Petition — Marine Development Corp. v. Heiman
Supreme Court brief1976
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Court, U. $.
FILED
auG 3 1976
IN THE MICAAEL RODAK, JR..CLERS
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1976
w...76-160 4
MARINE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
Vv
MRS. ALANA G. HEIMAN, in Her Own Right; SANDRA JEAN HEIMAN, by
MRS. ALANA G. HEIMAN, Her Mother and Next Friend; and H. MAURICE
MITCHELL and JOSEPH W. GELZINE, Co-Administrators in Succession
With Will Annexed of the Estate of Max Heiman, Deceased; BOATEL
COMPANY, INC.; KOHLER CO. and MEDLIN MARINE, INC.,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit
MICHAEL E. HALE
1500 Union National Plaza
Little Rock, Arkansas 72201
Counsel for Petitioner
SA eae 2 ARTS
St. Louis Law Printing Co., Inc., 812 Olive Street 63101 314-231-4477
SS
INDEX
Page
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Appendix A—Order Denying Petition for Rehearing of
Se Ge UD Hy TD 6 he eis occ es eeseaeesens A-1
Appendix B—Mandate of the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals Handed Down April 14, 1976 .............. A-2
Appendix C—Order Granting Petition for Rehearing of
Marine Issued February 17, 1976 ................ A-4
Appendix D—Order Vacating and Setting Aside Court's
Order of January 30, 1976 Dated February 2, 1976 .. A-6
Appendix E—Order Denying Petition for Rehearing of
Marine Filed January 30, 1976 ..............445. A-7
Appendix F—Panel Opinion of the Eighth Circuit Filed
PPP Peer re Teer T yy Tee eT eT ee A-8
Appendix G—Memorandum Opinion of Judge Eisele Filed
fl errr errr reer Ceres A-28
Appendix H—Judgment Filed of Record March 14, 1975 A-31
Appendix I—Memorandum Cpinion of Judge Eisele Filed
Oe TS TD Fa FD 65 6 och ceeds cesccceencs A-35
Appendix J—Finding From the Bench by Judge Eisele on
Th CEE 666 kb se 4 Neda bbN C68 4e 6d 6568 A-57
CITATIONS
Cases
Brown v. General Motors Corp., 355 F.2d 814 (4th Cir.
1966) cert. denied 386 U.S. 1036 (1967) ........
Jacobson v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp., 409 F.2d 1263,
a eg ects ae
Kerber v. American Machine & Foundry Co., 411 F.2d
ee, Mee Ge UME oie sciences eeceesscs
Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir.
Wo 6 Sena ste de Vee a suns occa ee Pee Ce uae
Marker v. Universal Oil Prod. Co., 250 F.2d 603 (10th
SR te, Ce eral ec ge ee aN
Posey v. Clark Equip. Co., 409 F.2d 560 (7th Cir.) cert.
Gentes 396 US. 940 (1969) ... 0... ccc ccc ccees
Standhardt v. Flintkote Co., 508 P.2d 1283 (1973) ......
Walker v. Stauffer Chem. Corp., 19 Cal App 3d 671, 96
SE OUTED sc fone nccevacebeceucceusdnes
Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176 (Sth Cir. 1971)
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1976
eee SE.
MARINE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
.
MRS. ALANA G. HEIMAN, in Her Own Right; SANDRA JEAN HEIMAN, by
MRS. ALANA G. HEIMAN, Her Mother and Next Friend; and H. MAURICE
MITCHELL and JOSEPH W. GELZINE, Co-Administrators in Succession
With Will Annexed of the Estate of Max Heiman, Deceased; BOATEL
COMPANY, INC.; KOHLER CO. and MEDLIN MARINE, INC..,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit
CITATIONS TO OPINIONS BELOW
The Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit and the Opinion of the United States District
Court, Eastern District of Arkansas, Western Division, are un-
reported. The Order of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
_—
rendered May 7, 1976 denying the Petition for Rehearing with
suggestion for rehearing en banc filed by Medlin Marine, Inc. is
printed in Appendix A. The opinion of the Eighth Circuit
sitting en banc rendered April 14, 1976, is printed in Appendix
B. The Order of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rendered
February 17, 1976, granting Marine Development Corpora-
tion’s Petition for Rehearing en banc is printed in Appendix C.
The Order of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rendered Feb-
ruary 2, 1976, setting aside its Order of January 30, 1976 is
printed in Appendix D. The Order of the Eighth Circuit ren-
dered January 30, 1976, is printed in Appendix E. The panel
opinion of the Eighth Circuit Court filed January 13, 1976, is
printed in Appendix F.
The findings, opinions and judgment of the United States
District Court, Eastern District, Western Division, are printed
as follows:
Memorandum Opinion of Judge Garnett Thomas Eisele
filed of record May 5, 1975, is printed ia Appendix G.
Judgment filed of record March 14, 1975 is printed in Ap-
pendix H.
Memorandum Opinion of Judge Garnett Thomas Eisele
filed of record on March 7, 1975, is printed in Ap-
pendix I.
Findings from‘the Bench by Judge Eisele on March 4,
1975, is printed in Appendix J.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals by Per
Curiam Order dated April 14, 1976 was entered on May 14,
1976. Timely Petition for Rehearing en banc filed by Medlin
Marine, Inc. was denied on May 7, 1976. The jurisdiction of
this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals erred in affirm-
ing the lower court’s ruling in an admiralty case that Marine De-
velopment Corporation, a component part manufacturer, had
a “duty to warn” the manufacturer of the completed product,
Boatel Company, Inc., of a potential danger based upon hypo-
thetical facts (which were not the facts of the case as found by
the trial judge) even though the Court found the component
parts were not defective, that the air conditioning system was
not designed by Marine Development Corperation (but by
Boatel alone) and that Boatel knew that carbon monoxide gases
were lethal and dangerous.
STATEMENT
This is an admiralty case brought pursuant to Rule 9(h) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by the Estate of Max
Heiman, deceased, Mrs. Alana Heiman and Sandra Heiman
against Boatel Company, Inc. (Boatel),' the designer and manu-
facturer of a forty-seven foot Islander yacht purchased by Max
Heiman; Medlin Marine Company, Inc. (Medlin), the selling
franchise dealer; Kohler Co.,* the manufacturer and seller of a
gasoline powered generator which was incorporated into the
design of the yacht; and Marine Development Corporation
(Marine), the manufacturer of air conditioning component parts,
which were sold to Boatel to be used in the air conditioning sys-
tem on the Heiman yacht.
' Judgment was taken against Boatel by default, which is bank-
rupt.
* Judgmeat was entered in favor of Kohler in the lower court
and affirmed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en
banc. Medlin appealed the court's judgment that Kohler was not
liable, but neither argued or briefed the issue on appeal.
— een
Alana Heiman and Sandra Heiman sustained personal in-
juries and Max Heiman died due to inhalation of carbon mon-
oxide on the night of September 1, 1973, while they were sleep-
ing on board the yacht with the air conditioning running on the
Arkansas River just north of Little Rock, Arkansas.
Expert testimony disclosed that carbon monoxide produced
by the generator was exhausted out the stern of the boat. Im-
mediately above the exhaust outlet were four drain holes in-
corporated into an overhang on the stern. The carbon mon-
oxide was drawn back into the engine compartment through
the four drain holes becaus- of the vacuum created by the gaso-
line powered generator’s need for air for combustion purposes.
The engine compartment was separated from the living quarters
by a non-airtight wall. The return air vent for the forward air
conditioning system was placed in the equipment room which
was connected primarly with the engine room by a conduit on
the starboard side. When operating, the air conditioning unit
pulled air from the engine compartment, which in turn intro-
duced dangerous amounts of carbon monoxide in the living
space.
Recovery was sought against the defendants on the basis of
negligence, breach of implied warranties and strict liability.
Being in admiralty, the case was tried before the Honorable
Judge G. Thomas Eisele. At the close of the evidence, the
Court made separate findings of facts and conclusions of law.
The manufacturer, Boatel, being in default, was found negligent
and also strictly liable. The seller, Medlin, was found liable in
strict liability. The Court found that the generator manu-
facturer, Kohler, had no duty to warn and, therefore, was not
liable. The air conditioning component part manufacturer,
Marine, was found liable for negligent failure to warn. The
trial court apportioned fault between Boatel and Marine, finding
80% attributable to Boatel and 20% to Marine. The Court
further found that the fault of Medlin and Marine was equal.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
Argument will be based on the trial court's findings, since
the Eighth Circuit Court Mandate merely affirmed the Judg-
ment of the lower court. By this action the Eighth Circuit failed
to decide an important question of federal law which has not
been, but should be, settled by this Court.
Marine first contends that it is not liable for failure to warn
as a matter of law, based upon the trial court’s own findings.*
The trial court erroneously held Marine liable for failure to warn
based upon hypothetical facts which were not the facts of the
case as so found by the trial court. Marine submits that the
trial court, just the same as a jury, cannot hold a defendant
liable on facts which were not found to be the facts in the
case, especially where the conclusions are contrary to the trial
court’s own findings. Standhardt v. Flintkote Co., 508 P.2d 1283
(1973).
The trial court specifically found that the carbon monoxide
re-entered the engine compartment of the Heiman yacht through
four holes in the transom and that the four holes were a defect
which made the boat inherently dangerous. The four holes
were designed and manufactured by Boatel alone, and no one
but Boatel knew of the four holes. The four holes constituted a
defect in the boat and were the basis for finding liability against
Boatel and Medlin. The trial court further found that Boatel
alone designed and installed the air conditioning system as it
was found in the Heiman yacht in direct violation of the clear
and unambiguous installation instructions of Marine. The
Court further found that if the air conditioning components
furnished by Marine had been properly installed in accordance
with Marine’s instructions, the Heimans would not have been
harmed. The trial court specifically found that there were no
* The findings of fact as to Marine are found in Appendix J,
page A-57.
/ — 6 —
defects in the component parts sold to Boatel by Marine. The
liability of Marine for failure to warn was predicated on the
finding that Marine knew or should have known that carbon
monoxide might during the life of the vessel escape from either
the generator motor or the two propulsion engines due to acci-
dent or ordinary wear and tear. The trial court found that the
foregoing possible fact situation created a duty on Marine’s
part to warn of any hazard to life and health which might fore-
seeably result from the improper location of its equipment.
The holding of the trial court was clearly erroneous in that
the trial court’s conclusions of law are based upon facts which
were not the actual facts in the case as so found by the trial
court itself. The trial court found that there were no leaks in
the exhaust system in the Heiman yacht. To hold Marine liable,
the Court therefore based its findings upon hypothetical facts
concerning a possible leak in order to find any foreseeable duty
to warn. By doing so, the trial court has completely ignored its
finding of fact concerning the emission of carbon monoxide out
of the boat and then back through the four holes into the tran-
som, which was not foreseeable as to Marine.
Secondly, Marine had no duty to warn. Marine respectfully
submits that the duty to warn is imposed on the manufacturer
of a completed product and not upon the manufacturer (like
Marine) of component parts which undergo substantial change
by the manufacturer before the completed product is sold to
the ultimate consumer. The only cases Marine has found con-
Struing the issue of duty to warn involved manufacturers of
completed products and not component part manufacturers,
when the component parts were found not to be defective. The
duty to warn is imposed upon Boatel, the manufacturer, not
upon Marine. See Jacobson v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp.,
409 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1969): Walker y. Stauffer Chem.
Corp., 19 Cal App 3d 671, 96 Cal.Rptr. 803 (1971); Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, 402A caveats (2) and (3) and com-
ments. There is no duty to warn of obvious dangers whether the
| aaa
eas Winns
cause of action is stated in terms of negligence or strict liability
theory. Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176 (Sth Cir.
1971); Posey v. Clark Equip. Co., 409 F.2d 560 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied 396 U.S. 940 (1969): Larsen v. General Motors
Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); W. Prosser, The Law
of Torts 649 (4th ed. 1971); Restatement (Second) of Torts
$ 388 comment k; Kerber v. American Machine & Foundry
Co., 411 F.2d 419, 421-422 (8th Cir. 1969); Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, § 402A comments i, /.
The installation of the air conditioning system by Boatel in
such a manner as to allow the introduction of carbon monoxide
into the return intake was an obvious danger and the manufac-
turer is entitled to assume that his product will not be used in
an obvicusly dangerous manner. Marker v. Universal Oil Prod-
ucts Co., 250 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1957); Brown v. General
Motors Corp., 355 F.2d 814 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 386
U.S. 1036 (1967). This is so a fortiori where the product fur-
nished is a non-defective component part to be incorporated
into an air coditioning system by knowledgeable technicians and
engineers employed by the manufacturer, Boatel. Jacobson v.
Colorado Fuel & lron Corp., supra.
Kohler, the manufacturer of the gasoline generator, was not
found to be liable for failure to warn. Yet it was Kohler’s gen-
erator that produced the carbon monoxide. How can it be said
that Kohler could not reasonably foresee leaks in its own ex-
haust system and have no duty to warn, but Marine could?
Kohler, like Marine, had furnished installation instructions, but
no warnings. If Kohler had no duty to warn. neither does Ma-
rine, for the reason that the danger was obvious and the com-
ponent parts used underwent substantial change and were in-
stalled into a completed product manufactured by Boatel, alone.
The duty to warn was that of Boatel—the manufacturer.
For the foregoing reasons, Marine’s motion for a directed
verdict should have been granted.
CONCLUSION
A Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be granted to de-
termine whether the doctrine of “duty to warn” extends to in-
clude manufacturers of component parts, which are found not
to be defective and have undergone substantial change by the
manufacturer before the completed product is sold to the ulti-
mate consumer in order to have uniformity of decisions among
the courts of appeal.
The Opinion of the trial court which was affirmed by the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, has erroneously extended the
law of products liability to include not only the seller and manu-
facturer of the product, but also all of the component part
manufacturers on the theory of failure to warn. The duty im-
posed upon Marine in this case is contrary to law and policy
reasoning. The policy reasoning for not holding a component
part manufacturer liable is stated in Walker v. Stauffer Chem.
Corp., supra, as follows:
“We do not believe it realistically feasible or necessary to
the protection of the public to require the manufacturer
and supplier of a standard chemical ingredient such as
bulk sulfuric acid, not having control over the subsequent
compounding, packaging or marketing of the item even-
tually causing injury to the ultimate consumer, to bear the
responsibility for that injury. The manufacturer (seller) of
the product, causing the injury is so situated as to afford
necessary protection. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
supra, 24 Cal.2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436.”
Respectfully submitted
MICHAEL E. HALE
1500 Union National Plaza
Little Rock, Arkansas 72201
Counsel for Petitioner
APPENDIX
APPENDIX A
United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit
75-1258 September Term, 1975
Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, etc. et al.,
Appellees,
vs.
Medlin Marine, Inc., Appeals from the
Appellant. United States Dis-
75-1383 trict Court for the
Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, etc., et al., Easterr District of
Appellees, Arkansas.
—--~--
VS.
Medlin Marine, Inc.,
Appellant. |
The Court having considered petition for rehearing en banc
filed by counsel for appellant and, being fully advised in the
premises, it is ordered that the petition for rehearing en banc
be, and it is hereby, denied.
Considering the petition for rehearing en banc as a petition
for rehearing, it is ordered that the petition for rehearing also
be, and it is hereby, denied.
May 7, 1976
a * oo
APPENDIX B
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
No. 75-1258 September Term, 1975
Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, etc., et al., -
Appellees,
VS. —
Medlin Marine, Inc.,
Appellant.
No. 75-1287
Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, etc., et al.,
ie Appellees,
Marine Development Corp., Appeals from _ the
Appellant. | United States District
No. 75-1383 Court for the Eastern
Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, etc., et al., | District of Arkansas.
Appellees,
vs. —
Medlin Marine, Inc.,
Appellant.
No. 75-1384
Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, etc., et al.,
Appellees,
VS. se
Marine Development Corp.,
Appellant. |
Before Gibson, Chief Judge, Lay, Heaney, Bright, Ross,
Stephenson, Webster, and Henley, Circuit Judges
Per Curiam
The prior panel opinion filed in these cases January 13,
1976 is ordered withdrawn.
—
~~ oe
The judgment of the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Arkansas is hereby affirmed by an equally divided
Court.
April 14, 1976
(See attached sheet for cost information.)
A true copy.
Attest:
ROBERT C. TUCKER
Clerk, U. S. Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit.
May 14, 1976
APPENDIX C
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
No. 75-1258 September Term, 1975
Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, etc., et al., )
Appellees,
VS. PPS
Medlin Marine, Inc.,
Appellant.
No. 75-1287
Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, etc., et al.,
nm Appellees,
Marine Development Corp., Appeals from. the
| AGGOREM. | viaseed Sates Blesiet
No. 75-1383
; Court for the Eastern
Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, etc., et al., aay
District of Arkansas.
Appellees,
VS.
Medlin Marine, Inc.,
Appellant.
No. 75-1384
Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, etc., et al.,
“ Appellees,
Marine Development Corp.,
Appellant. /
The court has carefully considered petition for rehearing with
suggestions for rehearing en banc filed by counsel for appellant
Marine Development Corporation. Being fully advised in the
premises it is now here ordered that the petition for rehearing
—_—* =
with suggestions for rehearing en banc be, and it is hereby,
granted.
These cases are to be re-submitted to the court en banc at a
session of the court to be later determined.
February 17, 1976
—* va
APPENDIX D
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
75-1287 September Term, 1975
Mrs. Alana G. Heiman in her own right, >
et al.,
Appellees,
vs.
Marine Development Corporation, Appeals from the
Appellant. | United States Dis-
75-1384 ' trict Court for the
Mrs. Alana G. Heiman in her own right, | Eastern District of
et al., Arkansas
Appellees,
VS.
Marine Development Corporation,
Appellant. ’
On the Court’s own motion it is now here ordered that our
order of January 30, 1976, denying petition for rehearing en
banc and rehearing be, and it is hereby, vacated and set aside.
February 2, 1976
APPENDIX E
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
75-1287 September Term, 1975
Mrs. Alana G. Heiman in her own right, )
et al.,
Appellees,
VS.
Marine Development Corp., Appeals from the
Appellant. , United States Dis-
75-1384 trict Court for the
Mrs. Alana G. Heiman in her own right, | Eastern District of
et al., Arkansas
Appellees,
VS.
Marine Development Corp.,
Appellant.
The Court having considered petition for rehearing en banc
filed by counsel for appellant and, being fully advised in the
premises, it is ordered that the petition for rehearing en banc
be, and it is hereby, denied.
Considering the petition for rehearing en banc as a petition
for rehearing, it is ordered that the petition for rehearing also
be, and it is hereby, denied.
January 30, 1976
—*
APPENDIX F
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
Nos. 75-1258, 75-1287, 75-1383 and 75-1384
No. 75-1258
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas
Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, in her own right; Sandra Jean Heiman,
by Mrs. Alana G. Heinian, her mother and next friend, and
H. Maurice Mitchell and Joseph W. Gelzine, Co-Adminis-
trators in Succession with Will Annexed of the Estate of
Max Heiman, Deceased,
Appellees,
Boatel Company, Inc., Marine Development Corporation,
and
Kohler Co.,
Appellee,
and
Medlin Marine, Inc.,
Appellant.
—
No. 75-1287
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas
Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, in her own right; Sandra Jean Heiman,
by Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, her mother and next friend; and
H. Maurice Mitchell and Joseph W. Gelzine, Co-Adminis-
trators in Succession with Will Annexed of the Estate of
Max Heiman, Deceased,
Appellees,
Boatel Company, Inc.,
Marine Development Corporation,
Appellant,
and
Medlin Marine, Inc. and Kohler Co.
No. 75-1383
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas
Mrs. Alana G. Heiman in her own right; Sandra Jean Heiman,
by Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, her mother and next friend, and
H. Maurice Mitchell and Joseph W. Gelzine, Co-Adminis-
trators in Succession with Will Annexed of the Estate of
Max Heiman, Deceased,
Appellees,
v.
Boatel Company, Inc., Marine Development Corporation,
Kohler Co. and Medlin Marine, Inc.,
Appellant.
— A-10 —
No. 75-1384
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas
Mrs. Alana G. Heiman in her own right; Sandra Jean Heiman,
by Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, her mother and next friend; and
H. Maurice Mitchell and Joseph W. Gelzine, Co-Adminis-
trators in Succession with Will Annexed of the Estate of
Max Heiman, Deceased,
Appellees,
v.
Boatel Company, Inc., and Marine Development Corporation,
. Appellant,
Medlin Marine, Inc. and Kohler Co.
Submitted: October 17, 1975
Filed: January 13, 1976
Before Clark, Associate Justice,* Lay and Ross, Circuit
Judges.
Lay, Circuit Judge.
This is an admiralty case brought by the Estate of Max
Heiman, deceased, Mrs. Alana Heiman and Sandra Heiman
against Boatel Company, Inc. (Boatel), the manufacturer of a
yacht purchased in August, 1972 by Max Heiman. Boatel’s
retail franchise dealer, Medlin Marine, Inc. (Medlin), the air-
conditioning unit manufacturer, Marine Development Corp.
* Associate Justice Tom C. Clark, Unit
Retired, sitting by designation. nited States Supreme Court
— A-11 —
(Marine), and the generator manufacturer, Kohler Company,
were also sued.' The plaintiffs sought damages for the death of
Max Heiman and for personal injuries to Mrs. Heiman and their
daughter, Sandra, due to inhalation of carbon monoxide on
September 1, 1973 while the Heimans slept on the yacht with
the airconditioner running.
The evidence disclosed that the gasoline-powered generator
created carbon monoxide and exhausted it at the stern below
the water line. Immediately over the boat's exhaust outlet were
four drainage holes which due to an overhang were not visible
when the boat was in the water. The generator’s need for air
tended to create a vacuum, causing the exhausted fumes to be
sucked through the four holes back into the engine compart-
ment. The boat's engine compartment was separated from the
living quarters by a non-airtight wall. Boatel installed the
air-conditioning unit near a passage leading to the engine
compartment. When operating, the unit pulled air from that com-
partment, thereby introducing dangerous amounts of carbon
monoxide into the living quarters.
Recovery was sought on the basis of negligence, breach of
implied warranty and strict liability. The case was tried to
the court, the Honorable Judge G. Thomas Eisele. The court's
findings on liability were that:
|. Boatel, the yacht manufacturer, was negligent and was
also liable in strict liability;
2. Marine Development, the airconditioning unit manufac-
turer, was negligent for failure to warn;
3. Medlin Marine, the retailer, was liable in strict liability,
but was not negligent since there was no evidence that Medlin
knew or should have known of the holes over the exhaust; and
' The defendants cross-complained against each other. Plaintiff
dismissed its complaint against defendant Kohler, but the cross-com-
plaints against Kohler remained.
— A-12 —
4. Kohler, the generator manufacturer, had no duty to warn
and was not otherwise negligent.
The court apportioned the fault between Boatel and Marine,
finding that 80% was attributable to Boatel and 20% Marine.
The court held that Medlin was entitled to indemnity against
Boatel for its entire liability. The court further found that the
fault of Medlin and Marine was equal and denied any indemnity
between those parties. Medlin and Marine appeal. Boatel, a
bankrupt, did not defend below and takes no part in this appeal.
The principal issues on appeal are 1) the sufficiency of evi-
dence to sustain Marine’s liability for negligent failure to warn;
2) the question of indemnity between Medlin and Marine; and
3) whether the wrongful death damages awarded were based
on proper evidence and were not otherwise excessive.”
Marine’s Liability: Duty to Warn
At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Eisele filed detailed find-
ings of fact and conclusions. The court found that the air-
conditioning unit was not mechanically or otherwise physically
defective; that Boatel installed the airconditioning unit in viola-
tion of the installation instructions furnished by Marine; that
there is nothing inherently dangerous in the use of properly
installed airconditioning systems; and that had Boatel installed
the system in accord with the instructions, the Heimans would
not have been harmed.
Nonetheless, the trial court found Marine liable for its failure
to warn Boatel and the Heimans of the potential consequences
of improperly installing its airconditioning components. The
trial court found:
* Medlin noticed an appeal of the trial court's judgment that
Kohler was not liable, but neither argued nor briefed this issue on
appeal. Therefore we deem the appeal on this issue abandoned.
er ee eee
— A-13 —
. . . Marine Development Corporation knew or should
have known that there were significant openings from the
engine compartment into the living spaces . . . and that
. carbon monoxide might, during the life of the vessel,
be found in the engine compartment in dangerous concen-
trations.
Marine Development also knew or should have known
that if the forward cooling unit were installed as it was in
the equipment room it could and would, under certain fore-
seeable circumstances, draw air from the engine compart-
ment and circulate it throughout the living areas of the
boat.
Of all the parties to this action, Marine is and should
be the most knowledgeable with respect to the effects of
air-conditioning systems and their operations. It has more
than 50 percent of all the air-conditioning business in the
class of boats and yachts of the approximate size of the
Heiman vessel.
It has held itself out as a specialist in marine air-con-
ditioning . . .
The court further found:
Marine, being so intimately associated with boat manufac-
turers and boat designers, knew or should have known that
such manufacturers. for their own convenience and for de-
sign purposes, might install the cooling unit so as to have
the effect of pumping air from the engine compartment.
The potential seriousness of the injury which might re-
sult is obvious. In addition, there is no practical impedi-
ment to its ability to give an adequate warning. Carbon
monoxide is odorless. colorless, and tasteless. It is insidi-
ous and subtle in its operation and effect. If there is any
risk of it being introduced into a living space, a warning
of that risk should obviously be given.
— A-14—
The record reveals substantial evidence supporting these find-
ings. We cannot say under the circumstances that the findings
are clearly erroneous. It has long been held that a manufacturer
is liable for foreseeable misuses of its product and for failure
to warn of those misuses. See Griggs v. Firestone Tire & Rub-
ber Co., 513 F.2d 851 (8th Cir. 1975); Hoppe v. Midwest Con-
veyor Co., 485 F.2d 1196, 1201 (8th Cir. 1973); Larsen v.
General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 504-05 (8th Cir. 1968).
The trial court correctly pointed out the basic distinction be-
tween the duty to give adequate instructions for the installation
and use of a product and the duty to warn of hazards which
might result from failure to follow those instructions. See Buf-
fington v. Amchem Products, Inc., 489 F.2d 1053, 1054-55
(8th Cir. 1974); Ross v. Up-Right, Inc., 402 F.2d 943, 948
(Sth Cir. 1968): L. Frumer & M. Friedman, Products Liability
§ 8.05[1] (1975). Thus, there can be no argument that the in-
stallation instructions were an adequate warning of the poten-
tial danger from improper installation of the unit.
Marine further urges that it had no duty to warn since Boatel
had similar knowledge, and that the dangers of improper in-
stallation were common knowledge. It is also urged that a
warning would have been futile since even after this accident,
Boatel failed to relocate airconditioning units on similar boats.
We think the evidence is sufficient to make these questions of
fact, rather than of law.
The trial court found that Marine had superior knowledge
of the operation of the air conditioning unit, that it held itself
out to the public as a specialist in marine air conditioning and
that it was totally familiar with boat construction. From this,
the court reasonably inferred that Marine should have known
of the danger that an improperly installed unit would act as a
pump, drawing the gases from the engine compartment, whereas
Boatel did not possess such expertise and knowledge. The ques-
— A-15 —
tion of whether a warning to the boat manufacturer would have
been futile is also a question to be resolved by the fact finder. A
similar question arose in Post v. American Cleaning Equipment
Corp., 437 S.W.2d 516 (Ky. 1969), which involved an injury
from an industrial vacuum cleaner bearing the instructions “only
use on 115 volts AC or DC”. The plaintiff plugged the unit
into a 220 DC outlet and the issue was the adequacy of the in-
structions. In reversing a directed verdict for the defendant, the
Kentucky Supreme Court stated:
It is no answer to say that appellant would have attached
the machine to a 220 DC outlet anyway. since he did so
in face of the directions which were furnished. Maybe he
would have, but the facts at hand make that a question of
conjecture. One thing seems certain—IF the dire conse-
quences of using 220 DC had been plainly and adequately
posted—the appellee would prevail as a matter of law. The
fact that reasonable differences of view may be reached as
to the adequacy of the warning here makes this a jury
onme. ...
437 S.W.2d at 521.
We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the
trial court's finding that Marine Development Corporation was
liable in both strict liability and “negligence”.
Indemnification
The court denied indemnification to Medlin, the retailer, as
against Marine Development, the air conditioner manufacturer.’
It did so even though Medlin was liable only under strict lia-
* The Court also denied Marine's claim for indemnification
against Medlin. Although Marine appealed from this judgment, it
was neither argued nor briefed on appeal and therefore is waived
and abandoned.
—_
bility, while Marine's liability was based on negligence. The
court reasoned that strict liability implied fault and thus con-
sidered the question as one of contribution rather than indemni-
fication, concluding that the fault of Marine and Medlin was
equal.
The Restatement of Restitution provides:
A person who, without personal fault, has become sub-
ject to tort liability for the unauthorized and wrongful
conduct of another, is entitled to indemnity from the other
for expenditures properly made in the discharge of such
liability.
Restatement. Restitution § 96 (1937).
The difference between primary and secondary liability is
not based on a difference in degrees of fault. It rests rather
on the nature of the legal obligation owed by the wrongdoer to
the injured party. See Tromza v. Tecumseh Products Co., 378
F.2d 601, 605-06 (3rd Cir. 1967).
We find no authority which would alter the traditional tests
of indemnity under the circumstances. Medlin’s responsibility
is secondary when compared to Marine’s. This is obvious from
the finding that Medlin’s fault is based only on strict liability
and that none of Medlin’s personnel knew or should have known
the danger involved. Medlin’s liability is vicarious and Marine
must make Medlin whole.
We therefore find that the court erred in denying Medlin
indemnity against Marine.
Damages
The trial court awarded the administrators of the decedent's
estate the following amounts:
—_<
Alana G. Heiman, wife, $443,762.07,
Sandra Jean Heiman, daughter, $41,536.33,
Judith Heiman Samuel, daughter, $21,000.00,
Estate of Max A. Heiman, $5,906.85.
Marine and Medlin attack this verdict on the grounds that
the trial court erred 1) in its method of determining contribution
as an element of damage; 2) in admitting Mrs. Heiman’s testi-
mony concerning her living expenses subsequent to Mr. Hei-
man’s death on the issue of contribution; 3) in considering a
5% to 6% managerial fee for the operation of apartments
owned by Mr. Heiman; 4) in considering the decedent's tax
records while he was employed by the Gus Blass Company; 5)
in allowing an inflationary factor; and 6) in awarding excessive
damages.
In awarding damages the trial court relied on the elements
of damage in admiralty wrongful death cases set forth in Sea-
Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974).*
4 There the Court observed:
Recovery for loss of support has been universally recognized,
and includes all the financial contributions that the decedent
would have made to his dependents had he lived. Similarly,
the overwhelming majority of state wrongful-death acts and
courts interpreting the Death on the High Seas Act have per-
mitted recovery for the monetary value of services the decedent
provided and would have continued to provide but for his
wrongful death. Such services include, for example, the nur-
ture, training, education, and guidance that a child would have
received had not the parent been wrongfully killed. Services the
decedent performed at home or for his spouse are also com-
pensable.
Compensation for loss of society, however, presents a closer
question. The term “society” embraces a broad range of mu-
tual benefits each family member receives from the others’
continued existence, including love, affection, care, attention,
companionship, comfort, and protection. Unquestionably, the
deprivation of these benefits by wrongful death is a grave loss
to the decedent's dependents,
*~ * ~ * * * ws
Finally, in addition to recovery for loss of support, services,
and society, damages for funeral expenses may be awarded un-
—Y
The basic attack relates to the damages awarded by reason
of the alleged money contributions. Defendants contend that
the award was excessive due to Mr. Heiman’s deteriorating fi-
nancial position. To aid our discussion we set forth in the
margin the relevant part of Judge Eisele’s detailed findings and
conclusions.”
In assessing damages for wrongful death a trier of fact must
make a reasonable extrapolation from the evidence of the
amount necessary as compensation for the loss. At best this
can only be an estimate of actual damage projected over a per-
son's life expectancy. The trier of fact has a duty to consider
the totality of the decedent’s personality, work habits and char-
acter, his past and present earnings as well as his proven ca-
pacity to earn. All relevant evidence, past and present, which
provides insight to the fact finder may be considered in arriving
- a eres me rg remedy in circumstances where
ent s dependents have either paid for the fun
liable for its payment. 4 eines
414 U.S. at 584-86, 591.
4 — found:
though the status of Mr. Heiman’s economic conditi
the time of his death, based as it was upon income heim .
a and from apartment complexes located in Arkansas and
lorida, was precarious and deteriorating, it is likely that, had
holdings. 7 ae have salvaged at least some small part of his
. . . [A] fair interpretation of the evidence forces th
to find that, had Mr. Heiman lived, he would have re
combination of great effort and extremely good fortune to sal-
vage even as much as a fourth of his overall holdings and that
realistically, it is more probable that, had he lived, Mr. Hei-
man would only have been able to extricate himself from his
financial difficulties without any net personal obligation, sal-
vaging only a small, perhaps even nominal, amount of his
business holdings. The Court must analyze the probable “con-
tributions” element of damages with this finding in mind.
The evidence chatty establishes that Mr. Heim
é an wa
of business and executive ability. Before 1965 he had held
positions of responsibility with one of the largest department
— A-19 —
at a just verdict. To urge that one should not consider past in-
come and past employment as reflected by tax returns, or that
it is improper to consider uncompensated endeavors which
might have contributed to growth in future net worth is to sug-
gest verdicts based on incomplete evidence. To urge in a
wrongful death case that the deceased's future earning capacity
must be measured only in terms of his actual income at the time
of his death ignores reality and benefits only the wrongdoer. The
law of compensation does not function within such narrow con-
straints. We similarly disregard the attack on admission of the
evidence of Mrs. Heiman’s expenses after the accident. These
were all relevant factors to be considered. The trial court, as
any trier of fact, was entitled to make reasonable inferences
from all of the evidence.
We have more difficulty with the admitted testimony of the
economist. In Riha v. Jasper Blackburn Corp., 516 F.2d 840
(8th Cir. 1975), this court reversed a jury verdict where an
economist had projected a specific annual inflation rate over a
stores ir the State of Arkansas. the Gus Blass Company. The
evidence from his W-2 forms indicates that his average an-
nual income for the last three years he was with the Gus Blass
Company (1963, 1964 and 1965) was in excess of $20,000.00.
The compensation for performing similar services in 1975
would obviously be considerably in excess of that figure. . .
This. then, is another of the bases upon which the Court's
decision concerning the amount and the probability of future
contributions must be predicated.
When Mr. Heiman got seriously involved in the real estate.
motel and apartment building ventures, he devoted most of his
time to personally overseeing such operations. He maintained
an oftice with a secretary at the Holcomb Heights Apartments.
It is true that he had on-the-site employees who looked after
the routine operations, the collection of rents and maintenance.
But, with the exception of the Fair Park Gardens, which were un-
der a management arrangement with Block Realty Company. he
contributed a considerable amount of his time to the overall
management of the properties. The evidence indicates that.
had Mr. Heiman not been performing these services. he would
have had the alternative of contracting for such services with
some real estate management company. The usual fee for
— A-20 —
person's work expectancy. We held this to be unduly speculative
when the exact income was projected to the year 2005. Riha
was followed by Johnson v. Serra, 52i F.2d 1289 (8th Cir.
1975), where in a wrongful death action we excluded testimony
of an economist’s projection of an eight per cent inflation rate
over the decedent's work expectancy to the year 2002. In both
cases, we followed the Sixth Circuit's decision in Bach v. Penn-
sylvania Central Transportation Co., 502 F.2d 1117 (6th Cir.
1974). We approved language from Bach which indicated that
“[slome consideration of probabilities is inevitable in any fair
award of damages.” 516 F.2d at 845, quoting 502 F.2d at
1122.
Our opinions in Riha and Johnson were not intended to pre-
clude use of economists as experts to testify on probable wage
increases over reasonable periods of time or on inflationary or
deflationary factors of the past and their general relevance to
the future. In Riha we held, consistent with Nebraska law and
such services would run in the neighborhood of five to six
percent of the gross receipts. Of course, such a firm would
have had to pay the management expenses and wages of the
on-the-site employees out of its fees. Looking at Mr. Heiman’s
tax records covering his various operations over a period of
years, the Court finds that he was performing services which,
had they been contracted, would have required the payment
of at least $20,000 per year over and above the management
and employee expense actually experienced.
. . Looking at both Mrs. Heiman’s testimony as to her
actual expenses since Mr. Heiman’s death and the tax records
and other records kept by Mr. Heiman reflecting contributions
prior to his death, the Court finds that on an average Mr. Hei-
man was contributing just under $30,000 to the living ex-
pense requirements of the entire family. In making this de-
termination, the Court has disregarded certain items, such as
jewelry expenditures, from the figures testified to by Mrs. Hei-
man on the one hand, and, on the other hand, has reduced the
figures revealed by Mr. Heiman’s records by the amounts of
the insurance premiums, the boat expense, and certain other
expeises. Had he lived, Mr. Heiman’s own living expenses
would have had to be defrayed out of the total living expense
contributions. Furthermore, if, as the Court suspects, financial
— A-21 —
prior federal cases, that the precise mathematical projection by
the economist using an inflation factor of seven per cent to the
year 2005 was too conjectural. We held that the expert wit-
ness was not competent to testify, within any acceptable range
of probability, that a precise inflationary rate would continue
for so long. The rate of inflation depends on many collateral
considerations such as war and peace, tax rates, the state of the
general economy, interest rates and myriad other extrapolations.
The science of economics is too imprecise at present for its
experts to offer more than speculative guesses as to the state of
the economy for the future. As we stated in Johnson:
Inflationary forecasts of economists are, of course, only
personal opinions, even when based on past trends. It must
be recognized that trends may often be faulty indicators
of the future as well as the present and that economists
have fared only slightly better than fortune tellers and
soothsayers in foretelling the future. Economic factors op-
erate at varying degrees of intensity in our economy, and
it seems there are as many explanations of past trends and
predictions of future trends as there are economists. We
could be entering into an inflationary cycle with its attend-
circumstances would have required Mr. Heiman to accept em-
ployment from a third-party employer, he would, of course,
have had to pay state and federal income taxes on his com-
pensation, a sit, tion which would be entirely different from
the tax situation which had existed in the years immediately
prior to his death where, because of the nature of his invest-
ments and the tax laws involved, he was not required to pay
such taxes.
The court is convinced that, had Mr. Heiman lived, he and
his family would have had to cut down somewhat on their
overall style of living but would still have been able to live
most comfortably.
From all the evidence, the Court finds that through one
method or another Mr. Heiman, had he lived, would have been
able to provide and would in fact have provided contributions
and su to the other members of his family (i.c., excluding
himself) in the sum of $22,500.00 per year, measured in 1975
dollars, over the remaining working years of his life.
— A-22 —
ant depreciation of the dollar or into a deflationary era,
as in the 1930's. Both possibilities are to a considerable
extent speculative and conjectural.
521 F.2d at 1294.
The dangers of allowing the expert to make such “guesses”,
even though subjected to cross-examination, is that it leads
to protracted litigation of collateral issues without reasonable
boundaries and allows unreliable conjecture to be conveyed in
terms of mathematical certainty.
Consistent with our rulings in Riha and Johnson, we think
that in the instant case it was error for the trial court to receive
into evidence the economist’s projection of Mr. Heiman’s con-
tributions over his work life expectancy using a 5% % inflation
rate. Whether this error requires a reversal and remand to the
district court, however, necessitates further analysis.
In the present case the trial judge, rather than a jury, served
as the trier of fact. The essential difference between a bench
trial and a jury trial is that the trial judge's verdict is supported
by specific findings of fact which must withstand analysis under
the clearly erroneous test. As such, a trial judge’s conclusion
is more vulnerable on review than the jury verdict which will
be sustained upon demonstration of substantial evidence to sup-
port the verdict. See Oil Screw Noah's Ark v. Bentley & Felton
Corp., 322 F.2d 3, 5-6 (Sth Cir. 1963); cf. Jackson v. Hart-
ford Accident & Indemnity Co., 422 F.2d 1272, 1278 (8th Cir.
1970) (concurring opinion, Lay, J.). The jury's methodology
in reaching its verdict is, of course, inherent in the verdict and
is not subject to collateral attack. Chicago, R. 1. & Pac. R. R.
v. Speth, 404 F.2d 291 (8th Cir. 1968).
| Nonetheless, in the instant case, the trial judge has set forth
his factual findings, which clearly show that the court rejected
the economist’s analysis and applied his own understanding and
— A-23 —
experience of inflationary impact on future contributions. Judge
Eisele in rejecting the economist’s testimony used a 542% pres-
ent value discount rate and then applied an inflationary factor
of 4%, resulting in a discount of the projected earnings by
142%. The economist estimated loss of future contributions to
Mrs. Heiman as $760,276; Judge Eisele’s figure was $350,910.
The fundamental question is thus whether the trier of fact
may use his own understanding and experience in arriving at a
damage figure where “expert” evidence as to the precise cal-
culation, factors and result involved in the equation would be
inadmissible.
In our prior opinions we have approved the following lan-
guage from Bach:
Even though no expert testimony on inflation and future
increases was admitted, it was still error for the district
court to charge the jury that it should not consider “future
increases or decreases in the purchasing power of money.”
Cf. Willmore v. Hertz Corporation, 437 F.2d 357 (6th
Cir. 1971). Inflation is a fact of life within the common
experience of all jurors. Admittedly, if the jury considers
this issue without expert testimony, their calculations will
be even more imprecise. There is always a chance that the
verdict may be too generous. But if jurors should be pro-
hibited from applying their common knowledge of inflation
in reaching a verdict, the party entitled to recovery could
be grievously under-compensated. The court can always
rectify an exorbitant verdict through its power of remittitur.
See 6A Moore’s Federal Practice € 59.05[3].
502 F.2d at 1122, quoted in 516 F.2d 845.
Thus we are committed to the rule that although an expert
witness may not project an inflationary rate over a person's
life expectancy, the trier of fact may consider future increases
—A-24—
or decreases in the purchasing power of money. As indicated
in Bach, even though a jury's opinion, like the economist's, may
be imprecise, the ultimate check on their extrapolation is whether
the verdict is exorbitant. Thus, we hold in the present case it
was not error for the trial court, sitting as a trier of fact, to con-
sider an inflationary impact on the damage award based on his
own understanding and experience. The remaining question
we must face then is whether the damage award is excessive.
The fundamental tests of whether a verdict is excessive are
whether it falls within the reasonable range of the evidence and
whether it is shocking to the conscience. Krall v. Crouch Bros.,
Inc., 473 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1973); O’Brien v. Stover.
443 F.2d 1013, 1018-19 (8th Cir. 1971); Solomon Dehydrat-
ing Co. v. Guyton, 294 F.2d 439, 447-48 (8th Cir.). cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 929 (1961). The first is an objective test, the
latter a subjective evaluation by the judges of this court. As
we have discussed the verdict falls within a reasonable range
of the evidence. The projected earnings of the deceased were
established at $22,500 whereas there was evidence that in the
past Heiman earned more than this. Further, in evaluating the
totality of this proof and the circumstances surrounding Mr.
Heiman’s contributions to his wife and family, we do not find
the verdict shocking.
The judgments for the plaintiffs are affirmed as against Ma-
rine and Medlin; the judgment denying the cross-complaint of
Medlin against Marine is reversed and the district court is di-
rected to enter judgment in favor of Medlin on its claim for in-
demnity against Marine; the judgment in favor of Kohler on
the cross-complaint is affirmed. Costs of plaintiffs and Medlin
shall be assessed to Marine; Kohler shall pay its own costs.
Ross, Circuit Judge, Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The result reached by the majority
gives proof to the old saw that hard cases make bad law. The
—_< =
death and injuries in this case were the result of negligence and
defective design of the Heiman yacht by Boatel; however, Boatel
is bankrupt and unable to respond in damages. Under the law
of strict liability and implied warranty the dealer who acted as
an intermediary between Boatel and the decedent Medlin is
liable, even though it cannot be said that Medlin was at fault
in any traditional sense of the word. In this case it is harsh that
Medlin cannot be indemnified by Boatel, but that should not be
justification to stretch the law of torts in order to impose lia-
bility on a party who is just as innocent of fault: Marine De-
velopment, the manufacturer of the air conditioning components.
The components supplied by Marine Development were not
defective, and had they been installed as the manufacturer in-
structed, they would not have been dangerous. However, Boatel
installed the air conditioning sysiem on the Heiman yacht in
such a way that one cooling unit's air intake was from the
engineroom, and not surprisingly. the engineroom air contained,
at the time of the accident, carbon monoxide.
There is no duty to warn of obvious dangers under either
negligence or strict liability theory. Ward v. Hobart Manufactur-
ing Co., 450 F.2d 1176, 1188 (Sth Cir. 1971); Posey v. Clark
Equipment Co., 409 F.2d 560, 563 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 940 (1969); W. Prosser, The Law of Torts 649 (4th
ed. 1971): Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388, comment k;
see Kerber v. American Machine & Foundry Co., 411 F.2d 419,
421-422 (8th Cir. 1969); Restatement (Second) of Torts, §
402A, comments i, j. As Chief Judge Gibson stated in Larsen
v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 505 (8th Cir. 1968),
cited by the majority:
Almost any chattel or commodity is capable of inflicting
injury; knives cut, axes split, dynamite explodes, food
spoils, poison kills. Where the danger is obvious and
known to the user, no warning is necessary and no liability
— A-26 —
attaches for an injury occurring from the reasonable haz-
ards attached to the use of chattels or commodities, but
where the dangerous condition is latent it should be dis-
closed to the user, and non-disclosure should subject the
maker or supplier to liability for creating an unreasonable
risk.
I believe that as a matter of law Marine Development was not
liable here, because the installation of the air conditioner in a
manner which permitted the introduction of carbon monoxide
into the unit's air intake was an obvious danger and a manu-
facturer is entitled to assume that his product will not be used
in an obviously dangerous manner. Marker v. Universal Oil
Products Co., 250 F.2d 603, 606-607 (10th Cir. 1957); see
Brown v. General Motors Corp., 355 F.2d 814, 819-821 (4th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1036 (1967). This is so
a fortiori where the product is merely a component which is to
be incorporated into a system by technicians and engineers, as
Boatel’s personnel were here. Jacobson v. Colorado Fuel &
Iron Corp., 409 F.2d 1263, 1273 (9th Cir. 1969). The ma-
jority has come dangerously close to making the manufacturer
an insurer in this case. 1 would reverse on the issue of Marine
Development's liability.
I also dissent from the affirmance of the award of over half
a million dollars in damages. It is inconceivable to me how—
when “economists have fared only slightly better than fortune
tellers and soothsayers” and the prediction of inflationary or de-
flationary trends by an expert is “to a considerable extent specu-
lative and conjectural” —we can allow a federal judge to do what
the acknowledged experts in the field cannot; that is to project
a specific annual inflation rate over a person's life expectancy.
As we recognized most recently in Johnson v. Serra, 521 F.2d
1289, 1295-1296 (8th Cir. 1975): “The federal circuits that
have faced the issue in cases involving federally created claims,
governed by federal rather than state law, have for the most
—_
part rejected * * * trial court consideration of future inflationary
trends in damage assessment.” (Footnote omitted.) In Johnson
we indicated we would probably follow the majority rule in a
case applying federal law, such as this admiralty claim. John-
son v. Serra, supra, 521 F.2d at 1295. The majority goes fur-
ther today than we went in Riha v. Jasper Blackburn Corp., 516
F.2d 840, 843-845 (8th Cir. 1975). Certainly it goes further
than we said we would go in Johnson.
I also have grave doubts about some of the matters considered
by the trial court in computing the contributions Mr. Heiman
would have made to his family. These included: 1) considera-
tion of the salary the decedent had earned eight to ten years
before his death in a business unrelated to his livelihood at the
time of the accident, 2) consideration of a “management fee” of
5-6% of the value of apartments owned and operated by the de-
cedent after finding that he probably would have lost 75% of
those real estate holdings, had he lived, 3) considering living
expenses of the Heiman family which were incurred after Mr.
Heiman’s death in order to show what the decedent would
have been able to contribute.
Under the circumstances, I do not think an award of over
$512,000 was appropriate. Accordingly, | would remand this
case to the district court with directions to dismiss Marine De-
velopment as a defendant and for reconsideration of the ques-
tion of damages.
A true copy.
Attest
Clerk, U. S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
— A-28 —
APPENDIX G
In the United States District Court
Eastern District of Arkansas
Western Division
Mrs. Alana G. Heiman in her own right; Sandra Jean Heiman,
by Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, her Mother and Next Friend: and
H. Maurice Mitchell and Joseph W. Gelzine, Co-Administra-
tors in Succession with Will Annexed of the Estate of Max
Heiman, Deceased
Plaintiffs
v. No. LR-73-C-261
Boatel Company, Inc., Marine Development Corporation, and
Medlin Marine, Inc.
Defendants
Kohler Co.
Third-Party Defendant
Memorandum Opinion
The defendants, Medlin Marine, Inc. and Marine Development
Corporation, have now submitted very able briefs to the Court,
arguing their differing views concerning the law of indemnity
and contribution as applied to the findings and conclusions
heretofore made by the Court. The issues tendered have be-
come of utmost important to the parties because of the bank-
ruptcy of the defendant manufacturer, Boatel Company.
The very strong and immediate reaction of the Court upon
reading the briefs of these two parties is that neither result con-
tended for would work justice in this case. On the contrary,
to accept the position of either would, in the opinion of the
— A-29 —
Court, result in an extremely unjust apportionment of the finan-
cial responsibility arising out of the joint and several liability
of these defendants to the plaintiffs. It is true that the Court
has heretofore apportioned the fault predicated upon negligence
as between the two defendants held to be negligent, i.e., Boatel
and Marine Development, but it has not made any determina-
tion of the comparative fault between the defendant Medlin
and the defendant Marine, or any other defendant. The basic
fallacy of Marine’s position is that Medlin, because of its legal
relationship with Boatel, should at the very least stand in the
shoes of Boatel in terms of any apportionment of fault. From
all that has been said in open court and in the prior Memo-
randum Opinion, it should be quite clear that, on any scale, the
fault of Boatel far exceeded that of Medlin. On the other hand,
the error of Medlin is in assuming, because of the Court’s find-
ing that Medlin’s liability was one based simply upon Medlin’s
legal position as the retailer of the boat, that Medlin is “without
fault”. The truth is that the law of strict liability implies fault.
Medlin chu.< to deal with Boatel and to place the latter’s prod-
ucts in the hands of the public. In other words, Medlin sells
to the public instrumentalities which, if they are defective, have
a great potential for harm. The policy of the law is indeed re-
flected in the very theory of strict liability.
After analyzing the precedents cited by both Medlin and
Marine the Court is convinced that we are dealing with a prob-
lem of contribution among tortfeasors rather than the question
of tort indemnity. [The problem, however, is that we are called
upon to compare the fault of one held liable on a theory of
strict liability with the fault of another held liable on a theory
of negligent failure to warn.]
One thing is clear from the facts of the case: the principal
“culprit”, the principal wrongdoer in this tragedy, was obviously
Boatel. Whether you examine Boatel’s responsibility on the
basis of strict liability, implied warranty, or negligence, that
— A-30 —
liability and its predominating causative relationship to the
death and injuries here is obvious, clear and certain. If it is
open to the Court to determine where the loss should rest as
between the two other defendants whose fault is so much less,
relatively, than Boatel, then the Court would find it most diffi-
cult to find greater fault on the part of one than the other,
viewing “fault” in the light of the facts and the policies and
attitudes reflected in the law concerning negligence and strict
liability.
After examining the precedents submitted, the Court has
concluded that it is open to the Court to apportion the loss be-
tween the two financially responsible defendants in accordance
with the facts of the case. Those facts have been adequately
found and treated by the Court from the bench and in the
prior written memorandum. From a review thereof, the Court
concludes that the fault of Marine and Medlin is equal.
Dated this Sth day of May, 1975.
/s/ GARNETT THOMAS EISELE
United States District Judge
Filed May 5, 1975
— A-31 —
APPENDIX H
In the United States District Court
Eastern District of Arkansas
Western Division
Alana G. Heiman; Sandra Jean Heiman; and H. Maurice Mit-
chell and Joseph W. Gelzine, Co-Administrators in Succes-
sion with Will Annexed of the Estate of Max A. Heiman, De-
ceased,
Plaintiffs,
VS. No. LR-73-C-261
Boatel Company, Inc.; Marine Development Corporation; Med-
lin Marine, Inc.; and Kohler Co.,
Defendants.
Judgment
On February 5, 1975, the above cause comes on for trial in
admiralty before the Court, the plaintiffs appearing by their
counsel, Henry Woods and Steele Hays, the defendant Medlin
Marine, Inc. by its counsel, William H. Sutton, the defendant
Marine Development Corporation by its counsel, Phillip Car-
roll, and the defendant Kohler Co. by its counsel, William R.
Overton and Gordon S. Rather, Jr. The defendant Boatel Com-
pany, Inc. does not appear and has not filed a responsive plead-
ing in this cause. All parties present having announced ready
for trial, the plaintiffs’ counsel announces in open court that
it desires to dismiss its cause of action against Kohler Co., which
the Court thereupon entered with prejudice, but the cause con-
tinues against Kohler on the cross claims of defendants Medlin,
Marine, Inc. and Marine Development Corporation.
— A-32 —
Testimony began on February 5, 1975, continued through
February 11, 1975, and resumed on February 26, 1975, con-
tinued through March 4, 1975, at which point all the parties
rested. The Court thereupon made its findings of fact and dic-
tated them into the record in open court and on March 7, 1975,
a Memorandum Opinion was filed by the Court. Since the
filing of such Memorandum Opinion, it has come to the atten-
tion of the Court that it misunderstood the testimony concern-
ing the future life and work expectancies of the decedent;
such future work expectancy is found to be 21.6 years and
such future life expectancy is found to be 22.6 years. Based
upon the findings of fact and the Memorandum Opinion, it is
the judgment and order of the Court that the plaintiffs H. Mau-
rice Mitchell and Joseph W. Gelzine, Co-Administrators of the
Estate of Max A. Heiman, deceased, do have and recover from
the defendants Medlin Marine, Inc., Marine Development Cor-
poration and Boatel Company, Inc., on behalf of the wife, ch:’-
dren and estate of Max A. Heiman, the following amounts:
Alana G. Heiman, wife ............ $443,762.07
Sanda Jean Heiman, daughter ....... 41,536.33
Judith Heiman Samuel, daughter ...... 21,000.00
Estate of Max R. Heiman ........... 5,096.85
Judgment is therefore entered jointly and severally on behalf
of said co-administrators against defendants Medlin Marine,
Inc., Marine Development Corporation and Boatel Company,
Inc. in the amounts set forth above.
In open court, the attorneys for all parties agreed that Sandra
Jean Heiman had attained her majority while this action was
pending and the Court does therefore find that she is now en-
titled to have judgment individually in her own right and that
the style of this action has been arnended accordingly.
It Is Further Ordered and Adjudged that Alana G. Heiman,
for her personal injuries, do have and recover the sum of
— A-33 —
Twenty Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety-three and 50/100
Dollars ($20,893.50) from Medlin Marine, Inc., Marine De-
velopment Corporation and Boatel Company, Inc., and judg-
ment is hereby entered jointly and severally against those de-
fendants for such amount.
It Is Further Ordered and Adjudged that Sandra Jean Heiman,
for her personal injuries, do have and recover the sum of Seven-
teen Thousand Five Hundred Thirty-seven and 88/100 Dollars
($17,537.88) from Medlin Marine, Inc., Marine Development
Corporation and Boatel Company, Inc., and judgment is hereby
entered jointly and severally against those defendants for such
amount.
It Is Further Ordered and Adjudged that each of the above
amounts for which judgment was granted shall bear interest at
the rate allowed by the laws of the State of Arkansas in accord-
ance with 28 U.S.C.A. § 1961. It was agreed in open court by
the attorneys for all parties to this action that each of the above
amounts for which judgment was granted shall bear interest
from March 12, 1975.
The cross complaints by Marine Development Corporation
and Medlin Marine, Inc. against Kohler Co. are dismissed. The
relative degree of fault between the defendants Boatel Company,
Inc. and Marine Development Corporation is assessd as follows:
Boatel Company, Inc. 80%
Marine Development Corporation 20%
Medlin Marine, Inc. is hereby granted a judgment in in-
demnity against the defendant Boatel Company, Inc. for all
amounts for which judgment against Medlin Marine, Inc. has
been awarded herein in favor of the plaintiffs. The Court how-
ever reserves all questions of indemnity and contribution as be-
tween Marine Development Corporation and Medlin Marine,
Inc. for future determination.
ws 2 epee:
— A-34 — | — A-35 —
Costs are awarded in favor of the plaintiffs and defendant
Kohler Co. APPENDIX I
GARNETT THOMAS EISELE
United States District Judge In the United States District Court
Date: March 14, 1975 Eastern District of Arkansas
Western Division
Approved as to Form:
(Illegible) Mrs. Alana G. Heiman in Her Own Right; Sandra Jean Hei-
Attorney for Plaintiffs man, by Mrs. Alana G. Heiman, Her Mother and Next
WILLIAM H. SUTTON Friend; and H. Maurice Mitchell and Joseph W. Gelzine, Co-
Attorney for Defendant Administrators in Succession With Will Annexed of the Es-
Medlin Marine, Inc. tate of Max Heiman, Deceased,
PHILLIP CARROLL - De ian anes vomaine
Attorney for Defendant
Marine Development Corporation Boatel Company, Inc., Marine Development Corporation, and
WILLIAM R. OVERTON Medlin Marine, Inc.,
Attorney for Defendant Defendants,
Kohler Co. Kohler Co.,
Third-Party Defendant.
Memorandum Opinion
Although the trial of this cause lasted about ten days, most
of the basic facts are undisputed as will be revealed by an ex-
amination of the record. Because of the pressure of time and
judicial business, the Court must content itself with making the
essential findings with respect to disputed issues of fact and the
necessary conclusions of law, providing in the process only a
minimum of background information.
On September 1, 1973, Mr. Max Heiman, Mrs. Alana Hei-
man, his wife, and Miss Sandra Heiman, his daughter, went
on an outing in Mr. Heiman’s 47 ft. Islander yacht on the Arkan-
sas River. On leaving the Little Rock Yacht Club, Mr. Hei-
man radioed Mr. Harry Ehrenberg, who was upriver in his own
Nr
— A-36 —
boat and who had previously recommended a beach rendezvous
site to Mr. Heiman. Mr. Heiman asked Mr. Ehrenberg how to
get to the site, which was located one-quarter to one-half mile
past Palarm Creek on the way up the river. Mr. Ehrenberg
advised that it was somewhat difficult to find, and he therefore
volunteered to take his runabout out onto the river and lead
Mr. Heiman to the island where other boats had already assem-
bied. This he did, and Mr. Heiman brought his boat to the
island and beached it to the south of the other yachts. There
were approximately five boats in all that were beached along
the east side of the island. Mr. Heiman’s was the southernmost.
The bow of the boat rested on a very gentle slope in a manner
which did not lower the rear of the boat more than two or three
inches further down in the water than it would be if floating
free.
That evening before dinner, the Heimans came ashore and vis-
ited others on the boats to the north of them. The various
groups then returned to their own boats to dine. After dinner
the Heimans watched a football game and thereafter Mr. Hei-
man came ashore again and walked his dog. He told Mr. Ehren-
berg that he did not wish to go fishing the next day, but intended
to rest. The Heimans retired about 10:30 on the evening of
September 1.
On the morning of September 2, the Ehrenbergs and others in
the group were fishing and visiting up and down the line of
boats and getting ready for a fish fry. Later on, Mrs. Ehren-
berg became concerned since she had not observed any activity
on the Heiman boat. She insisted that Mr. Ehrenberg go over
to the boat to invite them to join the others. Mr. Sam Winstead
and Mr. Ehrenberg boarded the Heiman yacht, but could not
arouse anyone or open the door. Mr. Winstead pried the slid-
ing glass door open with a screwdriver, and he and Mr. Ehren-
berg rushed in. Mr. Winstead turned off the generator, and they
both then ran out for air. They immediately re-entered and
—_—<
found Mr. and Mrs. Heiman on the two beds in the rear living
compartment. Mr. Heiman was apparently dead. They man-
aged to get the Heimans out on the open deck. Mrs. Heiman
rolled her eyes and Sandra spoke once, but each then lapsed
back into a coma. Since Mr. Winstead had the fastest boat, the
Heimans were placed upon it and it returned with them to the
Little Rock Yacht Club. The Heiman yacht was piloted back
to the Little Rock Yacht Club by Mr. Dick Herget, who
entered the Heiman vessel with a deputy sheriff. Everyone was
instructed not to disturb anything on the boat. When the boat
was back at the Little Rock Yacht Club, Mr. Herget locked it
and delivered the keys to Mr. Buddy Payne. Mr. Payne kept
the boat locked thereafter, only opening it at the direction of
the attorneys.
Contributory Negligence of Mr. and Mrs. Max Heiman and
Sandra Heiman
The defendants have contended that Mr. and Mrs. Max Hei-
man and Sandra Heiman were contributorially negligent. A
contrary finding has already been made of record in open court.
An additional point, probably, needs to be made. The defend-
ants suggest that if the craft is anchored in open water it will
weather-vane with the wind and this would avoid the precise
problem which occasioned the death of Mr. Heiman and the
injuries of Mrs. Heiman and Miss Sandra Heiman. The short
answer to this is that all who were involved in the manufacture,
sale and operation of such craft knew, and know, that they will
be frequently beached for recreational purposes rather than
anchored in open water. Further, if the carbon monoxide haz-
ard was known, or should have been known, and the safeguard
against same was to be the requirement that the boat always
be anchored in open water where it could freely pivot 360
degrees, then obviously a clearcut instruction and warning to
this effect would be required. None was given or suggested.
— A-38 —
Boatel Liability
The Court made most of its findings of fact and conclusions
of law with respect to the liability of the various parties in open
court the day after the conclusion of the trial. The following
findings and conclusions are supplementary to those stated from
the bench and must be read in conjunction therewith to be
properly understood.
The defendant Boatel Company, Inc. sold its product, the 47
ft. Islander, to the defendant Medlin Marine, Inc. in defective
condition, unreasonably dangerous to the potential purchaser
and likely users. At the time of the sale, Boatel was engaged in
the business of selling boats and yachts, and the 47 ft. Islander
yacht which was sold by it to Medlin Marine, Inc. and thence
to Mr. Max Heiman was a standard production item. As was
expected, the boat did reach the purchaser, Mr. Max Heiman,
and the other likely users of that boat, without substantial
change in the condition from that which existed at the time
it left the manufacturing plant in Mora, Minnesota. The prod-
uct was so dangerous and hazardous, as delivered to Medlin Ma-
rine and as delivered to Mr. Max Heiman, that no prudent man-
ufacturer or seller would have marketed it had it been aware of
the defective conditions and their potential. The defective con-
ditions have heretofore been stated in open court, and those
conditions were proximate causes of the death of Mr. Max
Heiman and the injuries sustained by Mrs. Alana Heiman and
Miss Sandra Heiman.
Kohler Liability
On the day after the completion of the trial, the Court made
findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to various
liability issues. It concluded that Marine Development Corpora-
tion was liable to the plaintiffs, but it did not make a determina-
— A-39 —
tion as to the liability of the Kohler Company. Rather, the Court
on that occasion made certain factual findings concerning the
role of the Kohler Company, but expressly reserved the issue
of Kohler’s liability for further study. At this time the Court
supplements its findings of fact and conclusions of law with re-
spect to Kohler’s liability as follows:
The third-party defendant, Kohler Company, knew, or had
reason to know or believe, that its gasoline-driven generator
would be installed in the engine compartment of a boat man-
ufactured by Boatel and, further, that such boat would have
sizeable holes or openings in the forward wall of the engine
compartment. Kohler also knew, or had reason to know or be-
lieve, that its generator unit might very likely be integrated with,
and used together with, a recirculating air conditioning system.
Kohler also knew, or had reason to know or to believe, that
leaks do occasionally develop in the exhaust systems of marine
generator engines resulting in the direct discharge of carbon
monoxide into the engine compartment. It also knew that these
leaks could occur through accident or ordinary wear and tear.
And, of course, it is undisputed that Kohler sold the engine
that produced the carbon monoxide that resulted in the death
and injuries in this case, and Kohler was fully aware of the fact
that its engine would produce carbon monoxide and that that
gas was potentially lethal.
The only real liability question in connection with Kohler is
whether it had a duty to warn and, then, if it did have such a
duty which it failed to discharge, was the breach of that duty
a proximate cause of the death and injuries in this case?
There was evidence in this case that carbon monoxide in the
engine compartment would probably diffuse and flow through
the openings in the engine compartment forward wall whether
there was an air conditioning system on the boat or not. There
is even testimony that if there were lethal concentrations of car-
bon monoxide in the engine compartment that lethal concen-
0
— A-40 —
trations would eventually build up in the living compartments
even in the absence of an air conditioning system. In the Court's
judgment, however, the evidence did not, and does not, sup-
port a finding that concentrations of carbon monoxide which
would be hazardous to life or health would penetrate into the
living areas of a boat in the absence of an improperly installed
air conditioning system.' When the generator engine is oper-
ating, it creates a negative pressure in the engine compartment
since it demands a source of air and oxygen. Of course, if there
were a sufficient leak directly from the exhaust system into the
engine compartment, positive pressures could be created which
could result in an outflow of carbon monoxide into the living
quarters.
The key question here is whether the Kohler Company had
reason to know, understand, and believe that the presence of
carbon monoxide in the engine compartment could be poten-
tially hazardous to the occupants and users of the boat in the
living compartments of the boat. If so, it could be argued that
it should have warned against any foreseeable circumstance
which would permit the introduction of carbon monoxide into
that engine compartment, and, again if it had that knowledge,
then it should warn the manufacturer and the potential users
of the potential, through accident or wear and tear, of a leak
developing in the exhaust system within the engine compart-
ment, and it would also have a duty to warn the boat manu-
facturer not to create entryways from outside of the boat in
the vicinity of the exhausts which would permit the reintroduc-
tion of the carbon monoxide into the engine compartment.
Here, Kohler argues, in effect, that it gave such a warning when
its manual stated, “never put inlets in the transom”. It has al-
ready been stated in open court that this language would avail
' It should be noted, and the Court so finds, that there is no
significant difference in the airflow situation in the case of a properly
installed recirculating air conditioning and heating system from that
which obtains in the complete absence of an air conditioning and
heating system.
ek ees
om Ant <-
Kohler little because, taken in appropriate context, it obviously
referred to the proper construction of the ventilation system,
and the inlet ventilators, which are designed to operate while
the boat is in motion, obviously would not work if installed
on the transom. But, even assuming the language was intended
to guard against the very thing that Boatel in fact did here.
was it adequate as a warning as contrasted to its adequacy as a
construction instruction. If this were the sole issue, the Court
would have to resolve it against Kohler in the same fashion that
it resolved a similar argument against Marine Development Cor-
poration, because, clearly, the language does not suggest in
any way the potential hazard to life and health that might re-
sult from the failure to follow the instruction.
All this brings us back to the most difficult question: “know-
ing that carbon monoxide might be in the engine compartment
as a result of the operation of its generator engine at some
time during the life of the boat. and knowing that there were
Openings from the engine compartment communicating di-
rectly with the living areas of the boat, did Kohler have a duty
to warn Boatel not to put holes in the exterior of the boat in
the vicinty of the engine exhausts, which holes would directly
communicate with the engine compartment, and to further point
out that to do so might have the effect of producing death or
injuries to those occupying the living spaces of the boat. The
answer to this question must turn on the further question: did
Kohler know, or should it have known, that an air conditioning
system, improperly installed, or however installed, might pump
carbon monoxide out of the engine compartment and into the
living areas of the boat.” On the basis of the evidence, the
Court must find that Kohler did not know of this effect (indeed.
none of the parties did until after the accident) and it further
finds and concludes that it had no duty to know, or reason to
know, of this potential. To hold otherwise would charge the
manufacturer of a generator with the unreasonable requirement
of having to be intimately aware of the tendencies and propen-
ee ee
—_.
sities and nature of a// appliances and systems that might take
electric energy from a generating unit. The Court concludes,
while recognizing that the question here is a close one, that the
law does not go that far and, therefore, that Kohler had no duty
to warn Boatel which could form a predicate for liability against
it in this case.
Upon the basis of the same analysis, the Court must con-
clude that Kohler had no duty to warn or recommend that the
bilge blower be operated continuously when the generator en-
gine or the other engines were operating and the boat was nof
under way. Until the post-accident analysis of this case. at any
rate, the purpose and function of the bilge blower was consid-
ered by all to be simply a method of ventilating the engine com-
partment for the purpose of eliminating potentially explosive
fumes. It was not conceived by anyone that it would have any
relationship to the potential carbon monoxide problem.
Damages
The United States Supreme Court in Sea-Land Services, Inc.
v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 584, states that, under the maritime
wrongful-death remedy, the decedent's dependants may recover
damages “for the loss of support. services, and society. as well
as funeral expenses”. It then goes on to discuss these elements
of damages:
“Recovery for loss of support has been universally recog-
nized, and includes all the financial contributions that the
decedent would have made to his dependents had he lived.
Similarly, the overwhelming majority of state wrongful-
death acts and courts interpreting the Death on the High
Seas Act have permitted recovery for the monetary value
of services the decedent provided and would have con-
tinued to provide but for his wrongful death. Such services
include, for example, the nurture, training, education, and
—_—~
guidance that a child would have received had not the
parent been wrongfully killed. Services the decedent per-
formed at home or for his spouse are also compensable.
“Compensation for loss of society, however, presents a
closer question. The term ‘society’ embraces a broad range
of mutual benefits each family member receives from the
others’ continued existence, including love, affection, care,
attention, companionship, comfort, and protection. Un-
questionably, the deprivation of these benefits by wrongful
death is a grave loss to the decedent's dependents.”
. * * * * * *
“Finally, in addition to recovery for loss of support,
services, and society, damages for funeral expenses may be
awarded under the maritime wrongful-death remedy in
circumstances where the decedent's dependents have either
paid for the funeral or are liable for its payment.”
As a footnote to its discussion of “loss of society,” the Court
made it clear that this element should not be confused with
mental anguish or grief which are not compensable under the
maritime wrongful-death remedy. It states that loss of society
“entails the loss of positive benefits,” while mental anguish or
grief “represents an emotional response to the wrongful death.”
A “dependent” for our purposes may be such beyond his or
her legal majority and may be such independent of the legal
responsibilities imposed by state law. This is particularly so
with respect to certain “unfinished business” in the maturation
process such as advanced, college-level education. Where the
evidence discloses the intent and ability to pursue such an edu-
cation on the part of a child of the decedent and the con-
comitant determination to, and ability to, provide such educa-
tional opportunities on the part of the decedent himself, then
that child would remain a “dependant” for such purposes until
completion of the educational process.
— A-44 —
A. Contributions
From the evidence it is clear beyond question that Mr. Hei-
man was an exceptional person and an ideal husband and father.
He occupied an important place in the civic and business life
of the Little Rock community and the highest positions of lay
leadership in his church. He was devoted to his wife and his
daughters and always put their interests first. He was concerned
with their welfare and did his utmost to shield them from life’s
difficulties and vicissitudes. He had an intense personal interest
in the education of the daughters. He was a “family man” in
the sense that his whole life revolved about his wife and daugh-
ters. The members of the family spent much more of their
“free” time enjoying the companionship of each other than one
would expect in the average family.
Although the status of Mr. Heiman’s economic condition at
the time of his death, based as it was upon income from a motel
and from apartment complexes located in Arkansas and Florida,
was precarious and deteriorating, it is likely that, had he lived,
he would have salvaged at least some small part of his holdings.
Mr. Heiman had broad family and personal contacts with in-
fluential and wealthy businessmen throughout the country, and
he also had what appears to be an unusual ability to borrow
money, considering the status of his overall financial condition.
This is dramatically illustrated by the evidence indicating that
he had arranged an additional $100,000 loan just a few days
nrior to his death.
Nevertheless, a fair interpretation of the evidence forces the
Court to find that, had Mr. Heiman lived, he would have needed
a combination of great effort and extremely good fortune to
salvage even as much as a fourth of his overall holdings and
that, realistically, it is more probable that, had he lived, Mr.
Heiman would only have been able to extricate himself from
his financial difficulties without any net personal obligation,
salvaging only a small, perhaps even nominal, amount of his
cane ein ea
— A-45 —
business holdings. The Court must analyze the probable “con-
tributions” element of damages with this finding in mind.
Mr. Heiman can be considered a victim of the times in the
sense that practically all of the overall financial conditions and
circumstances affecting the success of such investments went
sour at about the same time. Beyond that, he possibly did not
retrench when he should have. His concern for and interest in
his family, and his hope, based more upon wish than reality, led
him into the practice of using cash flow from depreciation as
the basis for contributions to his family and his own living ex-
penses. As a result, when conditions began to approach the
critical stage, he did not have the necessary reserves to fall back
upon to tide him over. This left him with only one possible
recourse: to borrow more, and this alternative would itself be-
come increasingly more difficult.
The evidence clearly establishes that Mr. Heiman was a man
of business and executive ability. Before 1965 he had held
positions of responsibility with one of the largest department
stores in the State of Arkansas, the Gus Blass Company. The
evidence from his W-2 forms indicates that his average annual
income for the last three years he was with the Gus Blass Com-
pany (1963, 1964 and 1965) was in excess of $20,000. The
compensation for performing similar services in 1975 would
obviously be considerably in excess of that figure. The evidence
of his ability to command executive-level compensation from
third-party employers is clear and convincing. This, then, is
another of the bases upon which the Court's decision concern-
ing the amount and probability of future contributions must be
predicated.
When Mr. Heiman got seriously involved in the real estate,
motel and apartment building ventures, he devoted most of his
time to personally overseeing such operations. He maintained
an office with a secretary at the Holcomb Heights Apartments.
It is true that he had on-the-site employees who looked after
— A-46 —
the routine operations, the collection of rents, and maintenance.
But, with the exception of the Fair Park Gardens, which were
under a management arrangement with Block Realty Company,
he contributed a considerable amount of his time to the overall
management of the properties. The evidence indicates that, had
Mr. Heiman not been performing these services, he would have
had the alternative of contracting for such services with some
real estate management company. The usual fee for such serv-
ices would run in the neighborhood of five to six percent of the
gross receipts. Of course, such a firm would have had to pay
the management expenses and wages of the on-the-site employees
out of its fees. Looking at Mr. Heiman’s “tax records” covering
his various operations over a period of years, the Court finds
that he was performing services which, had they been con-
tracted, would have required the payment of at least $20,000
per year over and above the management and employee expense
actually experienced.
It is clear from the evidence that Mrs. Heiman had no knowl.
edge of her husband's business affairs prior to his death, and it
is also clear that Mr. Heiman shielded her from even the routine
responsibilities of paying household bills and expenses. There-
fore, she personally kept no records of, and has no knowledge
of, the contributions made to her and the family prior to Mr.
Heiman’s death. The executors have found records kept by Mr.
Heiman, however, which provide some insight into the con-
tributions made to the family over recent years. In addition,
Mrs. Heiman has kept an accurate record of her expenses since
Mr. Heiman’s death, and has testified that those expenditures
have been in line with, and certainly not more than, those in-
curred in prior years. Looking at both Mrs. Heiman’s testi-
mony as to her actual expenses since Mr. Heiman’s death and the
tax records and other records kept by Mr. Heiman reflecting
contributions prior to his death, the Court finds that on an
average Mr. Heiman was contributing just under $30,000 to
the living expense requirements of the entire family. In making
rte tem Oe ee
—_S
this determination, the Court has disregarded certain items, such
as jewelry expenditures, from the figures testified to by Mrs. Hei-
man on the one hand, and, on the other hand, has reduced the
figures revealed by Mr. Heiman’s records by the amounts of the
insurance premiums, the boat expense, and certain other ex-
penses. Had he lived, Mr. Heiman’s own living expenses
would have had to be defrayed out of the total living expense
contributions. Furthermore, if, as the Court suspects, financial
circumstances would have required Mr. Heiman to accept em-
ployment from a third-party employer, he would, of course, have
had to pay state and federal income taxes on his compensation,
a situation which would be entirely different from the tax
situation which had existed in the years immediately prior to
his death where, because of the nature of his investments and
the tax laws involved, he was not required to pay such taxes.
The Court is convinced that, had Mr. Heiman lived, he and
his family would have had to cut down somewhat on their over-
all style of living but would still have been able to live most
comfortably.
From all the evidence, the Court finds that through one
method or another Mr. Heiman, had he lived, would have been
able to provide and would in fact have provided contributions
and support to the other members of his family (i.e., excluding
himself) in the sum of $22,500.00 per year, measured in 1975
dollars, over the remaining working years of his life.
The plaintiffs put in evidence experience tables showing a
23.3 year life expectancy for a 48-year-old man. There was
evidence indicating that Mr. Heiman had in the past suffered a
heart attack, but there is no indication that he was not enjoying
reasonably good health just prior to his death. From the evi-
dence the Court finds that Mr. Heiman would have lived 21
more years and that he would have remained active as an
economic producer for 20 years, calculated from the date of
his death.
—_e
Since the Court is convinced that decedent would have paid
the full costs of his daughters’ college educations, it is obvious
that during those years when such payments would be required,
less would be available for the support of Mrs. Heiman. This
situation would reverse, however, when the daughters had com-
pleted their educations and were either married or “on their
own”.
B. Loss of services.
Under the Gaudet case, supra, “services” would include the
nurture, training, education, and guidance that Sandra and Judy
would have received had Mr. Heiman survived, and would also
include those services which he would have performed at home
or for his wife. With respect to the former, the Court must
find and conclude that both Sandra and Judy actually received
nurture, training, education, and guidance from their father
over the really important formative years of their lives. They
now possess in their personalities the benefits of those important
contributions to their lives. That Mr. Heiman would have con-
tinued to provide guidance, had he lived, is equally obvious.
The point is, however, that the “twig had already been bent”
and that Mr. Heiman’s future contributions in this respect
would have been more on the basis of the mutual interchange
one finds among equal adults in a family unit. The Court is
assessing some damages for this loss, while recognizing that it
was minimal under the circumstances. The Court fixes the lump
sum of $1,000.00 as the present value of such loss to Judy Hei-
man and the sum of $2,000.00 as the present value of such
loss to Sandra Heiman, taking into consideration the difference
in the ages and status of independence of the two girls at the
time of Mr. Heiman’s death.
The situation is different with respect to Mrs. Heiman. The
evidence indicates that Mr. Heiman provided much in the way
CC $-$§— —=aSaS_—— SS
—_S
of personal services for Mrs. Heiman and for the support of
the homeplace itself. He worked around the house. kept the
family’s books, paid the family’s bills, and provided much in
the way of direct assistance to his wife. The Court finds that
the reasonable value, on an annual basis, of such services would
amount to $1,000.00 in 1975 dollars and that such services
would have continued for the balance of Mr. Heiman’s life.
C. Loss of Society.
The Gaudet case, supra, makes it clear that the decedent's
dependants are entitled to recover for “loss of society” which,
according to the Supreme Court, embraces a broad range of
mutual benefits, including “love, affection, care, attention, com-
panionship, comfort, and protection”. Although it is difficult to
place a value upon such things—most people feeling that it is
impossible to measure such benefits in terms of dollars—still
lump sum awards will be made to reflect those important losses
in this case as follows:
1. For Mrs. Heiman $35,000.00
2. For Mrs. Lou (Judy) Samuel $10,000.00
3. For Miss Sandra Heiman $15,000.00
D. Funeral expenses.
Finally, the Gaudet case makes it clear that a recovery is per-
mitted for funeral expenses. The Court finds the funeral ex-
pense to be $5,096.85.
Damages of Mrs. Alana Heiman and Sandra Jean Heiman
Mrs. Heiman testified that she recalls that the family retired
about 10:30 on the evening of September 1. The next thing
— A-50 —
that she recalls is her awakening in the intensive care unit of
St. Vincent Infirmary several days after the accident. From
other evidence the Court determines that Mrs. Heiman first re-
gained significant consciousness on September 5. She was not
really clear of mind until September 6. As she regained con-
sciousness, she found that it was difficult to breathe (a trache-
ostomy having been performed while she was still in a comatose
state) and noticed that her hands were bound to the side of
the bed. She was confused and became instinctively terrified. She
was receiving fluids intravenously and had to be suctioned
when she began to cough. As she regained awareness of the
situation, she found that she was on a respirator. Her leg, in
which she had phlebitis and in which she had received a
transfusion, caused her pain. She recalls developing pneumonia,
with attendant fatigue, coughing and pain in her chest.
She is aware that she developed cerebral edema and heart
difficulties which occasioned numerous cardiograms.
Mrs. Heiman has made a remarkable recovery, considering
her close brush with death. She has continuing difficulty with
her leg, which swells when she is on it for any length of time.
When the leg swells, it causes pain. She has experienced no
continued difficulty as a result of the tracheostomy except an Oc-
casional feeling of “drawing” or tension in her throat. Psycho-
logically she has not made as complete a recovery. She still is
extremely nervous and, on occasion, becomes emotionally upset.
She finds that she cries quite frequently, but is trying to fight
off these emotional residuals. She is, according to her own tes-
timony and the testimony of her doctor, coping quite well with
these difficulties.
When Sandra Heiman first regained consciousness several
days after the accident in the intensive care unit of the hospital,
she, too, was very frightened. There were needles in her arms
and she had trouble breathing and talking. Her knees were
eee er eS ee ee ee ee
— A-51 —
swelling and causing considerable pain. As indicated in the
discussion of Dr. Levy's testimony below, Sandra has made a
remarkable recovery, but she does have some residuals. She
finds that she tires much more quickly now than before the
accident, feeling that she has somewhat limited breathing capac-
ity. Her voice is lower and cracks on occasion as a result of the
tracheostomy and treatment while in the hospital. She still has
a numb place on her leg.
Emotionally, Sandra finds that she still cries more often than
before, but it is evident to the Court, as it was to Dr. Levy, that
she is getting control of this situation.
It would be well at this time to discuss briefly the relation-
ship between Sandra and her father. Theirs was a particularly
close relationship. Sandra was a real “tomboy” and enjoyed
fishing, shooting skeet, and watching football games with her
father. She helped Mr. Heiman do such things as reloading
his shells and he, in turn, taught her how to drive an automobile.
In sum, there was a close, warm, affectionate relationship be-
tween Sandra Heiman and her father that was obvious not only
to Sandra and her father but also noted by the rest of the family
and the family’s friends.
Dr. Jerome Levy was the physician in charge of the han-
dling of Mrs. Heiman’s case and Sandra Heiman’s case. The
Court was most favorably impressed by the testimony of Dr.
Levy. That testimony reflected that nice balance of personal
concern for his patients and complete professional objectivity.
He was not cross-examined by any of the attorneys for the de-
fendants.
Dr. Levy is principally an internist. He first saw Mrs. Heiman
around 4:00 p.m. on September 2. (She had been earlier at-
tended by Dr. John Samuel in the emergency room. Dr. Sam-
uel is now deceased.) He found Mrs. Heiman unconscious and
— A-52 —
in a form of shock. She showed evidence of brain injury and
her pulse was rapid, although her blood pressure was normal.
When admitted, Mrs. Heiman’s lungs were clear and her breath-
ing was satisfactory. He assessed her overall condition as critical
due to carbon monoxide poisoning and sought consultation with
Dr. John Schultz, who was well-trained in respiratory problems,
and Dr. Howell, a neurologist. Dr. Schultz was called in because
Mrs. Heiman soon developed difficulty in breathing. Dr. Howell
was called in because of the fear of possible brain damage or
injury. As the breathing difficulty developed, it became ob-
vious that a tracheostomy would have to performed, and Dr.
Stewart, a chest surgeon, was called in for this purpose.
The breathing problem which developed is a form of respira-
tory failure. The collection of fluid in the tissue blocks the
oxygen distribution. Oxygen was administered and the trache-
ostomy permitted a satisfactory air exchange. Nevertheless,
Mrs. Heiman developed pneumonia. The carbon monoxide
soon produced cerebral edema in Mrs. Heiman. Although the
precise mechanics of causation are not known, the lack of oxy-
gen available to the tissue causes fluids to develop in the cells
and between the cells with consequent swelling. This is treated
by the tracheostomy and provision for pure oxygen heretofore
mentioned, and also by the use of dexamethasone, a steroid
which mobilizes the fluid permitting it to get into the blood-
stream and thus to be carried away.
About the time the doctors began to make progress with the
cerebral edema, they noted difficulties with Mrs. Heiman’s heart.
Some areas of the body are particularly susceptible to damage
due to loss of oxygen. The brain, lungs, heart and kidneys are
the critical organs. Heart tissue and cells become weak and do
not function properly because of lack of oxygen. Dr. Levy
testified that Mrs. Heiman did sustain injury to her heart re-
flecting myocardial damage. This condition was treated by rest,
oxygen and the use of a drug which regulated Mrs. Heiman’s
a —) meee
a ee ee
— A-53 —
blood pressure. The heart condition steadily improved, but it
was several months before Dr. Levy found the heart muscle
restored to its normal strength and condition.
Mrs. Heiman was in the hospital from September 2 to Sep-
tember 15, most of the time in intensive care.
The first day that Mrs. Heiman’s mind was clear was Sep-
tember 6. On that occasion she asked about Mr. Heiman, and
Dr. Levy told her the truth.
Dr. Levy has followed Mrs. Heiman since her discharge from
the hospital and has found that she has progressed very well
under the restrictions imposed by him. After approximately
six months, her physical condition stabilized, leaving her with
only minor physical residuals. She still has trouble with the
blockage of the vein in her leg resulting from the aggravation
of her phlebitis condition, but Dr. Levy is convinced, overall,
that she has done extremely well. Dr. Levy indicates that it will
take longer for Mrs. Heiman to attain complete relief from the
emotional and psychological results of her injuries, but he is
convinced that she is making a determined effort in this con-
nection.
Although Mrs. Heiman has made a remarkable recovery, it
is equally clear to the Court that she suffered great mental
and physical pain as a direct result of her exposure to the
carbon monoxide.
Dr. Levy also handled Sandra Heiman’s case. Sandra was 17
at the time of the accident and was just preparing to enter her
senior year in high school. Miss Heiman’s symptoms and diffi-
culties paralleled those of her mother, but in some areas were
worse, according to Dr. Levy. She developed an almost fatal
complication relating to her renal system. At the very time
when she was recovering from the same cerebral edema and
a a
aan Sip <n
heart conditions as those suffered by her mother, she had a
kidney failure which approached a uremic state. However, she
was treated for this condition and fortunately snapped back, and
thereafter proceeded steadily on the road to recovery. Sandra
also suffered from acute respiratory failure which also required
a tracheostomy. A respirator was used to assist her to breathe,
just as in the case of her mother. She also was discharged from
the hospital on September 15.
Dr. Levy states that the brain, heart, lung and kidney con-
ditions suffered by Sandra Heiman have been restored and re-
paired by nature’s efforts since then. Sandra, too, noted her own
remarkable recovery as far as her physical condition is con-
cerned. The main residual, according to Dr. Levy, is that result-
ing from emotional shock. Even in this area, it appears that she
has made good progress although, as expected she experiences
some relapses on occasion. It is clear from the evidence that
Sandra has suffered no permanent brain damage. She is mak-
ing an excellent scholastic record in college.
The Court finds the reasonable value of the medical and hos-
pital services rendered to Mrs. Heiman to be $5,893.50 and the
reasonable value of such services for Sandra Heiman to be
$5,037.88.
For all other appropriate elements of damage for their per-
sonal injuries, the Court finds that Mrs. Heiman is entitled to
the sum of $15,000.00 and Miss Sandra Heiman is entitled to
the sum of $12,500.00.
Besides Sandra Heiman, the Heimans had only one other
child, Judy, who is now Mrs. Lou Samuel. Judy was at the
University of Arkansas at Fayetteville when she learned of the
tragedy. She immediately came home and did not thereafter
return to the University at Fayetteville.
Judy, too, had a very special and close relationship with her
father. When Judy was at Sophie Newcomb College in New
ee
— A-55 —
Orleans, her father talked to her by long distance telephone
from his office at least once a week. Whenever he went to
Florida to check on his business investments, he would detour
through New Orleans so he could visit Judy. In addition, Mr.
and Mrs. Heiman both made frequent trips to New Orleans
to visit their daughter.
Judy was engaged to be married at the time of the accident.
Mr. Heiman made several trips with her about the country so
that she might find a wedding dress that they both liked. Such
episodes simply illustrate the basic relationship.
To further detail that evidence which so clearly shows the
strong mutual happy feelings of love, concern, understanding
and warm affection which characterized this strong family unit
would serve no useful purpose. What has been said should
suffice.
Damages—inflation factor
The Court is convinced that the law permits, and realism
requires, the assessment of any reasonably probable inflationary
or deflationary trend over the future years in which it is found
that contributions would have been made or services would
have been rendered by a decedent. Where a proper evidentiary
basis is laid, the Court should consider such trends and their
effect upon the purchasing and earning power of the dollar. The
Court was impressed with the testimony of Dr. Floyd Durham, a
professor of economics at Texas Christian University. While not
agreeing with certain of his findings and conclusions concerning
future trends, the Court was impressed with his overall analysis
thereof and has used that analysis, along with other evidence in
the case, in reaching its own conclusion as to an appropriate
adjustment in this case for inflationary trends.
— A-56 —
The law requires the trier of fact to determine the present
valuation of contributions which would have, had the decedent
lived, been made over a period of future years. To get the
present value, the trier of fact must determine an appropriate
discount rate. On the other side of the coin, the trier of the
facts should attempt to evaluate future inflationary trends in
order to properly reflect the purchasing and earning power of
the dollar over those same future years. Dr. Durham used a dis-
count rate of 4% percent and an inflationary rate of 5/2 per-
cent. The Court, on the other hand, finds that the more ap-
propriate discount rate would be 51% percent and the more
appropriate inflation rate would be 4 percent considering the
two decade projections we are working with here.
Indemnity
Medlin Marine, Inc. is entitled under the law to an indemnity
judgment over against the defendant Boatel for all amounts for
which judgment against Medlin has been awarded herein in
favor of the plaintiffs.
Contribution among tortfeasors
The Court fixes and assesses the relative degree of fault be-
tween the defendant Boatel Company and the defendant Marine
Development Corporation as follows:
Boatel Company 80%
Marine Development Corporation 20%
Filed March 7, 1975
as i a i se rn
—_v
[*1770] APPENDIX J
In the United States District Court, Eastern District
of Arkansas, Western Division
Mrs. Alana G. Heiman in Her Own,
Right; Sandra Jean Heiman, by Mrs.
Alana G. Heiman, Her Mother and
Next Friend; and H. Maurice Mitch-
ell and Joseph W. Gelzine, Co-Ad-
ministrators in Succession With Will
Annexed of the Estate of Max Hei-
man, Deceased, > No. LR-73-C-261
Plaintiffs,
Boatel Company, Inc., Marine Devel-
opment Corporation, Kohler Com-
pany, and Medlin Marine, Inc.,
Defendants. /
Trial
Before:
The Honorable Garnett Thomas Eisele,
United States District Judge
U. S. District Courtroom,
U. S. Post Office & Courthouse,
Little Rock, Arkansas,
March 4, 1975.
* Numbers appearing in brackets in text indicate page numbers
of original stenographic transcript of testimony.
— A-58 —
[1771] Appearances
On behalf of plaintiffs:
HENRY WOODS, Esq., of
McMath, Leatherman & Woods,
711 West Third Street,
Little Rock, Arkansas; and
STEELE HAYS, Esq., of
Spitzberg, Mitchell & Hays,
300 Garner Place,
Little Rock, Arkansas.
On behalf of defendant Marine Development Corporation:
PHILLIP CARROLL, Esq., and
VINCE FOSTER, Esq., of
Rose, Nash, Williamson, Carroll & Clay,
720 West Third Street,
Little Rock, Arkansas.
On behalf of defendant Medlin Marine:
WILLIAM H. SUTTON, Esq,., of
Smith, Williams, Friday, Eldredge & Clark,
1100 Boyle Building,
Little Rock, Arkansas.
On behalf of defendant Kohier Company:
WILLIAM R. OVERTON, Esq., and
GORDON S. RATHER, Esq., of
Wright, Lindsey & Jennings,
2200 Worthen Bank Building,
Little Rock, Arkansas.
— A-59 —
[1772] PROCEEDINGS
The Court: Good afternoon.
Mr. Woods.
Mr. Woods: Your Honor, I would like to introduce this
stipulation. I don’t guess it’s necessary to read it. The Court
and all the parties have copies of it. I will just introduce it as
an exhibit. I'll be glad to read it.
The Court: This had to do with damages?
Mr. Woods: Yes, sir.
The Court: It will be received in evidence as a stipulation.
Mr. Sutton: Your Honor, I think I speak for all the defend-
ants in saying that we do not object to the evidence not being
authenticated any more than what it is. This is what the stipu-
lation goes for, as far as we are concerned. We do object to it
on the grounds of relevance and on the grounds of not being
properly introducible at this time and as not being a proper
support of any loss of contributions that it might be offered to
prove.
The Court: Well, the Court is permitting it to be introduced
out of time, and the other objections will be overruled. It will
be received as the other evidence in the case.
Mr. Overton: I join in that objection.
Mr. Carroll: Marine joins.
[1773] The Court: All the defendants object to the receipt on
the basis stated by Mr. Sutton.
This will be Plaintiff's Exhibit 73, and it is received.
(The document referred to was marked for identification as
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 73, and was received in evidence.)
— A-60 —
Mr. Overton: Your Honor, after all the evidence is com-
pleted, the defendant Kohler would like to renew its motions for
directed verdict on each of the cross complaints against it.
Mr. Sutton: Likewise for Medlin Marine. We would also
move that all is pleadings conform to the proof in the case.
The Court: I am going to permit all the pleadings to be con-
formed to the proof that has been received.
Mr. Carroll: Marine makes the same motion, Your Honor, in
its behalf.
The Court: Very well. All the motions have been received.
Their resolution really will be part of the general findings and
conclusions that the Court reaches in the case.
“I have not been able to make the progress I hoped I could,
but I have made some substantial progress and since you are
all here I intend to give the benefit of what I have [1774] ac-
complished as far as I have gone.
I am not today making any findings with respect to damages;
although, as you will note presently, those issues are very much
before the Court and I did spend some time on those issues
today, perhaps at the cost of the business at hand.
I am making these findings but I may well file additional
findings, even with respect to the issues covered here. I may
supplement these findings in a memorandum since a memo-
randum will have to be filed covering other issues anyway.”
I want to start by stating certain conclusions of law, par-
ticularly with respect to matters that I do not believe are sub-
ject to any real controversy and where the underlying facts are
quite clear.
(A) Boatel is liable to the plaintiffs on the bases of strict lia-
bility and negligent design.
(B) Medlin Marine, Incorporated is liable to the plaintiffs on
the bases of strict liability and implied warranty.
—_Y pe
There is no negligence or carelessness on the part of the de-
cedent, Mr. Max Heiman, or on the part of Alana G. Heiman
or Sandra Jean Heiman which caused or contributed to the death
of Mr. Heiman or to the injuries and damages sustained by
Alana Heiman and Sandra Jean Heiman.
The Court further concludes that the liability of the defend-
ant Medlin Marine, Incorporated is based upon the legal re-
lationships existing between it and the manufacturer, [1775] on
the one hand, and between it and Mr. Max Heiman on the other.
There is no separate and independent basis for liability of
Medlin Marine to the plaintiffs based upon the acts or omis-
sions of Medlin or any of its agents or employees. In this con-
nection the Court finds that none of the representatives of Med-
lin—any of its agents or employees—knew or should have
known of the four holes on the underside of the transom of the
Heiman boat prior to the accident.
Now this is probably not really in dispute, but I want to
make this finding. There is no evidence to indicate that either
Mr. Heiman or anyone else ever spent a night on the yacht
prior to the night of September 1, 1973. There is no evidence
to indicate or to suggest that the generator, air-conditioning
system on the yacht was ever, prior to September 1, 1973,
operated for any substantial period while the vessel was moored,
beached, or anchored.
In fact, the evidence is to the contrary, indicating this was
the first and only night the Heimans ever spent on the yacht
and the first and only occasion during which the generator,
air-conditioning systems were operated together for an extended
period of time while the boat was stationary.
The night in question was, according to Mr. Eherenberg—
and the Court so finds—was ideal. The water was calm. There
was a slight breeze from the east, which would mean that it
approached the Heiman boat from the stern.
— A-62 —
[1776] Now I am going to make what might be called “miscel-
laneous findings of fact,” because they are not really tied to-
gather in any narrative form, in response to the requests and
suggestions of the parties. Of course, it’s going to be necessary
that these findings be integrated in with and related to the other
findings that I am going to make today and perhaps later.
Considering the arrangement of the boat and its equipment
as it existed on September 1, 1973, a substantial risk existed
that discharged engine exhaust gases would be drawn back into
the engine compartment through the four water drain holes when
the generator engine alone was operating.
This process would be accelerated when the forward air-
conditioning system was activated. This would be so, even with
the sliding door entirely open: but the tendency would be in-
creased as the sliding door was progressively closed.
There are direct air passages, significant in size, between the
engine compartment and the other areas of the yacht as a result
of openings in the forward wall of the engine compartment. The
largest of these openings is next to the upper starboard wall of
the engine compartment. There is a smaller opening at a similar
location on the port side. In addition, there is a tiny crack
around the thermostat which is used to control the heater in the
engine compartment.
On the night in question carbon monoxide from the [1777]
generator engine was exhausted into the water immediately under
the overhang portion of the transom. The carbon monoxide,
which is slightly lighter than air and which was also warmer
that the ambient air, was propelled out of the water directly
under the transom where it was drawn through the four holes
in the transom into the engine compartment by the negative
pressure being created in the engine compartment by the opera-
tion of the generator and the air-conditioning system.
High concentrations of carbon monoxide developed in the
engine compartment and were drawn forward, principally
— A-63 —
through the right starboard opening in the engine compartment,
into the equipment room where the carbon monoxide entered
the forward cooling unit from which it was discharged into the
forward living areas and then circulated by both air-conditioning
units throughout the yacht.
The buildup of the carbon monoxide in the living quarters
resulted in the death of Mr. Max Heiman and the injuries to
Mrs. Heiman and Sandra Heiman.
A completely airtight bulkhead between the rear cabin and
the engine compartment of the Heiman yacht would have elimi-
nated the hazard of introducing carbon monoxide from the
generator engine into the living quarters of that vessel.
The introduction of an appropriately designed arrangement
which would induce fresh air into the air-conditioning system
at the proper point could have virtually eliminated the [1778]
hazard of introducing lethal quantities of carbon monoxide into
the living quarters of the vessel.
This simply means that positive pressure can be designed
into an air-conditioning system which will have the effect of
causing an outflow rather than an inflow of air from the engine
compartment. Such a system would probably require larger air-
conditioning tonnage and consequently cost more to obtain
the same cooling and heating effect as a recirculating system.
It should be noted, however, that elsewhere in my findings
I have found that there is nothing inherently or per se hazardous
in the use of a properly installed recirculating system on a boat
such as Mr. Heiman’s.
Leaks do occasionally develop in the exhaust systems of
marine generator engines and in the exhaust systems of marine
propulsion engines, resulting in the direct discharge of carbon
monoxide into the engiie compartment, and this fact was known
by or shouid have been known by the defendants and third-party
defendant, Kohler.
— A-64 —
The four holes in the transom of the Heiman yacht constitute
a defect which was a proximate cause of the death of Max Hei-
man and the injuries to Mrs. Heiman and Sandra Heiman, and
thus creates liability against Boatel and Medlin Marine on the
basis of strict liability.
The location of the intake for the forward [1779] air-condi-
tioner in the equipment room of the yacht, combined with the
making of the openings in the engine room forward bulkhead
and the location of such openings, together constitute a defect
which was a proximate cause of the death of Max Heiman and
the injuries to Mrs. Heiman and Sandra Heiman, thus creating
liability against Boatel and Medlin Marine on the basis of strict
liability and tort.
The defendant, Marine Development Corporation, did not
design the air-conditioning as it is found and arranged in the
Heiman boat. That design and arrangement was made and
carried out by Boatel alone and was in direct violation of the
clear and unambiguous installation instructions furnished by
Marine Development.
The Court finds and concludes that there is nothing inherently
or per se defective or hazardous in the use of properly installed
recirculating air-conditioning systems.
Further, although there was evidence to the contrary, the
Court finds that had the air-conditioning components provided
by Marine Development been properly installed by Boatel in
accordance with Marine’s manual the Heimans would not have
been harmed.
This finding must be limited to the facts of this case since
the evidence suggests that under altered configurations such a
system, even if installed according to the manual, might cause
or contribute to such an accident.
[1780] Therefore, the difficult question concerning Marine’s
liability does not turn on any defects in its components—there
were none—or upon its participation in the as-is design of the
— A-65 —
Heiman air-conditioning system; but rather upon its duty to
warn Boatel of the potential consequences of improperly install-
ing its components, given its knowledge or imputed knowledge of
the boat designs and given its overall business relationship with
Boatel.
It is clear from the evidence that none of the parties to this
action ever realized, prior to their investigations of this acci-
dent, the serious hazard which results from the improper loca-
tion of the cooling units when combined with the circumstances
that the bulkhead between the engine compartment and the
living spaces of the boat is not airtight or even substantially
airtight.
Still, the evidence is such that all of the defendants and the
cross-defendant, Kohler Company, knew or should have known
there was a risk—however slight—that carbon monoxide would,
at sometime during the life of the vessel, be in the engine com-
partment.
The principal basis for this statement is not that any of the
parties except Boatel knew or should have known that Boatel
would design a drain system as it did, thereby providing direct
access of carbon monoxide from outside the boat back into the
engine compartment; but rather that such [1781] parties knew
or should have known that carbon monoxide might, during the
life of the vessel, escape from either the generator motor or from
one of the two propulsion engines due to accident or ordinary
wear and tear during the life of the vessel.
The Court finds and concludes that Marine Development
Corporation knew or should have known that there were sig-
nificant openings from the engine compartment into the living
spaces—and I believe that statement was acknowledged in the
opening statement of Mr. Carroll—and that they knew or should
have known that carbon monoxide might, during the life of the
vessel, be found in the engine compartment in dangerous con-
centrations.
— A-66 —
Marine Development also knew or should have known that if
the forward cooling unit were installed as it was in the equip-
ment room it could and would, under certain forseeable circum-
stances, draw air from the engine compartment and circulate
it throughout the living areas of the boat.
Of all the parties to this action, Marine is and should be the
most knowledgeable with respect to the effects of air-condition-
ing systems and their operations. It has more than SO percent of
all the air-conditioning business in the class of boats and yachts
of the approximate size of the Heiman vessel.
It has held itself out as a specialist in marine air-conditioning
and has represented to its customers and to the public at large
that it has a long history of testing and [1782] improving its
products. It has maintained a close relationship with a large
number of boats manufacturers. It has a naval architect on its
staff and others experienced in boat construction.
It knew that with very rare exceptions all craft for which it
supplies air-conditioning equipment have non-airtight engine
compartments. It knew that the engine which drives the gen-
erator is almost invariably located in the engine compartment
along with the propulsion engines. It knew that its products
would be integrated with the Kohler unit or an Onan unit and
operated in conjunction with such a unit.
It is further clear from the evidence that Marine Development
, ‘ °
Corporation sells more than off-the-shelf products to its cus-
tomers, whether those customers be the manufacturers of boats
or its franchise dealers.
Marine, in fact, offers advice and assistance with respect to
the design and installation of the components which it manu-
factures. Here Boatel, if it actually received such advice, did
not follow it; but the question remains: should a party in the
position of Marine, with its superior knowledge and informa-
tion, not only advise its customers how properly to install its
products but also where there is a significant, known hazard to
— A-67 —
health or life which could result from improper installation,
clearly and specifically to warn thereof.
The Court has already found that Marine did not [1783]
really understand and appreciate the effect of the improper lo-
cation of its units in terms of the hazard to life and health in-
volved, although it did understand the effects of such improper
location upon the efficient operation of its cooling and heating
equipment.
The Court finds and concludes that defendant, Marine De-
velopment Corporation, should have known of the hazard to
life and health posed by the improper installation of its equip-
ment; and, therefore, that it should have warned Boatel in a
clear and unequivocal way concerning same.
A manufacturer must know the nature and propensities of
its products and warn of dangers created by that nature and
those propensities. In this connection a distinction must be
drawn between the duty to give adequate instructions and direc-
uons for the use or installation of a product, on the one hand,
and the duty to warn of potential hazards which might result
from deviations from such directions or instructions, on the
other hand.
Here Marine did not know the hazards and, therefore, did not
warn against them. Its instructions requiring that the cooling
unit be located in the space to be cooled or heated and that such
units shouid be installed so that there would be an adequate
path for the air to circulate free y into the units from the space
being cooled and then from the units back to the space being
cooled were obviously and clearly [1784] directed toward the
objective of the efficient utilization of the equipment for heating
and cooling.
In the eyes of Marine Development Corporation the improper
installation of a cooling unit in a space other than that to be
cooled would greatly interfere with the efficient operation of the
equipment. That it might also act as a pump to draw any carbon
— A-68 —
monoxide which might be in the engine compartment was not
known or considered by Marine prior to the investigation of
this tragedy.
Directions and warnings obviously serve different purposes.
Rarely can one be an adequate substitute for the other. It was
Marine's duty here, therefore, to warn of any hazard to life or
health that might forseeably result from the improper location
of its equipment.
The failure to warn may be predicated upon the theories of
either negligence or strict liability. Here Marine, being so inti-
mately associated with boat manufacturers and boat designers,
knew or should have known that such manufacturers, for their
own convenience and for design purposes, might install the cool-
ing unit so at to have the effect of pumping air from the engine
compartment.
The potential seriousness of the injury which might result is
obvious. In addition, there is no practical impediment to its
ability to give an adequate warning. Carbon monoxide is odor-
less. colorless, and tasteless. It is insidious and [1785] subtle in
its operation and effect. If there is any risk of it being intro-
duced into a living space, a warning of that risk should obvi-
ously be given.
The Court finds and concludes that Marine Development
Corporation owed such a duty to warn not only Boatel, the
boat manufacturer, ‘but also prospective purchasers and users
of the draft under the facts and circumstances of this case.
Marine Development did not undertake to actually inspect
and supervise the installation of its equipment by boat manu-
facturers, although it frequently made itself available to perform
such services when a new model or a new installation was con-
templated.
Where it knows that it will not be in a position to supervise
and inspect and installations on each of the boats in which its
equipment is installed, then it obviously has the duty to prospec-
mrt cen a aE tk mee Hs
nee eee
— A-69 —
tive purchasers and users to adequately warn them of the po-
tential hazard which would result from the improper installation
of that equipment.
The Court finds and concludes that Marine Development's
failure to give such a warning was a proximate cause of the death
of Mr. Heiman and injuries of Mrs. Heiman and Sandra Heiman.
Now I am going to make certain findings with respect to
Kohler, but I can tell you before I conclude that I have yet to
determine legal liability with respect to that particular [1786]
question. I hope to do so promptly.
In any event, the factual findings that I will make are as fol-
lows:
The Kohler Company supplied Boatel with a generator set
consisting of the generator proper, an internal combustion engine
to drive the generator, and a muffler which Boatel then installed
in the engine compartment of the Heiman boat. These Kohler
products were line production items which were sold by Kohler
to Kizer Engine Sales in Green Bay, Wisconsin, which in turn
sold them unchanged to Boatel.
The first Islander 47 yacht was constructed in September
1969 and either contained an Onan or Kohler generator unit.
The recirculating air-conditioning systems were not installed
on Boatel yachts as optional equipment until sometime in 1971.
No tests were made by Boatel, the manufacturer, to determine
how these items of optional equipment affected each other in the
completed boat. The photos of the yacht contained in the Boatel
brochure, Plaintiff's Exhibit 34, and other evidence indicates
that not all Islander 47 yachts have the bilge blower exhaust
vent located on the vertical transom panel.
Although there was some evidence indicating that Kohler
representatives saw the Islander 47 yacht displayed at the boat
show in 1969, there is no adequate evidentiary basis for the
Court to find that the displayed boat had the bilge blower ex-
haust vent located in its transom as it is on the Heiman boat.
—~
[1787] The Court further finds that at no time prior to the
commencement of this action did Kohler or any of its represen-
tatives know or have any reason to know of the four drain holes
located in the underside of the overhanging portion of the
transom.
Now by way of footnote, Kohler cites as a defense the lan-
guage which is contained in its manual which provides: “Never
put inlets on the transom.” The Court does not feel this lan-
guage gives Kohler much comfort because it finds that the term
“inlets” properly interpreted, in context, would be restricted
to the venting systems of inlets and outlets there under con-
sideration in that portion of the manual.
In installing the generator, Boatel relied upon the Kohler
technical installation manual. Although Kohler’s manual indi-
cates on the first page that detailed installation plans can be
obtained upon request from Kohler, none were ever requested
by Boatel. Boatel alone designed the transom of the boat, the
engine compartment, the forward wall of the engine compart-
ment, the installation arrangement for the air-conditioning sys-
tem, and the sliding door arrangement for the forward air intake.
It is undisputed that no consequential leaks existed in the
Kohler unit or its exhaust system. There is no evidence that the
Kohler components were defective in design, installation or op-
eration. There is a complete absence of any evidence of any
manufacturing defect which was in existence at [1788] the
time the components left the Kohler factory. It is undisputed
that fumes and gases from the Kohler gasoline combustion
engine were exhausted outside of the boat.
Mr. Klapmeier of Boatel admitted that he was well aware of
the fact that internal combustion engines emit carbon monoxide,
that carbon monoxide is dangerous and lethal, and that he
knew these facts before designing the Islander 47 yacht.
Now, gentlemen, that is as far as I have gotten. I have
not made my final decision on the possible Kohler liability and
garg”
—*
I have not made findings here yet with respect to damages. |
hope to complete this maybe even tomorrow—hopefully to-
morrow—because I need to get on with the business of the
Court. If so, we will call you and let you know so that you can
come by and pick up copies of the further findings and con-
clusions.
If there is nothing else, we will be in recess.
(Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the above-entitled proceedings
were concluded.)
[1789] Certificate
I, Carolyn S. Fant, Official Court Reporter for the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, West-
ern Division, appointed pursuant to the provisions of Title 28,
United States Code, Section 753, do hereby certify that the
foregoing is a full, true and correct transcript of proceedings had
in the within-entitled and numbered cause on the date herein-
before set forth; and I do further certify that the foregoing
transcript has been prepared by me or under my direction.
CAROLYN FANT
Official Reporter
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.