Petition — Air Line Employees Ass'n, International v. Evans

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Supreme Court, U. &

FILED by,

JUN 17 1976

in Tas MICHAEL RODAK

R., CLERK

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1975.

No. @5-1826

AIR LINE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,

INTERNATIONAL,

Petitioner,

VS,

NELSON EVANS,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA.

ADAIR, GOLDTHWAITE, STANFORD

AND DANIELS, P.A..,

600 Rhodes Haverty Building,

Atlanta, Georgia 30303,

404/522-5950,

and

WYATT JOHNSON,

Staff Vice President and

General Counsel, ALEA,

5600 South Central Avenue,

Chicago, Illinois 60638,

312/767-3333,

Attorneys for Air Line Employee

Association, International,

Gunthorp-Warren Printing Cornpany, Chicago e Financial 6-6565 A> 56

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

PAGE

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AUTHORITIES CITED.

Cases.

Alabaugh v. Baltimore and Ohio R. R. Co., 222 F.2d 861

SU ED bck Se ceheneneceecdeacnnens 13, 17, 18

Andrews v. Louisville and Nashville Railway Co., 406 U.S.

Bet GED <creanndgcseciiivnscedased 6, 13, 14, 15, 16

Ballie v. Rollins and Burlington Northern, Inc., 530 P. 2d

440 (Bap. Ch. BERS. TPIS) co cccccccescccseveses 15

Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 401 F.2d 87, cert.

denied, International Association of Machinists v.

Brady, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969) ............. 6, 16, 19, 20

Cook v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 309 S.W. 2d

STD COED. THSE) cc vcccccccccccvccvccessosecsee 13

Giordano v. Modern Air Transport, 504 F.2d 882 (Sth

Sh GOD dh 0n'ndcsdbucecesanesendicescensesans 19

Haney v. Chesapeake and Ohio R. R. Co., 498 F.2d 987

Gh Si Gg: GD a 0 x66 cen secdcnccccuvecsence 15, 18

ii

Johns v. Baltimore and Ohio R. R. Co., 118 F. Supp. 317

(N.D. Ill., 3 Judge Court, 1954) .........- cee eee 13

Machinists v. Central Airlines, 327 U.S. 682 (1963) ...10, 13

Merinuk v. Baker, 366 F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Penn. 1972).. 15

Moore v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 312 U.S. 630 (1941). 13

Railway Employees Department v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225

PP SPPET Teer TITTE eT eererirs Perr ree 10

Rinker v. Penn Central Transportation Co., 350 F. Supp.

ee Ge BR, TROD cecccccccccsosesscccsss 15

Rossi v. TWA, 507 F.2d 404 (9th Cir., 1974) ....... 19

Sampsell v. Baltimore and Ohio R. R. Co., 235 F.2d 569

fe RTT TTT Terre Te TT ee ee 13

Wells v. Southern Airways, Inc., 517 F.2d 132 (Sth Cir.,

PTT TT Tee eT TCT OTC Tere Tee 19

West v. American Airlines, 352 F. Supp. 1278 (N.D. Ill. |

SD hee de ER Ane donee hedéacesaceusdennséees 15

Statutes.

Se es GENE bv dad en ede ns oneedeceeeseeuns 2

Railway Labor Act, Sec. 1, 44 Stat. 577, as amended (45

SE ED 6 000Gn be cbensecanensees tune 3, 5,12

Railway Labor Act, Title I, Sec. 2, First, Second, Third,

Sixth, Eleventh, 44 Stat. 577, as amended (45 U.S.C.A.

PEC eee eee TTT eT eer reer 3, 10, 12

Railway Labor Act, Title Il, Sec. 201, 202, 204 (45

Se: Ty Be SUD ce deneucncsesecececs 3, 10, 12

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Miscellaneous.

Rule 23(1)(i), Rules of the Supreme Court .......... 1

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1975.

AIR LINE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,

INTERNATIONAL,

Petitioner,

vs,

NELSON EVANS,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA.

To the Honorable Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of

the Supreme Court of the United States:

The petitioner, Air Line Employees Association, International,

by its undersigned attorneys, prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue

to review a judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia.

OPINION BELOW.

The opinion of the Supreme Court of Georgia rendered on

April 7, 1976, rehearing denied, April 20, 1976, is reported at

—— So.2d ........... (not reported as of this date). A copy of the

said opinion is appended hereto in accordance with Rule 23

(1) (i).

JURISDICTION.

The respondent’s cause of action was based upon alleged viola-

tions of rights under a collective bargaining agreement made

pursuant to the Railway Labor Act and alleged violations of

rights under the Railway Labor Act. In its pleadings, and at

every step of the proceedings in the trial and. appellate courts,

the petitioner contended that the facts as stated required the

respondent to exhaust his administrative remedies before pursu-

ing court action. The Courts below rejected this contention

(Appendix A, B). Thus, the State Court has decided a federal

question of suostance in a way not in accord with applicable

decisions of this Court. The judgment below was entered on

April 7, 1976, and rehearing was denied on April 20, 1976.

Jurisdiction of this Court to review is invoked by the petitioner

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1257(3).

QUESTION PRESENTED.

Pursuant to the union security provisions of a collective

bargaining agreement, the respondent airline employee was dis-

charged at the request of the petitioner, his collective bargainin;

representative, by the employer for non-payment of union dues.

The collective bargaining agreement contained an administrative

procedure for review of such a dispute by a wutral arbitrator.

The employee brought suit without utilizing tt administrative

relief procedure. He was subsequently reemployed ond now seeks

only damages from the petitioner.

Thus, the sole question presented here is whether the respond-

ent employee should have been required to exhaust his available

administrative relief prior to proceeding with this court action.

STATUTES INVOLVED.

The statutes involved in this case are the following:

Railway Labor Act, Title I, Sec. 1, 44 Stat. 577, as

amended (45 U.S.C.A. 151).

Railway Labor Act, Title I, Sec. 2, First, Second, Third,

Sixth, Eleventh, 44 Stat. 577, as amended (45 U.S.C.A.

152).

Railway Labor Act, Title Il, Sec. 201, 202, 204 (45

U.S.C.A. 181, 182, 184).

STATEMENT.

The respondent Evans, sued the petitioner, Air Line Em-

ployees Association, International (hereinafter referred to as

ALEA), and Airlift International, Inc. (hereinafter referred to

as Airlift), in the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia,

complaining of discharge by the employer, Airlift, at the request

of the collective bargaining representative, ALEA, for non-pay-

ment of union dues. Evans sought reinstatement to employment

and damages (actual and punitive) for wrongful discharge.

Evans alleged that until November 19, 1974, he was em-

ployed by Airlift at the Atlanta airport (amended complaint.

R. p. 90, para. 3). He was a member of ALEA, a labor

organization representing at Airlift the craft or class of em-

ployees to which Evans belonged (Amended Complaint, R.

p. 91, para. 7, 8). Airlift is a carrier by air and, as such, is

subject to and governed by the provisions of the Railway Labor

Act in its relations with its employees (Amended Complaint,

R. p. 91, para. 7). ALEA, representing employees of an air

carrier, likewise is governed by the Railway Labor Act

(Amended Complaint, R. p. 91, para. 8). Thus, this case in-

volves the application of federal law.

When Evans was employed by Airlift, he was told by a

management representative that he “would be required to join’

4

the union.” Evans agreed to join ALEA, signed a check-off

authorization for his dues and was told he would have to pay an

initiation fee of $58.00 (not due until after he completed his 90

day probationary period of employment) (Amended Complaint,

R. pp. 92, 93, para. 13, 14).

On November 16, 1974, Evans received a copy by certified

mail of a letter which is attached to the Amended Complaint as

Exhibit A (R. p. 98). The letter was addressed to the Vice

President of Airlift by the President of ALEA and stated that

Evans has not complied with Section 23, paragraph C, of the

collective bargaining agreement (this provision appears R. pp.

72, 73). Evans was terminated by Airlift on November 19,

1974 (Amended Complaint, R. p. 91, para. 6). Without resort-

ing to the contract grievance procedure (R. pp. 72, 73), Evans

filed suit on November 25, 1974 (R. p. 19), seeking injunctive

relief (Amended Complaint R. pp. 95, 96), damages, actual

and punitive, and attorneys’ fees (Amended Complaint, R.

p. 96).

Evans alleged that his termination was contrary to the col-

lective bargaining agreement and to the Railway Labor Act:

“Plaintiff shows that he was terminated illegally, unlaw-

fully, and wrongfully under the Collective Bargaining Agree-

ment and that said termination was a direct contravention

of said Agreement and the Railway Labor Act, 42 [sic]

U.S.C. Chapter 8.” Amended Complaint, R. p. 91, para.

7.

Although Evans sought to protect rights under the collective

bargaining agreement and the Railway Labor Acct, he also sought

to bypass the orderly procedures provided by the collective bar-

gaining agreement and required by the Railway Labor Act

and came into court without seeking to pursue or exhaust same:

“Plaintiff is without an adequate remedy at law and

seeks a temporary and permanent injunction to protect

his rights under the Collective Bargaining Agreement and

5

to retain his membership in said Union which is a condition

of his employmen'.” Amended Complaint, R. p. 92, para.

11.

Both ALEA and Airlift responded to the Amended Com-

plaint by answer and by filing motions to dismiss (R. pp. 94,

140). The motion to dismiss of Airlift stated: 1) both defend-

ants were organizations within the meaning of and covered by

the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C.A. § 151, et seq.); 2) Count

I of Evans’ complaint alleged a wrongful discharge, and Count

II alleged a conspiracy to effect the wrongfully discharge; 3)

if the discharge was wrongful that it was subject to the com-

pulsory arbitration processes required by the Railway Labor

Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151, et seqg., § 181, § 184 (incorporated into

the collective bargaining agreement), which act all parties agree

is applicable. Thus the failure to exhaust said remedies com-

pelled the dismissal of the case for want of jurisdiction and for

failure to state a claim (R. p. 94). ALEA’s motion restated

the defense of failure to state a claim principally relying upon

failure to exhaust administrative remedies (R. p. 140).

In due course, the motions were set for hearing and were

orally argued before the trial court. The trial judge over-ruled

said motions and rendered a handwritten opinion (R. p. 146,

App. A).

The defendants filed a request for immediate review pursuant

to Georgia Code §6-701. The trial court agreed that the over-

ruling of the motion to dismiss was of such importance that im-

mediate review should be had and certified the matter on August

4, 1975 (R. p. 150).

A petition was filed in the Court of Appeals. The Court of

Appeals transferred the request to the Supreme Court, and the

Supreme Court granted leave to file an appeal by order dated

September 3, 1975.

A notice of appeal was timely filed by both ALEA and Airlift

(R. p. Al, A2).

6

Subsequently, Airlift made a settlement with Evans and re-

employed him. Evans dismissed his case against Airlift pursuant

to Georgia Code § 81A-14la (R. p. 154). Consequently, Air-

lift withdrew from the appeal of the case (R. p. 152) and there

remained and presently remain only Evans’ damage claims

against ALEA.

In deciding the appeal (App. B), the Supreme Court of

Georgia relied on the case of Brady v. Trans World Airlines,

Inc., 401 F.2d 87, cert. denied, International Association of

Machinists v. Brady, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969), distinguishing be-

tween a situation such as Andrews v. Louisville and Nashville

Railway Co., 406 U.S. 320, where, in a dispute between an em-

ployer and employee, the Court required exhaustion of admin-

istrative remedies, and a dispute such as Brady, supra, where

the dispute was between the employee and his union, the Supreme

Court of Georgia determinating in the latter instance that the

doctrine of exhaustion of administrative relief was inapplicable.

Apparently, the Supreme Court of Georgia overlooked in the

Brady case, supra, the requirement of exhaustion of admin-

istrative relief in a claim by an employee for damages against

his union.

ARGUMENT.

The complete collective bargaining agreement under which

Evans seeks to base his case is attached to the motions to dismiss

(R. p. 99). Evans was given a copy of the agreement in August,

1974, and was aware of its provisions (R. p. 65).

Pertinent provisions follow:

“THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into in ac-

cordance with the provisions of the Railway Labor Act,

as amended, by and between AIR LIFT INTERNA-

TIONAL, INC. (hereinafter known as the ‘Company’)

and the CLERICAL OFFICE, AND STATION EM-

PLOYEES in the service of AIRLIFT INTERNA-

7

TIONAL, INC. as represented by the AIR LINE EM-

PLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL (here-

inafter known as the ‘Union’).

WITNESSETH:

It is hereby mutually agreed:

SECTION 1—RECOGNITION

(a) The Company hereby recognized the Air Line Em-

ployees Association as the duly designated and authorized

representative of the Clerical, Office, and Station Employees

in the employ of the Company for the purpose of the Rail-

way Labor Act, as amended, in accordance with the cer-

tification issued by the National Mediation Board on July

30, 1959, in Case No. R-3364. (R. p. 101.)

. * * * *

SECTION 23—-UNION SECURITY

(a) (1) All employees covered by this Agreement must be-

come and remain members of the Union as a condition

to their continued employment. Good standing shall

be attained if he tenders the initiation fee and periodic

dues uniformly required as a condition of member-

ship by the union. Any employee not presently a

member of the Union shall comply herewith within

sixty (60) days or be discharged hereunder.

(2) All new employees of the Company shall become

members of the Union sixty (60) days after date of

employment with the Company and shall thereafter

maintain membership in the Union as provided for

in Paragraph (a)(1) of this Section.

(b) If a member becomes delinquent in the payment of

initiation fee and/or membership dues, such member

shall be notified by certified mail, return receipt re-

quested, copy to the Vice President—Scheduled Air

Freight of the Company, that he is delinquent in the

payment of initiation fee and/or dues as specified

herein and is subject to discharge as an employee of

the Company. Such letter shall also notify the em-

8

ployee that he must remit the required payment within

a period of fifteen (15) days or be discharged.

(c) If upon the expiration of the fifteen day period the

employee still remains delinquent, the Union shall

certify in writing to the Vice President—Scheduled

Air Freight of the Company, copy to the employee,

that the employee has failed to remit payment within

the grace period allowed and is therefore to be dis-

charged. The Vice President—Scheduled Air Freight

shall then take proper steps to discharge such em-

ployee from the service of the Company.

(d) A grievance by an employee who is to be discharged

as the result of an interpretation or application of

the provisions of the Agreement shall be subject to the

following procedure:

(1) An employee who believes that the provisions

of this Section pertaining to him have not been

properly interpreted or applied may submit his request

for review in writing within five (5) days from the date

of his notification by the Vice President—Scheduled

Air Freight as provided in Paragraph (c). The request

must be submitted to the Vice President—Scheduled

Air Freight or his designee, who will review the

grievance and render his decision in writing not later

than five (5) days following the receipt of the

grievance.

(2) The Vice President—Scheduled Air Freight, or

his designee, will forward his decision to the employee,

with a copy to the Union Headquarters. If the decision

is not satisfactory to both the employee and the

Union, then either may appeal the grievance within

ten (10) days from the date of the decision directly

to a neutral referee agreed to by the Company and

the Union. In the event the parties fail to agree on a

neutral within the specified period, the neutral shall

be appointed under the provisions of Section Seven,

First A, of the Railroad Labor Act. The decision of

the neutral referee shall be final and binding.

(3) During the period a grievance is being handled

under the provisions of this Section, and until final

9

award by the neutral referee, the employee shall not

be discharged from the Company nor lose any seniority

rights because of no.-compliance with the terms and

provisions of this Section.

(e) An employee discharged by the Company under the

provisions of this Section shall be deemed to have

been ‘discharged for cause’ within the meaning of the

terms and provisions of this Agreement.

(f) It is agreed that the Company shall not be liable for

any time or wage claims for an employee discharged

’ by the Company pursuant to a written order by an

authorized Union representative under the terms of

this Section.

(g) The Company shall provide the Union Headquarters

each month with a list of all resignations, transfers,

new hires, leaves of absence, etc.

(h) The Union has the responsibility to properly advise

new employee of Union membership requirements.

[R. pp. 126-127; Emphasis added.]

* * * *

SECTION 26—DURATION OF AGREEMENT

This Agreement shall become effective on the date of sign-

ing, December 13, 1973 except as specifically otherwise

stated, and shall amend the Agreement dated July 1, 1971

and shall continue in full force and effect until July 1,

1975. The Agreement shall renew itself thereafter each

July 1 unless written notice of intended change is served

in accordance with Section 6, Title I of the Railway

Labor Act, as amended, by either party thereto at least

sixty (60) days prior to July 1 of any year. [R. p. 129)”

Special note should be made that the procedure provided for

employees with complaints relative to violations of Section 23

is different from the procedure involving a grievance in the

traditional labor-management sense (See Section 19, R. pp.

122-124, of the bargaining agreement). The procedure under

Section 23 allows appeal to begin at the Vice Presidential level

and proceed directly to a neutral arbitrator and maintains the

.

10

employee in his job during the process. This is the procedure

which Evans seeks to bypass.

Attention is called to the Letter of Agreement attached to

the collective bargaining agreement which “in compliance with

Section 204, Title I], of the Railway Labor Act, as amended,

.. . establish(s) a System Board of Adjustment for the purpose

of adjusting and deciding disputes which may arise under the

terms of the ... Agreement”. (R. pp. 132-135.)

Simply stated, Section 23, the “union security” clause of the

collective bargaining agreement, requires membership in the

Union as a condition of continued employment. Evans does not

challenge the validity or legality of the clause itself and that

is not a matter in controversy.' It is also not disputed that

Airlift is a “carrier by air” and employer; that ALEA is the

designated and certified bargaining representative of the unit

concerned; and that Evans was, ‘ntil his termination, an “em-

ployee” in that bargaining unit; all within the meaning of the

Railway Labor Act. It follows that the employment relation-

ship in issue is governed by the Railway Labor Act and the

collective bargaining agreement.* This fact is admitted on the

face of the Amended Complaint (Paragraphs 7, 10, 19, R.

pp. 76, 77, 79).

Within the context of the above, the operative facts are quite

basic. Upon Evans’ initial hire he was informed of the “union

1. Section 2, Eleventh, of the Railway Labor Act expressly au-

thorizes “union shop” agreements for employers and employees

covered by that Act. This authority is effective even in “right-to-

work” states. Railway Employees Department v. Hanson, 351 U.S.

225 (1956).

2. It should be noted that the Railway Labor Act requires the

parties to “exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agree-

ments.” As a part of this duty there must be set up adjustment proce-

dures for the settlement of disputes arising thereunder. Such an

agreement made pursuant to the Railway Labor Act has “the im-

primatur of federal law upon it”; in matters arising under such an

agreement the federal law is controlling. Railway Employees De-

partment v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956); Machinists v. Central

Airlines, 372 U.S. 682 (1963).

il

security” requirement in the collective bargaining agreement. He

met the Union “chairman” or shop steward shortly thereafter

and took steps to join ALEA. Although he signed a dues

“checkoff” authorization he did not pay his initiation fee, it not

being payable until an employee completes his probationary

period with the Carrier.

Following the completion of that probationary period, how-

ever, ALEA still had not received the initiation fee which is

required for full membership. The Union made a series of in-

quiries concerning this failure to pay the required fee and

finally demanded payment within fifteen days, warning Evans

that he was subject to discharge for delinquency. The Union

did not receive the initiation fee and in due course called upon

Airlift to terminate the employment of Evans for non-compliance

with the union security clause.

Upon receipt of the Union’s request and pursuant to

the existing collective bargaining agreement, Airlift discharged

Evans for non-compliance with the union security clause. It

is significant that the only true issue of fact in this case is raised

by Evans’ claim that he did pay the initiation fee.

It is also very noteworthy that in accordance with the Railway

Labor Act, the collective bargaining agreement contains an

adjustment procedure specifically designed to resolve dispute

discharges under the union security clause. An employee who

believes the provisions have not been properly applied may refer

the matter to a neutral arbitrator for determination of the dis-

pute. Pending resolution of the matter, the employee remains

employed with no loss of seniority rights (see Section 23(d)

(2) (3)).

Evans, however, did not avail himself of these procedures.

Although the law as set forth hereinafter clearly requires that he

pursue this administrative avenue of redress prior to bringing

suit, he ignored these procedures and commenced this litigation

alleging, generally, a wrongful discharge and a conspiracy to

wrongfully discharge.

12

The Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151, et seq., which

governs the labor relations between the parties to this suit, is a

unique piece of labor legislation. Its singularity arises from

its success in maintaining industrial peace in the railroad and

airline industries. This is chiefly owing to the Act’s mandatory

dispute settlement procedures,

Two of the Act’s stated purposes are (1) to avoid any inter-

ruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged

therein, and (2) to provide for the prompt and orderly settle-

ment of all disputes growing out of grievances or out of the

interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of

pay, rules or working conditions.

More specifically, Section 2, First, provides:

“It shall be the duty of all carriers . . . and employees to

exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agree-

ments concerning rates or pay, rules, and working con-

ditions, and fo settle all disputes, whether arising out of

the application of such agreements or otherwise .. .” (45

U.S.C. § i52; emphasis supplied. )

Thus, it is the statutory “duty” of ali carriers and their em-

ployees “to settle all disputes.” That does not mean some dis-

putes; it means all disputes “growing out of the application of

such agreements or otherwise.”

In furtherance of that general duty and specifically with refer-

ence to air carriers, Title II, Section 204, of the Act provides

that “. . . it shall be the duty of every carrier and its employees,

acting through their representatives, . . . to establish a board of

adjustment. . .”

The purpose of that adjustment board is to settle:

“. .. disputes between an employee or group of employees

and a carrier . . . growing out of grievances, or out of the

interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates

pay, rules, or working conditions .. .” (45 U.S.C. § 184;

emphasis suppled. )

13

Failing to reach a settlement in conference between the parties,

such disputes may be referred by petition of the parties or by

either party to the adjustment board.

It is now well settled that pursuit of this administrative remedy

is not based on an election nor is it at the option of the parties

— it is a compulsory administrative procedure. The Act requires

that the adjustment procedure be set up, and it further requires

that it be used to settle all disputes. Machinists v. Central Air-

lines, 372 U.S.C. 682 (1963).

This requirement of pursuit of the administrative remedy

under the Railway Labor Act prior to seeking judicial redress

has long been recognized. See, for example, Sampsell v. Balti-

more and Ohio R. R. Co., 235 F.2d 569 (4th Cir., 1956);

Alabaugh v. Baltimore and Ohio R. R. Co., 222 F.2d 861

(4th Cir., 1955). Both cases involved the discharge of an em-

ployee for failure to pay union dues. See also, Johns v. Balti-

more and Ohio R. R. Co., 118 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. IIL, 3

judge court, 1954); and Cook v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car

Porters, 309 S.W.2d 579 (Mo., 1958).

There existed in the past, however, a narrow exception to

the exhaustion requirement. See Moore v. Illinois Central R. R.

Co., 312 U.S. 630 (1941). Under that exception an em-

ployee could treat an adverse employment decision as a final

discharge, forego his administrative remedies, and institute a

court action for breach of contract.*

In 1972, however, in Andrews v. Louisville and Nashville

Railway Co., 406 U.S. 320, the Supreme Court closed the

Moore exception to the administrative exhaustion requirement.

In that case, which interestingly enough was also commenced

in the Fulton County (Georgia) Superior Court, a railroad

3. Parenthetically, it should be noted that in addition to dam-

ages, Evans requested reinstatement and back pay. (See the Prayer

of the Amended Complaint.) This is, of course, inconsistent with

acceptance of the discharge as final and such relief would not have

been available in a court action under the Moore case, even if it

still was good law.

14

employee was injured in an auto accident and incapacitated for

a period of time. He later claimed complete recovery and re-

quested to be put back to work. The carrier refused, stating that

the employee had not fully recovered. The employee elected

to treat that refusal as a discharge and sued for damages without

pursuing his remedy before the adjustment board. The Federal

District Court to which the case had been removed dismissed the

complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; the

Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal.

Speaking for an almost unanimous Court in that case, Justice

Rehnquist noted that the prior exception to the exhaustion re-

quirement had been based on an erroneous conclusion that the

Railway Labor Act’s dispute adjustment procedures had been in-

tended as optional, not compulsory. This was in fact not the

Congressional intent:

“.. . the notion that the grievance and arbitration proce-

dures provided for minor disputes in the Railway Labor

Act are optional, to be availed of as the employee or the

carrier chooses, was never good history and is not longer

good law.” 406 U.S. at p. 322.

The Court went on to hold:

“The term ‘exhaustion of administrative remedies’ in its

broader sense may be an entirely appropriate description

of the obligation of both the employee and carrier under

the Railway Labor Act to resort to dispute settlement pro-

cedures provided by that Act.” 406 U.S. at p. 325; Em-

phasis supplied.

In fact, the Court stated, the obligation may be even broader

than mere “exhaustion”; except in those cases where the ad-

justment board’s procedures and proceedings are judicially re-

viewed for due process and like matters, the administrative

remedy is “exclusive”.

“It is clear, however, that in at least some situations the

Act makes the federal administrative remedy exclusive,

rather than merely requiring exhaustion of remedies in

15

one forum before resorting to another. A party who has

litigated an issue before the Adjustment Board on the merits

may not relitigate that issue in an independent judicial pro-

ceeding. . . . he is limited to the judicial review of the

Board’s proceedings that the Act itself provides.” 406 U.S.

at p. 325.

Thus, the Andrews case has firmly and unequivocally estab-

lished that the Railway Labor Act’s dispute settlement procedures

are mandatory, not optional, and that an employee who has a

dispute with a carrier arising out of the interpretation or applica-

tion of a collective bargaining agreement must resort to those

administrative procedures for his remedy. Because Andrews had

not availed himself of those procedures, just as Evans has not

in this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of his

complaint.

Since Andrews, this requirement has been applied by other

courts. In Haney v. Chesapeake and Ohio R. R. Co., 498 F.2d

987 (D.C. Cir., 1974), a former employee sued the railroad for

separation pay allegedly due under a collective bargaining agree-

ment. The dismissal of her complaint was affirmed based on

the failure to exhaust her administrative remedies. In so holding,

the Court commented on the Andrews decision:

“A decision like Andrews involving a matter that has

been considered and reconsidered in lighi of reflection over

the years, is not to be accorded a niggardly construction.

Sound principles of judicial administration conjoined with

the salient considerations discussed in that case make it

appropriate to require appellant to pursue her grievance

adjustment remedies. . . .” 498 F.2d at p. 992.

For similar applications of the exhaustion principal under the

Railway Labor Act see: Rinker v. Penn Central Transportation

Co., 350 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Penn., 1972); West v. American

Airlines, 352 F. Supp. 1278 (N.D. Ill., 1972); Merinuk v.

Baker, 366 F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Penn., 1972). Ballie v. Rollins

and Burlington Northern, Inc., 530 P.2d 440 (Sup. Ct. Mont.,

1974).

16

In light of the unequivocal holding of the Andrews case, it

should be noted that during oral argument on the Motions, the

Plaintiff advanced several arguments designed to obscure the

plain requirements of the Railway Labor Act as enunciated in

Andrews. Chief among these arguments were: (1) Andrews and

the adjustment procedures do not apply because this is not a

dispute arising out of the collective bargaining agreement con-

cerning rates of pay, rules or working conditions; and (2) it

would be unjust and “absurd” to refer the Plaintiff for his re-

dress back to ne partics who allegedly committed the wrong.®

As to the first of these arguments the Andrews court addressed

a similar proposition when confronted with a state law breach

of employment contract theory rather than a violation of the

collective bargaining agreement. There the Court stated in part:

“The fact that petitioner characterizes his claim as one for

‘wrongful discharge’ does not save it from the Act's man-

datory provisions for the processing of grievances. . . .

the very concept of ‘wrongful discharge’ implies some sort

of statutory or contractual standard that modifies the tradi-

tional common-law rule that a contract of employment is

terminable by either party at will. . . .” 406 U.S. at pp.

324, 325.

Noting that the only source of Andrews’ right not to be dis-

charged was the collective bargaining agreement, the Court rea-

soned that the extent of the obligations to return him to work

necessarily depended upon an interpretation of that agreement.

The claim was therefore subject to the Act’s adjustment pro-

cedure.

In a like manner, the present case also arises out of the col-

lective bargaining agreement. But for the agreement there would

a on

5. In oral argument the Plaintiff placed an inordinate emphasis

on the dicta in Brady v. Trans World Airlines, 401 F.2d 87 (3rd

Cir., 1968). Two main factors make that case inapposite to the

present considerations: (1) it preceded Andrews by some four

years and (2) most significantly, the claimant in that case had

pursued his administrative remedies prior to turning to the judicial

system. Evans has not even attempted to utilize those procedures.

17

have been no requirement that Evans join the Union as a con-

dition of continued employment; but for the agreement there

would have been no requirement that the Carrier discharge him

for failure to maintain Union membership; and, like in Andrews,

but for the agreement the discharge may not be characterized as

“wrongful”.

Furthermore, how can Evans claim this matter does not arise

cut of the collective bargaining agreement when on the fact

of his Amended Complaint he charges that his termination

was in violation of that agreement? (See paragraph 7 of the

Amended Complaint)

The fact that Evans characterizes his claim as one for

“wrongful discharge” or “conspiracy” or “failure to represent”

cannot alter the nature of the crucial dispute in this case—Evans

claims he paid his initiation fee and ALEA claims he did not.

That is precisely and exactly the type of dispute that Congress

intended to be decided in the administrative settlement proce-

dures mandated by the Act.

Evans’ second argument propounded in an effort to sidestep

the requirements of the Railway Labor Act is that since his

discharge was the result of action by both Airlift and ALEA

it would be unjust to refer him to the adjustment procedure

for redress. This argument ignores, however, the impartial ad-

ministrative procedures which the Act and the collective bargain-

ing agreement specifically provide. By the express terms of the

contract an employee aggrieved under the “union security”

clause may refer the matter directly to a “neutral referee.” (Col-

lective Bargaining Agreement, § 23 (d)(2); at R.p. 126,7.)

In addition, Evans’ argument also chooses to ignore the judi-

cial review available after he has at least attempted to pursue

his administrative remedies.

This matter was addressed by the Court in Alabaugh v. Balti-

more and Ohio R. R. Co., 222 F.2d 861 (4th Cir., 1955),

as follows:

18

“The argument that the Adjustment Board might not

furnish a fair tribunal in cases of this character because

certain members might be biased atid preiudiced because

of union affiliations furnishes no reason why the courts

may ignore the fact that Congress has vested it with exclu-

sive primary jurisdiction in such cases.” 222 F.2d at p. 867.

Following the Andrews decision. the Court in Haney v.

Chesapeake and Ohio R. R. Co., 498 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir.,

1974) answered a similar claim by a plaintiff seeking to by-pass

the mandatory grievance procedure. There the Court stated:

“In effect, appellant would have us carve out an exception

to Andrews whenever an aggrieved employee’s prosecu-

tion of his claim runs the risk of making his union an

adversary. Aithough the concern expressed by appellant is

plausible, we conclude that relieving her of the exhaustion

requirement would open too large a hole in Andrews, and

that the sound course is to require her to seek relief before

the administrative tribunal, relying for further protection

on the general doctrines of law permitting limited judicial

surveillance in an action complaining of administrative

abuse. ... Whether an adjustment board will give adequate

consideration to appellant's particular claim is not an issue

that should be prejudged before that tribunal has had

an opportunity to act.” 498 F.2d at p.992; emphasis

supplied.

It is plain from the above that a claim of “probable prejudice”

in the administrative process is not sufficient to overcome the

exhaustion of remedies requirement of the Railway Labor Act.

In so claiming Evans is not only ignoring the fact that he may

refer the matter to a neutral arbitrator, but he is also asking the

Court to speculate and prejudge that Congressionally mandated

arbitration process without giving it an opportunity to perform

its specific function-

Even after aggrieved employee has exhaused his administra-

tive remedies, it is not to be assumed, as Evans has done, that

an adjustment procedure is “inherently unfair” merely because

it is set up (pursuant to the Railway Labor Act) in a contract

19

between the Union and the Carrier. Wells v. Southern Airways,

Inc., 517 F.2d 132 (Sth Cir. 1975); Giordano v. Modern Air

Transport, 504 F.2d 882 (Sth Cir., 1974); Rossi v. TWA,

507 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1974). Certainly, if the fairness of

the arbitration process may withstand an attack on the grounds

of bias or partiality after an individual has given them a chance

to operate, it would seem highly inappropriate to nullify those

procedures as a matter of law and allow them to be bypassed

on the mere assertion that the procedure will possibly be biased.

There is a final and most crucial factor herein to which the

consideration of the court is respectfully directed. The Supreme

Court of Georgia in its opinion clearly was influenced by the

case of Brady v. TWA, supra, with regard to the holding therein

that since a system board of adjustment does not have jurisdic-

tion to hear an employee's suit against his union for breach

of duty of fair representation there exists no bar to judicial re-

view of the merits of such a controversy. The Supreme Court

of Georgia interpreted this to mean that a claim by an em-

ployee against his union would not be subject to holding of

Andrews, supra, requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies

in a case between employer and employee.

It cannot be assumed even arguendo that such position is

correct. For one thing, Brady is factually different:

“

. . . While recalcitrant in accepting the new scale he

ultimately relented and made a tender of all past de-

linquencies prior to any demand by IAM upon TWA to

discharge him.”

This was not the case with respect to Evans.

Much more important, however, is the fact that the cast at bar

no longer (and did not before the Supreme Court of Georgia)

seeks reinstatement to employment. Evans is reemployed and

here seeks only aga‘ast ALEA actual and punitive damages.

After stating in the Brady case with respect to reinstatement:

“. .. In part I above, it was held that the Board was with-

out jurisdiction to entertain Mr. Brady's complaint which

20

was directed against both TWA and IAM. Under these

circumstances, when procedures for reinstatement are other-

wise unavailable to him, the purposes of the Railway Labor

Act would best be served if an employee seeking to regain

his job may invoke the equitable powers of the court... .

Emphasis supplied.

The Court, with respect to the damage claim against Brady's

union, stated as follows:

It has been the general rule, and the rule of this circuit,

that before a suit against a union for breach of its duty of

fair representation may be brought in the courts, the mem-

ber must first exhaust the available internal union remedies,

or show an adequate reason for failing to do so... .”

* * ~ % *

“._. Nevertheless, there is no obligation or evidence that he

evoked any appellate union procedures to redress the as-

serted unfair and arbitrary action against him by the

local and district officers. Nor does he advance an adequate

reason for his failure to do so... .”

* * * » *

“. . . However, in this case, Mr. Brady’s claim for such

damages may not be sustained because of his failure to

exhaust internal union remedies or to adequately explain

that failure... .”

Nowhere in the case at bar, an action for damages for

breach of duty of fair representation, does Evans allege that he

exhausted any administrative remedies of any kind whatsoever,

and he does not allege any adequaie reason for failing to do so.

Just as in the Brady case, Evans here is not entitled to recover

on his damage ciaim and the same should have been dismissed

on ALEA’s motion.

CONCLUSION.

The Railway Labor Act and the collective bargaining agree-

ment is clear in its mandate that disputes which arise from the

application of collective burgaining agreements, such as the one

21

presently before this Court, are to be settled in the statutory

adjustment processes specifically set up for that purpose. This

principle has been reemphasized by the Supreme Court in its

Andrews decision, and it is now beyond question that a plain-

tiff must exhaust his administrative remedies under that Act

prior to seeeking judicial redress.

In spite of Evan’s argumenis tnat the exhaustion principle does

not apply to his circumstances, his Amended Complaint sets

forth a claim which arises jrom the application of a Railway

Labor Act collective bargaining agreement; therefore his cause

is presently in the wrong forum. The scheme of labor relations

as contemplated by Congress in the railroad and airline industries

requires that this case be dismissed to the administrative processes

specifically designed to resolve such disputes.

Respectfully submitted,

ADAIR, GOLDTHWAITE, STANFORD

AND DANIELS, P.A..,

600 Rhodes Haverty Building,

Atlanta, Georgia 30303,

404/522-5950,

and

WYATT JOHNSON,

Staff Vice President and

General Counsel, ALEA,

5600 South Central Avenue,

Chicago, Llinois 60638,

312/767-3333,

By: WyYATT JOHNSON,

Attorneys for Air Line Employee

Association, International.

Al

APPENDIX A.

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY.

NELSON EVANS, >

VS. 7” ;

. Civil Action

r File No. C-841

AIRLIFT INTERNATIONAL INC., AND

AIR LINE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION

INTERNATIONAL.

ORDER.

The above defendants having brought before the Court

Motions to dismiss the plaintiff complaint, and the Court having

heard argument of counsel and citation of authorities, raising

subject matter jurisdiction and exhaustion of remedies, the Court

does hereby overrules and dismisses the said Motions of defend-

ants to the plaintiffs complaint.

So ordere | that Ist day of August.

JEPTHA C. TANKSLEY,

Judge, Superior Court, AJC.

APPENDIX B.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA.

Decided: April 7, 1976

30610. Arr LINE EMPLOYEES

ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL

vs.

EvANS (616)

GUNTER, Justice.

This is an interlocutory appeal, originally granted by this

court on the application of two applicant-defendants, from a

judgment that denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plain-

tiffs complaint. After this court had granted the interlocutory

appeal, one of the defendants, the employer of the plaintiff,

voluntarily dismissed its appeal, and, at the same time, the

plaintiff dismissed the employer as a party defendant in the trial

court. The result of these two dismissals is that the issues for

determination, as the appeal now stands, are between the plain-

tiff below, Evans, and the defendant below, the Union.

Since appellate jurisdiction was in this court when the inter-

locutory appeal was originally granted by this court, this court

has retained jurisdiction even though the two dismissals referred

to above have eliminated the equitable relief involved at the

time the interlocutory appeal was granted. Our Constitution pro-

vides: “It shail be competent for the Supreme Court to require

by certiorari or otherwise any case to be certified to the Supreme

Court from the Court of Appeals for review and determination

with the same power and authority as if the case had been

A3

carried by writ of error to the Supreme Court.” Ga. Code Ann.

sec. 2-3704.

Evans was an employee of the employer until November 19,

1974, when he was discharged by the employer at the direction

of the Union for his alleged failure to pay his initiation fee to

the Union.

On November 24, 1974, Evans filed his complaint against the

employer and the Union seeking injunctive relief, compensa-

tory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees. Both de-

fendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a claim on the ground that Evans had failed to exhaust

his administrative remedies required by the Railway Labor

Act, 45 U.S.C. Sec. 151 et seq., and the collective bargaining

agreement between the employer and the Union.

The trial judge overruled both motions to dismiss, two inter-

locutory appeals followed, the employer was then dismissed as

a party in the trial court, the employer dismissed its interlocutory

appeal, and we now have for decision, as the sole remaining

issue in the case, whether the Union’s motion to dismiss the

complaint was properly denied by the trial judge.

As we view the case in its present posture, the only issues for

determination are between Evans and the Union. Evans con-

tends that he was ejected from membership in the Union with-

out cause, or that he was denied membership in the Union with-

out cause, and that the Union, without cause, directed his dis-

charge by his employer for non-compliance by Evans with the

terms of the collective bargaining contract between the Union

and the employer. The responsive pleadings of the Union denied

that Evans had ever been a member of the Union, admitted that

he had paid dues to the Union for the month of October, 1974,

and admitted that his employment with the employer had been

terminated at the direction and request of the Union.

We think this case is controlled by the principles enunciated in

Sheet Metal Workers International Association v. Carter, 133

Ga. App. 872, 212 SE2d 645 (1975).

A4

Also, see Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 401 F.2d 87,

cert. denied, International Association of Machinists v. Brady,

393 U.S. 1048 (1969). In that case an employce charged the

Union with hostile discrimination in refusing to accept tender of

the plaintiff's dues and in wrongfully having him discharged

from employment with TWA. The complaint further charged the

Union with discrimination and with misrepresenting the facts

pertaining to the plaintiff's alleged dues delinquency in a hear-

ing before a Railway Labor Act adjustment board, The Third

Circuit construed such allegations as a complaint primarily

against his bargaining agent rather than his employer. After

setting forth statutory authority and discussing the jurisdiction

of adjustment boards and of the courts, the Third Circuit stated:

“The jurisdiction of railway carrier adjustment boards has been

construed as encompassing disputes between employees and their

employers, but not disputes between employees and their bar-

guining representatives.” P. 92.

See also Deboles v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 350 F. Supp.

1274 (1972), where it was held that the complaint set forth a

dispute primarily involving TWA employees and their Union

representatives, and that the Railway Labor Act had not pre-

empted jurisdiction from the state and federal courts.

We conclude in this case that the exhaustion of administra-

tive remedies by Evans, as contended by the Union, was not re-

quired, and Evans’ complaint was not subject to dismissal for

failure to state a claim.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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