Jurisdictional Statement — United States Trust Co. of NY v. New Jersey

Supreme Court brief1977

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MAY 21 1976

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Unite

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

No 475-1687

Unirep States Trust Company or New York, as Trustee

for The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

Consolidated Bonds, Fortieth and Forty-First Series, on

its own behalf and on behalf of all holders of Consoli-

dated Bonds of The Port Authority of New York and

New Jersey and all others similarly situated,

Appellant,

RODAK, JR.,.CLERK

Vv.

Tue Srate or New Jersey, Brennan T. Byrne, Governor

of the State of New Jersey, and Wim.u1aM F. Hytanp,

Attorney General of the State of New Jersey,

Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT |

DeverEUX MILBURN

Ropert A. McTAaAMaNnry

2 Wall Street

New York, New York 10005

Rosert B. MeyNer

Gateway I

Newark, New Jersey 07102

Attorneys for Appellant

Of Counsel:

Carter, Lepyarp & Mi_purn

Meyver, Lanpis & VERDON

May 21, 1976

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CN TRIO ccicesictnnseniinscnititinceatscnantilinaminingmnasamnannennes

EE ST an TEE TT aT EN

Ne I ccecinscrenniegnenctesciininimionantiinavnninenneiavies

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved ....

RITE GEE Ge CIID ecreccrsccsnrcinsiiseennctceeensetntncnantniicennne

Iiow the Federal Questions Were Raised and Decided

SY cessstiinsanienionte ssiieikdiabaciniaeedtabdaiediamualeet inhiniediiilladaibeiié

The Federal Questions are Substantial ........................

I,

IT.

ITT,

The judgment of the New Jersey Supreme

Court presents the substantial question whether

a State can unilaterally and retroactively re-

voke a solemn covenant it has made with

holders of municipal bonds, or whether such

bondholders are protected by the Contract and

Due Process clauses of the United States Con-

STIIIITIED ccshnuicesesdiistedsanisdandindiniiininsdeatahiaemiddanianmaiihigen

It is of great importance to Port Authority

bondholders that this Court decide that the re-

pealer is unconstitutional, thus returning the

security provided by the Covenant and restor-

ing the market for the bonds .................-...ccss-e0--+

The court below erroneously justified the viola-

tion of the impairment provisions of the Con-

stitution by terming the retroactive repeal of

the 1962 Covenant an exercise of the police

SOE sesisscahiniencssaninietieceseiitasibadibaiaaaiiacabandneishdibaicnsiaeiiininiies

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Appendix A

Decision of New Jersey Supreme Court ..................

Decision of New Jersey Superior Court

Appendix B

N.J.B.S. § 32:1-35.55(b)

Chapter 25, Laws of New Jersey of 1974 ................

I Ge GI IIY seicesiccitvinnssessnsstiagiareitetanbensintnapesnebamnabeiedieianis

ba]

Be eae on

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15

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TABLE OF CASES

PAGE

Arkansas v. Texas, 346 U.S. 368 (1953) .2.2.........:ccecceeeee 4

Bandini Petroleum Co. vy. Superior Court, 284 U.S.

OD CURIE ccctensescesnseneaitesintensnecctreadmnesnatbienneshmensetinnmesimnauia 4

City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965) ........ 22, 23

Courtesy Sandwich Shop v. Port of New York Author-

ity, 12 N.Y.2d 379, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 78,

rehearing denied, 375 U.S. 960 (1968) occ = 10

Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927) ............ccesesseeeees 15

Gaby v. The Port of New York Authority, et al., 134

N.J. Super. 124, 338 A.2d 833 (Super, Ct. 1975),

aff'd, 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976) ........-----0cec0+ 12

Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945) s.ecsccccccssccsssececesssseee 3,5

Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n vy. Blaisdell, 290 U.S, 398

STIS scnnonscshadinissnchiiesseniiniicinitinigiiabipennmmitaapiiinasiicaiaisiiteamintees 20

In re Hudson & Manhattan R.R., 174 F.Supp. 148

(S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff’d sub nom., Spitzer v. Stichman,

gy EF Ff. f. % ee 9

Indiana vy. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938) .....2....:cccceeeeeeeeeee 18

Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954) ... = 15

Jankovich vy. Indiana Toll Road Comm’n, 379 U.S. 487

CEIUEED . cncensensnisenneienmennaeneesiiidanmeassdaipiadinenasitniesonnanel 3, 4,5

Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943) 00... eeeeeeeeeeee 4

Lynch vy. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934) 0... 23

Metlakatla Indian Community, Annette Island Re-

serve v. Egan, 363 U.S. 555 (1960) ................cccccseeeeeees 4

New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U.S. 104 (1877) .........ccceceeceeeee 18

United States Trust Company of New York v. The

State of New Jersey, et al., 134 N.J. Super. 124, 338

A.2d 833 (Super. Ct. 1975), aff’d, 69 N.J. 253, 353

Pe Fg: 2, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21

United States Trust Company of New York ve The

State of New York, et al., Index No. 09128/74 (New

York Supreme Court, filed June 17, 1974) ................ 3

W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56

TIE cntismeitenneneniaineanioneemmeieien —— FF TF

iil

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

’ Constitution of the United States— —_

Article I, Section 10, Clamse 1 ooccccccccccccccccecseeeeeee 5, 6

RSE ETERS Sa Ae eae 5, 6

ET BD 5, 6

ET ae. See aa 3,4

ee S| (| ee 2, 7, 9, 10

I 2

Ch. 25, Laws of New Jersey of 1974 oooccccocccccccccccceeccoeee 2, 3,7

Ch. 208, Laws of New Jersey of 1972 ooo... cocceceeeee 11

Ch. 130, Laws of New Jersey of 1917 ooo... 7

Ch. 993, Laws of New York of 1974 oo. ccceeeee 2

Ch. 318, Laws of New York of 1973 ooo.c.cccccccccccccccsoeeeee 11

Ch. 1003, Laws of New York of 1972 oo. cccccccccccecceenee 11

SECONDARY AUTHORITIES

R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice

SOR EEE ee 4

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

No.

Unrrep States Trust Company or New York, as Trustee

for The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

Consolidated Bonds, Fortieth and Forty-First Series, on

its own behalf and on behalf of all holders of Consoli-

dated Bonds of The Port Authority of New York and

New Jersey and all others similarly situated,

Appellant,

v.

Tue State or New Jersey, Brenpan T. Byawe, Governor

of the State of New Jersey, and Wnuum F. Hytanp,

Attorney General of the State of New Jersey,

Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Appellant appeals from the judgment of the Supreme

Court of New Jersey, entered on February 25, 1976, affirm-

ing the decision of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law

Division, Bergen County, and submit this Statement to

show that the Supreme Court of the United States has

jurisdiction of the appeal and that substantial federal

: questions are presented.

Opinions Below

The decision and opinion of the Supreme Court of New

Jersey is reported at 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976), and

is set forth in Appendix A hereto at pages Al-A39. The

decision and opinion of the Superior Court of New Jersey,

Law Division, Bergen County, is reported at 134 N.J.

Super. 124, 338 A.2d 833 (Super. Ct. 1975), and is set forth

in Appendix A hereto at pages A40-A110.

Jurisdiction

Appellant initiated this action in the Superior Court of

New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, pursuant to

N.J.R.S. §§2A:16-50 et seg., seeking a declaration that

Chapter 25 of the Laws of New Jersey of 1974 contravened

the Contract and Due Process Clauses of the United States

and New Jersey Constitutions. Chapter 25 retroactively

repealed that part of the New Jersey Legislation enacted

in 1962 (N.J.R.S. § 32:1-35.55(b)) which had embodied a

statutory covenant (the “1962 Covenant’”)* between the

States of New Jersey and New York and with the holders

of Consolidated Bonds of the Port Authority of New York

and New Jersey (the “Port Authority”). The 1962 Cove-

nant specifically limited the involvement of the Port

Authority’s revenues and reserves in the area of deficit rail

mass transit.

After a trial in February 1975, narrowly limited to the

issues of bondholder reliance on the 1962 Covenant and the

extent of the damage to the secondary bond market caused

by the repeal, the Superior Court entered an order on May

* Due to the bi-state nature of the Port Authority, valid action by

both States was necessary to repeal retroactively the 1962 Covenant.

On June 15, 1974, New York passed legislation similar to Chapter

25 (Ch. 993, Laws of New York of 1974).

0S aA Se WOR. Olt Pet wens —

3

14, 1975 dismissing Appellant’s complaint and declaring

that Chapter 25 was consiitutionally valid. Appellant

appealed that decision directly to the Supreme Court of

New Jersey which, on February 25, 1976, affirmed the lower

pt judgment, per curiam. The Notice of Appeal to this

ourt was timely filed in

ge _ the Supreme Court of New Jersey

Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §1257(2), this being an appeal from a final judg-

ment of the Supreme Court of New J ersey, the highest

court of that State, holding that Chapter 25 of the Laws

of New Jersey of 1974 is not repugnant to Article I, Section

10, Clause 1 of, or the Fifth and Fourteenth duaninente

to, the United States Constitution.

The Related Case. We call the Court’s attention to the

pendency of a related action, United States Trust Company

of New York v. The State of New York, et al., Index No

09128/74, in the Supreme Court of New York, County of

New York, instituted on June 17, 1974. The New York

case attacks the validity of New York’s repeal of the 1962

Covenant on the grounds that it violates the United States

and New York Constitutions. If Appellant sueceeds in

the New York action, the 1962 Covenant will remain in

force, since valid bi-state legislation is required for effec-

tive repeal. Thus a final judgment in Appellant’s favor

in a New York court, not appealed, or not appealable*®

would end this case notwithstanding the New J ersey courte’

approval of the repeal.

* Such a judgment, if decided u i

, ed upon the adequate and indepen

om ee that the repeal violated the Due Process Clause of the

New York Constitution, would probably not be appealable to this

Court, ¢.g., Jankovich vy. Indiana Toll Road Comm’n, 379 US

487 (1965); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945). =

4

The pendency of the New York action does not affect the

quality of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision as a

“final judgment ... by the highest court of a state” under

28 U.S.C. § 1257(2).* It does not affect the power of this

Court summarily to reverse the New Jersey Supreme

Court’s decision and thus finally settle the entire contro-

versy, a course of action for which there are compelling

arguments.

This Court, on the other hand, could decide in its

diseretion to note probable jurisdiction in this case and

defer consideration on the merits pending final disposition

of the New York case. It is not unknown, of course, for

this Court to hold a case as to which it has noted probable

jurisdiction on its docket pending further proceedings else-

where. See Metlakatla Indian Community, Annette Island

Reserve v. Egan, 363 U.S. 555 (1960) (involving “highest

court of a state” segment of Section 1257. Similar defer-

rals have occurred when this Court’s original or certiorari

jurisdiction has been invoked. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Teras,

246 U.S. 368 (1953) (original jurisdiction), and, as to cer-

tiorari, the eases discussed in R. Stern & E. Gressman,

Supreme Court Practice § 5.9, at p. 919 (4th ed. 1969).

The arguments for a noting of probable jurisdiction and

subsequent deferral are two-fold:

1. If the New York court declares the New York

repeal legislation repugnant to the New York Consti-

tution, that decision is probably not appealable to

this Court, since there would be an “adequate and

independent state ground” for it. E.g., Jankovich v.

Indiana Toll Road Comm’n, 379 U.S. 487 (1965) ;

* FE g., Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943), and Bandini Petro-

leum &:. v. Superior Court, 284 U.S. 8 (1931), which held that the

possibility of a controlling decision in a subsequent or distinct

action, or one collateral in nature, will not cause an appeal to be non-

final and thus unreviewable.

ae

Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945). Since valid

bi-state legislation is necessary for repeal, it would

then not be necessary for this C i

pense Bag ourt to decide the

2. If the New York court declares the New York

repeal legislation constitutional, or unconstitutional

because repugnant to the United States Constitution,

this Court will then be in a position to decide the

entire controversy having had the benefit of the New

York courts’ consideration of the factual issues.

Questions Presented

1.

Is the 1974 New Jersey statute repealing retroactively

the 1962 Covenant between the States of New Jersey and

New York and with Port Authority bondholders, upon

which holders of over $1,600,000,000 of Port Authority

bonds relied, repugnant to Article I, Section 10, Clause 1

of the United States Constitution on the ground that such

repeal impaired an obligation of contract?

2.

Is the 1974 New Jersey statute repealing retroactively

the 1962 Covenant between the States of New Jersey and

New York and with Port Authority bondholders, which

conferred a valuable and substantial security right upon

the holders of over $1,600,000,000 of Port Authority bonds

repugnant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution on the ground that such repeal

constituted a taking of property for public use without

just compensation and without due process of law?

3.

Can the 1974 New Jersey statute which repealed the 1962

Covenant between the States of New Jersey and New York

and with Port Authority bondholders, which was arbitrarily

adopted without any legislative hearing or debate, with no

mention whatsoever of any kind of an emergency, and which

in fact was not related to any emergency, and which is

repugnant to Article I, Section 10, Clause ! of the United

States Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-

ments thereto, be upheld two years later by a court finding

that it represented a valid exercise of the State’s police

power by reason of the coincidental existence of an emer-

gency to which the legislature made no reference?

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved

The Constitutional provisions which Appellant contends

have been violated by the retroactive repeal of the 1962

Covenant are Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the United

States Constitution, commonly known as the “Contract

Clause”, which provides in part as follows:

“No State shall... pass any ... Law impairing the

Obligation of Contracts .. .”

and the following clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments, respectively :

“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law; nor shall

private property be taken for public use, without

just compensation”, and

“nor shall any State deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law. .. .”

:

:

’

7

This case also involves N.J.R.S. § 32:1-35.55(b), the 1962

Covenant, set forth at pages B1-B4 of Appendix B, and

Chapter 25 of the Laws of New Jersey of 1974, the retro-

active repealer, set forth at pages B5-b6 of Appendix B.

Statement of the Case

Appellant instituted this action in three capacities: (1) as

trustee for the holders of $200,000,000 of Port Authority

Consolidated Bonds, (2) on its own behalf as holder of

almost $100,000,000 of Port Authority Consolidated Bonds

in trust and other fiduciary accounts and (3) on behalf of

the holders of the over $1,600,000,000 outstanding Consoli-

dated Bonds. The action seeks a declaratory judgment that

Chapter 25 of the Laws of New Jersey of 1974, which unila-

terally and retroactively cancelled a statutory covenant

between the States of New York and New Jersey and with

holders of Consolidated Bonds of the Port Authority, vio-

lates the United States Constitution.

The Port Authority was established in 1921 by a bi-sta‘e

Compact as a financially independent authority to accom-

plish public purpose projects with funds contributed by

private investors. The Port Authority was created to deal

with the commercial needs of the Port of New York—the

handling, distribution and transportation not of persons but

of freight and cargo by rail, ship and motor truck. (Ch.

130, Laws of New Jersey of 1917). With only the support

of a modest initial appropriation, the two States dedicated

themselves in their Compact to the “encouragement of the

investment of capital” in the Port Authority to finance

those projects authorized for Port Authority development.

Financing for these purposes was to be accomplished by

giving the Port Authority power to mortgage its facilities

and to pledge the revenues from such facilities to secure

the payment of bonds issued to private investors.

Port Authority Consolidated Bonds are not general

obligations of the State of New Jersey or the State of New

York. They are not backed by the general revenues of

either State, are not guaranteed by either State and are

not supported by any grant of either State’s power to tax.

Accordingly, the Port Authority throughout its history,

until 1962, would only undertake projects which it believed

would eventually contribute net revenues for the repay-

ment of its bonds and was required by its creditors to enter

into various contractual undertakings, to which the States

often were parties, to protect the revenues and reserves

pledged to bondholders.

In the early 1960’s, it was proposed that, for the first time

in its history, the Port Authority be directed to assume

financial responsibility for a facility expected to require

enormous capital expenditures and to sustain perpetual

operating deficits. This was the Hudson & Manhattan Rail-

road, a privately owned interstate electric commuter rail-

road system then linking Manhattan, Newark and Hoboken.

The takeover of the Hudson & Manhattan by the Port

Authority was proposed at a time when the four commuter

railroads operating in Northern New Jersey were sustain-

ing total passenger operating deficits of almost $60,000,000

annually, the New York commuter railroads operating defi-

cits of between $10,000,000 and $15,000,000 annually, and the

New York City transit system operating deficits of

$90,000,000 annually, exclusive of debt service charges of

$87,000,000.

Of the several commuter rail systems serving the Port

District, the financial prospects of the Hudson & Manhattan

were by far the worst. It had been in reorganization for

many years, and in 1959 the bankruptcy court approved a

plan which left the railroad with enough cash to continue

et et

operations for only two years, with no funds for capital

expenditures. In re Hudson d& Manhattan R.R., 174

F.Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff’d sub nom., Spiteer Vv

Stichman, 278 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1960). 7

: In 1961, the New York State legislature enacted legisla-

tion directing the Port Authority to take over and operate

the Hudson & Manhattan, with no limitation on the agency’s

future involvement in deficit rail mass transit.*

The New Jersey legislature did not concur. In spite

of the fact that there were other financial tests, under-

takings and provisions for bondholder protection then

in effect relating to Consolidated Bonds, the New Jersey

legislative committee which had been conducting hearings

on the matter concluded that the Port Authority could only

hope to borrow the funds necessary to take over the Hudson

& Manhattan if the States agreed to limit, by a “constitu-

tionally-protected” statutory covenant, the extent of ihe

future involvement of the agency in the enormous deficits

incurred by the area’s commuter rail systems.** New York

concurred and the legislation adopted was the 1962 cove-

nant, which provides in part:

“The 2 States covenant and agree with each

other and with the holders of any affected bonds, as

hereinafter defined, that so long as any of such bonds

*In response to this 1961 New York legislation

the largest single holder of Port Authority Convcliied "Honda

immediately stopped purchasing such bonds and adopted a policy of

replacing its holdings of Port Authority Bonds. Upon the adoption

of the 19€2 Covenant, Appellant again began purchasing Consoli-

dated Bonds for its fiduciary accounts, increasing its holdings to over

$96,000,000 at the time the Covenant was retroactively repealed.

** As the Superior Court found: “the Legislature

: of 1962 con-

cluded that it was necessary to place a limitation on mass transit

deficit operations to be undertaken by the Authority in the future

,- a to promote continued investor confidence in the Authority.”

10

remain outstanding and unpaid and the holders

thereof shall not have given their consent as provided

in their contract with the port authority, ... (b)

neither the States nor the port authority nor any

subsidiary corporation incorporated for any of the

purposes of this act will apply any of the rentals,

tolls, fares, fees, charges, revenues or reserves, which

have been or shall be pledged in whole or in part as

security for such bonds, for any railroad purposes

whatsoever other than permitted purposes herein-

after set forth... .”

The 1962 Covenant accomplished its purpose. On Sep-

tember 1, 1962, the Port Authority took over the Hudson &

Manhattan through its PATH subsidiary, obtaining the

funds necessary for the acquisition and modernization of

the railroad by the successful sale of bonds to private

investors. In fact, in 1962 and 1963, when the value of the

Covenant was fresh in the minds of the legislators, the two

States joined in a most vigorous defense of the legislation

embodying the Covenant which finally resulted in a decision

on the merits by this Court that the constitutional attacks

on the validity of such legislation did not present any sub-

stantial Federal question. Courtesy Sandwich Shop v. Port

of New York Authority, 12 N.Y. 2d 379, appeal dismissed,

8375 U.S. 78, rehearing denied, 375 U.S. 960 (1963).

Notwithstanding the fact that every other major commuter

rail system in the Port District (Penn Central, Erie Lacka-

wanna, Central Railroad of New Jersey) passed through

bankruptey proceedings, private investors, knowing of the

protection of the 1962 Covenant against unlimited involve-

ment of pledged revenues and reserves in deficit rail mass

transit,* continued to purchase Port Authority Consoli-

* The Covenant was described in detail in every Official Statement

following the date of its enactment, in the Port Authority’s Annual

Reports, and in Information Sessions held by the agency and its

underwriters to acquaint prospective investors with the investment

merits of Consolidated Bond offerings.

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11

dated Bonds on favorable terms through the 1960’s and

early 1970s,

In 1973, in connection with proposed PATH rail exten-

sions to Kennedy Airport in New York and to suburban New

Jersey, the two States, after extensive hearings, adopted

legislation prospectively repealing the 1962 Covenant. By

this action, the States in effect reaffirmed the Covenant’s

protection for the over $1,400,000,000 in outstanding bonds

by refusing to repeal the Covenant retroactively with

respect to such bonds.* (Ch. 1003, Laws of New York of

1972; Ch. 318, Laws of New York of 1973; Ch. 208, Laws of

New Jersey of 1972). In the spring of 1974, fulfilling a

campaign promise, newly-elected Governor Byrne of New

Jersey pushed through legislation to cancel the Covenant

unilaterally and retroactively with respect to outstanding

Consolidated Bonds. In marked contrast to the extensive

hearings, reports and findings surrounding the enactment

of the Covenant in 1962 and its prospective repeal in 1973,

no hearings were held, no alternatives were examined, and

bondholders were not notified of the pending legislation.

At no time, either upon the passage of the bill or upon the

signing of it by the Governor, was there any mention of any

emergency caused by the gas shortage or air pollution or

anything else. The companion legislation in New York was

adopted following a brief legislative colloquy in which it

was inferred that the Port Authority’s Consolidated Bonds

were guaranteed by both States. In fact, of course, they

are not,

* Since bonds protected by the Covenant remained ou i

, . . t

the Covenant’s protection continued in fact for bonds of sin eal

after the prospective re until th : .

of the protected bonds. - baited oa redemption

12

How the Federal Questions Were

Raised and Decided Below

Appellant in its Complaint asserted that the retroactive

repeal of the 1962 Covenant constituted an impairment of

the contract between the two States and with the bond-

holders in violation of the Contract Clause of the United

States Constitution and that such repeal constituted a tak-

ing of the bondholders’ property in violation of the Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.

The Superior Court held that: “the repeal legislation was

a reasonable and hence valid exercise of the states’ police

power which is not prohibited by the Contract Clause of

either the Federal or the State Constitution.” (A109). In

a footnote, that court stated that it would not consider

Appellant’s arguments based on the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments since, to the extent that claim was based on

a decline in the price of the bonds in the secondary market

for the bonds it was factually rejected and, in any event,

the test of Constitutional validity as applied to repeal

legislation is the same under both the Contract and the Due

Process Clauses. (A94 n.36).

The Superior Court then entered an order dismissing

Appellant’s complaint and ordering judgment in favor of

defendants on that portion of their counterclaim which

sought a declaratory judgment that Chapter 25 was con-

stitutional.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed

“substantially for the reasons set forth in the opinion

[below]”. (A4).*

* On December 10, 1974, the Superior Court ordered that an

existing action in which Appellant had intervened, Gaby v. The Port

of New York Authority, et al., be consolidated with Appellant’s

action for certain limited purposes. At issue in Gaby was the Con-

stitutional validity of the 1962 Covenant. In view of the decision

as to the validity of the retroactive repeal of the Covenant, the Gaby

case was dismissed by the Superior Court, the dismissal was affirmed

by the Supreme Court of New Jersey and the case will not be further

discussed hereafter.

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The Federal Questions Are Substantial

The judgment of the New Jersey Supreme Court

presents the substantial question whether a State can

unilaterally and retroactively revoke a solemn cove-

nant it has made with holders of municipal bonds, or

whether such bondholders are protected by the Con

tract and Due Process clauses of the United States

Constitution.

The States of New Jersey and New York passed legis-

lation in 1962 whereby they promised that if the investing

public would continue to put its money into Port Authority

Consolidated Bonds to enable the Port Authority to take

over and operate the Hudson & Manhattan Railroad

and to build the World Trade Center, neither they nor the

Port Authority would apply any of the revenues or reserves

pledged as security for those bonds for any railroad pur-

poses whatsoever other than permitted purposes defined in

the legislation. As stated above, in 1962 the four Northern

New Jersey commuter lines, the New York commuter rail-

roads and the New York City transit system were showing

annual operating deficits of about $60,000,000, $10,000,000

to $15,000,000, and $20,000,000 respectively. To protect the

bondholders by preventing pledged revenues and reserves

from being consumed by these appalling and inevitable

deficits was no idle promise. It was a promise which was

absolutely necessary in order to induce the investing public

into continuing to buy Consolidated Bonds. It was a

promise which was absolutely repudiated without any hear-

ing or any debate by the New Jersey legislature. Is it any

wonder that the entire investing public and, in particular,

the municipal bond market is waiting for this Court to tell

them whether they can rely upon the pledged word of a

14

State—whether a State will be permitted under the United

States Constitution to make a promise to entice investment

in municipal bonds and then repudiate it when it serves its

purpose so to do?

During the trial below, representatives of each of the

four principal areas of the municipal bond industry® testi-

fied without contradiction that the secondary market for

Port Authority Consolidated Bonds had been dramatically

disrupted by the retroactive repeal of the Covenant. A

dealer in the bonds testified that in relation to bonds of

comparable quality and maturity Port Authority Bonds

had fallen by 6 to 12 points, or $60 to $120 per $1,000 prin-

cipal amount, as a direct result of the retroactive repeal of

the Covenant. There was also uncontroverted testimony

with respect to the value of the 1962 Covenant as a security

device not duplicated by other contractual undertakings

with bondholders.**®

The witnesses at the trial below also testified without

contradiction regarding the effect of the retroactive repeal

of the 1962 Covenant on the market for municipal bonds

issued by New Jersey and New York. Purchasers of muni-

cipal bonds represent perhaps the most conservative of

investors, willing to sacrifice higher yields because of the

tax benefits attendant upon this type of obligation, the

almost absolute assurance of repayment and, in the mean-

* Investment banking (John F. Thompson of W. H. Morton

Division of American Express Company and Lester Murphy of

Barr Brothers), investment advisory (John F, Thompson), dealers

(Lester Murphy and Austin Fitzgerald of Weedon & Co.) and

institutional investors (Gordon Fowler of Connecticut General Life

Insurance Company).

** The Covenant’s unique value as a security device is demon-

strated by the fact that, promptly following the decision of the New

Jersey Supreme Court below, the two states announced that the Port

Authority would be required to give to each state $120 million, a

total of $240 million, for mass transit purposes.

AE of tn. ee

46 ie ee

ee Pe ete ae

:

15

time, the assurance of a liquid investment. Purchasers of

municipal bonds finance public purpose projects from fire

trucks to airports, all upon the market’s understanding that

the contractual undertakings between issuers and private

investors are inviolate. Thus, the witnesses below testified

that many institutional investors, as a result of the retro-

active repeal of the 1962 Covenant, simply crossed New

York and New Jersey obligations entirely off their lists,

undoubtedly contributing to the dire financial situation in

which New York City and New York State are presently

enmeshed.

This Court should hear this appeal in order finally to

determine whether the promises made by States to the

creditors of state agencies mean what they say or whether

they are subject to arbitrary unilateral cancellation when-

ever the Legislatures believe that course to be politically

expedient.

It is of great importance to Port Authority bond-

holders that this Court decide that the po me is

unconstitutional, thus returning the security provided

7 o Covenant and restoring the market for the

The Superior Court found® that bondholders’ reliance on

the Covenant was not the “primary consideration” for the

purchase of their bonds. The Superior Court said: “no

_ * This Court is not bound by the Superior Court’s factual find-

ings. This a involves “a conclusion of law as to a Federal

right and a finding of fact . . . so intermingled as to make it ;

nevessary, in order to pass upon the Federal question, to analyze the

facts.” Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 385 (1927); see also Kern-

Limerick, Ine. V. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110, 121 (1954) (“... the long

course of judicial construction . . . establishes as a principle that the

duty rests on this Court to decide for itself facts or constructions

upon which federal constitutional issues rest.’’)

16

witness testified that purchases would-not have been made

without the covenant,* but only that they would not have

purchased or recommended the purchase of the bonds ‘at

the price which they were then offered’”. (A91). To say

that bondholders would not have purchased the bends on

the proffered terms absent the Covenant is to say that

bondholders would not have purchased the bonds at all

absent the Covenant, since investors were not offered a

bond at one interest rate with the Covenant’s protection

and another bond at a much higher interest rate without

it. They were offered a package and each witness below

testified that neither they nor their customers were inter-

ested in the package without the Covenant.

The court below implied that bondholders should be

satisfied with the contractual protections which pre-

ceded the adoption of the Covenant, since Port Authority

bonds in fact were purchased before the enactment of the

Covenant. This is a tempting fallacy but a fallacy nonethe-

less. Prior to the Covenant’s enactment, the power of the

States to direct the Port Authority into any perpetual defi-

cit undertaking was only theoretical since the necessary

private financing would never have been forthcoming on

acceptable terms. When it became apparent that the States

intended to change the agency’s course and direct it into

a field inherently incapable of profitable operation, then

and only then were the existing statutory and contractual

protections for bondholders wholly inadequate. Then and

* This statement by the Superior Court is inaccurate. John F.

Thompson, the dean of municipal bond analysts, testified in part:

“Q. If you knew that the covenant would later be repealed

would you have recommended the Port Authority bonds dur-

ing the 60s?

“A. No.” (T8614 to 17).

Ae ee OD AA me

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17

only then did some reasonable financial limitation become

an absolute sine qua non of future Port Authority Consoli-

dated Bond financing on reasonable terms. The 1962 Cove-

nant was the limitation agreed upon by the States.

Similarly, the Superior Court required proof of “per-

manent” secondary market damage as a result of the repeal.

That proof is in the record—the very recovery in the bonds

which the Superior Court relied upon to support its con-

clusion that damage was not “permanent” was explained

as a short-term technical adjustment in the market

prompted by purchases to cover short sales in the closing

months of the preceding year. Further, after the retro-

active repeal the market for Port Authority bonds became

“extremely thin” and “sensitive” so that a sale of a large

block of the bonds could not be made at the current bid

price but only at a price substantially below it. The

Superior Court found no significance in this market dis-

ruption or in a market decline of 6 to 12 points (some $60

to $120 per $1,000 principal amount of bonds) as a direct

result of the Covenant’s repeal, notwithstanding the fact

that over $1,600,000,000 in bonds are outstanding. With

respect to a single $100,000,000 issue of Consolidated Bonds

this decline represents a diminution in market value of

between $6,000,000 and $12,000,000. This, to the courts

below, was not an impairment of constitutional proportions.

The Superior Court did concede that bo

t: dholders’

security had been diminished: aie

“To the extent that the re

peal of the cove

authorizes the Authority to assume greater “ofcits

for such purposes, it permits a diminution of the

pledged revenues and reserves and may be said to

constitute an impairment of the states’ i

the bondholders.” A95. ne

18

The present planned “diminution” is $240 million, with no

assurance to bondholders that this is not just the beginning.

The possibility of such increasing diversions, to the courts

below, was not an impairment of constitutional proportions.

Il.

The court below erroneously justified the violation

of the impairment provisions of the Constitution by

terming the retroactive repeal of the 1962 Covenant

an exercise of the police power.

The 1962 Covenant is the clearest possible example of a

contract made by a State with certain of its citizens. The

opening words of the Covenant read: “The 2 States

covenant and agree with each other and with the holders

of any affected bonds. . . .” Such a contract must be secure

against impairment under the Contract Clause of the United

States Constitution and, since a property right is created,

protected by the Federal Due Process Clause. A95 n.38;

see Indiana v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938); New Jersey

v. Yard, 95 U.S. 104 (1877). It was passed only following

exhaustive legislative hearings and was enacted as a bar-

gained-for “constitutionally-protected” (in the words of the

New Jersey legislative committee) statutory covenant.

The Superior Court’s holding that the repeal was con-

stitutional, notwithstanding the conceded impairment, is

based on an erroneofis application of language derived from

W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935). The

Superior Court stated the test of constitutionality as

follows:

“Coneeding the existence of some impairment of

hondholder security as a result of the repeal, has

;

19

the action of the states destroyed the quality of their

security as an ‘acceptable investment for a rational

investor’?” A107-A108.

It is from Kavanaugh that the Superior Court adopted

its test of constitutionality. 295 U.S. at 60. The Superior

Court, however, misread the holding in Kavanaugh. This

Court held there that in enacting the challenged legisla-

tion the legislature had “put restraint aside” and “with

studied indifference to the interests of the mortgagee or to

his appropriate protection they have taken from the mort-

gage the quality of an acceptable investment for a rational

investor.” Jd. This Court specifically noted that the

changes wrought by the challenged legislation were so sub-

stantial that the State had transgressed the “outermost

limits” of constitutional bounds:

“In the books there is much talk about distinctions

between changes of the substance of the contract

and changes of the remedy. The dividing line

is at times obscure. There is no need for the pur-

poses of this case to plot it on the legal map. Not

even changes of the remedy may be pressed so far

as to cut down the security of a mortgage without

moderation or reason or in a spirit of oppression.

Even when the public welfare is invoked as an

excuse, these bounds must be respected. ... We

state the outermost limits only. In stating them we

do not exclude the possibility that the bounds are

even narrower. The case does not call for definition

more precise. A catalogue of the changes imposed

upon this mortgage must lead to the conviction that

the framers of the amendments have put restraint

aside. With studied indifference to the interests of

the mortgagee or to his appropriate protection they

have taken from the mortgage the quality of an

acceptable investment for a rational investor.” Jd.

(emphasis added).

20

Thus, although in Kavanaugh the Court was careful to

state that the destruction of the quality of the security “as

an acceptable investment for a rational investor” con-

stituted the “outermost limits” of the bounds of which a

state may not transgress, the Superior Court adopted these

outer limits as its standard for determining the constitu-

tionality of the 1974 repeal legislation. The Superior Court

has turned what to this Court was an unconstitutional maxi-

mum into a required minimum. .

If only those acts of the State which resulted in the

destruction of a contract as an acceptable investment were

constitutionally impermissible, then virtually no covenant

or combination of covenants in a bond resolution or statute

would be safe from abrogation. There are, after all,

innumerable covenants and provisions in bond resolutions

and statutes, the abrogation of which would not “destroy”

the bond’s security, but which obviously would result in a

material impairment.

Additionally, the Superior Court erroneously held:

“The line of demarcation between Blaisdell and

Kavanaugh may be expressed as one of degree : The

states’ inherent power to protect the public welfare

may be validly exercised under4he Contract Clause

even if it impairs a contractual obligation so long as

it does not destroy it.” A102.

The Superior Court concluded that the framers of the

Constitution of the United States meant “destroy” when

they said “impair.” Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell,

290 U.S. 398 (1934), certainly does not support this extreme

view, since it merely involved a postponement of remedies

for a short period of time.

In reaching its conclusion that the retroactive repeal of

the 1962 Covenant was “a reasonable and hence valid exer-

cise” of the police power, the Superior Court found:

“Suffice it to say that between 1962 and 1974 the

security afforded bondholders had been substantially

ee ee ee

;

;

‘

:

21

augmented by a vast increase in Authority revenues

and reserves, and the Authority’s financial ability to

absorb greater deficits, from whatever source and

without any significant impairment of bondholder

security, was correspondingly increased. During the

same interval mass transit facilities within the Dis-

trict continued to deteriorate while the public need for

such facilities became unprecedented as the result of

the promulgation of stringent federal air pollution

regulations designed to reduce automobile usage and

the emergence of an energy crisis which threatened

the entire system of private automobile transporta-

tion in the two States.” A106-A107 (footnotes

omitted).

The Superior Court’s first conclusion, that the Port

Authority’s ability to absorb deficits has greatly increased,

is simply inaccurate. Its second conclusion, that mass tran-

sit facilities would decline while public need increased, was

fully contemplated in 1962.

While the Port Authority’s revenues greatly increased

in the 1960’s and early 1970’s so did its expenses and reserve

requirements, so much that the actual surplus revenues of

the Port Authority in excess of mandated reserves in-

creased only $2,718,000 in the 13 years from the enactment

of the Covenant 0 its retroactive repeal, while, during the

same period, the principal amount of outstanding Con-

solidated Bonds increased from approximately $690,000,000

to over $1,600,000,000.

The alleged improvement in the Port Authority’s finan-

cial position cannot justify repeal of the Covenant, even if

it existed. If it could, then any contractual undertaking

with bondholders, if effective in contributing to an improve-

ment in the obligor’s financial well-being, would be subject

to arbitrary cancellation. Surely it takes more to justify

the State in abrogating its promise!

The pressing need for rail mass transit facilities in the

Port District was the very reason the Covenant was

22

enacted—to enable the Port Authority to take over the

destitute Hudson & Manhattan, while maintaining investor

confidence in light of the certainty that rail mass transit

systems would continue to decline financially. .

The Superior Court based primary reliance on this

Court’s decision in City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S.

497 (1965). Bl Paso, a case dealing with squatters’ rights

in Texas, is clearly distinguishable.

Briefly stated, the facts in El Paso were as follows: In

1910, the State of Texas sold public land to plaintiff’s pre-

decessor in title in accordance with a State policy of selling

such lands to raise funds for publie schools. The purchase

money mortgage contract was extremely favorable to the

purchaser and, in practice, the time for payment of prin-

cipal was periodically extended and, in fact, was never

called due. The State retained a right of forfeiture if the

owner failed to pay interest, but the owner or his vendees

were entitled to reinstatement, provided no rights of third

persons had intervened. The right to reinstatement was

therefore defeasible and the State always had pursued a

policy of quick resale of the forfeited lands to a third party,

thus cutting off the right to reinstatement. In 1941, legis-

lation was enacted providing that the right of reinstatement

had to be exercised within five vears from the date of for-

feiture or the effective date of the act, whichever was later.

Plaintiff, who filed his application for reinstatement more

than five years after the date of forfeiture, filed suit to

determine title to the land, claiming that the 1941 legislation

violated the Contract Clause.

The narrow exception to the rule that a State may not

repudiate its contractual undertakings which was estab-

lished in El Paso has no application to the repeal of the

1962 Covenant. Unlike Hl Paso, here the State has many

a

Ot a eh _

ee ee

—_—

_—

_—

alternatives*® to deal directly or indirectly with the require-

ments for commuter rail mass transit. Here the repudiated

obligation was in fact a substantial inducement to private

investors lending their funds to an agency of the State.

To argue whether it was “a primary inducement” is to

quibble. Suffice it to say that it was a sine qua non of the

purchase by the bondholders of these particular Consoli-

dated Bonds. Here the investors reasonably expected the

State’s obligation to endure until their bonds were satisfied.

Here, rather than the dramatic change in circumstances

present in El Paso, the very danger foreseen in 1962 and

sought to be protected against by the Covenant came to

pass. Here, unlike El Paso, if any unforeseen or unex-

pected benefits have been conferred they have been con-

ferred on the State. In 1962, it was expected that the Port

Authority would be taking off the States’ hands in the

future deficits for operating the old Hudson & Manhattan

in an amount which would level off at $6,575,000 annually.

In fact, those deficits now exceed $35,000,000 annually, and

the States refuse to remedy the situation through fare

increases. Here, unlike El Paso, the bondholders’ contract

has been totally cancelled rather than modified by some

reasonable adjustment in its terms. In marked contrast,

when the terms of the Triborough Bridge Authority bonds

were changed to benefit mass transit, the bondholders were

* Several obvious alternatives are: to guarantee an issue of Port

Authority bonds for mass transit purposes; to allow the Port

Authority to increase PATH fares to competitive levels, thus free-

ing more funds for railroad purposes under the Covenant’s formula;

to issue State bonds and simply utilize the Port Authority’s oper-

ating expertise; or to refund outstanding bonds protected by the

Covenant and secure bondholder consent under those issues not

yet refundable. These ulternatives demonstrate that this case does

not involve any lofty governmental purpose. Rather, it involves

money, and only money, a desire by the State to further lessen

government expenditures. This has never been sufficient to justify

the cancellation of a State’s contract. E.g., Lynch v. United States,

292 U.S. 571, 580 (1934).

24

consulted and consented to the change after obtaining an

increase in the interest rate. El Paso, therefore, is dis-

tinguishable from this case upon every ground on which

that decision was based. This case presents the clearest

example of an unconstitutional impairment of contract and

a taking of bondholders’ property without just compensa-

tion and without due process of law.

Conclusion

This Court should reverse the judgment of the Supreme

Court of New Jersey or, in the alternative, note probable

jurisdiction of the appeal and, if the Court deems it appro-

priate, order the appeal deferred pending resolution of the

related action in New York.

Respectfully submitted,

DevEREUX MILBURN

Ropert A. McTAMANEY

Rosert B. Meyner

Attorneys for Appellant

Of Cownsel:

Carter, Lepyarp & MiLpuRN

Two Wall Street

New York, New York 10005

(212) 732-3200

Meyner, Lanpis & VeRDON

Gateway I

Newark, New Jersey 07102

(201) 624-2800

APPENDIX A

Decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey

UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK. AS

TRUSTEE FOR THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK

AND NEW JERSEY CONSOLIDATED BONDS, FORTIETH

AND FQRTY-FIRST SERIES; ON ITS OWN BEHALF

AND ON BEHALF OF ALL HOLDERS OF CONSO) .DATED

BONDS OF THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK

AND NEW JERSEY AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SIT-

UATED, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT-CROSS-RESPONDENT,

v. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY; BRENDAN T. BYRNE,

GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY; AND

WILLIAM F. HYLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANTS-RESPON-

DENTS-CROSS-APPELLANTS.

DANIEL M. GABY, PLAINTIFF-CROSS-APPELLANT, v. THE

PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY, JAMES C. KELLOGG.

Ili, HOYT AMMIDON, GUSTAVE L. LEVY, JAMES G.

HELLMUTH, ANDREW C. AXTELL, WILLIAM J. RONAN,

W. PAUL STILLMAN, WALTER H. JONES, BERNARD J.

LASKER, PHILIP B. HOFFMAN, AND JERRY FINKEL-

STEIN, COMMISSIONERS OF THE PORT OF NEW YORK

AUTHORITY, AUSTIN J. TOBIN, EXECUTIVE DIREC-

TOR OF THE PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY, AND

WILLIAM T. CAHILL, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF

NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANTS-CROSS-RESPONDENTS,

AND UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW

YORK, ETC., INTERVENOR.

Argued October 7, 1975—Decided February 25, 1976.

SYNOPSIS

Class action on behalf of citizens, residents and taxpayers

whose occupations were dependent upon the existence of mass

transportation was brought against Port Authority of New

York and New Jersey challenging constitutionality of cove-

nant between the States of New Jersey and New York on one

hand and the holders of bonds issued by the Port Authority

on the other hand with respect to the use io which certain

revenues were to be put. After the covenant was repealed by

New Jersey Legislature, trustee for the bonds brought action

challenging the constitutionality of the repealing statute.

The Superior Court, Law Division, 134 N. J. Super. 124,

upheld the constitutionality of the repealer and dismissed the

class action and the parties appealed. The Supreme Court

held that compact which created the Port Authority em-

powered, but did not mandate, the Authority to develop a

plan for a particular kind of method of transportation ; and

that, since the Authority had exercised its discretion by re-

jecting a policy favoring mass transportation, mandamus did

not lie to compel the Authority to develop a plan for mass

transit even though, by virtue of repeal of the covenant, it

had the funds to do so.

Affirmed.

Pashman, J., concurred in part and dissented in part and

filed an opinion.

Mr. Robert B. Meyner and Mr. Devereux Milburn, of the

New York bar, argued the cause for appellant-cross-respon-

dent-intervenor United States Trust Company (Messrs.

Meyner, Landis and Verdon, and Messrs. Carter,

Ledyard and Milburn and Hawl:ins, Delafield and Wood.

of the New York bar, attorneys; Mr. Meyner, Mr. Milburn,

and Mr. Donald J. Robinson, of the New York bar. on the

brief and of counsel).

Mr, Murray J. Laulicht and Mr. Michael I. Sovern, ot the

New York bar, Special Counsel to the Attorney General. ar-

gued the cause for respondents-cross-appellants State of New

Jersey, Brendan T. Byrne and William F. Hyland (Jr.

William FP. Hyland, Attorney General of New Jersey. at-

torney; Mr. Laulicht, Mr. Sovern and Mr. Harold Eagar,

of the New York bar, Special Counsel to the Attorney Gen-

eral, on the brief).

Mr. Howard Stern argued the cause for plaintiff-cross-ap-

pellant Daniel M. Gaby (Messrs. Shavick, Stern, Schotz,

Steiger and Croland, attorneys; Mr. Stern on the brief.

Mr. Stern and Mr. Theodore-W. Kheel of the New York

bar and Messrs. Battle, Fowler, Stokes and Kheel of the New

York bar, of counsel). |

A4

Mr. Francis A. Mulhern argued the cause fot eross-re-

spondent The Port Authority of New York and Newwéerscy,

et al. (Mr. Mulhern, attorney and on the brief; Mr. ‘Patrick

J. Falvey of the New York’ bar, Mr. Joseph Lesser of the

New York bar, Ms. Isobel E. Muirhead, Mr. Arthur P. Berg

of the New York bar, and Mr. Vigdor D. Bernstein, of

counsel! ).

Per Curiam. The judgment is affirmed, substantially for

the reasons set forth in the opinion of Judge Gelman, 134

N. J. Super. 124 (Law Div. 1975). The observations which

follow are occasioned by Justice Pashman’s suggested remedy

in the Gaby suit.’

Whatever persuasive force might be accorded the argument

that as a matter’of policy the Port Authority should devote

more of its energies and resources to the mass transit field,

the fact remains that the remedy fashioned by our Brother is

neither pressed for by Gaby on this appeal nor within the

powers of this Court to direct and enforce.

Gaby’s class action complaint for a declaratory judgment

that the 1962 Covenant was unconstitutional asked for “multi-

farious relief,” including a request that the Port Authority

be directed “to formulate and submit to the court a plan

for the development of mass transit facilities within the

Port District,” 134 N. J. Super. at 131. However, the trial

judge, having concluded in the United States Trust Co. suit

that “the repeal legislation was a reasonable and hence valid

exercise of the states’ police power which is not prohibited

by the Contract Clause of either the Federal or the State Con-

stitution,” id. at 197, found it unnecessary to reach the issue

of the 1962 Covenant’s asserted invalidity. He therefore dis-

iJustice Pashman would order the Port Authority to complete

pending projects and to “formulate and

tions for a regional mass transportation scheme to

of New York and New Jersey * * * in an expeditious fashion and

within a fixed period of time.” Post at 288.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

A5

- Missed Gaby’s complaint, id. at 198, without discussing the re-

quested relief of a direction for development of a mass transit .

plan, on which issue there was neither testimony nor argu-

ment at the trial level.

In his brief filed in the Court after direct certification of his

appeal, 68 V. J. 175 (1975), Gaby conceded his limited pur-

pose in pursuing the appeal as being “to preserve the issue of

the constitutionality of the 1962 Covenant.” The point of this

in turn was, as he put it, to furnish “an alternative ground for

affirming the decision below.”? Whatever issues may have been

preserved by his appeal and whatever desire there may have

been to present “all the issues,” the fact remains that Gaby’s

brief raises and discusses only the validity of the Covenant in

constitutional terms. No argument is made there for any

special relief; and, understandably, the Port Authority has

likewise not briefed the question at all iu this Court. At oral

argument the subject was adverted to only in a limited fash-

ion.

Ordinarily, we would have no occasion to decide an issue .

which, while portentous in itself, has become so remote and

peripheral to the central thrust of this litigation. However,

inasmuch as the minority opinion raises and discusses in ez-

tenso this question of considerable public significance, namely,

the involvement of the Port Authority in mass transit and

particularly the propriety of this Court ordering as a specific

remedy the submission of a plan for development of mass

transit facilities, we overlook whatever infirmities may exist

in the record before us, compounded by the practical disad-

vantage of not having the views of the parties, and proceed to

address the point. 4

[1] The 1921 Compact between the States of New York

and New Jersey, whereby the Port Authority was ‘created,

N. J. 8. A. 32:1-4, envisioned the adoption of a Compre-

hensive Plan for the development of the port. N. J. 9. A.

~~. Motion for Certification of Plaintiff-Respondent, Daniel

. Gaby.

A6

32:1-11. Direction was given to the Port Authority in the

Plan itself “to proceed with the development of the nort of

New York in accordance with said comprehensive plan * * *.”

N. J. 8. A. 32:1-33. That the Authority’s involvement in

transportation matters was contemplated is obvious from a

reading of this and other portions of the Comprehensive Plan

as well as of the Compact; but it requires a quantum leap

to derive therefrom a mandate (as distinguished from the

power) to develop a plan for a particular kind or method of

transportation, to wit, mass transit. It is not without sig-

nificance, for instance, that the legislature has provided that

the Authority may make recommendations for the increase

and improvement of transportation facilities, N. J. S. A.

32 :1-13, which by definition includes railroads and any fa-

cility for the “transportation or carriage of persons or prop-

erty,” NV. J. S. A. 32:1-23; but nowhere is it mandated that

such recommendations be made. A mandate such as that

contemplated by the minority opinion is not something to be

inferred by the courts but rather is a singularly appropriate

subject for specific legislative directive, conspicuously absent

here. Cf. Del. Riv. & Bay Auth. v. N. J. Pub. Emp. Rel.

Comm’n., 112 N. J. Super. 160, 165 (App. Div. 1970), aff’d

o. b., 58 N. J. 388 (1971). 5

If, then, the Authority is in the position of being em-

powered (as we acknowledge) rather than mandated to act in

the area of mass transit, its exercise of that power becomes

a matter of discretion and judgment. As is made abundantly

clear by the voluminous record in this case, the trial court’s

opinion, and the concurring and partially dissenting opinion

here, the Authority has more than once in recent years

broached the question of whether it should pursue a policy

of encouraging mass transit and has determined that it shall

not. The remedy suggested in the minority opinion is de-

signed to overrule that decision. As such it is in the nature of

the former prerogative writ of mandamus, now invocable un-

der proceedings for relief in lieu of prerogative writs, Rule

4:69.

AZ

[2,3] However, mandamus will not lie if the duty to act

is a discretionary one and the discretion has been exercised.

As Justice Heher explained, in Switz v. Middletown Twp.,

23 N. J. 580 (1957), mandamus is “a coercive process that

commands the performance of a specific ministerial act or

duty, or compels the exercise of a discretionary function,

‘but does not seek to interfere with or control the mode and

manner of its exercise or to influence or direct a particular

result.” 23 N. J. at 587. © we have sought to demon-

strate, the circumstances before us do not at all invite or

accommodate the remedy proposed. This is so because the

Authority (whose function is clearly not ministerial) has in

fact exercised its discretion, even though that exercise has

resulted in the rejection of a policy favoring mass trans-

portation. Being a judgment decision its wisdom may be

‘open to dispute; but as to the propriety of this Court’s re-

fusal to intrude on the underlying policy determination.

there can be no question in the circumstances before us.

And this not as a response to some procedural deficiency

but because of our respect for the fundamental substantive

principle embodied in mandamus.

Finally, we observe that in this particular area of bi-

state operations, there is close and continuing supervision

of the Port Authority by the other branches of government.

Hence, the proposed remedy would not only tend to usurp

the influence over the Authority vested in the Governors of

the States of New York and New Jersey, but would also in-

trude upon the functions of the legislatures of the respec-

tive States, whose task it is in the final analysis to enact

appropriate legislation and take such other action as may

be required to remedy whatever deficiencies may exist with

respect to mass transit.

Affirmed.

PasHMAN, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

:

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I

INTRODUCTION TO GABY COMPLAINT

My Brothers today affirm a lower court decision which was

the product of two separate and distinct actions consolidated

for trial. United States Trust Co. v. State, 134 N. J. Super.

124 (Law Div. 1975). In the first action, brought by plain-

tiff United States Trust Company, the trial court sustained

the State’s repeal of the 1962 statutory covenant (N. J.

S. A. 32:1-35.55) between the States of New Jersey and

New York and the holders of bonds issued by the Port

Authority of New York and New Jersey (Port Authority).

That covenant was concurrently enacted by the legislatures

of New York and New Jersey at the time of the Port Au-

thority’s acquisition of the Hudson & Manhattan Railroad

Company (H & M), since renamed the Port Authority

Trans-Hudson System (PATH). Intended as a means of

protecting the bondholders’ investments, the covenant pro-

hibited the states and the Port Authority from applying

“any of the rentals, tolls, fares, fees, charges, revenues or

reserves, . . . for any railroad purposes whatsoever other

than permitted purposes.” N. J. 8S. A. 32:1-35.55. As sub-

sequently defined in ~* covenant, “permitted purposes”

precluded the establix at, acquisition or construction of

any railroad facility until the Port Authority could deter-

mine that the facility would be self-supporting or would not

produce deficits except within narrowly defined limits.

In dismissing plaintiff’s cause of action, the trial court

found that the 1974 “repealer,” N. J. S. A. 32:1-35.55a,

was immune from constitutional challenge as an impairment

of contractual obligation, a right which is protected by

U.S. Const., Art. 1, § X and N. J. Const. (1947), Art. IV,

§ VII, © 3. he a collateral finding, the court determined that

' the attractiveness of Port Authority bonds was not contingent

upon the continued protection of the 1962 covenant, but

rather upon the viability of the Port Authority itself.

Ad

The majority affirms the trial court on these bases and

to this extent, I concur fully and completely with the con-

clusions reached by Judge Gelman in his very enlightened

and comprehensive opinion. My agreement is premised on.

the unduly restrictive influence which the covenant exerted

on Port Authority operations in contravention of the

statutory mandates upon which that agency was created in

1921. The paralytic effect of the covenant could be seen in

_ the Authority’s practical inability and attitudinal reluctance

to‘ respond to the mounting.needs for rapid transit in the

New York metropolitan area. In light of the limited util-

ity which it continued to serve, the 1962 covenant repre-

sented an artificial obstacle to the affirmative public action

which was necessitated as an alternative to continued and

wasteful reliance solely on the private automobile as the

primary mode of transportation. ‘

The second action, Gaby v. Port of New York Authority,

et al., was likewise concerned with the repeal of the 1962

covenant, Expanded into a class action on behalf of citizens,

residents and taxpayers whose occupations are dependent

upon the existence of mass transportation, plaintiff cites the

1962 covenant as .an impediment to the improvement and

expansion of these facilities. While the State of New Jersey

sought the repeal of the covenant as an ultimate end in the

(United States Trust Co. action, plaintiff Gaby visualizes a

repeal as merely a means to a larger end. This is because

the vindication of Gaby’s interests is only partially depen-

dent on freeing the financial resources from the restrictions

of the 1962 covenant and placing them at the Port Author-

ity’s disposal. More problematical and essential to the relief

which he desires is the necessity to overcome the adminis-

. trative inertia which has characterized the agency’s efforts

in the area of mass transportation. Consequently, Gaby re-

quested in his complaint that the trial court:

. . . [Direct and’ order the Port Authority, its Commissioners,

and its Executive Director to formulate and submit to this Court,

or a Special Master to be appointed by this Court, a plan for the

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development of mass transportation facilities in the Port District.

. [Plaintiff Gaby’s complaint at 17]

This action was pretried on February 22, 1973 and oral

arguments were heard on September 26, 1973 on the par-

ties’ respective motions for summary judgment. Judgment

was deferred and arguments were later rescheduled to per-

mit the submission of briefs on additional issues and the

intervention of United States Trust Company as a party

defendant representing the interests of Port Authority bond-

holders. Prior to these arguments, the pendency of legisla-

tion repealing the covenant recommended that the trial court

withhold further review. Accordingly, the proceedings were

stayed to permit consideration of the anticipated legislation.

The statutory repealer which was signed into law by Gov-

ernor Brendan T. Byrne on April 30, 1974 precipitated the

United States Trust Co. action, which was instituted on the

same day. On the basis of common subject matter, this later

action was consolidated on December 10, 1974 with the

previously filed Gaby case by order of the trial court. These

matters then proceeded to trial in February 1975.

The trial was largely confined to the factual issues of

bondholder reliance on the 1962 covenant and resultént dam-

age to the secondary bond market caused by the repeal of the

covenant. The information which was thus elicited formed

the basis for the trial court’s reported opinion, 134 N. J.

Super. 124, in which the constitutionality of the 1974 re-

pealer was sustained. Although reasons upon which the

court’s decision was grounded were clearly distinguishable

from the constitutional arguments advanced by Gaby, the

court’s ultimate decision — the rejection of the 1962

covenant — coincided with Gaby’s interests. Regardless of

whether that result was achieved by sustaining the 1974 re-

pealer as the trial court did, or whether it was achieved by

tinding the 1962 covenant itself unconstitutional as sug-

gested by Gaby, the result indicated the possibility of grant-

ing the further relief sought by Gaby. A more activist role

All

for the Port Authority appeared to be a reality. Nonetheless,

the court concurrently ordered the dismissal of Gaby’s com-

plaint, thus frustrating the additional relief which he sought.

134 N. J. Super. at 198. From this disposition, Gaby filed

a cross-motion for direct certification which was granted on

May 28, 1975. 68 N. J. 175 (1975).

Similar to his presentation before the trial court, Gaby’s

arguments are again directed towards a declaration df the

unconstitutionality of the 1962 covenant. This is more the

result of strategic considerations, however, than devotion to

substantive principle. Recognizing the limited nature of the

trial court’s factual findings and disposition, Gaby has

taken what appears to be a most advisable legal ¢ »rse. By

preserving the issue of the constitutionality of tne 1962

covenant on appeal, he has simultaneously preserved one of

his major contentions should this or any other court reverse

the trial court on the constitutionality of the 1974 repealer.

Furthermore, in his Supreme Court brief, Gaby explained

that his contentions with regard to the 1962 Covenant are

inextricably tied to his request for greater involvement of

the Port Authority in mass transit projects:

The Appellant’s Brief of Gaby is concerned with the validity of

the 1962 Covenant (N- J. 8. A. 32:1-35.50 et seq.). Central to

the issue of the validity of the Covenant is the question whether

the mass transportation of people within the Port District was one

of the principal activities aythorized by the Compact (N. J. S. A.

32 :1—35.50 et seq.) ; whether the insulation of the Port Authority

from that activity was in such derogation of the Compact as to

frustrate its meaning and intent and so material as to require Con-

gressional approval. [Plaintiff-Cross Appellant’s brief at 3].

The majority today chooses to overlook this relationship

in its reluctance to transcend the judgmental confines of

the trial court and in its affirmation of that court’s dis-

missal of Gaby’s complaint. This disposition, undertaken in

an unusually cavalier fashion, is not a product of some mis-

understanding as to the essential relief which Gaby requests.

On the contrary, the majority recognizes the strategic con-

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siderations implicit in Gaby’s desire to preserve the issue

of the constitutionality of the 1962 Covenant. Ante (at

261). Nonetheless, in characterizing the constitutional argu-

ments raised by Gaby as exemplifying a “limited purpose

in pursuing the appeal,” the majority misconstrues and

frustrates the true interests of Gaby, and has done so in @

manner which I find most distressing.

The majority justifies its truncated consideration of Gaby’s

plea by referring to an isolated phrase, taken out of context

from a sentence which Gaby adopted as representative of -

his position in his cross-motion for certification. When more

appropriately considered within the sentence in which it

originally appeared, the phrase — “an alternative ground

for affirming the decision below” — assumes an entirely dif-

ferent meaning from that which the majority attaches to it:

‘The purposes of this cross motion are identical with those stated

by the State of New Jersey in its cross motion for certification:

“ . . bring before the Supreme Court all of the issues submitted

to Judge Gelman and to avoid the possibility that some of the issues

submitted to Judge Gelman might have to be determined in the first

instance by the Appellate Division. Because of the urgency and

public importance of this case, it would be most unwise to require

a .piecemeal, appellate process, particularly since the [first] issue

presented by this cross motion could be an alternative ground for

affirming the decision below. . . .” [Plaintiff-cross appellant’s ap-

pendix at 47a-48a; emphasis supplied).

While the “first issue” refers to the constitutionality of the

1962 covenant, I believe it would be wrong to confuse Gaby’s

real interest in stimulating improvement of urban mass

transportation with his more temporal interest in having the

1962 covenant declared unconstitutional. The majority not

only fails to make this distinction, but fails to do so despite

Gaby’s expressed desire to present “all of the issues” to this

Court.

This failure is only compounded by the majority’s persistent

willingness to ignore the Gaby complaint and the relief which

it warrants. In spite of plaintiff’s overindulgent concern for

the constitutionality issue, the statement of his case reflects

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more than a limited and perfunctory reference to the subject.

During the course of oral argument, counsel for Gaby spe-

cifically stated: oi ii

Yes, as we read the compact between the states, the affirmative

obligation of the Port Authority in this area is to plan. The imme-

diate affirmative obligation . . . and indeed in these b and else-

where, there is a suggestion that if the Covenant’ is in or the

repealer upheld, either way, that it would be appropriate for the

Court to direct the Port Authority to study mass transit needs in

the Port Authority area and make proper proposals. Then wien

it comes to implementation, then you're talking about legislation

of the two states, but the affirmative obligation of the Port Au-

thority is to study the problem as it affects the Port area.

It should be noted in passing, that this statement not only

affirms the relief desired by plaintiff, but also embodies a re-

quest for a remedy which parallels that which I suggest be-

low, infra at 287-288. |

Therefore, although my Brothers remove the constricting

fiscal shackles of the 1962 covenant, they fail to take the

additional steps which flow as natural concomitants to the

action which they affirm. This failure, as I see it, stems, in

part, from a reluctance to go farther and faster in an area

plagued by administrative inaction and intransigence. It also

constitutes an indulgence in the meaningless gesture of sus-

taining the 1974 repealer without concurrently authorizing

the relief needed to implement the initiative which the Legis-

lature sought to instill in the Port Authority by that repeal.

As I fear, the administrative foot-dragging which was im-

plicit in the 1962‘covenant, may be only symptomatic of the

inertia which has characterized the Port Authority in the

field of mass transit operations. The majority’s decision can

only serve to perpetuate this sad state of affairs. |

In light of the rapidly deteriorating condition of mas«

transit operations in the metropolitan area, this disposition

is most unfortunate. Faced with the ever-increasing deficits

which are inherent in this mode of public transportation, mass

transit operations have been repeatedly shunned by the Port

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Authority in spite of its statutory mandate to the contrary.

As cutbacks in service have been experienced throughout the

Port District; the commuters’ resort to the private automobile

has produced a dysfunctional, volume of. traffic congestion

and pollution. The toll which this congestion has exacted

has been obvious in the tunnels and on the bridges, whose op-

erations &e Port Authority apparently prefers to maintain.

Unlike today’s majority, I am unwilling to assign plaintiff

Gaby’s case to death or to a peaceful somnambulism. This is

particularly so wheré within the historical and evidential ma-

terials presented to the trial court reside the seeds for a more

sweeping and effective disposition. I cannot sanction the mere

repeal of the 1962 covenant without a concurrent assurance

that the Port Authority will assume those responsibilities for

which it was created and, which to this point, it has effectively

avoided. The recalcitrance of the Port Authority. has not been

‘altered by the trial court’s disposition and will not be altered

by merely affirming that decision. A more effective disposition

is needed. :

I[

HISTORY OF THE OBLIGATION OF THE PORT

- AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE MASS TRANSIT

FACILITIES

In its opinion, the majority grudgingly acknowledges the

Port Authority’s obligation to become involved in mass trans-

portation. After a perfunctory reading of the statutory frame-

work of the Port Authority, the majority concludes that the

existence of such a mandate is “a singularly appropriate sub-

ject for specific legislative directive, conspicuously absent

here.” (At 258). 7

While specific statutory directives have served as vehicles

for recent Port Authority projects, NV. J. S. A. 32:1-35.20

(authorization for the Port Authority to undertake mass

transportation projects to link the various Airports in the

Port District), NV. J. S. A. 32:1-35.21 -fauthorization to

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build railroad lines to and facilities at the various airports in

the Port District), its employment is in its infancy and

affords no insight as to the previously reluctant forays which

the Port Authority has made into the field of mass trans-

portation. A full consideration of the statutory basis of the

Port Authority and the history of its implementation reveals

that the majority’s interpretation of the Authority’s powers

and obligations is both short-sighted and erroneous. For

instance, the statutory creation of the Port Authority evinces

a clear legislative intent to have the Authority become in-

volved in development of mass transportation. The majority

position misconceives the role of the Authority to be a drone-

like entity ultimately dependent upon enabling legislation, ra-

ther than a separate bi-state agency. Similarly, the majority

fails to recognize the inherent limitations on the knowledge,

information and expertise which are at the disposal of the

New Jersey and New York Legislatures on the subject of mass

transit operations. In light of this fact, the wisdom of relying

upon legislative directives to address the panoply of needs

within the field of mass transportation ‘becomes problematical.

The failure of the majority to account for these factors casts

a large shadow upon the validity of its construction of the

Port Autho ity’s powers. These inadequacies within the ma-

jority position become apparent upon thorough consideration

of the statutory origins of the Port Authority and the man-

date which was encompassed in its original Compact and Com-

prehensive Plan.

| A. Origins and Early Development ;

Compact and Comprehensive Plan

The Port Authority is a statutory product of a compact

which was entered into by the States of New Jersey and New

York in 1921.! Modeled after the recommendations of a joint

1New Jersey approved the compact by L. 1921, c. 151, now con-

tained in NW. J. 8. A. 32:1-1 et seg. The comparable New York

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commiasion,? the Port Authority represented a response to, the

dysfunctional competition and commercial disputes which his-

torically had plagued the two states.* As such, it was intended

to meet the needs and interests which the two states shared

with respect to the Port of New York. This was expressly

recognized in the preamble to the 1921 Compact, which stated :

The future development of such terminal, transportation and other

facilities of commerce will require the expenditure of large sums

legislation was adopted in Laws of New York 1921, c. 154, now con-

tained in N. Y¥. Unconsol. Laws, § 6401 et seg. (McKinney 1961).

Congressional consent to the compact was granted by Pub. Res.

No. 17, 8S. J. Res. 88, o. 77, 42 Stat. 174.

At the time of creation, the agency was designated “The Port

of New York Authority.” N. J. 8. A. 82:1-4. This was amended by

L. 1972, c. 69, $§ 1, 2, contained in N. J. 8. A. 32:1-4 and 32:1-4.1,

to the more ecumenical “The Port Authority of New York and

New Jersey.” For the purposes of this opinion, the agency shall

be referred to as the Port Authority or just Authority.

2The New York, New Jersey Port and Harbor Development Com-

mission was a body whose representative membership were created

by independent, though concurrently enacted bills which were passed

by the Legislatures of New Jersey and New York in 1917. Composed

of three commissioners from each state, the commission issued a

preliminary report in 1918, New York, New Jersey Port and Harbor

Development Comm'n, Preliminary Joint Report, Tranemitted to the

Legislature, February 18, 1918 (1918). This was followed by a prog-

ress report in 1919, and a comprehensive report in 1920, in which.

the commission proposed te establishment of a permanent body

with interstate jurisdiction. Joint Report with Comprehenswe Plan

and Recommendations (1920). It subsequently submitted the ten-

tative draft of the proposed compact. See Bard, The Port of New

York Authority, 24-34 (1942).

In the Matter of Devoe Mfg. Co., 108 U. 8. 401, 406-10, 2 8. Ct.

894, 27 L. Ed. 764 (1883) j-State v. Babcock, 30 N. J. L. 28 (Sup.

Ct. 1862); Central RR. of N. J. v. Jersey City, 70 N. J. L. 81

(1903), a concise presentation of its history may be found in

Bard, supra, footnote 2, at 5-24.

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of money, and the cordial co-operation of the states of New York

and New Jersey in the encouragement of the investment of capital,

and in the formulation and execution of the necessary physical

plans... . (N. J. 8. A. 32:1-1]

While the Compact delineated the framework for the Port

Authority and its operations, the necessity for a more specific

impl~mentation was recognized in Article X, which directed

the state legislatures to adopt “a plan or plans for the compre-

hensive development of the port of New York” “as soon as

may be practicable.” N. J. 8S. A. 32:1-11. The formulation

of this plan was undertaken by the Authority’s initial board

of commissioners, whose Report with Plan for the Comprehen-

sive Development of the Port of New York, December 21,

1921 (1921) was eventually enacted as the Comprehensive

Plan mandated by the Compact.*

This plan envisioned an active and affirmative role for the

Port Authority in the development of the Port District.5 Sec-

tion 8 of the Comprehensive Plan provided :

-

The Port of New York Authority is hereby authorized and directed

to proceed with the development of the port of New York in accord-

ance with said comprehensive plan as rapidly as may be economically

practicable and is hereby vested with all necessary and appropriate

powers not inconsistent with the constitution of the United States

or of either state, to effectuate the same, except the power to levy

taxes or assessments. [N. J. S. A. 32:1-33; emphasis supplied]

That fulfillment of this statutory mandate contemplated the

involvement of the Port Authority in transportation matters

of the Port District is undeniable. This responsibility, for

4The Comprehensive Plan was enacted in L. 1922, c. 9, now con-

tained in N. J. 8. A. 32:1-25 et seq. New York approved the Com-

prehensive Plan in Laws of New York 1922, c. 43, now found in

N. Y. Unconsol. Laws § 6451-68 (McKinney (1961)). Congressional

— was secured in 8. J. Res. of July 1, 1922, c. 277, 42 Stat.

5The metes and bounds of the Port District are defined in N. J.

8. A. 32:1-3.

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example, was explicitly mentioned in that portion of the pre-

amble of the Compact cited above. Article XXII of the Com-

pact further clarifies this responsibility by defining “trans-

portation facility” as including:

. . . railroads, steam or electric, motor truck or other street or

highway vehicleg, tunnels, bridges, boats, ferries, carfloats, lighters,

tugs, floating elevators, barges, scows or harbor craft of any kind,

aircraft suitable for harbor service, and every kind of transportation

facility now in use or hereafter designed for use for the transporta-

tion or carriage of persons or property. [N. J. 8. A. 32 :1-23; em-

phasis supplied]

The centrality of the railroads to the organizational and co-

ordination schemes of the Port Authority was highlighted by

the separate definition of “railroads.” This was a reflection of

the final report by the New York, New Jersey Port and Har-

bor Development Commission, which in 1920 had recom-

mended the establishment of a bi-state agency with appropri-

ate jurisdiction. See footnote 2, supra. The report, whose

factual findings served as the basis for the Compact and the

Comprehensive Plan, found the commercial inadequacies

of the metropolitan area to be “primarily a railroad problem.”

The absence of railroad coordination and accessibility at many

places within the district consequently required “essentially

a railroad plan.” The Commission summarized its suggestions

in a proposal which entailed the establishment of railroad belt-

line systems between New Jersey and New York, and con-

cluded :

This remodeled terminal railroad system, bringing every railroad

of the Port to every part of the Port, and thus giving every part of

the Port opportunity to develop and to have the economical trans-

6N. J. & A. 82:1-23 provides:

“Railroads” shall include railways, extensions thereof, tunnels,

subways, bridges, elevated structures, tracks, poles, wires, conduits,

powerhouses, substations, lines for the transmission of power, car

barns, shops, yards, sidings, turnouts, switches, stations and ap-

proaches thereto, cars and motive equipment.

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portation service needed for its commercial and industrial growth

and expansion, constitutes the comprehensive plan of the Commis-

sion — the plan which the Commission recommends for formal

adoption by the two states. [New York, New Jersey Port and Har-

bor Development Commission, Joint Report, supra footnote 2, at 3]

This statutory responsibility to develop the transportation

facilities of the Port District, and particularly facilities re-

lating to railroad operations, contained an implicit obligation

to foster passenger transportation service. Although the

Port and Development Commission report concentrated on

the freight shipment needs of the area, it did not preclude a

comparable role for the Port Authority in passenger service.

With one notable exception, the Port Authority’s role in

passenger service is confirmed by the early history of the

agency. In this regard, however, even that exception, the

1928 veto message of Governor Alfred E. Smith of New York

which rejected a New Jersey proposal for the development

of a rapid transit system between the states, may be no

more than a personal predilection. 7 See 134 N. J. Super. at

149. Noting that the Port Authority should “stick to this

program . . .[for] the solution of the great freight distribu-

tion problem,” Governor Smith at no time denied the agency’s

power to deal with passenger service, and only suggested a

reordering of its priorities. More importantly, the position

which he advocated was expressly repudiated by the Port

Authority that same year. In a June 11, 1928 resolution

supporting the continuation of a Suburban Transit Engi-

TGovernor Smith, in what remains the only major statement ques-

tioning a Port Authority role in passenger traffic, remarked:

I am satisfied that the Port Authority should stick to this pro-

gram, and I am entirely unwilling to give my approval to any

measure which at the expense of the solution of the great freight

distribution problem will set the Port Authority off on an entirely

new line of problem connected with the solution of the suburban

passenger problem.

Veto Message, Public Papers of Governor Alfred E. Smith of 1928,

187-88 (1938).

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neering Board,® the Port Authority recognized that it had

a responsibility to the metropolitan commuter, based on its

broader duty to develop transportation in the Port District:

The Commissioners of the Port Authority have found in their

studies that no adequate or effective interstate transportation de-

velopment can take place without taking full account of tranepor-

tation of passengers as well as of freight throughout the Port Die-

trict. [Emphasis supplied]

B. Port Authority Involvement in the

Area of Mass Transit ;

Reports, Studies and Legislation.

Concerning Mass Transit

The continuance of its role in mass transportation has

been reaffirmed by the Port Authority from time to. time.

The obligation to provide for passenger service within the

8The Suburban Transit Engineering Board had been created in

response to a Port Authority suggestion in its 1927 Annual Report.

As that report stated:

It is our opinion that, in the long run, the greatest progress will

be attained by having this Engineering Board undertake the re-

sponsibility for the preparation of the engineering section of a

comprehensive suburban transit plan for the entire port district.

The Port of New York Authority, Annual Report for 1927, 56

(Jan. 20, 1928).

Parenthetically, it should be noted that this body was the intended

recipient of the funds which Governor Smith vetoed. The Port of

New York Authority, Annual Report for 1928, 63 (Dec. 31, 1928).

®Annual Report for 1928, supra footnote 8, at 64-66. The Port

Authority answered more directly the fears expressed by Governor

Smith in a subsequent part of its June 11, 1928 resolution:

The Commissioners of the Port Authority are satisfied from the

reports of their staff that continuance of the work of the Suburban

Transit Engineering Board and the participation therein by mem-

bers of the staff of The Port of New York Authority will not at

this time divert any of their efforts away from the effectuation

of the statutory Comprehensive Plan nor from their duties in the

field of protecting the Port nor from any other pending work

of the Port Authority, but on the contrary, the continuance of

such Suburban Transit Engineering Board’s work will facilitate

_ the other work of.the Port Authority. [Jé. at 65)

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Compact’s injunction to the Post Authority has not only

been acknowledged by those whose occupations and interests

are related to the transportation field,’® but by ranking mem-

bers of the Port Authority staff as well. For example, the

following colloquy between Assemblyman J. Edward Crabiel

and the Port Authority’s then Executive Director Austin J.

Tobin occurred at a 1958 legislative hearing:

ASSEMBLYMAN CRABIEL: Mr. Tobin, just to clear my mind

on certain key points — I have been reading your report and lis-

tening to your talk — there is no question that, as far as the com-

pact between the two states is concerned, the Legislatures could

direct the Port Authority to do rapid transit and that that would

he within their compact.

MR. TOBIN: Yes sir. There's no question about it. [Hearings

on Assembly Bills No. 16 and 115 and Senate Bill No. 50, supra

footnote 10, Nov. 24, 1958, at 44) (emphasis supplied).

The manifestations of this responsibility have been insig-

nificant such as the separate sections which the Authority

devoted to “Suburban Transit” in its earlier Annual Re-

ports (a practice by the way, which has been resumed since

the Port Authority’s acquisition of the H & M railroad in

1962). See T. W. Kheel & R. J. Kheel, “The Port Author-

ity 1962 Covenant — Bar to Mass Transportation,” 27 Rut-

gers L. Rev. 1, 5( 1973) ; The Port of New York Authority,

Annual Report for 1923, “Commuter Passenger Traffic,”

35-36 (Jan. 19, 1924); Annual Report for 1924, “Conges-

tion of Passenger-Traffic,” 23-24 (Jan. 24, 1925); Amnual

Report for 1929, “Suburban Transit,” 27-28 (Dec. 31,

1930). More indicative, ‘however, of the Port Authority’s

10See Hearings on Assembly Bille No. 16 and 115 and Senate

Bill No. 50 before N. J. Assembly Comm. on Fed. & Interst. Rels.

and Assembly Comm. on Highways, Transp. and Pub. Utilities, Nov.

24, 1958, at 18A (Statement of Augustus 8. Dreier, Counsel, Inter-

Municipal Group for Better Rail Service); Dec. 3, 1968, at 22-A

(Statement of Herman T. Stichman, Trustee, Hudson & Manhattan

Railroad) (hereinafter referred to as Assembly Hearings); Caro,

The Power Broker Robert Moses and The Fall of New York, 922-

23 (1974).

A22

role in rapid transit operations have been the infrequent re-

ports which it has issued on this subject.’’ The representa-

tiveness of at least 14 of these reports cannot be premised

on any successful projects which they have stimulated or

realized. As frankly admitted by Edward J. O’Mara, a chair-

man of the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission (a Port

Authority-funded investigative agency which itself produced

an unsuccessful series of legislative proposals) : ‘

For at least 35 years, there has been a growing public awareness

of the importance of mass transportation in the metropolitan re-

gion in the State of New Jersey. At least 14 more or less exten-

sive studies have been made of the problem by various committees

and commissions. Nothing has ever come of them, and in the mean-

time the problem has been becoming progressively more acute.

[Assembly Hearings, Nov. 24, 1958, at TOA]

See also 2d Hearing before N. J. Sen. Comm’n (Created un-

11These reports have been conducted on a variety of topics and

in conjunction with various other interested organizations. Some,

though by no means all, of these studies have included a continuing

study begun in 1927 of the suburban transit facilities to relieve

traffic congestion in conjunction with a variety of other groups (pur-

sueut to New Jersey legislative authorization, L. 1927, c. 277); a

1937 study entitled “Suburban Transit for Northern New Jersey

(Mar. 1, 1937) concerning interstate and suburban passenger prob-

léms within the Port District and New Jersey in particular (under-

taken pursuant to L. 1936, c. J. Res. No. 6); a continuation of

studies begun in 1937 and the presentation of legislative proposals

for implementing a new transit system (pursuant to L. 1988, ce.

J. Res. No. 1); a 1948 study concerning the development of a rapid

transit system in Northern New Jersey which would link Newark

Airport and New York City (undertaken pursuant to a request by

New Jersey Governor Alfred E. Driscoll) ; 1948 study concerning the

development of a north-south transit line in Hudson County (ini-

tiated at the request of the City of Bayonne); and the creation

in 1952 of the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission to undertake

a comprehensive study of the transit problems of the Port District

(L. 1952, c. 194). By agreement reached in 1955, the Port Authority

provided $800,000 when this last study was inaugurated. The Com-

mission's repert was released in 1958. In addition, the Port Authority

in the early 1960’s conducted a series of studies concerning the

feasibility of its acquiring the operations of the H & M railroad,

and later, the conditions under which the authority would do so.

A23

der Sen. Res. No. 7 (1960) and Reconstituted under Sen. Res.

No. 7 (1961)) to Study the Financial Structure and Opera-

tions of The Port of New York Authority, Jan. 27, 1961 (2d

day), at 64-66 (Statement of Austin J. Tobin, Executive Di-

rector, Port of New York Authority). In this respect, these

studies provide a broad overview of the historic approach of

the Port Authority to the problems of urban mass transit.

This background is particularly important because what the

Court is truly asked to consider is the manner in which

the Port Authority has dealt with the problems of mass tran-

sit in the Port District, and the attitudinal reluctance which

has characterized its efforts in this area of transportation.

These studies, in conjunction with the annual reports which

are issued by the Port Authority, possess several characteris-

tics worth noting. First, virtually none of the studies resulted

from the Port Authority’s own initiative. Most of the studies

were the product of either legislative or other governmental

requests for pertinent information and proposals. See footnote

11, supra. While the failure to take affirmative administrative

or investigatory action may not necessarily be indicative of an

agency’s abdication of responsibility in the case of the Port

Authority, the failing is particularly suspect. This is because

the duties expressly imposed on the Port Authority by the

1921 Compact were those to “make plans for the development

of said district, supplementary to or amendatorv of any plan

theretofore adopted ;”!* and to suggest to the state legislatures

recommended means to improve Port commerce."

12N. J. S. A. 32:1-12, which was contained in the original Com-

pact as Article XI and which is indicative of a statutory mandate,

provides:

The port authority shall from time to time make plans for the

development of said district, supplementary to or amendatory of

any plan theretofore adopted, and when such

proved by the legislatures of the two states, they shall be binding

upon both states with the same force and

porated in this agreement. [Emphasis supplied]

13N. J. 8. A. 32:1-13 provides:

The port authority may from time to time make recommenda-

7

A24

Second, none of these studies contains an expressed com-

mitment (much less a recommendation of such a commit-

ment) by thé Port Authority to undertake the construction or

implementation of a mass transit system. Instead, most of

them recommend the assumption of these obligations by other

governmental or quasi-governmental bodies and agencies. See

The Port of New York Authority, Suburban Transit for

Northern New Jersey, 10 (1937) ; The Port of New York Au-

thority, Annual Report for 1958, 38-42. In conjunction with

this, it should be noted that the Authority was one of the

staunchest supporters of two New Jersey legislative proposals,

S-50 and A-115, which were introduced and discussed in

1958. See Assembly Hearings, supra, Nov. 24, 1958, at 44, 49

(Statements of Austin J. Tobin, Executive Director, Port of

New York Authority). Not surprisingly both of these mea-

sures presented plans for the establishment of an independent

agency to handle matters relating to mass transportation.

Conversely, the Port Authority was strongly opposed to a

companion proposal, A—16, which would have authorized the

agency itself to develop, improve and coordinate the rapid

transit facilities in the Port District. Assembly Hearings,

supra, Nov. 24, 1958, at 18-19 (Statements of Austin J.

Tobin, Executive Director, Port of New York Authority)."

United States, based upon study and analysis, for the better con-

duct of the commerce passing in and through the port of New

York, the increase and improvement of transportation and terminal

facilities therein, and the more economical and expeditious handling

of such commerce.

14On this point, a noted transportation expert, Michael N. Daniel-

son, observed :

A good many people in the New York area, particularly in

New Jersey, could see no point in creating another agency, whether

bi-state or tri-state, as long as the Port of New York Authority

apparently possessed both the jurisdiction and financial capacity

to tackle the regional rail problem. Time and again, the Port

Authority fended off these forays, emphasizing that there was an

“absolute incompatibility between railroad deficits and the PNYS’S

contractual limitations with its bondholders . . . and to confine itself

to self-supporting projects.” [Danielson, Federal-Metropolitan Pol-

itice and the Commuter Crisis, 23 (1965)]. 7

A25

Finally, as previously noted, there has been a startling ab-

sence of tangible progress resulting from, or attributable to

these investigatory efforts. This is true even though the Port

Authority has recognized the commuter problems which beset

the New York metropolitan area. As early as 1925, iu its

Annual Report, the Authority observed:

While hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent in urban

rapid transit during the past decade, no commensurate amounts

have been expended on suburban rapid transit, and the commuter

has reached the limit of his endurance where the trunk lines lead-

ing into New York City are incapable of handling both suburban

and through traffic. The passenger service of every railroad in the

Port District is taxed to its limit by the requirements of this ser-

vice. There is barely room during the rush hours for the trains

carrying freight because of the commuter service, while passengers

and freight must both necessarily move during these hours. [The

hg New York Authority, Annual Report for 1924, 23 (Jan. 24,

See also The Port of New York Authority, Annwal Report

for 1927, 10, 53 (Jan. 20, 1928). Over the years, this

recognition has increased with its realization of the expanding

dimensions of commuter congestion and the inability of

private transit facilities to cope with the problem. The Port

of New York and New Jersey, 1972 Annual Report, 10-15

(1972); 1973 Annual Report, 10-15 (1973); 1974 Annual

Report, 4-6 (1974).

The Port Authority’s ineffectual investigative efforts can-

not be justified due to a theoretical lack of jurisdiction in mass

transit operations. Such jurisdiction was given to the agency

in the Compact of 1921. Nor is the lack of success due to the

financial inability of the Port Authority to assume additional |

obligations. As the triai court found, the Authority is not

only financially sound, but has suffered no detrimental ef-

fects from the repeal of the protective 1962 Covenant:

Suffice it to say that between 1962 and 1974 the security afforded

bondholders had been substantially augmented by a vast increase in

Authority revenues and reserves, and the Authority’s financial ability

to absorb greater deficits, from whatever source and without any

A26

significant impairment of bondholder security, was correspondingly

increased. [134 N. J. Super. at 194-95]

Rather, the limited effectiveness of these studies is mereiy

symptomatic of an underlying limitation which the Port Au-

thority has imposed on its own involvement in mass transpor-

tation. This limitation, which is derived from a narrow

construction of its statutory powers, precludes an undertaking

by the Authority unless the relevant project will be financially

self-supporting, or will only generate deficits within con-

servatively defined limits. While the definition of the limita-

tion is presented in purely financial terms, its effect has

been to severely restrict the scope of activities in which the

agency may engage. Because the majority of mass trans-

portation facilities are closely associated with high deficits,

the practical operation of the Port Authority’s self-imposed

restriction has prevented the Authority from fulfilling its

rapid transit obligations.

C. History of the Self-Supporting Concept

While the provisions of the Compact and Comprehensive

Plan sketched a broad authorization in terms of the activities

which were within jurisdiction of the Port Authority, the

powers accorded to it were not commensurate with its tasks.

Without the necessary power, the Authority could not uni-

laterally support its statutory mandates, much less initiate

action in their behalf:

An impressive body of activities was thus laid out wherein the

Port Authority could formulate the needs of the port as a whole

and be vigilant to protect its interests. It would serve as a focus

and agent of the forces of unity within the port.. The primary re-

quirement in this field would not be legal power but adequate

funds and continuous application. The Port Authority never lacked

support with respect to the former, and was well conceived to

function with respect to the latter. But success along this line of

endeavor would depend upon cooperation from public agencies and

private interests. Where conflicts developed it could make progress

very slowly, if at all. (Bard, supra, footnote 2, at 58-59)

A%7

As a result of setbacks incurred in early legal skirmishes

with the powerful railroads in the 1920’s, the Port Authority

appeared to assume a less assertive role in the port’s develop-

ment than that anticipated by its proponents. Reluctant to

promote otherwise desirable activities within the Port Dis-

trict, the Authority restricted its goals to the dubious task

of maintaining a balanced budget. The difficulty of this ob-

jective was compounded by the fact that under both the Com-

pact and the Comprehensive Plan, the Port Authority had

been denied the power to either levy assessments or pledge

the credit of either state. Annual Report for 195.4, vi (1954).

Consequently, to offset the costs and losses which it incurred,

the agency was dependent upon the revenues which it realized

from its various projects and facilities.

While this new objective in the early years of the Port

Authority was tempered by a “rule of economic practicabil-

ity,” The Port’of New York Authority, Annual Report for

1926, 5 (Jan. 20, 1927), its importance was later elevated

by the increased emphasis placed on self-sufficiency. In

other words, because the fiscal stability of the Port Author-

ity was dependent upon the revenues of its facilities, it was

necessary for all projects to demonstrate their self-support-

ing capacity before the Authority would undertake their im-

plementation. Thus, James C. Kellogg, III, the then Vice-

Chairman of the Port Authority, read from a prepared state-

ment before a Senate Commission in 1960, as follows:

In order that the Port Authority might carry out the tremendous

and continuing task of developing the public terminal and trans-

portation facilities of this metropolitan area, the two Legislatures

clothed it with all necessary and appropriate powers of port and

terminal development, with the important exception of the power

to tax or to levy assessments. This reservation is the key to the

whole concept of the Port Authority, which is that of a self-sup-

porting agency, whose public projects are carried on through the

development of their own revenues and charges, and which im-

poses no burdens on the general taxpayer. [Hearings before N. J.

Sen. Comm'n Created under Sen. Rea. No. 7 (1960) to Study the

Financial Structure and Operations of the Port of New York Awu-

thority, September 27, 1960, 7-8 (Statement of James C. Kellogg,

III, Vice-Chairman of the Port Authority) J.

A28

The objective of a self-supporting authority, while salu- ,

tary in principle, was inconsistent with the Port Authority’s

original objectives and early history. In its annual report

for 1924, the Authority explicitly rejected the self-support-

ing concept as a basis for its operations:

Preferably, and in the main, therefore, the Port Authority regards

itself rather as the guardian and guide of the Port District, protect-

img it against attacks both from within and without, and directing

its activities and developments with a view to procuring the great-

est cooperation of existing agencies, the utmost efficiency and the

minimum of cost. If such is to be its primary function it should not

be erpected to be self-supporting. [The Port of New York Authority,

Annual Report for 1924, 9-10 (Jan. 24, 1925); emphasis supplied]

Moreover, the self-supporting concept as a fundamental pre-

cept of the Port Authority’s financial scheme is belied both

by the projects which it embarked upon after its creation

and by subsequent developments in its financial structure.

‘As the trial court observed, because of the heavy investment

required by these early projects, the Port Authority was

confronted with large deficits from the outset. 134 N. J.

Super. at 140. However, rather than restricting the Author-

ity’s activities, New Jersey and New York encouraged such

projects by advancing funds, transferring control of lucra-

tire facilities (such as the Holland Tunnel) to the Author-

ity, and permitting the Authority to issue “open-ended”.

bonds. This latter device, in particular, helped free the

Port Authority from absolute reliance on self-supporting

projects. By placing all revenues derived from the sale of

open-ended bonds into a common fund, the Port Authority

was able to free deficit operations from the inadequate sales

of their particular bonds. Goldberg, A History of the Port

of New York Authority Financial Structures, 5 (1964).

The pooling of resources not only permitted the Port Au-

thority to finance debt-ridden facilities through those which

were profitable, but simultaneously afforded bondholders a

certain degree of security regardless of the success or failure

of any given project. The open-ended financing of the Port

A29 -

Authority, which was originally introduced in the form of

the General Reserve Fund (N. J. 8. A. 32:1-142), literally,

the pool into which all funds were paid, was later expanded

by the Authority’s adoption of the Consolidated Bond Reso-

lution in 1952. This resolution, which abandoned the prac-

tice of earmarking funds for specific projects, authorized

the issuance of bonds whose revenues would be designated

by the Authority for a given project according to its needs.

As the trial court found, the resolution obviated any further

concern for maintaining the self-supporting concept as a

prerequisite to Port Authority involvement in a project:

With the adoption of the CBR the “self-supporting” facility con-

cept which had governed earlier authority financing ceased to have

the significance previously attached to it; for under the CBR the

Authority’s financial structure is based on a unitary enterprise

concept and al) revenues from all facilities are pooled. Individual

facilities are not financed independently of the rest of the Authority.

The facilities contribute their revenues for debt service on all Auv-

thority bonds uccording to their earning power and without regard

to the amount cf bonds issued for the construction of any par-

ticular facility. [134 N. J. Super. at 143]

Enactments such as the General Reserve Fund and the

Consolidated Bond Resolution created the possibility for the

involvement of the Port Authority in traditionally deficit

operations such as mass transportation. Nonetheless, the

translation of this new financial freedom into practical ac-

tion was not forthcoming from the Port Authority:

That cashbox, so long empty, was full now, thanks to the postwar

traffic boom, . . . the Port Authority’s was worth $700,000,000.

Long on cash, moreover, the Port Authority was short on dreams.

The visionaries who had created it were long gone from its coun-

cils; Julius Henry Cohen had been replaced by money men like

Cullman and Colt and Pope whose eyes were brightened by the

balances in the Authority’s ledgers, not by the potentialities for

improving the common weal that those balances represented. The

purpose for which the Authority had been created — the develop-

ment of an overall transportation system to knit together a great

port — had been lost sight of for years. Plans the Authority had

aplenty, of course, but unrelated plans, plans for individual projects,

joined by no link other than the fact that their construction would

return the agency profit. [Caro, supra, footnote 10, at 922-23]

A30

The resultant program which the Port Authority pursued

represented less of an integrated effort to organize and co-

ordinate the commerce of the port of New York, and more

of an administrative mish-mash with little cohesiveness or

relation to the agency’s statutory mandate. Thus, construc-

tion of a World Trade Center, with little or no relation to

the activities for which the Port Authority was created, was

suddenly elevated to an importance which transcended that

of a more traditionally-regarded responsibility of the Author-

ity such as mass transportation.

The underlying rationale for these actions wés unmis-

takably attributable to retention of the self-supporting limi-

tation to which the Port Authority had previously adhered.

This was made clear by Executive Director Tobin of the

Port Authority when questioned at a 1958 hearing about

the manner in which future revenues and reserves would be

committed :

Well, it is closed unless those future bond issues have to do with

projects that can be made self-supporting and in whict the Com-

missioners of the Port Authority will not only certify a @ matter

of conscience and a matter of record that they lelieve that

they can be made self-supporting and will add to the gen-

eral credit of the Port Authority; but also if they can demon-

strate arithmetically on sound projections of its existing ret revenues

and its maximum future debt service that those projecs will not

hurt this bondholder. That’s all he has. If that bondholer has an

open end bond without those restrictions, he has a piece of paper.

[Assembly Hearings, supra, November 24, 1958, at 38 (Statement

of Austin J. Tobin, Executive Director, Port of New York Au-

thority); emphasis supplied]

This self-limitation has exacerbated the Port authority’s

demonstrated lack of initiative. For example, although the

Port Authority in 1955 agreed to provide the Metropolitan

Rapid Transit Commission with $800,000 for tiat body’s

. study of a metropolitan scheme of mass transit, the price

which the Authority extracted for its financial support was

a “Memorandum of Understanding” which precluded its

own role in any deficit operations which the Commission

A31

might recommend. Danielson, supra at 23; Assembly Hear-

ings, supra, December 3, 1958, at 91-A to 92—A (Statement

of Frank H. Simon, Exécutive Director, Metropolitan Rapid

Transit Commission). More importantly, perhaps, the Port

Authority’s inertia has interjected itself in the relationship

between the agency and the Legislatures which it allegedly

serves. This has been done in an often contradictory fashion

‘as illustrated by the following discussion between Assembly-

man Crabiel and Executive Director Tobin:

ASSEMBLYMAN CRABIEL: What I'm getting at here is, you're

saying categorically that you cannot take a deficit. Now, I’m raising

the point that as far as the Legislatures of the two states, when

they established the compact there was nothing in the compact

and nothing in the instructions from the Legislatures to the Port

Authority that they could not undertake a deficit operation.

MR. TOBIN: Well, excuse me, sir. I'd say that there was. I

would say that the way the statutes are phrased, it could under-

take nothing except a self-supporting operation. We have no way

of financing anything but a self-supporting operation.

ASSEMBLYMAN CRABIEL: Well how do you account for the

fact, then, that you have operated deficit operations?

MR. TOBIN: Because the pooled revenues have been sufficient.

Because we believed also, when we went into those, that they could

be self-supporting and we were wrong.

ASSEMBLYMAN CRABIEL: That’s what I was pointing up.

[Assembly Hearings, supra, November 24, 1958, at 45]

III

THE ROLE OF THE PORT AUTHORITY

Ultimately, those who are most hurt by the Port Author-

ity’s failure to enter the field of mass transportation are.

of course, the commuters. Absence of Port Authority initia-

tive in ‘this area is a direct reflection of the deficits which

are inherent in the provision of this public service:

Until the late 1950’s, trausit operations in the United States

were generally profitable and, consequently, attractive to investment.

Decline in patronage and increasing labor and equipment costs have

completely reversed this trend to a point where today, public transit

in its everyday operations in. most cities is a losing proposition.

The losses are not as great as sometimes presuméd but, in most

A32

cases, average between 20 and 25 percent annually. Therefore,

public transit — like many other sectors of the transportation in-

dustry, including private automobile transportation — now requires

substantial public support in the form of direct financial subsidies

to be capable of rendering necessary services. [Roeseler and Levi,

“State Subsidies for Public Transit: An Overview of Current

Legislation,” 4 Urban Lawyer 59, 60 (1972)]

See also Kuneafsey and Edelman, “A Market-Oriented Nolu-

tion to the Northeast Railroad Dilemma,” 41 J. C. C. Pract.

J. 1%4 (1973-74). This problem concerning the financial

weaknesses of mass transit facilities has been realized within

the New York metropolitan area. This, no doubt, has re-

sulted from both the unusually heavy demands which have

been placed on these systems in the Port District, and the

lack of a perceived common interest among the District’s

geographic and political components. Danielson, supra, at

21-22.

The Port Authority’s failure to assume an active role in

solving this problem has had a concurrent effect on the

traveling habits of the average commuter. Faced with in-

creasing service cutbacks and escalating fares, the commuter

is left with fewer alternatives to the private automobile.

Grubb, “Urban Transportation .\lternatives to the .\uto-

mobile,” 39 I. C. C. Pract. J. 19 (1971-72); Cooper,

“Prospects for a Mass Movement to Public Transit,” 5

Urban Lawyer 679 (1973). His increasing resort to this

mode of transportation in turn has caused a drastic in-

crease in traffie congestion and air pollution which are com-

monly associated with the metropolitan area.

These problems have stimulated legislative responses on

hoth the federal and state levels. The federal respons? von-

sists primarily of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964,

49 U.S.C. A., § 1601 et seq., which purports to encourage

“the planning and establishment of areawide urban mass

transportation systems needed for economical and desirable

urban development, with the cooperation of mass transporta-

tion companies both public and private.” 49 U. S.C. A., §

1601. See Haley and Watkins, “The Urban Mass Transporta-

A33

tion Assistance Act of 1970 — A Federal Program Comes of

Age,” 16 N. Y. Law For. 741 (1970). As a corollary to the

urban mass transit crisis, the federal government has enacted

the Clean Air Act, 42 U7. 8S. C. A. § 1857 et seq. Similar

considerations produced comparable legislation in New Jersey,

Emergency Energy Fair Practices Act of 1974. L. 1974, ce.

2, 6; Executive Order No. 1 (Feb. 5, 1974).

These legislative enactments were most recently recognized

in a report issued by the Joint Transportation and Com-

munications Committee of the New Jersey Legislature. Pe-

port of the Senate and General Assem)ly Joint Transportation

and Communications Committee (l’ursuant lo Assembly Con-

current Res. No, 211 of 1974), October 6, 1975, As the report

noted:

The legislation passed by New Jersey during the last four years

clearly reflects the determination on the part of its officials to direct

the Port Authority towards making a greater financial commitment

to mass transit. In order to determine whether New Jerser has

heen treated hy the Port Authority in a fair and impartial manner

the Committee bas investigated the degree of Port Authority re-

<ponsiveness to meeting the mass transportation needs of the State.

[/d. at 13]

The Committee's conclusion was succinct as it was unfortu-

nate:

The Committee recognizes that the Port Authority has acquired

a reputation for its engineering, planning and management skills.

It is the conclusion of the Committee, however, that in the area

of mass transportation the Port Authority's performance has not

heen satisfactory. [/d. at 17]

The Committee’s conclusions were premised upon the same

type of factors which I have considered above. While the Com-

mittee was hopeful that the Port Authority would take its

mass transportation responsibilities “more seriously” in the

future, it nonetheless pledged “its vigilance to see that the

A34

Port Authority ‘completes the mass transportation projects

it has promised to complete.” Jd. at 18, 19."

The sensitivity of the state government to the urgent need

for more modern means of public transportation has not been

confined to the legislative branch. In his recent “State of the

State” address, Governor Byrne not only recognized this prob-

lem, but concurrently cited the Port Authority’s responsibility

for its solution. Perhaps even more important, the Governor

indicated his willingness to impose an affirmative sanction on

the Port Authority should the desired action in the area of

mass transit not be forthcoming:

x

How do we keep the railroads running at a time when the sta

subsidy program costs over $100 million a year and has been grow-

ing by more than 35 per cent a year? Should there be an overall

operating agency for these lines? What about the communities and

industries served by lines soon to be abandoned? Where can we

find the $255 million required to match federal funding for the

45While the history of the Port Authority’s involvement in mass

transportation has been discouraging, the prospects for renewed ef-

forts by the agency in this area of endeavor are hopeful. In the

above cited report by the pgs ed pea pect =

ommunications Committee, the development of a mass -

aa plan by the Port Authority was noted, Report of the Senate

and General Assembly Joint Transportation and Communications

Committee (Pursuant to Assembly Concurrent Res. No. 211 of 1974,

16-17 (October 4, 1975)). This plan committed the Port Authority

to the provision of additional direct rail service.to Penn Station in

New York City for New Jersey commuters, the expansion of the

Midtown Bus Terminal, the construction of a rail link to Kennedy

Airport and the extension of the PATH system from Newark to

Plainfield. Although the Urban Mass Transportation Administration

on December 19, 1975 rejected New Jersey's request for $278-

million to construct the PATH extension, the State’s expressed in-

tention to reapply for such funds will create the possibility of a con-

tinued role for the Port Authority in mass transportation. The

Sunday Star-Ledger, December 21, 1975, at 1, 8; The New York

Times, December 22, 1975, at —-; The New York Times, January

4, 1976, at 34. This persistence has apparently been succeseful as

federal approval of a $400-million block grant for the PATH ex-

tension to Plainfield and other mass transit projects is anticipated.

The Star-Ledger, February 10, 1976, at 1.

A35

modernization of two major commutes. lines and the extension of

PATH to Plainfield?

The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey must increase

its commitment to these efforts. If it is unwilling to do so, we will

insist that it rescind the toll increases instituted last year for the

specific purpose of funding improvements in the public transporta-

tion system. [Annual Message of Governor Brendan T. Byrne, Jan.

13, 1976, at 19}

I, too, would similarly take this opportunity to demonstrate

the vigilance which has motivated the Joint Committee and

the Governor. The Port Authority has too long neglected the

responsibility with which it was statutorily charged in 1921.

In So. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Tp. of Mt. Laurel, 6%

N. J. 151, 189 (1975), we recognized the significance of

transportation to the overall development of an urban area.

I would today reaffirm this significance.

IV

CONCLUSION

The relief which I recommend today is intended as an

answer to a problem which has assumed crisis proportions.

The Port Authority is the produ.cr, the director and the

main character of the play known as “The Disease of Mass

Transportation.” This malady has suffered too long from

the benign neglect of public agencies such as the Port Au-

thority, and such neglect has permitted the disease to spread

unattended. The resulting state of affairs may most accurately

~~he described as one of emergency. While the appellation

“emergency” was at one time reserved for calamitous and

natural occurrences, the inadequate and deteriorating quality

of mass transit in the metropolitan area has had an eroding

effect on the urban environment in which it operates. This

effect has been measurable not only in terms of the unending

lines of commuters who have been inconvenienced by in-

‘efficient service, but also in terms of traffic congestion with

its attendant pollution as well. The courts of this country

have long recognized that such emergent circumstances may

A36

serve as a mandate to administrative action. “While emer-

gency does not create power, emergency may furnish the-

accasion for the exercise of power.” Home Building & Loan

Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. 8. 398, 425-26, 54 S. Ct. 231, 238,

78 L. Ed. 413, 422 (1934); Hourigan v. North Bergen T'p.,

113 N. J. L. 143, 148 (E. & A. 1934).

For an Authority that; is long on cash and short on

dreams,"® it is time to respond for those who have long suf-

fered the inconvenience and expense which have resulted from

the Port Authority’s inaction.

I would order the Port Authority, its Commissioners and

its Executive Director to not only complete those projects to

which it is already committed, but to formulate and present

plans and suggestions for @ regional mass transportation

scheme to the Legislatures of New York and New Jersey.

Implicit in this would be the requirement that such efforts be

completed in an expeditious fashion and within a fixed period

of time. This injunction is necessary to bring home the im-

portance of Authority action in the face of the current trans-

portation crisis.

In proposing this relief. I should not be understood as ad-

vocating usurpation of the functions of either the executive

or legislative branches of government. The majority’s charac-

terization of my position is in error. (At 259). My dis

position does not contemplate ordering either the Governors

or the Legislatures of the States of New Jersey and New York |

to undertake any particular course or courses of action. I

would be loathe to intrude upon the relationships which have

developed between these other branches of state government

and the Port Authority. Nonetheless, I am all too aware of

the fact that expertise in the field of mass transit operations

resides in the body which was originally vested with both

power and jurisdiction in that area, namely the Port Au-

thority. By according the Authority a statutory mandate to

16Caro, supra, footnote 10 at 922.

A37

undertake mass transportation projects, it was anticipated

hy both States that the Port Authority would actively re-

search, promote and recommend projects to be authorized and

implemented by the State Legislatures. It is precisely the

Port Authority’s reluctance to utilize its expertise that has

frustrated this basic first step towards the development of a

much-needed integrated mass transportation system in the

metropolitan area. Therefore, I would order the Port Au-

thority to proceed with this initial planning stage, while, at

the same time, acknowledging that ultimate adoption and im-

plementation of the resultant plans remain a legislative and

executive prerogative. The declared willingness of those

branches of government to adopt appropriate measures leaves

me confident that only timely suggestions by the Port Au-

thority are needed to point the direction towards improved

mass transit operations. ;

Although I am unsure whether it is the perception of my

suggested order as a usurpation of executive and legislative

function which underlies the majority’s disagreement with

such relief, I am, nonetheless, clear in my opposition to the

lesson in civil procedure which the majority would impose

on this case, I find that the majority’s exercise of power un-

der a writ of mandamus would ill-befit a remedy with such a

Marshallian association. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U. 8. (1

Cranch) 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803). This is a direct result of not

only the restrictive but the erroneous construction which the

majority gives to the powers implicit in a mandamus. The

writ of mandamus is a remedial process whose essential func-

tion is to compel the performance of a ministerial action or the

exercise of a discretionary function. Roberts’ v. Holsworth,

10 V. J. L. 5% (Sup. Ct. 1828); Switz v. Middletown Twp.,

23 N. J. 580 (1957). This mode of relief is particularly ap-

propriate with regard to recalcitrance by public officials or

authorities. Bd. of Taration v. Belleville, 92 N. J. Super.

338, 340-41 (Law Div. 1966). While the court has the power

under a mandamus to compel action, it does not similarly

have the power to control discretion in the performance of

A38

the designated action. Such discretion properly resides in

the functioning authority.

By its construction of the mandamus, the majority would

not only accord the authority discretion in the manner of

performing the compelled action, but would permit the au-

thority discretion as to whether the ordered. action should

be performed at all. Although the majority has recognized

that the Port Authority has resisted efforts to promote its

involvement in mass transportation, it would consider this

to be an exercise of discretion which would preclude a

mandamus or an order similar to the one which I have sug-

gested :

As we have sought to demonstrate, the circumstances before us

do not at all invite or accommodate the remedy proposed. This is

«o because the Authority (whose function is clearly not ministerial)

has in fact exercised its discretion, even though that exercise has

resulted in the rejection of a policy favoring mass transportation.

Being a judgment decision its wisdom may be open to dispute;

hut as to the propriety of this Court’s refusal to intrude on the

underlying policy determination, there can be no question in the

circumstances before us [At 259].

| cannot subscribe to such reasoning, whose circular nature

would undercut the relief which the majority otherwise feels

warranted under the circumstances and which would effec-

tively emasculate the mandamus, or any similar relief, as

a remedy. *

I reject the majority’s approach to the problem of this

case within a procedural context. We have been taught that

there are no rights without remedies. By stripping us of

our remedies, the majority is most assuredly divesting us

of our rights. Marbury v. Madison, supra, 5 U. S. (1

Cranch) at 163, 2 L. Ed. at 69. Furthermore, we have long

passed the days wherein cases were decided on the niceties

of procedural technicalities. Hodgson v. Applegate, 31 N. J.

29, 43 (1959) ; Edelstein v. Asbury Park, 51 N.-J. Super.

368. 385 (App. Div. 1958). There is no need to resurrect

in this case another of these manifestations of by-gone days.

A39

Even if I were to acknowledge the necessity of specifically

resorting to a mandamus or its equivalent, I could not

justify withholding such relief in this case; nor can I pres- -

ently understand the distinction which the majority draws

between the mandamus which they recommend and the order

which I propose. Granting that mandamus is an “extraor-

dinary remedial process,” Beronio v. Pension Comm’n of

Hoboken, 130 N. J. L. 620, 623 (E. & A. 1943), afPg 129

N. J. L. 557% (Sup. Ct. 1943), I cannot see the unfortunate

plight of the more than 30 million commuters who are de-

pendent upon the Port Authority’s transportation services

annually, nor the Authority’s benign neglect of their plight,

as being anything less than extraordinary. This is particu-

larly so where to adopt the majority’s approach would per-

mit the Port Authority to ignore the statutory responsi-

bilities with which it was charged in 1921.

The majority in Gaby v. Port of New York Authority has

been unwilling to take the action which I regard as impera-

tive. From its disposition I must, therefore, respectfully

dissent.

For affirmance—Justices MOUNTAIN, SULLIVAN and CuIF-

FORD and Judges ConrorD, CaRToN and HaLPERN—6.

Concurring in part and diesenting ing in part—Justice Pasn-

MAN—1. ;

A40

Decision of the Superior Court of New Jersey,

Law Division, Bergen County

UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK, ETC.,

PLAINTIFF, v. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, ET AL.,

DEFENDANTS .

DANIEL M. GABY, PLAINTIFF, v. THE PORT OF NEW YORK

AUTHORITY, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.

Superior Court of New Jersey

Law Division

Argued April 8, 9, 1975—Decided May 14, 1975.

SYNOPSIS

Consolidated actions were brought concerning constitu-

tional validity of legislation creating, and later repealing,

a covenant between the States of New Jersey and New York

and holders of bonds issued by the Port Authority of New

York and New Jersey. Defendants filed counterclaim for

declaration of validity of repealing legislation. The Su-

perior Court, Law Division, Gelman, J. 8. C., held that

legislative enactments, such as the 1962 covenant whereby

the States and Authority were precluded from applying Au-

thority revenues and reserves for passenger railroad pur-

poses unless permitted by criteria set forth in the covenant,

can constitute a contract within meaning of the contract

clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions, that not

every impairment of a contract obligation or security for its

performance runs afoul of the contract clause, that a State’s

inherent power to protect the public welfare may be validly

exercised under the contract clause even if it impairs a con-

tractual obligation so long as it does not destroy it, and

that in view of emergent problems of air pollution, crises

in mass transit and energy problems repeal legislation was a

reasonable and valid exercise of the State’s police power

and was not prohibited by the contract clause of either the

Federal or State Constitution.

Complaints dismissed; judgment for defendants on coun-

terclaim.

A41

Mr. Robert B. Meyner and Mr. Devereux Milburn (of

the New York Bar) for plaintiff United States Trust Com-

pany (Messrs. Meyner, Landis & Verdon, attorneys; and

Messrs. Carter, Ledyard & Milburn, attorneys; and Mr.

Donald J. Robinson (of the New York Bar) Messrs. Haw-

kins, Delafield & Wood, attorneys).

Mr. Michael I. Sovern (of the New York Bar) and Mr.

Murray J. Laulicht, special counsel for defendants (Mr.

William F. Hyland, Attorney General of New J ersey, attor-

ney; Mr. Harold 8. H. Edgar (of the New York Bar) on

the brief).

Mr. Theodore W. Kheel (of the New York Bar) and Mr.

Howard Stern for plaintiff Daniel M. Gaby (Messrs. Battle,

Fowler, Stokes & Kheel, attorneys, and Messrs. Shavick,

Stern, Schotz, Steiger & Croland, attorneys).

Mr. Joseph Lesser (of the New York Bar) for defendant

Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Mr. Francis

A, Mulhern, attorney) ; aud Mr. Patrick J. Falvey (of the

New York Bar). Vs. Isubel E. Muirhead, Mr. Arthur P.

Berg (of the New York Bar), (Mr. Vigdor D. Bernstein,

of counsel).

GztmMaN, J. S. C. These are consolidated actions which

have as their common subject matter the constitutional va-

lidity of legislation of this State creating, and later repeal-

ing, a covenant between the States of New Jersey and New

York and the holders of bonds issued by the Port Author-

ity of New York and New Jersey (Port Authority).1 The

; ae the terms of the Compact of 1921 creating the Port Author-

ty, N. J. 8. A. 32:1-1 et seg., legislative action taken by one state

134 N..J.Super.—9

A42

first legislative act in question, chapter 8 of the Laws of

1962, N. J. 8. A. 32:1-35.50 (the 1962 covenant), author-

ized the Port Authority to construct the World Trade Cen-

ter and to acquire and operate the Hudson & Manhattan

Railroad Company. As part of the 1962 legislation the two

States enacted a statutory covenant with each other and

with the holders of certain Port Authority bonds whereby

the States and the Port Authority were precluded from ap-

plying the Authority’s revenues and reserves for passenger

railroad purposes unless permitted by the criteria set forth

in the statute. N. J. S. A. 32:1-35.55.

The 1962 covenant was repealed by chapter 25 of the

Laws of 1974.2 The complaint filed by the United States

Trust Company challenges the constitutionality of the re-

peal act of 1974, and the Gaby complaint attacks the va-

lidity of the 1962 covenant. We turn, then, to the proce-

dural history of these actions and the issues projected by

the respective pleadings.

Procedural History

1. The Gaby Action

On May 16, 1972 plaintiff Daniel Gaby filed a class

action complaint for a declaratory judgment that the 1962

covenant violated the Federal and State Constitutions. The

complaint named as defendants the Port Authority, its com-

missioners and executive director, and the then Governor of

New Jersey, William T. Cahill. On October 25, 1972, on

affecting the powers and duties of the Port Authority is not effective

until concurred in by the legislature of the other. N. J. 8. A. 32:1-8.

Statutory citations in this opinion will be limited to the applicable

New Jersey statutes unless the context otherwise requires.

2In 1972 the Legislature had repealed the 1962 covenant as to all

bonds of the Authority issued after the effective date of the act.

L. 1972, c. 208; N. J. 8S. A. 32:1-35.55a. The act betame effective

upon the adoption of concurrent legislation by the State of New

York on May 10, 1973. Laws of N. Y. 1973, c. 318. The validity

of this legislation is not in issue in these proceedings.

A43

the motion of the Attorney General of New Jersey, the

complaint was dismissed as to former Governor Cahill. The

Attorney General also moved to dismiss the complaint for

failure to name as an indispensable party the Port Author-

ity’s bondholders. No disposition appears to have been made

of the motion at that time.

The Gaby complaint alleges, among other things, that

the residents of the State of New Jersey are dependent

upon mass transit facilities and are adversely affected by

the deterioration of such facilities within the District ser-

viced by the Port Authority (the Port District). It is al-

leged that the Port Authority was created by the Compact

of 1921 and consented to by the United States Congress®

to assure “cooperation of the two states in the future develop-

ment” of transportation facilities within the Port District,

and that by virtue of the 1962 covenant, restricting the

Port Authority’s power to acquire or operate passenger rail

transit facilities, the two states entered into a new “Com-

pact” without the consent of Congress and in violation of

U. 8. Const., Art. 1, § 10. The complaint further alleges

that the 1962 covenant constitutes an unconstitutional sur-

render by the State of its sovereign powers “to protect the

health, general welfare and safety of the people,” and that

it has impaired and obstructed existing facilities for the

transportation of goods in interstate commerce, in viola-

tion of U. 8. Const., Art. 1, § 8.

Gaby asks for multifarious relief. Aside from seeking a

declaration as to the unconstitutionality of the 1962 cov-

enant, he asks the court to declare the covenant to be sub-

ject to repeal, and to direct the Port Authority to formu-

late and submit to the court a plan for the development of

mass transit facilities within the Port District.

The Gaby action was pretried on February 22, 1973, at

which time it was stipulated that the action could proceed

3Pub. Res. No. 17, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (42 Stat. 174).

A44

as 2 class action without formal notice to th class repre-

sented by plaintiff. Thereafter both sides mowed for sum-

mary judgment, and oral argument on the motions was

heard on September 26, 1973. At the concluson of the ar-

gument the court directed the parties to stbmit further

briefs on the constitutional issues and on the question

whether the bondholders were necessary partie: to the Gaby

action. Following conferences between comsel and the

court, it was agreed the United States Tmst Company

should be permitted to intervene in the Gab action as a

party defendant to represent the interests of tle bondholders

in that action. An order to such effect was eitered on De-

cember 18, 1973, and arguments were reschduled on the

motions for summary judgment.

Prior to the date fixed for the argument the prospects

for the adoption of the repeal act became ipparent, and

further action in the Gaby case was stayed pending future

legislative developments.

2. The United States Trust Company Actin

The New Jersey Legislature completed wtion on the

repeal act on April 22, 1974, and Governo’ Brendan T.

Byrne signed the bill into law on April 30,1974. On the

same day United States Trust Company (/. S. Trust)

filed its complaint on behalf of itself as the lolder of Port

Authority bonds, as trustee for certain desigrated issues of

Port Authority bonds, and on behalf of all lolders of con-

solidated bonds issued by the Port Authoriy. The com-

plaint names as defendants the State of Nev Jersey, Gov-

ernor Byrne and the Attorney General of Ne Jersey, and

seeks a declaratory judgment that the reped act violated

the Federal and State Constitutions.

U. S. Trust alleges that it is the holder (fr its own ac-

count and in a fiduciary capacity) of $96,010,000 of con-

solidated bonds issued by the Port Authorty; that the

Port Authority was intended, under the terms of the Com-

pact approved by Congress, to be a self-supporting public

A45

agency whose obligations were to be and are payable from

its net revenues and certain reserve funds; that the 1962

covenant was enacted to protect the Port Authority’s ex-

isting and future bondholders from the diversion of pledged

revenues and reserves to finance deficit mass transit facili-

ties and further to preserve the Port Authority’s credit

standing; that the Port Authority notified prospective pur-

chasers of its bonds of the existence of the 1962 covenant

and purchasers relied on the covenant in purchasing bonds

issued by the Port Authority, and that the secondary mar-

ket for the Port Authority consolidated bonds has been ad-

versely affected by the repeal act.

The complaint alleges that the repeal act violates the

“impairment” and “taking” provisions of the Federal Con-

stitution, U. S. Const., Art. T, § 10 and Amends. V and

XIV, and the equivalent provisions of the New Jersey Con-

stitution, NV. J. Const. (1947), Art. IV, § VIT, par. 3;

Art. I, pars. 1 and 20.

The answer filed by defendants asserts several defenses

among which the following may be briefly noted: (1) the

repeal act constitutes a reasonable exercise of the police

power by the State; (2) the 1962 covenant itself violated

the Federal Constitution because of lack of congressional

consent; (3) the repeal act does not constitute an “im-

pairment” of the contract since the obligation of the Port

Authority to pay its bondholders remains intact; (4) the

hondhoiders were on notice of the reserved powers of the

State to repeal the 1962 covenant, and (5) the repeal act

was adopted as a police power measure to meet a transpor-

tation crisis affecting the health, safety and welfare of per-

sons residing within the Disirict. Finally, the answer as-

serts a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment that the

repeal act is constitutional.

A consent order was entered pursuant to R. 4:32—1 in

the U. S. Trust action directing that the action be main-

tained and defended as a class action by U. S. Trust on

A46

behalf of all holders of consolidated bouds of the Port Au-

thority, and that notice to the class be deemed to have been

given by means of the media publicity which was dis-

seminated when the action was instituted. On December 10,

1974 the Gaby and U. S. Trust actions were consolidated

by order of the court.

The parties to the U. S. Trust action have filed a 366-

page stipulation of facts, accompanied by exhibits covering

all phases of the case with the exception of two issues: (1)

whether the purchasers of consolidated bonds issued by the

Port Authority after the adoption of the 1962 covenant re-

lied in fact upon the existence of the covenant, and (2)

whether the repeal of the 1962 covenant adversely affected

the secondary market for Port Authority bonds. These is-

sues were the subject of a trial on February 4, 5, 6, 7 and

11. 1975, and the court’s findings on the issues will be set

forth infra.

The Formation, Facilities and Financial Structure

of the Port Authority.

1. Formation and Facilities.

In 1917 the States of New Jersey and New York estab-

lished the New York, New Jersey Port and Harbor De-

velopment Commission (the Commission) to study the fa-

cilities and problems of the Port of New York and to rec-

ommend a plan for the future development of the Port.*

The Commission filed its Report’ on December 16, 1920

4The enabling legislation directed the commissioners to negotiate

and agree upon a joint report recommending a policy for the states

“to the end that said port shall be efficiently and constructively

organized and furnished with modern methods of piers, rail and water

and freight facilities * * *.” The Commission was to work out “a

comprehensive and adequate interstate and Federal port policy, to

meet commercial needs in times of peace and the protection of the

harbor and adjacent localities in times of war.” DL. 1917, ¢. 130.

5Joint Report with Comprehensive Plan and Recommendations,

New York, New Jersey Port and Harbor Development Commission,

1920 (hereafter cited as the Report).

A47

setting forth its findings, conclusions and recommendations.

The core recommendation of the Commission was the cre-

ation by the two states of a common public agency by means

of which the states would cooperate in the future develop-

ment of the facilities of the Port in accordance with the

comprehensive plan recommended by the Commission.* Re-

port at 436. In discussing the legal precedents for the es-

tablishment by the States of an agency having a substan-

tial impact on interstate commerce, the report stated:

Permissive or restrictive, as the case may be, the power of Congress

over the instrumentalities of interstate traffic is exclusive, when in

a specific case it has been exercised. But this latter limitation,

coupled with the broad police power of the State and its control of

intrastate commerce, has left to New York and New Jersey a broad

field within which they may act without express Federal consent. It

is hoped, of course, by securing congressional approval of any plan

which may be adopted, to avoid future conflict with the Federal

authority over interstate unification and control of the Port. But

for the present the States may act alone. [Report at 446]

Prophetically tne Commission noted that

{o]ur port problem is primarily a railroad problem. * * * There-

fore the comprehensive plan to evolve which this Commission was

created is essentially a railroad plan. With the proper network of

rail facilities, the development of other terminal facilities can follow

along rational lines * * *. A complete reorganization of the railroad

system is the most fundamental physical need of the Port of New

York. [Report at 3]

However, the railroad problem upon which the Commis-

sion focused was not that of passenger transit but the hand-

ling and distribution of freight and cargo into and out of

the Port District, and the comprehensive plan recommended

by the Commission addressed itself exclusively to the trans-

portation and distribution, not of persons but of freight

ena —— aO- for a Compact between the States was

rs) y contained in the Commission's prelimin -

mitted in 1918. . ieeaing

A48

and cargo by rail, and to a lesser extent by ship and motor

truck. In its 474 pages plus appendices the only signifi-

cant discussion of passenger traffic in the Report is con-

tained in the section dealing with ferries and vehicular tun-

nels. After noting that the bulk of interstate passenger

traffic was accommodated by the Hudson River ferries and

that the impact of the Holland Tunnel (started in 1920)

could not be forecast, the Report opined:

Vehicular tunnels offer little promise as a means of conveying pas-

sengers, and the one rapid-transit facility in existence between ‘he two

States, while operated to near capacity, is not sufficiently profitable

to warrant optimism that others will be built. [Report at 330)

Following the submission of the Commission’s Report,

the Port of New York Authority’ was created pursuant to

an interstate compact, signed April 30, 1921, between the

States of New Jersey and New York. N. J. S. A. 32:1-1

et seq. The consent of Congress “to each and every part and

article” of the Port Authority Compact was obtained effec-

tive August 23. 1921. Pub. Res. Vo. 1%, 6%th Cong. 1st

Sess. The preamble of the Port Authority Compact states

that “a better coordination of the terminal, transportation

and other facilities of commerce in, about and through the

port of New York, will result in great economies, benefiting

the nation, as well as the states of New York and New Jer-

sey,” and that “the future development of such terminal,

transportation and other facilities of commerce will require

the expenditure of large sums of money, and the cordial

co-operation of the States of New York and New Jersey in

the encouragement of the investment of capital, and in the

formulation and execution of the necessary physical plans.”

Article I of the Compact contains the agreement and

pledge by the two states of their “faithful co-operation in

7TThe name of the Port of New York Authority was changed to

the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey on July 1, 1972.

N. J. 8. A. 32:1-4.

A49

the future planning and development of the port of New

York, holding in high trust for the benefit of the nation the

special blessings and natural advantages thereof”. Article

II defines the Port of New York District, comprising an

area of about 1500 square miles in both states within a

radius of about 25 miles from the Statue of Liberty. Ar-

ticle III establishes the Port Aythority’as “a body cor-

porate and politic, having the powers and jurisdiction here-

inafter enumerated, and such other akd additional powers

as shall be conferred upon it by the legislature of either

state concurred in by the legislature of the other, or by act

or acts of congress.” Article VI vests in the Port Author-

ity “full power and authority to purchase, construct, lease

and/or operate any terminal or transportation facility

within [the Port] district”; to make charges for the use

of such facilities, and “to borrow money and secure the

same by bonds or by mortgages upon any property” held by

the Port Authority. Article VII provides that the Port

Authority “shall have such additional powers and duties

as may hereafter be delegated to or imposed upon it from

time to time by the action of the legislature of either state

concurred in by the legislature of the other,” and mandates

that the Port Authority shall not pledge the credit of either

State except with the consent of its legislature. Article XI

requires the Port Authority to make plans for the develop-

ment of the Port District supplementary to or amendatory

of any plan theretofore adopted, and Article XII authorizes

the Port Authority to “make recommendations to the legis-

latures of the two states or to the congress of the United

States, based upon study and analysis, for the better con-

duct of the commerce passing in and through the port of

New York.”

Article XXII of the Compact defines “transportation fa-

cility” to include “railroads, steam or electric * * * and

every kind of transportation facility now in use or hereafter

designed for use for the transportation or carriage of per-

A50

sons or property”, and defines “railroad” as “includ [ing]

railways, extensions thereof, tunnels, subways, bridges, ele-

vated structures, tracks, poles, wires, conduits, power houses,

substations, lines for the transmission of power, car barns,

shops, vards, sidings, turnouts, switches, stations and ap-

proaches thereto, cars and motive equipment.”

In 1922 the states, with the consent of Congress, adopted

a Comprehensive Plan for the development of the Port of

New York. N. J. 8S. A. 32:1-25 et seq.; Pub. Res. No. 66,

67th Cong., 2d Sess. The Comprehensive Plan sets forth

the development program initially envisioned by the Com-

mission for implementation by the Port Authority.

In the Plan, like the Report upon which it was based,

unification of terminal operations and facilities, consolida-

tion of shipments, adaptation and coordination of existing fa-

cilities, improvement of commercial rail, truck and water fa-

cilities and other freight handling improvements are set

forth as principles to govern the development of the Port

Authority. The Comprehensive Plan proposed to establish

direct rail freight connections between New Jersey and Man-

hattan to furnish “the most expeditious, economical and

practical transportation of freight especially meat, produce,

milk and other commodities comprising the daily needs of

the people.” WN. J. S. A. 32:1-29. Section 8 of the 1922

Comprehensive Plan statute denies to the Authority the

power to levy taxes or assessments, and provides that the

bonds or other securities issued by the Port Authority shall

at all times be free from taxation by either state. N. J. S. A.

32:1-33. Finally, it should be noted that the power was re-

served to the states to add to, modify or change any part of

the Plan. W. J. S. A. 32 :1-26.

Pursuant to the Compact, the Comprehensive Plan and

subsequent amendments and supplements thereto, the Port

Authority operates all of the interstate vehicular tunnels

and bridges in the Port District, which include the Holland

A51

Tunnel®, the Lincoln Tunnel, the George Washington Bridge,

the Bayonne Bridge and the Arthur Kill Bridges. In addi-

tion, the Port Authority owns and/or operates the following

facilities: Newark International Airport, Teterboro Airport,

LaGuardia Airport, John F. Kennedy International Airport

and two heliports; Port Newark, the Hoboken Port Author-

ity Marine Terminal, the Elizabeth Port Authority Marine

Terminal, the Columbia Street Marine Terminal, the Erie

Basin Port Authority Marine Terminal and a Mid-Man-

hattan Consolidated Passenger Ship Terminal: the Port

Authority Bus Terminal, the George Washington Bridge Bus

Station and the Newark and New York Union Motor Truck

Terminals; the Port Authority Trans-Hudson system (op-

erated for the Port Authority through its wholly-owned sub-

sidiary, the Port Authority Trans-Husdon Corporation) and

the World Trade Center.

Excluding the 1921 Compact and the 1922 Comprehensive

Plan, the Legislatures of New Jersey and New York have

adopted 39 separately enacted, concurrent statutes authoriz-

ing the construction and financing of the foregoing facilities,

the issuance of bonds and notes by the Authority, the regula-

tion of suits against it, and the establishment of a general re-

serve fund for the payment of the Authority’s obligations.

None of these 39 statutes received specific Congressional con-

sent.

2. The Financial Structure of the Port Authority

Under the terms of the Compact the power to levy taxes

or to pledge the credit of either state was expressly withheld

from the Authority. From its inception, with the exception

of monies advanced as loans by the states, the Authority was

8The Holland Tunnel had been constructed by state commissions

pursuant to a compact between the states which received tle con-

sent of Congress. In 1930 the Holland Tunnel was transferred to

the Port Authority in order to enable it to honor its obligations to

bondholders in the face of deficits incurred in connection with the

Arthur Kill, George Washington and Bayonne Bridges. L. 1980,

c. 247.

A52

required to finance its facilities solely with money borrowed

from the public and to be repaid out of the revenues derived

from its operations. By reason of these financial limitations

two concepts initially emerged which have played an im-

portant role in the realization of the purposes for which the

Authority was created: first, the specific projects under-

taken by the Authority should be self-supporting, +. ¢., the rev-

enues of each should be sufficient to cover its operating ex-

penses and debt service requirements; and second, since the

Authority is a public agency over which its creditors have no

direct control, the bondholders should be protected by

covenants with the Authority and with the states which have

ultimate control over its operations.

The first facilities constructed by the Authority were ve-

hicular spans linking Staten Island and New Jersey — the

Arthur Kill Bridges — which were opened to traffic in 1928.

A third Staten Island-New Jersey crossing, the Bayonne

Bridge, was placed in operation in 1931. In that same year

the George Washington Bridge was opened to traffic. With

respect to each of these facilities the Port Authority was au-

thorized to and did issue bonds in separate series to pay for

the cost of acquisition of lands and construction. The reve-

nues and tolls from each facility were statutorily pledged as

security for the repayment of the series bonds issued in con-

junction with the specific facility involved. N. J. 8. A. 32:1-

39, 62, 86. The States of New Jersey and New York advanced

additional moneys to pay for the costs of construction, and

the funds so advanced were accorded a subordinated status

to the funds raised by the Authority from the sale of its own

bonds to the public. NV. J. 9. A. 32:1-60, 63, 81, 87. The

statutory authorizations for each project and its funding

were declared to be “a contract or agreement between the two

states for the benefit of those lending money to the port au-

thority.” N. J. 8. A. 32 :1-65, 89.

The first bonds issued to the public by the Authority were

“closed-end” bonds based on the estimated costs of each

facility, and the Authority was prohibited from issuing more

A53

bonds than the amount initially authorized for the project.

See Goldberg, A History of the Port of New York Authority

Financial Structure (1964), at 3 (hereafter cited as Gold-

berg). The gross revenues from each bridge were applied

first to the payment of expenses of operation and maintenance

of the bridge, then to the payment of debt service on its

bonds, and the surplus, if any, was to be deposited in a

separate reserve fund available only to the bondholders of

that series. Goldberg, at 4.

As noted earlier, the initial facilities were not self-sustain-

ing, and in 1930 the states transferred the control, operation

and the revenues of the Holland Tunnel to the Port Au-

thority to help place the Port Authority on a self-sustaining

basis. NV. J. §. A. 32:1-119. Simultaneously, the states en-

acted legislation, commonly called the General Reserve Fund

Act, N. J. 8. A. 32:1-142, and by the terms of that act the

surplus revenues derived by the Authority from all facilities

built with the proceeds of sale of its bonds are pooled so as to

create a general reserve fund in an amount equal to 10%

of the par value of all bonds issued by the Authority. The

act pledges the general reserve fund as security for the

payment of interest and principal on all bonds theretofore or

thereafter issued by the Authority. Surplus moneys of the

Authority in excess of the general reserve fund requirements

may be used for any purpose authorized by the states.

The general reserve fund thus becomes available to bond-

holders to pay the debt service requirements of facilities which

were not self-supporting. By this device the surplus revenues

of the Holland Tunnel were used to pay the debt service re-

quirements of the Arthur Kill and Bayonne Bridges and the

George Washington Bridge. The general reserve fund was

also envisioned as a security device to induce the public

to invest in future facilities such as the then contemplated

Lincoln Tunnel project. See Goldberg, at 7.

Following the enactment of the General Reserve Fund Act

the Port Authority issued additional series of bonds to finance

the construction of the Inland Terminal Building and to repay

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the states for the amounts expended by them to construct

the Holland Tunnel. Goldberg, at 5. In 1935 the Authority

commenced the issuance of a new series of bonds, known as

general and refunding bonds, the proceeds of which were used

to refund all of the original bridge bonds issued by the Au-

thority and to finance the initial construction of the Lincoln

Tunnel. These bonds were secured by a pledge of the net

revenues of all of the Authority’s then existing facilities and

by the general reserve fund. Under the terms of the resolu-

tion authorizing the issuance of general and refunding bonds

the Authority also contracted to create a special reserve fund

into wh

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Jurisdictional Statement — United States Trust Co. of NY v. New Jersey · 431 U.S. 1 | Frix