loss of services.

Under the Gaudet case, supra, “services” would include the

nurture, training, education, and guidance that Sandra and Judy

would have received had Mr. Heiman survived, and would also

include those services which he would have performed at home

or for his wife. With respect to the former, the Court must

find and conclude that both Sandra and Judy actually received

nurture, training, education, and guidance from their father

over the really important formative years of their lives. They

now possess in their personalities the benefits of those important

contributions to their lives. That Mr. Heiman would have con-

tinued to provide guidance, had he lived, is equally obvious.

The point is, however, that the “twig had already been bent”

and that Mr. Heiman’s future contributions in this respect

would have been more on the basis of the mutual interchange

one finds among equal adults in a family unit. The Court is

assessing some damages for this loss, while recognizing that it

was minimal under the circumstances. The Court fixes the lump

sum of $1,000.00 as the present value of such loss to Judy Hei-

man and the sum of $2,000.00 as the present value of such

loss to Sandra Heiman, taking into consideration the difference

in the ages and status of independence of the two girls at the

time of Mr. Heiman’s death.

The situation is different with respect to Mrs. Heiman. The

evidence indicates that Mr. Heiman provided much in the way

CC $-$§— —=aSaS_—— SS

—_S

of personal services for Mrs. Heiman and for the support of

the homeplace itself. He worked around the house. kept the

family’s books, paid the family’s bills, and provided much in

the way of direct assistance to his wife. The Court finds that

the reasonable value, on an annual basis, of such services would

amount to $1,000.00 in 1975 dollars and that such services

would have continued for the balance of Mr. Heiman’s life.

C. Loss of Society.

The Gaudet case, supra, makes it clear that the decedent's

dependants are entitled to recover for “loss of society” which,

according to the Supreme Court, embraces a broad range of

mutual benefits, including “love, affection, care, attention, com-

panionship, comfort, and protection”. Although it is difficult to

place a value upon such things—most people feeling that it is

impossible to measure such benefits in terms of dollars—still

lump sum awards will be made to reflect those important losses

in this case as follows:

1. For Mrs. Heiman $35,000.00

2. For Mrs. Lou (Judy) Samuel $10,000.00

3. For Miss Sandra Heiman $15,000.00

D. Funeral expenses.

Finally, the Gaudet case makes it clear that a recovery is per-

mitted for funeral expenses. The Court finds the funeral ex-

pense to be $5,096.85.

Damages of Mrs. Alana Heiman and Sandra Jean Heiman

Mrs. Heiman testified that she recalls that the family retired

about 10:30 on the evening of September 1. The next thing

— A-50 —

that she recalls is her awakening in the intensive care unit of

St. Vincent Infirmary several days after the accident. From

other evidence the Court determines that Mrs. Heiman first re-

gained significant consciousness on September 5. She was not

really clear of mind until September 6. As she regained con-

sciousness, she found that it was difficult to breathe (a trache-

ostomy having been performed while she was still in a comatose

state) and noticed that her hands were bound to the side of

the bed. She was confused and became instinctively terrified. She

was receiving fluids intravenously and had to be suctioned

when she began to cough. As she regained awareness of the

situation, she found that she was on a respirator. Her leg, in

which she had phlebitis and in which she had received a

transfusion, caused her pain. She recalls developing pneumonia,

with attendant fatigue, coughing and pain in her chest.

She is aware that she developed cerebral edema and heart

difficulties which occasioned numerous cardiograms.

Mrs. Heiman has made a remarkable recovery, considering

her close brush with death. She has continuing difficulty with

her leg, which swells when she is on it for any length of time.

When the leg swells, it causes pain. She has experienced no

continued difficulty as a result of the tracheostomy except an Oc-

casional feeling of “drawing” or tension in her throat. Psycho-

logically she has not made as complete a recovery. She still is

extremely nervous and, on occasion, becomes emotionally upset.

She finds that she cries quite frequently, but is trying to fight

off these emotional residuals. She is, according to her own tes-

timony and the testimony of her doctor, coping quite well with

these difficulties.

When Sandra Heiman first regained consciousness several

days after the accident in the intensive care unit of the hospital,

she, too, was very frightened. There were needles in her arms

and she had trouble breathing and talking. Her knees were

eee er eS ee ee ee ee

— A-51 —

swelling and causing considerable pain. As indicated in the

discussion of Dr. Levy's testimony below, Sandra has made a

remarkable recovery, but she does have some residuals. She

finds that she tires much more quickly now than before the

accident, feeling that she has somewhat limited breathing capac-

ity. Her voice is lower and cracks on occasion as a result of the

tracheostomy and treatment while in the hospital. She still has

a numb place on her leg.

Emotionally, Sandra finds that she still cries more often than

before, but it is evident to the Court, as it was to Dr. Levy, that

she is getting control of this situation.

It would be well at this time to discuss briefly the relation-

ship between Sandra and her father. Theirs was a particularly

close relationship. Sandra was a real “tomboy” and enjoyed

fishing, shooting skeet, and watching football games with her

father. She helped Mr. Heiman do such things as reloading

his shells and he, in turn, taught her how to drive an automobile.

In sum, there was a close, warm, affectionate relationship be-

tween Sandra Heiman and her father that was obvious not only

to Sandra and her father but also noted by the rest of the family

and the family’s friends.

Dr. Jerome Levy was the physician in charge of the han-

dling of Mrs. Heiman’s case and Sandra Heiman’s case. The

Court was most favorably impressed by the testimony of Dr.

Levy. That testimony reflected that nice balance of personal

concern for his patients and complete professional objectivity.

He was not cross-examined by any of the attorneys for the de-

fendants.

Dr. Levy is principally an internist. He first saw Mrs. Heiman

around 4:00 p.m. on September 2. (She had been earlier at-

tended by Dr. John Samuel in the emergency room. Dr. Sam-

uel is now deceased.) He found Mrs. Heiman unconscious and

— A-52 —

in a form of shock. She showed evidence of brain injury and

her pulse was rapid, although her blood pressure was normal.

When admitted, Mrs. Heiman’s lungs were clear and her breath-

ing was satisfactory. He assessed her overall condition as critical

due to carbon monoxide poisoning and sought consultation with

Dr. John Schultz, who was well-trained in respiratory problems,

and Dr. Howell, a neurologist. Dr. Schultz was called in because

Mrs. Heiman soon developed difficulty in breathing. Dr. Howell

was called in because of the fear of possible brain damage or

injury. As the breathing difficulty developed, it became ob-

vious that a tracheostomy would have to performed, and Dr.

Stewart, a chest surgeon, was called in for this purpose.

The breathing problem which developed is a form of respira-

tory failure. The collection of fluid in the tissue blocks the

oxygen distribution. Oxygen was administered and the trache-

ostomy permitted a satisfactory air exchange. Nevertheless,

Mrs. Heiman developed pneumonia. The carbon monoxide

soon produced cerebral edema in Mrs. Heiman. Although the

precise mechanics of causation are not known, the lack of oxy-

gen available to the tissue causes fluids to develop in the cells

and between the cells with consequent swelling. This is treated

by the tracheostomy and provision for pure oxygen heretofore

mentioned, and also by the use of dexamethasone, a steroid

which mobilizes the fluid permitting it to get into the blood-

stream and thus to be carried away.

About the time the doctors began to make progress with the

cerebral edema, they noted difficulties with Mrs. Heiman’s heart.

Some areas of the body are particularly susceptible to damage

due to loss of oxygen. The brain, lungs, heart and kidneys are

the critical organs. Heart tissue and cells become weak and do

not function properly because of lack of oxygen. Dr. Levy

testified that Mrs. Heiman did sustain injury to her heart re-

flecting myocardial damage. This condition was treated by rest,

oxygen and the use of a drug which regulated Mrs. Heiman’s

a —) meee

a ee ee

— A-53 —

blood pressure. The heart condition steadily improved, but it

was several months before Dr. Levy found the heart muscle

restored to its normal strength and condition.

Mrs. Heiman was in the hospital from September 2 to Sep-

tember 15, most of the time in intensive care.

The first day that Mrs. Heiman’s mind was clear was Sep-

tember 6. On that occasion she asked about Mr. Heiman, and

Dr. Levy told her the truth.

Dr. Levy has followed Mrs. Heiman since her discharge from

the hospital and has found that she has progressed very well

under the restrictions imposed by him. After approximately

six months, her physical condition stabilized, leaving her with

only minor physical residuals. She still has trouble with the

blockage of the vein in her leg resulting from the aggravation

of her phlebitis condition, but Dr. Levy is convinced, overall,

that she has done extremely well. Dr. Levy indicates that it will

take longer for Mrs. Heiman to attain complete relief from the

emotional and psychological results of her injuries, but he is

convinced that she is making a determined effort in this con-

nection.

Although Mrs. Heiman has made a remarkable recovery, it

is equally clear to the Court that she suffered great mental

and physical pain as a direct result of her exposure to the

carbon monoxide.

Dr. Levy also handled Sandra Heiman’s case. Sandra was 17

at the time of the accident and was just preparing to enter her

senior year in high school. Miss Heiman’s symptoms and diffi-

culties paralleled those of her mother, but in some areas were

worse, according to Dr. Levy. She developed an almost fatal

complication relating to her renal system. At the very time

when she was recovering from the same cerebral edema and

a a

aan Sip <n

heart conditions as those suffered by her mother, she had a

kidney failure which approached a uremic state. However, she

was treated for this condition and fortunately snapped back, and

thereafter proceeded steadily on the road to recovery. Sandra

also suffered from acute respiratory failure which also required

a tracheostomy. A respirator was used to assist her to breathe,

just as in the case of her mother. She also was discharged from

the hospital on September 15.

Dr. Levy states that the brain, heart, lung and kidney con-

ditions suffered by Sandra Heiman have been restored and re-

paired by nature’s efforts since then. Sandra, too, noted her own

remarkable recovery as far as her physical condition is con-

cerned. The main residual, according to Dr. Levy, is that result-

ing from emotional shock. Even in this area, it appears that she

has made good progress although, as expected she experiences

some relapses on occasion. It is clear from the evidence that

Sandra has suffered no permanent brain damage. She is mak-

ing an excellent scholastic record in college.

The Court finds the reasonable value of the medical and hos-

pital services rendered to Mrs. Heiman to be $5,893.50 and the

reasonable value of such services for Sandra Heiman to be

$5,037.88.

For all other appropriate elements of damage for their per-

sonal injuries, the Court finds that Mrs. Heiman is entitled to

the sum of $15,000.00 and Miss Sandra Heiman is entitled to

the sum of $12,500.00.

Besides Sandra Heiman, the Heimans had only one other

child, Judy, who is now Mrs. Lou Samuel. Judy was at the

University of Arkansas at Fayetteville when she learned of the

tragedy. She immediately came home and did not thereafter

return to the University at Fayetteville.

Judy, too, had a very special and close relationship with her

father. When Judy was at Sophie Newcomb College in New

ee

— A-55 —

Orleans, her father talked to her by long distance telephone

from his office at least once a week. Whenever he went to

Florida to check on his business investments, he would detour

through New Orleans so he could visit Judy. In addition, Mr.

and Mrs. Heiman both made frequent trips to New Orleans

to visit their daughter.

Judy was engaged to be married at the time of the accident.

Mr. Heiman made several trips with her about the country so

that she might find a wedding dress that they both liked. Such

episodes simply illustrate the basic relationship.

To further detail that evidence which so clearly shows the

strong mutual happy feelings of love, concern, understanding

and warm affection which characterized this strong family unit

would serve no useful purpose. What has been said should

suffice.

Damages—inflation factor

The Court is convinced that the law permits, and realism

requires, the assessment of any reasonably probable inflationary

or deflationary trend over the future years in which it is found

that contributions would have been made or services would

have been rendered by a decedent. Where a proper evidentiary

basis is laid, the Court should consider such trends and their

effect upon the purchasing and earning power of the dollar. The

Court was impressed with the testimony of Dr. Floyd Durham, a

professor of economics at Texas Christian University. While not

agreeing with certain of his findings and conclusions concerning

future trends, the Court was impressed with his overall analysis

thereof and has used that analysis, along with other evidence in

the case, in reaching its own conclusion as to an appropriate

adjustment in this case for inflationary trends.

— A-56 —

The law requires the trier of fact to determine the present

valuation of contributions which would have, had the decedent

lived, been made over a period of future years. To get the

present value, the trier of fact must determine an appropriate

discount rate. On the other side of the coin, the trier of the

facts should attempt to evaluate future inflationary trends in

order to properly reflect the purchasing and earning power of

the dollar over those same future years. Dr. Durham used a dis-

count rate of 4% percent and an inflationary rate of 5/2 per-

cent. The Court, on the other hand, finds that the more ap-

propriate discount rate would be 51% percent and the more

appropriate inflation rate would be 4 percent considering the

two decade projections we are working with here.

Indemnity

Medlin Marine, Inc. is entitled under the law to an indemnity

judgment over against the defendant Boatel for all amounts for

which judgment against Medlin has been awarded herein in

favor of the plaintiffs.

Contribution among tortfeasors

The Court fixes and assesses the relative degree of fault be-

tween the defendant Boatel Company and the defendant Marine

Development Corporation as follows:

Boatel Company 80%

Marine Development Corporation 20%

Filed March 7, 1975

as i a i se rn

—_v

[*1770] APPENDIX J

In the United States District Court, Eastern District

of Arkansas, Western Division

Mrs. Alana G. Heiman in Her Own,

Right; Sandra Jean Heiman, by Mrs.

Alana G. Heiman, Her Mother and

Next Friend; and H. Maurice Mitch-

ell and Joseph W. Gelzine, Co-Ad-

ministrators in Succession With Will

Annexed of the Estate of Max Hei-

man, Deceased, > No. LR-73-C-261

Plaintiffs,

Boatel Company, Inc., Marine Devel-

opment Corporation, Kohler Com-

pany, and Medlin Marine, Inc.,

Defendants. /

Trial

Before:

The Honorable Garnett Thomas Eisele,

United States District Judge

U. S. District Courtroom,

U. S. Post Office & Courthouse,

Little Rock, Arkansas,

March 4, 1975.

* Numbers appearing in brackets in text indicate page numbers

of original stenographic transcript of testimony.

— A-58 —

[1771] Appearances

On behalf of plaintiffs:

HENRY WOODS, Esq., of

McMath, Leatherman & Woods,

711 West Third Street,

Little Rock, Arkansas; and

STEELE HAYS, Esq., of

Spitzberg, Mitchell & Hays,

300 Garner Place,

Little Rock, Arkansas.

On behalf of defendant Marine Development Corporation:

PHILLIP CARROLL, Esq., and

VINCE FOSTER, Esq., of

Rose, Nash, Williamson, Carroll & Clay,

720 West Third Street,

Little Rock, Arkansas.

On behalf of defendant Medlin Marine:

WILLIAM H. SUTTON, Esq,., of

Smith, Williams, Friday, Eldredge & Clark,

1100 Boyle Building,

Little Rock, Arkansas.

On behalf of defendant Kohier Company:

WILLIAM R. OVERTON, Esq., and

GORDON S. RATHER, Esq., of

Wright, Lindsey & Jennings,

2200 Worthen Bank Building,

Little Rock, Arkansas.

— A-59 —

[1772] PROCEEDINGS

The Court: Good afternoon.

Mr. Woods.

Mr. Woods: Your Honor, I would like to introduce this

stipulation. I don’t guess it’s necessary to read it. The Court

and all the parties have copies of it. I will just introduce it as

an exhibit. I'll be glad to read it.

The Court: This had to do with damages?

Mr. Woods: Yes, sir.

The Court: It will be received in evidence as a stipulation.

Mr. Sutton: Your Honor, I think I speak for all the defend-

ants in saying that we do not object to the evidence not being

authenticated any more than what it is. This is what the stipu-

lation goes for, as far as we are concerned. We do object to it

on the grounds of relevance and on the grounds of not being

properly introducible at this time and as not being a proper

support of any loss of contributions that it might be offered to

prove.

The Court: Well, the Court is permitting it to be introduced

out of time, and the other objections will be overruled. It will

be received as the other evidence in the case.

Mr. Overton: I join in that objection.

Mr. Carroll: Marine joins.

[1773] The Court: All the defendants object to the receipt on

the basis stated by Mr. Sutton.

This will be Plaintiff's Exhibit 73, and it is received.

(The document referred to was marked for identification as

Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 73, and was received in evidence.)

— A-60 —

Mr. Overton: Your Honor, after all the evidence is com-

pleted, the defendant Kohler would like to renew its motions for

directed verdict on each of the cross complaints against it.

Mr. Sutton: Likewise for Medlin Marine. We would also

move that all is pleadings conform to the proof in the case.

The Court: I am going to permit all the pleadings to be con-

formed to the proof that has been received.

Mr. Carroll: Marine makes the same motion, Your Honor, in

its behalf.

The Court: Very well. All the motions have been received.

Their resolution really will be part of the general findings and

conclusions that the Court reaches in the case.

“I have not been able to make the progress I hoped I could,

but I have made some substantial progress and since you are

all here I intend to give the benefit of what I have [1774] ac-

complished as far as I have gone.

I am not today making any findings with respect to damages;

although, as you will note presently, those issues are very much

before the Court and I did spend some time on those issues

today, perhaps at the cost of the business at hand.

I am making these findings but I may well file additional

findings, even with respect to the issues covered here. I may

supplement these findings in a memorandum since a memo-

randum will have to be filed covering other issues anyway.”

I want to start by stating certain conclusions of law, par-

ticularly with respect to matters that I do not believe are sub-

ject to any real controversy and where the underlying facts are

quite clear.

(A) Boatel is liable to the plaintiffs on the bases of strict lia-

bility and negligent design.

(B) Medlin Marine, Incorporated is liable to the plaintiffs on

the bases of strict liability and implied warranty.

—_Y pe

There is no negligence or carelessness on the part of the de-

cedent, Mr. Max Heiman, or on the part of Alana G. Heiman

or Sandra Jean Heiman which caused or contributed to the death

of Mr. Heiman or to the injuries and damages sustained by

Alana Heiman and Sandra Jean Heiman.

The Court further concludes that the liability of the defend-

ant Medlin Marine, Incorporated is based upon the legal re-

lationships existing between it and the manufacturer, [1775] on

the one hand, and between it and Mr. Max Heiman on the other.

There is no separate and independent basis for liability of

Medlin Marine to the plaintiffs based upon the acts or omis-

sions of Medlin or any of its agents or employees. In this con-

nection the Court finds that none of the representatives of Med-

lin—any of its agents or employees—knew or should have

known of the four holes on the underside of the transom of the

Heiman boat prior to the accident.

Now this is probably not really in dispute, but I want to

make this finding. There is no evidence to indicate that either

Mr. Heiman or anyone else ever spent a night on the yacht

prior to the night of September 1, 1973. There is no evidence

to indicate or to suggest that the generator, air-conditioning

system on the yacht was ever, prior to September 1, 1973,

operated for any substantial period while the vessel was moored,

beached, or anchored.

In fact, the evidence is to the contrary, indicating this was

the first and only night the Heimans ever spent on the yacht

and the first and only occasion during which the generator,

air-conditioning systems were operated together for an extended

period of time while the boat was stationary.

The night in question was, according to Mr. Eherenberg—

and the Court so finds—was ideal. The water was calm. There

was a slight breeze from the east, which would mean that it

approached the Heiman boat from the stern.

— A-62 —

[1776] Now I am going to make what might be called “miscel-

laneous findings of fact,” because they are not really tied to-

gather in any narrative form, in response to the requests and

suggestions of the parties. Of course, it’s going to be necessary

that these findings be integrated in with and related to the other

findings that I am going to make today and perhaps later.

Considering the arrangement of the boat and its equipment

as it existed on September 1, 1973, a substantial risk existed

that discharged engine exhaust gases would be drawn back into

the engine compartment through the four water drain holes when

the generator engine alone was operating.

This process would be accelerated when the forward air-

conditioning system was activated. This would be so, even with

the sliding door entirely open: but the tendency would be in-

creased as the sliding door was progressively closed.

There are direct air passages, significant in size, between the

engine compartment and the other areas of the yacht as a result

of openings in the forward wall of the engine compartment. The

largest of these openings is next to the upper starboard wall of

the engine compartment. There is a smaller opening at a similar

location on the port side. In addition, there is a tiny crack

around the thermostat which is used to control the heater in the

engine compartment.

On the night in question carbon monoxide from the [1777]

generator engine was exhausted into the water immediately under

the overhang portion of the transom. The carbon monoxide,

which is slightly lighter than air and which was also warmer

that the ambient air, was propelled out of the water directly

under the transom where it was drawn through the four holes

in the transom into the engine compartment by the negative

pressure being created in the engine compartment by the opera-

tion of the generator and the air-conditioning system.

High concentrations of carbon monoxide developed in the

engine compartment and were drawn forward, principally

— A-63 —

through the right starboard opening in the engine compartment,

into the equipment room where the carbon monoxide entered

the forward cooling unit from which it was discharged into the

forward living areas and then circulated by both air-conditioning

units throughout the yacht.

The buildup of the carbon monoxide in the living quarters

resulted in the death of Mr. Max Heiman and the injuries to

Mrs. Heiman and Sandra Heiman.

A completely airtight bulkhead between the rear cabin and

the engine compartment of the Heiman yacht would have elimi-

nated the hazard of introducing carbon monoxide from the

generator engine into the living quarters of that vessel.

The introduction of an appropriately designed arrangement

which would induce fresh air into the air-conditioning system

at the proper point could have virtually eliminated the [1778]

hazard of introducing lethal quantities of carbon monoxide into

the living quarters of the vessel.

This simply means that positive pressure can be designed

into an air-conditioning system which will have the effect of

causing an outflow rather than an inflow of air from the engine

compartment. Such a system would probably require larger air-

conditioning tonnage and consequently cost more to obtain

the same cooling and heating effect as a recirculating system.

It should be noted, however, that elsewhere in my findings

I have found that there is nothing inherently or per se hazardous

in the use of a properly installed recirculating system on a boat

such as Mr. Heiman’s.

Leaks do occasionally develop in the exhaust systems of

marine generator engines and in the exhaust systems of marine

propulsion engines, resulting in the direct discharge of carbon

monoxide into the engiie compartment, and this fact was known

by or shouid have been known by the defendants and third-party

defendant, Kohler.

— A-64 —

The four holes in the transom of the Heiman yacht constitute

a defect which was a proximate cause of the death of Max Hei-

man and the injuries to Mrs. Heiman and Sandra Heiman, and

thus creates liability against Boatel and Medlin Marine on the

basis of strict liability.

The location of the intake for the forward [1779] air-condi-

tioner in the equipment room of the yacht, combined with the

making of the openings in the engine room forward bulkhead

and the location of such openings, together constitute a defect

which was a proximate cause of the death of Max Heiman and

the injuries to Mrs. Heiman and Sandra Heiman, thus creating

liability against Boatel and Medlin Marine on the basis of strict

liability and tort.

The defendant, Marine Development Corporation, did not

design the air-conditioning as it is found and arranged in the

Heiman boat. That design and arrangement was made and

carried out by Boatel alone and was in direct violation of the

clear and unambiguous installation instructions furnished by

Marine Development.

The Court finds and concludes that there is nothing inherently

or per se defective or hazardous in the use of properly installed

recirculating air-conditioning systems.

Further, although there was evidence to the contrary, the

Court finds that had the air-conditioning components provided

by Marine Development been properly installed by Boatel in

accordance with Marine’s manual the Heimans would not have

been harmed.

This finding must be limited to the facts of this case since

the evidence suggests that under altered configurations such a

system, even if installed according to the manual, might cause

or contribute to such an accident.

[1780] Therefore, the difficult question concerning Marine’s

liability does not turn on any defects in its components—there

were none—or upon its participation in the as-is design of the

— A-65 —

Heiman air-conditioning system; but rather upon its duty to

warn Boatel of the potential consequences of improperly install-

ing its components, given its knowledge or imputed knowledge of

the boat designs and given its overall business relationship with

Boatel.

It is clear from the evidence that none of the parties to this

action ever realized, prior to their investigations of this acci-

dent, the serious hazard which results from the improper loca-

tion of the cooling units when combined with the circumstances

that the bulkhead between the engine compartment and the

living spaces of the boat is not airtight or even substantially

airtight.

Still, the evidence is such that all of the defendants and the

cross-defendant, Kohler Company, knew or should have known

there was a risk—however slight—that carbon monoxide would,

at sometime during the life of the vessel, be in the engine com-

partment.

The principal basis for this statement is not that any of the

parties except Boatel knew or should have known that Boatel

would design a drain system as it did, thereby providing direct

access of carbon monoxide from outside the boat back into the

engine compartment; but rather that such [1781] parties knew

or should have known that carbon monoxide might, during the

life of the vessel, escape from either the generator motor or from

one of the two propulsion engines due to accident or ordinary

wear and tear during the life of the vessel.

The Court finds and concludes that Marine Development

Corporation knew or should have known that there were sig-

nificant openings from the engine compartment into the living

spaces—and I believe that statement was acknowledged in the

opening statement of Mr. Carroll—and that they knew or should

have known that carbon monoxide might, during the life of the

vessel, be found in the engine compartment in dangerous con-

centrations.

— A-66 —

Marine Development also knew or should have known that if

the forward cooling unit were installed as it was in the equip-

ment room it could and would, under certain forseeable circum-

stances, draw air from the engine compartment and circulate

it throughout the living areas of the boat.

Of all the parties to this action, Marine is and should be the

most knowledgeable with respect to the effects of air-condition-

ing systems and their operations. It has more than SO percent of

all the air-conditioning business in the class of boats and yachts

of the approximate size of the Heiman vessel.

It has held itself out as a specialist in marine air-conditioning

and has represented to its customers and to the public at large

that it has a long history of testing and [1782] improving its

products. It has maintained a close relationship with a large

number of boats manufacturers. It has a naval architect on its

staff and others experienced in boat construction.

It knew that with very rare exceptions all craft for which it

supplies air-conditioning equipment have non-airtight engine

compartments. It knew that the engine which drives the gen-

erator is almost invariably located in the engine compartment

along with the propulsion engines. It knew that its products

would be integrated with the Kohler unit or an Onan unit and

operated in conjunction with such a unit.

It is further clear from the evidence that Marine Development

, ‘ °

Corporation sells more than off-the-shelf products to its cus-

tomers, whether those customers be the manufacturers of boats

or its franchise dealers.

Marine, in fact, offers advice and assistance with respect to

the design and installation of the components which it manu-

factures. Here Boatel, if it actually received such advice, did

not follow it; but the question remains: should a party in the

position of Marine, with its superior knowledge and informa-

tion, not only advise its customers how properly to install its

products but also where there is a significant, known hazard to

— A-67 —

health or life which could result from improper installation,

clearly and specifically to warn thereof.

The Court has already found that Marine did not [1783]

really understand and appreciate the effect of the improper lo-

cation of its units in terms of the hazard to life and health in-

volved, although it did understand the effects of such improper

location upon the efficient operation of its cooling and heating

equipment.

The Court finds and concludes that defendant, Marine De-

velopment Corporation, should have known of the hazard to

life and health posed by the improper installation of its equip-

ment; and, therefore, that it should have warned Boatel in a

clear and unequivocal way concerning same.

A manufacturer must know the nature and propensities of

its products and warn of dangers created by that nature and

those propensities. In this connection a distinction must be

drawn between the duty to give adequate instructions and direc-

uons for the use or installation of a product, on the one hand,

and the duty to warn of potential hazards which might result

from deviations from such directions or instructions, on the

other hand.

Here Marine did not know the hazards and, therefore, did not

warn against them. Its instructions requiring that the cooling

unit be located in the space to be cooled or heated and that such

units shouid be installed so that there would be an adequate

path for the air to circulate free y into the units from the space

being cooled and then from the units back to the space being

cooled were obviously and clearly [1784] directed toward the

objective of the efficient utilization of the equipment for heating

and cooling.

In the eyes of Marine Development Corporation the improper

installation of a cooling unit in a space other than that to be

cooled would greatly interfere with the efficient operation of the

equipment. That it might also act as a pump to draw any carbon

— A-68 —

monoxide which might be in the engine compartment was not

known or considered by Marine prior to the investigation of

this tragedy.

Directions and warnings obviously serve different purposes.

Rarely can one be an adequate substitute for the other. It was

Marine's duty here, therefore, to warn of any hazard to life or

health that might forseeably result from the improper location

of its equipment.

The failure to warn may be predicated upon the theories of

either negligence or strict liability. Here Marine, being so inti-

mately associated with boat manufacturers and boat designers,

knew or should have known that such manufacturers, for their

own convenience and for design purposes, might install the cool-

ing unit so at to have the effect of pumping air from the engine

compartment.

The potential seriousness of the injury which might result is

obvious. In addition, there is no practical impediment to its

ability to give an adequate warning. Carbon monoxide is odor-

less. colorless, and tasteless. It is insidious and [1785] subtle in

its operation and effect. If there is any risk of it being intro-

duced into a living space, a warning of that risk should obvi-

ously be given.

The Court finds and concludes that Marine Development

Corporation owed such a duty to warn not only Boatel, the

boat manufacturer, ‘but also prospective purchasers and users

of the draft under the facts and circumstances of this case.

Marine Development did not undertake to actually inspect

and supervise the installation of its equipment by boat manu-

facturers, although it frequently made itself available to perform

such services when a new model or a new installation was con-

templated.

Where it knows that it will not be in a position to supervise

and inspect and installations on each of the boats in which its

equipment is installed, then it obviously has the duty to prospec-

mrt cen a aE tk mee Hs

nee eee

— A-69 —

tive purchasers and users to adequately warn them of the po-

tential hazard which would result from the improper installation

of that equipment.

The Court finds and concludes that Marine Development's

failure to give such a warning was a proximate cause of the death

of Mr. Heiman and injuries of Mrs. Heiman and Sandra Heiman.

Now I am going to make certain findings with respect to

Kohler, but I can tell you before I conclude that I have yet to

determine legal liability with respect to that particular [1786]

question. I hope to do so promptly.

In any event, the factual findings that I will make are as fol-

lows:

The Kohler Company supplied Boatel with a generator set

consisting of the generator proper, an internal combustion engine

to drive the generator, and a muffler which Boatel then installed

in the engine compartment of the Heiman boat. These Kohler

products were line production items which were sold by Kohler

to Kizer Engine Sales in Green Bay, Wisconsin, which in turn

sold them unchanged to Boatel.

The first Islander 47 yacht was constructed in September

1969 and either contained an Onan or Kohler generator unit.

The recirculating air-conditioning systems were not installed

on Boatel yachts as optional equipment until sometime in 1971.

No tests were made by Boatel, the manufacturer, to determine

how these items of optional equipment affected each other in the

completed boat. The photos of the yacht contained in the Boatel

brochure, Plaintiff's Exhibit 34, and other evidence indicates

that not all Islander 47 yachts have the bilge blower exhaust

vent located on the vertical transom panel.

Although there was some evidence indicating that Kohler

representatives saw the Islander 47 yacht displayed at the boat

show in 1969, there is no adequate evidentiary basis for the

Court to find that the displayed boat had the bilge blower ex-

haust vent located in its transom as it is on the Heiman boat.

—~

[1787] The Court further finds that at no time prior to the

commencement of this action did Kohler or any of its represen-

tatives know or have any reason to know of the four drain holes

located in the underside of the overhanging portion of the

transom.

Now by way of footnote, Kohler cites as a defense the lan-

guage which is contained in its manual which provides: “Never

put inlets on the transom.” The Court does not feel this lan-

guage gives Kohler much comfort because it finds that the term

“inlets” properly interpreted, in context, would be restricted

to the venting systems of inlets and outlets there under con-

sideration in that portion of the manual.

In installing the generator, Boatel relied upon the Kohler

technical installation manual. Although Kohler’s manual indi-

cates on the first page that detailed installation plans can be

obtained upon request from Kohler, none were ever requested

by Boatel. Boatel alone designed the transom of the boat, the

engine compartment, the forward wall of the engine compart-

ment, the installation arrangement for the air-conditioning sys-

tem, and the sliding door arrangement for the forward air intake.

It is undisputed that no consequential leaks existed in the

Kohler unit or its exhaust system. There is no evidence that the

Kohler components were defective in design, installation or op-

eration. There is a complete absence of any evidence of any

manufacturing defect which was in existence at [1788] the

time the components left the Kohler factory. It is undisputed

that fumes and gases from the Kohler gasoline combustion

engine were exhausted outside of the boat.

Mr. Klapmeier of Boatel admitted that he was well aware of

the fact that internal combustion engines emit carbon monoxide,

that carbon monoxide is dangerous and lethal, and that he

knew these facts before designing the Islander 47 yacht.

Now, gentlemen, that is as far as I have gotten. I have

not made my final decision on the possible Kohler liability and

garg”

—*

I have not made findings here yet with respect to damages. |

hope to complete this maybe even tomorrow—hopefully to-

morrow—because I need to get on with the business of the

Court. If so, we will call you and let you know so that you can

come by and pick up copies of the further findings and con-

clusions.

If there is nothing else, we will be in recess.

(Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the above-entitled proceedings

were concluded.)

[1789] Certificate

I, Carolyn S. Fant, Official Court Reporter for the United

States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, West-

ern Division, appointed pursuant to the provisions of Title 28,

United States Code, Section 753, do hereby certify that the

foregoing is a full, true and correct transcript of proceedings had

in the within-entitled and numbered cause on the date herein-

before set forth; and I do further certify that the foregoing

transcript has been prepared by me or under my direction.

CAROLYN FANT

Official Reporter

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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