Petition — Air Line Employees Ass'n, International v. Evans
Supreme Court brief1976
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Supreme Court, U. &
FILED by,
JUN 17 1976
in Tas MICHAEL RODAK
R., CLERK
Supreme Court of the United States
OcTOBER TERM, 1975.
No. @5-1826
AIR LINE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,
INTERNATIONAL,
Petitioner,
VS,
NELSON EVANS,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA.
ADAIR, GOLDTHWAITE, STANFORD
AND DANIELS, P.A..,
600 Rhodes Haverty Building,
Atlanta, Georgia 30303,
404/522-5950,
and
WYATT JOHNSON,
Staff Vice President and
General Counsel, ALEA,
5600 South Central Avenue,
Chicago, Illinois 60638,
312/767-3333,
Attorneys for Air Line Employee
Association, International,
Gunthorp-Warren Printing Cornpany, Chicago e Financial 6-6565 A> 56
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
PAGE
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AUTHORITIES CITED.
Cases.
Alabaugh v. Baltimore and Ohio R. R. Co., 222 F.2d 861
SU ED bck Se ceheneneceecdeacnnens 13, 17, 18
Andrews v. Louisville and Nashville Railway Co., 406 U.S.
Bet GED <creanndgcseciiivnscedased 6, 13, 14, 15, 16
Ballie v. Rollins and Burlington Northern, Inc., 530 P. 2d
440 (Bap. Ch. BERS. TPIS) co cccccccescccseveses 15
Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 401 F.2d 87, cert.
denied, International Association of Machinists v.
Brady, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969) ............. 6, 16, 19, 20
Cook v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 309 S.W. 2d
STD COED. THSE) cc vcccccccccccvccvccessosecsee 13
Giordano v. Modern Air Transport, 504 F.2d 882 (Sth
Sh GOD dh 0n'ndcsdbucecesanesendicescensesans 19
Haney v. Chesapeake and Ohio R. R. Co., 498 F.2d 987
Gh Si Gg: GD a 0 x66 cen secdcnccccuvecsence 15, 18
ii
Johns v. Baltimore and Ohio R. R. Co., 118 F. Supp. 317
(N.D. Ill., 3 Judge Court, 1954) .........- cee eee 13
Machinists v. Central Airlines, 327 U.S. 682 (1963) ...10, 13
Merinuk v. Baker, 366 F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Penn. 1972).. 15
Moore v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 312 U.S. 630 (1941). 13
Railway Employees Department v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225
PP SPPET Teer TITTE eT eererirs Perr ree 10
Rinker v. Penn Central Transportation Co., 350 F. Supp.
ee Ge BR, TROD cecccccccccsosesscccsss 15
Rossi v. TWA, 507 F.2d 404 (9th Cir., 1974) ....... 19
Sampsell v. Baltimore and Ohio R. R. Co., 235 F.2d 569
fe RTT TTT Terre Te TT ee ee 13
Wells v. Southern Airways, Inc., 517 F.2d 132 (Sth Cir.,
PTT TT Tee eT TCT OTC Tere Tee 19
West v. American Airlines, 352 F. Supp. 1278 (N.D. Ill. |
SD hee de ER Ane donee hedéacesaceusdennséees 15
Statutes.
Se es GENE bv dad en ede ns oneedeceeeseeuns 2
Railway Labor Act, Sec. 1, 44 Stat. 577, as amended (45
SE ED 6 000Gn be cbensecanensees tune 3, 5,12
Railway Labor Act, Title I, Sec. 2, First, Second, Third,
Sixth, Eleventh, 44 Stat. 577, as amended (45 U.S.C.A.
PEC eee eee TTT eT eer reer 3, 10, 12
Railway Labor Act, Title Il, Sec. 201, 202, 204 (45
Se: Ty Be SUD ce deneucncsesecececs 3, 10, 12
SO Sa STD wecccoccescecscevetecseneeecs 5
Ge GA, UPR ccc ccceccnaccesseeassececs 6
Miscellaneous.
Rule 23(1)(i), Rules of the Supreme Court .......... 1
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1975.
AIR LINE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,
INTERNATIONAL,
Petitioner,
vs,
NELSON EVANS,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA.
To the Honorable Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court of the United States:
The petitioner, Air Line Employees Association, International,
by its undersigned attorneys, prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue
to review a judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia.
OPINION BELOW.
The opinion of the Supreme Court of Georgia rendered on
April 7, 1976, rehearing denied, April 20, 1976, is reported at
—— So.2d ........... (not reported as of this date). A copy of the
said opinion is appended hereto in accordance with Rule 23
(1) (i).
JURISDICTION.
The respondent’s cause of action was based upon alleged viola-
tions of rights under a collective bargaining agreement made
pursuant to the Railway Labor Act and alleged violations of
rights under the Railway Labor Act. In its pleadings, and at
every step of the proceedings in the trial and. appellate courts,
the petitioner contended that the facts as stated required the
respondent to exhaust his administrative remedies before pursu-
ing court action. The Courts below rejected this contention
(Appendix A, B). Thus, the State Court has decided a federal
question of suostance in a way not in accord with applicable
decisions of this Court. The judgment below was entered on
April 7, 1976, and rehearing was denied on April 20, 1976.
Jurisdiction of this Court to review is invoked by the petitioner
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1257(3).
QUESTION PRESENTED.
Pursuant to the union security provisions of a collective
bargaining agreement, the respondent airline employee was dis-
charged at the request of the petitioner, his collective bargainin;
representative, by the employer for non-payment of union dues.
The collective bargaining agreement contained an administrative
procedure for review of such a dispute by a wutral arbitrator.
The employee brought suit without utilizing tt administrative
relief procedure. He was subsequently reemployed ond now seeks
only damages from the petitioner.
Thus, the sole question presented here is whether the respond-
ent employee should have been required to exhaust his available
administrative relief prior to proceeding with this court action.
STATUTES INVOLVED.
The statutes involved in this case are the following:
Railway Labor Act, Title I, Sec. 1, 44 Stat. 577, as
amended (45 U.S.C.A. 151).
Railway Labor Act, Title I, Sec. 2, First, Second, Third,
Sixth, Eleventh, 44 Stat. 577, as amended (45 U.S.C.A.
152).
Railway Labor Act, Title Il, Sec. 201, 202, 204 (45
U.S.C.A. 181, 182, 184).
STATEMENT.
The respondent Evans, sued the petitioner, Air Line Em-
ployees Association, International (hereinafter referred to as
ALEA), and Airlift International, Inc. (hereinafter referred to
as Airlift), in the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia,
complaining of discharge by the employer, Airlift, at the request
of the collective bargaining representative, ALEA, for non-pay-
ment of union dues. Evans sought reinstatement to employment
and damages (actual and punitive) for wrongful discharge.
Evans alleged that until November 19, 1974, he was em-
ployed by Airlift at the Atlanta airport (amended complaint.
R. p. 90, para. 3). He was a member of ALEA, a labor
organization representing at Airlift the craft or class of em-
ployees to which Evans belonged (Amended Complaint, R.
p. 91, para. 7, 8). Airlift is a carrier by air and, as such, is
subject to and governed by the provisions of the Railway Labor
Act in its relations with its employees (Amended Complaint,
R. p. 91, para. 7). ALEA, representing employees of an air
carrier, likewise is governed by the Railway Labor Act
(Amended Complaint, R. p. 91, para. 8). Thus, this case in-
volves the application of federal law.
When Evans was employed by Airlift, he was told by a
management representative that he “would be required to join’
4
the union.” Evans agreed to join ALEA, signed a check-off
authorization for his dues and was told he would have to pay an
initiation fee of $58.00 (not due until after he completed his 90
day probationary period of employment) (Amended Complaint,
R. pp. 92, 93, para. 13, 14).
On November 16, 1974, Evans received a copy by certified
mail of a letter which is attached to the Amended Complaint as
Exhibit A (R. p. 98). The letter was addressed to the Vice
President of Airlift by the President of ALEA and stated that
Evans has not complied with Section 23, paragraph C, of the
collective bargaining agreement (this provision appears R. pp.
72, 73). Evans was terminated by Airlift on November 19,
1974 (Amended Complaint, R. p. 91, para. 6). Without resort-
ing to the contract grievance procedure (R. pp. 72, 73), Evans
filed suit on November 25, 1974 (R. p. 19), seeking injunctive
relief (Amended Complaint R. pp. 95, 96), damages, actual
and punitive, and attorneys’ fees (Amended Complaint, R.
p. 96).
Evans alleged that his termination was contrary to the col-
lective bargaining agreement and to the Railway Labor Act:
“Plaintiff shows that he was terminated illegally, unlaw-
fully, and wrongfully under the Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment and that said termination was a direct contravention
of said Agreement and the Railway Labor Act, 42 [sic]
U.S.C. Chapter 8.” Amended Complaint, R. p. 91, para.
7.
Although Evans sought to protect rights under the collective
bargaining agreement and the Railway Labor Acct, he also sought
to bypass the orderly procedures provided by the collective bar-
gaining agreement and required by the Railway Labor Act
and came into court without seeking to pursue or exhaust same:
“Plaintiff is without an adequate remedy at law and
seeks a temporary and permanent injunction to protect
his rights under the Collective Bargaining Agreement and
5
to retain his membership in said Union which is a condition
of his employmen'.” Amended Complaint, R. p. 92, para.
11.
Both ALEA and Airlift responded to the Amended Com-
plaint by answer and by filing motions to dismiss (R. pp. 94,
140). The motion to dismiss of Airlift stated: 1) both defend-
ants were organizations within the meaning of and covered by
the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C.A. § 151, et seq.); 2) Count
I of Evans’ complaint alleged a wrongful discharge, and Count
II alleged a conspiracy to effect the wrongfully discharge; 3)
if the discharge was wrongful that it was subject to the com-
pulsory arbitration processes required by the Railway Labor
Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151, et seqg., § 181, § 184 (incorporated into
the collective bargaining agreement), which act all parties agree
is applicable. Thus the failure to exhaust said remedies com-
pelled the dismissal of the case for want of jurisdiction and for
failure to state a claim (R. p. 94). ALEA’s motion restated
the defense of failure to state a claim principally relying upon
failure to exhaust administrative remedies (R. p. 140).
In due course, the motions were set for hearing and were
orally argued before the trial court. The trial judge over-ruled
said motions and rendered a handwritten opinion (R. p. 146,
App. A).
The defendants filed a request for immediate review pursuant
to Georgia Code §6-701. The trial court agreed that the over-
ruling of the motion to dismiss was of such importance that im-
mediate review should be had and certified the matter on August
4, 1975 (R. p. 150).
A petition was filed in the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals transferred the request to the Supreme Court, and the
Supreme Court granted leave to file an appeal by order dated
September 3, 1975.
A notice of appeal was timely filed by both ALEA and Airlift
(R. p. Al, A2).
6
Subsequently, Airlift made a settlement with Evans and re-
employed him. Evans dismissed his case against Airlift pursuant
to Georgia Code § 81A-14la (R. p. 154). Consequently, Air-
lift withdrew from the appeal of the case (R. p. 152) and there
remained and presently remain only Evans’ damage claims
against ALEA.
In deciding the appeal (App. B), the Supreme Court of
Georgia relied on the case of Brady v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 401 F.2d 87, cert. denied, International Association of
Machinists v. Brady, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969), distinguishing be-
tween a situation such as Andrews v. Louisville and Nashville
Railway Co., 406 U.S. 320, where, in a dispute between an em-
ployer and employee, the Court required exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies, and a dispute such as Brady, supra, where
the dispute was between the employee and his union, the Supreme
Court of Georgia determinating in the latter instance that the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative relief was inapplicable.
Apparently, the Supreme Court of Georgia overlooked in the
Brady case, supra, the requirement of exhaustion of admin-
istrative relief in a claim by an employee for damages against
his union.
ARGUMENT.
The complete collective bargaining agreement under which
Evans seeks to base his case is attached to the motions to dismiss
(R. p. 99). Evans was given a copy of the agreement in August,
1974, and was aware of its provisions (R. p. 65).
Pertinent provisions follow:
“THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the Railway Labor Act,
as amended, by and between AIR LIFT INTERNA-
TIONAL, INC. (hereinafter known as the ‘Company’)
and the CLERICAL OFFICE, AND STATION EM-
PLOYEES in the service of AIRLIFT INTERNA-
7
TIONAL, INC. as represented by the AIR LINE EM-
PLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL (here-
inafter known as the ‘Union’).
WITNESSETH:
It is hereby mutually agreed:
SECTION 1—RECOGNITION
(a) The Company hereby recognized the Air Line Em-
ployees Association as the duly designated and authorized
representative of the Clerical, Office, and Station Employees
in the employ of the Company for the purpose of the Rail-
way Labor Act, as amended, in accordance with the cer-
tification issued by the National Mediation Board on July
30, 1959, in Case No. R-3364. (R. p. 101.)
. * * * *
SECTION 23—-UNION SECURITY
(a) (1) All employees covered by this Agreement must be-
come and remain members of the Union as a condition
to their continued employment. Good standing shall
be attained if he tenders the initiation fee and periodic
dues uniformly required as a condition of member-
ship by the union. Any employee not presently a
member of the Union shall comply herewith within
sixty (60) days or be discharged hereunder.
(2) All new employees of the Company shall become
members of the Union sixty (60) days after date of
employment with the Company and shall thereafter
maintain membership in the Union as provided for
in Paragraph (a)(1) of this Section.
(b) If a member becomes delinquent in the payment of
initiation fee and/or membership dues, such member
shall be notified by certified mail, return receipt re-
quested, copy to the Vice President—Scheduled Air
Freight of the Company, that he is delinquent in the
payment of initiation fee and/or dues as specified
herein and is subject to discharge as an employee of
the Company. Such letter shall also notify the em-
8
ployee that he must remit the required payment within
a period of fifteen (15) days or be discharged.
(c) If upon the expiration of the fifteen day period the
employee still remains delinquent, the Union shall
certify in writing to the Vice President—Scheduled
Air Freight of the Company, copy to the employee,
that the employee has failed to remit payment within
the grace period allowed and is therefore to be dis-
charged. The Vice President—Scheduled Air Freight
shall then take proper steps to discharge such em-
ployee from the service of the Company.
(d) A grievance by an employee who is to be discharged
as the result of an interpretation or application of
the provisions of the Agreement shall be subject to the
following procedure:
(1) An employee who believes that the provisions
of this Section pertaining to him have not been
properly interpreted or applied may submit his request
for review in writing within five (5) days from the date
of his notification by the Vice President—Scheduled
Air Freight as provided in Paragraph (c). The request
must be submitted to the Vice President—Scheduled
Air Freight or his designee, who will review the
grievance and render his decision in writing not later
than five (5) days following the receipt of the
grievance.
(2) The Vice President—Scheduled Air Freight, or
his designee, will forward his decision to the employee,
with a copy to the Union Headquarters. If the decision
is not satisfactory to both the employee and the
Union, then either may appeal the grievance within
ten (10) days from the date of the decision directly
to a neutral referee agreed to by the Company and
the Union. In the event the parties fail to agree on a
neutral within the specified period, the neutral shall
be appointed under the provisions of Section Seven,
First A, of the Railroad Labor Act. The decision of
the neutral referee shall be final and binding.
(3) During the period a grievance is being handled
under the provisions of this Section, and until final
9
award by the neutral referee, the employee shall not
be discharged from the Company nor lose any seniority
rights because of no.-compliance with the terms and
provisions of this Section.
(e) An employee discharged by the Company under the
provisions of this Section shall be deemed to have
been ‘discharged for cause’ within the meaning of the
terms and provisions of this Agreement.
(f) It is agreed that the Company shall not be liable for
any time or wage claims for an employee discharged
’ by the Company pursuant to a written order by an
authorized Union representative under the terms of
this Section.
(g) The Company shall provide the Union Headquarters
each month with a list of all resignations, transfers,
new hires, leaves of absence, etc.
(h) The Union has the responsibility to properly advise
new employee of Union membership requirements.
[R. pp. 126-127; Emphasis added.]
* * * *
SECTION 26—DURATION OF AGREEMENT
This Agreement shall become effective on the date of sign-
ing, December 13, 1973 except as specifically otherwise
stated, and shall amend the Agreement dated July 1, 1971
and shall continue in full force and effect until July 1,
1975. The Agreement shall renew itself thereafter each
July 1 unless written notice of intended change is served
in accordance with Section 6, Title I of the Railway
Labor Act, as amended, by either party thereto at least
sixty (60) days prior to July 1 of any year. [R. p. 129)”
Special note should be made that the procedure provided for
employees with complaints relative to violations of Section 23
is different from the procedure involving a grievance in the
traditional labor-management sense (See Section 19, R. pp.
122-124, of the bargaining agreement). The procedure under
Section 23 allows appeal to begin at the Vice Presidential level
and proceed directly to a neutral arbitrator and maintains the
.
10
employee in his job during the process. This is the procedure
which Evans seeks to bypass.
Attention is called to the Letter of Agreement attached to
the collective bargaining agreement which “in compliance with
Section 204, Title I], of the Railway Labor Act, as amended,
.. . establish(s) a System Board of Adjustment for the purpose
of adjusting and deciding disputes which may arise under the
terms of the ... Agreement”. (R. pp. 132-135.)
Simply stated, Section 23, the “union security” clause of the
collective bargaining agreement, requires membership in the
Union as a condition of continued employment. Evans does not
challenge the validity or legality of the clause itself and that
is not a matter in controversy.' It is also not disputed that
Airlift is a “carrier by air” and employer; that ALEA is the
designated and certified bargaining representative of the unit
concerned; and that Evans was, ‘ntil his termination, an “em-
ployee” in that bargaining unit; all within the meaning of the
Railway Labor Act. It follows that the employment relation-
ship in issue is governed by the Railway Labor Act and the
collective bargaining agreement.* This fact is admitted on the
face of the Amended Complaint (Paragraphs 7, 10, 19, R.
pp. 76, 77, 79).
Within the context of the above, the operative facts are quite
basic. Upon Evans’ initial hire he was informed of the “union
1. Section 2, Eleventh, of the Railway Labor Act expressly au-
thorizes “union shop” agreements for employers and employees
covered by that Act. This authority is effective even in “right-to-
work” states. Railway Employees Department v. Hanson, 351 U.S.
225 (1956).
2. It should be noted that the Railway Labor Act requires the
parties to “exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agree-
ments.” As a part of this duty there must be set up adjustment proce-
dures for the settlement of disputes arising thereunder. Such an
agreement made pursuant to the Railway Labor Act has “the im-
primatur of federal law upon it”; in matters arising under such an
agreement the federal law is controlling. Railway Employees De-
partment v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956); Machinists v. Central
Airlines, 372 U.S. 682 (1963).
il
security” requirement in the collective bargaining agreement. He
met the Union “chairman” or shop steward shortly thereafter
and took steps to join ALEA. Although he signed a dues
“checkoff” authorization he did not pay his initiation fee, it not
being payable until an employee completes his probationary
period with the Carrier.
Following the completion of that probationary period, how-
ever, ALEA still had not received the initiation fee which is
required for full membership. The Union made a series of in-
quiries concerning this failure to pay the required fee and
finally demanded payment within fifteen days, warning Evans
that he was subject to discharge for delinquency. The Union
did not receive the initiation fee and in due course called upon
Airlift to terminate the employment of Evans for non-compliance
with the union security clause.
Upon receipt of the Union’s request and pursuant to
the existing collective bargaining agreement, Airlift discharged
Evans for non-compliance with the union security clause. It
is significant that the only true issue of fact in this case is raised
by Evans’ claim that he did pay the initiation fee.
It is also very noteworthy that in accordance with the Railway
Labor Act, the collective bargaining agreement contains an
adjustment procedure specifically designed to resolve dispute
discharges under the union security clause. An employee who
believes the provisions have not been properly applied may refer
the matter to a neutral arbitrator for determination of the dis-
pute. Pending resolution of the matter, the employee remains
employed with no loss of seniority rights (see Section 23(d)
(2) (3)).
Evans, however, did not avail himself of these procedures.
Although the law as set forth hereinafter clearly requires that he
pursue this administrative avenue of redress prior to bringing
suit, he ignored these procedures and commenced this litigation
alleging, generally, a wrongful discharge and a conspiracy to
wrongfully discharge.
12
The Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151, et seq., which
governs the labor relations between the parties to this suit, is a
unique piece of labor legislation. Its singularity arises from
its success in maintaining industrial peace in the railroad and
airline industries. This is chiefly owing to the Act’s mandatory
dispute settlement procedures,
Two of the Act’s stated purposes are (1) to avoid any inter-
ruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged
therein, and (2) to provide for the prompt and orderly settle-
ment of all disputes growing out of grievances or out of the
interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of
pay, rules or working conditions.
More specifically, Section 2, First, provides:
“It shall be the duty of all carriers . . . and employees to
exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agree-
ments concerning rates or pay, rules, and working con-
ditions, and fo settle all disputes, whether arising out of
the application of such agreements or otherwise .. .” (45
U.S.C. § i52; emphasis supplied. )
Thus, it is the statutory “duty” of ali carriers and their em-
ployees “to settle all disputes.” That does not mean some dis-
putes; it means all disputes “growing out of the application of
such agreements or otherwise.”
In furtherance of that general duty and specifically with refer-
ence to air carriers, Title II, Section 204, of the Act provides
that “. . . it shall be the duty of every carrier and its employees,
acting through their representatives, . . . to establish a board of
adjustment. . .”
The purpose of that adjustment board is to settle:
“. .. disputes between an employee or group of employees
and a carrier . . . growing out of grievances, or out of the
interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates
pay, rules, or working conditions .. .” (45 U.S.C. § 184;
emphasis suppled. )
13
Failing to reach a settlement in conference between the parties,
such disputes may be referred by petition of the parties or by
either party to the adjustment board.
It is now well settled that pursuit of this administrative remedy
is not based on an election nor is it at the option of the parties
— it is a compulsory administrative procedure. The Act requires
that the adjustment procedure be set up, and it further requires
that it be used to settle all disputes. Machinists v. Central Air-
lines, 372 U.S.C. 682 (1963).
This requirement of pursuit of the administrative remedy
under the Railway Labor Act prior to seeking judicial redress
has long been recognized. See, for example, Sampsell v. Balti-
more and Ohio R. R. Co., 235 F.2d 569 (4th Cir., 1956);
Alabaugh v. Baltimore and Ohio R. R. Co., 222 F.2d 861
(4th Cir., 1955). Both cases involved the discharge of an em-
ployee for failure to pay union dues. See also, Johns v. Balti-
more and Ohio R. R. Co., 118 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. IIL, 3
judge court, 1954); and Cook v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car
Porters, 309 S.W.2d 579 (Mo., 1958).
There existed in the past, however, a narrow exception to
the exhaustion requirement. See Moore v. Illinois Central R. R.
Co., 312 U.S. 630 (1941). Under that exception an em-
ployee could treat an adverse employment decision as a final
discharge, forego his administrative remedies, and institute a
court action for breach of contract.*
In 1972, however, in Andrews v. Louisville and Nashville
Railway Co., 406 U.S. 320, the Supreme Court closed the
Moore exception to the administrative exhaustion requirement.
In that case, which interestingly enough was also commenced
in the Fulton County (Georgia) Superior Court, a railroad
3. Parenthetically, it should be noted that in addition to dam-
ages, Evans requested reinstatement and back pay. (See the Prayer
of the Amended Complaint.) This is, of course, inconsistent with
acceptance of the discharge as final and such relief would not have
been available in a court action under the Moore case, even if it
still was good law.
14
employee was injured in an auto accident and incapacitated for
a period of time. He later claimed complete recovery and re-
quested to be put back to work. The carrier refused, stating that
the employee had not fully recovered. The employee elected
to treat that refusal as a discharge and sued for damages without
pursuing his remedy before the adjustment board. The Federal
District Court to which the case had been removed dismissed the
complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; the
Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal.
Speaking for an almost unanimous Court in that case, Justice
Rehnquist noted that the prior exception to the exhaustion re-
quirement had been based on an erroneous conclusion that the
Railway Labor Act’s dispute adjustment procedures had been in-
tended as optional, not compulsory. This was in fact not the
Congressional intent:
“.. . the notion that the grievance and arbitration proce-
dures provided for minor disputes in the Railway Labor
Act are optional, to be availed of as the employee or the
carrier chooses, was never good history and is not longer
good law.” 406 U.S. at p. 322.
The Court went on to hold:
“The term ‘exhaustion of administrative remedies’ in its
broader sense may be an entirely appropriate description
of the obligation of both the employee and carrier under
the Railway Labor Act to resort to dispute settlement pro-
cedures provided by that Act.” 406 U.S. at p. 325; Em-
phasis supplied.
In fact, the Court stated, the obligation may be even broader
than mere “exhaustion”; except in those cases where the ad-
justment board’s procedures and proceedings are judicially re-
viewed for due process and like matters, the administrative
remedy is “exclusive”.
“It is clear, however, that in at least some situations the
Act makes the federal administrative remedy exclusive,
rather than merely requiring exhaustion of remedies in
15
one forum before resorting to another. A party who has
litigated an issue before the Adjustment Board on the merits
may not relitigate that issue in an independent judicial pro-
ceeding. . . . he is limited to the judicial review of the
Board’s proceedings that the Act itself provides.” 406 U.S.
at p. 325.
Thus, the Andrews case has firmly and unequivocally estab-
lished that the Railway Labor Act’s dispute settlement procedures
are mandatory, not optional, and that an employee who has a
dispute with a carrier arising out of the interpretation or applica-
tion of a collective bargaining agreement must resort to those
administrative procedures for his remedy. Because Andrews had
not availed himself of those procedures, just as Evans has not
in this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of his
complaint.
Since Andrews, this requirement has been applied by other
courts. In Haney v. Chesapeake and Ohio R. R. Co., 498 F.2d
987 (D.C. Cir., 1974), a former employee sued the railroad for
separation pay allegedly due under a collective bargaining agree-
ment. The dismissal of her complaint was affirmed based on
the failure to exhaust her administrative remedies. In so holding,
the Court commented on the Andrews decision:
“A decision like Andrews involving a matter that has
been considered and reconsidered in lighi of reflection over
the years, is not to be accorded a niggardly construction.
Sound principles of judicial administration conjoined with
the salient considerations discussed in that case make it
appropriate to require appellant to pursue her grievance
adjustment remedies. . . .” 498 F.2d at p. 992.
For similar applications of the exhaustion principal under the
Railway Labor Act see: Rinker v. Penn Central Transportation
Co., 350 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Penn., 1972); West v. American
Airlines, 352 F. Supp. 1278 (N.D. Ill., 1972); Merinuk v.
Baker, 366 F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Penn., 1972). Ballie v. Rollins
and Burlington Northern, Inc., 530 P.2d 440 (Sup. Ct. Mont.,
1974).
16
In light of the unequivocal holding of the Andrews case, it
should be noted that during oral argument on the Motions, the
Plaintiff advanced several arguments designed to obscure the
plain requirements of the Railway Labor Act as enunciated in
Andrews. Chief among these arguments were: (1) Andrews and
the adjustment procedures do not apply because this is not a
dispute arising out of the collective bargaining agreement con-
cerning rates of pay, rules or working conditions; and (2) it
would be unjust and “absurd” to refer the Plaintiff for his re-
dress back to ne partics who allegedly committed the wrong.®
As to the first of these arguments the Andrews court addressed
a similar proposition when confronted with a state law breach
of employment contract theory rather than a violation of the
collective bargaining agreement. There the Court stated in part:
“The fact that petitioner characterizes his claim as one for
‘wrongful discharge’ does not save it from the Act's man-
datory provisions for the processing of grievances. . . .
the very concept of ‘wrongful discharge’ implies some sort
of statutory or contractual standard that modifies the tradi-
tional common-law rule that a contract of employment is
terminable by either party at will. . . .” 406 U.S. at pp.
324, 325.
Noting that the only source of Andrews’ right not to be dis-
charged was the collective bargaining agreement, the Court rea-
soned that the extent of the obligations to return him to work
necessarily depended upon an interpretation of that agreement.
The claim was therefore subject to the Act’s adjustment pro-
cedure.
In a like manner, the present case also arises out of the col-
lective bargaining agreement. But for the agreement there would
a on
5. In oral argument the Plaintiff placed an inordinate emphasis
on the dicta in Brady v. Trans World Airlines, 401 F.2d 87 (3rd
Cir., 1968). Two main factors make that case inapposite to the
present considerations: (1) it preceded Andrews by some four
years and (2) most significantly, the claimant in that case had
pursued his administrative remedies prior to turning to the judicial
system. Evans has not even attempted to utilize those procedures.
17
have been no requirement that Evans join the Union as a con-
dition of continued employment; but for the agreement there
would have been no requirement that the Carrier discharge him
for failure to maintain Union membership; and, like in Andrews,
but for the agreement the discharge may not be characterized as
“wrongful”.
Furthermore, how can Evans claim this matter does not arise
cut of the collective bargaining agreement when on the fact
of his Amended Complaint he charges that his termination
was in violation of that agreement? (See paragraph 7 of the
Amended Complaint)
The fact that Evans characterizes his claim as one for
“wrongful discharge” or “conspiracy” or “failure to represent”
cannot alter the nature of the crucial dispute in this case—Evans
claims he paid his initiation fee and ALEA claims he did not.
That is precisely and exactly the type of dispute that Congress
intended to be decided in the administrative settlement proce-
dures mandated by the Act.
Evans’ second argument propounded in an effort to sidestep
the requirements of the Railway Labor Act is that since his
discharge was the result of action by both Airlift and ALEA
it would be unjust to refer him to the adjustment procedure
for redress. This argument ignores, however, the impartial ad-
ministrative procedures which the Act and the collective bargain-
ing agreement specifically provide. By the express terms of the
contract an employee aggrieved under the “union security”
clause may refer the matter directly to a “neutral referee.” (Col-
lective Bargaining Agreement, § 23 (d)(2); at R.p. 126,7.)
In addition, Evans’ argument also chooses to ignore the judi-
cial review available after he has at least attempted to pursue
his administrative remedies.
This matter was addressed by the Court in Alabaugh v. Balti-
more and Ohio R. R. Co., 222 F.2d 861 (4th Cir., 1955),
as follows:
18
“The argument that the Adjustment Board might not
furnish a fair tribunal in cases of this character because
certain members might be biased atid preiudiced because
of union affiliations furnishes no reason why the courts
may ignore the fact that Congress has vested it with exclu-
sive primary jurisdiction in such cases.” 222 F.2d at p. 867.
Following the Andrews decision. the Court in Haney v.
Chesapeake and Ohio R. R. Co., 498 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir.,
1974) answered a similar claim by a plaintiff seeking to by-pass
the mandatory grievance procedure. There the Court stated:
“In effect, appellant would have us carve out an exception
to Andrews whenever an aggrieved employee’s prosecu-
tion of his claim runs the risk of making his union an
adversary. Aithough the concern expressed by appellant is
plausible, we conclude that relieving her of the exhaustion
requirement would open too large a hole in Andrews, and
that the sound course is to require her to seek relief before
the administrative tribunal, relying for further protection
on the general doctrines of law permitting limited judicial
surveillance in an action complaining of administrative
abuse. ... Whether an adjustment board will give adequate
consideration to appellant's particular claim is not an issue
that should be prejudged before that tribunal has had
an opportunity to act.” 498 F.2d at p.992; emphasis
supplied.
It is plain from the above that a claim of “probable prejudice”
in the administrative process is not sufficient to overcome the
exhaustion of remedies requirement of the Railway Labor Act.
In so claiming Evans is not only ignoring the fact that he may
refer the matter to a neutral arbitrator, but he is also asking the
Court to speculate and prejudge that Congressionally mandated
arbitration process without giving it an opportunity to perform
its specific function-
Even after aggrieved employee has exhaused his administra-
tive remedies, it is not to be assumed, as Evans has done, that
an adjustment procedure is “inherently unfair” merely because
it is set up (pursuant to the Railway Labor Act) in a contract
19
between the Union and the Carrier. Wells v. Southern Airways,
Inc., 517 F.2d 132 (Sth Cir. 1975); Giordano v. Modern Air
Transport, 504 F.2d 882 (Sth Cir., 1974); Rossi v. TWA,
507 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1974). Certainly, if the fairness of
the arbitration process may withstand an attack on the grounds
of bias or partiality after an individual has given them a chance
to operate, it would seem highly inappropriate to nullify those
procedures as a matter of law and allow them to be bypassed
on the mere assertion that the procedure will possibly be biased.
There is a final and most crucial factor herein to which the
consideration of the court is respectfully directed. The Supreme
Court of Georgia in its opinion clearly was influenced by the
case of Brady v. TWA, supra, with regard to the holding therein
that since a system board of adjustment does not have jurisdic-
tion to hear an employee's suit against his union for breach
of duty of fair representation there exists no bar to judicial re-
view of the merits of such a controversy. The Supreme Court
of Georgia interpreted this to mean that a claim by an em-
ployee against his union would not be subject to holding of
Andrews, supra, requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies
in a case between employer and employee.
It cannot be assumed even arguendo that such position is
correct. For one thing, Brady is factually different:
“
. . . While recalcitrant in accepting the new scale he
ultimately relented and made a tender of all past de-
linquencies prior to any demand by IAM upon TWA to
discharge him.”
This was not the case with respect to Evans.
Much more important, however, is the fact that the cast at bar
no longer (and did not before the Supreme Court of Georgia)
seeks reinstatement to employment. Evans is reemployed and
here seeks only aga‘ast ALEA actual and punitive damages.
After stating in the Brady case with respect to reinstatement:
“. .. In part I above, it was held that the Board was with-
out jurisdiction to entertain Mr. Brady's complaint which
20
was directed against both TWA and IAM. Under these
circumstances, when procedures for reinstatement are other-
wise unavailable to him, the purposes of the Railway Labor
Act would best be served if an employee seeking to regain
his job may invoke the equitable powers of the court... .
Emphasis supplied.
The Court, with respect to the damage claim against Brady's
union, stated as follows:
It has been the general rule, and the rule of this circuit,
that before a suit against a union for breach of its duty of
fair representation may be brought in the courts, the mem-
ber must first exhaust the available internal union remedies,
or show an adequate reason for failing to do so... .”
* * ~ % *
“._. Nevertheless, there is no obligation or evidence that he
evoked any appellate union procedures to redress the as-
serted unfair and arbitrary action against him by the
local and district officers. Nor does he advance an adequate
reason for his failure to do so... .”
* * * » *
“. . . However, in this case, Mr. Brady’s claim for such
damages may not be sustained because of his failure to
exhaust internal union remedies or to adequately explain
that failure... .”
Nowhere in the case at bar, an action for damages for
breach of duty of fair representation, does Evans allege that he
exhausted any administrative remedies of any kind whatsoever,
and he does not allege any adequaie reason for failing to do so.
Just as in the Brady case, Evans here is not entitled to recover
on his damage ciaim and the same should have been dismissed
on ALEA’s motion.
CONCLUSION.
The Railway Labor Act and the collective bargaining agree-
ment is clear in its mandate that disputes which arise from the
application of collective burgaining agreements, such as the one
21
presently before this Court, are to be settled in the statutory
adjustment processes specifically set up for that purpose. This
principle has been reemphasized by the Supreme Court in its
Andrews decision, and it is now beyond question that a plain-
tiff must exhaust his administrative remedies under that Act
prior to seeeking judicial redress.
In spite of Evan’s argumenis tnat the exhaustion principle does
not apply to his circumstances, his Amended Complaint sets
forth a claim which arises jrom the application of a Railway
Labor Act collective bargaining agreement; therefore his cause
is presently in the wrong forum. The scheme of labor relations
as contemplated by Congress in the railroad and airline industries
requires that this case be dismissed to the administrative processes
specifically designed to resolve such disputes.
Respectfully submitted,
ADAIR, GOLDTHWAITE, STANFORD
AND DANIELS, P.A..,
600 Rhodes Haverty Building,
Atlanta, Georgia 30303,
404/522-5950,
and
WYATT JOHNSON,
Staff Vice President and
General Counsel, ALEA,
5600 South Central Avenue,
Chicago, Llinois 60638,
312/767-3333,
By: WyYATT JOHNSON,
Attorneys for Air Line Employee
Association, International.
Al
APPENDIX A.
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY.
NELSON EVANS, >
VS. 7” ;
. Civil Action
r File No. C-841
AIRLIFT INTERNATIONAL INC., AND
AIR LINE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
INTERNATIONAL.
ORDER.
The above defendants having brought before the Court
Motions to dismiss the plaintiff complaint, and the Court having
heard argument of counsel and citation of authorities, raising
subject matter jurisdiction and exhaustion of remedies, the Court
does hereby overrules and dismisses the said Motions of defend-
ants to the plaintiffs complaint.
So ordere | that Ist day of August.
JEPTHA C. TANKSLEY,
Judge, Superior Court, AJC.
APPENDIX B.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA.
Decided: April 7, 1976
30610. Arr LINE EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL
vs.
EvANS (616)
GUNTER, Justice.
This is an interlocutory appeal, originally granted by this
court on the application of two applicant-defendants, from a
judgment that denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plain-
tiffs complaint. After this court had granted the interlocutory
appeal, one of the defendants, the employer of the plaintiff,
voluntarily dismissed its appeal, and, at the same time, the
plaintiff dismissed the employer as a party defendant in the trial
court. The result of these two dismissals is that the issues for
determination, as the appeal now stands, are between the plain-
tiff below, Evans, and the defendant below, the Union.
Since appellate jurisdiction was in this court when the inter-
locutory appeal was originally granted by this court, this court
has retained jurisdiction even though the two dismissals referred
to above have eliminated the equitable relief involved at the
time the interlocutory appeal was granted. Our Constitution pro-
vides: “It shail be competent for the Supreme Court to require
by certiorari or otherwise any case to be certified to the Supreme
Court from the Court of Appeals for review and determination
with the same power and authority as if the case had been
A3
carried by writ of error to the Supreme Court.” Ga. Code Ann.
sec. 2-3704.
Evans was an employee of the employer until November 19,
1974, when he was discharged by the employer at the direction
of the Union for his alleged failure to pay his initiation fee to
the Union.
On November 24, 1974, Evans filed his complaint against the
employer and the Union seeking injunctive relief, compensa-
tory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees. Both de-
fendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a claim on the ground that Evans had failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies required by the Railway Labor
Act, 45 U.S.C. Sec. 151 et seq., and the collective bargaining
agreement between the employer and the Union.
The trial judge overruled both motions to dismiss, two inter-
locutory appeals followed, the employer was then dismissed as
a party in the trial court, the employer dismissed its interlocutory
appeal, and we now have for decision, as the sole remaining
issue in the case, whether the Union’s motion to dismiss the
complaint was properly denied by the trial judge.
As we view the case in its present posture, the only issues for
determination are between Evans and the Union. Evans con-
tends that he was ejected from membership in the Union with-
out cause, or that he was denied membership in the Union with-
out cause, and that the Union, without cause, directed his dis-
charge by his employer for non-compliance by Evans with the
terms of the collective bargaining contract between the Union
and the employer. The responsive pleadings of the Union denied
that Evans had ever been a member of the Union, admitted that
he had paid dues to the Union for the month of October, 1974,
and admitted that his employment with the employer had been
terminated at the direction and request of the Union.
We think this case is controlled by the principles enunciated in
Sheet Metal Workers International Association v. Carter, 133
Ga. App. 872, 212 SE2d 645 (1975).
A4
Also, see Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 401 F.2d 87,
cert. denied, International Association of Machinists v. Brady,
393 U.S. 1048 (1969). In that case an employce charged the
Union with hostile discrimination in refusing to accept tender of
the plaintiff's dues and in wrongfully having him discharged
from employment with TWA. The complaint further charged the
Union with discrimination and with misrepresenting the facts
pertaining to the plaintiff's alleged dues delinquency in a hear-
ing before a Railway Labor Act adjustment board, The Third
Circuit construed such allegations as a complaint primarily
against his bargaining agent rather than his employer. After
setting forth statutory authority and discussing the jurisdiction
of adjustment boards and of the courts, the Third Circuit stated:
“The jurisdiction of railway carrier adjustment boards has been
construed as encompassing disputes between employees and their
employers, but not disputes between employees and their bar-
guining representatives.” P. 92.
See also Deboles v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 350 F. Supp.
1274 (1972), where it was held that the complaint set forth a
dispute primarily involving TWA employees and their Union
representatives, and that the Railway Labor Act had not pre-
empted jurisdiction from the state and federal courts.
We conclude in this case that the exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies by Evans, as contended by the Union, was not re-
quired, and Evans’ complaint was not subject to dismissal for
failure to state a claim.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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