Appellants Brief — Philadelphia v. New Jersey

Supreme Court brief1977

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Supreme Court of ‘the net

October Term, 1975.

No. 75-1150

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, CITY OF GLEN COVE, LANDFILL

AND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, MAC SANITARY

LANDFILL, INC., KINSLEYS LANDFILL, INC., and

DelLORENZO-INTERSTATE WASTE REMOVAL CO., INC.

(Now INTERSTATE WASTE REMOVAL CO., INC.),

Appellants,

JERSEY cnd RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Commissioner of the

Department of Environmental Protection of the State of New

Jersey,

Appellees.

On Appeal From the Supreme Court of the State of

New Jersey.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS.

Jamazson, McCaRrpELL,

— pn ig Moore, PEsxin & SPICER,

3rd Floor, Lewis Tower Building, A, Feofeestonal Corporation,

pany oe 4 2a wm so. (600) 306-5511

Printing Co., 711 Go. 60th St., Phila. Pa. 19143 — Tel. (215) 727-6711

1976

INDEX.

Page

OPINIONS BELOW .............00ccccccceucceuceeees 1

nk esccccccces 2

STATUTE INVOLVED ................ccccceeeceeeeeee 3

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ................00.cc0ceeee: 4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .............0...000e000: 5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................00eee00e: 16

Neen cccncccccce 17

A. Solid and Liquid Waste, and the Process of Collect-

ing, Transporting, Treating and Disposing of Same,

Is a Recognized Subject of Interstate Commerce ... 17

B. P.L. 1973, c. 363, on Its Face Discriminates Against

and Directly Burdens Interstate Commerce ....... 27

1. Evenhandednness .............6. 00s cceeceeeeee 29

2. Legitimate Local Purpose .................... 50

3. Effect Upon Interstate Commerce ............. 68

C. Appellants Were Unconstitutionally Denied a Plenary

Hearing on the Merits of Their Claim ............ 73

TT het e eRe etab bse ceneccccccececccccccss 80

TABLE OF CITATIONS.

Cases: Page

Alexandria Scrap Corporation v. Hughes, 391 F. Supp. 46

(Md. 1975), prob. jur. noted — U. S. — (1975) ........ 23

American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission, 15

Ore. App. 618, 517 P. 2d 691 (Ct. App. Ore. 1973) ..... 38

Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U. S. 251 (1908) ................04. 25, 41

Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511 (1935) .......... 50

Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U. S. 454 (1940) .............. 30, 35

Bourjois, Inc. v. Chapman, 301 U. S. 183 (1937) ........... 25

Bowie Inn, Inc. v. City of Bowie, 274 Md. 230, 335 A. 2d 679

CG GO, GE GD en cevcccuccuccocteuchauceschens 38

Bowman v. Chicago & c. Railway Co., 125 U. S. 465 (1888)

17, 18, 41

Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78 (1891) ................. 32, 33

Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673 (1930) ......... 78

Cities Service Co. v. Peerless Co., 340 U. S. 179 (1950) ..... 27

City of Altus, Oklahoma v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828 (W. D.

We GHD becccsascsscsccond agecteséhededeseeeceds 49

Clason v. Indiana, 306 U. S. 439 (1939) .................. 25

Cohen v. Bredehoeft, 290 F. Supp. 1001 (S. D. Tex. 1968) .. 38

Construction Ind. Ass’n., Sonoma Cty. v. City of Petaluma,

Se BB GEe Ce GE Be ccccccccnscoveccesccces 38

Crossman v. Lurman, 192 U. S. 189 (1904) ................ 25

Dahnke-Walker Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282 (1921) .... 19

Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U. S. 349 (1951) .......... 25, 30

Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage

Ga, SD GD. Ge Ge GRD kceccbvccsccshiviceeadssetes 18

Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U. S. 110 (1928)

18, 20

FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972) .... 18

Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385 (1914) .................. 78

Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, — U. S. —, 47 L. Ed. 2d 55

EREUED cuceccccececcsesncceseuaseneansesmesiaamiiad 25, 29

Hackensack Meadowlands v. Mun. Landfill Auth., 127 N. J.

Super. 160 (Ch. 1974), rev. 68 N. J. 451 (1975) ..2, 12, 22, 93,

24, 30, 39, 40, 50, 64, 70, 71

TABLE OF CITATIONS (Continued).

Cases (Continued): Page

Hale v. Bimeo Trading Co., 306 U. S. 375 (1939) .......... 37

Head v. New Mexico Board, 374 U. S. 424 (1963) ......... 35

Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U. S. 297 (1919) .............0006- 24

Horn v. Community Refuse Disposal, Inc., 186 Neb. 43, 180

N. W. 2d @O1 (Sup. Ct. 1970) ..........0ceceeeeeeees 65

Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. S. 440 (1960) ....28, 35, 36,

37, 39

Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U. S. 497 (1925) ... 24

Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91 (1972) ................ 18

Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N. J. 57

SEE evnidsdiubeomincenchecsdénenasétpscecececsse 73

Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.

CIE vind oc nn nancnnscosneqensaceshens 21

Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313 (1890) ................ 33

Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U. S. 346 (1933) ...........-..+005. 25

- Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U. S. 306 (1950) .. 78

Myers v. City of Hagerstown, 214 Md. 312, 135 A. 2d 147

a og 66

Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 (1947) ............... 27

Oklahoma v. Kansas Nat. Gas Co., 221 U. S. 229 (1911) ....48, 68

Oreg.-Washington Co. v. Washington, 270 U. S. 87 (1926) . .34, 35

Penna. v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553 (1923) ............. 48

Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970) .......... 28, 29

Pipe Line Cases, 234 U. S. 548 (1914) ...............0004. 18

Pluzaley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461 (1894) ........ 2A, 26, 32

Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U. S. 361

CEE win cdnssasancdecncénesddsovesosecvesesqccoese 50

Portland Pipe Line Co. v. Environmental Imp. Com’n, 307

A. 2d 1 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. 1973), app. dis. 414 U. S.

Be ED ddddidcndscddevncccbee ccessccqgndhesesed 38, 39

Price v. Indiana, 238 U. S. 446 (1915) ..................5. 25

Public Utilities Comm. v. Landon, 249 U. S. 236 (1919) .... 18

Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465 (1877) ......... 31, 32, 33, 35

Rasmussen v. Idaho, 181 U. S. 198 (1901) ............. 33, 34, 35

Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. © 507 (1906) ............. 18

Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137 (1902) ................05. 58

TABLE OF CITATIONS (Continued).

Cases (Continued): Page

Rhodes v. Houston, 202 F. Supp. 624 (D. Neb. 1962), affd

309 F. 2d 959 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. den. 372 U. S. 909

(1963), 383 U. S. 971 (1966) ........ ccc cee eee ee eeees 78

Rocchi v. Zoning Bd. of App. of Town of Glastonbury, 157

Conn. 106, 248 A. 2d 922 (Sup. Ct. 1968) ............. 66

Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501 (1912) ..............5005e- 25, 26

Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 131 U. S. 1 (1898) ........ 25

Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58 (1897) ...............eeeeee 33

Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U. S. 189 (1925) ..... ...-18, 29

Sligh v. Kirkland, 237 U. S. 52 (1915) ............ snesaved 25

Smith v. St. Louis and Southwestern Ry. Co., 181 U. S. 248

CREED 0 ccdcccccvcbecodedduccdbdsédecdcsenbucedisds 58

Soap and Detergent Association v. City of Chicago, 357 F.

Supp. 44 (N. D. Ill. 1973), rev. Proctor & Gamble Co. v.

City of Chicago, 509 F. 2d 69 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. den.

Ge Gu. Ga GOED co cdwsnv ccccidtendbusebasscicsc< 38

South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S.

Tee GHD cecsdéncudasccececonsadacsensdscowicssies 29

Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460 (1882) ............. 18

Thornton v. United States, 271 U. S. 414 (1926) ........... 18

United States v. Bishop Processing Co., 287 F. Supp. 624

[it DE MED addndenévvetadeenemetndetebinedd sees 18

U. S. v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U. S. 293 (1945) ........ 21

United States v. Pennsylvania Refuse Removal Ass’n, 242 F.

Supp. 794 (E. D. Pa. 1965), affd 357 F. 2d 806 (3rd

Cir. 1966), cert. den. 384 U. S. 961 (1966) ......... 19, 20, 21

U. S. v. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U. S. 533 (1944) .......... 21

Wolff Co. v. Industrial Court., 262 U. S. 522 (1923) ........ 22

Wood v. Town of Wilton, 156 Conn. 304, 240 A. 2d 904 (Sup.

Te MEET « . ccdacsuaatbiadbmctauhianesiuenice can 66

Statutes:

United States

CO Rae ut app tie Dy Een am ae 20

OG BS GID isis kccidedncnctcercevsbcounetie 2

iP a es Ge ED Scoedvcnccecudedeceseue 2

a | Rrra as ek 69

TABLE OF CITATIONS (Continued).

Statutes (Continued): Page

GD BE SEIOD). 2. ccccccccvccsccccccccecsvcesods 69

a MEE 6 coscvcnccedcccnuacccccdulbissoeiods 69

Sh ccc cue cen adasedaccendetesdhescndode 69

ee A ins cit dnbucetdésnneccs Peubus Ube peqacds 69

New Jersey

I dccccspécctyvcevaghadu Deis cbinds 51

TE OD A TED ce vcccccccccscvcscesedcctdcecctode 51

ET. BA, TRS) cc cc cvcccccccccedvcccccesccceds 19

IN. J.B. A. UBsNBe 2... nc cccccccccevss See eeweeeseeees 19, 63

re Oe os. one bouudinsawtuetesncatede 19

Be ee Os ED vocpocccccccccopeccoenet¥uctessees 51

8g 8 | PPPPPTTTTITITIITT TTL Tie ie 43

Pe By Es EN ce vcccccccccceueevcecdesevecesceses 1, 3, 60

Be, Be Be Bh, THARIPED cc ccccccccccccccccscccbeccccsccecs 1, 3, 60

eM PE Se ccccccccccccccecosdecdstectecioss 19

hy i ED cco cececccccceddcdetececete bs 19

Be Be B, Be Coccvccccccccscccusccevetcénccsscte 50, 51

th SI cd, ciueieddaccscencesduvbuscehts 22

eb - EA EE Wa ces cccccccadececocccsedilvrceesees 58

Pe SE ED nv cccdeccascccéosvensvuecdeoccuecte 22

Be De Oe By Ge ~ 0 cc vccccccccccccsstWebedbvsrcncets 22

ee EL oda sccneasnidecbounthosusents 29

Bs WE Se - ce cccecscccccccccn cesses tuveses sie 22

te AEE (is 5s cou nuchsduudteebot@aumeryess 64

Se A SEED cvveccccccenvocdvsyeisceceseeds 64

his SE betevecrsaes ocevesretekboetettéeuts 1, et seq.

pO RE GEE vo cecvcccavessusenesecteeedcetes cxceeu 20, 63

Pennsylvania

EE Said ndeieus wescuvensvenecOduudiipes cuceee 49, 71

Constitutional Provisions:

U. S$. Constitution

Og SAAS errr errr ey 10, 11, 12, 21, 74

I rc oie Oe oa oe et sedestee votenad 78, 80

IIE cones 6 cokkadgaedabdssedeesbetbecatece 27

TABLE OF CITATIONS (Continued).

Administrative Regulations: Page

Be DB &. Ge Pe Sher bacccddncasasccccsseneun 6, 8, 61, 62, 63, 64

Bee i By Ge Ce Kh vcd séccveseccsececncouetbenenaie 7, 61

ee > Gy Ge PD 0'0 6 Uracddectecccanavcxens 9, 23, 52, 60, 63

Bee Be Bs Gi FHS vvcccnccccccncudééeccccnbbensas 60

See > Ele We IE 6.0.6. 600005.)040000ccenceskuseasens 60

Sa we te Ge HE 0:0.50:5.0.0:500060006és0eusbodschaek 63

Pa: iy A Ge PE hen decccncndscccsccedeacineeal 67

OD Be PE i ivi cccccnsdesctcaaae ee 60

Bee Bo Ay GS, Fee CUI noon cccccccdscoccccescce 45

WD th, OS vv iiinddncncdncsccccavdhaddeetee’ 53, 67

eee 5 Breet ers un 53

ae > A PEE Snddcdcctdvsdondccessdcuwenneenl 53

is i Se Se ED 66006 Ckedeekedeaduaaeieeael 2A, 53, 65

oe ey ir Gs Pe 66 bb dee sesevisacdssseciea ee 24, 53

Bee Be Gs Ge SUE kinds odd c0dcdccvnbedensedbdeasaal 54

Se Be Ge Gi CE Scene vcnsccccdicdcqcnics deddisenees 56

ae i Oy Ge. SE . dcdapudcnddcedcnsaeasadsndsoasen 56

Sh des Gh PE . 005 0 csccccksendededesuwabsanuices 56

> > Gee Ws WE 060k 0000dsnendnconedceusasedas 56

ie Ge CE Se ass adéddducdesiscadeuseaueea 55

> ie Ge EEE 0.0500006nneabeccadacdieaskesnans 54

Wi i th Oe SE as ecco dkasecducd teens ea. 58

be Oe SEE cn kbcnacuciucuussauiaastedecaue 57

Sh ab Se EE Ke dcounbandeesaedscbudiuudsannal 57

eet Ee We EE Gad. cncundccncaceansdsitebiciad 57

Oe PEE enscanstnaonnsnedecieddieesasdnu 57

eb Oe Ss EE EE - Bbicnecdeueedencusseacbeueanaeee 57

ie A ee POD Sc aeWedenmeddnncdcendedccedeccua 58

Be ee Se ED. Sd dcdvdenecoddedveceveccdesscnes Be |

i> > Ge WP PEE ws 60d0ccccdntucccanebusienies 24

ie ip Gs Ge ED K0bnbbd856s déndbdeccccccesedadcus 57

be Ae ee EE db n.bn 5 bd6 dd 0 cdecadkdhecibasicnns 57

ae Se CPD b0ecwnssntecsececdéensdetuciats 57

TABLE OF CITATIONS (Continued).

Administrative Regulations (Continued): Page

ey Ee EEE: chedvcucesdbelcbdccveccedsouase 56

Sea HE. cee debe ecdedeéncccccs vesetoessses 56

i EEE * couadesddcdosesdcececssavcpvccects 57

Se St EEE | po vecccdvedccvocs vesptovescensens 56, 57

ey EE iv 0nd 5 dpe coedpeeesececeaceccecs 59

Other Authorities:

Annotation, “Public Dump as Nuisance”, 52 ALR 2d 1134... 66

1965 U. S. Code, Cong. and Adm. News .................. 69

1970 U. S. Code, Cong. and Adm. News ... .............. 69

Municipal Refuse Disposal, 3rd ed. (Chicago: Public Admin-

SE Sn 2d0s ccntposessocceceassetace 66

New Jersey State Sanity Code ..............ceeeeeees 50, 51, 52

New Jersey State Solid Waste Management Plan (Newark:

Planners Associates, Inc., 1970) .................. 24, 52, 59

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroper Term, 1975.

No. 75-1150.

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, CITY OF GLEN COVE,

LANDFILL AND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,

MAC SANITARY LANDFILL, INC., KINSLEY’S

LANDFILL, INC, anp DELORENZO-INTERSTATE

WASTE REMOVAL CO., INC. (Now INTERSTATE

WASTE REMOVAL CO., INC.),

Appellants,

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT OF EN-

VIRONMENTAL PROTECTION OF THE STATE

OF NEW JERSEY ann RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,

COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRON-

MENTAL PROTECTION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Appellees.

On APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF New JERSEY.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS.

OPINIONS BELOW.

The opinion of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law

Division, declaring P. L. 1973, c. 363 (N. J. 8. A. 13:11-9,

10) unconstitutional is not reported. The opinion of the

Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, in the

2 Brief of Appellants

companion case Hackensack Meadowlands v. Mun. Land-

fill Auth. is reported in the official reports at 127 N. J.

Super. 160 (Ch. 1974), and in the unofficial reports at 316

A. 2d 711. The opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court,

reversing the trial court’s decisions in each of the aforesaid

cases, is published in the official reports as Hackensack

Meadowlands v. Mun. Landfill Auth., 68 N. J. 451 (1975),

and in the unofficial reports as Hackensack Mead. Dev.

Com'n v. Municipal L. A., 348 A, 2d 505 (N. J. Sup. Ct.

1975). Said opinion is cited as Hackensack Meadowlands

v. Mun. Landfill Auth., 68 N. J. 451 (1975) in the within

Brief.

JURISDICTION.

This matter is brought pursuant to 28 U. S. C.

§ 1257(2) and in the alternative, 28 U. S. C. § 1257(3) to

set aside the judgment of the New Jersey Supreme Court

which upheld the constitutionality of P. L. 1973, c. 363.

Said judgment was rendered on November 18, 1975, and

entered on the same date. Thereafter, on December 11,

1975, the New Jersey Supreme Court remanded the matter

to the Superior Court, Law Division, “for such further

proceedings, if any, that that Court may deem appropriate

. . . (A340). On December 19, 1975, the New Jersey

Superior Court, Law Division, issued its order stating, in

pertinent part, that “. . . no further proceedings are

deemed appropriate by this Court . . .” (A343). A

notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States

was thereafter filed in the New Jersey Supreme Court on

January 9, 1976. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

of the United States to review this suit (a) by direct appeal

is conferred by Title 28, United States Code, Section

1257(2), and alternatively (b) by certiorari is conferred by

Title 28, United States Code, Section 1257(3).

Brief of Appellants 3

STATUTE INVOLVED.

The text of P. L. 1973, c. 363, the constitutional valid-

ity of which is involved in the present suit, reads as follows:

“The legislature finds and determines that since

the enactment of P. L. 1973, c. 39 (C 13:11-1

et seq.) the volume of solid and liquid waste

continues to rapidly increase, that the treatment

and disposal of these wastes continues to pose an

even greater threat to the quality of the environ-

ment of New Jersey, that the available and ap-

propriate land fill sites within the State are being

diminished, that the environment continues to be

threatened by the treatment and disposal of waste

which originated or was collected outside the

State, and that the public, health, safety and wel-

fare require that the treatment and disposal

within this State of all wastes generated outside

of the State be prohibited.

“No person shall bring into this State any solid

or liquid waste which originated or was collected

outside the territorial limits of the State, except

garbage to be fed to swine in the State of New

Jersey, until the commissioner shall determine

that such action can be permitted without en-

dangering the public health, safety and welfare

and has promulgated regulations permitting and

regulating the treatment and disposal of such

waste in this State. Any person violating this

provision shall be subject to the penalty and en-

forcement provisions of the “Waste Control Act,’

P. L. 1973, c. 39.”

Said statute is published in the pocket part of Title 13,

New Jersey Statutes Annotated, Section 11-9 and 11-10 at

pp. 85-86.

4 Brief of Appellants

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.

1. Is solid and liquid waste, or the process of collect-

ing, transporting, treating and disposing of same, a recog-

nized subject of interstate commerce?

2. Does a state statute which prohibits the entry into

the state of any solid or liquid waste (except garbage to be

fed to swine in the state) collected in another state, dis-

criminate against or place an undue burden upon interstate

commerce?

3. In reversing an order granting a motion for sum-

mary judgment, may an appellate court constitutionally

decide the case on its merits without offering the moving

parties an opportunity to be heard, prior to the final deter-

mination, on the material issues of fact raised by their

complaint?

Brief of Appellants 5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On January 2, 1974, P. L. 1973, c. 363, being

“An Act to prohibit any person from bringing

into this State any solid and liquid waste which

originated or was collected outside the State

was approved by the Governor of the State of New Jersey,

to become effective on February 1, 1974.

On January 21, 1974, appellants filed a complaint

attacking the constitutionality of said statute on federal

and state constitutional grounds (A7). Their simultaneous

application for a temporary restraining order was sup-

ported by an affidavit of a licensed professional engineer

(A37) which averred that the transportation, treatment or

disposal of solid waste in New Jersey in accordance with

applicable Federal and New Jersey state and administra-

tive laws, rules and regulations would not pose a threat to

the health, welfare and safety of the residents of said state:

“3. The transportation in New Jersey of solid

waste in accordance with the terms and provi-

sions of applicable Federal and New Jersey state

and administrative laws, rules and regulations is

not hazardous to the public health and does not

constitute a threat to the health, welfare or safety

of the residents of the State of New Jersey.

“4. The treatment and disposal in New Jersey of

domestic or foreign solid waste in accordance

with the terms and provisions of applicable Fed-

eral and New Jersey state and administrative

laws, rules and regulations is not hazardous to

the public health and does not constitute a threat

6 Brief of Appellants

to the health, welfare or safety of the residents of

the State of New Jersey.” '

It was further supported by a copy of a letter dated De-

cember 26, 1973 from Richard W. DeKorte, Esq:, Counsel

to Governor William T. Cahill, to David Quient, Esq., city

attorney of appellant City of Glen Cove (A47), in which

the Counsel to the Governor stated:

“Also, I might add that Senate Bill No. 2367

(OCR) [P. L. 1973, c. 363] would not have been

introduced had the sister states of New Jersey

permitted solid wastes originating in their states

to be disposed of at or near the point of orig-

ination.”

Based upon the aforesaid documents, and additional affi-

davits which documented that immediate and irreparable

harm would be suffered by appellants if temporary injunc-

tive relief was not granted, the Superior Court of New

Jersey, Law Division issued an Order to Show Cause with

Temporary Restraints on January 21, 1974, which, inter

alia, restrained the State from enforcing the provisions of

P. L. 1973, c. 363 (A5). On the return date of the Order

to Show Cause, February 1, 1974, the trial court issued an

interlocutory injunction continuing the restraints thereto-

fore issued, and further specifically enjoining the enforce-

ment of N. J. A. C. 7:1-4, until its further order * (A105).

1. The conclusions expressed in said paragraphs 3 and 4 have

never been attacked or rebutted. Quite the contrary, they have

been confirmed by appellees. See p. 9 infra.

2. N. J. A. C. 7:1-4, a rule governing the importation of solid

and liquid waste from outside New Jersey, was adopted by the

Com oner of the gt ie: Department of Environmental

Protecti 18, 1 to authority conferred

P. L. 1973, c. 463. Seid rule, wah aap adopted — p aie

Brief of Appellants 7

In granting interlocutory injunctive relief, the trial court

considered among others, an affidavit of the Deputy As-

sistant Administrator for Solid Waste Management Pro-

grams, United States Environmental Protection Agency

(A55), which averred, in pertinent part, as follows:

“It has not been established to the satisfaction

of EPA that the continuation of disposal, in an

environmentally sound manner, of solid waste

generated outside New Jersey poses any greater

immediate health threat to its citizens than the

continued disposal of domestically generated

solid waste. Therefore, there appears to be no

2. (Cont'd. )

measure to become effective February 1, 1974, provides, in perti-

nent part, as follows:

j (1) Garbage to be fed to swine in the State of New

ersey;

2) ed waste material, inclu news-

we. paper, gas and metals, that is free et pee Thee

materials not mixed with other solid or liquid waste

that is intended for a recycling or reclamation facility;

Baserstepe dei:

per cent t of any su is

Seen & ppsens tt a ° mate-

rials;

Brief of Appellants

immediate health threat to justify the precipitous

passage and implementation of this statute

[P. L. 1973, c. 363] and these regulations.

[N. J. A. C. 7:14]

. . . a State importation ban such as that enacted

by New Jersey is in conflict with the national

policy set forth in Section 206 of the Solid Waste

Disposal Act. . . . Moreover, the continuation

of such a restriction would establish an unfavor-

able precedent which, if followed by a substan-

tial number of other States, would render re-

gional and interstate solutions to solid waste

disposal problems impossible to attain.

The foregoing is not to say that appropriate

standards should not be applied in the areas of

treatment and disposal of solid wastes and of

land use planning. We strongly favor the adop-

tion of standards applicable to domestic and

imported solid wastes so that they apply on an

equal basis with out-of-state waste subject to

the same statutory and regulatory treatment as

domestic waste.

. . A single thrust to ban out-of-state wastes

impedes rather than enhances environmental

quality.

In conclusion, it is EPA policy that no munici-

pality or State should take action to prevent the

free flow of waste across municipal or state

boundaries provided the transport, processing,

and disposition of the waste is in accordance

with the provisions of applicable federal and

Brief of Appellants 9

state environmental and land use laws, guide-

lines, regulations, and recognizéd engineering

practices.”

A plenary hearing on the merits of appellants’ complaint

was scheduled by the Court for March 25, 1974 (A118).

On February 11, 1974, John P. Fazzio, Inc., t/a John

P. Fazzio Landfill Co. and Continental Vanguard, Inc.

were granted leave to intervene.

Thereafter on February 13, 1974, appellees filed their

answer to the complaint in this matter, wherein they spe-

cifically admitted that the principal concern of the New

Jersey Legislature in adopting P. L. 1973, c. 363 was to

preserve landfill acres in New Jersey for solid waste gen-

erated in said State. They further admitted that there

is no qualitative difference between the solid waste which

originates or is collected outside the State of New Jersey

and that which originates or is collected within the State,

and there is no difference with respect to the disposal of

same (A97).

On March 13, 1974, appellants deposed the Principal

Environmental Engineer of the Bureau of Solid Waste

Management, New Jersey Department of Environmental

Protection. During the course of said deposition, the

engineer admitted that the proposed Rules of the Bureau

of Solid Waste Management, N. J. A. C. 7:26-1 et seq.

(effective July 1, 1974) (A107, 109), were entirely ade-

quate to protect the health, safety and welfare of the

people of the State of New Jersey and the quality of its

environment.’ He also revealed that no effort had been

2. Sel suite wee dost . eee Sates we te eines

hensi regulate waste es. Par-

ren np Lg ty LF Ss ig dey = a

had ent dey oh g (a) dust, (b

— d) insects, rodents, . oe

a beh | mama ta} gas generation, ng surface and

10 Brief of Appellants

made by the Department of Environmental Protection to

calculate the total acreage available for sanitary landfill

purposes in the State of New Jersey or to identify the

location and availability of facilities which presently exist

or may hereafter be developed outside the State of New

Jersey (A115).

Appellants thereafter moved for summary judgment

on two federal constitutional grounds which, in their

opinion, raised solely questions of law: (a) P. L. 1973,

c. 363, on its face, discriminates against interstate com-

merce in violation of Art. 1, Sec. 8, cl. 3 of the Consti-

tution of the United States, and (b) the Congress of the

United States has preempted the narrow field preventing

the adoption of laws, ordinances and regulations which

prohibit the interstate movement of solid waste for pur-

poses of treatment or disposal (A116).* Appellees cross-

moved for summary judgment on the same issues, and

urged in a portion of their brief filed with the trial court

(A121-122), that summary judgment not be granted to

appellants pending a hearing on the merits:

“At this stage of the litigation sub judice the

Court has not had an opportunity to consider any

of the relevant facts and circumstances except

for affidavits submitted in favor of and in opposi-

tion to the issuance of ad interim restraints.

“Among those proofs which the court must con-

sider are: the nature and extent of the dangers

3. (Cont'd. )

ground water quality, (i) collection and haulage, (j) open burning,

and other related problems.

4. The motion did not seek summary judgment with

to the many remaining federal constitutional questions

the complaint since those 5 ee involved genuine issues of

material fact (A7 et seq., )

Brief of Appellants 11

to the health, safety, welfare and environment of

New Jersey presented by the disposal of wastes

in New Jersey; the nature and extent of the solid

waste crisis in New Jersey; the rapid exhaustion

of landfill life in New Jersey; the volume of out-

of-state waste being disposed of in New Jersey;

the severe limiting effects on the future develop-

ment of property which has been used for sani-

tary landfill purposes; the extent of the effect on

interstate commerce.”

Pending a determination of the motions, the hearing date

was rescheduled to April 15, 1974, if necessary.

On March 25, 1974, the trial court heard oral argu-

ment on the cross-motions for summary judgment, and

delivered its opinion (A206) granting summary judgment

to appellants and striking down P. L. 1973, c. 363 on the

ground that same discriminated against interstate com-

merce in violation of Art. 1, Sec. 8, cl. 3 of the Constitu-

tion of the United States:

“... I find that the statute in question here is

attempting to control material that is properly

the subject of interstate commerce, that the

method of attempting is discriminatory and,

therefore, unconstitutional.”

On April 23, 1974, appellees filed a notice of appeal

(A216), by which they appealed from the trial court's

grant of summary judgment to appellants.

More than 4 months later, on July 26, 1974, appellees

moved before the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate

Division, for a stay of judgment (A218). Said motion was

denied by the Court on August 14, 1974 (A220).

12 Brief of Appellants

Following the submission of briefs by all parties, and

prior to argument in the Appellate Division, the appeal

was certified directly to the New Jersey Supreme Court

and consolidated with Hackensack Meadowlands v. Mun.

Landfill Auth.’ by order dated October 7; 1974 (A223).

The consolidated cases were argued before the New Jersey

Supreme Court on December 2, 1974.

Almost one year later, on November 18, 1975, the

New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the

trial court on the merits, and vacated the injunctive order

which had been in effect since the inception of the litiga-

tion. Although the Court agreed that certain solid and

liquid waste is merchantable and that the transportation

and disposal of solid and liquid waste represents a legiti-

mate subject of interstate commerce, Hackensack Meadow-

lands v. Mun. Landfill Auth., 68 N. J., supra at 466-469,

it nevertheless upheld the constitutionality of P. L. 1973, c.

363 on the grounds that same represented a reasonable

exercise of the State’s police power and did not place an

undue burden upon or discriminate against interstate com-

merce in violation of Art. 1, Sec. 8, cl. 3 of the Constitu-

tion of the United States. It also concluded that Congress

did not preempt the field of solid waste disposal (A225).

By its ruling, the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted

a novel and unprecedented procedural approach: it dis-

posed, on its merits, of a case involving substantial dis-

puted issues of material fact which had never been heard

5. In Hackensack Meadowlands, suit was brought by the

Hackensack Meadowlands Development Commission and the De-

artment of Environmental Protection to enjoin the Municipal

Sanitary Landfill Authority from a i ng for disposal in its land-

fill site located within the Hackensack Meadowlands District any

solid waste > coagy, Sogo or collected outside the territorial

limits of New Jersey. The Superior Court, Chancery Division, held

that the exclusion of out-of-state solid waste from deposit in landfill

sites within the state was unconstitutional as representing a dis-

crimination against interstate commerce.

Brief of Appellants 13

by the trial court.* Since a hearing was not held, there

was no testimony from which to make findings of fact

with respect to either (a) the legitimacy of the exercise

of the State’s police power and the nature and degree

of the burden imposed upon interstate commerce, or (b)

the numerous issues of material fact raised by the remain-

ing counts contained in appellants complaint. Curiously,

such remaining counts were never mentioned by the New

Jersey Supreme Court in its opinion.

On November 18, 1975, the same date upon which

the case was decided, the New Jersey Supreme Court

granted appellants emergent motion for a stay of judgment

and interim injunctive relief pending its further order

(A257).

In an effort to abate the extreme prejudice visited

upon them, appellants moved the New Jersey Supreme

Court to retain jurisdiction pending a remand of the fac-

tual issues to the trial court on an expedited basis (A259).

The trial court reported that it could hold a plenary hear-

ing within two weeks. In the alternative, appellants sought

a stay pending an application for injunctive relief to the

Supreme Court of the United States.

On December 11, 1975, the New Jersey Supreme

Court denied appellants’ motion for a stay, vacated the

6. The trial court granted, as a matter of law, appellants’

motion for summary judgment prior to the scheduled hearing date.

The only facts presented to the trial court were contained in affi-

davits in favor of and in tion to the issuance of interim in-

junctive relief, and these vits, with one exception (A70), were

not part of the appendix presented to the New Jersey Supreme |

Court at the time it deci the case. There was no reason to

present said affidavits to the New Jersey Supreme Court since their

purpose was solely to support an application for interim injunctive

relief and not to prove a case involving disputed issues of material

fact. Based upon the Rules of Court, ts understood that

the case w be remanded for a g on the merits if an

appellate court reversed the order of the trial court granting sum-

mary

14 Brief of Appellants

emergency stay that it had previously issued, effective

December 31, 1975, and further

“OrnverED that the motion for a remand to the

Superior Court, Law Division, for such further

proceedings, if any, that that court may deem

appropriate is granted; provided, however, that

any relief granted by the Law Division shall not

include the issuance or continuation of a stay;

and it is further

Orperep that this Court does not retain juris-

diction.”

(A340).

Based upon this order, appellants and intervenors

were compelled, as a practical matter, to dismiss with

prejudice every count in their respective complaints which

had not been specifically resolved by the New Jersey

Supreme Court in its decision of November 18, 1975, so

that there would unquestionably be a final judgment from

which a direct appeal could be taken to the Supreme

Court of the United States. In the order pursuant to

which the unresolved issues raised by appellants and

intervenors complaints were dismissed (A342), the trial

court

“FurTHER Onverep, that, in light of the dismissal

of the above counts, and the decision by the

New Jersey Supreme Court upholding the con-

stitutionality of P. L. 1973, c. 363 as representing

a valid exercise of the State’s police power which

does not unreasonably burden interstate com-

merce and said Court thereby having finally

determined Counts I, VII and XIX of plaintiffs’

complaint and Count One of plaintiffs-inter-

venors complaint, no further proceedings are

Brief of Appellants 15

deemed appropriate by this Court in connection

with the above captioned matter.”

On December 22, 1975, appellants filed an applica-

tion for a stay of judgment with Mr. Justice Brennan.

Said application was granted on December 31, 1975.

Thereafter, probable jurisdiction was noted on April 5,

1976,

16 Brief of Appellants

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.

Solid and liquid waste, and the service of collecting,

transporting, treating and disposing of same, are recognized

subjects of interstate commerce.

A statute which prohibits the entry of a subject of

commerce, irrespective of condition or potential for harm,

is directed against commerce and may not stand.

If a threat is caused to the public health and en-

vironmental quality by solid and liquid waste, or the proc-

ess of treating, transporting and disposing of same, it is

based upon the nature of the substance being regulated

and not its place of origin. Regulation of such commerce

must be accomplished in an evenhanded, nondiscrimina-

tory manner.

The Court will decide for itself whether a statute

represents a legitimate exercise of the state’s police power,

or whether it really amounts to a discriminatory regulation

of interstate commerce and a direct burden thereon.

A police regulation which affects interstate commerce

must not go beyond the necessities of the particular case.

If the legislative purpose is to preserve acreage from use

as a disposal site, there is no reason to prohibit entry or

forms of treatment and disposal other than sanitary land-

filling.

In light of the many genuine issues of material fact,

the New Jersey Supreme Court erred in upholding the

constitutionality of P. L. 1973 c. 363 as not violative of

the Commerce Clause absent a hearing, on the merits,

before the trial court. Appellants were thereby denied

due process of the law.

Brief of Appellants 17

ARGUMENT.

A.

© and Liquid Waste, and the Process of Collecting,

Transporting, Treating and Disposing of Same, is a

Recognized Subject of Interstate Commerce.

In the proceedings before the New Jersey Courts,

Appellees argued that solid and liquid waste are not legiti-

mate subjects of interstate commerce, and therefore not

within the purview of the commerce clause. This con-

tention was rejected below, and is wholly unsupportable

in law and in fact.

The meaning of the clause “legitimate subject of

commerce” was explained by Mr. Justice Matthews in

Bowman v. Chicago &c Railway Co., 125 U. S. 465 (1888).

Holding that a state cannot, for the purpose of protecting

its people against the evils of intemperance, enact laws

which regulate interstate commerce, the court stated:

“ . . It has never been regarded as within the

legitimate scope of inspection laws to forbid

trade in respect to any known article of com-

merce, irrespective of its condition and quality,

merely on account of its intrinsic nature and the

injurious consequences of its use or abuse.

. . » Doubtless the States have power to provide

by law suitable measures to prevent the introduc-

tion into the States of articles of trade, which, on

account of their existing condition, would bring

in and spread disease, pestilence, and death, such

as rags or other substances infected with the

germs of yellow fever or the virus of small-pox,

or cattle or meat or other provisions that are

diseased or decayed, or otherwise, from their

18 Brief of Appellants

condition and quality, unfit for human use or con-

sumption. Such articles are not merchantable;

they are not legitimate subjects of trade and

commerce. They may be rightly outlawed as

intrinsically and directly the immediate sources

and causes of destruction to human health and

life.

Bowman v, Chicago &c Railway Co., 125

U. S. supra, at 488-489. (Emphasis added. )

Pursuant to the decision in Bowman, if solid or

liquid waste or some identifiable portion thereof is a

“known article of commerce”, or if the service of collecting

and disposing of solid or liquid waste is a “subject of trade

or commerce”, then a prohibition against importation can-

not be imposed merely on account of intrinsic nature, with-

out regard to condition and quality.

Subjects of interstate commerce are determined by

“. . . practical consideration and the established course of

business”. Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278

U. S. 110 (1928), Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U. S.

189, 198 (1925), Public Utilities Comm. v. Landon, 249

U. S. 236, 245 (1919); cf. Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203

U. S. 507, 523 (1906). Commerce is not confined to

transportation alone, but comprehends all commercial

intercourse, including the component parts therecf."

1p ay a state line, Thornton v. United States, 271 U. S. 414

4 . 8, 548, 560 Lg telegraphic communication wire,

Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. §. 460, 464 (1985) and tants

in ambient air, United States v. Bishop P.

624, 629 (D. Md. 1968). With

respect to

and water, see also Illinois v. Milwaukee, U. S, 91, 103 (1972).

Brief of Appellants 19

Dahnke-Walker Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 290

(1921).

Appellants’ solid waste collection and disposal com-

panies are lawful business entities existing under the

laws of the State of New Jersey (A7), N. J. S. A. 14A:1-1

et seq., and generally empowered by same

“to conduct its business, carry on its operations,

and have offices and exercise the powers granted

by this act anywhere in the universe”,

N. J. S.A. 14A:3-1(1) (i)

Appellees admit that solid waste collected outside New

Jersey has been disposed of at sanitary facilities within the

State * (A83, 97), and that certain communities in New

Jersey dispose of all or a portion of their solid waste out-

side the State of New Jersey (A114). Such practice has

been carried on for years. United States v. Pennsylvania

Refuse Removal Ass'n., 242 F. Supp. 794 (E. D. Pa. 1965).

The legislature has recently acknowledged the solid

waste industry as an integral part of “the free enterprise

system” in New Jersey. P. L. 1975, c. 326, N. J. S. A.

13:1E-2b(5). It has also specifically recognized the need

to assure an adequate volume of solid waste at solid waste

facilities: °

“The Legislature recognizes that solid waste

and recycling facilities will be financed through

long term borrowing which requires the negotia-

tion of long term contracts with municipalities

. According to Departmental estimates, 1.5 million tons of

osha wacee outside of the State was disposed of in New

Jersey in 1971 ( ).

9. The term “solid waste facilities” is defined in the Act to

ag » aan gu inghude »_- g ipciparaten . . . [and] sanitary land-

a cuitary meaner” P-L, 1005, ¢, O06 N. fsa wat hi

20 Brief of Appellants

and other solid waste collectors to guarantee the

flow of solid waste to such facilities.”

P. L. 1975, c. 326, N. J. S. A. 13: 1E-2c.

(Emphasis added. )

Appellant City of Philadelphia has entered into long

term contracts with sanitary landfill facilities located in

New Jersey (A31, 41, 271). Expenditures for environ-

mental controls approximating $500,000 were made at Ap-

pellant Kinsley’s Landfill, Inc. sanitary landfill site upon

the direction of the Department of Environmental Pro-

tection (A270). The improvements would not have been

made but for a ten year contract with Philadelphia (A271).

A sanitary landfill must receive a sufficient quantity of solid

waste to be economically feasible (A271, 281-282). If pre-

vented from obtaining solid waste, the business of Kinsley's

and of other Appellant sanitary landfill owners will be

greatly diminished or destroyed (A44, 254, 271, 281).

Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U. S. supra,

at 8.

The proposition that the disposal in one state of solid

waste collected in another state constitutes an activity in

interstate commerce is too well established to be seriously

questioned. In United States v. Pennsylvania Refuse

Removal Assn., 242 F. Supp. 794 (E. D. Pa. 1965) certain

defendants were indicted and convicted for price fixing,

allocating customers and rigging bids in connection with a

refuse removal business in the Greater Philadelphia area

in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. That Act pro-

vides, in pertinent part, “Every . . . conspiracy, in re-

straint of trade or commerce among the several states, . .

is declared to be illegal”. 15 U. S. C. $1.

The Court held that the disposal in New Jersey of

substantial quantities of refuse collected in Pennsylvania

constituted an activity within the flow of interstate com-

merce. In responding to defendants’ arguments that a

Brief of Appellants 21

worthless commodity like trash cannot be the subject of

“trade or commerce” as those terms are used in the

Sherman Act, the Court observed:

“That argument misses the point. Here, the

real subject of ‘trade or commerce’ was not worth-

less debris, but the valuable service of removing

and disposing of it. Since services are encom-

passed within the meaning of the words ‘trade or

commerce’ as used in the Act, United States v.

Nat'l Assn. of Real Estate Boards, 339 U. S. 485,

488-492, 70 S. Ct. 711, $4 L. Ed. 1007 (1950),

the defendants position has no merit.”

United States v. Pennsylvania Refuse

Ass'n., 242 F. Supp., supra, at 700.

(Emphasis added. )

The decision of the Federal District Court was af-

firmed by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit which

succinctly stated: “. . . refuse transported from Penn-

sylvania to New Jersey and disposed of in the latter state

. . . was plainly a proper subject of interstate commerce”.

United States v. Pennsylvania Refuse Removal Ass’n., 357

F. 2d 806, 808 (3rd Cir. 1966). Certiorari was denied by

this Court, 384 U. S. 961 ( 1966).’°

Established business practice leads inescapably to the

cenclusion that the collection and disposal of solid waste

in the Sherman Act. U.S. 0. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U. S. 293,

298 Ee OE nts ay Se ge a 533, 558 ( ~~

Ly Thecfore, if U:

7, a8 (ot Ci. 108 ee Ro dey 8

fa

a

a

constitute

U. S. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 8, cl. 3.

22 Brief of Appellants

recognized solid waste collection and disposal as a legiti-

mate subject of commerce. In adopting the Solid Waste

Utility Control Act of 1970, N. J. S. A. 48:13A-1 et seq., the

Legislature found that the service of solid waste collection

and disposal “. . . is a matter of grave concern to all citi-

zens and is an activity thoroughly affected with the public

interest, . . .” N. J. S. A. 48:13A-2, and that the “. . .

rates and public utility aspects of the solid waste collection

industry and the solid waste disposal industry . . .” should

be regulated by the Board of Public Utility Commissioners,

N. J. S. A. 48:13A-4. The entire solid waste industry was

afforded public utility status by N. J. S. A. 48:2-13, which

states, in pertinent part:

“The term ‘public utility’ shall include every

. solid waste collection, [or] solid waste dis-

posal . . . system, plant or equipment for public

use, under privileges granted or hereafter to be

granted by this State... .”

In Wolff Co. v. Industrial Court., 262 U. S, 522, 535

(1923), Mr. Chief Justice Taft observed that a public

utility has“. . . the affirmative duty of rendering a public

service demanded by any member of the public”, Ter-

mination or discontinuance of such service can be effected

only with the express approval of the Public Utilities Com-

mission, N, J, S. A. 48:2-24. One is hard-pressed to con-

ceive how a legislatively-regulated industry engaged in the

performance of an “activity thoroughly affected with the

public interest, . . .” N. J. S$. A. 48:13A-2, could be any-

thing other than a legitimate, indeed a vital, subject of both

intrastate and interstate commerce.

While it is thus clear that the valuable service of col-

lecting and disposing of solid waste is an activity in inter-

state commerce, it is also clear that solid waste itself is

Brief of Appellants 23

often a merchantable commodity." In Hackensack

Meadowlands v. Mun. Landfill Auth., 127 N. J. Super. 160,

170 (Ch. 1974), rev. other grnds. 68 N. J. 451 (1975), the

companion case to the within matter, the trial court re-

jected appellee’s argument that solid and liquid waste is

neither merchantable nor a legitimate subject of interstate

commerce: “. . . refuse may be utilized for construction,

landfill, recycling of paper, bottles and metal and produc-

tion of electricity”. The New Jersey Supreme Court

agreed, saying:

“We readily recognize that modern technol-

ogy is such that certain types of solid waste may

have legitimate market value for recycling or

other purposes. We therefore agree with the

decision below, insofar as the HMDC regula-

tions are concerned, that they cannot be sustained

on the theory that no item of interstate com-

merce is involved, as these regulations do clearly

attempt to exclude from the HMD even those

types of wastes which may have some potentiality

of useful renewal.”

Hackensack Meadowlands wv. Mun.

Landfill Auth., 68 N. J., supra, at 467-

468.

Sanitary landfilling is itself a method of recycling and

resource recovery. Solid waste can be accepted for dis-

posal at a sanitary landfill facility and used in a cost effici-

ent and environmentally sound manner to recover severely

mined or devastated lands and to produce gas for com-

1l. A United States District Court has recently held that the

movement of automobile hulks across state lines constitutes inter-

state commerce. Alexandria Scrap Corporation v. 4

. Md. 1975); ‘ 96 S. Ct. 31 (1975), A

SN IOe pantry SEER

in the Rules of the Bureau of Solid Waste Management. N. J. A. C.

7:26-1.4.3. (A147).

24 Brief of Appellants

mercial purposes (A275-279). It can also be utilized to

create power generation by incineration.

Land recovered through sanitary landfilling is fre-

quently devoted to public recreational use and green

acres (A277). It may also be used for residential, com-

mercial and industrial development. Problems previously

encountered at former sanitary landfill sites with respect to

support of heavy structures can be avoided by merely leav-

ing certain land areas untouched in the landfilling process

(A276). The key, in every situation, is responsible pro-

fessional planning before sanitary landfill operations com-

mence. Since New Jersey sanitary landfills must be de-

veloped in accordance with plans and designs prepared by

licensed professional engineers, N. J. A. C. 7:26-2.2.3;

7:26-2-4, the purpose to which the site will be devoted

upon completion of the sanitary landfill process may be

known before any operations begin, N. J. A. C. 7:26-

- 2.12.2.22.

Significantly, the New Jersey State Solid Waste Man-

agement Plan, approved by the United States Environ-

mental Protection Agency as the official State plan for

New Jersey, Hackensack Meadowlands v. Mun. Landfill

Auth., 68 N. J., supra, at 463, frankly states:

“It is not unusual for a properly designed and con-

structed sanitary landfill to become an asset to

the local area.” ”

On occasion, the free flow of commerce has been the

subject of state regulatory action. In the absence of

controlling federal legislation or implied federal preemp-

tion, a state may exercise its police power to prevent

deception or fraud upon the public, Plumley v, Massa-

chusetts, 155 U. S. 461 (1894), Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248

U. S. 297 (1919), Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266

12. New Jersey Solid Waste Management Plan (Newark:

Planners Associates, Inc., 1970) at p. 71. -*

Brief of Appellants 25

U. S. 497 (1925), the prompt disposal of large animals not

slaughtered for food, Clason v. Indiana, 306 U. S. 439

(1939), and the importation of unhealthy swine or cattle,

Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U. S. 251 (1908); Mintz v. Baldwin,

289 U. S. 346 (1933), decayed, noxious or adulterated

foods, Crossman v. Lurman, 192 U. S. 189 (1904); Savage

v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501 (1912), Price v. Illinois, 238 U. S.

446 (1915), or immature citrus —_ Me ho ge

v. Kirkwood, 237 U. S. . How-

pin pe espe not, even in these situations, exclude

articles of commerce with impunity.’

A regulation designed to protect the public health

must be reasonable in its requirements, promote its ob-

jective without discrimination, and not go beyond the

necessities of the particular case: “*

“The evident purpose of the statute is to pre-

vent fraud and imposition in the sale of food for

domestic animals,—a matter of great importance

held that a statute the sale in Pennsylvania of

a substance, other than that produced from unedulter-

ated or cream, 1d the Commerce Clause:

absolute i as aut

article has never been permitted as a rem

mete th ion of that which was

unhealthy or impure :

ae be admitted that oleomargarine in the course

of its manufacture may sometimes be adulterated by dis-

26 Brief of Appellants

to the people of the state. Its requirements were

directed to that end, and they were not unreason-

able. It was not aimed at interstate commerce,

but, without discrimination, sought to promote

fair dealing in the described articles of food.”

Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S., supra, at

525.

An identical sentiment was expressed in Plumley v.

Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461, 471 (1894), where this

Court, in upholding a statute prohibiting the manufacture

or sale of oleomargarine colored in imitation of yellow but-

ter, said: “If the Statute of Massachusetts had been so

framed as to be applicable only to oleomargarine manu-

factured in other states, . . . the case would have been

wholly different”.

Although countless opportunities were presented, Ap-

pellees never contended by any affidavit that (a) the trans-

portation, treatment or disposal of solid or liquid waste in

accordance with applicable federal and state laws and

regulations poses any material threat to the health, wel-

fare and safety of the people of New Jersey or to the

quality of its environment; (b) an unsuspecting public will

be deceived or defrauded by the transportation, treatment

or disposal of solid or liquid waste collected in another

state; or (c) the inherent condition of solid waste is such

that it will always spread pestilence and disease. Quite

to the contrary, interstate disposal of solid waste has been

carried on, without interruption, for many years. During

that period, state regulations have applied equally to all

solid waste regardless of the place of its collection.

The interstate transportation of solid and liquid waste

for treatment and disposal represents a legitimate, indeed

a necessary and vital, activity in interstate commerce.

Brief of Appellants 27

P. L. 1973, c. 363, on Its Face Discriminates Against and

Directly Burdens Interstate Commerce.

The plain and unambiguous language of P. L. 1973, c.

363, entitled:

“An Act to prohibit any person from bringing

into this State any solid and liquid waste which

originated or was collected outside the State... ,”

reveals that its sole iritent and purpose is to impose an im-

mediate, absolute, and complete ban upon the movement

into or through New Jersey of any solid or liquid waste

which originated or was collected outside the State. Treat-

ment of liquid waste, processing of solid waste, and dis-

posal or interstate movement of all waste collected outside

New Jersey is equally prohibited. Conversely, no at-

tempt whatsoever has been made in the statute to control,

regulate or prohibit the movement, treatment, processing

or disposal of solid or liquid waste which originates or is

collected within the State of New Jersey.

Activities in interstate commerce are not, by that fact

alone, immune from reasonable regulations adopted by a

state or local government pursuant to the exercise of its

reserved police power. U. S. Const., Amend. 10. As

reiterated by Mr. Justice Rutledge in Nippert v. Richmond,

327 U. S. 416, 425 (1947), “. . . not all burdens upon com-

merce, but only undue or discriminatory ones, are forbid-

den”; and in Cities Service Co. v. Peerless Co., 340 U. S.

179, 186-187 (1950), Mr. Justice Clark observed:

“The only requirements consistently recog-

nized have been that the regulation not discrim-

inate against or place an embargo on interstate

commerce, that it safeguard an obvious state

28 Brief of Appellants

interest and that the local interest at stake out-

weigh whatever national interest there might be

in the prevention of state restrictions.”

Absent controlling federal legislation, the commerce

clause does not deprive the states of the power to regulate

matters of local public concern in those areas where uni-

formity of regulation is not necessary, as long as the ex-

ercise of the police power serves a real and legitimate

purpose and does not place an undue or excessive burden

on or discriminate against interstate commerce.

The test has been stated most recently by this Court

in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970);

“Although the criteria for determining the

validity of state statutes affecting interstate com-

merce have been variously stated, the general

rule that emerges can be phrased as follows:

Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to

effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and

its effects on interstate commerce are only in-

cidental, it will be upheld unless the burden im-

posed on such commerce is clearly excessive in

relation to the putative local benefits. Huron

Cement Co. v. Detroit, 372 U. S. 440, 443. If a

legitimate local purpose is found, then the ques-

tion becomes one of degree. And the extent of

the burden that will be tolerated will, of course,

depend on the nature of the local interest in-

volved, and on whether it could be promoted as

well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.

Occasionally, the Court has candidly undertaken

a balancing approach in resolving these issues,

Southern Pacific Co. v, Arizona, 325 U. S. 761,

but more frequently it has spoken in terms of

Brief of Appellants 29

‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ effects and burdens. See

e.g. Schafer v. Farmers Grain Co., supra.” (Em-

phasis added) ©

See also Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, — U. 8. — , 47

L. Ed. 2d 55 (1976).

Pursuant to the test announced in Pike, a balance will

not be made between the burden imposed on interstate

commerce, on the one hand, and the putative local bene-

fits, on the other hand, unless it is first determined that the

regulation (a) is evenhanded, (b) is based upon a legiti-

mate local purpose, and (c) only incidentally affects inter-

state commerce. If it is defective on any of these grounds,

then the regulation must fall.

1, Evenhandedness.

A prohibition directed solely against solid or liquid

waste which originates or is collected outside the State,

and against the movement of such waste through New

Jersey, is not evenhanded, and constitutes a direct burden

and discriminatory regulation of interstate commerce. Dis-

crimination against interstate commerce in any form or

method is prohibited by the Commerce Clause. South

Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177,

185 (1938).

In the single paragraph of its opinion devoted to the

discrimination issue, the New Jersey Supreme Court com-

mented:

“Nor has there been discrimination, at least

in the economic sense. In examining this point

we must look to the ends sought to be achieved.

Here the purpose of the legislation is to protect

the inhabitants and vital resources of New Jersey,

not to impose economic barriers or create com-

mercial restrictions. Nor is there any real or

30 Brief of Appellants

significant discrimination in favor of local col-

lectors. Refuse amassed by them outside the

State may not be brought into New Jersey. Con-

versely, residenis of other states are free to col-

lect and dump within the state.”

Hackensack Meadowlands wv. Mun.

Landfill Auth., 68 N. J., supra, at 475.

In Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U. S. 349, 354

(1951), this Court struck down an ordinance of the City

of Madison, Wisconsin, which prohibited the sale of milk

as pasteurized unless it was processed and bottled at an

approved pasteurization plant within a five mile radius

from the central square of Madison. In response to Madi-

son's argument that the ordinance was aimed simply at

protecting the health of the community, Mr. Justice Clark

wisely noted that to sustain an ordinance simply because

it denominates itself

“, .. @ health measure, would mean that the

Commerce Clause of itself imposes no limitations

on state action other than those laid down by the

Due Process Clause, save for the rare instance,

where a state artlessly discloses an avowed pur-

pose to discriminate against interstate goods.”

The Court's responsibility in this area has been em-

phasized by Mr. Justice Reed in Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311

U. S. 454, 455-456 (1940) where he commented:

“The commerce clause forbids discrimina-

tion, whether forthright or ingenious. In each

case it is our duty to determine whether the

statute under attack, whatever its name may be,

will in its practical operation work discrimination

against interstate commerce.”

Brief of Appellants 31

This responsibility has been undertaken conscien-

tiously and with great care by the Court. In Railroad Co.

vo. Husen, 95 U. 8. 465 (1877), the United States Supreme

Court struck down a Missouri statute which prohibited the

entry of Texas, Mexican or Indian cattle into any county

in the State between the first day of March and the first

day of December of each year.

Speaking for a unanimous Court, Mr. Justice Strong

announced the general rule governing sanitary and health

laws as follows:

“While we unhesitatingly admit that a State

may pass sanitary laws, and laws for the pro-

tection of life, liberty, health, or property within

its borders; while it say prevent persons and

animals suffering under contagious or infectious

diseases, or convicts, &c., from entering the State;

while for the purpose of self-protection it may

establish quarantine, and reasonable inspection

laws, it may not interfere with transportation into

or through the State, beyond what is absolutely

necessary for its self-protection.

Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S., supra,

at 472.

Applying this rule to the statute of Missouri, Mr.

Justice Strong found a clear attempt to regulate interstate

commerce:

“It is not a quarantine law. It is not an in-

spection law. It says to all natural persons and

to all transportation companies, ‘You shall not

bring into the State any Texas cattle or any Mexi-

can cattle or Indian cattle, between March 1 and

December 1 in any year, no matter whether they

32 Brief of Appellants

are free from disease or not, no matter whether

they may do an injury to the inhabitants of the

State or not; and if you do bring them in even

for the purpose of carrying them through the

State without unloading them, you shall be sub-

ject to extraordinary liabilities.’ Such a statute,

we do not doubt, it is beyond the power of a

State to enact. To hold otherwise would be to

ignore one of the leading objects which the Con-

stitution of the United States was designed to

secure.

Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. supra,

at 473.

In Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S., supra, at 469,

Mr. Justice Harlan had occasion to discuss the holding in

the Railroad Co. case. He noted that the object and effect

of said statute “. . . was to meet at the borders of Missouri

a large and common subject of commerce and prohibit its

crossing the state line during the larger part of each year.

.” (Emphasis added. )

A statute enacted to prevent the sale of unwholesome

meat was considered and struck down in Brimmer v. Reb-

man, 138 U. S. 78 (1891). The statute declared it to be

unlawful to offer for sale within Virginia any beef, veal or

mutton, from animals slaughtered one hundred miles or

more from the place at which it is offered for sale unless

previously inspected and approved by local inspectors. In-

spection was not required of fresh meats from animals

slaughtered within one hundred miles from place of sale.

Rejecting the state's contention that the statute repre-

sented a valid police regulation reasonably designed to

protect the public health, Mr. Justice Harlan stated:

EO a

Brief of Appellants 33

“Whether there shall be inspection or no,

. . . is made to depend entirely upon the place

where the animals from which the beef, veal or

mutton is taken, were slaughtered. . . . [A state]

may not, under the guise of exerting its police

powers, or of enacting inspection laws, make dis-

criminations against the products and industries

of some of the States in favor of the products and

industries of its own or of other States.

Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S., supra,

at 82.

See also Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313 (1890) and

Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58 (1897).

In Rasmussen v. Idaho, 181 U. S. 198 (1901), this

Court upheld an Idaho statute which empowered the Gov-

ernor of Idaho to regulate or prohibit the importation into

the state of sheep from localities outside the state where

scab or other infectious disease has become epidemic.

Speaking for a unanimous Court, Mr. Justice Brewer dis-

tinguished the Railroad Co. case upon which the plaintiff

in error in Rasmussen largely relied:

“It will be perceived that the act in Rail-

road Co. v. Husen was an absolute prohibition

operative during eight months of the year. It

was an act continuous in its force; provided for

no inspection, and was predicated on the assump-

tion that the State had the right to exclude for

two-thirds of each year the introduction of all

those kinds of cattle, sick or well, and whether

likely to distribute disease or not.

In the case before us the statute makes no

absolute prohibition of the introduction of sheep,

34 Brief of Appellants

but authorizes the Governor to investigate the

condition of sheep in any locality, and, if found

to be subject to scab or any epidemic disease lia-

ble to be communicated to other sheep, to make

such restriction on their introduction into the

State as shall seem to him, after conference with

the State sheep inspector, to be necessary.”

Rasmussen v. Idaho, 181 U. S. supra, at

201. (emphasis added )

A similar quarantine act was considered in Oreg.-

Washington Co. v. Washington, 270 U. S. 87 (1926). The

Washington Director of Agriculture, with the approval of

the Governor, forbade the importation into the state of

alfalfa hay or meal (except in sealed containers) from

designated counties outside the state in which, upon in-

spection, a weevil injurious to the alfalfa plant was found.

After reciting the general rule that, absent arbitrariness or

discriminatory motive, a state may prevent the introduc-

tion within its borders of human beings, animals or plants

which may cause disease, injury or destruction to the

State's inhabitants and resources, this Court upheld the

statute commenting:

“We think that here the investigation re-

quired by the Washington law and the investiga-

tion actually made into the existence of this pest

and its geographical location makes the law a

real quarantine law, and not a mere inhibition

against importation of alfalfa from a large part

of the country without regard to the conditions

which might make its importation dangerous.”

Oreg.-Washington Co. v. Washington

270 U. S., supra, at 96.

Brief of Appellants 35

The New Jersey Statute in question imposes an un-

limited prohibition without regard to condition. It is an

embargo. There is no provision for inspection or for any

other deliberative process prior to exclusion. The statute

is erroneously predicated on the assumption that a state

has the right to exclude the introduction of all kinds of

solid and liquid waste, whether likely to impair public

health and environmental quality or not. Rasmussen v.

Idaho, 181 U. S., sispru, at 201.

As in the Railroad Co. case, P. L. 1973, c. 363, is

neither a quarantine law nor an inspection law; and like

the statute in that case, P. L. 1973, c. 363 says to all natural

persons and to all transportation companies: “You shall not

bring into the State solid or liquid waste of any nature or

description, for any purpose whatsoever, no matter whether

it does an injury to the inhabitants of the State or not; no

matter whether it does an injury to the quality of the

environment or not; and if you do bring it in even for

the purpose of carrying it through the State without un-

loading it you shall be subject to extraordinary liabilities.”

The fact that Railroad Co. v. Husen dealt with cattle

and not with solid waste is neither material nor distinguish-

able. The principle is identical in each case; once an ac-

tivity is legitimately in interstate commerce there can be

no discrimination. Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U. S. 454

(1940); Head v. New Mexico Board, 374 U. S. 424, 429

1963 ).

; . the leading environmental case Huron Cement Co.

v. Detroit; 362 U. S. 440 (1960), an action was instituted

by a corporation engaged in operating federally licensed

steam vessels in interstate commerce to enjoin the enforce-

ment of certain provisions of the Smoke Abatement Code

of the City of Detroit. Finding that the ordinance applied

‘

36 Brief of Appellants

equally to all ships and did not destroy the right of free

passage, this Court held that the ordinance was a valid

exercise of the state’s police power:

“, . . State regulation based on the police

power, which does not discriminate against in-

terstate commerce or operate to disrupt its re-

quired uniformity, may. constitutionally stand.

“It has not been suggested that the local ordi-

nance, applicable alike to ‘any person, firm or

corporation’ within the city, discriminates against

interstate commerce as such. It is a regulation of

general application, designed to better the health

and welfare of the community. . . .” Huron Ce-

ment Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. S., supra, at 448

(Citations omitted, emphasis added. )

Although a smoke abatement ordinance enacted to

promote the health and welfare of a city’s inhabitants will

generally support an exercise of the police power, the

power to adopt such ordinances is not unlimited.

“The basic limitations upon local legislative

power in this area are clear enough. The con-

trolling principles have been reiterated over the

years in a host of this Court’s decisions. Even-

handed local regulation to effectuate a legitimate

local public interest is valid unless preempted by

federal action . . ., or unduly burdensome on

maritime activities or interstate commerce... .”

Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. S.

supra, at 443 (Citations omitted, emphasis

added ).

Brief of Appellants

37

The Court, in Huron, stressed the fact that the local

ordinance there in question was applicable alike to all

persons, firms and corporations. Had the ordinance been

For example, if the City of Detroit had attempted to

reduce air pollution and thereby promote the health and

welfare of the city’s inhabitants by prohibiting the dis-

of in the Port of Detroit by any steam-

:

tion against interstate commerce.

Similarly, if the State of New Jersey had attempted

to reduce air pollution by prohibiting any person from

driving a motor vehicle upon the roads of this state unless

the vehicle was registered in New Jersey, there would be

an unmistakable and intolerable discrimination against

interstate commerce.

If there is a threat posed to the health, welfare and

safety of the people of New Jersey or to the quality of

its environment by the treatment or disposal of solid and

liquid waste in accordance with regulations administered

by the Department of Environmental Protection (a posi-

tion which appellants do not believe can be factually sup-

ported), then it is a threat attributable to the nature of

the substance being regulated, and not to its place of

origin. Remedial measures based upon the exercise of

the State’s police power must be undertaken in an even-

handed manner. There can be no discrimination in favor

of intrastate commerce and against interstate commerce.

Hale v. Bimeo Trading Co., 306 U. S. 375, 380 (1939).

During the last few years, state and federal courts

have been called upon with increasing regularity to review

legislation dealing with the maintenance of environmental

38 Brief of Appellants

values: American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Com-

mission, 15 Ore. App. 618, 517 P. 2d 691, 703 (Ct. App.

Ore. 1973) (ban on non-returnable beverage containers );

Soap and Detergent Association v. City of Chicago, 357

F. Supp. 44 (N. D. Ill. 1973), rev. Proctor & Gamble Co.

v. City of Chicago, 509 F. 2d 69, 78 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.

den. 421 U. S. 978 (1975) (ban on phosphate detergents );

Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Environmental Imp. Com’n.,

307 A. 2d 1, 40 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. 1973); app. dis., 414

U. S. 1035 (1973) (prevention and control of marine oil

spillage ); Construction Ind. Ass'n., Sonoma Cty. v. City

of Petaluma, 522 F. 2d 897, 909 (9th Cir. 1975) (ban on

further building); Bowie Inn, Inc. v. City of Bowie, 274

Md. 230, 335 A. 2d 679, 688 (Ct. App. Md. 1975) (return

deposit requirement )."*

While the statutes and ordinances in the aforesaid

cases were upheld against attacks based upon alleged vio-

lations to the Commerce clause, each court was careful to

note the absence of discriminatory treatment. Intrastate

commerce was treated equally with interstate commerce.

Thus, in Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Environmental

Imp. Com’n., 307 A. 2d 1 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. 1973), app.

dis., 414 U. S. 1035 (1973), the Supreme Judicial Court

of Maine was called upon to review the constitutionality of

an act relative to overwater transfers of petroleum. Plain-

tiffs challenge of the act was based, in part, upon an

alleged impermissible burden on interstate commerce.

The Court rejected this argument, saying:

15. See also Cohen v. Bredehoeft, 290 F. Supp. 1001, ~s

(S. D. Tex. 1968) where, in upholding a munici

hibiting fireworks within the city, the court said: “The ordinance

treats all fireworks distributors, whether local or foreign, y

and its affect on interstate commerce is incidental to its

purpose of protecting the public.”

——— -

= — -

— =~

Brief of Appellants 39

“The issue of whether regulations promul-

gated under the state’s police power seeking to

protect the state’s inhabitants from environmental

pollution may be applied to those engaged in

interstate commerce was before the Supreme

Court in Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of

Detroit, 362 U. S. 440, 80 S. Ct. 813, 4 L. Ed. 2d

852 (1960). The City had adopted a smoke

abatement ordinance and sought to enforce the

penal provisions of that ordinance against ship-

pers admittedly engaged in interstate commerce.

The Detroit ordinance did not discriminate

against interstate commerce and there was no

showing that national uniformity was required to

prevent inconsistent local regulations.

The Maine Act does not discriminate in

favor of intrastate commerce... .”

Portland Pipe Line Corp v. Environ-

mental Imp. Com’n., 307 A. 2d, supra,

at 40. (Emphasis added ) *

In Hackensack Meadowlands v. Mun. Landfill Auth.,

127 N. J. Super. 160 (Ch. 1974) the companion case to

the case at bar, Judge (now Justice) Sidney Schreiber **

16. Subsequent to his decision in the Hackensack Meadow-

eaeeline Fy, Rag ened Base ee SE Rather ew!

Supreme Court. The Hackensack Meadowlands case was appealed

catoned mater. Both cues were dap fn the same pinion.

Justice Schreiber di at in the

not

coh ge | ee ng gg ating ke is

saresteenst n Fackensack. MA Meadowlands v. Mun.

ey oi: «wall Hae

40 Brief of Appellants

struck down regulations adopted by the New Jersey De-

partment of Environmental Protection and the Hacken-.

sack Meadowlands Development Commission which pro-

hibited persons engaged in the collection of solid or liquid

wastes which originated or were collected outside the

State from disposing of same in the Hackensack Meadow-

lands District. In language equally pertinent to the pres-

ent matter, Judge Schreiber observed:

“DEP and HMDC rationalize that discrim-

ination is absent because the regulations do not

prefer New Jersey over out-of-state landfill op-

erators or garbage haulers. The difficulty with

that rationale is that it is the discrimination based

on the origin of the refuse, not the residence of

the owner or carrier, which is invidious. Trans-

portation of the refuse, whether carried by New

Jerseyans or nonresidents, in interstate commerce

is directly affected by the ban.

Although the State’s objective in attempting

to conserve a local natural resource for local

needs is a proper police power purpose, that can-

not be accomplished by discrimination based on

the source of the refuse.”

Hackensack Meadowlands wv. Mun.

Landfill Auth., 127 N. J. Super., supra,

at 174. (Emphasis added. )

A state cannot discriminate against interstate com-

merce under the guise of protecting the health of its citi-

zens or its natural resources. The Court has a duty to

determine for itself whether the regulation represents a

valid exercise of the State’s police power, or whether it is

really and substantially a regulation of interstate com-

Brief of Appellants 41

merce. Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U. S. 251, 256 (1908). The

independent exercise of that duty is especially important

because the power to determine the articles which may be

the subject of commerce is, in effect, the controlling one.

Bowman v. Chicago & Railway Co., 125 U. S. 465 (1888).

Legislation designed to prohibit the treatment or dis-

posal in New Jersey of solid waste collected outside the

State was first proposed six years ago with the introduction

of S. 834 in the New Jersey Senate on May 4, 1970." Sec-

tion 2 of that bill, entitled “An Act to prevent the treatment

and disposal within this State of solid waste collected out-

side this State”, provided as follows:

“Notwithstanding the provisions of any other

law to the contrary, no solid waste collected from

any location without the territorial limits of this

State shall be treated or disposed of in any solid

waste disposal facility located within this State.”

By written memorandum dated May 8, 1970," the

Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Environ-

mental Protection advised the Governor that the Depart-

ment supported “. . . the concept of prohibiting the im-

portation of out-of-state garbage” into New Jersey, and

recommended that the bill be signed, if passed by the

legislature. The reason for the Department's position was

explained by the Commissioner as follows:

“. . . The amount of land available in land-

fills is rapidly being depleted. It is in the inter-

ests of the State to reserve the available land for

17. of bills introduced in the N Legislature

uz arable a the New Janey State Library in Trenton New

ersey

18. Said memorandum is contained in the file of the Counsel to

the Governor, maintained in the State Archives at the New Jersey

State Library, Trenton, New Jersey.

42 Brief of Appellants

the disposal of solid wastes originating in the

State.”

No mention was made of public health or environmental

quality.

Although S. 834 passed the Senate, it did not move in

the Assembly and died at the end of the legislative

session.”

A bill almost identical to S. 834, A. 1019, was intro-

duced in the New Jersey Assembly on April 12, 1972 by

Assemblyman Dawes. -Like its predecessor, A. 1019 ex-

pressly prohibited the treatment or disposal in New Jersey

of any solid waste collected outside the State. ;

Less than one month later, on May 4, 1972, a second

bill, A. 1132, the Waste Control Act, was introduced by

the same Assemblyman. Unlike A. 1019 which con-

templated direct statutory prohibition, A. 1132 conferred

upon the Commissioner of the Department of Environ-

mental Protection the power to regulate and prohibit the

incineration and landfill in New Jersey of solid waste col-

lected outside the State. In his “statement” attached to

the bill, Assemblyman Dawes commented:

. . . This bill recognizes that the citizens

of New Jersey do not have the luxury of un-

limited resources and disposal sites. The bill

also reflects an awareness that the continuing use

of New Jersey lands for solid waste disposal

facilities . . . presents an unfortunate picture of

the State, particularly in the Hackensack

Meadowlands area.”

By memorandum dated October 3, 1972,” the Presi-

dent of the New Jersey Public Utilities Commission urged

19. Information with respect to bills introduced in the New

Jersey Legislature is available in the New Jersey Legislative Index.

20. See footnote 18, supra.

Brief of Appellants 43

the Governor to veto A. 1132, if passed, due to the potential

for retributive action:

“If New Jersey prohibits waste collected out-

side the State from being dumped within the

State, it may find that reciprocal action wiil be

taken by neighboring states wherein New Jersey

disposes of its solid wastes; e.g., Philadelphia

dumps in New Jersey and New Jersey dumps in

Pennsylvania.”

A. 1019 was never adopted, but A. 1132 passed the

legislature and was signed by the Governor on February

21, 1973. The adverse recommendation of the Public

Utilities Commission was not accepted. Upon signing the

bill, the Governor issued a press release™ in which he

stated that the Waste Control Act represented “. . . a

significant step in controlling the daily influx of trash and

garbage from adjoining states which threatens to engulf

New Jersey's remaining sanitary landfill sites”.

Although the Waste Control Act conferred upon the

Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Pro-

tection the power to-prohibit the incineration and landfill

in New Jersey of solid waste collected outside the state,

iv. J. 8, A. 13:11, no immediate regulatory action was

undertaken by him. Perhaps that was because no imme-

diate threat to the environment or public health was recog-

nized by the Department.

Almost 8 months passed without further activity.

Then, on October 19, 1973, Acting Governor Alfred N.

Beadleston published a tersely worded press release

(A53) saying:

“I have today directed Commissioner Rich-

ard J. Sullivan of the Department of Environ-

21. Press releases issued by the Governors of New J

now collected and maintained at the New Jersey State Library,

Trenton, New Jersey.

Brief of Appellants

mental Protection to initiate immediately the

legal process to ban all dumping of out-of-state

garbage in New Jersey. I have taken this action

after consultation by telephone with Governor

William T. Cahill and with his full support.

This ban will be accomplished either by

legislation or by regulation issued by Commis-

sioner Sullivan pursuant to the State Waste Con-

trol Act, Chapter 39 of the Public Laws of 1973.

The State will proceed under whichever of those

two legal methods is faster and more effective.

I have issued this directive after thorough

consultation with Commissioner Sullivan and At-

torney General Kugler. The ban against the

dumping of garbage from either New York or

Pennsylvania will be strictly enforced, when it

becomes effective, with the full resources of the

Department of Environmental Protection and the

State Department of Law and Public Safety.

New Jersey cannot continue to tolerate the

grave environmental dangers being created by

the dumping of garbage in New Jersey from New

York or any other state. This is a sovereign State,

not a dumping ground, and this State Govern-

ment will act decisively to protect the health and

welfare of its citizens. Not only does out-of-

state dumping pose immediate environmental

and health problems, but over the long run, the

people of New Jersey will be forced to pay much

higher costs for waste removal because available

landfill dumping areas are filled up.

Commissioner Sullivan will proceed immedi-

ately to draft the necessary regulation under the

Brief of Appellants 45

Administrative Procedures Act, which prescribes

a required timetable of public notice and public

hearings. The Legislature will return Nov. 12

and, if it appears that it would be the most ex-

peditious route, will be asked to approve the

necessary legislation, under emergency proce-

dures if possible.” b

Less than a month later, on November 8, 1973, the

Commissioner published proposed Rules Governing the

Bureau of Solid Waste Management. Section 7:26-1.8 of

the proposed Rules contained a provision unconditionally

prohibiting the disposal of out-of-state waste within New

Jersey.”

The rationale for the proposed prohibition is explained

in paragraph IV of the “Basis and Background for the

Proposed Rules of the Bureau of Solid Waste Manage-

ment” (A45-46). Curiously, references to public health

and environmental quality are virtually non-cxistent. If

“grave environmental dangers” were being created by the

“dumping of garbage in New Jersey from New York”, as

acting Governor Beadleston had rhetoricized, the Depart-

ment of Environmental Protection didn’t know anything

about it. The reasons expressed by the Department for

the proposed administrative prohibition were: (1) to as-

22. The text of the proposed rule read as follows:

7:26-1.8 Out of State Waste

46 Brie; of Appellants

sure the availability of landfill acres in New Jersey for

solid waste generated in said State, and (2) to stabilize

the cost of solid waste collection and disposal for New

Jersey residents.”

Four days after the publication of the proposed

Rules of the Bureau of Solid Waste Management, on No-

vember 12, 1973, S. 2367 was introduced in the New-Jersey

Senate. The stated purpose of the bill was to prohibit the

entry into New Jersey of any solid or liquid waste which

originated or was collected outside of the state, except

garbage to be fed to swine within New Jersey.”

The Department of Environmental Protection was re-

quested to submit its comment on the bill to the Office of

the Counsel to the Governor. The comment submitted by

the Department,” was surprisingly candid:

“A. Description of Bill's Effect—

Amends the existing Waste Control Act of

1973 by reversing the present burden of proof

so that out-of-state solid and liquid waste will be

banned unless the Department issues regulations

permitting same. No doubt this approach was

taken—as opposed to an absolute ban—so as not

blatantly to traverse the commerce clause of the

Federal Constitution.”

23. This was admitted _ PRY

to the Complaint in this action ( Al AO,

24. When S. 2367 was originally introduced, the clause “

ey e to be fed to swine in the State of New Jersey,” was

ri See footnote 18, supra.

Brief of Appellants 47

“E. Departmental Comments—

Out-of-state waste is clearly a problem but

it is not necessarily insurmountable. The Bureau

of Solid Waste reports that the major difficulty is

that New York ‘garbage’ competes with the land-

fill sites in heavily populated areas which will

tap out within a few years, in any case. Thus,

whereas such waste comprises no more than a

small percentage of the total waste collected in

the state, it is approximately 25% of the waste

disposed in the New Jersey portion of the New

York-New Jersey Metropolitan area. This is the

truly critical region for solid waste. However,

liquid waste from New York and Pennsylvania

may even be needed by New Jersey processing

plants, so as to reduce their per unit costs. The

bill will clearly permit the Department to issue

regulations allowing same where necessary or

(Emphasis added )

S. 2367 was passed by the Senate on November 19,

1973, and by the Assembly on November 26, 1973. While

the bill was pending before the Governor for his review,

Richard W. DeKorte, Counsel to the Governor, wrote ‘to

David Quient, Esquire, City Attorney for Appellant City

of Glen Cove (A47-48), saying:

“Also, I might add that Senate Bill No. 2367

(OCR) would not have been introduced had the

sister states of New Jersey permitted solid wastes

originating in their states to be disposed of at or

near the point of origination.”

48 Brief of Appellants

S. 2367 was signed by the Governor on January 2,

1974, P. L. 1973, c. 363.

Since the prohibitory legislation emanated from the

Governor's office, it can be reasonably expected that the

Governor's Counsel was well-versed in its raison detre.

_ The evidence, in its cumulative effect, overwhelmingly

demonstrates that P. L. 1973, c. 363 was not adopted as a

valid health measure, but was intentionally designed to

directly burden and discriminate against interstate com-

merce. Indeed, Appellees readily admit that a purpose

of the statute was to preserve landfill acres in New Jersey

for solid waste generated in said state (A21,100).

In Penna. v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 597-598

(1923), a West Virginia statute prohibited the exportation

of its natural gas unless an adequate supply was available

to meet the needs of its citizens. Although the Supreme

Court of the United States recognized that the gas supply

was a natural product of the State and would be insuf-

ficient to meet the needs of the State if exportation was

allowed, the statute had to fall because it represented “an

attempt to regulate the interstate business to the ad-

vantage of the local customers”.

Similarly, in Oklahoma v. Kansas Nat. Gas Co., 221

U. S. 229, 255 (1911), this Court declared uncognstitu-

tional an Oklahoma “conservation” statute preventing a

pipeline company from transporting natural gas outside

the state:

“If the States have such power a singular

situation might result. Pennsylvania might keep

its coal, the Northwest its timber, the mining

states their minerals. And why may not the

products of the field be brought within the prin-

cipal? Thus, enlarged, or without that enlarge-

ment, its influence on interstate commerce need

Brief of Appellants 49

not be pointed out. To what consequence does

such power tend? If one state has it, all States

have it; embargo may be retaliated by embargo

and commerce will be halted at state lines. And

yet we have said that ‘in matters of foreign and

interstate commerce there are no state lines’. In

such commerce, instead of the States, a new

power appears and a new welfare, a welfare

which transcends that of any State. But rather

let us say it is constituted of the welfare of all

of the States and that of each State is made

greater by a division of its resources, natural and

created, with every State, and those of every

other State with it. This was the purpose, as it

is the result, of the interstate commerce clause

of the Constitution of the United States. If there

is to be a turning backward it must be done by

the authority of another instrumentality than a

court.” (Emphasis added)

See also City of Altus, Oklahoma v. Carr, 255 F. Supp.

828 (W. D. Tex. 1966).

The potential for retaliation is not a mere theoretical

possibility in the present case. The Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania has already enacted legislation to prevent the

disposal in that Commonwealth of solid waste collected

from any location in another state that does not accept

solid waste from Pennsylvania. 35 P. S. § 6007 et seq. The

legislation was intended to be retaliatory in operation and

effect (A62). ;

Exclusionary and retaliatory legislation is destructive

to the achievement of national goals. Such enactment

places the well-being of a few over the well-being of the

whole, and can lead to the kind of isolationism that the

commerce clause was intended t» prevent.

50 Brief of Appellants

Mr. Justice Cardozo expressed the principle with great

eloquence. In declaring unconstitutional a statute which

prohibited the sale in New York of milk purchased in

another state at a price lower than the minimum prescribed

by the New York statute, he commented:

“The Constitution was framed under the

dominion of a political philosophy less parochial

in range. It was framed upon the theory that the

peoples of the several states must sink or swim

together, and that in the long run prosperity and

salvation are in union and not division.”

Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, 294 U. S.

511, 523 (1935).

A statute which facially prohibits entry without regard

to condition is “. . . hostile in conception as well as burden-

some in result”. Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. An-

drews, 375 U. S. 361, 377 (1964). It represents discrim-

ination of the most basic kind, and cannot be tolerated to

stand.

2. Legitimate Local Purpose.

Despite the comprehensive regulation of the solid

waste collection and disposal process by various state ad-

ministrative agencies, the New Jersey Supreme Court

found that P. L. 1973, c. 363 served a legitimate local pur-

pose. This conclusion is without reasonable basis.

In 1958, the New Jersey Public Health Council

adopted Chapter VIII-Refuse Disposal as part of the State

Sanitary Code pursuant to authority conferred by

N. J. S. A. 26:1A-7. Chapter VIII prohibited the opera-

tion of dumps and authorized the disposal of solid waste

only through use of

Brief of Appellants 51

“(a) sanitary landfills established, con-

ducted, operated and maintained in accordance

with standards set forth in Regulation 4, 5, and 6

of this Chapter

OR

(b) Incinerators constructed, operated and

maintained in accordance with Code or Regula-

tion of the New Jersey Air Pollution Control

Commission.

| (c) Other methods of disposal as may be

approved by the State Department of Health.”

The regulations collected in Chapter VIII-Refuse Dis-

posal, were adopted, consistently with the mandate in

N. J. S. A. 26:1A-7, “. . . to preserve and improve the public

health in this State.” *

On April 13, 1970, the Public Health Council adopted

a revision of Chapter VIII of the State Sanitary Code which

substantially expanded the previously-existing regulations.

The authorized methods of disposal were not changed or

altered in any way, but additional operational require-

ments were imposed to further protect the public health.

On April 22, 1970, the functions, powers and duties of the

Public Health Council were transferred to and vested in

the Division of Environmental Quality and the Commis-

sioner of the Department of Environmental Protection,

N. J. S. A. 13:1D-7a. Chapter VIII of the State Sanitary

Code was not repealed by the administrative

tion; it remained in full force and effect, under the furis-

diction of the Department of Environmental Protection,

N. J. S. A. 13:1D-15, 13: 1E-66.

26. N State Trenton: N

Suse Denes G heth, on abe BO

52 Brief of Appellants

Approximately three months later, on July 31, 1970,

the New Jersey Solid Waste Management Plan was pub-

lished. Said Plan, approved by the United States Environ-

mental Protection Agency as the official State Plan for New

Jersey, reported with candor:

“There is no technological reason ‘ie we

cannot dispose of solid waste with minimal en-

vironmental harm.

“The Department of Environmental Protec-

tion, under Chapter 39, continues to enforce the

Public Health Council State Sanitary Code as it

pertains to refunse disposal. That is, the Bureau

of Solid Waste Management still has Chapter

VIII of the State Sanitary Code with which to

regulate and assure nuisance-free operation of

disposal sites in conformance with good practice

and health standards.” *

Chapter VIII of the State Sanitary Code continued in

effect until July 1, 1974, when it was superceded by the

Rules of the Bureau of Solid Waste Management,

N. J. A. C. 7:26-1 et seq. in adopting said Rules, the

Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Pro-

tection commented: “No rule was altered in such a way as

to provide less protection to the public health, safety or

welfare than provided by the Chapter VIII regulations,”

(A126).

The principal environmental engineer of the Bureau

of Solid Waste management was more direct in his assess-

ment of the Rules. During a deposition conducted on

March 13, 1974, he grudgingly admitted that the Rules as

27. New Jersey State Solid Waste per ad Plan (Newark:

Planners Associates, Inc., 1970) at pp. 2 78.

Brief of Appellants 53

then proposed were entirely adequate to protect the health,

safety and welfare of the people of New Jersey and the

quality of its environment (A109).

The Rules, which are extremely comprehensive in

nature, provide that the exclusive methods by which solid

waste may be disposed in New Jersey are through use of:

“a. Sanitary landfills established, operated

and maintained in accordance with the regula-

tions set forth in this subchapter.

“b. Incinerators constructed, operated and

maintained in accordance with Regulations of the

New Jersey State Department of Environmental

Protection promulgated under authority of the

Air Pollution Control Act 1954 and regulations

set forth in this subchapter.

“c. Transfer station, composting facility, re-

source recovery or other processing facility, con-

structed and operated in accordance with regu-

lations set forth in this subchapter.”

N. J. A. C. 7:26-2.1.2

Dumps are expressly prohibited. N. J. A. C.7:26-2.1.1.

No person may engage in the disposal of solid waste

in New Jersey without having first obtained approval of a

registration statement and engineering design from the

Department of Environmental Protection. N. J. A. C.

7:26-2.2.2; 7:26-2.2.3. Designs for sanitary landfills, in-

cinerators, and other methods of disposal must be prepared

by a New Jersey licensed professional engineer and sub-

mitted to the Bureau of Solid Waste Management for its

review, N. J. A. C. 7:26-2.4. In addition to other require-

ments, each engineering design for a sanitary landfill must

include (a) a designation of the property or portion thereof

54 Brief of Appellants

for which approval is being sought; (b) contours and pro-

posed final elevations; (c) proposed sequence of develop-

ment; (d) soil borings; (e) soil classifications; (f) soil

profile and aquifer information; (g) geological and ground

water data; (h) identification of registered wells and pub-

lic buildings within a one-half mile radius; (i) surface and

subsurface drains; (j) leachate collection system, if ap-

plicable; (k) profile views for excavation, and grades and

elevations for dikes, berms or other pollution protection

devices or techniques; (1) proposed landscaping, beauti-

fication and screening techniques; (m) gas venting and

monitoring system; (n) ground water monitoring wells;

and (o) estimated capacity. N. J. A. C. 7:26-2.12.2.

Special emphasis is placed upon the control and elim-

ination of ground and surface water pollution at sanitary

landfill sites. To accomplish this objective N. J. A. C

7:26-2.5.4 provides, in pertinent part:

“No new sanitary landfill shall be conducted,

nor shall an existing landfill continue to be con-

ducted where the solid waste, in whole or in part,

or the leachate produced as a result of the sanitary

landfill, impairs the quality of the surface or

ground waters of this state to a degree that would

degrade the quality of either the surface or

ground waters of this state beyond the classifica-

tion established by the Department for the surface

water in question or the potable water standard

established by the Department in the case of

ground water.” (A247)

In addition, N. J. A. C. 7:26-2.5.22 requires the in-

stallation of ground water monitoring systems as a condi-

tion precedent to the operation of a new sanitary landfill

or the expansion of an existing facility:

Brief of Appellants 55

“No new solid waste facility shall begin op-

erations without first installing a ground water

monitoring system constructed and located in

accordance with instructions furnished by the

Department. Further, no new facility shall be-

gin operations prior to obtaining ground water

samples, and analyses thereof, for the purpose of

establishing baseline information.” (A249)

The Department of Environmental Protection can re-

quire the installation of an impermeable liner (A282),

where necessary, to create a barrier between the

solid waste and exposed surfaces that would otherwise be

unsatisfactory for land disposal purposes.

Gas venting systems must be installed at every exist-

ing sanitary landfill site, and at every new facility, as a

condition of continued operation. In this connection,

N. J. A. C. 7.26-2.5.21 provides:

56 Brief of Appellants

structures on or adjacent to the facility be per-

mitted.” (A249) !

In addition to the aforesaid, a sanitary landfill must

effectively control scattering of papers and other light-

weight material, N. J. A. C. 7:26-2.5.6, dust, N. J. A. C.

7:26-2.5.7, odor, N. J. A. C. 7:26-2.5.8, and insects and

rodents, N. J. A. C. 7:26-2.5.12. Other stringent and care-

fully conceived operational requirements, too numerous

to mention, are also imposed by the Rules.

The situation with respect to the regulation of in-

cineration is much the same. The construction and op-

eration of incinerators for solid waste disposal is governed

by both the Rules of the Bureau of Solid Waste Manage-

ment, and by the Rules of the Bureau of Air Pollution

Control, N. J. A. C. 7:27-11.1 et seq.

No person may construct a new incinerator, or use a

new or altered incinerator, unless a “Permit to Construct,

Install or Alter Control Apparatus or Equipment” and a

“Certificate to Operate Control Apparatus or Equipment”

have first been obtained from the Bureau of Air Pollution

Control, Department of Environmental Protection, N. J.

A. C. 7:27-11.4. In order to assure that incinerators and

control equipment will not pollute the air,

“The Department may require such details

regarding the equipment or control apparatus as

it considers necessary to determine that the equip-

ment or control apparatus is designed to operate

without causing a violation of any provisions of

the New Jersey Air Pollution Control Act or aay

provisions of codes, rules or regulations promul-

gated hereunder... .”

N. J. A. C. 7:27-8.4(b)

Brief of Appellants 57

The Rules of the Bureau of Air Pollution Control con-

tain specific emission standards with respect to particles

emission, smoke emission, unburned waste or ash emis-

sion, and odor emission, N. J. A. C. 7:27-11.4. Most im-

portantly, an incinerator cannot be coiistructed or used

unless it is “. . . effective for the purpose of air pollution

control”. N. J. A. C. 7:27-11.2. See also N. J. A. C. 7:27-

5.2(a) being a regulation of general applicability which

prohibits the emission into the outdoor atmosphere of sub-

stances in quantities which shall result in air pollution.

es burning is specifically prohibited, N. J. A. C. 7:27-

An incinerator cannot be used for solid waste disposal

purposes until an engineering design prepared by a New

Jersey licensed professional engineer has been filed with

and approved by the Bureau of Solid Waste Management.

Such design must contain information with respect to (a)

rated capacity, (b) current and anticipated daily loadings,

(c) unloading and storage facilities, (d) emergency stor-

age facilities, (e) alternate unloading locations, (f) rodent

and odor control techniques, ‘{g) daily residue tonnage,

(h) disposal location of residue, and (i) accompanying re-

— or reclamation activity, if any. N. J. A. C. 7:26-

The Rules regulate the operation as well as the design

of incinerator facilities. Areas where putrescible waste is

stored or deposited must be cleaned within each twenty-

four hour period, and no such waste may be stored longer

than twenty-four hours without acceptable treatment to

prevent putrefaction. N. J. A. C. 7:26-2.11.1; 7:26-2.11.2.

A program to control the scattering of papers and other

lightweight material, N. J. A. C. 7:26-2.11.3, dust,

N. J. A. C. 7:26-2.11.4, odors, N. J. A. C. 7:26-2.11.5, and

58 Brief of Appellants

insects and rodents, N. J. A. C. 7:26-2.11.8 must be imple-

mented at each facility.” :

The New Jersey Department of Environmental Pro-

tection is not the only state administrative agency au-

thorized to supervise the operation of solid waste facilities.

Regulatory control is independently conferred upon, and

may be exercised by, the Board of Public Utility Com-

missioners. N. J. S. A. 48:2-23 provides as follows:

“The board may, after hearing, upon notice,

by order in writing, require any public utility to

furnish safe, adequate and proper service, includ-

ing furnishing and performance of service in a

manner that tends to conserve and preserve the

quality of the environment and prevent the pol-

lution of the waters, land and air of this State,

and to maintain its property and equipment in

such condition as to enable it to do so.”

It is within this regulatory framework that the

New Jersey Supreme Court upheld P. L. 1973, c. 363, as

being a reasonable, non-discriminatory exercise of the

State’s police power which does not unduly burden inter-

state commerce.

Although a state has a responsibility to protect its

people and their property, it is well-established that a

police regulation which affects interstate commerce must

not go beyond the necessities of the particular case. Reid

v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137, 151 (1902); Smith v. St. Louis

and Southwestern Ry. Co. 181 U. S. 248, 256 (1901).

The prohibition imposed by P. L. 1973 c. 363, § 2, is

not directed against treatment or disposal at all: it is

specifically directed against entry. The effect of the statute

28. For other regulations, see N. J. A. C. 7:26-2.11 entitled:

General Operational Requirements for Incinerators, Transfer

Stations, Processing Facility, and Resource Recovery Facilities.

Brief of Appellants 59

is both to prohibit entry and to prevent every adminis-

tratively authorized and regulated form of disposal, whether

expected to do injury to the inhabitants of the state or not.

| Even if the New Jersey Supreme Court was correct

in finding that the preservation of land represented a legiti-

mate local purpose.”

“, . . extending the lifespan of existing land-

fills and thereby preserving further acreage from

use as disposal sites is a legitimate and valid ex-

ercise of the police power of the State.”

Hackensack Meadowlands v. Mun.

Landfill Auth., 68 N. J., supra, at 472.

then there was still no basis to prohibit (a) entry, and

(b) other authorized and regulated forms of disposal, in-

cluding resource recovery and incineration.

The statute went far beyond what was reasonable

and necessary in order to accomplish its purpose.

It is interesting that “garbage to be fed to swine in

the State of New Jersey” is statutorily excepted from the

otherwise unlimited embargo imposed by P. L. 1973, c.

363. The word “garbage” is not synonymous or co-exten-

sive with, but is narrower than, the term “solid waste”.

It is a word of art, separately defined in New Jersey as:

“, . » all putrescible animal and vegetable

wastes resulting from the handling, preparation,

cooking and consumption of . . . food. . . .”

N. J. A. C. 12:100-2.1 (Emphasis added )

29, Tr oui topes be haan nov the peste cet

pre n Aoie coll iat, ad Bak serena. cheyld not, be

to that purpose. There is no evi in the record

or among the competent authorities, to this view. Quite

60 Brief of Appellants

Putrescible waste ® has a greater potential for harm

to the public health than bulky waste,” construction

waste * or demolition waste.” Yet garbage to be fed to

swine can freely enter New Jersey, while non-putrescible

wastes and garbage intended for other purposes cannot.

Although P. L. 1973, c. 363 contains a Legislative

finding

“_ . that the public, health, safety, and wel-

fare require that the treatment and disposal

within this State of all wastes generated outside

of the State be prohibited”,

N. J. S. A. 13:1I-9. (Emphasis added)

the Commissioner of the Department of Environmental

Protection is specifically empowered to find that the entry

of solid and liquid waste collected in another state

“ .. can be permitted without endangering the

public health, safety and welfare. . . .”

N. J. S. A. 13:11-10.

30. N. J. A. C. 7:26-1.4.46—“Any waste liable to enter into a

state of putrefaction, the typically anaerobic splitting of proteins

31. N. J. A. C. 7:26-1.4.3—“Large items of solid waste which

because of their size or weight requires handling other than nor-

mally used for municipal solid waste. Bulky waste includes but is

not Limited to such items as tree trunks, auto bodies, demolition or

construction material, appliances, furniture, and drums.”

32. N. J. A. C. 7:26-1.4.14—“Waste building material and refuse

resulting from construction, remodeling, and repels operstions om

houses, commercial buildings, pavements, and structures.”

33. N. J. A. C. 7:26-1.4.17—“Waste generated from the razing

of buildings, factories, and other man-made structures, including

streets, roads, and fences.”

Brief of Appellants 61

This presents a paradox of the first order: if the pro-

hibition against treatment and disposal of out-of-state

wastes is actually required to protect the public health,

safety and welfare, as found by the legislature, then a

delegation of power to the Commissioner of the Depart-

ment of Environmental Protection to permit and regulate

the entry of wastes for treatment and disposal is incon-

sistent and unexercisable; conversely, if the Commissioner

determines, pursuant to the power delegated to him by the

legislature, that wastes generated in another state can

enter New Jersey without adversely affecting the public

health, safety and welfare, then the legislative finding is

erroneous.

Sixteen days after the enactment of P. L. 1973, c.

363, and in accordance with the authority granted to him

in said legislation, the Commissioner adopted N. J. A. C.

7:1-4 as an emergency regulation to become effective

on the same date as the statute, February 1, 1974. Al-

though said rule followed P. L. 1973, c. 363 in declaring

a general prohibition against the entry into New Jersey

of solid or liquid waste collected outside the State,

“No person shall bring into this State, or ac-

cept for disposal in this State, any solid or liquid

waste which originated or was collected outside

the territorial limits of this State,”

certain designated wastes including pesticides, hazardous

waste and chemical waste entering the State solely for

processing or treatment were excepted from the general-

ized entry ban. N. J. A. C. 7:14.2. This action by the

Commissioner was exceedingly significant for at least two

reasons: (a) contrary to a contemporaneous legislative

finding, it demonstrated that the public health, safety and

62 Brief of Appellants

welfare, in actuality, did not require that the entry of all

wastes generated outside the State be prohibited, and (b)

if substances noxiously designated “hazardous waste”

could be carried into New Jersey and treated therein

without further regulation of transportation, then it fol-

lows that the mere entry and treatment of any other less

hazardous waste does not endanger the public health,

safety and welfare.

The legitimacy of the legislative finding in P. L. 1973,

c. 363, § 1 was implicitly challenged by the Commissioner

by the adoption of N. J. A. C. 7:1-4. Said emergency

regulation was predicated upon an immediate serious

threat to the public health, safety and welfare if certain

solid and liquid wastes were excluded from New Jersey

(A93):

“Wuereas, the imminent ban upon the im-

portation into this State of wastes intended for re-

source recovery and recycling facilities, and of

those hazardous chemical, pesticide, bulk liquid

and bulk semi-liquid wastes intended for treat-

ment, processing or recovery facilities presents

both and immediate and long-term peril to pub-

lic health, safety and welfare ....” (Emphasis

added )

Part of the “peril” identified by the Commissioner

was the economic survival of certain solid waste facilities

(A93): .

“Wuereas, the proper treatment, processing

or recovery of hazardous, chemical, pesticide,

bulk liquid and bulk semi-liquid wastes fre-

quently requires the use of elaborate processes

and equipment; and

Brief of Appellants 63

“WHEREAS, it is apparent that the economic

survival of solid waste facilities utilizing such

elaborate processes and equipment for the proper

treatment, processing or recovery of . . . wastes

generated within the State is dependent upon

the acceptance of those wastes generated or col-

lected outside the territorial limits of this State;

..++ (Emphasis added )

The Commissioner’s remarks with respect to economic

survival are especially noteworthy and equally applicable

to sanitary landfill and incineration sites where the cost of

land, equipment and environmental controls is staggering

o 270 art wal a fact equally recognized by the

ew Jersey ture, P. L. 1975, c. , $3,

N. J. > 13: 1E-2c. weenie

inherent danger involved in adop a statute

which excludes all commerce, a tepeye Ue sub-

sequent, is that articles of commerce may, unintentionally

or otherwise, be unconstitutionally caught in the prohibi-

tion. That is precisely what has happened here. Of the

many examples which might be postulated, one will

Automobile bodies are included in the general cate-

gory of “bulky waste” as defined by the Rules of the

Bureau of Solid Waste Management, N. J. A. C. 7:26-1.4.3.

The word “disposal” is not limited to final disposition, but

also contemplates storage, treatment, utilization and

processing, N. J. A. C. 7:26-1.4.20. Thus, the transporta-

tion of automobile bodies into New Jersey for storage pend-

ing subsequent shipment to an out-of-state site is pro-

hibited by P. L. 1973, c. 363 and by N. J. A. C. 7:1-4.

It is clear, therefore, that the power conferred upon

the Commissioner to permit the entry of solid and liquid

wastes which are otherwise prohibited by P. L. 1973, c.

363 does not save the statute from an attack on Commerce

64 Brief of Appellants

Clause grounds.” Rather, it illustrates the critical weak-

ness and manifest impropriety of the statute. All out-of-

state. wastes are excluded until the Commissioner

affirmatively acts. The Commissioner is neither compelled

to act nor to deal with solid and liquid wastes collected

within the state. And once adopted, regulations may be

amended or repealed, at will, with relative ease.”

On June 28, 1974, approximately six months after the

enactment of P. L. 1973, c. 363, the Commissioner of the

Department of Environmental Protection adopted the

Rules of the Bureau of Solid Waste Management. Ac-

cording to the principal environmental engineer of the

Bureau, the collection and disposal of solid waste in ac-

cordance with said rules does not pose any substantial or

material threat to the health, welfare and safety of the

people of New Jersey or to the quality of the environ-

ment (A109). That being the case, one is hard-pressed

to discern the reason why the Commissioner, by his in-

action, permits the exclusion of out-of-state waste to con-

tinue. Since there is no qualitative difference between

solid waste which originates or is collected outside the

34. Although the New Jersey Supreme Court to view

N.J. A. C. 7:1 op Raning © commas Cae ont . 1973, c. 363,

Hackensack Me v. Mun. Landfill Auth., 68 N. J.,

at 468, Appellants respectfully submit that cmmnet to ibe

quad to's date cdaiaiteaive quay ty os eneuatietient

statute. Even if they could, the ency regulations adopted by

the Commissioner continue to accepted subjects of com-

merce.

35. N. J. A. C. 7:1-4 was adopted t to that section of

the New J Administrative Procedure Act, N. J. S. A

to

Brief of Appellants 65

State of New Jersey and that which originates or is col-

lected within the State (A21, 100), the discriminatory

treatment against interstate commerce is inexplicable. For

example, if solid waste collected in New Jersey can be in-

cinerated in accordance with regulations adopted by the

New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection,

what harm can be done by permitting the incineration of

qualitatively identical wastes collected outside the State?

To ask the question is to answer it.

The disposal of solid waste in accordance with pres-

ently existing laws and regulations and in conformance

with sound engineering practices** does not present a

serious threat to health or environmental safety. Appellees

have never, by affidavit, disputed this conclusion, which is

generally accepted throughout the United States.

In Horn v. Community Refuse Disposal, Inc., 186

Neb. 43, 180 N. W. 2d 691 (Sup. Ct. 1970), plaintiffs

brought an action to enjoin the establishment and opera-

tion of a sanitary landfill. The court denied the applica-

tion saying:

“The evidence is persuasive that it is pos-

sible to operate a sanitary landfill so that it will

not emit offensive odors, pollute ground waters,

or be attractive to rodents. The rules and regu-

lations adopted in 1969 enforcible by the State

Department of Health under statutory authority

are reasonably designed to produce that result.”

Horn v. Community Refuse Disposal,

180 N. W. 2d, supra, at 692.

The overwhelmingly accepted rule is that incinerators

and sanitary landfills which are properly maintained and

Management precedent

landfill or the of ee Bt

wa! or expansion of any existing facility. N. J

66 Brief of Appellants

operated are not public nuisances; Wood v. Town of Wil-

ton, 156 Conn. 304, 240 A. 2d 904 (Sup. Ct. 1968); Rocchi

v. Zoning Bd. of App. of Town of Glastonbury, 157 Conn.

106, 248 A. 2d 922 (Sup: Ct. 1968); Myers v. City of

Hagerstown, 214 Md. 312, 135 A. 2d. 147 (Ct. App. 1957)

(and cases therein cited); Annotation, “Public Dump as

Nuisance’, 52 ALR 2d 1134.

All too often, the words “sanitary landfill” and “dump”

are confused with one another.” They are very different

entities.** The Rules of the Bureau of Solid Waste Man-

agement define a sanitary landfill as:

37. See Municipal — Disposal, 3rd ed. (Chicago: Public

Administration Service, 1970), pg. 93, wherein it is stated:

Although the sanitary landfill as a method of refuse dis-

posal was given a clean bill of health many years ago, its

tance by the public is still far from unanimous. The

public has too often heard the terms “landfill”, “dump”,

and “sanitary landfill” used interchangeably and does not

understand the difference between a sanitary landfill and

a landfill or dump. ‘Unfortunately there are too many

disposal facilities labeled “sanitary landfills” which are

glaringly deficient in some of the essential elements. The

968 National Survey shows that 94 cent of all landfill

refuse disposal projects fall short o ee with all

criteria for fully acceptable operations. resulting

public image of sanitary landfills has been damaging.

A well-located, well-designed, and efficiently operated

sanitary landfill meets public health standards and re-

quirements for control of air and water pollution, fire,

and nuisances:

1. Vector breeding .or sustenance is prevented by

eliminating harborage and food supply for rats, flies, and

other vermin.

2. Air pollution by dust, smoke, and odor is controlled.

3. Fire hazards are controlled during tional

phases. (They are negligible in a completed all.)

4. Pollution of surface and ground waters is pre-

cluded.

5. All nuisance factors are effectively controlled; i.e.,

Se quan © ey aap bio and taize is hunt ts

a um.

38. Pictorial illustrations of a “sanitary landfill” and a “dump”

appear on the sheet facing this page.

Brief of Appellants 67

“The land disposal site employing an engi-

neered method of disposal of solid waste in a

manner that minimizes environmental hazards,

including, but not limited to the spreading of

the solid waste in thin layers, compacting the

waste to the smallest practical volume, and ap-

plying cover material on a daily or more fre-

quent basis.”

N. J. A. C. 7:26-1.4.54 (Emphasis

added )

A dump, on the other hand, is separately defined as:

“A land site at which solid waste is disposed

of in a manner which does not protect the en-

vironment, is susceptible to open burning, or is

exposed to the elements, vectors, and scavengers.”

N. J. A. C. 7:26-1.4.23.

When dumps were determined to be hazardous to

human health, their operation was entirely prohibited in

the State of New Jersey, N. J. A. C. 7:26-2.1.1. No distinc-

tion was made between dumps which accepted for disposal

solid waste collected within New Jersey and those which

accepted waste collected outside the State. The regula-

tion acted in a non-discriminatory, even-handed manner

in addressing a legitimate public problem. It was the

method of disposal which posed a substantial threat to

public health and environmental quality, not the sub-

stances disposed of or the place of their origin.

Environmental hazards are minimized by the sanitary

landfill disposal method, and by incineration, due to the

emphasis placed upon design and sanitary operation.

Origin of wastes is not related to these criteria. The de-

68 Brief of Appellants

gree to which a disposal mode presents a threat to public

health and environmental quality is entirely within the

regulatory control of the State.

The legitimate local interests of the State have al-

ready been protected, without exclusion, by the adoption

of state administrative regulations applicable alike to in-

trastate commerce and interstate commerce.

3. Effect Upon Interstate Commerce.

The direct burden imposed upon interstate commerce

by the adoption of P. L. 1973, c. 363 is obvious and severe.

Prohibitory legislation affects interstate commerce in a

most basic and fundamental sense. As stated by Mr. Jus-

tice McKenna in Oklahoma v. Kansas Nat. Gas Co., 221

U. S., supra, at 249, “. . . to prohibit interstate commerce

is more than to indirectly affect it.”

P. L. 1973, c. 363 directly prohibits the interstate dis-

posal of solid and liquid waste. It is not unique in that re-

spect. Since 1969, seven states have adopted laws which,

to varying degrees, prohibit the disposal of solid waste

collected in another state.** Three other states have fm-

posed various regulatory limitations.** The effect of these

enactments is to retard, if not to entirely obviate, the na-

tional goal of achieving interstate cooperation in confront-

ing the solid waste disposal problem (A57, 58). |

More than ten years ago, Congress identified solid

waste disposal as a problem of national concern. In 1965

39. Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Penn-

sylvania, Rhode Island and Vermont.

On December 30, 1974, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

enacted legislation to prevent the disposal in that Commonwealth

of solid waste collected from any location in another state that

does not accept solid waste from Pennsylvania. This legislation

was surely paren by, and retaliatorily directed against, the

prohibitory legislation adopted in New Jersey.

40. Delaware, Illinois and Louisiana.

Brief of Appellants 69

it enacted the Solid Waste Disposal Act, Pub. L. 89-272,

for the purpose of promoting “a national research and de-

velopment program for new and improved methods of

proper and economic solid waste disposal”, 42 U. S. C.

§ 3251(b)(1), and providing financial resources to ac-

complish same. Five years later, the Resource Recovery

Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-512 was adopted to underscore the

importance of resource recovery. In both cases, the Secre-

tary of Health, Education and Welfare {now the Adminis-

trator of the Environmental Protection Agency) was di-

rected to “. . . encourage cooperative activities by the

States . . . encourage, where practicable, interstate, inter-

local, and regional planning . . .; and encourage the en-

actment of improved and, so far as practicable, uniform

state and local laws governing solid waste disposal”. 42

U. S.C. § 3254.

_Prohibitory and retaliatory legislation is clearly alien

to the expressed congressional intent. It creates a climate

attuned to inhibit rather than to promote the national

interest; and it will lead to an escalation in the cost of solid

waste collection and disposal, which is already significant.

An estimated $3 billion was spent annually for solid

waste col'ection and disposal at the time of the adoption

of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U. S. C. § 3251 et seq.,

1965 U. S. Code, Cong. and Adm. News, p. 3614. The cost

of said service reached an estimated $4.5 billion by 1970,

1970 U. S. Code, Cong. and Adm. News, p. 4553. The

House Report noted:

“The greatest amount of the moneys spent

goes for collecting solid waste and transporting

it to some place where it may be dumped or

burned.”

1970 U. S. Code, Cong. and Adm. News,

p. 4553.

70 Brief of Appellants

An identical conclusion was reached independently by

the Bureau of Solid Waste Management (A75) which

noted: “. . . The collection and haulage of our solid waste

accounts for 75 to 85 percent of the total collection/ dis-

posal costs... .”

Although the New Jersey Supreme Court held that

P. L. 1973, c. 363 did not discriminate against interstate

commerce in an economic sense, it recognized the obvious

economic impact of its decision upon interstate commerce:

“The City of Yonkers has access to the Croton

dump in New York at a modest increase in cost

of five dollars per ton. Philadelphia's stated al-

ternatives are either to install adequate air pol-

lution devices in their existing incinerators or to

establish new landfill sites outside the city, which

would require the purchase of additional disposal

trucks.”

Hackensack Meadowlands wv. Mun.

Landfill Auth., 68 N. J., supra, at 476.

The New Jersey Department of Environmental Pro-

tection estimates that 1.5 million tons of solid waste orig-

inating outside of the State was buried in New Jersey in

1971. Hackensack Meadowlands v. Mun. Landfill Auth.,

68 N. J., supra, at 461. If the cost of disposing of solid

waste is increased at the same “modest” rate of five dollars

per ton postulated for the City of Yonkers, then yearly

disposal costs for out-of-state waste would increase by a

staggering $7.5 million. Furthermore, Appellant City of

Philadelphia has averred that the cost of incineration facili-

ties complying with federal and state air pollution stand-

ards would cost approximately $100,000,000 (A264).

These costs are hardly insignificant.

But that is not all. Economic harm will likely be suf-

fered by New Jersey in its efforts to dispose of the solid

Brief of Appellants 71

waste collected within its borders. Since a direct relation-

ship exists, in land disposal of solid waste, between cost

and distance to disposal site, communities located in

northern New Jersey will no doubt look to southern New

York and eastern Pennsylvania, rather than to southern

New Jersey, when existing landfill sites situated in the

northern part of the state are consumed in an estimated 3

years. Hackensack Meadowlands ». Mun. Landfill Auth.,

68 N. J., supra, at 461. These communities will be im-

mediately foreclosed from seeking disposal alternatives in

Pennsylvania, either now or in the future, because re-

taliatory legislation has been adopted by that Common-

wealth, 35 P. S. § 6007. Furthermore. the prohibition

against interstate treatment and disposal of solid waste will

inevitably lead to the diminishment and termination of

sanitary landfill business in New Jersey (A44, 254, 271,

281), with attendant increase of disposal costs to persons

presently relying upon said sites.

According to estimates prepared by the New Jersey

Department of Environmental Protection, the exclusion of

out-of-state solid waste would increase the anticipated

existing landfill life in New Jersey by a mere 8%. This

potential loss, which is already inconsiderable, is of no

special concern in light of available sites which may here-

after be developed for sanitary landfill purposes. In an

affidavit submitted to the trial court, it was unequivocally

stated by two New Jersey licensed professional engineers

(A61) that there is no scarcity of land in the State which

could be used for solid waste disposal:

“There is unlimited suitable available acre-

age in the State of New Jersey for sanitary landfill

purposes which could be developed in accordance

with existing and proposed regulations of the

New Jersey Department of Environmental Pro-

tection.”

72 Brief of Appellants

No affidavit has been filed to refute the truth or ac-

curacy of that assertion, although many opportunities have

been presented to do so.

Engineering designs for sites capable of handling mil-

lions of tons of solid waste have already been filed with the

New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection or

are presently being developed (A275-289). This is simply

a reflection of the immutable principle that private indus-

try responds to consumer demand.

Ironically, as of March 13, 1974, the New Jersey De-

partment of Environmental Protection made no effort to

calculate the total acreage available for sanitary landfill

purposes in the State of New Jersey (A112), or to de-

termine the location and availability of facilities which

presently exist or may hereafter be developed outside the

State of New Jersey (A115). It is distressing indeed that

the method adopted by the State to provide for the disposal

of its own solid waste is to prohibit the disposal, in pri-

vately owned and operated sanitary landfills, of waste col-

lected or originating outside the State.

Tonnage figures associated with solid waste disposal

appear at first glance and without explanatory remarks, to

be overwhelming. They are, in reality, of no special sig-

nificance. A sanitary landfill site consisting of 200 acres,

filled to a depth of 50 feet, and operated in compliance

with the regulations of the New Jersey Department of En-

vironmental Protection, wou!d remain fully operational to

dispose of 10,000 tons of solid waste per week for a period

of approximately 12.4 (111) to 15 years (A61, 275).

Assuming for the sake of argument, that approximately

10,000 tons of solid waste per week are being brought into

New Jersey from the City of Philadelphia and disposed of

in this State (A70), it would take at least 12.4 years to fill

a single 200 acre site! And such site could thereafter be

Brief of Appellants 73

used for industrial, commercial, recreational, or green

acres purposes (A276-277).

In wording and in practical effect, P. L. 1973, c. 363

imposes a direct and intolerable burden upon interstate

commerce.

Cc.

Appellants Were Unconstitutionally Denied a Plenary

Hearing on the Merits of Their Claim.

In granting Appellants’ motion for summary judgment

on March 25, 1974, the New Jersey Superior Court, Law

Division, declared P. L. 1973, c. 363 unconstitutional as a

matter of law on the ground that same discriminates

against interstate commerce.

The statements made by Mr. Justice Brennan, when

he sat upon the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Judson v.

Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N. J. 57, 74

(1954), continue to represent the definitive expression of

the standards of decision governing the grant or denial of

a summary judgment motion:

“It is designed to provide a prompt business-

like and inexpensive method of disposing of any

cause which a discriminating search of the merits

in the pleadings, depositions and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits submitted on the

The standards of decision governing the

grant or denial of a summary judgment empha-

size that a party opposing a motion is not to be

denied a trial unless the moving party sustains

the burden of showing clearly the absence of a

74 Brief of Appellants

ing care so as not to defeat a summary judgment

if the movant is justly entitled to one.” (Em-

phasis added )

Appellants motion for summary judgment was based

only upon those Commerce Clause issues which did not

involve questions of material fact. They acknowledged

the existence of other issues upon which summary judg-

ment could not be granted (A120).

The trial judge’s opinion reveals his determination as

a matter of federal constitutional law, (a) that the trans-

portation of solid or liquid waste across state lines is a

legitimate subject of interstate commerce, and (b) that

P. L. 1973, c. 363, on its face, discriminates against inter-

state commerce. Had the trial court not reached those

conclusions, appellants’ motion for summary judgment

would have been denied, and the plenary hearing sched-

uled for April 15, 1974, would have been conducted.

By their notice of appeal (A216) Appellees appealed

to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division:

“ . . from the final judgment of the Supe-

rior Court, Law Division, Mercer County, en-

tered on March 26, 1974, by the Honorable

George Y. Schoch, declaring P. L. 1973, c. 363

unconstitutional as violative of Art. 1, Section 8,

Clause 3 of the Constitution of the United States

in favor of plaintiffs, City of Philadelphia, Penn-

sylvania, City of Glen Cove, Long Island, New

York, Landfill and Development Company, MAC

Sanitary Landfill, Inc., Kinsley’s Landfill, Inc.

and DeLorenzo-Interstate Waste Removal Co.,

Inc.”

Said notice of appeal also contained a certification

that a plenary hearing had never been held before the

trial court:

Brief of Appellants 75

“I hereby certify that there was no testimony

taken in the above case. The matter was de-

cided on summary judgment.”

Appellees did not appeal from the denial of their

cross-motion for partial summary judgment. If they did,

and leave to file an interlocutory appeal was granted by

the Superior Court, Appellate Division, the only relief to

which Appellees would have been entitled was a partial

summary judgment and a remand for a hearing of the

numerous remaining issves of material fact.

Although the New Jersey Supreme Court agreed that

the transportation and disposal of solid waste represented

2 legitimate subject of interstate commerce, it did not

agree that P. L. 1973, c. 363 discriminated against inter-

state commerce. However, instead of reversing the deci-

sion of the trial court and remanding the matter for a

hearing on the material factual issues presented by the

complaint, it disposed of the entire matter by upholding

the constitutionality of the statute. Appellants were

thereby entirely deprived of an opportunity to present

evidence on the reasonableness of the exercise of the

State's police power and the extent of the burden upon

interstate commerce. They were also deprived of their

right to present evidence with respect to the numerous

non-Commerce Clause issues raised by their complaint.

This result was incomprehensible. Appellees had

never urged that they were entitled to judgment, as a mat-

ter of law, on the merits of the entire action. Quite to the

contrary, they specifically argued to the trial court that

there were numerous unresolved questions of material fact

(A121-122):

“At this stage of the litigation sub judice the

Court has not had an opportunity to consider any

76 Brief of Appellants

of the relevant facts and circumstances except

affidavits submitted in favor of and in opposition

to the issuance of ad interim restraints.

Among those proofs which the court must con-

sider are: the nature and extent of the dangers

to the health, safety, welfare and environment of

New Jersey presented by the disposal of wastes

in New Jersey; the nature and extent of the solid

waste crisis in New Jersey; the rapid exhaustion

of landfill life in New Jersey; the volume of out-

of-state waste being disposec of in New Jersey;

the severe limiting effects on the future develop-

ment of property which has been used for sani-

tary landfill purposes; the extent of the effect on

interstate commerce.”

Appellants petitioned the New Jersey Supreme Court

to reconsider their decision. They pointed out that a

plenary hearing had never been held on any issue raised

by the complaint, including the reasonableness of the

exercise of the State’s police power and the extent of its

burden upon interstate commerce, and that P. L. 1973, c.

363 was not being attacked on Commerce Clause grounds

alone.“

After considering appellants’ arguments, the New

Jersey Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court

_ . . for such further proceedings, if any, that that Court

may deem appropriate... . .” (A340). No guidance was

given to the trial court as to what proceedings, if any,

might be “deemed appropriate” by the New Jersey

Supreme Court in light of its decision, on the merits, that

4l. counts in the complaint challenged P. L. 1973,

363 on sooense, equal pootection of the lowe and impeliment

of the obligation of contract grounds, among others.

Brief of Appellants 77

P. L. 1973, c. 363 represented a reasonable exercise of

the State’s police power and did not unreasonably burden

interstate commerce. Said decision was neither altered

nor amended in connection with the remand. In addition,

the Court refused to retain jurisdiction and specifically

prohibited the trial court from granting any interim in-

junctive relief. After effectively depriving appellants of

their day in court on the merits of their complaint, the

Court also foreclosed appellants from pursuing procedural

remedies in the trial court.

The net effect of these rulings was not only to place

appellants in a substantially worse position than they would

have been in had their motion for summary judgment ini-

tially been denied by the trial court, but also to deprive

them of a most basic and fundamental right: appellants

were never afforded an opportunity to be heard prior to a

final determination by the New Jersey Supreme Court that

P. L. 1973, c. 363 (a) represented a reasonable exercise of

the State’s police power, and (b) did not unreasonably

burden interstate commerce. In addition, they were fore-

closed from obtaining injunctive relief pending a resolution

of “. . such further proceedings, if any, that . . . [the

trial } Court may deem appropriate... .

As a practical consequence of this action,‘ appellants

were constrained to dismiss, with prejudice, each and

every count in their complaint which had not been directly

addressed by the New Jersey Supreme Court, so that a

direct appeal could be taken to this Court.

Appellants respectfully contend that they have been

denied due process of law by the New Jersey Supreme

duak by Ep comeaen of Se tee oa

me eh ae eh

reparable harm. a) to be consistent with the conclusion

reached by Mr. Justice Brennan, who stayed the mandate of the

New Jersey Supreme Court.

78 Brief of Appellants

Court, in violation of the 5th and 14th amendments to the

Constitution of the United States, and in contravention of

the decisions of this Court.

The principle of federal constitutional law applicable

to the case at bar has been reiterated time and time again

by the United States Supreme Court:

“The fundamental requisite of due process of law

is the opportunity to be heard.”

Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 394

(1914); Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co.,

339 U. S. 306 (1950).

An opportunity to be heard includes an opportunity to

present a case and to be heard in its support. Brinkerhoff-

Faris Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S$. 673, 681 (1930). Although

appellants scrupulously followed the procedural rules in-

hering in the courts in the State of New Jersey, they were

entirely deprived of an opportunity to be heard at a

meaningful time and in a meaningful manner in order to

defend their substantive right. They had no opportunity

to be heard on the merits of any issue of material fact

raised by their complaint prior to the final determination.

Rhodes v. Houston, 202 F. Supp. 624 (Neb. 1962), affd

309 F. 2d 959 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. den. 372 U. S. 909

(1963), 383 U. S. 971 (1966).

The denial of this fundamental right was raised to the

New Jersey Supreme Court at a conference meeting in the

presence of appellees on November 18, 1975, the very

same day that the case sub judice was decided. Accord-

ingly, the additional federal claim presented by the within

due process argument was raised by appellants at their

very first opportunity. Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v. Hill, 281

U. S., supra, at 678. It was asserted a second time less

than two weeks later in a motion addressed to the New

Brief of Appellants 79

Jersey Supreme Court which resulted in the aforesaid

order remanding the case to the trial court “. . . for such

further proceedings, if any, that that Court may deem

appropriate... .”

Upon appellants’ consent to dismiss all counts of its

complaint except Counts I, VII and XIX, no further pro-

(oar were deemed appropriate by the trial court,

A343),

“. . . in light of . . . the decision by the New

Jersey Supreme Court upholding the constitu-

tionality of P. L. 1973, c. 363 as representing a

valid exercise of the State’s police power which

does not reasonably burden interstate commerce

and said Court thereby having finally determined

Counts I, VII and XIX of plaintiffs’ com-

The action taken by the New Jersey Supreme Court

in upholding the constitutionality of P. L. 1973, c. 363

without affording appellants an opportunity to be heard on

the merits violates due process of the law. Fundamental

rights cannot so lightly be discarded.

80 Brief of Appellants

CONCLUSION.

The New Jersey Supreme Court has decided an issue

of national importance in a way not in accord with the

decisions of this Court, and in conflict with decisions of

other state and federal courts which have recently de-

cided cases involving environmental questions. It has also

so far departed from the accepted and usual course of ju-

dicial proceedings as to violate appellants right to due

process of the law in violation of the 5th and 14th amend-

ments to the Constitution of the United States.

It is respectfully urged, in order of preference, and in

the alternative, (1) That the judgment of the New Jersey

Supreme Court be reversed and P. L. 1973, c. 363 be de-

clared unconstitutional on the ground that same directly

burdens and discriminates against interstate commerce;

or (2) that the judgment of the New Jersey Supreme

Court be reversed, and the matter remanded to the trial

court for a hearing on the factual issues raised by the

Commerce Clause questions, provided, however, that this

Court retain jurisdiction and continue the stay of judg-

ment heretofore granted pending a final determination

of the matter by this Court on its merits.

Respectfully submitted,

HERBERT F. Moone,

ARTHUR MEISEL,

Jamieson, McCarpELL,

Moore, Peskin & SPICER,

A Professional Corporation,

Attorneys for Appellants.

Joun R. Papova,

Soto & Papova,

Special Legal Consultant to

Appellant City of Philadelphia.

Brief of Appellants 81

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.

We hereby certify that on this 3rd day of June, 1976,

three copies of the Brief of Appellants and the Single Ap-

pendix were mailed, with adequate first class postage pre-

paid, to Assistant Attorney General Stephen Skillman, at

his office located in the State House Annex, Trenton, New

Jersey 08625; and to William C. Brashares and Paul M.

Laurenza, Cladouhos & Brashares, attorneys for amicus

curiae, National Solid Wastes Management Association, at

their law office located at 1750 New York Avenue, N.W.,

Washington, D. C. 20006.

We further certify that all d to be

served have been served.

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Appellants Brief — Philadelphia v. New Jersey · 430 U.S. 141 | Frix