Motion to Dismiss — United States Trust Co. of NY v. New Jersey

Supreme Court brief1977

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er iaremesctn’ |S

Ms FILED

JUN 7 1976

i

IN THE 5 |

Supreme Court of the Anite, State K, JR., nate

Ocroper Term, 1975

No. 75-1687

UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK,

as Trustee for The Port Authority of New York and

New Jersey Consolidated Bonds, Fortieth and Forty-

First Series, on its own behalf and on behalf of all

holders of Consolidated Bonds of The Port Authority

of New York and New Jersey and all others similarly

situated

Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, BRENDAN T.

BYRNE, Governor of the State of New Jersey, and

WILLIAM F. HYLAND, Attorney General of the State

of New Jersey,

Appellees.

On Appeal from the Supreme Court of New Jersey

——————_—_— SSS

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR WANT OF A

SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL QUESTION

——_—_—_— en

Wuium F. Hyianp,

Attorney General of the State of

New Jersey,

Attorney for Appellees,

State House Annex,

Trenton, New Jersey. 08625

By Special Counsel:

Mronazt I. Sovery,

Murray J. Lav.icut,

Harzotp 8. H. Epaas.

Dated: June 7, 1976

SSS ese tenner NY oan) eae

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Motion To Dismiss For Want oF a SUBSTANTIAL

FEDERAL QUESTION

STATEMENT

A. The lower courts found that repeal had no

adverse effect upon bondholders .

B. The lower courts found that repeal of the

covenant was a proper exercise of the States’

police power

THe THree Questions PreseNTeD Are Nor Susstan-

TAIL FEDERAL QUESTIONS

Tue Svuacestion THat THE Court Notre PRoBABLE

JURISDICTION AND DererR FurRTHER CONSIDERATION IS

WitrnHovut Merit

CONCLUSION .........

Cases Cited

Albigese v. City of Jersey City, 127 N.J. Super. 101,

316 A.2d 483 (Law Div.), modified on other grounds,

129 N.J. Super. 567, 324 A.2d 577 (App. Div. 1974)

Arizona State Highway Comm’n v. Nelson, 105 Ariz.

76, 549 P.2d 509 (1969)

Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) ....

Beaumont v. Faubus, 239 Ark. 801, 394 S.W.2d 478

(1965)

Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798)

PAGE

10

13

S 8

ii TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Calif. Teachers Ass’n v. Newport Unified School

District, 333 F. Supp. 436 (C.D. Cal. 1971) 200000... 20

City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965) ..17, 19, 20

Delaware River Port Authority v. Tiemann, 403 F.

Supp. 1117 (D.N.J. 1975) 12

Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park,

316 U.S. 502 (1942) 22

Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) ........ 15

Friends of the Earth v. Carey, No. 75-7497 (2d Cir.

April 26, 1976) 26

Gaby v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey

et al., No. 75-1712 10

Gelfert v. National City Bank, 313 U.S. 221 (1941) .... 29

Home Building & Loan Ass’n vy. Blaisdell, 290 U.S.

398 (1934) . 17-19

Jacksonville Port Auth. v. State, 161 So.2d 825 (Fla.

1964) 21

Lyon v. Flournoy, 271 Cal. App.2d 774, 76 Cal. Rptr.

869 (1969) appeal dismissed for want of a sub-

stantial federal question, 396 U.S. 274 (1970) ........ 20

Massachusetts Port Authority v. Treasurer & Re-

ceiver General, 352 Mass. 755, 227 N.E.2d 902

(1967) | 20

Matter of Farrell v. Drew, 19 N.Y.2d 486, 281 N.Y.S.

2d 1, 227 N.E.2d 824 (1967) 20, 29

Michigan Transp. Co. v. Secretary of State, 41 Mich.

App. 654, 201 N.W.2d 83 (1972), leave to appeal

denied, 389 Mich. 767 (1973) 20

TABLE OF CONTENTS iii

PAGE

New Bedford v. New Bedford, Woods Hole, Martha’s

Vineyard & Nantucket S.S. Auth., 336 Mass. 691,

148 N.E.2d 637, appeal dismissed for want of a

substantial federal question, 358 U.S. 53 (1958) .... 21

N.J. Highway Auth. v. Sills, 111 N.J. Super. 313, 268

A.2d 308 (Ch. Div. 1970), aff’d, 58 N.J. 432, 278

A.2d 489 (1971) . 13, 14

N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth. v. MeCrane, 61 N.J.

1, 292 A.2d 545, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 943

(1972) . 13, 20

Ohlson v. Phillips, 304 F. Supp. 1152 (D.C. Colo.

1969), aff'd, 397 U.S. 317 (1970) 20

Opinion of the Justices, 334 Mass. 721, 136 N.E.2d

223 (1956) 21

Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 882 (Mass. 1974) 20

Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 298

N.Y.S.2d 955, 246 N.E.2d 275 (1969) 28

Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S.

(4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) 15

Twentieth Century Association, Inc. v. Waldman, 294

N.Y. 571, 63 N.E.2d 177 (1945) 29

Veix v. Sixth Ward Building & Loan Ass’n of New-

ark, 310 U.S. 32 (1940) 29

New York Constitution Cited

Article 1:

Sec. 6 29

See. 7 29

iv TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGH

Statutes Cited

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 ...... sasiasndiaaiiiincailidads 26

Compact Clause, Art. 1, $10, cl. 3 ...22.22.......cseceeceeeeeee 10

Emergency Energy Fair Practices Act of 1974 ........ 11

National Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1974 12

New Jersey Laws, 1974, Chapter 25 -........: Sicntieusimiaiiie

Se

New York Laws, 1974 Chapter 993

Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 -................. 11

28 U.S.C.:

RE ree 28

50 U.S.C.—Energy Supply and Environmental Co-

ordination Act of 1974:

Be We Se CI; venirsinitrniaeriatitensttinsoinitiatieiiiatee 11,12

Regulation Cited

38 Fed. Reg. 31388 et seq. (November 13, 1973) ........ 11

Other Authorities Cited

Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause,

57 Harv. L. Rev. 512, 621, 852 (1944) 0. 14

The Federalist Papers, Number 44 15

Wright, The Contract Clause and the Constitution

(1938) 14

ER EE Se ee

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser Term, 1975

No. 75-1687

—_——

UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK,

as Trustee for The Port ew of New York and

New Jersey Consolidated Bonds, ortieth and Forty-

First Series, on its own behalf and .on behalf of all

holders of Consolidated Bonds of The Port Authority

of New York and New Jersey and all others similarly

— Appellant,

Vv.

THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, BRENDAN T.

BYRNE, Governor of the State of New Jersey, and

WILLIAM F. HYLAND, Attorney General of the State

of New Jersey, Appellees

On Appeal from the Supreme Court of New Jersey

+—-

Motion To Dismiss For Want of a Substantial

Federal Question

Appellees, the State of New Jersey, Governor Brendan

T. Byrne and Attorney General William F. Hyland, move

the Court to dismiss this appeal on the ground that the

2

appeal does not present a substantial federal question re-

quiring plenary consideration, with briefs on the merits

and oral argument, for its resolution.

Appellant’s claim that the challenged legislation was

an arbitrary exercise of the States’ police power is re-

futed by a massive record, both stipulated and litigated

that makes clear the contrary proposition. Significantly,

none of the eight judges who have reviewed it to date, in

a forum of appellant’s choosing, has thought otherwise.

Their unanimous conclusion is reflected in the trial court’s

finding that “the claim that bondholder security has been

materially impaired or destroyed by the repeal is simply

not supported by the record.” A108*

The essence of appellant’s remaining claims, here as be-

low, is that the Contract Clause provides absolute protec-

tion to every undertaking contained in or applicable to

municipal bonds, regardless of how peripheral it is to

securing the underlying obligation or how seriously it

impedes accomplishment of vital governmental purposes.

Courts have uniformly rejected that position. To adopt

it would create a specially privileged class enjoying a

unique immunity denied to everyone else who enters into

contracts.

Statement

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme

Court of New Jersey, unanimously affirming a judgment

of the Superior Court of New Jersey, upholding the con-

* “A” and “B” refer to the Appendix to Appellant’s Jurisdictional

Statement. “j.S.” refers to Appellant’s Jurisdictional Statement.

we refers to the trial transcript. “Stip.” refers to the Stipulation.

C” refers to a trial court exhibit. “S” refers to a State exhibit.

a

3

stitutionality of Chapter 25 of the New Jersey Laws of

1974. B5-6. The challenged 1974 statute, together with

concurrent and identical legislation of the State of New

York, Chapter 993 of the New York Laws of 1974, re-

pealed legislation enacted in 1962 and hereinafter referred

to as the 1962 covenant, whereby the States of New York

and New Jersey and the Port Authority of New York and

New Jersey were precluded from applying any of the

Authority’s revenues and reserves for passenger railroad

purposes other than the Hudson & Manhattan Railroad

(now known as PATH) unless permitted by the extra-

ordinarily complicated criteria set forth in the 1962 legis-

lation, N.J.S.A. 32:1-35.55. B1-4.

This action was commenced by appellant on April 30,

1974. In December 1974, the parties signed and filed a

366-page stipulation of facts with respect to the estab-

lishment and facilities of the Port Authority of New York

and New Jersey; New Jersey’s public transportation re-

quirements, including analyses of demographic and trans-

portation factors, the energy crisis and health and envir-

onmental factors; a history of rapid transit passenger

rail operations in the Port District and the Metropolitan

New York area from 1921 to late 1974; federal mass

transportation policy as reflected in federal legislation

and federal administrative determinations; the financial

position of the Port Authority; a description of Port

Authority bonds and bond resolutions, including the com-

ments of the two principal bond rating agencies, Moody’s

and Standard & Poor’s; and additional materials with

respect to the enactment of the 1962 covenant and the

1974 repeal legislation. The stipulation was accompanied

by 8 lengthy exhibits, including the then most recent plan

of the New Jersey Department of Transportation and

the latest Official Statement (or prospectus) and Annual

Report of the Port Authority; a detailed analysis pre-

4

pared in 1961—and thus prior to the 1962 covenant—by

the then General Solicitor of the Port Authority of its

financial and bonding structure; a 1971 consultant’s re-

port on the Port Authority’s participation in a new pas-

senger railroad operation; and materials from 1971 and

1972 State legislative hearings with respect to the Port

Authority’s participation in rail mass transit.

The stipulation and its accompanying exhibits demon-

strated that although the 1962 covenant did little or noth-

ing to enhance bondholder security, it had a profoundly

deleterious effect on the coordination of transportation

in the Port District. It impeded rational solution of the

pressing problems of increasing highway congestion, de-

teriorating mass transit, poisonous air pollution and un-

certain petroleum supplies. Appellees were, accordingly,

prepared to rest their defense of the repeal legislation on

the stipulated materials.

Appellant, however, requested and was granted an op-

portunity to present tesiimony on two additional factual

questions tendered by its complaint: whether Port Au-

thority bondholders relied in any meaningful sense upon

the 1962 covenant and whether the repeal of the 1962

covenant had an adverse effect on the secondary market

for Port Authority bonds. The trial court also indi-

cated that it would be desirable to present the testi-

mony of an expert witness with respect to the financial

structure of the Port Authority and the interrelationships

of the 1962 covenant and the other requirements set forth

in the Port Authority statutes and bond resolutions. T. 8-

10, 458-59; C-2. Five days of testimony and dozens of

additional exhibits were introduced with respect to these

matters at the trial conducted in February 1975.

ee

———

5

A. The lower courts found that repeal had

no adverse effect upon bondholders.

On May 14, 1975, the trial court issued its comprehen-

sive opinion sustaining the validity of New J ersey’s re-

peal of the 1962 covenant.’ With respect to the disputed

issue of bondholder reliance upon the 1962 covenant, the

trial court found that “few, if any, members of the in-

vestment community ever analyzed closely the actual effect

of the 1962 covenant upon bondholder security,” A90,

that “the covenant cannot be said to have been the ‘pri-

mary consideration’ for the purchases having been made,”

A91, and that neither the interest rates on Port Authority

bonds nor the ratings assigned to these bonds by the

principal rating services were affected by the presence

or absence of the 1962 covenant, A89-92. With respect to

the disputed question whether the repeal of the 1962 cove-

nant had an adverse effect upon the secondary market in

Port Authority bonds, the trial court, on the basis of ex-

tensive trial testimony and exhibits comparing prices of

Port Authority bonds and bonds issued by other tax-

exempt agencies, found that: “The bottom line of the

plaintiff's proofs on this issue is simply that the evidence

fails to demonstrate that the secondary market price of

Authority bonds was adversely affected by the repeal of

the covenant, except for a short-term fall-off in price the

effect of which has now been dissipated insofar as it can

be related to the enactment of the repeal.” A93-94.

The trial court carefully analyzed the _humerous and

powerful statutory and contractual provisions other than

1The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed, with one Justice

partially dissenting, “substantially for the reasons set forth in the

opinion of” the trial court. A4. Justice Pashman s partially dissent-

ing opinion complimented the trial court’s “very enlightened and

comprehensive opinion.” A9.

6

the 1962 covenant that fully protect the security of Port

Authority bondholders. A51-61. They include among other

protections: the General Reserve Fund, irrevocably

pledged as security for the payment of interest and prin-

cipal on all Port Authority bonds, which contained

$173,487,000 in 1974; the 1.3 test, which insists that net

revenues exceed prospective debt service by a healthy

margin before new Consolidated Bonds may be issued;

the Consolidated Bond Reserve Fund, pledged as addi-

tional security for Consolidated Bonds, which grew from

$7.1 million in 1972 to $21.9 million in 1973 to $46.8 mil-

lion in 1974; a pledge of the net revenues from each

facility financed by the issuance of Consolidated Bonds

to the payment of debt service on all Consolidated Bonds;

a contractual commitment to establish and collect “rents,

tolls and other charges in connection with facilities the

net revenues of which are pledged as security for Con-

solidated Bonds, to the end that at least sufficient net

revenues may be produced therefrom at all times to pro-

vide for the debt service upon all Consolidated Bonds”;

a prohibition on the application of any part of the Con-

solidated Bond Reserve Fund for the payment of operat-

ing deficits of a facility acquired without the issuance of

Consolidated Bonds; and yet another prohibition on the

issuance of Consolidated Bonds for a facility not previ-

ously financed by Port Authority bonds unless the Com-

missioners of the Port Authority certify that the issuance

of the Consolidated Bonds for the proposed additional

facility will not “materially impair the sound credit stand-

ing of the Authority or the investment status of Consoli-

dated Bonds or the ability of the Authority to fulfill its

commitments, whether statutory or contractual or reason-

ably incidental thereto, including its undertakings to the

holders of Consolidated Bonds.”

7

Thus, before the 1962 covenant was enacted and after

its repeal, the Port Authority could not give its revenues

to other agencies to subsidize mass transit, and it could

not itself undertake any mass transit projects that might

endanger the bondholders’ security. It could no more take

over the New York City subway system, whose irrelevant

deficits appellant regularly recounts, J.S. 8, 13, than it

could the national debt. A109. The trial court concluded,

accordingly, that the repeal of the 1962 covenant did not,

as a factual matter, materially affect the obligation of

appellant’s contract:

The repeal, of course, leaves intact the provisions

of the CBR [the Consolidated Bond Resolution

adopted by the Authority on October 9, 1952] and

the series resolutions which now constitute, together

with the General Reserve Fund Act, the same meas-

ure of the bondholders’ contractual security rights

as existed prior to the enactment of the covenant

in 1962. Presumably rational investors—including

the plaintiff—purchased hundreds of millions of

dollars of consolidated bonds prior to 1962, without

the additional security afforded by the covenant and

with full knowledge of the power of the States to

direct the Authority into mass transit operations.

The two principal bond rating services, upon whose

judgment the financial community places great reli-

ance, rated the consolidated bonds—minus the cove-

nant—as securities as to which no default was anti-

cipated.

The claim that bondholder security has been ma-

terially impaired or destroyed by the repeal is

simply not supported by the record. The pledge of

the Authority’s net revenues and reserves remains

8

intact; the Authority will still be barred from the

issuance of any new consolidated bonds unless the

1.3 test required by the CBR is met; and the Au-

thority will continue to be prohibited from the is-

suance of any consolidated bonds or other bonds

secured by a pledge of the general reserve fund

without the certification required by section 7 of

the series resolutions, to wit: that in the opinion

of the Authority the estimated expenditures in con-

nection with any additional facility for which such

bonds are to be issued would not, for the ensuing

ten years, impair the sound credit standing of the

Authority, the investment status of its consolidated

bonds, or the Authority’s obligations to its consoli-

dated bondholders. A108.

The soundness of the trial court’s conclusion that repeal

of the 1962 covenant had no material significance was

promptly confirmed by leading investment advisers. With-

in two weeks after the trial court’s opinion, Barr Brothers

& Co., one of the three largest dealers in Port Authority

bonds, issued a report specifically referring to the trial

court’s decision, summarizing the other bondholder pro-

tections and the great financial strength of the Port Au-

thority, and concluding:

Whether or not the Port Authority ever gets in-

volved in Mass Transit, we feel it continues to be

one of the finest revenue credits in the country,

amply protected by the basic bond resolution, ex-

cellent management and some highly profitable and

monopolistic facilities that can more than carry a

reasonable amount of Mass Transit, particularly

with the recent toll increases on the Hudson cross-

ings providing additional revenues.

ee

AS

9

This report is from a firm that is a member of the class

represented by appellant and from which it selected one

of its expert witnesses. See J.S. 14, fn.

In June 1975, the month after the trial court’s opinion,

the two principal bond rating agencies, Standard & Poor’s

and Moody’s, each confirmed the continuation of the Port

Authority’s “A” rating. Standard & Poor’s, while ex-

pressing a concern about the effect of future Port Au-

thority involvement in mass transit, says: “Despite this

concern, we are continuing our ‘A’ rating on the Port

Authority’s Consolidated Bonds and are also rating the

new Consolidated Notes ‘A’ based upon the Authority’s

strong operating, financial and management record and

the prospect for a continuation of this outstanding rec-

ord.” Moody’s, also referring to the trial court’s opinion,

continues its “A” rating on Port Authority obligations

because “earnings of the present facilities are good, re-

serves for debt service continue strong, and recent toll

increases have further strengthened its financial position

at this time.”

These conclusions are not surprising. It was not bond-

holders who sought the 1962 covenant, but the manage-

ment of the Port Authority. A89-90; Stip., p. 158; S-40.

Until 1962, that management had resolutely, and success-

fully, opposed meaningful Port Authority participation in

the carriage of persons by rail. See, e.g., A61-65. A com-

mitment to rail transit would have deflected them from

other missions to which they attached higher priorities.

See, e.g., 8-33. Forced at last to accept some responsi-

bility for rail transit, they conceived of the covenant and

2 The “A” rating signifies that the bonds are of investment qual-

ity and that no default in payment of interest or principal is antici-

pated. A9I1.

10

insisted upon its enactment, as the price of their acquies-

cence.®

B. The lower courts found that repeal of

the covenant was a proper exercise

the States’ police power. - -

Though repeal of the 1962 covenant took little or noth-

ing from appellant, it did make possible rational planning

and administration of bi-State transportation efforts. The

trial court found that by early 1974, when the repeal legis-

lation was introduced, the public need for mass transpor-

tation facilities “became unprecedented as the result of

the promulgation of stringent federal air pollution regu-

lations designed to reduce automobile usage and the emer-

gence of an energy crisis which threatened the entire sys-

tem of private automobile transportation in the two

merce A107. This finding is amply supported by the

reco

In November 1973, the Administrator of the federal

Environmental Protection Agency promulgated regula-

tions designed to achieve a 67 percent reduction in hydro-

3 The State has argued from the outset that the 1962 covenant is

not a constitutionally protected contract both because the Compact

Clause, Art. 1, §10, cl. 3, and the Port Authority Compact itself

make it voidable, and because subsequent federal developments have

preempted it. The court below did not rule on these questions pre-

fering to assume arguendo that a contract was made and to hold the

repeal valid.

Should this Court note probable jurisdiction in the United States

Trust Company case, however, it ought to note probable jurisdiction

in Gaby v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey et al., No

75-1712 as well, so that these issues, which have not been passed

upon by the courts below, A110, may be considered fully.

11

carbon emissions and a 47 percent reduction in carbon

monoxide emissions in the northern part of New Jersey.

38 Fed. Reg. 31388 et seq. (November 13, 1973). In issu-

ing these regulations, the Administrator specifically em-

phasized the importance of the development of mass tran-

sit facilities to the improvement of New Jersey’s air

quality: “The development of large-scale mass transit

facilities and the expansion and modification of existing

mass transit facilities is essential to any effort to reduce

automotive pollution through reductions in vehicle use.”

A86.

Moreover, the repeal legislation was introduced on Feb-

ruary 15, 1974, Stip., p. 348 fn., at the very height of the

energy crisis. Eleven days earlier, the New Jersey Leg-

islature had enacted the Emergency Energy Fair Prac-

tices Act of 1974, which found that “an energy shortage

now exists and may continue for the foreseeable future”;

ten days earlier, Governor Byrne, in his first Executive

Order, had proclaimed that an energy emergency existed.

Stip., p. 43; A87.

In February 1974, the President of the United States

submitted a Message to Congress on the Energy Crisis,

which said that, “It is now widely recognized that the de-

velopment of better mass transit systems may be one of

the key solutions to both our energy and environmental

problems.” A87-88. Congress has repeatedly expressed

agreement with this viewpoint. For example, the Re-

gional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, enacted on Janu-

ary 2, 1974, contains specific findings by Congress that

“rail service and rail transportation offer economic and

environmental advantages with respect to... energy effi-

ciency and conservation . . . to such extent that the preser-

vation and maintenance of adequate and efficient rail serv-

ice is in the national interest.” A88. See also the Energy

12:

Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, 50

U.S.C. sections 791 et seg.; and the National Mass Trans-

poration Assistance Act of 1974, ASO, fn. 29. During the

debate on the latter Act in late 1974, Congressman Joseph

Minish of New Jersey, one of its principal sponsors, re-

minded Congress:

With our present energy situation and the threat

of a renewed crisis in this area, the need for mass

transit aid has become ever more critical. Buses

and rail cars consume only a fraction of the energy

that a private automobile does, yet we cannot ex-

‘pect the commuting public to reduce significantly its

use of private cars if we do not provide suitable

alternative sources of transportation. Stip., p. 278.

In May 1975, as a direct result of the repeal of the

1962 covenant, the Port Authority increased its vehicular

bridge and tunnel tolls, which had remained constant since

1927, in order “to increase its ability to finance vital mass

transit improvements.” C-18. The toll increase revenues,

estimated at $40 million per year, will be used to finance

mass transit projects that remained dormant while the

covenant stood. See AS80-84.

It deserves emphasis that the $40 million annual in-

crease in revenues resulting from the toll increase would

not have been available unless substantially committed to

mass transit. The bridge toll increases are subject to

federal approval and that approval would probably be

withheld but for the intended application of the funds to

mass transit. See Delaware River Port Authority v. Tie-

mann, 403 F. Supp. 1117 (D.N.J. 1975); Stip., pp. 280-85.

In any event, the Governors would not have approved the

increase if its sole purpose were to add redundant funds

to already ample bond reserves in excess of $250 million.

13

Appellant’s assertion that bondholders have lost $240

million of “their” protection J.S. 24 fn., 18, 1s plainly

contrary to fact. All of that money, and much more, will

come from funds generated by the toll increase, not other-

wise available to bondholders.

The Three Questions Presented Are Not Substantial

Federal Questions.

Appellant asserts first that,

The judgment of the New Jersey Supreme Court

presents the substantial question whether a State

can unilaterally and retroactively revoke a solemn

covenant it has made with holders of municipal

bonds, or whether such bondholders are protected

by the Contract and Due Process clauses of the

United States Constitution. J.S. 13.

Neither of the courts below has suggested that bond-

holders are not “protected by the Contract and Due Proc-

ess clauses of the United States Constitution.” On the

contrary, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has repeat-

edly and emphatically declared its solicitude for the rights

of bondholders. For example, in N.J. Sports & Exposi-

tion Auth. v. McCrane, 61 N.J. 1, 26, 292 A.2d 545, 558,

appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 943 (1972), the Court said that

when purchasers buy bonds “a solemn pact comes into

being between them and the State” that is “secure against

impairment by succeeding legislatures except for a proper

exercise of the State’s never abdicated police powers.”

And, in N.J. Highway Auth. v. Sills, 111 N.J. Super. 313,

968 A.2d 308 (Ch. Div. 1970), aff’d, 58 N.J. 432, 278 A.2d

489 (1971), the Court invalidated State legislation having

a trivial effect upon bondholders because the legislation

14

was “not addressed to any problem of state-wide impor-

tance as was the Texas legislation considered in City oj

El Paso.” 111 N.J. Super. at 329, 268 A.2d at 312.

This steadfast record of concern for bondholders may

well explain why appellant, a New York based bank, and

its New York counsel chose to litigate first in New Jersey,

though it had its choice of federal and state courts in

New York as well.

All the courts below did was: (1) find that appellant

had failed to establish the facts necessary to support its

claim of an infringement upon its constitutional rights;

and (2) decide as a matter of law that appellant was

wrong in urging that any change in a contract with bond-

holders violates the Constitution.

The trial court’s assessment of appellant’s legal theories

is as applicable to its jurisdictional statement as to ap-

pellant’s presentation below:

The thrust of plaintiff’s argument is that any

impairment of the security provisions of a contract

violates the Contract Clause. It seeks to recreate

a theory of the Contract Clause which, if ever im-

bedded in our constitutional law, no longer exists.

As reflected in the course of more than 150 years

of its judicial interpretation, the Contract Clause

must be construed in harmony with the power of

the States to alter or modify their contractual ob-

ligations where an important public interest re-

quires. A109.

The trial court’s legal analysis is unquestionably right.

The history of the Contract Clause is an oft-told tale.‘

*See, ¢.g., Wright, The Contract Clause and the Constitution

(1938); Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause, 57

Harv. L. Rev. 512, 621, 852 (1944).

16

The Clause was construed expansively in the early nine-

teenth century at a time when it was the sole source of fed-

eral authority to restrain unreasonable State legislation.®

Despite the Framers’ probable concern with State laws

releasing private debts, see Federalist Papers No. 44, the

Clause was held applicable to government contracts. The

leading cases are Fletcher v. Peck, 10 US. (6 Cranch) 87

(1810), and Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). Even these earliest cases,

however, expressed concern for unduly hampering State

governments in the organization of their internal affairs.

In Dartmouth College, Chief Justice Marshall observed:

“that the framers of the constitution did not intend to

restrain the states in the regulation of their civil insti-

tutions, adopted for internal government, and that the

instrument they have given us is not to be so construed,

may be admitted.” 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 629.

The earliest Contract Clause standards were refash-

ioned, and in the process liberalized, under the weight of

government’s increasing responsibilities. In a series of

eases this Court held that all contracts are made subject

to implied conditions, among them the fair exercise of

the State’s police power in the interests of public health,

safety and welfare. No legislature can bargain that power

away. The trial court accurately summarized these cases

as follows:

First in dictum, Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U.S. 645, 650,

94 L.Ed. 302 (1877), and then by direct application

of the doctrine, the court held that a lottery fran-

chise granted for a definite term of years could be

5 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), held the

Bill of Rights inapplicable to the States; Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3

Dall.) 386 (1798), held the ex post facto clause inapplicable to

civil legislation.

16

repealed. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 25

L.Ed. 1079 (1880); Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U.S.

448, 18 S.Ct. 199, 42 L.Ed. 553 (1897). In North-

western Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659,

24 L.Ed. 1036 (1878), it was held that a franchise

to operate a fertilizer factory at a given location

could be negated by the exercise of the police power

to abate a nuisance. Similarly, the power to con-

trol the use of the public streets may not be bar-

gained away, Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Golds-

boro, 232 U.S. 548, 34 S.Ct. 364, 58 L.Ed. 721 (1914) ;

Denver & Rio Grande R. Co. v. Denver, 250 US.

241, 39 S.Ct. 450, 63 L.Ed. 958 (1919), nor can the

state contractually bind itself not to exercise its

power of eminent domain, West River Bridge Co.

v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 12 L.Ed. 535 (1848);

Pennsylvania Hospital v. Philadelphia, 245 U.S.

20, 38 S.Ct. 35, 62 L.Ed. 124 (1917), or to change

the location of its governmental subdivisions, New-

ton v. Mahoning County, 100 U.S. 548, 25 L.Ed.

710 (1880). The broadest expression of this view

of the police power during this period is to be found

in Chicago ¢@ Alton R.R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S.

67, 35 S.Ct. 678, 59 L.Ed. 1204 (1915), where Jus-

tice Pitney said:

“Tt is established by repeated decisions of this

court that neither of these provisions of the Fed-

eral Constitution [the Contract and Due Process

Clauses] has the effect of overriding the power of

the state to establish all regulations reasonably nec-

essary to secure the health, safety, or general wel-

fare of the community; that this power can neither

be abdicated nor bargained away and is inalienable

even by express grant; and that all contract and

property rights are held subject to its fair exer-

17,

cise * * *, And it is also settled that the police

power embraces regulations designed to promote

the public convenience or the general welfare and

prosperity, as well as those in the interest of public

health, morals or safety. [238 U.S. at 76-77, 35

S.Ct. at 682].” A100-101.

The path of Contract Clause doctrine from 1915 to now

has led to progressive recognition that State police powers

cannot be limited to discrete categories of State activity:

eminent domain, government institutions, morals, health,

key industries. Rather the police power is a general one;

what counts is whether it is fairly exercised. That assess-

ment calls for harmonizing use of the reserved power with

the constitutionally mandated policy of contract protec-

tion. That is the central meaning of Home Building ¢

Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), in which this

Court upheld emergency debtor relief laws, and its pro-

geny, particularly City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S.

497 (1965). There this Court, by an 8-1 majority, rejected

Justice Black’s arguments for a formalistic approach and

held squarely that “it is not every modification of a con-

tractual promise that impairs the obligation of contract

under federal law” (379 U.S. at 506-507). In a key pas-

sage, Justice White wrote:

The decisions “put it beyond question that the

prohibition is not an absolute one and is not to be

read with literal exactness like a mathematical for-

mula,” as Chief Justice Hughes said in Home Build-

ing & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398. The

Blaisdell opinion, which amounted to a comprehen-

® We note that this case falls clearly within two of the classic

pigeonholes, promotion of health and regulation of government in-

stitutions.

18

sive restatement of the principles underlying the

application of the Contract Clause, makes it quite

clear that “[n]ot only is the constitutional provi-

sion qualified by the measure of control which the

State retains over remedial processes, but the State

also continues to possess authority to safeguard the

vital interests of its people. It does not matter

that legislation appropriate to that end ‘had the

result of modifying or abrogating contracts already

in effect.’ Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 276.

Not only are existing laws read into contracts in

order to fix obligations as between the parties, but

the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign

power is also read into contracts as a postulate of

the legal order. ... This principle of harmonizing

the constitutional prohibition with the necessary

residuum of state power has had progressive recog-

nition in the decisions of this Court.” 290 U.S. at

434. Moreover, the “economic interests of the State

may justify the exercise of its continuing and domi-

nant protective power notwithstanding interference

with contracts.” Jd. 290 U.S. at 437. The State has

the “sovereign right . . . to protect the ... general

welfare of the people. . . . Once we are in this

domain of the reserve power of a State we must

respect the ‘wide discretion on the part of the legis-

lature in determining what is and what is not ne-

cessary.’” East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn,

326 U.S. 230, 232-233. As Mr. Justice Johnson said

in Ogden v. Saunders, “[i]t is the motive, the policy,

the object, that must characterize the legislative

act, to affect it with the imputation of violating the

obligation of contracts.” 12 Wheat. 213, 6 L.Ed.

606, 633.

19

Of course, the power of a state to modify or

affect the obligation of contract is not without limit.

“(Whatever is reserved of state power must be

consistent with the fair intent of the constitutional

limitation of that power. The reserved power can-

nct be construed so as to destroy the limitation, nor

is the limitation to be construed to destroy the re-

served power in its essential aspect. They must

be construed in harmony with each other. This

principle precludes a construction which would per-

mit the State to adopt as its policy the repudiation

of debts or the destruction of contracts or the de-

nial of means to enforce them.” Blaisdell, swpra,

290 U.S. at 439."

As the last sentence quoted makes clear, the State may

not have a policy of repudiating debts, destroying con-

tracts or denying the means to enforce them. In specific

instances, however, it may modify contracts where the

end is legitimate and the measures taken are reasonable.

And in determining whether the measures are reasonable,

the legislature has “wide discretion.” ®

7 Appellant errs by trying to make the specific facts that supported

a finding of reasonableness in E/ Paso into a doctrinal litmus. J.S.

22-24. It compounds the error in several ways: among them, it

ignores that fact that Simmons lost his land while appellant has lost

nothing.

® This would suffice to dispose of appellant’s claim that the legis-

latures should have adopted the “obvious alternatives” to repeal,

see J.S. 23 fn., even if those alternatives were available. In fact,

they were not and appellant’s suggestion is quite misleading. For

example, appellant says that the States should “refund outstanding

bonds protected by the Covenant and secure bondholder consent un-

(Footnote continued on following page)

20

These principles have provided State and federal courts

with workable guidelines. See, e.g., Calif. Teachers Ass’n

v. Newport Unified School District, 333 F. Supp. 436 (C.D.

Cal. 1971); Ohlson v. Phillips, 304 F. Supp. 1152, 1156

(D.C. Colo. 1969), aff'd, 397 U.S. 317 (1970); Lyon v.

Flournoy, 271 Cal. App.2d 774, 76 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1969),

appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal ques-

tion, 396 U.S. 274 (1970); Michigan Transp. Co. v. Secre-

tary of State, 41 Mich. App. 654, 201 N.W.2d 83 (1972),

leave to appeal denied, 389 Mich. 767 (1973); Albigese v.

City of Jersey City, 127 N.J. Super. 101, 112-13, 316 A.2d

483, 488-89 (Law Div.), modified on other grounds, 129

N. J. Super. 567, 324 A.2d 577 (App. Div. 1974); Matter

of Farrell v. Drew, 19 N.Y.2d 486, 281 N.Y.S.2d 1, 227

N.E.2d 824 (1967).

These guidelines are as applicable to municipal bonds

as to any other form of contract and the courts of many

states have so held. Leading cases include: Opinion of

the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 882 (Mass. 1974); Massachusetts

Port Authority v. Treaswrer & Receiver General, 352

Mass. 755, 227 N.E. 2d 902 (1967); N.J. Sports & Exposi-

tion Auth. v. McCrane, supra, 61 N.J. 1, 292 A.2d 545,

appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 943 (1972). And see, e.g.,

Arizona State Highway Comm’n v. Nelson, 105 Ariz. 76,

549 P.2d 509 (1969); Beawmont v. Faubus, 239 Ark. 801,

394 S.W.2d 478 (1965). Even before El Paso, courts held

bonds, like other contracts, subject to the police power.

(Footnote continued from preceding page)

der those issues not yet refundable.” Appellant proffers this sug-

gestion although its counsel has sworn that the owners of more than

$1.5 billion of the $1.6 billion in outstanding Port Authority bonds

are unknown to the Port Authority or its paying agents, and although

it knows that all of those bonds were issued during a period when

interest rates were far lower than those currently prevailing.

21

E.g., New Bedford v. New Bedford, Woods Hole, Martha’s

Vineyard & Nantucket S.S. Auth., 336 Mass. 651, 148 N.E.

2d 637, appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal

question, 358 U.S. 53 (1958); Opinion of the Justices, 334

Mass. 721, 136 N.E.2d 223 (1956); Jacksonville Port Auth.

v. State, 161 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1964).

The central issue in this case is not the legal rules but

rather their application to this massive record, and it is

with that application that this statement is mainly con-

cerned. One key point warrants repeated emphasis. Noth-

ing has happened to appellant. It does not allege that

the probability of repayment of the bonds has been mate-

rially affected; nor was it, at trial, able to show any dimu-

nition of the bonds’ value in the secondary market. In-

deed, an investment company from whom appellant se-

cured an expert witness affirmed that truth immediately

following the trial court’s opinion.

The now repealed law provided bondholders with no

security at all. It did not create a lien against specific

funds; it imposed no restrictions on deficit spending gen-

erally. It stated only that the purposes be other than

passenger rail transit. For example, large deficits for

buses were permitted. Yet what could be more absurd,

and destructive of sound governmental policy, than that

the choice of transit mode in the Port District be deter-

mired by the availability of Port Authority financing for

one mode rather than the other—no matter what the rela-

tive balance of energy, public health and ecology consid-

erations. The absurdity is heightened when, as here, toll

increases that are permissible only because of their in-

tended diversion to mass transit uses have substantially

increased the Port Authority’s revenues, making the whole

program one with no net effect on bondholders.

22

It would be an abdication of tie “overnment’r respon-

sibility to allow bondholders so tangentially involved to

determine regional transpoiiation pelicy. Aft r all, “the

Constitution is ‘intended to preserve practical and sub-

stantial rights, not to maintain theories.’” Faitoute Iron

& Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 514

(1942).

Fight judges have already weighed this record in re-

sponse to appellant’s claims that their interests are vitally

affected. None has been persuaded.

Appellant goes on to argue that:

It is of great importance to Port Authority bond-

holders that this Court decide that the repealer is

unconstitutional, thus returning the security pro-

vided by the Covenant and restoring the market for

the bonds. J.S. 15.

But, as was made clear above, this Court’s decision is

of little or no importance to bondholders. Neither the

“security provided by the Covenant” nor the “market for

the bonds” was impaired by repeal. Appellant’s selective

presentation of the facts cannot mask the reality—the

courts below found against it on these facts after exten-

sive consideration. And the record fully supports those

findings.

The trial court’s conclusion that “few, if any, members

of the investment community ever analyzed closely the

actual effect of the 1962 covenant upon bondholder se-

curity,” A90, is amply supported by the litigated record.

Despite that finding, however, appellant continues its

practice of asserting as true propositions for which there

is no evidentiary support, such as that the covenant was

“absolutely neeessary to induce the investing public into

23

continuing to buy Consolidated Bonds,” J.S. 13, or that

the limitation was “an absolute sine qua non” of future

Port Authority financing, J.S. 17. Appellant asserés that

it stopped buying Port Authority bonds in 1961. J.S. 9,

fn. Appellant had ample opportunity to offer evidence

of its own actions but chose not to expose this assertion

to cross-examination at trial. As a result, the record is

wholly barren of evidence to support it.

If, contrary to the trial court’s findings, investors really

needed the reassurance of the covenant, investor concern

should have been at its height in January 1962. At its

previous session, the New York Legislature had adopted

legislation containing no covenant and requiring the Au-

thority to take over the Hudson & Manhattan. A71. Dun

and Bradstreet, taking note of this, nonetheless rated the

Port Authority’s prospects as “Superior,” P-1, and the

Nineteenth series was sold on January 4, 1962 without

difficulty at an interest rate of 34% percent. A89.

Between 1962 and May 1973, the Port Authority issued

20 series of Consolidated Bonds at interest rates ranging

from 344 percent to 65 percent. A91. Though the Port

Authority was now operating a passenger railroad with

substantial deficits and the covenant might or might not

endure,’ bondholder enthusiasm for Port bonds continued

unabated.

In 1973, New Jersey and New York enacted legislation

repealing the covenant with respect to bonds issued after

May 10, 1973. A83-84. In June 1973, the Port Authority

® Appellant’s chief witness from the investment community, John

Thompson, testified that he was aware at all relevant times that under

certain circumstances a State may constitutionally abrogate its con-

tracts and that other pledges had been repudiated. T. 315-6 to 316-

10, 319-11 to 13.

24

issued its 40th series of Consolidated Bonds at an inter-

est rate of 6 percent. Though the covenant did not apply,

appellant exercised its discretion to buy $2,570,000 of 40th

series bonds for its fiduciary accounts. T. 850-13 to

853-17.

In October 1973, as the gubernatorial race between

Brendan Byrne and Charles Sandman was nearing reso-

lution, the Port Authority issued $100 million of its 41st

series of Consolidated Bonds. Stip., Ex. IJ. Though the

covenant did not apply to these bonds and candidate

Byrne had, as appellant claims, called for greater partici-

pation by the Authority in mass transportation, the bonds

were sold at an interest rate of 5% percent. In light of

these undisputed facts, the trial court concluded:

it is clear that the interest rates which the Au-

thority has had to pay on non-affected bonds [the

40th and 4ist series] was not materially affected

by the absence of direct covenant protection. A92.

At the trial, appellant attempted to show that the re-

peal of the covenant adversely affected the secondary

market for Port Authority bonds. After a careful evalu-

ation of the live testimony and comprehensive documen-

tary evidence submitted to him, the trial court concluded:

The bottom line of plaintiff’s proofs on this issue

is simply that the evidence fails to demonstrate that

the secondary market price of Authority bonds was

adversely affected by the repeal of the covenant,

except for a short-term fall-off in price the effect

of which has now been dissipated insofar as it can

be related to the enactment of the repeal. A93-94.

Notwithstanding this finding, appellant persists in claim-

ing, J.S. 17, that there was a significant decline in the

25

market value of its bonds. But appellant neglects to ad-

vise the Court of the fact that at the time of trial (Febru-

ary 1975) the prices for bonds of the Port Authority of

New York and New Jersey and of the Massachusetts Port

Authority (an agency selected for comparison by appel-

lant) bore exactly the same relationship to each other that

they did when appellant’s exhibits began (July 1973) and

immediately prior to the repeal of the covenant (April

1974). A92-93.?°

For its final argument, appellant maintains:

The court below erroneously justified the viola-

tion of the impairment provisions of the Constitu-

tion by terming the retroactive repeal of the 1962

Covenant an exercise of the police power. J.S. 18.

The repeal legislation questioned in this case is of vital

regional importance." The dependence of the New York

Metropolitan area, largely embraced by the Port District,

on effective mass transportation is unique in the nation.

The Port of New York and New Jersey is the nation’s

10 Appellant’s claim of market disruption is similarly unfounded.

J.S. 17. The trial court specifically considered the opinion testi-

mony offered by plaintiff with respect to the alleged “thinness” of

the market for Port Authority bonds. A92 and fn. 33. But ap-

pellant’s evidence on this point was contradictory and internally in-

consistent. See T. 93, 407, 728-29, 744-46.

11 Appellant’s suggestions, J.S. 6, 11, that the Legislatures acted

precipitously in repealing the covenant is belied by the record. The

1971 legislative hearings are summarized at Stip., pp. 223-232, and

some of the material presented at those hearings appears in Stip.,

Ex. VII. Relevant legislation was enacted in both States in 1971,

in New York in 1972, in both States in 1973 and again in 1974.

The New Jersey Senate held an information session on Port Auth-

ority mass transit bills in December 1972. Stip., pp. 253a-255.

26

greatest harbor because of its many navigable waterways;

yet transporting people conveniently across and under

those waterways into highly concentrated business dis-

tricts is both necessary to the economic vitality of the

region and difficult to accomplish. For decades, federal

policies and outright subsidies have spurred private auto-

mobile ownership and use at the expense of public trans-

portation systems that move people much more effici-

ently, particularly at peak hours. The consequent decline

of the region’s mass transportation network is now, and

has long been, among its major economic problems.

Two developments of the 1970’s, however, have given

that problem entirely new dimensions. Automotive pol-

lutants are now known to be principally responsible for

the area’s inferior air quality. The best available scientific

evidence is that our citizens’ health is being impaired by

the presence of levels of earbon monoxide and other auto-

related pollutants far in excess of federally-mandated

levels established pursuant to the Clean Air Act Amend-

ments of 1970." Both states are under federal pressure

to reduce pollution by imposing restrictions on driving;

the restrictions, such as limits on daytime delivery of

goods, are so serious that they would cause major eco-

nomic dislocation. Everyone who has studied the prob-

lems agrees that more effective mass transportation must

be part of the solution. Second, the Arab oil embargo,

causing long lines at gas stations and restricted travel and

economic activity within the States, and outright gun bat-

tles over fuel prices and allocations elsewhere, showed that

12% Friends of the Earth v. Carey, No. 75-7497 (2d Cir. April

26, 1976), the Court of Appeals noted that “the public of New York

City is exposed to carbon monoxide pollution that has . . . climbed

to over five times the federal health standards.” Slip opinion at

3440.

27

the region’s economy in the absence of mass transit al-

ternatives could be shut down by persons and policies over

whom the States have no control. Avoiding such energy

dependence has become a major national policy; energy

conservation is a central feature of that policy.

The great problems to which this legislation is addressed

—public health, economic vitality, security in the event of

emergency—are thus those central concerns of people that

governments are primarily organized to address. Appel-

lant’s representation that the legislation was not enacted

in pursuit of police power objectives is frivolous. More-

over, the basic goal of the two states, to permit a bil-

lion dollar bi-State transportation agency with a monopoly

on regional interstate automotive crossings to utilize in-

ereased revenues derived from that traffic to support

energy-conserving, less polluting alternatives, is an emi-

nently sensible one. Appellant’s principal witness has pub-

licly urged the same policy of subsidizing mass transit at

the expense of automobiles. S-4.

The narrow question on which the case turned below was

whether the legislation was reasonable in view of the

policy of contract protection mandated by both State and

Federal Constitutions. And every judge that addressed

the question concluded that the ends sought by repeal

were vitally important and that bondholder interests were

not materially affected.

28

The Suggestion That the Court Note Probable

Jurisdiction and Defer Further Consideration

is Without Merit.

This Court’s jurisdiction turns only on whether the

issues presented are substantial. A state statute was up-

held by the highest court of the State in the face of a

properly raised federal claim. 28 U.S.C. §1257(2).

Appellant suggests that this Court might note probable

jurisdiction, and hold disposition until the conclusion of

related New York litigation. That would cause further

delay in the State’s ability to meet the urgent problems

that animated repeal more than two years ago. The

vital importance of freeing the Port Authority to per-

form its proper role in transportation as quickly as pos-

sible has been recognized both by the political branches

of State government and by the State judicial branch,

which granted this case expedited treatment.

Moreover, this delay would serve no useful purpose.

Appellant’s New York action has no independent vitality

and has in fact lain dormant since its commencement by

appellant in 1974. Its resolution turns entirely on the

federal issues that have been fully litigated in this case.

To suggest that the New York litigation will provide an

additional record or might resolve the lawsuit fully on an

adequate state ground is mistaken.

New York follows the modern rule that estops a party

from relitigating issues when (a) the issues are identical

and decisive and (b) a full and fair opportunity to con-

test the decision was provided. Schwartz v. Public Ad-

ministrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 246 N.E.2d

275 (1969). The federal issues have, of course, been fully

litigated in this case. All bondholders were included in

the class before the New Jersey court. There will be no

independent construction of federal law.

29

With the federal issues resolved, the New York law

suit is meritless unless there is some nonfederal basis

for declaring the repeal invalid under the New York State

Constitution. The contention that any such basis exists

is frivolous and appellant cites no case in support of its

position. Unlike the New Jersey Constitution, the New

York Constitution has no provision explicitly protecting

contract rights. New York jurisprudence on issues of con-

tract protection turns entirely on the meaning of the fed-

eral Constitution. See, e.g., Gelfert v. National City Bank,

313 U.S. 221 (1941); Matter of Farrell v. Drew, supra,

19 N.Y. 2d 486, 281 N.Y.S. 2d 1, 227 N.E. 2d 824 (1967).

It is a hopeless task for appellant to conjecture some

basis for believing that a New York state court might

find the covenant’s repeal a State constitutional violation,

even though it is acting on the assumption that the fed-

eral mandates have been complied with. To be sure, New

York has due process clauses, New York Const., Article 1,

sections 6 and 7. But, research discloses no New York

cases remotely suggesting that a modification of contract

rights permissible under the federal Constitution would

violate these provisions of the New York Constitution.

A legislative alteration of contract rights that survives

analysis under the federal contract clause does not war-

rant independent analysis under the federal due process

clause. See Veix v. Sixth Ward Building & Loan Ass’n

of Newark, 310 U.S. 32, 41 (1940). New York law holds

precisely the same thing. See Twentieth Century Asso-

ciation, Inc. v. Waldman, 294 N.Y. 571, 582, 63 N.E.2d 177,

180 (1945).

30

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, appellees respectfully

request the Court to dismiss this appeal for want of a

substantial federal question.

Respectiully submitted,

Wuisam F. Hytanp,

Attorney General of the State of

New Jersey,

Attorney for Appellees,

By Special Counsel:

Micnas.t |, Sovearn,

Murnay J. Laviicnat,

Haroip 8. H. Epaan.

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