Petition — Blanchard v. Johnson
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Supreme Ceurt, UM |
| FILED “#
MAY 26 1976
Bannaebntheanbin ne! aS
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1975
No. 75-1 ¢ ] 6
NORMAN F. BLANCHARD, et al.,
Petitioners,
vs.
ROLLA R. JOHNSON, et al.,
Respondents,
and
MARINE ENGINEERS BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATION,
ASSOCIATED MARITIME OFFICERS, AFL-CIO,
Applicants for Intervention.
—---—- -——
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To the United States Court of Appeals
For the Sixth Circuit
—— —-
ee
Merritt W. GREEN, II
GERALD B. LacKEy
GREEN, Lackey, NEWCOMER
and Harris
330 Spitzer Building
Toledo, Ohio 43604
Counsel for Petitioners
THE GATES LEGAL PUBLISHING CO.. CLEVELAND. OHIO—TEL. (216) 621-5647
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ET ARE Le A,
Statement of Jurisdiction ___._______-____________
ETE Se ee
Statutory Provisions Involved __- edie
I I I a Fe cute imatnnoemace
I a
EES ETT Oe
S. Peeeee Be oe ote
Reasons for Granting the Writ _.__________ SPataheos
I. This Case Presents an Important Issue of Na-
tional Labor Policy Requiring Resolution by
This Court _____- eee ee Pat A Ne A
A. The issue in this case is one of first impres-
sion involving the construction of the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,
29 U.S.C. §§411(a) (1) and 501(a) _____-
1. Equal voting rights ____-___ aon 1 Pen ;
2. Fiduciary duties of union officials ____
B. Review of this case is essential to the pres-
ervation of the fundamental rights of the
union members and essential to guarantee
the full and active participation by the rank
and file in the affairs of their union ____ __
II. This Case Presents a Good Vehicle for This
Court to Consider and Decide the Issue Pre-
sented Herein ____.___. x Sos
a ee a ae ee ae EN
Appendix:
Opinion of the District Court ____-_____________
Coo ow .- - LW LH
10
16
II
Opinion of the Court of Appeals _.__._._.__.__.__.___ A4
Judgment of the Court of Appeals _.______-______ Al2
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964) _____-__-16,17
Cefalo v. Moffett, 449 F.2d 1193 (D.C. Cir., 1971) _- 9
Dusing v. Nuzzo, 26 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1941) _..._._-._ 14
Gurton v. Arons, 339 F.2d 371 (2nd Cir., 1964) ___- _.
Highway Truck Drivers v. Cohen, 182 F. Supp. 608
(E.D. Pa., 1960) aff'd 284 F.2d 162 _ Cir.,
1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961) __-_-__-.- 9
House v. Schwartz, 18 Misc. 2d 21, 188 N.Y.S.2d 308
sa RDS A LS aR EL A nn oe ae 14
Keck v. Employees Independent Ass’n., 387 F. Supp.
I 10
Kerr v. Shanks, 466 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir., 1972) __-_ 10
Musicians Federation v. Wittstein, 379 U.S. 171
EE ee
Navarro v. Gannon, 385 F.2d 512 (2nd Cir., 1967) __10, 11
Nelson v. Johnson, 212 F. Supp. 233 (D. Minn., 1963),
aff'd 325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir., 1963) __._________10, 14
Phillips v. Osborne, 403 F.2d 826 (9th Cir., 1968) ___ 13
Pignotti v. Sheet Metal Workers, 477 F.2d 825 (8th
Cir., 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1067 (1974)
sateinecienlisadihsidtendibiaetameaptidnseiainieasartiiimabantinntencinaitel 10, 14, 15
Sabolsky v. Budzonowski, 457 F.2d 1245 (3rd Cir.,
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 853 (1973) ____10, 14, 15
Schuchardt v. Millwrights & Mach. Erectors Loc.
Union No. 2834, 380 F.2d 795 (10th Cir., 1967) __10, 11
III
Sertic v. The District Council of —, 423 F.2d
f . i _aeSa a a |
Sheldon v. shnsiinatatedl 497 F.2d 1276 _ Cir.,
SE ( o cceudconed ce Ma 12
Smith v. General Truck Drivers, 181 F. Supp. 14
(D.C. Calif., 1960) - 10
Tinkler v. Powell, 23 Wyo. 352, 151 P. 1097 (1915) 14
Yanity v. Benware, 376 F.2d 197 (2nd Cir., 1967) 13
Young v. Hayes, 195 F. Supp. 911 (D.D.C., 1961) 11
Texts
Aaron, The Labor Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act of 1959, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 851 (1960) 10
Clark, The Fiduciary Duties of Union Officials Under
Section 501 of the LMRDA, 52 Minn. L. Rev. 437
SU” siecle blot otescuien ae => SF
Cox, Internal Affairs of I Labor Unions Under the
Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 Micu. L. Rev. 819
Se = |
Cox, The Role of Law in Reise: Union Democ-
racy, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 609 (1959) _.--- ss siséd'BB’
Dugan, Fiduciary Obligations Under the New Act, 48
Geo. LJ. 277 (1958) -.--..._-...-- 10
Hickey, The Bill of Rights of Union Members, 48 Geo.
i ( 1 a
Rosen, Fair Representation, Contract Breach and Fi-
duciary Obligations: Unions, Union Officials and
the Worker in Collective salted 15 HastINGs
L.J. 391 (1964) - iaiteimaianariie 14
Rothman, Legislative History of the “Bill of Rights”
for Union Members, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 199 (1960) 10
Scott, The Fiduciary sieeanad 37 Cauir. L. Rev. 539
(1949) _. Gan nen eid.
IV
Union Officers-Fiduciary Duties, 15 A.L.R.3d 939 _._ 10
Wollett, Fiduciary Problems Under Landrum-Griffin,
13 N.Y.U. Ann. Conr. on Lasor 267 (1960) __-- 10
Statutes
29 U.S.C. $101 __- me asieniieamtaeen 4
29 U.S.C. §185 _______- wats lasceieiisiiialdaia
29 U.S.C. §402 ___- -scciairaniadeeaaiie
29 U.S.C. §411 _____- svalecceicelene coun
29 U.S.C. §41l(a) - inn an
29 U.S.C. §411(a) (1) 2, 9, 10, 11, 13, 17, 19
29 U.S.C. §411(a) (3) 7 : 12
29 U.S.C. §411(a) (3) (B) —
29 U.S.C. §412 __- | 4
29 U.S.C. §501 3, 4, 14, 15
29 U.S.C. $501 (a) 2, 3, 9, 10, 13, 14, 17, 19
Other
Elliott Bill, H. R. 8342, 86 Cong. 1st Sess., Section 501
(1959) | 14
Elliott Bill, Supplementary Report, H. R. Rep. No.
741, 86 Cong. Ist Sess. 81 (1959) i4
Interim Report of the Select Committee on Improper
Activities in the Labor or News Review, Sp. Rep.
No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) 1)
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1975
No. .
NORMAN F. BLANCHARD, et al.,
Petitioners,
vs.
ROLLA R. JOHNSON, et al.,
Respondents,
and
MARINE ENGINEERS BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATION,
ASSOCIATED MARITIME OFFICERS, AFL-CIO,
Applicants for Intervention.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
“Tu the United States Court of Appeals
For the Sixth Circuit
Petitioners pray that a writ of certiorari issue to
review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit in this case.
2
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals has not yet been
reported, but is printed in the Appendix attached hereto,
infra, p. A4. The opinion of the District Court is reported
as Blanchard, et al. v. Johnson, et al., 388 F. Supp. 208
(1975) and is printed in the Appendix, infra, p. Al.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered
on April 2, 1976. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).
QUESTION PRESENTED
Does a rank and file member who casts a vote for
union affiliation receive a meaningful choice within the
meaning of 29 U.S.C. $411(a) (1) and §501(a) if only one
of several bona fide proposals for affiliation is placed on
the ballot?
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Section 101(a), Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §411(a) (1):
Equal Rights. - Every member of a labor organ-
ization shall have equal rights and privileges within
such organization to nominate candidates, to vote in
elections or referendums of the labor organization,
to attend membership meetings, and to participate in
the deliberations in voting upon the business of such
meetings, subject to reasonable rules and regulations
in such organization’s constitution and by-laws.
3
Civil Enforcement, Section 102:
Any person whose rights secured by the provi-
sions of this title have been infringed by any violation
of this title may bring a civil action in a District Court
of the United States ‘or such relief (including injunc-
tions) as may be appropriate. Any such action
against a labor organization shall be brought in the
District Court of the United States in the district
where the alleged violation occurred, or where the
principal office of such labor organization is located.
Section 501, Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §501 (a):
Fiduciary responsibility of officers of labor or-
ganizations - The officers, agents, shop stewards, and
other representatives of a labor organization occupy
positions of trust in relation to such organization and
its members as a group. It is, therefore, the duty of
each such person, taking into account the special
problems and functions of a labor organization, to
hold its money and property solely for the benefit
of the organization and its members, and to manage,
invest, and expend the same in accordance with its
constitution and by-laws and any resolution of the
governing bodies adopted thereunder, to refrain from
dealing with such organization as an adverse party
or in behalf of an adverse party in any matter con-
nected with his duties and upholding or acquiring
any pecuniary or a personal interest which conflicts
with the interest of such organization, and to account
to the organization for any profit received by him
in whatever capacity in connection with transactions
conducted by him or under his direction on behalf
of the organization. A general exculpatory provision
in the constitution and by-laws of such a labor organ-
ization or a general exculpatory resolution of a gov-
erning body purporting to relieve any such person of
liability for breach of the duties declared by this
section shall be void as against public policy.
4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Introduction
On June 18, 1974, Petitioners who were all members
in good standing of the Great Lakes and Rivers District,
Masters, Mates and Pilots—Local 47 (hereinafter Local
47)' filed a complaint along with an application for leave
to sue and a motion for a preliminary injunction in the
Western Division of the United States Federal District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The complaint
was based on §§101, 102 and 501 of the Labor Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act (hereinafter LMRDA)
and §301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (here-
inafter LMRA), 29 U.S.C. §§185, 411, 412 and 501. Peti-
tioners sought to have the balloting on a referendum for
affiliation of Local 47 with the International Longshore-
men’s Association, AFL-CIO (hereinafter ILA) enjoined,
the ballots already cast impounded and destroyed, and any
future referendum on the question of affiliation, as well
as any actual merger or affiliation, enjoined unless a plan
therefor had first been submitted to the Court which
contained provisions for full disclosure of all relevant
terms of any proposed affiliation, accompanied by suffi-
cient time before balloting for members to offer their views
thereon, and adequate protection for the secrecy and in-
tegrity of the ballot.
1 Local 47 is a “Labor Organization” within the meaning of
29 U.S.C. §402. Its membership is made up of approximately 550
men who are employed as supervisory personnel on ships which
sail the Great Lakes and adjoining rivers and waterways. The
members of Local 47 are seafaring men who spend most of the
year on ships sailing the Great Lakes. The principal office of
Local 47 is in Cleveland, Ohio. The individual Defendants in this
action are or were officers and members of the Executive Board
of Local 47 (A. 202, 215). (A refers to the Appendix in the Court
of Appeals.)
5
B. Background
While Local 47 was going through the process of
disaffiliation with the IOMMP,’ it began to receive in-
quiries from other organizations as to possible affiliation
with them. These included inquiries from the Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, the Marine Engineers
Beneficial Association—Associated Maritime Officers,
AFL-CIO (hereinafter MEBA), the ILA, the Steelworkers
Union, and Local 333, United Marine Association (A. 102-
104, 129).
The MEBA proposal for affiliation which was made
to Local 47 included a promise of complete autonomy for
Local 47 (A. 129). MEBA also made a number of ad-
ditional proposals accompanying their offer of affiliation
which, arguably, would have been of great benefit to the
members of Local 47.*
*-For many years, Local 47 was affiliated with the Interna-
tional Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots (hereinafter
IOMMP), but in November, 1973, it broke away from that organ-
ization because the IOMMP made certain changes in its constitu-
tion which threatened the autonomy of Local 47 (A. 126, 127,
137). Part of these constitutional changes involved the IOMMP
affiliation with the ILA.
* These proposals were set down in writing in a letter from
Raymond T. McKay, President of MEBA to Defendant Duff the
newly elected President of Local 47, on November 11, 1974 and
included:
a. a grant of an autonomous charter to Local 47 with a right
to retain its own treasury, officers, constitution and
by-laws;
b. the right to negotiate contracts in Local 47’s existing
bargaining units and complete protection of the AFL-
CIO no-raiding agreement;
c. the right to continued, non-interference with the opera-
tion of the Great Lakes and Rivers District and Maritime
Pension Plan;
d. a waiver of all charter fees and back dues;
e. a per capita fee of $1.35 per member per month payable
to MEBA for active members only, not retired members;
(Footnote continued on following page)
Around May 16, 1974, Respondent Johnson acting
alone and without the other members of the Executive
Board of Local 47, completed negotiations with President
Thomas W. Gleason of the ILA for an affiliation of Local
47 with the ILA (A. 140). At no time did Johnson or Vice
President Duff of Local 47 read the constitution of the
ILA, preferring instead to rely upon the oral assurances of
its President that Local 47 would retain its autonomy‘
(A. 142-143).
On May 24, 1974, the Defendants mailed a ballot to
each member of Local 47 for a referendum on the question
(Continued from previous page)
f. available office space in MEBA offices and use of their
hard and soft ware by Local 47;
g. a joint organizational campaign on the Great Lakes and
Rivers to be financed by MEBA; and
h. access to MEBA’s legislative, lobbying machinery (A.
225-228) .
The Teamsters apparently also offered Local 47 a million
dollar fund for organization purposes (A. 129). However, for
reasons of their own, the Executive Board chose to vote on and
submit only the affiliation proposal from the ILA to the member-
ship for a vote (A. 104).
*The price of the affiliation agreement with the ILA also
meant that Local 47 members would have to pay $1.35 per month
per capita tax which would amount to approximately $9,000 per
year (A. 106, 143). Neither was there any written understanding
as to the relationship of Local 47 and the ILA in regards to the
certain articles of the ILA’s constitution which raised serious
questions as to whether Local 47 would remain autonomous or
not (A. 142-143). The agreement between Defendant Johnson
and President Gleason of the ILA was finalized in a series of cor-
respondence dating from May 17, 1974 to May 24, 1974 (A. II:
2-5).
The Executive Board members discussed and approved the
affiliation through a series of individual telephone calls, with
nothing conveyed to them in writing and no group debate or dis-
cussion on the merits or liabilities of the proposed affiliation
(A. 99-100, 147).
The Executive Board of Local 47 did not discuss the terms
or conditions for affiliation a Pog Ray eT offers ee
accepting the ILA proposal (A. 1 . At no time was the
understanding entered into between Defendant Johnson and
President Gleason of the ILA reduced to writing and communi-
cated to the membership of Local 47 (A. 104-105, 111).
7
of affiliation with the ILA (A. 16-19, 147). No other
proposal was offered for a vote (A. 149-150). The letter
attached to the ballot purported to represent the entire
agreement between Local 47 and the ILA, but it contained
no mention of the previously discussed oral agreements for
the payment of a per capita tax, or of any constitutional
provisions of the ILA (A. 141-144). This letter contained
all of the information which the Executive Board in their
infinite wisdom chose to divulge to the members of Local
47° (A. 104-105).
The First Referendum was enjoined and the ballots
impounded by the District Court because the secrecy and
the integrity of the ballot had been seriously violated.®
The Second Referendum was also enjoined by the Court
basically because insufficient notice and information had
been given to the membership.‘
* The reason given by Defendant Johnson for the appalling
lack of communication with the seafaring membership concern-
ing the other affiliation offers which had been received was that
as the full time staff officer for Local 47 he did not believe this
was in the best interest of the membership to know (A. 129, 152).
The only other means by which the membership of Local 47
would have known of the proposed plans to affiliate with the ILA
was if they had attended the 1974 union convention where the
idea was casually discussed, but Local 47’s constitution and by-
laws require you to be an elected delegate to attend the conven-
tion with reimbursed expenses (A. 153). Any other member
of Local 47 who wished to attend was required to travel to the
convention site from his own home at his own expense.
“The referendum ballots were sent out to members of
Local 47 to be returned to a post office box in Cleveland by
June 24, 1974. The outside envelope which the members returned
contained the signature and membership number of the voter.
The inside envelope contained the ballot (A. 115). Defendants
Johnson and Duff and other persons under their direction would
periodically pick up the ballots from the post office box and out-
side the presence of any neutral observer, or any observer at all,
open both ballots thereby violating the secrecy of the balloting
and enabling Defendants to determine the trend of the election
so they could obtain more favorable votes for affiliation with the
ILA if such was needed (A. 115).
7 The Court issued its Order July 5, enjoining the conduct
(Footnote continued on following page)
8
On December 3, an informal hearing was conducted
by the Court in chambers to approve a plan for the third
referendum which would conform to the Court’s July 5,
1975 order. At that hearing the Court denied MEBA’s
motion to intervene in this action but ordered that the
affiliation proposal of MEBA be placed on the ballot along
with that of the ILA.”
C. Proceeding Below
On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the entire District Court’s decision with the ex-
ception of its direction to include the MEBA proposal on
a referendum ballot.
Petitioners now petition this Court to review the
Court of Appeals judgment of reversal in favor of the
Respondent.
(Continued from previous page)
of the second referendum and any future referendum unless
approved by the Court. The Court went on to hold:
“No such plan will be approved unless it contains, at a min-
imum, adequate safeguards for the secrecy of the ballot, full
disclosures of all the terms of all affiliation proposals, as well
as copies of the constitution of the organization with which
affiliation is to be considered and voted upon, and access to
the mailing list of Defendant Local 47 by all members in
sufficient time to express their views before a vote is to
begin.” (A. 200-211).
‘In support of this aspect of its order the Court stated:
“ _. Although it is true that §3 of Article XXIII of the Con-
stitution of Local 47 does not require that all affiliation
proposals be voted upon the same ballot, it somehow seems
unnecessarily grudging for the union officers to conduct a
referendum on only the proposal which they personally sup-
port. This Court has previously indicated that it would not
hesitate to enjoin the Defendants from using the Union
Constitution to avoid a referendum on an affiliation proposal.
Such a refusal by union officers, who are, after all, fidu-
ciaries, runs afoul of the policies which underlie §$§411 and
501, because seriatim balloting in this case may result in
unfair unadvantage for the proposal favored by the union
leadership. Thus, the Court will enjoin the use of the con-
stitutional provision and order the MEBA proposal placed
on the ballot along with the ILA proposal.” (A. 229).
9
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I. This Case Presents an Important Issue of National
Labor Policy Requiring Resolution by This Court.
A. The issue in this case is one of first impression
involving the construction of the Labor Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§411 (a) (1) and 501 (a).
The issue presented by this case” is of widespread
nationwide concern as demonstrated by substantial litiga-
tion involving similar issues in other circuits.’’ Since the
“It should be noted that the decision of the Court of Ap-
peals is unclear as to which statute its decision is grounded upon.
The Court of Appeals held that the District Court unnecessarily
intruded into the internal operations of Local 47 by directing
that the MEBA proposal be added to the ballot. And the Court
thus concluded that §411 (a) (1) did not disallow seriatim voting
on affiliation proposals so long as sufficient information about all
proposals which were received by the Executive Board were
disseminated to the membership. Consequently, an initial read-
ing of the decision of the Court of Appeals seems to indicate that
the Court only considered 29 U.S.C. §411 (a) (1) in arriving at
its decision.
Footnote 8 of the Court’s decision, which apparently was an
attempt to clarify the decision, only helps to becloud it. The
footnote reads as follows:
“The portions of the Judgment of the District Court which
we affirm are properly grounded upon Section 411 (a) (1).
The actions directed by the portion of the Judgment which
we reverse would be improper under either Section 411 (a)
(1) or Section 501(a). Thus we need not reach the ques-
tion of the applicability of the Section 501 (a) fiduciary duty
to the instant case.”
The footnote indicated that the Court did not reach the ques-
tion of the applicability of Section 501(a). However, the second
sentence of the footnote indicates that the actions directed by
the Judgment would be improper under either Section 411 (a)
(1) or Section 501(a). Thus, it is apparent that the District
Court indeed did consider Section 501(a) in concluding that the
insertion of MEBA on the ballot would be improper under both
sections.
1” Cefalo v. Moffett, 449 F.2d 1193 (D.C. Cir., 1971); High-
way Truck Drivers v. Cohen, 182 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa., 1960),
aff'd 284 F.2d 162 (3rd Cir., 1960), cert denied, 365 U.S. 833
(Footnote continued on following page)
10
enactment of Landrum-Griffin voluminous discussion of
the duties imposed upon unions by $411 (a) (1) and
$561 (a) has appeared in the literature,'' yet this Court
has not set forth the comprehensive standards needed to
protect the rights of millions of rank and file members
when they are voting in union conducted elections.
1. Equal voting rights
The impetus behind the Labor-Management Report-
ing and Disclosure Act of 1959 was the shocking findings
of the McClellan Committee. The entire thrust in the first
report of the McClellan Committee was in support of a
proposition that unions should be democratic.’* Congress
in enacting the Bill of Rights of the LMRDA, Section 411
(a) (1), determined:
(Continued from previous page)
(1961); Keck v. Employees Independent Ass’n., 387 F. Supp. 241
(E.D. Pa., 1974); Kerr v. Shanks, 466 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir., 1972);
Navarro v. Gannon, 385 F.2d 512 (2nd Cir., 1967); Nelson v.
Johnson, 212 F. Supp. 233 (D. Minn., 1963), aff'd 325 F.2d 646
(8th Cir., 1963); Pignotti v. Sheet Metal Workers, 477 F.2d 825
(8th Cir., 1973), cert. denied 414 U.S. 1067 (1974); Sabolsky v.
Budzonowski, 457 F.2d 1245 (3rd Cir., 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 853 (1973); Sertic v. The District Council of Carpenters, 423
F.2d 515 (6th Cir., 1970); Schuchardt v. Millwrights & Mach.
Erectors Loc. Union No. 2834, 380 F.2d 795 (10th Cir., 1967);
Smith v. General Truck Drivers, 181 F. Supp. 14 (D.C. Calif.,
1960).
™ Aaron, The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 851 (1960); Cox, Internal Affairs
of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 Mic.
L. Rev. 819 (1960); Dugan, Fiduciary Obligations Under the New
Act, 48 Geo. L. J. 277 (1959); Hickey, The Bill of Rights of Union
Members, 48 Geo. L. J. 226 (1959); Rothman, Legislative History
of the “Bill of Rights” for Union Members, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 199
(1960); Union Officers-Fiduciary Duties, 15 A.L.R.3d 939; Wol-
lett, Fiduciary Problems Under Landrum-Griffin, 13 N.Y.U. ANN.
Conr. oN LaBor 267 (1960).
12 See, Interim Report of the Select Committee on Improper
Activities in the Labor or News Review, Sp. Rep. No. 1417, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
11
“The efficiency of a monolithic union under autocratic
rule is gained at too great a price if it necessitates any
sacrifice of the members’ rights to determine the
course of their organization. The balance was struck
in favor of union democracy. Only a union responsive
to the rights of its members can achieve the ideals of
responsibility, opportunity and_ self-determination
that are recognized as fundamental velues to the labor
movement.” Navarro v. Gannon, 385 F.2d 512, 518
(2nd Cir., 1967).
The basic purpose then of the “Bill of Rights” is to
assure to union members a basically democratic union and
a concomitant right to determine the ultimate course of
their organization.’* One of the first cases supporting these
rights was Young v. Hayes, 195 F. Supp. 911 (D.D.C.,
1961). In that case union members brought an action pur-
suant to §411 (a) (1) to restrain the union from putting
into effect constitutional amendments approved by the
general membership in a vote on a ballot that grouped 47
such amendments under one proposal. Granting the mem-
bers’ request for injunctive relief, the Court held:
“. . It would appear to this Court that a plain reading
of the Bill of Rights portion, as well as others, is a
clear indication by Congress that the right to vote ex-
tended in the Act is not a mere naked right to cast a
ballot. Rather, the general tenor of the act would seem
to indicate that those who make up the management
of the union may not submit amendments for referen-
dum to the membership in any form they wish. Per-
mitting a union to submit propositions to its member-
ship in any form they wish might very well open up
the way of usurpation of power by union management,
which the Court cannot believe was intended by the
framers of the Landrum-Griffin Act.” (emphasis
added )
™ Schuchardt v. Millwrights & Machine Erectors, Loc.
Union No. 2834, 380 F.2d 797 (10th Cir., 1967), Navarro v. Gan-
non, 385 F.2d 512 (2nd Cir., 1967).
12
The next case in this area is Sertic, et al. v. The Dis-
trict Council of Carpenters, 423 F.2d 515 (6th Cir., 1970).
The principal question presented in that case was whether
a referendum resulting in an increase in dues of labor
union members, could be combined on the same ballot
with approval of negotiations of a wage increase without
violating $411 (a) (3) of the Act. The Court held that
voting on multiple questions precluded a meaningful vote
on the dues issue alone, and declared the referendum in-
valid as not complying with the requirements of the Act."
Finally, in Sheldon v. O’Callaghan, 497 F.2d 1276
(2nd Cir., 1974), several union members sought an injunc-
tion to prevent a new constitution from taking effect be-
cause the officers of the union were, inter alia, stressing
the popular features of the proposed constitution while
playing down or refusing to communicate to the members
those aspects which would have been unpopular with many
members of the union. The plaintiffs based their suit on
$411, contending among other things that the union of-
ficers had violated that section in:
refusing to permit Plaintiffs to transmit their views
to the other members of the union before or during
the voting period or to have access to the union’s
mailing list in order to disseminate their views.
14 At first glance this case would appear to stand for the
opposite proposition that is espoused in the instant case. How-
ever, even though the Court in Sertic was concerned with a dif-
ferent sub-paragraph of $411 (a), the rationale behind the deci-
sion is still applicable here. That rationale being that the members
are entitled to a meaningful and equal vote on issues that affect
them. In Sertic the members were deprived of this right by the
inclusion of multiple issues on one ballot. However, in the pres-
ent case the members are being denied a meaningful choice by
the exclusion of MEBA from the ballot. When one examines the
long continuing struggle between the different labor unions for
affiliation with Local 47, one has to conclude that the ILA would
be given an unfair advantage by seriatim voting and that the
members would be deprived of a meaningful choice. There can
be no meaningful choice where there is only one union on the
ballot.
13
The Court concluded that the LMRDA required the
Defendants to make the list of members of the Union avail-
able to a mailing service so that the Plaintiffs could trans-
mit their views on the issues involved in the referendum
to the membership.
That Respondents here have chosen seriatim ballot-
ing, just as they chose to violate the secrecy of the ballot
in the first referendum and chose to not disclose important
information to the members in the second referendum,
does not insulate them from the requirements of §411 (a)
(1). The clear policy of the Act is to bid farewell to the
regime of benevolent well-meaning union autocrats and
to give favor to a system of union democracy with its con-
comitants of free choice and self-determination. It is re-
spectfully urged that free choice and self-determination,
what petitioners call a meaningful choice, can only be ac-
complished by having both affiliation referenda on the
ballot.
2. Fiduciary duties of union officials
Section 501 (a) declares that union officials occupy
positions of trust with respect to their union. There has
been considerable discussion and disagreement about the
breadth of the fiduciary obligations imposed upon union
officials by this section.”
The Respondents contend that the duty imposed upon
them pursuant to §501 (a) is to be narrowly construed
and limited to only fiscal matters which affect Local 47.
Though the Circuits are not in agreement as to the
import of this section,”* the “majority view” is that §501
Clark, The Fiduciary Duties of Union Officials Under
Section 501 of the LMRDA, 52 Munn. L. Rev. 437, 440 (1967).
% See, Gurton v. Arons, 339 F.2d 371 (2nd Cir., 1964);
Yanity v. Benware, 376 F.2d 197 (2nd Cir., 1967); and Phillips v.
Osborne, 403 F.2d 826 (9th Cir., 1968) for the holding that §501
is meant to cover only money and property.
'? See footnote 17 on following page.
14
(a) imposes a duty upon the Respondents which is “as
broad as human experiences in the labor field.” Nelson v.
Johnson, supra, note 10. Indeed, the legislative history
supports this broader construction.”
(Continued from previous page)
17 Further support for the proposition that §501(a) applies
to non-fiscal as well as fiscal matters can be found in the language
of the statute itself. The second sentence of §501(a) which sup-
posedly refers only to fiscal wrongdoing, contains language which
has been interpreted as imposing fiduciary duties in a non-fiscal
nature. See, Nelson v. Johnson, supra at note 10; Sabolsky v.
Budzonowski, supra at note 10; Pignotti v. Sheet Metal Workers,
supra at note 10; Rosen, Fair Representation, Contract Breach
and Fiduciary Obligations; Unions, Union Officials and the
‘ieee in Collective Bargaining, 15 Hastincs L.J. 391, 430
1964).
Despite the scarcity of direct precedent, it seems plain that
all union officers and employees have always been subject to the
usual common-law fiduciary duties of an agent. See Cox,
Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of
1959, 58 Micu. L. Rev. 819 (1960); Clark, The Fiduciary Duties
of Union Officials Under §501 of the LMRDA, 52 Minw. L. Rev.
437 (1967); Dusing v. Nuzzo, 26 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1941); Tinkler
v. Powell, 23 Wyo. 352, 151 P. 1097 (1915); House v. Schwartz, 18
Misc.2d 21, 25, 188 N.Y.S.2d 308, 313 (Sup. Ct., 1959).
18 Section 501 of the LMRDA was taken in total from the
Elliott Bill, H. R. 8342, 86 Cong. 1st Sess. Section 501 (1959).
The Bill was reported out by the House Committee on Education
and Labor. Since there is no indication in the legislative history
that any changes were intended by the House when it included
the fiduciary provision of the Elliott Bill as part of the Landrum-
Griffin Bill which was ultimately enacted, the supplementary
report accompanying the Elliott Bill is extremely relevant. As
to whether the fiduciary duty of a union official extends to non-
fiscal matters, the supplementary report notes:
“We affirm that the committee bill is broader and stronger
than the provisions of S. 1555 which relate to fiduciary re-
sponsibilities. S. 1555 applied the fiduciary principle to union
officials only in their handling of ‘money or property’ (See,
S. 1555 Sec. 610), apparently leaving other questions to the
common law of the several States. Although the common law
covers the matter, we considered it important to write the
fiduciary principle explicitly into the federal labor legisla-
tion. Accordingly, the committee bill extends the fiduciary
principles to all the activities of union officials or other union
agents or representatives.” H. R. Rep. No. 741, 86 Cong. 1st
Sess. 81 (1959).
_———
15
The duties created in §501 (a) must include the duty
to keep the membership informed on matters which they,
the rank and file, must decide. It is the duty of the union
leadership to see that the lines of communication and dis-
semination of views and opinions are kept open and work-
ing, especially when, as here, affiliation with the ILA would
change the very form and existence of the local union.
The Respondents in the instant case have breached the
duty owed to the members of Local 47 pursuant to §501
(a) by insisting on seriatim balloting thus failing to pro-
vide the members of Local 47 with a meaningful vote on
the affiliation referendum.
The Respondents defend their breach of trust by as-
serting that their actions are proper under the union’s
constitution. However, the Courts have not been hesitant
to enjoin activity protected or authorized by union by-laws
and constitutions when it is shown that it violates the pro-
visions of the LMRDA. See, Pignotti v. Sheet Metal Work-
ers, supra, note 10; Sabolsky v. Budzanowski, supra, note
10.
The compelling need for this Court to exercise its
certiorari jurisdiction in a case such as this to resolve these
conflicts was cogently articulated by a member of the IIli-
nois bar, R. Theodore Clark, Jr.:
“The imposition of fiduciary duties upon union officials
represents an important land mark in federal labor
legislation. As one writer has noted, they represent
the judgment of Congress, which most certainly will
never be reversed, as to the minimum applicable and
legal standards by which the behavior of union leaders
must be measured. (Footnote omitted) It is unfortu-
nate, however, that Congress in enacting such an im-
portant provision used language which is open to so
many varying interpretations. Although the process
of ‘litigation elucidation’ (Footnote omitted) has
resolved some of the uncertainties, the Supreme Court
16
will undoubtedly have to resolve others, especially
with respect to the breadth of the fiduciary duties im-
posed upon union officials.” The Fiduciary Duties of
Union Officials Under Section 501 of the LMRDA,
52 Minn. L. Rev. 437, 481.
B. Review of this case is essential to the preserva-
tion of the fundamental rights of the union mem-
bers and essential to guarantee the full and active
participation by the rank and file in the affairs
of their union.
Another compelling reason for this Court to grant
certiorari in this case is to protect and preserve the funda-
mental principle enunciated in Musicians Federation v.
. Wittstein, 379 U.S. 171 (1964) and Calhoon v. Harvey,
379 U.S. 134 (1964) that there should be full and active
participation by the rank and file in the affairs of the
union. In the former case the Court cited with approval
the following language from the Senate Committee report
accompanying S.1555 (Kennedy-Ervin, Bill):
“Union members have a vital interest therefor in the
policies and conduct of union affairs. To the extent
that union procedures are democratic they permit the
individual to share in the formation of union policy.
This is not to say that in order to have democratically
responsive unions, it is necessary to have each union
member make decisions in detail as in a New England
town meeting. What is required is the opportunity
to enforce policy and leadership by free and periodic
elections.”
The instant case, however, does not deal with the
members making decisions concerning details of union
business. On the contrary, the question of affiliation with
the ILA or the MEBA concerns the very existence of Local
47. It is this kind of decision that should only be made
with the elective procedure guaranteed all the trappings
of the democratic process. This ought to include the right
17
to make a meaningful choice between bona fide competing
entities.
Though the Musicians Federation v. Wittstein case
concerned Section 411(a) (3) (B) rather than Section 411
(a) (1) or Section 501 (a), petitioners submit that it is still
applicable. In fact, these latter sections impose a greater
duty upon the union leadership and a greater right is pro-
tected by them than by the former section. In Calhoon
the Court long ago recognized the subtle ways by which
election rights can be removed through discrimination at
a less visible stage of the political process.
Just as the Court was concerned with infringement
of the equal right to nominate candidates for union office
so should the Court be concerned about the infringement
of equal opportunity to vote for affiliation referenda. Both
the right to nominate and the right of affiliation concern
fundamental voting rights of the rank and file members
and should be protected accordingly.
A fiduciary generally owes a duty of loyalty in consci-
entious dealing toward another because of the nature of
the relationship or the subject matter of the transaction.”
Preserving union democracy often involves this duty of
loyalty in protecting individuals and minorities against
numerical majorities. In this country we have not been
willing to trust even governmental self-restraint in dealing
with basic liberties. We rely upon rigid constitutions en-
forced by an independent judiciary. Labor unions play a
more important role in the community than other private
organizations for their powers are greater and their func-
tions are different from those of a fraternal association or
19“Some fiduciary relations are undoubtedly more intense
than others. The greater the independent authority to be exer-
cised by the fiduciary duty, the greater the scope of the fiduciary
duty. Thus a trustee is under a stricter duty of loyalty than is
an agent upon whom limited authority is conferred .. .” Scott,
The Fiduciary Principl-. 37 Cautr. L. Rev. 539 (1949).
18
a social club. Even a corporation rarely affects a share-
holder to the same degree that the bargaining representa-
tive influences the lives of employees in the bargaining
unit. Furthermore, labor unions occupy their present posi-
tion largely by force of law:
“The government which gives unions this power has
the concomitant obligation to provide safeguards
against abuse. The most effective safeguard is legal
assurance that unions will be responsive to the desires
of the men and women who they represent.””
Il. This Case Presents a Good Vehicle for This Court
to Consider and Decide the Issue Presented Herein.
The facts of this case present the competing policy
interest involved in the clearest and most compelling light
and therefore provide this Court with an optimal opportu-
nity to consider and decide the substantial and unresolved
legal issue contained herein. Throughout these proceed-
ings the officers of Local 47 have referred to MEBA’s ef-
forts to be on the affiliation ballot as a “raid” on Local 47
members. On the Contrary, however, there is overwhelm-
ing evidence that establishes that the Respondents, and not
MEBA, by their conduct in attempting to effectuate an
affiliation with the ILA, “raided” the rights of the rank
and file of Local 47. The Executive Board of Local 47 did
not discuss the terms and conditions of the other affiliation
offers before accepting the ILA proposal,” understandings
entered into between Respondents and the ILA were not
reduced to writing nor were they communicated to the
membership of Local 47,” and adequate safeguards for the
““ Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy,
72 Harv. L. Rev. 609, 610-611 (1959).
“' A. 150-151.
“2 A. 104-105, 111.
19
secrecy of the ballot were ignored.” It was this blatant
disregard for the rights of the rank and file which led the
District Court Judge to conclude that the Respondents had
violated Section 411 (a) (1) and had breached their duty
under Section 501 (a), thus requiring him to enjoin, in
effect, not one, but three affiliation referenda.
The rights of the individual union member must be
defined when the very existence of their organization is
at stake. The parameters of the labor law issue contained
in this case are of nationwide concern and in need of clarifi-
cation by this Court.
CONCLUSION
The central issue in this case is whether the rank and
file members of Local 47, whose voting rights have been
tread upon, are to be deprived of a meaningful vote since
they will not be permitted to choose between bona fide
competing affiliation proposals.
If the answer is to be “‘yes’”’, it should be so only after
a reasoned consideration and explanation by this Court of
the competing National Labor Law policy interests which
compel such a result.
Accordingly, Petitioners pray that this Court grant
their petition for a writ of certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
GREEN, LACKEY, NEWCOMER
and HArRIs
By: Merritt W. Green, I]
GERALD B. LACKEY
330 Spitzer Building
Toledo, Ohio 43604
(419) 243-1105
Counsel for Petitioners
“4 A. 115.
Al
APPENDIX
OPINION OF THE DISTRICT COURT
(Filed January 20, 1975)
Civil Action C74-546
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NorTHERN DistTrRICT oF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
NORMAN F. BLANCHARD, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Vv.
ROLLA R. JOHNSON, et al.
Defendants
and
MARINE ENGINEERS BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATION,
ASSOCIATED MARITIME OFFICERS, AFL-CIO,
Applicants for Intervention.
ORDER
This cause is before the Court on a motion by District
2, Marine Engineers Beneficial Association. Associated
Maritime Officers [hereafter MEBA|]| to intervene as a
party plaintiff and on a motion by MEBA to be placed
on the ballot on a referendum to be held on the question
of affiliation. The defendants have also petitioned the
Court for its approval of their plan for the conduct of the
balloting. All have briefed these matters.
As the Court has taken pains to show in its Mem-
orandum of July 9, 1974, this suit is based on statutes, 29
A2
U.S.C., $$412 |sic] and 501, which confer certain rights on
members of labor organizations. Thus, there are no rights
here being asserted which benefit unions as distinct from
their members. Therefore, since Rule 24, Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, assumes that there is an intersection
of interests among plaintiffs and intervenors, it is clear
that the motion to intervene of MEBA must be denied.
Placing MEBA on the affiliation referendum ballot
is quite another matter however. Although it is true that
$3 of Article XXIII of the Constitution of Local 47 does
not require that all affiliation proposals be voted upon
on the same ballot, it somehow seems unnecessarily grudg-
ing for the union officers to conduct a referendum on only
the proposal which they personally support. This Court
has previously indicated that it would not hesitate to en-
join the defendants from using the union constitution to
avoid a referendum on an affiliation proposal. Such a
refusal by union officers, who are, after all, fiduciaries,
runs afoul of the policies which underlie §§ 411 and 501,
because seriatim balloting in this case may result in unfair
advantage for the proposal favored by the union leader-
ship. Thus, the Court will enjoin the use of the constitu-
tional provision and order the MEBA proposal placed on
the ballot along with the ILA proposal.
As to the defendants’ plan for holding the balloting,
the Court expressly approves the use of the American
Arbitration Association.
Plaintiffs’ objections to the timing of the referendum
do not appear to be well taken. Given the wide geographic
dispersal of the membership, no time would seem to be
particularly felicitous for any election. However, the wide
dispersal does argue for a maximum period of time be-
tween the mailing of ballots and the deadline for their
return so as to facilitate the free discussion and inter-
change of ideas which lie at the heart of § 411. The Court
AS
therefore finds any period of less than thirty (30) days
for balloting to be suspect, within the facts of this case.
The Court will thus require at least thirty (30) days for
the members to discuss the issues and return their ballot.
Plaintiffs’ objections to the limitations on the mailing
of views by members are well taken. The Court agrees
that there is no reason why members should be denied the
opportunity to mail their views as often as they wish and
at the times they wish. Since the concept of majority rule
is at the center of federal labor policy, Sheldon v. O’Cal-
laghan, 497 F.2d 1276, 1282, 86 LRRM 3064 (2nd Cir.
1974), it is imperative that the lines of communication
among the membership be as unfettered as reason can
make them. Union officials bear a heavy burden of justi-
fication for any acts which unnecessarily restrain the
ability of the members to discuss matte:s on which they are
to vote. No justification for this limitation has been of-
fered by the union leadership and none appears to the
Court. Accordingly, the plan as proposed is modified to
permit any member to mail his views at any time to the
membership as often as he chooses so long as he bears the
expense of the mailings.
To sum up: The motion of MEBA to intervene as a
party plaintiff is denied; the affiliation proposal of MEBA
shall appear on the ballot along with that of the ILA; the
referendum shal! be held at such time as defendants pro-
pose through the auspices of the American Arbitration
Association; defendants shall permit at least thirty (30)
days for dissemination of views by the membership fol-
lowing the mailing of the ballots; and any member shall be
permitted to mail his views at any time to the membership
through the AAA, as often as he wishes so long as he bears
the expense thereof.
It IsSo OrpEReED.
/s/ NicHotas J. WALINSKI
United States District Judge
A4
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
(Filed April 2, 1976)
Nos. 75-1606, 75-1607
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For THE S1xtTH CIRCUIT
NORMAN F. BLANCHARD, et al.,
Plaintiff-Appellees,
V.
ROLLA R. JOHNSON, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
APPEAL from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division.
Before: Epwarps, CELEBREZZE and ENGEL, Circuit
Judges.
CELEBREZZE, Circuit Judge: Appellees, members of
the Great Lakes and Rivers District, Masters, Mates and
Pilots—Local 47 (hereinafter Local 47), initiated this
action in the District Court seeking to enjoin a referendum
which was in progress among the members of Local 47.
The referendum raised the question of whether Local 47
should affiliate with the International Longshoreman’s
Association (hereinafter ILA). Appellees were sup-
porters of a rival union, District II Marine Engineers
Beneficial Association—Associated Maritime Officers
(hereinafter MEBA), and of its attempt to convince Local
47 to affiliate with MEBA. Named as defendants were
Local 47; Rolla R. Johnson, the Local’s President and a
member of its Executive Board; and seven other members
of the local’s Executive Board. Appellees, in their Com-
plaint, alleged that the officers violated their fiduciary
AS
duties to and deprived the members of Local 47 of their
right to “an intelligent and knowledgeable” vote on the
issue of affiliation.
Local 47 has approximately 550 members, all of whom
are supervisory personnel on ships which sail the Great
Lakes and adjoining waterways. Due to the limitation on
membership to supervisors, Local 47 is regulated by the
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
(hereinafter LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1970).
The nature of their employment makes communica-
tion among members of Local 47 difficult. An annual con-
vention is held in March, and every third year officers
are nominated by the convention delegates and thereafter
elected by mail ballot of all members.
In November of 1973 Local 47 disaffiliated itself
from the International Organization of Masters, Mates and
Pilots, because that organization had changed its constitu-
tion in a manner which threatened the autonomy of Local
47. Thereafter, a number of labor organizations sought
the affiliation of Local 47, including ILA, MEBA and the
Teamsters. The District Court found that these three
organizations submitted definite affiliation proposals to
the Executive Board of Local 47. The Executive Board,
pursuant to Article XXIII of the Constitution of Local 47,
considered and approved the ILA proposal and submitted
it by referendum to the membership for ratification or
rejection. Appellees contended below that the Executive
Board, whose members considered the ILA proposal supe-
rior to the other proposals, failed to provide the member-
ship with sufficient information about the other proposals
to allow the members to cast an informed vote.
On June 18, 1973, following two days of hearings, the
District Court impounded the ballots in the affiliation
referendum because the Executive Board had seriously
A6
impaired the secrecy and integrity of the balloting by
opening some ballots to gauge the trend of the election.
The District Court did not enjoin any future referendum
“feeling it sufficient to leave the officers free to conduct
another vote in accordance with Local 47’s constitution
and ‘... with adequate information as to the terms of any
affiliation with the ILA.’ ””’
Appellants held another referendum immediately,
mailing out new ballots and cover letters on June 21, 1974.
Appellees filed a motion for a temporary restraining order
which the District Court declined to issue. Rather, the
District Court set a July 1, 1974, hearing on Appellees
original motion for a preliminary injunction. Following
the July 1, 1974, hearing the District Court issued the
Memorandum Opinion, in which it concluded that 29
U.S.C. § 411(a) (1)° guaranteed union members the right
to a meaningful vote in union elections. The District
Court further concluded that 29 U.S.C. § 501(a) created
a duty on the part of the officers of a union to provide the
membership with sufficient information on the issues to
allow members to cast an informed vote. The trial court
noted that union officers may convey their opinions on the
issues to the membership but are also duty-bound to see
that points of view at variance with their own, if such exist,
are disseminated. The District Court concluded that the
membership had a right, by virtue of Sections 411(a) (1)
and 501(a), “to know and vote on all affiliation proposals,
to know all the terms thereof, as well as the governing law
‘Norman F. Blanchard, et al. v. Rolla, et al., No. C 74-288
(N. D. Ohio, filed July 5, 1974), Joint Appendix, Vol. I, at 201.
*(a) (1) Equal rights.—Every member of a labor organiza-
tion shall have equal rights and privileges within such organiza-
tion to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or referendums
of the labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to
participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of
such meetings, subject to reasonable rules and regulations in such
organization’s constitution and bylaws.
AZT
of any organization with which they were to affiliate, and
to know the views of other members on the proposals.’”
The District Court enjoined the ongoing referendum and
required the officers of Local 47 to submit for approval a
plan for conducting future referenda which would be con-
sistent with the conclusions expressed in the Court’s
opinion.
Appellants filed a Motion to Modify the July 5, 1974,
order. On November 1, 1974, the District Court filed a
Memorandum and Order denying Appellants’ motion
stating:
Defendants’ motion does not appear well taken
however. It should be noted that this Court’s Order
does not require the union executive board to submit
all affiliation proposals to the membership for a ref-
erendum. What it does require is full disclosure of
the terms of all proposals before a vote on any one
will be approved by this Court.’
On December 3, 1974, MEBA filed a motion seeking
to intervene, and a motion seeking to have its affiliation
proposal placed on the referendum ballot. On January
20, 1975, the District Court filed another Memorandum
and Order. The Court denied MEBA’s motion to intervene
but granted the motion to appear on the ballot, stating
Placing MEBA on the affiliation referendum
ballot is quite another matter however. Although it
is true that § 3 of Article XXIII of the Constitution
of Local 47 does not require that all affiliation pro-
posals be voted upon on the same ballot, it somehow
seems unnecessarily grudging for the union officers
to conduct a referendum on only the proposal which
they personally support. This Court has previously
indicated that it would not hesitate to enjoin the
defendants from using the union constitution to avoid
* District Court Opinion, Joint Appendix, Vol. I, at 209.
* Joint Appendix, Vol. I., at 215.
A8
a referendum on an affiliation proposal. Such a re-
fusal by union officers, who are, after all, fiduciaries,
runs afoul of the policies which underlie §§ 411 and
501, because seriatim balloting in this case may result
in unfair advantage for the proposal favored by the
union leadership. Thus, the Court will enjoin the use
of the constitutional provision and order the MEBA
proposal placed on the ballot along with the ILA
proposal.”
Appellants bring this appeal claiming that, consistent
with their duty as defined in Local 47’s Constitution,’ they
rejected MEBA’s affiliation proposal and that the District
Court erred in concluding that Sections 411(a)(1) and
501(a) of the LMRDA require presentation of a rejected
offer in a referendum. Appellants further contend that the
District Court properly denied MEBA’s motion to inter-
vene.
We turn first to consideration of the District Court’s
denial of MEBA’s motion to intervene. Rule 24(a) (2),
Fed. R. Civ. P., establishes a threefold test for nonstatutory
intervention of right:
(2) when the applicant claims an interest relat-
ing to the property or transaction which is the subject
of the action and he is so situated that the disposition
of the action may as a practical matter impair or im-
pede his ability to protect that interest, unless the ap-
plicant’s interest is adequately represented by exist-
ing parties.
We note that from its inception Appellants’ case has
been handled by Gerald B. Lackey, a member of the
Toledo, Ohio, law firm which regularly represents MEBA.
Appellees are Local 47 members who are supporters of
MEBA in its efforts to secure Local 47’s affiliation. A rep-
> Joint Appendix, Vol. I., at 229.
® Constitution of Great Lakes and Rivers District, Masters,
Mates and Pilots—Local 47, art. XVII, § 3 and art. XXIII, § 3.
AY
resentative of MEBA suggested to Appellee Blanchard
that he contact Lackey and another MEBA representative
was present when Blanchard first met with Lackey. It was
at this meeting that plans to take legal action against Local
47 and its officers were formulated. It appears that the
interests of MEBA and of Appellees in this action are vir-
tually identical. As we noted in Afro American Patrol-
men’s League v. Duck, 503 F.2d 294, 298 (6th Cir. 1974),
“fajn applicant for intervention has the burden of show-
ing that representation by existing parties is inadequate.”
MEBA failed to carry this burden and the District Court
did not err in denying MEBA’s motion to intervene.
We turn to consideration of the remaining issue raised
by Appellants—whether the District Court erred in re-
quiring Appellants to include MEBA’s affiliation proposal
on the referendum ballot. Appellants point te Local 47’s
constitution and by-laws as not requiring inclusion of the
MEBA proposal on the referendum ballot because they had
in good faith considered the proposal and rejected it.
Appellees contend that the District Court correctly
read LMRDA Sections 411(a) (1) and 501(a) to create a
duty on the part of the individual Appellants to provide the
membership with sufficient information to evaluate all af-
filiation proposals.
The Supreme Court in Musicians Federation v. Witt-
stein, 379 U.S. 171, 182-183 (1964), stated:
“The pervading premise of both these titles [Title I
and Title IV, Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act of 1959} is that there should be full and
active participation by the rank and file in the affairs
of the union.”
This Court, after reviewing the legislative history and
judicial consideration of the LMRDA, concluded in Sertic
v. District Council of Carpenters, 423 F.2d 515, 521 (6th
Al0
Cir. 1970), that “[u]nion members are entitled under the
Act to the right of a meaningful vote... .”
However, this Court is not unfettered in its determina-
tion of what constitutes “full and active participation” or
a “meaningful vote.”” As the Supreme Court noted in Cal-
hoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 138-139 (1964), issued the
same day as Musicians Federation, supra:
“Congress carefully prescribed that even this right
against discrimination is ‘subject to reasonable rules
and regulations’ by the union.”
The Court also states
“Plainly, [$101(a)(1)] is no more than a command
that members and classes of members shall not be
discriminated against in their right to nominate and
vote.” 379 U.S. at 139.
The Second Circuit in Sheldon v. O’Callighan {sic},
497 F.2d 1276, 1281 (2nd Cir. 1974), subscribed to the rea-
soning in Allen v. International Alliance of Theatrical Em-
ployees, 338 F.2d 309, 317 (5th Cir. 1964), “{t}his Court
recognizes the need to exercise what Judge Wisdom re-
ferred to as a ‘sound reluctance . . . to interfere in internal
union affairs.’”’ The Sheldon Court added
“The duly elected officers of a union have a right and
a responsibility to lead, and to give the members the
benefit of their advice on questions that arise.” 497
F.2d at 1282.
The District Court Order in the instant case concluded
with the following paragraph:
To sum up: The motion of MEBA to intervene
as a party plaintiff is denied; the affiliation proposal
of MEBA shall appear on the ballot along with that of
the ILA; the referendum shall be held at such time as
defendants propose through the auspices of the Amer-
ican Arbitration Association; defendants shall permit
at least thirty (30) days for dissemination of views
All
by the membership following the mailing of the bal-
lots; and any member shall be permitted to mail his
views at any time to the membership through the
AAA, as often as he wishes so long as he bears the
expense thereof. IT IS SO ORDERED.’
We conclude that the District Court’s actions in re-
solving this matter, with the exception of its direction to
include the MEBA proposal on the referendum ballot, were
proper under Section 411(a) (1).° The District Court un-
necessarily intruded into the internal operations of Local
47 by directing that the MEBA proposal be added to the
ballot. We do not read § 411(a) (1) to disallow seriatim
voting on affiliation proposals so long as sufficient informa-
tion about all proposals received by the Executive Board
is disseminated to the membership to allow a reasoned and
informed vote on the proposal which appears on the ballot.
Appellees and their fellow members of Local 47 will be
able to exercise their statutorily guaranteed right to an
informed vote assuming the above dissemination of infor-
mation. The membership of Local 47 may approve the
ILA proposal or may reject it and await the opportunity
to consider other such proposals.
That portion of the District Court’s Judgment which
directs that MEBA’s affiliation proposal appear on the
referendum ballot is reversed, the remaining portions of
the Judgment are affirmed.
* Joint Appendix, Vol. I, at 230.
* The portions of the Judgment of the District Court which
we affirm are properly grounded upon Section 411(a) (1). The
actions directed by the portion of the Judgment which we reverse
would be improper under either Section 411(a) (1) or Section
501(a). Thus we need not reach the question of the applicability
of the Section 501(a) fiduciary duty to the instant action.
Al2
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
(Filed April 2, 1976)
Nos. 75-1606, 75-1607
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For THE SrxtH CIRCUIT
NORMAN F. BLANCHARD, et al.,
Plaintiff-Appellees,
Vs.
ROLLA R. JOHNSON, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
Judgment of the District Court regarding the portion
of the Judgment which directs that MEBA’s affiliation
proposal appeal on the referendum ballot is reversed and
the remaining portions of the Judgment are affirmed.
Each party to pay its own costs on appeal.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.