Jurisdictional Statement — United States Trust Co. of NY v. New Jersey
Supreme Court brief1977
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
8.
am |
o*
MAY 21 1976
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Unite
OCTOBER TERM, 1975
No 475-1687
Unirep States Trust Company or New York, as Trustee
for The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
Consolidated Bonds, Fortieth and Forty-First Series, on
its own behalf and on behalf of all holders of Consoli-
dated Bonds of The Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey and all others similarly situated,
Appellant,
RODAK, JR.,.CLERK
Vv.
Tue Srate or New Jersey, Brennan T. Byrne, Governor
of the State of New Jersey, and Wim.u1aM F. Hytanp,
Attorney General of the State of New Jersey,
Appellees.
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT |
DeverEUX MILBURN
Ropert A. McTAaAMaNnry
2 Wall Street
New York, New York 10005
Rosert B. MeyNer
Gateway I
Newark, New Jersey 07102
Attorneys for Appellant
Of Counsel:
Carter, Lepyarp & Mi_purn
Meyver, Lanpis & VERDON
May 21, 1976
=
-_—~
CN TRIO ccicesictnnseniinscnititinceatscnantilinaminingmnasamnannennes
EE ST an TEE TT aT EN
Ne I ccecinscrenniegnenctesciininimionantiinavnninenneiavies
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved ....
RITE GEE Ge CIID ecreccrsccsnrcinsiiseennctceeensetntncnantniicennne
Iiow the Federal Questions Were Raised and Decided
SY cessstiinsanienionte ssiieikdiabaciniaeedtabdaiediamualeet inhiniediiilladaibeiié
The Federal Questions are Substantial ........................
I,
IT.
ITT,
The judgment of the New Jersey Supreme
Court presents the substantial question whether
a State can unilaterally and retroactively re-
voke a solemn covenant it has made with
holders of municipal bonds, or whether such
bondholders are protected by the Contract and
Due Process clauses of the United States Con-
STIIIITIED ccshnuicesesdiistedsanisdandindiniiininsdeatahiaemiddanianmaiihigen
It is of great importance to Port Authority
bondholders that this Court decide that the re-
pealer is unconstitutional, thus returning the
security provided by the Covenant and restor-
ing the market for the bonds .................-...ccss-e0--+
The court below erroneously justified the viola-
tion of the impairment provisions of the Con-
stitution by terming the retroactive repeal of
the 1962 Covenant an exercise of the police
SOE sesisscahiniencssaninietieceseiitasibadibaiaaaiiacabandneishdibaicnsiaeiiininiies
le
Appendix A
Decision of New Jersey Supreme Court ..................
Decision of New Jersey Superior Court
Appendix B
N.J.B.S. § 32:1-35.55(b)
Chapter 25, Laws of New Jersey of 1974 ................
I Ge GI IIY seicesiccitvinnssessnsstiagiareitetanbensintnapesnebamnabeiedieianis
ba]
Be eae on
13
15
ey
ii
TABLE OF CASES
PAGE
Arkansas v. Texas, 346 U.S. 368 (1953) .2.2.........:ccecceeeee 4
Bandini Petroleum Co. vy. Superior Court, 284 U.S.
OD CURIE ccctensescesnseneaitesintensnecctreadmnesnatbienneshmensetinnmesimnauia 4
City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965) ........ 22, 23
Courtesy Sandwich Shop v. Port of New York Author-
ity, 12 N.Y.2d 379, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 78,
rehearing denied, 375 U.S. 960 (1968) occ = 10
Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927) ............ccesesseeeees 15
Gaby v. The Port of New York Authority, et al., 134
N.J. Super. 124, 338 A.2d 833 (Super, Ct. 1975),
aff'd, 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976) ........-----0cec0+ 12
Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945) s.ecsccccccssccsssececesssseee 3,5
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n vy. Blaisdell, 290 U.S, 398
STIS scnnonscshadinissnchiiesseniiniicinitinigiiabipennmmitaapiiinasiicaiaisiiteamintees 20
In re Hudson & Manhattan R.R., 174 F.Supp. 148
(S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff’d sub nom., Spitzer v. Stichman,
gy EF Ff. f. % ee 9
Indiana vy. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938) .....2....:cccceeeeeeeeeee 18
Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954) ... = 15
Jankovich vy. Indiana Toll Road Comm’n, 379 U.S. 487
CEIUEED . cncensensnisenneienmennaeneesiiidanmeassdaipiadinenasitniesonnanel 3, 4,5
Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943) 00... eeeeeeeeeeee 4
Lynch vy. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934) 0... 23
Metlakatla Indian Community, Annette Island Re-
serve v. Egan, 363 U.S. 555 (1960) ................cccccseeeeeees 4
New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U.S. 104 (1877) .........ccceceeceeeee 18
United States Trust Company of New York v. The
State of New Jersey, et al., 134 N.J. Super. 124, 338
A.2d 833 (Super. Ct. 1975), aff’d, 69 N.J. 253, 353
Pe Fg: 2, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21
United States Trust Company of New York ve The
State of New York, et al., Index No. 09128/74 (New
York Supreme Court, filed June 17, 1974) ................ 3
W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56
TIE cntismeitenneneniaineanioneemmeieien —— FF TF
iil
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
’ Constitution of the United States— —_
Article I, Section 10, Clamse 1 ooccccccccccccccccecseeeeeee 5, 6
RSE ETERS Sa Ae eae 5, 6
ET BD 5, 6
ET ae. See aa 3,4
ee S| (| ee 2, 7, 9, 10
I 2
Ch. 25, Laws of New Jersey of 1974 oooccccocccccccccccceeccoeee 2, 3,7
Ch. 208, Laws of New Jersey of 1972 ooo... cocceceeeee 11
Ch. 130, Laws of New Jersey of 1917 ooo... 7
Ch. 993, Laws of New York of 1974 oo. ccceeeee 2
Ch. 318, Laws of New York of 1973 ooo.c.cccccccccccccccsoeeeee 11
Ch. 1003, Laws of New York of 1972 oo. cccccccccccecceenee 11
SECONDARY AUTHORITIES
R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice
SOR EEE ee 4
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1975
No.
Unrrep States Trust Company or New York, as Trustee
for The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
Consolidated Bonds, Fortieth and Forty-First Series, on
its own behalf and on behalf of all holders of Consoli-
dated Bonds of The Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey and all others similarly situated,
Appellant,
v.
Tue State or New Jersey, Brenpan T. Byawe, Governor
of the State of New Jersey, and Wnuum F. Hytanp,
Attorney General of the State of New Jersey,
Appellees.
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Appellant appeals from the judgment of the Supreme
Court of New Jersey, entered on February 25, 1976, affirm-
ing the decision of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Bergen County, and submit this Statement to
show that the Supreme Court of the United States has
jurisdiction of the appeal and that substantial federal
: questions are presented.
Opinions Below
The decision and opinion of the Supreme Court of New
Jersey is reported at 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976), and
is set forth in Appendix A hereto at pages Al-A39. The
decision and opinion of the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Bergen County, is reported at 134 N.J.
Super. 124, 338 A.2d 833 (Super. Ct. 1975), and is set forth
in Appendix A hereto at pages A40-A110.
Jurisdiction
Appellant initiated this action in the Superior Court of
New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, pursuant to
N.J.R.S. §§2A:16-50 et seg., seeking a declaration that
Chapter 25 of the Laws of New Jersey of 1974 contravened
the Contract and Due Process Clauses of the United States
and New Jersey Constitutions. Chapter 25 retroactively
repealed that part of the New Jersey Legislation enacted
in 1962 (N.J.R.S. § 32:1-35.55(b)) which had embodied a
statutory covenant (the “1962 Covenant’”)* between the
States of New Jersey and New York and with the holders
of Consolidated Bonds of the Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey (the “Port Authority”). The 1962 Cove-
nant specifically limited the involvement of the Port
Authority’s revenues and reserves in the area of deficit rail
mass transit.
After a trial in February 1975, narrowly limited to the
issues of bondholder reliance on the 1962 Covenant and the
extent of the damage to the secondary bond market caused
by the repeal, the Superior Court entered an order on May
* Due to the bi-state nature of the Port Authority, valid action by
both States was necessary to repeal retroactively the 1962 Covenant.
On June 15, 1974, New York passed legislation similar to Chapter
25 (Ch. 993, Laws of New York of 1974).
0S aA Se WOR. Olt Pet wens —
3
14, 1975 dismissing Appellant’s complaint and declaring
that Chapter 25 was consiitutionally valid. Appellant
appealed that decision directly to the Supreme Court of
New Jersey which, on February 25, 1976, affirmed the lower
pt judgment, per curiam. The Notice of Appeal to this
ourt was timely filed in
ge _ the Supreme Court of New Jersey
Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §1257(2), this being an appeal from a final judg-
ment of the Supreme Court of New J ersey, the highest
court of that State, holding that Chapter 25 of the Laws
of New Jersey of 1974 is not repugnant to Article I, Section
10, Clause 1 of, or the Fifth and Fourteenth duaninente
to, the United States Constitution.
The Related Case. We call the Court’s attention to the
pendency of a related action, United States Trust Company
of New York v. The State of New York, et al., Index No
09128/74, in the Supreme Court of New York, County of
New York, instituted on June 17, 1974. The New York
case attacks the validity of New York’s repeal of the 1962
Covenant on the grounds that it violates the United States
and New York Constitutions. If Appellant sueceeds in
the New York action, the 1962 Covenant will remain in
force, since valid bi-state legislation is required for effec-
tive repeal. Thus a final judgment in Appellant’s favor
in a New York court, not appealed, or not appealable*®
would end this case notwithstanding the New J ersey courte’
approval of the repeal.
* Such a judgment, if decided u i
, ed upon the adequate and indepen
om ee that the repeal violated the Due Process Clause of the
New York Constitution, would probably not be appealable to this
Court, ¢.g., Jankovich vy. Indiana Toll Road Comm’n, 379 US
487 (1965); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945). =
4
The pendency of the New York action does not affect the
quality of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision as a
“final judgment ... by the highest court of a state” under
28 U.S.C. § 1257(2).* It does not affect the power of this
Court summarily to reverse the New Jersey Supreme
Court’s decision and thus finally settle the entire contro-
versy, a course of action for which there are compelling
arguments.
This Court, on the other hand, could decide in its
diseretion to note probable jurisdiction in this case and
defer consideration on the merits pending final disposition
of the New York case. It is not unknown, of course, for
this Court to hold a case as to which it has noted probable
jurisdiction on its docket pending further proceedings else-
where. See Metlakatla Indian Community, Annette Island
Reserve v. Egan, 363 U.S. 555 (1960) (involving “highest
court of a state” segment of Section 1257. Similar defer-
rals have occurred when this Court’s original or certiorari
jurisdiction has been invoked. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Teras,
246 U.S. 368 (1953) (original jurisdiction), and, as to cer-
tiorari, the eases discussed in R. Stern & E. Gressman,
Supreme Court Practice § 5.9, at p. 919 (4th ed. 1969).
The arguments for a noting of probable jurisdiction and
subsequent deferral are two-fold:
1. If the New York court declares the New York
repeal legislation repugnant to the New York Consti-
tution, that decision is probably not appealable to
this Court, since there would be an “adequate and
independent state ground” for it. E.g., Jankovich v.
Indiana Toll Road Comm’n, 379 U.S. 487 (1965) ;
* FE g., Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943), and Bandini Petro-
leum &:. v. Superior Court, 284 U.S. 8 (1931), which held that the
possibility of a controlling decision in a subsequent or distinct
action, or one collateral in nature, will not cause an appeal to be non-
final and thus unreviewable.
ae
Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945). Since valid
bi-state legislation is necessary for repeal, it would
then not be necessary for this C i
pense Bag ourt to decide the
2. If the New York court declares the New York
repeal legislation constitutional, or unconstitutional
because repugnant to the United States Constitution,
this Court will then be in a position to decide the
entire controversy having had the benefit of the New
York courts’ consideration of the factual issues.
Questions Presented
1.
Is the 1974 New Jersey statute repealing retroactively
the 1962 Covenant between the States of New Jersey and
New York and with Port Authority bondholders, upon
which holders of over $1,600,000,000 of Port Authority
bonds relied, repugnant to Article I, Section 10, Clause 1
of the United States Constitution on the ground that such
repeal impaired an obligation of contract?
2.
Is the 1974 New Jersey statute repealing retroactively
the 1962 Covenant between the States of New Jersey and
New York and with Port Authority bondholders, which
conferred a valuable and substantial security right upon
the holders of over $1,600,000,000 of Port Authority bonds
repugnant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution on the ground that such repeal
constituted a taking of property for public use without
just compensation and without due process of law?
3.
Can the 1974 New Jersey statute which repealed the 1962
Covenant between the States of New Jersey and New York
and with Port Authority bondholders, which was arbitrarily
adopted without any legislative hearing or debate, with no
mention whatsoever of any kind of an emergency, and which
in fact was not related to any emergency, and which is
repugnant to Article I, Section 10, Clause ! of the United
States Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments thereto, be upheld two years later by a court finding
that it represented a valid exercise of the State’s police
power by reason of the coincidental existence of an emer-
gency to which the legislature made no reference?
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved
The Constitutional provisions which Appellant contends
have been violated by the retroactive repeal of the 1962
Covenant are Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the United
States Constitution, commonly known as the “Contract
Clause”, which provides in part as follows:
“No State shall... pass any ... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts .. .”
and the following clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, respectively :
“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation”, and
“nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. .. .”
:
:
’
7
This case also involves N.J.R.S. § 32:1-35.55(b), the 1962
Covenant, set forth at pages B1-B4 of Appendix B, and
Chapter 25 of the Laws of New Jersey of 1974, the retro-
active repealer, set forth at pages B5-b6 of Appendix B.
Statement of the Case
Appellant instituted this action in three capacities: (1) as
trustee for the holders of $200,000,000 of Port Authority
Consolidated Bonds, (2) on its own behalf as holder of
almost $100,000,000 of Port Authority Consolidated Bonds
in trust and other fiduciary accounts and (3) on behalf of
the holders of the over $1,600,000,000 outstanding Consoli-
dated Bonds. The action seeks a declaratory judgment that
Chapter 25 of the Laws of New Jersey of 1974, which unila-
terally and retroactively cancelled a statutory covenant
between the States of New York and New Jersey and with
holders of Consolidated Bonds of the Port Authority, vio-
lates the United States Constitution.
The Port Authority was established in 1921 by a bi-sta‘e
Compact as a financially independent authority to accom-
plish public purpose projects with funds contributed by
private investors. The Port Authority was created to deal
with the commercial needs of the Port of New York—the
handling, distribution and transportation not of persons but
of freight and cargo by rail, ship and motor truck. (Ch.
130, Laws of New Jersey of 1917). With only the support
of a modest initial appropriation, the two States dedicated
themselves in their Compact to the “encouragement of the
investment of capital” in the Port Authority to finance
those projects authorized for Port Authority development.
Financing for these purposes was to be accomplished by
giving the Port Authority power to mortgage its facilities
and to pledge the revenues from such facilities to secure
the payment of bonds issued to private investors.
Port Authority Consolidated Bonds are not general
obligations of the State of New Jersey or the State of New
York. They are not backed by the general revenues of
either State, are not guaranteed by either State and are
not supported by any grant of either State’s power to tax.
Accordingly, the Port Authority throughout its history,
until 1962, would only undertake projects which it believed
would eventually contribute net revenues for the repay-
ment of its bonds and was required by its creditors to enter
into various contractual undertakings, to which the States
often were parties, to protect the revenues and reserves
pledged to bondholders.
In the early 1960’s, it was proposed that, for the first time
in its history, the Port Authority be directed to assume
financial responsibility for a facility expected to require
enormous capital expenditures and to sustain perpetual
operating deficits. This was the Hudson & Manhattan Rail-
road, a privately owned interstate electric commuter rail-
road system then linking Manhattan, Newark and Hoboken.
The takeover of the Hudson & Manhattan by the Port
Authority was proposed at a time when the four commuter
railroads operating in Northern New Jersey were sustain-
ing total passenger operating deficits of almost $60,000,000
annually, the New York commuter railroads operating defi-
cits of between $10,000,000 and $15,000,000 annually, and the
New York City transit system operating deficits of
$90,000,000 annually, exclusive of debt service charges of
$87,000,000.
Of the several commuter rail systems serving the Port
District, the financial prospects of the Hudson & Manhattan
were by far the worst. It had been in reorganization for
many years, and in 1959 the bankruptcy court approved a
plan which left the railroad with enough cash to continue
et et
operations for only two years, with no funds for capital
expenditures. In re Hudson d& Manhattan R.R., 174
F.Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff’d sub nom., Spiteer Vv
Stichman, 278 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1960). 7
: In 1961, the New York State legislature enacted legisla-
tion directing the Port Authority to take over and operate
the Hudson & Manhattan, with no limitation on the agency’s
future involvement in deficit rail mass transit.*
The New Jersey legislature did not concur. In spite
of the fact that there were other financial tests, under-
takings and provisions for bondholder protection then
in effect relating to Consolidated Bonds, the New Jersey
legislative committee which had been conducting hearings
on the matter concluded that the Port Authority could only
hope to borrow the funds necessary to take over the Hudson
& Manhattan if the States agreed to limit, by a “constitu-
tionally-protected” statutory covenant, the extent of ihe
future involvement of the agency in the enormous deficits
incurred by the area’s commuter rail systems.** New York
concurred and the legislation adopted was the 1962 cove-
nant, which provides in part:
“The 2 States covenant and agree with each
other and with the holders of any affected bonds, as
hereinafter defined, that so long as any of such bonds
*In response to this 1961 New York legislation
the largest single holder of Port Authority Convcliied "Honda
immediately stopped purchasing such bonds and adopted a policy of
replacing its holdings of Port Authority Bonds. Upon the adoption
of the 19€2 Covenant, Appellant again began purchasing Consoli-
dated Bonds for its fiduciary accounts, increasing its holdings to over
$96,000,000 at the time the Covenant was retroactively repealed.
** As the Superior Court found: “the Legislature
: of 1962 con-
cluded that it was necessary to place a limitation on mass transit
deficit operations to be undertaken by the Authority in the future
,- a to promote continued investor confidence in the Authority.”
10
remain outstanding and unpaid and the holders
thereof shall not have given their consent as provided
in their contract with the port authority, ... (b)
neither the States nor the port authority nor any
subsidiary corporation incorporated for any of the
purposes of this act will apply any of the rentals,
tolls, fares, fees, charges, revenues or reserves, which
have been or shall be pledged in whole or in part as
security for such bonds, for any railroad purposes
whatsoever other than permitted purposes herein-
after set forth... .”
The 1962 Covenant accomplished its purpose. On Sep-
tember 1, 1962, the Port Authority took over the Hudson &
Manhattan through its PATH subsidiary, obtaining the
funds necessary for the acquisition and modernization of
the railroad by the successful sale of bonds to private
investors. In fact, in 1962 and 1963, when the value of the
Covenant was fresh in the minds of the legislators, the two
States joined in a most vigorous defense of the legislation
embodying the Covenant which finally resulted in a decision
on the merits by this Court that the constitutional attacks
on the validity of such legislation did not present any sub-
stantial Federal question. Courtesy Sandwich Shop v. Port
of New York Authority, 12 N.Y. 2d 379, appeal dismissed,
8375 U.S. 78, rehearing denied, 375 U.S. 960 (1963).
Notwithstanding the fact that every other major commuter
rail system in the Port District (Penn Central, Erie Lacka-
wanna, Central Railroad of New Jersey) passed through
bankruptey proceedings, private investors, knowing of the
protection of the 1962 Covenant against unlimited involve-
ment of pledged revenues and reserves in deficit rail mass
transit,* continued to purchase Port Authority Consoli-
* The Covenant was described in detail in every Official Statement
following the date of its enactment, in the Port Authority’s Annual
Reports, and in Information Sessions held by the agency and its
underwriters to acquaint prospective investors with the investment
merits of Consolidated Bond offerings.
tl
Se i Ee ms ~ tes oe
ee ew eee ree Oe ee me
te ah ne re tee >
wt
~
.
‘
j
.
11
dated Bonds on favorable terms through the 1960’s and
early 1970s,
In 1973, in connection with proposed PATH rail exten-
sions to Kennedy Airport in New York and to suburban New
Jersey, the two States, after extensive hearings, adopted
legislation prospectively repealing the 1962 Covenant. By
this action, the States in effect reaffirmed the Covenant’s
protection for the over $1,400,000,000 in outstanding bonds
by refusing to repeal the Covenant retroactively with
respect to such bonds.* (Ch. 1003, Laws of New York of
1972; Ch. 318, Laws of New York of 1973; Ch. 208, Laws of
New Jersey of 1972). In the spring of 1974, fulfilling a
campaign promise, newly-elected Governor Byrne of New
Jersey pushed through legislation to cancel the Covenant
unilaterally and retroactively with respect to outstanding
Consolidated Bonds. In marked contrast to the extensive
hearings, reports and findings surrounding the enactment
of the Covenant in 1962 and its prospective repeal in 1973,
no hearings were held, no alternatives were examined, and
bondholders were not notified of the pending legislation.
At no time, either upon the passage of the bill or upon the
signing of it by the Governor, was there any mention of any
emergency caused by the gas shortage or air pollution or
anything else. The companion legislation in New York was
adopted following a brief legislative colloquy in which it
was inferred that the Port Authority’s Consolidated Bonds
were guaranteed by both States. In fact, of course, they
are not,
* Since bonds protected by the Covenant remained ou i
, . . t
the Covenant’s protection continued in fact for bonds of sin eal
after the prospective re until th : .
of the protected bonds. - baited oa redemption
12
How the Federal Questions Were
Raised and Decided Below
Appellant in its Complaint asserted that the retroactive
repeal of the 1962 Covenant constituted an impairment of
the contract between the two States and with the bond-
holders in violation of the Contract Clause of the United
States Constitution and that such repeal constituted a tak-
ing of the bondholders’ property in violation of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
The Superior Court held that: “the repeal legislation was
a reasonable and hence valid exercise of the states’ police
power which is not prohibited by the Contract Clause of
either the Federal or the State Constitution.” (A109). In
a footnote, that court stated that it would not consider
Appellant’s arguments based on the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments since, to the extent that claim was based on
a decline in the price of the bonds in the secondary market
for the bonds it was factually rejected and, in any event,
the test of Constitutional validity as applied to repeal
legislation is the same under both the Contract and the Due
Process Clauses. (A94 n.36).
The Superior Court then entered an order dismissing
Appellant’s complaint and ordering judgment in favor of
defendants on that portion of their counterclaim which
sought a declaratory judgment that Chapter 25 was con-
stitutional.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed
“substantially for the reasons set forth in the opinion
[below]”. (A4).*
* On December 10, 1974, the Superior Court ordered that an
existing action in which Appellant had intervened, Gaby v. The Port
of New York Authority, et al., be consolidated with Appellant’s
action for certain limited purposes. At issue in Gaby was the Con-
stitutional validity of the 1962 Covenant. In view of the decision
as to the validity of the retroactive repeal of the Covenant, the Gaby
case was dismissed by the Superior Court, the dismissal was affirmed
by the Supreme Court of New Jersey and the case will not be further
discussed hereafter.
i}
D
{
i
|
}
}
4
{
q
4
13
The Federal Questions Are Substantial
The judgment of the New Jersey Supreme Court
presents the substantial question whether a State can
unilaterally and retroactively revoke a solemn cove-
nant it has made with holders of municipal bonds, or
whether such bondholders are protected by the Con
tract and Due Process clauses of the United States
Constitution.
The States of New Jersey and New York passed legis-
lation in 1962 whereby they promised that if the investing
public would continue to put its money into Port Authority
Consolidated Bonds to enable the Port Authority to take
over and operate the Hudson & Manhattan Railroad
and to build the World Trade Center, neither they nor the
Port Authority would apply any of the revenues or reserves
pledged as security for those bonds for any railroad pur-
poses whatsoever other than permitted purposes defined in
the legislation. As stated above, in 1962 the four Northern
New Jersey commuter lines, the New York commuter rail-
roads and the New York City transit system were showing
annual operating deficits of about $60,000,000, $10,000,000
to $15,000,000, and $20,000,000 respectively. To protect the
bondholders by preventing pledged revenues and reserves
from being consumed by these appalling and inevitable
deficits was no idle promise. It was a promise which was
absolutely necessary in order to induce the investing public
into continuing to buy Consolidated Bonds. It was a
promise which was absolutely repudiated without any hear-
ing or any debate by the New Jersey legislature. Is it any
wonder that the entire investing public and, in particular,
the municipal bond market is waiting for this Court to tell
them whether they can rely upon the pledged word of a
14
State—whether a State will be permitted under the United
States Constitution to make a promise to entice investment
in municipal bonds and then repudiate it when it serves its
purpose so to do?
During the trial below, representatives of each of the
four principal areas of the municipal bond industry® testi-
fied without contradiction that the secondary market for
Port Authority Consolidated Bonds had been dramatically
disrupted by the retroactive repeal of the Covenant. A
dealer in the bonds testified that in relation to bonds of
comparable quality and maturity Port Authority Bonds
had fallen by 6 to 12 points, or $60 to $120 per $1,000 prin-
cipal amount, as a direct result of the retroactive repeal of
the Covenant. There was also uncontroverted testimony
with respect to the value of the 1962 Covenant as a security
device not duplicated by other contractual undertakings
with bondholders.**®
The witnesses at the trial below also testified without
contradiction regarding the effect of the retroactive repeal
of the 1962 Covenant on the market for municipal bonds
issued by New Jersey and New York. Purchasers of muni-
cipal bonds represent perhaps the most conservative of
investors, willing to sacrifice higher yields because of the
tax benefits attendant upon this type of obligation, the
almost absolute assurance of repayment and, in the mean-
* Investment banking (John F. Thompson of W. H. Morton
Division of American Express Company and Lester Murphy of
Barr Brothers), investment advisory (John F, Thompson), dealers
(Lester Murphy and Austin Fitzgerald of Weedon & Co.) and
institutional investors (Gordon Fowler of Connecticut General Life
Insurance Company).
** The Covenant’s unique value as a security device is demon-
strated by the fact that, promptly following the decision of the New
Jersey Supreme Court below, the two states announced that the Port
Authority would be required to give to each state $120 million, a
total of $240 million, for mass transit purposes.
AE of tn. ee
46 ie ee
ee Pe ete ae
:
15
time, the assurance of a liquid investment. Purchasers of
municipal bonds finance public purpose projects from fire
trucks to airports, all upon the market’s understanding that
the contractual undertakings between issuers and private
investors are inviolate. Thus, the witnesses below testified
that many institutional investors, as a result of the retro-
active repeal of the 1962 Covenant, simply crossed New
York and New Jersey obligations entirely off their lists,
undoubtedly contributing to the dire financial situation in
which New York City and New York State are presently
enmeshed.
This Court should hear this appeal in order finally to
determine whether the promises made by States to the
creditors of state agencies mean what they say or whether
they are subject to arbitrary unilateral cancellation when-
ever the Legislatures believe that course to be politically
expedient.
It is of great importance to Port Authority bond-
holders that this Court decide that the po me is
unconstitutional, thus returning the security provided
7 o Covenant and restoring the market for the
The Superior Court found® that bondholders’ reliance on
the Covenant was not the “primary consideration” for the
purchase of their bonds. The Superior Court said: “no
_ * This Court is not bound by the Superior Court’s factual find-
ings. This a involves “a conclusion of law as to a Federal
right and a finding of fact . . . so intermingled as to make it ;
nevessary, in order to pass upon the Federal question, to analyze the
facts.” Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 385 (1927); see also Kern-
Limerick, Ine. V. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110, 121 (1954) (“... the long
course of judicial construction . . . establishes as a principle that the
duty rests on this Court to decide for itself facts or constructions
upon which federal constitutional issues rest.’’)
16
witness testified that purchases would-not have been made
without the covenant,* but only that they would not have
purchased or recommended the purchase of the bonds ‘at
the price which they were then offered’”. (A91). To say
that bondholders would not have purchased the bends on
the proffered terms absent the Covenant is to say that
bondholders would not have purchased the bonds at all
absent the Covenant, since investors were not offered a
bond at one interest rate with the Covenant’s protection
and another bond at a much higher interest rate without
it. They were offered a package and each witness below
testified that neither they nor their customers were inter-
ested in the package without the Covenant.
The court below implied that bondholders should be
satisfied with the contractual protections which pre-
ceded the adoption of the Covenant, since Port Authority
bonds in fact were purchased before the enactment of the
Covenant. This is a tempting fallacy but a fallacy nonethe-
less. Prior to the Covenant’s enactment, the power of the
States to direct the Port Authority into any perpetual defi-
cit undertaking was only theoretical since the necessary
private financing would never have been forthcoming on
acceptable terms. When it became apparent that the States
intended to change the agency’s course and direct it into
a field inherently incapable of profitable operation, then
and only then were the existing statutory and contractual
protections for bondholders wholly inadequate. Then and
* This statement by the Superior Court is inaccurate. John F.
Thompson, the dean of municipal bond analysts, testified in part:
“Q. If you knew that the covenant would later be repealed
would you have recommended the Port Authority bonds dur-
ing the 60s?
“A. No.” (T8614 to 17).
Ae ee OD AA me
er ee
|
:
:
:
|
17
only then did some reasonable financial limitation become
an absolute sine qua non of future Port Authority Consoli-
dated Bond financing on reasonable terms. The 1962 Cove-
nant was the limitation agreed upon by the States.
Similarly, the Superior Court required proof of “per-
manent” secondary market damage as a result of the repeal.
That proof is in the record—the very recovery in the bonds
which the Superior Court relied upon to support its con-
clusion that damage was not “permanent” was explained
as a short-term technical adjustment in the market
prompted by purchases to cover short sales in the closing
months of the preceding year. Further, after the retro-
active repeal the market for Port Authority bonds became
“extremely thin” and “sensitive” so that a sale of a large
block of the bonds could not be made at the current bid
price but only at a price substantially below it. The
Superior Court found no significance in this market dis-
ruption or in a market decline of 6 to 12 points (some $60
to $120 per $1,000 principal amount of bonds) as a direct
result of the Covenant’s repeal, notwithstanding the fact
that over $1,600,000,000 in bonds are outstanding. With
respect to a single $100,000,000 issue of Consolidated Bonds
this decline represents a diminution in market value of
between $6,000,000 and $12,000,000. This, to the courts
below, was not an impairment of constitutional proportions.
The Superior Court did concede that bo
t: dholders’
security had been diminished: aie
“To the extent that the re
peal of the cove
authorizes the Authority to assume greater “ofcits
for such purposes, it permits a diminution of the
pledged revenues and reserves and may be said to
constitute an impairment of the states’ i
the bondholders.” A95. ne
18
The present planned “diminution” is $240 million, with no
assurance to bondholders that this is not just the beginning.
The possibility of such increasing diversions, to the courts
below, was not an impairment of constitutional proportions.
Il.
The court below erroneously justified the violation
of the impairment provisions of the Constitution by
terming the retroactive repeal of the 1962 Covenant
an exercise of the police power.
The 1962 Covenant is the clearest possible example of a
contract made by a State with certain of its citizens. The
opening words of the Covenant read: “The 2 States
covenant and agree with each other and with the holders
of any affected bonds. . . .” Such a contract must be secure
against impairment under the Contract Clause of the United
States Constitution and, since a property right is created,
protected by the Federal Due Process Clause. A95 n.38;
see Indiana v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938); New Jersey
v. Yard, 95 U.S. 104 (1877). It was passed only following
exhaustive legislative hearings and was enacted as a bar-
gained-for “constitutionally-protected” (in the words of the
New Jersey legislative committee) statutory covenant.
The Superior Court’s holding that the repeal was con-
stitutional, notwithstanding the conceded impairment, is
based on an erroneofis application of language derived from
W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935). The
Superior Court stated the test of constitutionality as
follows:
“Coneeding the existence of some impairment of
hondholder security as a result of the repeal, has
;
19
the action of the states destroyed the quality of their
security as an ‘acceptable investment for a rational
investor’?” A107-A108.
It is from Kavanaugh that the Superior Court adopted
its test of constitutionality. 295 U.S. at 60. The Superior
Court, however, misread the holding in Kavanaugh. This
Court held there that in enacting the challenged legisla-
tion the legislature had “put restraint aside” and “with
studied indifference to the interests of the mortgagee or to
his appropriate protection they have taken from the mort-
gage the quality of an acceptable investment for a rational
investor.” Jd. This Court specifically noted that the
changes wrought by the challenged legislation were so sub-
stantial that the State had transgressed the “outermost
limits” of constitutional bounds:
“In the books there is much talk about distinctions
between changes of the substance of the contract
and changes of the remedy. The dividing line
is at times obscure. There is no need for the pur-
poses of this case to plot it on the legal map. Not
even changes of the remedy may be pressed so far
as to cut down the security of a mortgage without
moderation or reason or in a spirit of oppression.
Even when the public welfare is invoked as an
excuse, these bounds must be respected. ... We
state the outermost limits only. In stating them we
do not exclude the possibility that the bounds are
even narrower. The case does not call for definition
more precise. A catalogue of the changes imposed
upon this mortgage must lead to the conviction that
the framers of the amendments have put restraint
aside. With studied indifference to the interests of
the mortgagee or to his appropriate protection they
have taken from the mortgage the quality of an
acceptable investment for a rational investor.” Jd.
(emphasis added).
20
Thus, although in Kavanaugh the Court was careful to
state that the destruction of the quality of the security “as
an acceptable investment for a rational investor” con-
stituted the “outermost limits” of the bounds of which a
state may not transgress, the Superior Court adopted these
outer limits as its standard for determining the constitu-
tionality of the 1974 repeal legislation. The Superior Court
has turned what to this Court was an unconstitutional maxi-
mum into a required minimum. .
If only those acts of the State which resulted in the
destruction of a contract as an acceptable investment were
constitutionally impermissible, then virtually no covenant
or combination of covenants in a bond resolution or statute
would be safe from abrogation. There are, after all,
innumerable covenants and provisions in bond resolutions
and statutes, the abrogation of which would not “destroy”
the bond’s security, but which obviously would result in a
material impairment.
Additionally, the Superior Court erroneously held:
“The line of demarcation between Blaisdell and
Kavanaugh may be expressed as one of degree : The
states’ inherent power to protect the public welfare
may be validly exercised under4he Contract Clause
even if it impairs a contractual obligation so long as
it does not destroy it.” A102.
The Superior Court concluded that the framers of the
Constitution of the United States meant “destroy” when
they said “impair.” Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell,
290 U.S. 398 (1934), certainly does not support this extreme
view, since it merely involved a postponement of remedies
for a short period of time.
In reaching its conclusion that the retroactive repeal of
the 1962 Covenant was “a reasonable and hence valid exer-
cise” of the police power, the Superior Court found:
“Suffice it to say that between 1962 and 1974 the
security afforded bondholders had been substantially
ee ee ee
;
;
‘
:
21
augmented by a vast increase in Authority revenues
and reserves, and the Authority’s financial ability to
absorb greater deficits, from whatever source and
without any significant impairment of bondholder
security, was correspondingly increased. During the
same interval mass transit facilities within the Dis-
trict continued to deteriorate while the public need for
such facilities became unprecedented as the result of
the promulgation of stringent federal air pollution
regulations designed to reduce automobile usage and
the emergence of an energy crisis which threatened
the entire system of private automobile transporta-
tion in the two States.” A106-A107 (footnotes
omitted).
The Superior Court’s first conclusion, that the Port
Authority’s ability to absorb deficits has greatly increased,
is simply inaccurate. Its second conclusion, that mass tran-
sit facilities would decline while public need increased, was
fully contemplated in 1962.
While the Port Authority’s revenues greatly increased
in the 1960’s and early 1970’s so did its expenses and reserve
requirements, so much that the actual surplus revenues of
the Port Authority in excess of mandated reserves in-
creased only $2,718,000 in the 13 years from the enactment
of the Covenant 0 its retroactive repeal, while, during the
same period, the principal amount of outstanding Con-
solidated Bonds increased from approximately $690,000,000
to over $1,600,000,000.
The alleged improvement in the Port Authority’s finan-
cial position cannot justify repeal of the Covenant, even if
it existed. If it could, then any contractual undertaking
with bondholders, if effective in contributing to an improve-
ment in the obligor’s financial well-being, would be subject
to arbitrary cancellation. Surely it takes more to justify
the State in abrogating its promise!
The pressing need for rail mass transit facilities in the
Port District was the very reason the Covenant was
22
enacted—to enable the Port Authority to take over the
destitute Hudson & Manhattan, while maintaining investor
confidence in light of the certainty that rail mass transit
systems would continue to decline financially. .
The Superior Court based primary reliance on this
Court’s decision in City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S.
497 (1965). Bl Paso, a case dealing with squatters’ rights
in Texas, is clearly distinguishable.
Briefly stated, the facts in El Paso were as follows: In
1910, the State of Texas sold public land to plaintiff’s pre-
decessor in title in accordance with a State policy of selling
such lands to raise funds for publie schools. The purchase
money mortgage contract was extremely favorable to the
purchaser and, in practice, the time for payment of prin-
cipal was periodically extended and, in fact, was never
called due. The State retained a right of forfeiture if the
owner failed to pay interest, but the owner or his vendees
were entitled to reinstatement, provided no rights of third
persons had intervened. The right to reinstatement was
therefore defeasible and the State always had pursued a
policy of quick resale of the forfeited lands to a third party,
thus cutting off the right to reinstatement. In 1941, legis-
lation was enacted providing that the right of reinstatement
had to be exercised within five vears from the date of for-
feiture or the effective date of the act, whichever was later.
Plaintiff, who filed his application for reinstatement more
than five years after the date of forfeiture, filed suit to
determine title to the land, claiming that the 1941 legislation
violated the Contract Clause.
The narrow exception to the rule that a State may not
repudiate its contractual undertakings which was estab-
lished in El Paso has no application to the repeal of the
1962 Covenant. Unlike Hl Paso, here the State has many
a
Ot a eh _
ee ee
—_—
_—
_—
alternatives*® to deal directly or indirectly with the require-
ments for commuter rail mass transit. Here the repudiated
obligation was in fact a substantial inducement to private
investors lending their funds to an agency of the State.
To argue whether it was “a primary inducement” is to
quibble. Suffice it to say that it was a sine qua non of the
purchase by the bondholders of these particular Consoli-
dated Bonds. Here the investors reasonably expected the
State’s obligation to endure until their bonds were satisfied.
Here, rather than the dramatic change in circumstances
present in El Paso, the very danger foreseen in 1962 and
sought to be protected against by the Covenant came to
pass. Here, unlike El Paso, if any unforeseen or unex-
pected benefits have been conferred they have been con-
ferred on the State. In 1962, it was expected that the Port
Authority would be taking off the States’ hands in the
future deficits for operating the old Hudson & Manhattan
in an amount which would level off at $6,575,000 annually.
In fact, those deficits now exceed $35,000,000 annually, and
the States refuse to remedy the situation through fare
increases. Here, unlike El Paso, the bondholders’ contract
has been totally cancelled rather than modified by some
reasonable adjustment in its terms. In marked contrast,
when the terms of the Triborough Bridge Authority bonds
were changed to benefit mass transit, the bondholders were
* Several obvious alternatives are: to guarantee an issue of Port
Authority bonds for mass transit purposes; to allow the Port
Authority to increase PATH fares to competitive levels, thus free-
ing more funds for railroad purposes under the Covenant’s formula;
to issue State bonds and simply utilize the Port Authority’s oper-
ating expertise; or to refund outstanding bonds protected by the
Covenant and secure bondholder consent under those issues not
yet refundable. These ulternatives demonstrate that this case does
not involve any lofty governmental purpose. Rather, it involves
money, and only money, a desire by the State to further lessen
government expenditures. This has never been sufficient to justify
the cancellation of a State’s contract. E.g., Lynch v. United States,
292 U.S. 571, 580 (1934).
24
consulted and consented to the change after obtaining an
increase in the interest rate. El Paso, therefore, is dis-
tinguishable from this case upon every ground on which
that decision was based. This case presents the clearest
example of an unconstitutional impairment of contract and
a taking of bondholders’ property without just compensa-
tion and without due process of law.
Conclusion
This Court should reverse the judgment of the Supreme
Court of New Jersey or, in the alternative, note probable
jurisdiction of the appeal and, if the Court deems it appro-
priate, order the appeal deferred pending resolution of the
related action in New York.
Respectfully submitted,
DevEREUX MILBURN
Ropert A. McTAMANEY
Rosert B. Meyner
Attorneys for Appellant
Of Cownsel:
Carter, Lepyarp & MiLpuRN
Two Wall Street
New York, New York 10005
(212) 732-3200
Meyner, Lanpis & VeRDON
Gateway I
Newark, New Jersey 07102
(201) 624-2800
APPENDIX A
Decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey
UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK. AS
TRUSTEE FOR THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK
AND NEW JERSEY CONSOLIDATED BONDS, FORTIETH
AND FQRTY-FIRST SERIES; ON ITS OWN BEHALF
AND ON BEHALF OF ALL HOLDERS OF CONSO) .DATED
BONDS OF THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK
AND NEW JERSEY AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SIT-
UATED, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT-CROSS-RESPONDENT,
v. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY; BRENDAN T. BYRNE,
GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY; AND
WILLIAM F. HYLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANTS-RESPON-
DENTS-CROSS-APPELLANTS.
DANIEL M. GABY, PLAINTIFF-CROSS-APPELLANT, v. THE
PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY, JAMES C. KELLOGG.
Ili, HOYT AMMIDON, GUSTAVE L. LEVY, JAMES G.
HELLMUTH, ANDREW C. AXTELL, WILLIAM J. RONAN,
W. PAUL STILLMAN, WALTER H. JONES, BERNARD J.
LASKER, PHILIP B. HOFFMAN, AND JERRY FINKEL-
STEIN, COMMISSIONERS OF THE PORT OF NEW YORK
AUTHORITY, AUSTIN J. TOBIN, EXECUTIVE DIREC-
TOR OF THE PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY, AND
WILLIAM T. CAHILL, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF
NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANTS-CROSS-RESPONDENTS,
AND UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW
YORK, ETC., INTERVENOR.
Argued October 7, 1975—Decided February 25, 1976.
SYNOPSIS
Class action on behalf of citizens, residents and taxpayers
whose occupations were dependent upon the existence of mass
transportation was brought against Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey challenging constitutionality of cove-
nant between the States of New Jersey and New York on one
hand and the holders of bonds issued by the Port Authority
on the other hand with respect to the use io which certain
revenues were to be put. After the covenant was repealed by
New Jersey Legislature, trustee for the bonds brought action
challenging the constitutionality of the repealing statute.
The Superior Court, Law Division, 134 N. J. Super. 124,
upheld the constitutionality of the repealer and dismissed the
class action and the parties appealed. The Supreme Court
held that compact which created the Port Authority em-
powered, but did not mandate, the Authority to develop a
plan for a particular kind of method of transportation ; and
that, since the Authority had exercised its discretion by re-
jecting a policy favoring mass transportation, mandamus did
not lie to compel the Authority to develop a plan for mass
transit even though, by virtue of repeal of the covenant, it
had the funds to do so.
Affirmed.
Pashman, J., concurred in part and dissented in part and
filed an opinion.
Mr. Robert B. Meyner and Mr. Devereux Milburn, of the
New York bar, argued the cause for appellant-cross-respon-
dent-intervenor United States Trust Company (Messrs.
Meyner, Landis and Verdon, and Messrs. Carter,
Ledyard and Milburn and Hawl:ins, Delafield and Wood.
of the New York bar, attorneys; Mr. Meyner, Mr. Milburn,
and Mr. Donald J. Robinson, of the New York bar. on the
brief and of counsel).
Mr, Murray J. Laulicht and Mr. Michael I. Sovern, ot the
New York bar, Special Counsel to the Attorney General. ar-
gued the cause for respondents-cross-appellants State of New
Jersey, Brendan T. Byrne and William F. Hyland (Jr.
William FP. Hyland, Attorney General of New Jersey. at-
torney; Mr. Laulicht, Mr. Sovern and Mr. Harold Eagar,
of the New York bar, Special Counsel to the Attorney Gen-
eral, on the brief).
Mr. Howard Stern argued the cause for plaintiff-cross-ap-
pellant Daniel M. Gaby (Messrs. Shavick, Stern, Schotz,
Steiger and Croland, attorneys; Mr. Stern on the brief.
Mr. Stern and Mr. Theodore-W. Kheel of the New York
bar and Messrs. Battle, Fowler, Stokes and Kheel of the New
York bar, of counsel). |
A4
Mr. Francis A. Mulhern argued the cause fot eross-re-
spondent The Port Authority of New York and Newwéerscy,
et al. (Mr. Mulhern, attorney and on the brief; Mr. ‘Patrick
J. Falvey of the New York’ bar, Mr. Joseph Lesser of the
New York bar, Ms. Isobel E. Muirhead, Mr. Arthur P. Berg
of the New York bar, and Mr. Vigdor D. Bernstein, of
counsel! ).
Per Curiam. The judgment is affirmed, substantially for
the reasons set forth in the opinion of Judge Gelman, 134
N. J. Super. 124 (Law Div. 1975). The observations which
follow are occasioned by Justice Pashman’s suggested remedy
in the Gaby suit.’
Whatever persuasive force might be accorded the argument
that as a matter’of policy the Port Authority should devote
more of its energies and resources to the mass transit field,
the fact remains that the remedy fashioned by our Brother is
neither pressed for by Gaby on this appeal nor within the
powers of this Court to direct and enforce.
Gaby’s class action complaint for a declaratory judgment
that the 1962 Covenant was unconstitutional asked for “multi-
farious relief,” including a request that the Port Authority
be directed “to formulate and submit to the court a plan
for the development of mass transit facilities within the
Port District,” 134 N. J. Super. at 131. However, the trial
judge, having concluded in the United States Trust Co. suit
that “the repeal legislation was a reasonable and hence valid
exercise of the states’ police power which is not prohibited
by the Contract Clause of either the Federal or the State Con-
stitution,” id. at 197, found it unnecessary to reach the issue
of the 1962 Covenant’s asserted invalidity. He therefore dis-
iJustice Pashman would order the Port Authority to complete
pending projects and to “formulate and
tions for a regional mass transportation scheme to
of New York and New Jersey * * * in an expeditious fashion and
within a fixed period of time.” Post at 288.
BEST COPY AVAILABLE
A5
- Missed Gaby’s complaint, id. at 198, without discussing the re-
quested relief of a direction for development of a mass transit .
plan, on which issue there was neither testimony nor argu-
ment at the trial level.
In his brief filed in the Court after direct certification of his
appeal, 68 V. J. 175 (1975), Gaby conceded his limited pur-
pose in pursuing the appeal as being “to preserve the issue of
the constitutionality of the 1962 Covenant.” The point of this
in turn was, as he put it, to furnish “an alternative ground for
affirming the decision below.”? Whatever issues may have been
preserved by his appeal and whatever desire there may have
been to present “all the issues,” the fact remains that Gaby’s
brief raises and discusses only the validity of the Covenant in
constitutional terms. No argument is made there for any
special relief; and, understandably, the Port Authority has
likewise not briefed the question at all iu this Court. At oral
argument the subject was adverted to only in a limited fash-
ion.
Ordinarily, we would have no occasion to decide an issue .
which, while portentous in itself, has become so remote and
peripheral to the central thrust of this litigation. However,
inasmuch as the minority opinion raises and discusses in ez-
tenso this question of considerable public significance, namely,
the involvement of the Port Authority in mass transit and
particularly the propriety of this Court ordering as a specific
remedy the submission of a plan for development of mass
transit facilities, we overlook whatever infirmities may exist
in the record before us, compounded by the practical disad-
vantage of not having the views of the parties, and proceed to
address the point. 4
[1] The 1921 Compact between the States of New York
and New Jersey, whereby the Port Authority was ‘created,
N. J. 8. A. 32:1-4, envisioned the adoption of a Compre-
hensive Plan for the development of the port. N. J. 9. A.
~~. Motion for Certification of Plaintiff-Respondent, Daniel
. Gaby.
A6
32:1-11. Direction was given to the Port Authority in the
Plan itself “to proceed with the development of the nort of
New York in accordance with said comprehensive plan * * *.”
N. J. 8. A. 32:1-33. That the Authority’s involvement in
transportation matters was contemplated is obvious from a
reading of this and other portions of the Comprehensive Plan
as well as of the Compact; but it requires a quantum leap
to derive therefrom a mandate (as distinguished from the
power) to develop a plan for a particular kind or method of
transportation, to wit, mass transit. It is not without sig-
nificance, for instance, that the legislature has provided that
the Authority may make recommendations for the increase
and improvement of transportation facilities, N. J. S. A.
32 :1-13, which by definition includes railroads and any fa-
cility for the “transportation or carriage of persons or prop-
erty,” NV. J. S. A. 32:1-23; but nowhere is it mandated that
such recommendations be made. A mandate such as that
contemplated by the minority opinion is not something to be
inferred by the courts but rather is a singularly appropriate
subject for specific legislative directive, conspicuously absent
here. Cf. Del. Riv. & Bay Auth. v. N. J. Pub. Emp. Rel.
Comm’n., 112 N. J. Super. 160, 165 (App. Div. 1970), aff’d
o. b., 58 N. J. 388 (1971). 5
If, then, the Authority is in the position of being em-
powered (as we acknowledge) rather than mandated to act in
the area of mass transit, its exercise of that power becomes
a matter of discretion and judgment. As is made abundantly
clear by the voluminous record in this case, the trial court’s
opinion, and the concurring and partially dissenting opinion
here, the Authority has more than once in recent years
broached the question of whether it should pursue a policy
of encouraging mass transit and has determined that it shall
not. The remedy suggested in the minority opinion is de-
signed to overrule that decision. As such it is in the nature of
the former prerogative writ of mandamus, now invocable un-
der proceedings for relief in lieu of prerogative writs, Rule
4:69.
AZ
[2,3] However, mandamus will not lie if the duty to act
is a discretionary one and the discretion has been exercised.
As Justice Heher explained, in Switz v. Middletown Twp.,
23 N. J. 580 (1957), mandamus is “a coercive process that
commands the performance of a specific ministerial act or
duty, or compels the exercise of a discretionary function,
‘but does not seek to interfere with or control the mode and
manner of its exercise or to influence or direct a particular
result.” 23 N. J. at 587. © we have sought to demon-
strate, the circumstances before us do not at all invite or
accommodate the remedy proposed. This is so because the
Authority (whose function is clearly not ministerial) has in
fact exercised its discretion, even though that exercise has
resulted in the rejection of a policy favoring mass trans-
portation. Being a judgment decision its wisdom may be
‘open to dispute; but as to the propriety of this Court’s re-
fusal to intrude on the underlying policy determination.
there can be no question in the circumstances before us.
And this not as a response to some procedural deficiency
but because of our respect for the fundamental substantive
principle embodied in mandamus.
Finally, we observe that in this particular area of bi-
state operations, there is close and continuing supervision
of the Port Authority by the other branches of government.
Hence, the proposed remedy would not only tend to usurp
the influence over the Authority vested in the Governors of
the States of New York and New Jersey, but would also in-
trude upon the functions of the legislatures of the respec-
tive States, whose task it is in the final analysis to enact
appropriate legislation and take such other action as may
be required to remedy whatever deficiencies may exist with
respect to mass transit.
Affirmed.
PasHMAN, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
:
A8
I
INTRODUCTION TO GABY COMPLAINT
My Brothers today affirm a lower court decision which was
the product of two separate and distinct actions consolidated
for trial. United States Trust Co. v. State, 134 N. J. Super.
124 (Law Div. 1975). In the first action, brought by plain-
tiff United States Trust Company, the trial court sustained
the State’s repeal of the 1962 statutory covenant (N. J.
S. A. 32:1-35.55) between the States of New Jersey and
New York and the holders of bonds issued by the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey (Port Authority).
That covenant was concurrently enacted by the legislatures
of New York and New Jersey at the time of the Port Au-
thority’s acquisition of the Hudson & Manhattan Railroad
Company (H & M), since renamed the Port Authority
Trans-Hudson System (PATH). Intended as a means of
protecting the bondholders’ investments, the covenant pro-
hibited the states and the Port Authority from applying
“any of the rentals, tolls, fares, fees, charges, revenues or
reserves, . . . for any railroad purposes whatsoever other
than permitted purposes.” N. J. 8S. A. 32:1-35.55. As sub-
sequently defined in ~* covenant, “permitted purposes”
precluded the establix at, acquisition or construction of
any railroad facility until the Port Authority could deter-
mine that the facility would be self-supporting or would not
produce deficits except within narrowly defined limits.
In dismissing plaintiff’s cause of action, the trial court
found that the 1974 “repealer,” N. J. S. A. 32:1-35.55a,
was immune from constitutional challenge as an impairment
of contractual obligation, a right which is protected by
U.S. Const., Art. 1, § X and N. J. Const. (1947), Art. IV,
§ VII, © 3. he a collateral finding, the court determined that
' the attractiveness of Port Authority bonds was not contingent
upon the continued protection of the 1962 covenant, but
rather upon the viability of the Port Authority itself.
Ad
The majority affirms the trial court on these bases and
to this extent, I concur fully and completely with the con-
clusions reached by Judge Gelman in his very enlightened
and comprehensive opinion. My agreement is premised on.
the unduly restrictive influence which the covenant exerted
on Port Authority operations in contravention of the
statutory mandates upon which that agency was created in
1921. The paralytic effect of the covenant could be seen in
_ the Authority’s practical inability and attitudinal reluctance
to‘ respond to the mounting.needs for rapid transit in the
New York metropolitan area. In light of the limited util-
ity which it continued to serve, the 1962 covenant repre-
sented an artificial obstacle to the affirmative public action
which was necessitated as an alternative to continued and
wasteful reliance solely on the private automobile as the
primary mode of transportation. ‘
The second action, Gaby v. Port of New York Authority,
et al., was likewise concerned with the repeal of the 1962
covenant, Expanded into a class action on behalf of citizens,
residents and taxpayers whose occupations are dependent
upon the existence of mass transportation, plaintiff cites the
1962 covenant as .an impediment to the improvement and
expansion of these facilities. While the State of New Jersey
sought the repeal of the covenant as an ultimate end in the
(United States Trust Co. action, plaintiff Gaby visualizes a
repeal as merely a means to a larger end. This is because
the vindication of Gaby’s interests is only partially depen-
dent on freeing the financial resources from the restrictions
of the 1962 covenant and placing them at the Port Author-
ity’s disposal. More problematical and essential to the relief
which he desires is the necessity to overcome the adminis-
. trative inertia which has characterized the agency’s efforts
in the area of mass transportation. Consequently, Gaby re-
quested in his complaint that the trial court:
. . . [Direct and’ order the Port Authority, its Commissioners,
and its Executive Director to formulate and submit to this Court,
or a Special Master to be appointed by this Court, a plan for the
A10
development of mass transportation facilities in the Port District.
. [Plaintiff Gaby’s complaint at 17]
This action was pretried on February 22, 1973 and oral
arguments were heard on September 26, 1973 on the par-
ties’ respective motions for summary judgment. Judgment
was deferred and arguments were later rescheduled to per-
mit the submission of briefs on additional issues and the
intervention of United States Trust Company as a party
defendant representing the interests of Port Authority bond-
holders. Prior to these arguments, the pendency of legisla-
tion repealing the covenant recommended that the trial court
withhold further review. Accordingly, the proceedings were
stayed to permit consideration of the anticipated legislation.
The statutory repealer which was signed into law by Gov-
ernor Brendan T. Byrne on April 30, 1974 precipitated the
United States Trust Co. action, which was instituted on the
same day. On the basis of common subject matter, this later
action was consolidated on December 10, 1974 with the
previously filed Gaby case by order of the trial court. These
matters then proceeded to trial in February 1975.
The trial was largely confined to the factual issues of
bondholder reliance on the 1962 covenant and resultént dam-
age to the secondary bond market caused by the repeal of the
covenant. The information which was thus elicited formed
the basis for the trial court’s reported opinion, 134 N. J.
Super. 124, in which the constitutionality of the 1974 re-
pealer was sustained. Although reasons upon which the
court’s decision was grounded were clearly distinguishable
from the constitutional arguments advanced by Gaby, the
court’s ultimate decision — the rejection of the 1962
covenant — coincided with Gaby’s interests. Regardless of
whether that result was achieved by sustaining the 1974 re-
pealer as the trial court did, or whether it was achieved by
tinding the 1962 covenant itself unconstitutional as sug-
gested by Gaby, the result indicated the possibility of grant-
ing the further relief sought by Gaby. A more activist role
All
for the Port Authority appeared to be a reality. Nonetheless,
the court concurrently ordered the dismissal of Gaby’s com-
plaint, thus frustrating the additional relief which he sought.
134 N. J. Super. at 198. From this disposition, Gaby filed
a cross-motion for direct certification which was granted on
May 28, 1975. 68 N. J. 175 (1975).
Similar to his presentation before the trial court, Gaby’s
arguments are again directed towards a declaration df the
unconstitutionality of the 1962 covenant. This is more the
result of strategic considerations, however, than devotion to
substantive principle. Recognizing the limited nature of the
trial court’s factual findings and disposition, Gaby has
taken what appears to be a most advisable legal ¢ »rse. By
preserving the issue of the constitutionality of tne 1962
covenant on appeal, he has simultaneously preserved one of
his major contentions should this or any other court reverse
the trial court on the constitutionality of the 1974 repealer.
Furthermore, in his Supreme Court brief, Gaby explained
that his contentions with regard to the 1962 Covenant are
inextricably tied to his request for greater involvement of
the Port Authority in mass transit projects:
The Appellant’s Brief of Gaby is concerned with the validity of
the 1962 Covenant (N- J. 8. A. 32:1-35.50 et seq.). Central to
the issue of the validity of the Covenant is the question whether
the mass transportation of people within the Port District was one
of the principal activities aythorized by the Compact (N. J. S. A.
32 :1—35.50 et seq.) ; whether the insulation of the Port Authority
from that activity was in such derogation of the Compact as to
frustrate its meaning and intent and so material as to require Con-
gressional approval. [Plaintiff-Cross Appellant’s brief at 3].
The majority today chooses to overlook this relationship
in its reluctance to transcend the judgmental confines of
the trial court and in its affirmation of that court’s dis-
missal of Gaby’s complaint. This disposition, undertaken in
an unusually cavalier fashion, is not a product of some mis-
understanding as to the essential relief which Gaby requests.
On the contrary, the majority recognizes the strategic con-
A12
siderations implicit in Gaby’s desire to preserve the issue
of the constitutionality of the 1962 Covenant. Ante (at
261). Nonetheless, in characterizing the constitutional argu-
ments raised by Gaby as exemplifying a “limited purpose
in pursuing the appeal,” the majority misconstrues and
frustrates the true interests of Gaby, and has done so in @
manner which I find most distressing.
The majority justifies its truncated consideration of Gaby’s
plea by referring to an isolated phrase, taken out of context
from a sentence which Gaby adopted as representative of -
his position in his cross-motion for certification. When more
appropriately considered within the sentence in which it
originally appeared, the phrase — “an alternative ground
for affirming the decision below” — assumes an entirely dif-
ferent meaning from that which the majority attaches to it:
‘The purposes of this cross motion are identical with those stated
by the State of New Jersey in its cross motion for certification:
“ . . bring before the Supreme Court all of the issues submitted
to Judge Gelman and to avoid the possibility that some of the issues
submitted to Judge Gelman might have to be determined in the first
instance by the Appellate Division. Because of the urgency and
public importance of this case, it would be most unwise to require
a .piecemeal, appellate process, particularly since the [first] issue
presented by this cross motion could be an alternative ground for
affirming the decision below. . . .” [Plaintiff-cross appellant’s ap-
pendix at 47a-48a; emphasis supplied).
While the “first issue” refers to the constitutionality of the
1962 covenant, I believe it would be wrong to confuse Gaby’s
real interest in stimulating improvement of urban mass
transportation with his more temporal interest in having the
1962 covenant declared unconstitutional. The majority not
only fails to make this distinction, but fails to do so despite
Gaby’s expressed desire to present “all of the issues” to this
Court.
This failure is only compounded by the majority’s persistent
willingness to ignore the Gaby complaint and the relief which
it warrants. In spite of plaintiff’s overindulgent concern for
the constitutionality issue, the statement of his case reflects
Al3
more than a limited and perfunctory reference to the subject.
During the course of oral argument, counsel for Gaby spe-
cifically stated: oi ii
Yes, as we read the compact between the states, the affirmative
obligation of the Port Authority in this area is to plan. The imme-
diate affirmative obligation . . . and indeed in these b and else-
where, there is a suggestion that if the Covenant’ is in or the
repealer upheld, either way, that it would be appropriate for the
Court to direct the Port Authority to study mass transit needs in
the Port Authority area and make proper proposals. Then wien
it comes to implementation, then you're talking about legislation
of the two states, but the affirmative obligation of the Port Au-
thority is to study the problem as it affects the Port area.
It should be noted in passing, that this statement not only
affirms the relief desired by plaintiff, but also embodies a re-
quest for a remedy which parallels that which I suggest be-
low, infra at 287-288. |
Therefore, although my Brothers remove the constricting
fiscal shackles of the 1962 covenant, they fail to take the
additional steps which flow as natural concomitants to the
action which they affirm. This failure, as I see it, stems, in
part, from a reluctance to go farther and faster in an area
plagued by administrative inaction and intransigence. It also
constitutes an indulgence in the meaningless gesture of sus-
taining the 1974 repealer without concurrently authorizing
the relief needed to implement the initiative which the Legis-
lature sought to instill in the Port Authority by that repeal.
As I fear, the administrative foot-dragging which was im-
plicit in the 1962‘covenant, may be only symptomatic of the
inertia which has characterized the Port Authority in the
field of mass transit operations. The majority’s decision can
only serve to perpetuate this sad state of affairs. |
In light of the rapidly deteriorating condition of mas«
transit operations in the metropolitan area, this disposition
is most unfortunate. Faced with the ever-increasing deficits
which are inherent in this mode of public transportation, mass
transit operations have been repeatedly shunned by the Port
Al4
Authority in spite of its statutory mandate to the contrary.
As cutbacks in service have been experienced throughout the
Port District; the commuters’ resort to the private automobile
has produced a dysfunctional, volume of. traffic congestion
and pollution. The toll which this congestion has exacted
has been obvious in the tunnels and on the bridges, whose op-
erations &e Port Authority apparently prefers to maintain.
Unlike today’s majority, I am unwilling to assign plaintiff
Gaby’s case to death or to a peaceful somnambulism. This is
particularly so wheré within the historical and evidential ma-
terials presented to the trial court reside the seeds for a more
sweeping and effective disposition. I cannot sanction the mere
repeal of the 1962 covenant without a concurrent assurance
that the Port Authority will assume those responsibilities for
which it was created and, which to this point, it has effectively
avoided. The recalcitrance of the Port Authority. has not been
‘altered by the trial court’s disposition and will not be altered
by merely affirming that decision. A more effective disposition
is needed. :
I[
HISTORY OF THE OBLIGATION OF THE PORT
- AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE MASS TRANSIT
FACILITIES
In its opinion, the majority grudgingly acknowledges the
Port Authority’s obligation to become involved in mass trans-
portation. After a perfunctory reading of the statutory frame-
work of the Port Authority, the majority concludes that the
existence of such a mandate is “a singularly appropriate sub-
ject for specific legislative directive, conspicuously absent
here.” (At 258). 7
While specific statutory directives have served as vehicles
for recent Port Authority projects, NV. J. S. A. 32:1-35.20
(authorization for the Port Authority to undertake mass
transportation projects to link the various Airports in the
Port District), NV. J. S. A. 32:1-35.21 -fauthorization to
Al5
build railroad lines to and facilities at the various airports in
the Port District), its employment is in its infancy and
affords no insight as to the previously reluctant forays which
the Port Authority has made into the field of mass trans-
portation. A full consideration of the statutory basis of the
Port Authority and the history of its implementation reveals
that the majority’s interpretation of the Authority’s powers
and obligations is both short-sighted and erroneous. For
instance, the statutory creation of the Port Authority evinces
a clear legislative intent to have the Authority become in-
volved in development of mass transportation. The majority
position misconceives the role of the Authority to be a drone-
like entity ultimately dependent upon enabling legislation, ra-
ther than a separate bi-state agency. Similarly, the majority
fails to recognize the inherent limitations on the knowledge,
information and expertise which are at the disposal of the
New Jersey and New York Legislatures on the subject of mass
transit operations. In light of this fact, the wisdom of relying
upon legislative directives to address the panoply of needs
within the field of mass transportation ‘becomes problematical.
The failure of the majority to account for these factors casts
a large shadow upon the validity of its construction of the
Port Autho ity’s powers. These inadequacies within the ma-
jority position become apparent upon thorough consideration
of the statutory origins of the Port Authority and the man-
date which was encompassed in its original Compact and Com-
prehensive Plan.
| A. Origins and Early Development ;
Compact and Comprehensive Plan
The Port Authority is a statutory product of a compact
which was entered into by the States of New Jersey and New
York in 1921.! Modeled after the recommendations of a joint
1New Jersey approved the compact by L. 1921, c. 151, now con-
tained in NW. J. 8. A. 32:1-1 et seg. The comparable New York
_Al16
commiasion,? the Port Authority represented a response to, the
dysfunctional competition and commercial disputes which his-
torically had plagued the two states.* As such, it was intended
to meet the needs and interests which the two states shared
with respect to the Port of New York. This was expressly
recognized in the preamble to the 1921 Compact, which stated :
The future development of such terminal, transportation and other
facilities of commerce will require the expenditure of large sums
legislation was adopted in Laws of New York 1921, c. 154, now con-
tained in N. Y¥. Unconsol. Laws, § 6401 et seg. (McKinney 1961).
Congressional consent to the compact was granted by Pub. Res.
No. 17, 8S. J. Res. 88, o. 77, 42 Stat. 174.
At the time of creation, the agency was designated “The Port
of New York Authority.” N. J. 8. A. 82:1-4. This was amended by
L. 1972, c. 69, $§ 1, 2, contained in N. J. 8. A. 32:1-4 and 32:1-4.1,
to the more ecumenical “The Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey.” For the purposes of this opinion, the agency shall
be referred to as the Port Authority or just Authority.
2The New York, New Jersey Port and Harbor Development Com-
mission was a body whose representative membership were created
by independent, though concurrently enacted bills which were passed
by the Legislatures of New Jersey and New York in 1917. Composed
of three commissioners from each state, the commission issued a
preliminary report in 1918, New York, New Jersey Port and Harbor
Development Comm'n, Preliminary Joint Report, Tranemitted to the
Legislature, February 18, 1918 (1918). This was followed by a prog-
ress report in 1919, and a comprehensive report in 1920, in which.
the commission proposed te establishment of a permanent body
with interstate jurisdiction. Joint Report with Comprehenswe Plan
and Recommendations (1920). It subsequently submitted the ten-
tative draft of the proposed compact. See Bard, The Port of New
York Authority, 24-34 (1942).
In the Matter of Devoe Mfg. Co., 108 U. 8. 401, 406-10, 2 8. Ct.
894, 27 L. Ed. 764 (1883) j-State v. Babcock, 30 N. J. L. 28 (Sup.
Ct. 1862); Central RR. of N. J. v. Jersey City, 70 N. J. L. 81
(1903), a concise presentation of its history may be found in
Bard, supra, footnote 2, at 5-24.
Al7
of money, and the cordial co-operation of the states of New York
and New Jersey in the encouragement of the investment of capital,
and in the formulation and execution of the necessary physical
plans... . (N. J. 8. A. 32:1-1]
While the Compact delineated the framework for the Port
Authority and its operations, the necessity for a more specific
impl~mentation was recognized in Article X, which directed
the state legislatures to adopt “a plan or plans for the compre-
hensive development of the port of New York” “as soon as
may be practicable.” N. J. 8S. A. 32:1-11. The formulation
of this plan was undertaken by the Authority’s initial board
of commissioners, whose Report with Plan for the Comprehen-
sive Development of the Port of New York, December 21,
1921 (1921) was eventually enacted as the Comprehensive
Plan mandated by the Compact.*
This plan envisioned an active and affirmative role for the
Port Authority in the development of the Port District.5 Sec-
tion 8 of the Comprehensive Plan provided :
-
The Port of New York Authority is hereby authorized and directed
to proceed with the development of the port of New York in accord-
ance with said comprehensive plan as rapidly as may be economically
practicable and is hereby vested with all necessary and appropriate
powers not inconsistent with the constitution of the United States
or of either state, to effectuate the same, except the power to levy
taxes or assessments. [N. J. S. A. 32:1-33; emphasis supplied]
That fulfillment of this statutory mandate contemplated the
involvement of the Port Authority in transportation matters
of the Port District is undeniable. This responsibility, for
4The Comprehensive Plan was enacted in L. 1922, c. 9, now con-
tained in N. J. 8. A. 32:1-25 et seq. New York approved the Com-
prehensive Plan in Laws of New York 1922, c. 43, now found in
N. Y. Unconsol. Laws § 6451-68 (McKinney (1961)). Congressional
— was secured in 8. J. Res. of July 1, 1922, c. 277, 42 Stat.
5The metes and bounds of the Port District are defined in N. J.
8. A. 32:1-3.
Al8
example, was explicitly mentioned in that portion of the pre-
amble of the Compact cited above. Article XXII of the Com-
pact further clarifies this responsibility by defining “trans-
portation facility” as including:
. . . railroads, steam or electric, motor truck or other street or
highway vehicleg, tunnels, bridges, boats, ferries, carfloats, lighters,
tugs, floating elevators, barges, scows or harbor craft of any kind,
aircraft suitable for harbor service, and every kind of transportation
facility now in use or hereafter designed for use for the transporta-
tion or carriage of persons or property. [N. J. 8. A. 32 :1-23; em-
phasis supplied]
The centrality of the railroads to the organizational and co-
ordination schemes of the Port Authority was highlighted by
the separate definition of “railroads.” This was a reflection of
the final report by the New York, New Jersey Port and Har-
bor Development Commission, which in 1920 had recom-
mended the establishment of a bi-state agency with appropri-
ate jurisdiction. See footnote 2, supra. The report, whose
factual findings served as the basis for the Compact and the
Comprehensive Plan, found the commercial inadequacies
of the metropolitan area to be “primarily a railroad problem.”
The absence of railroad coordination and accessibility at many
places within the district consequently required “essentially
a railroad plan.” The Commission summarized its suggestions
in a proposal which entailed the establishment of railroad belt-
line systems between New Jersey and New York, and con-
cluded :
This remodeled terminal railroad system, bringing every railroad
of the Port to every part of the Port, and thus giving every part of
the Port opportunity to develop and to have the economical trans-
6N. J. & A. 82:1-23 provides:
“Railroads” shall include railways, extensions thereof, tunnels,
subways, bridges, elevated structures, tracks, poles, wires, conduits,
powerhouses, substations, lines for the transmission of power, car
barns, shops, yards, sidings, turnouts, switches, stations and ap-
proaches thereto, cars and motive equipment.
Al19
portation service needed for its commercial and industrial growth
and expansion, constitutes the comprehensive plan of the Commis-
sion — the plan which the Commission recommends for formal
adoption by the two states. [New York, New Jersey Port and Har-
bor Development Commission, Joint Report, supra footnote 2, at 3]
This statutory responsibility to develop the transportation
facilities of the Port District, and particularly facilities re-
lating to railroad operations, contained an implicit obligation
to foster passenger transportation service. Although the
Port and Development Commission report concentrated on
the freight shipment needs of the area, it did not preclude a
comparable role for the Port Authority in passenger service.
With one notable exception, the Port Authority’s role in
passenger service is confirmed by the early history of the
agency. In this regard, however, even that exception, the
1928 veto message of Governor Alfred E. Smith of New York
which rejected a New Jersey proposal for the development
of a rapid transit system between the states, may be no
more than a personal predilection. 7 See 134 N. J. Super. at
149. Noting that the Port Authority should “stick to this
program . . .[for] the solution of the great freight distribu-
tion problem,” Governor Smith at no time denied the agency’s
power to deal with passenger service, and only suggested a
reordering of its priorities. More importantly, the position
which he advocated was expressly repudiated by the Port
Authority that same year. In a June 11, 1928 resolution
supporting the continuation of a Suburban Transit Engi-
TGovernor Smith, in what remains the only major statement ques-
tioning a Port Authority role in passenger traffic, remarked:
I am satisfied that the Port Authority should stick to this pro-
gram, and I am entirely unwilling to give my approval to any
measure which at the expense of the solution of the great freight
distribution problem will set the Port Authority off on an entirely
new line of problem connected with the solution of the suburban
passenger problem.
Veto Message, Public Papers of Governor Alfred E. Smith of 1928,
187-88 (1938).
A20
neering Board,® the Port Authority recognized that it had
a responsibility to the metropolitan commuter, based on its
broader duty to develop transportation in the Port District:
The Commissioners of the Port Authority have found in their
studies that no adequate or effective interstate transportation de-
velopment can take place without taking full account of tranepor-
tation of passengers as well as of freight throughout the Port Die-
trict. [Emphasis supplied]
B. Port Authority Involvement in the
Area of Mass Transit ;
Reports, Studies and Legislation.
Concerning Mass Transit
The continuance of its role in mass transportation has
been reaffirmed by the Port Authority from time to. time.
The obligation to provide for passenger service within the
8The Suburban Transit Engineering Board had been created in
response to a Port Authority suggestion in its 1927 Annual Report.
As that report stated:
It is our opinion that, in the long run, the greatest progress will
be attained by having this Engineering Board undertake the re-
sponsibility for the preparation of the engineering section of a
comprehensive suburban transit plan for the entire port district.
The Port of New York Authority, Annual Report for 1927, 56
(Jan. 20, 1928).
Parenthetically, it should be noted that this body was the intended
recipient of the funds which Governor Smith vetoed. The Port of
New York Authority, Annual Report for 1928, 63 (Dec. 31, 1928).
®Annual Report for 1928, supra footnote 8, at 64-66. The Port
Authority answered more directly the fears expressed by Governor
Smith in a subsequent part of its June 11, 1928 resolution:
The Commissioners of the Port Authority are satisfied from the
reports of their staff that continuance of the work of the Suburban
Transit Engineering Board and the participation therein by mem-
bers of the staff of The Port of New York Authority will not at
this time divert any of their efforts away from the effectuation
of the statutory Comprehensive Plan nor from their duties in the
field of protecting the Port nor from any other pending work
of the Port Authority, but on the contrary, the continuance of
such Suburban Transit Engineering Board’s work will facilitate
_ the other work of.the Port Authority. [Jé. at 65)
A21
Compact’s injunction to the Post Authority has not only
been acknowledged by those whose occupations and interests
are related to the transportation field,’® but by ranking mem-
bers of the Port Authority staff as well. For example, the
following colloquy between Assemblyman J. Edward Crabiel
and the Port Authority’s then Executive Director Austin J.
Tobin occurred at a 1958 legislative hearing:
ASSEMBLYMAN CRABIEL: Mr. Tobin, just to clear my mind
on certain key points — I have been reading your report and lis-
tening to your talk — there is no question that, as far as the com-
pact between the two states is concerned, the Legislatures could
direct the Port Authority to do rapid transit and that that would
he within their compact.
MR. TOBIN: Yes sir. There's no question about it. [Hearings
on Assembly Bills No. 16 and 115 and Senate Bill No. 50, supra
footnote 10, Nov. 24, 1958, at 44) (emphasis supplied).
The manifestations of this responsibility have been insig-
nificant such as the separate sections which the Authority
devoted to “Suburban Transit” in its earlier Annual Re-
ports (a practice by the way, which has been resumed since
the Port Authority’s acquisition of the H & M railroad in
1962). See T. W. Kheel & R. J. Kheel, “The Port Author-
ity 1962 Covenant — Bar to Mass Transportation,” 27 Rut-
gers L. Rev. 1, 5( 1973) ; The Port of New York Authority,
Annual Report for 1923, “Commuter Passenger Traffic,”
35-36 (Jan. 19, 1924); Annual Report for 1924, “Conges-
tion of Passenger-Traffic,” 23-24 (Jan. 24, 1925); Amnual
Report for 1929, “Suburban Transit,” 27-28 (Dec. 31,
1930). More indicative, ‘however, of the Port Authority’s
10See Hearings on Assembly Bille No. 16 and 115 and Senate
Bill No. 50 before N. J. Assembly Comm. on Fed. & Interst. Rels.
and Assembly Comm. on Highways, Transp. and Pub. Utilities, Nov.
24, 1958, at 18A (Statement of Augustus 8. Dreier, Counsel, Inter-
Municipal Group for Better Rail Service); Dec. 3, 1968, at 22-A
(Statement of Herman T. Stichman, Trustee, Hudson & Manhattan
Railroad) (hereinafter referred to as Assembly Hearings); Caro,
The Power Broker Robert Moses and The Fall of New York, 922-
23 (1974).
A22
role in rapid transit operations have been the infrequent re-
ports which it has issued on this subject.’’ The representa-
tiveness of at least 14 of these reports cannot be premised
on any successful projects which they have stimulated or
realized. As frankly admitted by Edward J. O’Mara, a chair-
man of the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission (a Port
Authority-funded investigative agency which itself produced
an unsuccessful series of legislative proposals) : ‘
For at least 35 years, there has been a growing public awareness
of the importance of mass transportation in the metropolitan re-
gion in the State of New Jersey. At least 14 more or less exten-
sive studies have been made of the problem by various committees
and commissions. Nothing has ever come of them, and in the mean-
time the problem has been becoming progressively more acute.
[Assembly Hearings, Nov. 24, 1958, at TOA]
See also 2d Hearing before N. J. Sen. Comm’n (Created un-
11These reports have been conducted on a variety of topics and
in conjunction with various other interested organizations. Some,
though by no means all, of these studies have included a continuing
study begun in 1927 of the suburban transit facilities to relieve
traffic congestion in conjunction with a variety of other groups (pur-
sueut to New Jersey legislative authorization, L. 1927, c. 277); a
1937 study entitled “Suburban Transit for Northern New Jersey
(Mar. 1, 1937) concerning interstate and suburban passenger prob-
léms within the Port District and New Jersey in particular (under-
taken pursuant to L. 1936, c. J. Res. No. 6); a continuation of
studies begun in 1937 and the presentation of legislative proposals
for implementing a new transit system (pursuant to L. 1988, ce.
J. Res. No. 1); a 1948 study concerning the development of a rapid
transit system in Northern New Jersey which would link Newark
Airport and New York City (undertaken pursuant to a request by
New Jersey Governor Alfred E. Driscoll) ; 1948 study concerning the
development of a north-south transit line in Hudson County (ini-
tiated at the request of the City of Bayonne); and the creation
in 1952 of the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission to undertake
a comprehensive study of the transit problems of the Port District
(L. 1952, c. 194). By agreement reached in 1955, the Port Authority
provided $800,000 when this last study was inaugurated. The Com-
mission's repert was released in 1958. In addition, the Port Authority
in the early 1960’s conducted a series of studies concerning the
feasibility of its acquiring the operations of the H & M railroad,
and later, the conditions under which the authority would do so.
A23
der Sen. Res. No. 7 (1960) and Reconstituted under Sen. Res.
No. 7 (1961)) to Study the Financial Structure and Opera-
tions of The Port of New York Authority, Jan. 27, 1961 (2d
day), at 64-66 (Statement of Austin J. Tobin, Executive Di-
rector, Port of New York Authority). In this respect, these
studies provide a broad overview of the historic approach of
the Port Authority to the problems of urban mass transit.
This background is particularly important because what the
Court is truly asked to consider is the manner in which
the Port Authority has dealt with the problems of mass tran-
sit in the Port District, and the attitudinal reluctance which
has characterized its efforts in this area of transportation.
These studies, in conjunction with the annual reports which
are issued by the Port Authority, possess several characteris-
tics worth noting. First, virtually none of the studies resulted
from the Port Authority’s own initiative. Most of the studies
were the product of either legislative or other governmental
requests for pertinent information and proposals. See footnote
11, supra. While the failure to take affirmative administrative
or investigatory action may not necessarily be indicative of an
agency’s abdication of responsibility in the case of the Port
Authority, the failing is particularly suspect. This is because
the duties expressly imposed on the Port Authority by the
1921 Compact were those to “make plans for the development
of said district, supplementary to or amendatorv of any plan
theretofore adopted ;”!* and to suggest to the state legislatures
recommended means to improve Port commerce."
12N. J. S. A. 32:1-12, which was contained in the original Com-
pact as Article XI and which is indicative of a statutory mandate,
provides:
The port authority shall from time to time make plans for the
development of said district, supplementary to or amendatory of
any plan theretofore adopted, and when such
proved by the legislatures of the two states, they shall be binding
upon both states with the same force and
porated in this agreement. [Emphasis supplied]
13N. J. 8. A. 32:1-13 provides:
The port authority may from time to time make recommenda-
7
A24
Second, none of these studies contains an expressed com-
mitment (much less a recommendation of such a commit-
ment) by thé Port Authority to undertake the construction or
implementation of a mass transit system. Instead, most of
them recommend the assumption of these obligations by other
governmental or quasi-governmental bodies and agencies. See
The Port of New York Authority, Suburban Transit for
Northern New Jersey, 10 (1937) ; The Port of New York Au-
thority, Annual Report for 1958, 38-42. In conjunction with
this, it should be noted that the Authority was one of the
staunchest supporters of two New Jersey legislative proposals,
S-50 and A-115, which were introduced and discussed in
1958. See Assembly Hearings, supra, Nov. 24, 1958, at 44, 49
(Statements of Austin J. Tobin, Executive Director, Port of
New York Authority). Not surprisingly both of these mea-
sures presented plans for the establishment of an independent
agency to handle matters relating to mass transportation.
Conversely, the Port Authority was strongly opposed to a
companion proposal, A—16, which would have authorized the
agency itself to develop, improve and coordinate the rapid
transit facilities in the Port District. Assembly Hearings,
supra, Nov. 24, 1958, at 18-19 (Statements of Austin J.
Tobin, Executive Director, Port of New York Authority)."
United States, based upon study and analysis, for the better con-
duct of the commerce passing in and through the port of New
York, the increase and improvement of transportation and terminal
facilities therein, and the more economical and expeditious handling
of such commerce.
14On this point, a noted transportation expert, Michael N. Daniel-
son, observed :
A good many people in the New York area, particularly in
New Jersey, could see no point in creating another agency, whether
bi-state or tri-state, as long as the Port of New York Authority
apparently possessed both the jurisdiction and financial capacity
to tackle the regional rail problem. Time and again, the Port
Authority fended off these forays, emphasizing that there was an
“absolute incompatibility between railroad deficits and the PNYS’S
contractual limitations with its bondholders . . . and to confine itself
to self-supporting projects.” [Danielson, Federal-Metropolitan Pol-
itice and the Commuter Crisis, 23 (1965)]. 7
A25
Finally, as previously noted, there has been a startling ab-
sence of tangible progress resulting from, or attributable to
these investigatory efforts. This is true even though the Port
Authority has recognized the commuter problems which beset
the New York metropolitan area. As early as 1925, iu its
Annual Report, the Authority observed:
While hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent in urban
rapid transit during the past decade, no commensurate amounts
have been expended on suburban rapid transit, and the commuter
has reached the limit of his endurance where the trunk lines lead-
ing into New York City are incapable of handling both suburban
and through traffic. The passenger service of every railroad in the
Port District is taxed to its limit by the requirements of this ser-
vice. There is barely room during the rush hours for the trains
carrying freight because of the commuter service, while passengers
and freight must both necessarily move during these hours. [The
hg New York Authority, Annual Report for 1924, 23 (Jan. 24,
See also The Port of New York Authority, Annwal Report
for 1927, 10, 53 (Jan. 20, 1928). Over the years, this
recognition has increased with its realization of the expanding
dimensions of commuter congestion and the inability of
private transit facilities to cope with the problem. The Port
of New York and New Jersey, 1972 Annual Report, 10-15
(1972); 1973 Annual Report, 10-15 (1973); 1974 Annual
Report, 4-6 (1974).
The Port Authority’s ineffectual investigative efforts can-
not be justified due to a theoretical lack of jurisdiction in mass
transit operations. Such jurisdiction was given to the agency
in the Compact of 1921. Nor is the lack of success due to the
financial inability of the Port Authority to assume additional |
obligations. As the triai court found, the Authority is not
only financially sound, but has suffered no detrimental ef-
fects from the repeal of the protective 1962 Covenant:
Suffice it to say that between 1962 and 1974 the security afforded
bondholders had been substantially augmented by a vast increase in
Authority revenues and reserves, and the Authority’s financial ability
to absorb greater deficits, from whatever source and without any
A26
significant impairment of bondholder security, was correspondingly
increased. [134 N. J. Super. at 194-95]
Rather, the limited effectiveness of these studies is mereiy
symptomatic of an underlying limitation which the Port Au-
thority has imposed on its own involvement in mass transpor-
tation. This limitation, which is derived from a narrow
construction of its statutory powers, precludes an undertaking
by the Authority unless the relevant project will be financially
self-supporting, or will only generate deficits within con-
servatively defined limits. While the definition of the limita-
tion is presented in purely financial terms, its effect has
been to severely restrict the scope of activities in which the
agency may engage. Because the majority of mass trans-
portation facilities are closely associated with high deficits,
the practical operation of the Port Authority’s self-imposed
restriction has prevented the Authority from fulfilling its
rapid transit obligations.
C. History of the Self-Supporting Concept
While the provisions of the Compact and Comprehensive
Plan sketched a broad authorization in terms of the activities
which were within jurisdiction of the Port Authority, the
powers accorded to it were not commensurate with its tasks.
Without the necessary power, the Authority could not uni-
laterally support its statutory mandates, much less initiate
action in their behalf:
An impressive body of activities was thus laid out wherein the
Port Authority could formulate the needs of the port as a whole
and be vigilant to protect its interests. It would serve as a focus
and agent of the forces of unity within the port.. The primary re-
quirement in this field would not be legal power but adequate
funds and continuous application. The Port Authority never lacked
support with respect to the former, and was well conceived to
function with respect to the latter. But success along this line of
endeavor would depend upon cooperation from public agencies and
private interests. Where conflicts developed it could make progress
very slowly, if at all. (Bard, supra, footnote 2, at 58-59)
A%7
As a result of setbacks incurred in early legal skirmishes
with the powerful railroads in the 1920’s, the Port Authority
appeared to assume a less assertive role in the port’s develop-
ment than that anticipated by its proponents. Reluctant to
promote otherwise desirable activities within the Port Dis-
trict, the Authority restricted its goals to the dubious task
of maintaining a balanced budget. The difficulty of this ob-
jective was compounded by the fact that under both the Com-
pact and the Comprehensive Plan, the Port Authority had
been denied the power to either levy assessments or pledge
the credit of either state. Annual Report for 195.4, vi (1954).
Consequently, to offset the costs and losses which it incurred,
the agency was dependent upon the revenues which it realized
from its various projects and facilities.
While this new objective in the early years of the Port
Authority was tempered by a “rule of economic practicabil-
ity,” The Port’of New York Authority, Annual Report for
1926, 5 (Jan. 20, 1927), its importance was later elevated
by the increased emphasis placed on self-sufficiency. In
other words, because the fiscal stability of the Port Author-
ity was dependent upon the revenues of its facilities, it was
necessary for all projects to demonstrate their self-support-
ing capacity before the Authority would undertake their im-
plementation. Thus, James C. Kellogg, III, the then Vice-
Chairman of the Port Authority, read from a prepared state-
ment before a Senate Commission in 1960, as follows:
In order that the Port Authority might carry out the tremendous
and continuing task of developing the public terminal and trans-
portation facilities of this metropolitan area, the two Legislatures
clothed it with all necessary and appropriate powers of port and
terminal development, with the important exception of the power
to tax or to levy assessments. This reservation is the key to the
whole concept of the Port Authority, which is that of a self-sup-
porting agency, whose public projects are carried on through the
development of their own revenues and charges, and which im-
poses no burdens on the general taxpayer. [Hearings before N. J.
Sen. Comm'n Created under Sen. Rea. No. 7 (1960) to Study the
Financial Structure and Operations of the Port of New York Awu-
thority, September 27, 1960, 7-8 (Statement of James C. Kellogg,
III, Vice-Chairman of the Port Authority) J.
A28
The objective of a self-supporting authority, while salu- ,
tary in principle, was inconsistent with the Port Authority’s
original objectives and early history. In its annual report
for 1924, the Authority explicitly rejected the self-support-
ing concept as a basis for its operations:
Preferably, and in the main, therefore, the Port Authority regards
itself rather as the guardian and guide of the Port District, protect-
img it against attacks both from within and without, and directing
its activities and developments with a view to procuring the great-
est cooperation of existing agencies, the utmost efficiency and the
minimum of cost. If such is to be its primary function it should not
be erpected to be self-supporting. [The Port of New York Authority,
Annual Report for 1924, 9-10 (Jan. 24, 1925); emphasis supplied]
Moreover, the self-supporting concept as a fundamental pre-
cept of the Port Authority’s financial scheme is belied both
by the projects which it embarked upon after its creation
and by subsequent developments in its financial structure.
‘As the trial court observed, because of the heavy investment
required by these early projects, the Port Authority was
confronted with large deficits from the outset. 134 N. J.
Super. at 140. However, rather than restricting the Author-
ity’s activities, New Jersey and New York encouraged such
projects by advancing funds, transferring control of lucra-
tire facilities (such as the Holland Tunnel) to the Author-
ity, and permitting the Authority to issue “open-ended”.
bonds. This latter device, in particular, helped free the
Port Authority from absolute reliance on self-supporting
projects. By placing all revenues derived from the sale of
open-ended bonds into a common fund, the Port Authority
was able to free deficit operations from the inadequate sales
of their particular bonds. Goldberg, A History of the Port
of New York Authority Financial Structures, 5 (1964).
The pooling of resources not only permitted the Port Au-
thority to finance debt-ridden facilities through those which
were profitable, but simultaneously afforded bondholders a
certain degree of security regardless of the success or failure
of any given project. The open-ended financing of the Port
A29 -
Authority, which was originally introduced in the form of
the General Reserve Fund (N. J. 8. A. 32:1-142), literally,
the pool into which all funds were paid, was later expanded
by the Authority’s adoption of the Consolidated Bond Reso-
lution in 1952. This resolution, which abandoned the prac-
tice of earmarking funds for specific projects, authorized
the issuance of bonds whose revenues would be designated
by the Authority for a given project according to its needs.
As the trial court found, the resolution obviated any further
concern for maintaining the self-supporting concept as a
prerequisite to Port Authority involvement in a project:
With the adoption of the CBR the “self-supporting” facility con-
cept which had governed earlier authority financing ceased to have
the significance previously attached to it; for under the CBR the
Authority’s financial structure is based on a unitary enterprise
concept and al) revenues from all facilities are pooled. Individual
facilities are not financed independently of the rest of the Authority.
The facilities contribute their revenues for debt service on all Auv-
thority bonds uccording to their earning power and without regard
to the amount cf bonds issued for the construction of any par-
ticular facility. [134 N. J. Super. at 143]
Enactments such as the General Reserve Fund and the
Consolidated Bond Resolution created the possibility for the
involvement of the Port Authority in traditionally deficit
operations such as mass transportation. Nonetheless, the
translation of this new financial freedom into practical ac-
tion was not forthcoming from the Port Authority:
That cashbox, so long empty, was full now, thanks to the postwar
traffic boom, . . . the Port Authority’s was worth $700,000,000.
Long on cash, moreover, the Port Authority was short on dreams.
The visionaries who had created it were long gone from its coun-
cils; Julius Henry Cohen had been replaced by money men like
Cullman and Colt and Pope whose eyes were brightened by the
balances in the Authority’s ledgers, not by the potentialities for
improving the common weal that those balances represented. The
purpose for which the Authority had been created — the develop-
ment of an overall transportation system to knit together a great
port — had been lost sight of for years. Plans the Authority had
aplenty, of course, but unrelated plans, plans for individual projects,
joined by no link other than the fact that their construction would
return the agency profit. [Caro, supra, footnote 10, at 922-23]
A30
The resultant program which the Port Authority pursued
represented less of an integrated effort to organize and co-
ordinate the commerce of the port of New York, and more
of an administrative mish-mash with little cohesiveness or
relation to the agency’s statutory mandate. Thus, construc-
tion of a World Trade Center, with little or no relation to
the activities for which the Port Authority was created, was
suddenly elevated to an importance which transcended that
of a more traditionally-regarded responsibility of the Author-
ity such as mass transportation.
The underlying rationale for these actions wés unmis-
takably attributable to retention of the self-supporting limi-
tation to which the Port Authority had previously adhered.
This was made clear by Executive Director Tobin of the
Port Authority when questioned at a 1958 hearing about
the manner in which future revenues and reserves would be
committed :
Well, it is closed unless those future bond issues have to do with
projects that can be made self-supporting and in whict the Com-
missioners of the Port Authority will not only certify a @ matter
of conscience and a matter of record that they lelieve that
they can be made self-supporting and will add to the gen-
eral credit of the Port Authority; but also if they can demon-
strate arithmetically on sound projections of its existing ret revenues
and its maximum future debt service that those projecs will not
hurt this bondholder. That’s all he has. If that bondholer has an
open end bond without those restrictions, he has a piece of paper.
[Assembly Hearings, supra, November 24, 1958, at 38 (Statement
of Austin J. Tobin, Executive Director, Port of New York Au-
thority); emphasis supplied]
This self-limitation has exacerbated the Port authority’s
demonstrated lack of initiative. For example, although the
Port Authority in 1955 agreed to provide the Metropolitan
Rapid Transit Commission with $800,000 for tiat body’s
. study of a metropolitan scheme of mass transit, the price
which the Authority extracted for its financial support was
a “Memorandum of Understanding” which precluded its
own role in any deficit operations which the Commission
A31
might recommend. Danielson, supra at 23; Assembly Hear-
ings, supra, December 3, 1958, at 91-A to 92—A (Statement
of Frank H. Simon, Exécutive Director, Metropolitan Rapid
Transit Commission). More importantly, perhaps, the Port
Authority’s inertia has interjected itself in the relationship
between the agency and the Legislatures which it allegedly
serves. This has been done in an often contradictory fashion
‘as illustrated by the following discussion between Assembly-
man Crabiel and Executive Director Tobin:
ASSEMBLYMAN CRABIEL: What I'm getting at here is, you're
saying categorically that you cannot take a deficit. Now, I’m raising
the point that as far as the Legislatures of the two states, when
they established the compact there was nothing in the compact
and nothing in the instructions from the Legislatures to the Port
Authority that they could not undertake a deficit operation.
MR. TOBIN: Well, excuse me, sir. I'd say that there was. I
would say that the way the statutes are phrased, it could under-
take nothing except a self-supporting operation. We have no way
of financing anything but a self-supporting operation.
ASSEMBLYMAN CRABIEL: Well how do you account for the
fact, then, that you have operated deficit operations?
MR. TOBIN: Because the pooled revenues have been sufficient.
Because we believed also, when we went into those, that they could
be self-supporting and we were wrong.
ASSEMBLYMAN CRABIEL: That’s what I was pointing up.
[Assembly Hearings, supra, November 24, 1958, at 45]
III
THE ROLE OF THE PORT AUTHORITY
Ultimately, those who are most hurt by the Port Author-
ity’s failure to enter the field of mass transportation are.
of course, the commuters. Absence of Port Authority initia-
tive in ‘this area is a direct reflection of the deficits which
are inherent in the provision of this public service:
Until the late 1950’s, trausit operations in the United States
were generally profitable and, consequently, attractive to investment.
Decline in patronage and increasing labor and equipment costs have
completely reversed this trend to a point where today, public transit
in its everyday operations in. most cities is a losing proposition.
The losses are not as great as sometimes presuméd but, in most
A32
cases, average between 20 and 25 percent annually. Therefore,
public transit — like many other sectors of the transportation in-
dustry, including private automobile transportation — now requires
substantial public support in the form of direct financial subsidies
to be capable of rendering necessary services. [Roeseler and Levi,
“State Subsidies for Public Transit: An Overview of Current
Legislation,” 4 Urban Lawyer 59, 60 (1972)]
See also Kuneafsey and Edelman, “A Market-Oriented Nolu-
tion to the Northeast Railroad Dilemma,” 41 J. C. C. Pract.
J. 1%4 (1973-74). This problem concerning the financial
weaknesses of mass transit facilities has been realized within
the New York metropolitan area. This, no doubt, has re-
sulted from both the unusually heavy demands which have
been placed on these systems in the Port District, and the
lack of a perceived common interest among the District’s
geographic and political components. Danielson, supra, at
21-22.
The Port Authority’s failure to assume an active role in
solving this problem has had a concurrent effect on the
traveling habits of the average commuter. Faced with in-
creasing service cutbacks and escalating fares, the commuter
is left with fewer alternatives to the private automobile.
Grubb, “Urban Transportation .\lternatives to the .\uto-
mobile,” 39 I. C. C. Pract. J. 19 (1971-72); Cooper,
“Prospects for a Mass Movement to Public Transit,” 5
Urban Lawyer 679 (1973). His increasing resort to this
mode of transportation in turn has caused a drastic in-
crease in traffie congestion and air pollution which are com-
monly associated with the metropolitan area.
These problems have stimulated legislative responses on
hoth the federal and state levels. The federal respons? von-
sists primarily of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964,
49 U.S.C. A., § 1601 et seq., which purports to encourage
“the planning and establishment of areawide urban mass
transportation systems needed for economical and desirable
urban development, with the cooperation of mass transporta-
tion companies both public and private.” 49 U. S.C. A., §
1601. See Haley and Watkins, “The Urban Mass Transporta-
A33
tion Assistance Act of 1970 — A Federal Program Comes of
Age,” 16 N. Y. Law For. 741 (1970). As a corollary to the
urban mass transit crisis, the federal government has enacted
the Clean Air Act, 42 U7. 8S. C. A. § 1857 et seq. Similar
considerations produced comparable legislation in New Jersey,
Emergency Energy Fair Practices Act of 1974. L. 1974, ce.
2, 6; Executive Order No. 1 (Feb. 5, 1974).
These legislative enactments were most recently recognized
in a report issued by the Joint Transportation and Com-
munications Committee of the New Jersey Legislature. Pe-
port of the Senate and General Assem)ly Joint Transportation
and Communications Committee (l’ursuant lo Assembly Con-
current Res. No, 211 of 1974), October 6, 1975, As the report
noted:
The legislation passed by New Jersey during the last four years
clearly reflects the determination on the part of its officials to direct
the Port Authority towards making a greater financial commitment
to mass transit. In order to determine whether New Jerser has
heen treated hy the Port Authority in a fair and impartial manner
the Committee bas investigated the degree of Port Authority re-
<ponsiveness to meeting the mass transportation needs of the State.
[/d. at 13]
The Committee's conclusion was succinct as it was unfortu-
nate:
The Committee recognizes that the Port Authority has acquired
a reputation for its engineering, planning and management skills.
It is the conclusion of the Committee, however, that in the area
of mass transportation the Port Authority's performance has not
heen satisfactory. [/d. at 17]
The Committee’s conclusions were premised upon the same
type of factors which I have considered above. While the Com-
mittee was hopeful that the Port Authority would take its
mass transportation responsibilities “more seriously” in the
future, it nonetheless pledged “its vigilance to see that the
A34
Port Authority ‘completes the mass transportation projects
it has promised to complete.” Jd. at 18, 19."
The sensitivity of the state government to the urgent need
for more modern means of public transportation has not been
confined to the legislative branch. In his recent “State of the
State” address, Governor Byrne not only recognized this prob-
lem, but concurrently cited the Port Authority’s responsibility
for its solution. Perhaps even more important, the Governor
indicated his willingness to impose an affirmative sanction on
the Port Authority should the desired action in the area of
mass transit not be forthcoming:
x
How do we keep the railroads running at a time when the sta
subsidy program costs over $100 million a year and has been grow-
ing by more than 35 per cent a year? Should there be an overall
operating agency for these lines? What about the communities and
industries served by lines soon to be abandoned? Where can we
find the $255 million required to match federal funding for the
45While the history of the Port Authority’s involvement in mass
transportation has been discouraging, the prospects for renewed ef-
forts by the agency in this area of endeavor are hopeful. In the
above cited report by the pgs ed pea pect =
ommunications Committee, the development of a mass -
aa plan by the Port Authority was noted, Report of the Senate
and General Assembly Joint Transportation and Communications
Committee (Pursuant to Assembly Concurrent Res. No. 211 of 1974,
16-17 (October 4, 1975)). This plan committed the Port Authority
to the provision of additional direct rail service.to Penn Station in
New York City for New Jersey commuters, the expansion of the
Midtown Bus Terminal, the construction of a rail link to Kennedy
Airport and the extension of the PATH system from Newark to
Plainfield. Although the Urban Mass Transportation Administration
on December 19, 1975 rejected New Jersey's request for $278-
million to construct the PATH extension, the State’s expressed in-
tention to reapply for such funds will create the possibility of a con-
tinued role for the Port Authority in mass transportation. The
Sunday Star-Ledger, December 21, 1975, at 1, 8; The New York
Times, December 22, 1975, at —-; The New York Times, January
4, 1976, at 34. This persistence has apparently been succeseful as
federal approval of a $400-million block grant for the PATH ex-
tension to Plainfield and other mass transit projects is anticipated.
The Star-Ledger, February 10, 1976, at 1.
A35
modernization of two major commutes. lines and the extension of
PATH to Plainfield?
The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey must increase
its commitment to these efforts. If it is unwilling to do so, we will
insist that it rescind the toll increases instituted last year for the
specific purpose of funding improvements in the public transporta-
tion system. [Annual Message of Governor Brendan T. Byrne, Jan.
13, 1976, at 19}
I, too, would similarly take this opportunity to demonstrate
the vigilance which has motivated the Joint Committee and
the Governor. The Port Authority has too long neglected the
responsibility with which it was statutorily charged in 1921.
In So. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Tp. of Mt. Laurel, 6%
N. J. 151, 189 (1975), we recognized the significance of
transportation to the overall development of an urban area.
I would today reaffirm this significance.
IV
CONCLUSION
The relief which I recommend today is intended as an
answer to a problem which has assumed crisis proportions.
The Port Authority is the produ.cr, the director and the
main character of the play known as “The Disease of Mass
Transportation.” This malady has suffered too long from
the benign neglect of public agencies such as the Port Au-
thority, and such neglect has permitted the disease to spread
unattended. The resulting state of affairs may most accurately
~~he described as one of emergency. While the appellation
“emergency” was at one time reserved for calamitous and
natural occurrences, the inadequate and deteriorating quality
of mass transit in the metropolitan area has had an eroding
effect on the urban environment in which it operates. This
effect has been measurable not only in terms of the unending
lines of commuters who have been inconvenienced by in-
‘efficient service, but also in terms of traffic congestion with
its attendant pollution as well. The courts of this country
have long recognized that such emergent circumstances may
A36
serve as a mandate to administrative action. “While emer-
gency does not create power, emergency may furnish the-
accasion for the exercise of power.” Home Building & Loan
Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. 8. 398, 425-26, 54 S. Ct. 231, 238,
78 L. Ed. 413, 422 (1934); Hourigan v. North Bergen T'p.,
113 N. J. L. 143, 148 (E. & A. 1934).
For an Authority that; is long on cash and short on
dreams,"® it is time to respond for those who have long suf-
fered the inconvenience and expense which have resulted from
the Port Authority’s inaction.
I would order the Port Authority, its Commissioners and
its Executive Director to not only complete those projects to
which it is already committed, but to formulate and present
plans and suggestions for @ regional mass transportation
scheme to the Legislatures of New York and New Jersey.
Implicit in this would be the requirement that such efforts be
completed in an expeditious fashion and within a fixed period
of time. This injunction is necessary to bring home the im-
portance of Authority action in the face of the current trans-
portation crisis.
In proposing this relief. I should not be understood as ad-
vocating usurpation of the functions of either the executive
or legislative branches of government. The majority’s charac-
terization of my position is in error. (At 259). My dis
position does not contemplate ordering either the Governors
or the Legislatures of the States of New Jersey and New York |
to undertake any particular course or courses of action. I
would be loathe to intrude upon the relationships which have
developed between these other branches of state government
and the Port Authority. Nonetheless, I am all too aware of
the fact that expertise in the field of mass transit operations
resides in the body which was originally vested with both
power and jurisdiction in that area, namely the Port Au-
thority. By according the Authority a statutory mandate to
16Caro, supra, footnote 10 at 922.
A37
undertake mass transportation projects, it was anticipated
hy both States that the Port Authority would actively re-
search, promote and recommend projects to be authorized and
implemented by the State Legislatures. It is precisely the
Port Authority’s reluctance to utilize its expertise that has
frustrated this basic first step towards the development of a
much-needed integrated mass transportation system in the
metropolitan area. Therefore, I would order the Port Au-
thority to proceed with this initial planning stage, while, at
the same time, acknowledging that ultimate adoption and im-
plementation of the resultant plans remain a legislative and
executive prerogative. The declared willingness of those
branches of government to adopt appropriate measures leaves
me confident that only timely suggestions by the Port Au-
thority are needed to point the direction towards improved
mass transit operations. ;
Although I am unsure whether it is the perception of my
suggested order as a usurpation of executive and legislative
function which underlies the majority’s disagreement with
such relief, I am, nonetheless, clear in my opposition to the
lesson in civil procedure which the majority would impose
on this case, I find that the majority’s exercise of power un-
der a writ of mandamus would ill-befit a remedy with such a
Marshallian association. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U. 8. (1
Cranch) 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803). This is a direct result of not
only the restrictive but the erroneous construction which the
majority gives to the powers implicit in a mandamus. The
writ of mandamus is a remedial process whose essential func-
tion is to compel the performance of a ministerial action or the
exercise of a discretionary function. Roberts’ v. Holsworth,
10 V. J. L. 5% (Sup. Ct. 1828); Switz v. Middletown Twp.,
23 N. J. 580 (1957). This mode of relief is particularly ap-
propriate with regard to recalcitrance by public officials or
authorities. Bd. of Taration v. Belleville, 92 N. J. Super.
338, 340-41 (Law Div. 1966). While the court has the power
under a mandamus to compel action, it does not similarly
have the power to control discretion in the performance of
A38
the designated action. Such discretion properly resides in
the functioning authority.
By its construction of the mandamus, the majority would
not only accord the authority discretion in the manner of
performing the compelled action, but would permit the au-
thority discretion as to whether the ordered. action should
be performed at all. Although the majority has recognized
that the Port Authority has resisted efforts to promote its
involvement in mass transportation, it would consider this
to be an exercise of discretion which would preclude a
mandamus or an order similar to the one which I have sug-
gested :
As we have sought to demonstrate, the circumstances before us
do not at all invite or accommodate the remedy proposed. This is
«o because the Authority (whose function is clearly not ministerial)
has in fact exercised its discretion, even though that exercise has
resulted in the rejection of a policy favoring mass transportation.
Being a judgment decision its wisdom may be open to dispute;
hut as to the propriety of this Court’s refusal to intrude on the
underlying policy determination, there can be no question in the
circumstances before us [At 259].
| cannot subscribe to such reasoning, whose circular nature
would undercut the relief which the majority otherwise feels
warranted under the circumstances and which would effec-
tively emasculate the mandamus, or any similar relief, as
a remedy. *
I reject the majority’s approach to the problem of this
case within a procedural context. We have been taught that
there are no rights without remedies. By stripping us of
our remedies, the majority is most assuredly divesting us
of our rights. Marbury v. Madison, supra, 5 U. S. (1
Cranch) at 163, 2 L. Ed. at 69. Furthermore, we have long
passed the days wherein cases were decided on the niceties
of procedural technicalities. Hodgson v. Applegate, 31 N. J.
29, 43 (1959) ; Edelstein v. Asbury Park, 51 N.-J. Super.
368. 385 (App. Div. 1958). There is no need to resurrect
in this case another of these manifestations of by-gone days.
A39
Even if I were to acknowledge the necessity of specifically
resorting to a mandamus or its equivalent, I could not
justify withholding such relief in this case; nor can I pres- -
ently understand the distinction which the majority draws
between the mandamus which they recommend and the order
which I propose. Granting that mandamus is an “extraor-
dinary remedial process,” Beronio v. Pension Comm’n of
Hoboken, 130 N. J. L. 620, 623 (E. & A. 1943), afPg 129
N. J. L. 557% (Sup. Ct. 1943), I cannot see the unfortunate
plight of the more than 30 million commuters who are de-
pendent upon the Port Authority’s transportation services
annually, nor the Authority’s benign neglect of their plight,
as being anything less than extraordinary. This is particu-
larly so where to adopt the majority’s approach would per-
mit the Port Authority to ignore the statutory responsi-
bilities with which it was charged in 1921.
The majority in Gaby v. Port of New York Authority has
been unwilling to take the action which I regard as impera-
tive. From its disposition I must, therefore, respectfully
dissent.
For affirmance—Justices MOUNTAIN, SULLIVAN and CuIF-
FORD and Judges ConrorD, CaRToN and HaLPERN—6.
Concurring in part and diesenting ing in part—Justice Pasn-
MAN—1. ;
A40
Decision of the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Bergen County
UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK, ETC.,
PLAINTIFF, v. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, ET AL.,
DEFENDANTS .
DANIEL M. GABY, PLAINTIFF, v. THE PORT OF NEW YORK
AUTHORITY, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.
Superior Court of New Jersey
Law Division
Argued April 8, 9, 1975—Decided May 14, 1975.
SYNOPSIS
Consolidated actions were brought concerning constitu-
tional validity of legislation creating, and later repealing,
a covenant between the States of New Jersey and New York
and holders of bonds issued by the Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey. Defendants filed counterclaim for
declaration of validity of repealing legislation. The Su-
perior Court, Law Division, Gelman, J. 8. C., held that
legislative enactments, such as the 1962 covenant whereby
the States and Authority were precluded from applying Au-
thority revenues and reserves for passenger railroad pur-
poses unless permitted by criteria set forth in the covenant,
can constitute a contract within meaning of the contract
clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions, that not
every impairment of a contract obligation or security for its
performance runs afoul of the contract clause, that a State’s
inherent power to protect the public welfare may be validly
exercised under the contract clause even if it impairs a con-
tractual obligation so long as it does not destroy it, and
that in view of emergent problems of air pollution, crises
in mass transit and energy problems repeal legislation was a
reasonable and valid exercise of the State’s police power
and was not prohibited by the contract clause of either the
Federal or State Constitution.
Complaints dismissed; judgment for defendants on coun-
terclaim.
A41
Mr. Robert B. Meyner and Mr. Devereux Milburn (of
the New York Bar) for plaintiff United States Trust Com-
pany (Messrs. Meyner, Landis & Verdon, attorneys; and
Messrs. Carter, Ledyard & Milburn, attorneys; and Mr.
Donald J. Robinson (of the New York Bar) Messrs. Haw-
kins, Delafield & Wood, attorneys).
Mr. Michael I. Sovern (of the New York Bar) and Mr.
Murray J. Laulicht, special counsel for defendants (Mr.
William F. Hyland, Attorney General of New J ersey, attor-
ney; Mr. Harold 8. H. Edgar (of the New York Bar) on
the brief).
Mr. Theodore W. Kheel (of the New York Bar) and Mr.
Howard Stern for plaintiff Daniel M. Gaby (Messrs. Battle,
Fowler, Stokes & Kheel, attorneys, and Messrs. Shavick,
Stern, Schotz, Steiger & Croland, attorneys).
Mr. Joseph Lesser (of the New York Bar) for defendant
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Mr. Francis
A, Mulhern, attorney) ; aud Mr. Patrick J. Falvey (of the
New York Bar). Vs. Isubel E. Muirhead, Mr. Arthur P.
Berg (of the New York Bar), (Mr. Vigdor D. Bernstein,
of counsel).
GztmMaN, J. S. C. These are consolidated actions which
have as their common subject matter the constitutional va-
lidity of legislation of this State creating, and later repeal-
ing, a covenant between the States of New Jersey and New
York and the holders of bonds issued by the Port Author-
ity of New York and New Jersey (Port Authority).1 The
; ae the terms of the Compact of 1921 creating the Port Author-
ty, N. J. 8. A. 32:1-1 et seg., legislative action taken by one state
134 N..J.Super.—9
A42
first legislative act in question, chapter 8 of the Laws of
1962, N. J. 8. A. 32:1-35.50 (the 1962 covenant), author-
ized the Port Authority to construct the World Trade Cen-
ter and to acquire and operate the Hudson & Manhattan
Railroad Company. As part of the 1962 legislation the two
States enacted a statutory covenant with each other and
with the holders of certain Port Authority bonds whereby
the States and the Port Authority were precluded from ap-
plying the Authority’s revenues and reserves for passenger
railroad purposes unless permitted by the criteria set forth
in the statute. N. J. S. A. 32:1-35.55.
The 1962 covenant was repealed by chapter 25 of the
Laws of 1974.2 The complaint filed by the United States
Trust Company challenges the constitutionality of the re-
peal act of 1974, and the Gaby complaint attacks the va-
lidity of the 1962 covenant. We turn, then, to the proce-
dural history of these actions and the issues projected by
the respective pleadings.
Procedural History
1. The Gaby Action
On May 16, 1972 plaintiff Daniel Gaby filed a class
action complaint for a declaratory judgment that the 1962
covenant violated the Federal and State Constitutions. The
complaint named as defendants the Port Authority, its com-
missioners and executive director, and the then Governor of
New Jersey, William T. Cahill. On October 25, 1972, on
affecting the powers and duties of the Port Authority is not effective
until concurred in by the legislature of the other. N. J. 8. A. 32:1-8.
Statutory citations in this opinion will be limited to the applicable
New Jersey statutes unless the context otherwise requires.
2In 1972 the Legislature had repealed the 1962 covenant as to all
bonds of the Authority issued after the effective date of the act.
L. 1972, c. 208; N. J. 8S. A. 32:1-35.55a. The act betame effective
upon the adoption of concurrent legislation by the State of New
York on May 10, 1973. Laws of N. Y. 1973, c. 318. The validity
of this legislation is not in issue in these proceedings.
A43
the motion of the Attorney General of New Jersey, the
complaint was dismissed as to former Governor Cahill. The
Attorney General also moved to dismiss the complaint for
failure to name as an indispensable party the Port Author-
ity’s bondholders. No disposition appears to have been made
of the motion at that time.
The Gaby complaint alleges, among other things, that
the residents of the State of New Jersey are dependent
upon mass transit facilities and are adversely affected by
the deterioration of such facilities within the District ser-
viced by the Port Authority (the Port District). It is al-
leged that the Port Authority was created by the Compact
of 1921 and consented to by the United States Congress®
to assure “cooperation of the two states in the future develop-
ment” of transportation facilities within the Port District,
and that by virtue of the 1962 covenant, restricting the
Port Authority’s power to acquire or operate passenger rail
transit facilities, the two states entered into a new “Com-
pact” without the consent of Congress and in violation of
U. 8. Const., Art. 1, § 10. The complaint further alleges
that the 1962 covenant constitutes an unconstitutional sur-
render by the State of its sovereign powers “to protect the
health, general welfare and safety of the people,” and that
it has impaired and obstructed existing facilities for the
transportation of goods in interstate commerce, in viola-
tion of U. 8. Const., Art. 1, § 8.
Gaby asks for multifarious relief. Aside from seeking a
declaration as to the unconstitutionality of the 1962 cov-
enant, he asks the court to declare the covenant to be sub-
ject to repeal, and to direct the Port Authority to formu-
late and submit to the court a plan for the development of
mass transit facilities within the Port District.
The Gaby action was pretried on February 22, 1973, at
which time it was stipulated that the action could proceed
3Pub. Res. No. 17, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (42 Stat. 174).
A44
as 2 class action without formal notice to th class repre-
sented by plaintiff. Thereafter both sides mowed for sum-
mary judgment, and oral argument on the motions was
heard on September 26, 1973. At the concluson of the ar-
gument the court directed the parties to stbmit further
briefs on the constitutional issues and on the question
whether the bondholders were necessary partie: to the Gaby
action. Following conferences between comsel and the
court, it was agreed the United States Tmst Company
should be permitted to intervene in the Gab action as a
party defendant to represent the interests of tle bondholders
in that action. An order to such effect was eitered on De-
cember 18, 1973, and arguments were reschduled on the
motions for summary judgment.
Prior to the date fixed for the argument the prospects
for the adoption of the repeal act became ipparent, and
further action in the Gaby case was stayed pending future
legislative developments.
2. The United States Trust Company Actin
The New Jersey Legislature completed wtion on the
repeal act on April 22, 1974, and Governo’ Brendan T.
Byrne signed the bill into law on April 30,1974. On the
same day United States Trust Company (/. S. Trust)
filed its complaint on behalf of itself as the lolder of Port
Authority bonds, as trustee for certain desigrated issues of
Port Authority bonds, and on behalf of all lolders of con-
solidated bonds issued by the Port Authoriy. The com-
plaint names as defendants the State of Nev Jersey, Gov-
ernor Byrne and the Attorney General of Ne Jersey, and
seeks a declaratory judgment that the reped act violated
the Federal and State Constitutions.
U. S. Trust alleges that it is the holder (fr its own ac-
count and in a fiduciary capacity) of $96,010,000 of con-
solidated bonds issued by the Port Authorty; that the
Port Authority was intended, under the terms of the Com-
pact approved by Congress, to be a self-supporting public
A45
agency whose obligations were to be and are payable from
its net revenues and certain reserve funds; that the 1962
covenant was enacted to protect the Port Authority’s ex-
isting and future bondholders from the diversion of pledged
revenues and reserves to finance deficit mass transit facili-
ties and further to preserve the Port Authority’s credit
standing; that the Port Authority notified prospective pur-
chasers of its bonds of the existence of the 1962 covenant
and purchasers relied on the covenant in purchasing bonds
issued by the Port Authority, and that the secondary mar-
ket for the Port Authority consolidated bonds has been ad-
versely affected by the repeal act.
The complaint alleges that the repeal act violates the
“impairment” and “taking” provisions of the Federal Con-
stitution, U. S. Const., Art. T, § 10 and Amends. V and
XIV, and the equivalent provisions of the New Jersey Con-
stitution, NV. J. Const. (1947), Art. IV, § VIT, par. 3;
Art. I, pars. 1 and 20.
The answer filed by defendants asserts several defenses
among which the following may be briefly noted: (1) the
repeal act constitutes a reasonable exercise of the police
power by the State; (2) the 1962 covenant itself violated
the Federal Constitution because of lack of congressional
consent; (3) the repeal act does not constitute an “im-
pairment” of the contract since the obligation of the Port
Authority to pay its bondholders remains intact; (4) the
hondhoiders were on notice of the reserved powers of the
State to repeal the 1962 covenant, and (5) the repeal act
was adopted as a police power measure to meet a transpor-
tation crisis affecting the health, safety and welfare of per-
sons residing within the Disirict. Finally, the answer as-
serts a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment that the
repeal act is constitutional.
A consent order was entered pursuant to R. 4:32—1 in
the U. S. Trust action directing that the action be main-
tained and defended as a class action by U. S. Trust on
A46
behalf of all holders of consolidated bouds of the Port Au-
thority, and that notice to the class be deemed to have been
given by means of the media publicity which was dis-
seminated when the action was instituted. On December 10,
1974 the Gaby and U. S. Trust actions were consolidated
by order of the court.
The parties to the U. S. Trust action have filed a 366-
page stipulation of facts, accompanied by exhibits covering
all phases of the case with the exception of two issues: (1)
whether the purchasers of consolidated bonds issued by the
Port Authority after the adoption of the 1962 covenant re-
lied in fact upon the existence of the covenant, and (2)
whether the repeal of the 1962 covenant adversely affected
the secondary market for Port Authority bonds. These is-
sues were the subject of a trial on February 4, 5, 6, 7 and
11. 1975, and the court’s findings on the issues will be set
forth infra.
The Formation, Facilities and Financial Structure
of the Port Authority.
1. Formation and Facilities.
In 1917 the States of New Jersey and New York estab-
lished the New York, New Jersey Port and Harbor De-
velopment Commission (the Commission) to study the fa-
cilities and problems of the Port of New York and to rec-
ommend a plan for the future development of the Port.*
The Commission filed its Report’ on December 16, 1920
4The enabling legislation directed the commissioners to negotiate
and agree upon a joint report recommending a policy for the states
“to the end that said port shall be efficiently and constructively
organized and furnished with modern methods of piers, rail and water
and freight facilities * * *.” The Commission was to work out “a
comprehensive and adequate interstate and Federal port policy, to
meet commercial needs in times of peace and the protection of the
harbor and adjacent localities in times of war.” DL. 1917, ¢. 130.
5Joint Report with Comprehensive Plan and Recommendations,
New York, New Jersey Port and Harbor Development Commission,
1920 (hereafter cited as the Report).
A47
setting forth its findings, conclusions and recommendations.
The core recommendation of the Commission was the cre-
ation by the two states of a common public agency by means
of which the states would cooperate in the future develop-
ment of the facilities of the Port in accordance with the
comprehensive plan recommended by the Commission.* Re-
port at 436. In discussing the legal precedents for the es-
tablishment by the States of an agency having a substan-
tial impact on interstate commerce, the report stated:
Permissive or restrictive, as the case may be, the power of Congress
over the instrumentalities of interstate traffic is exclusive, when in
a specific case it has been exercised. But this latter limitation,
coupled with the broad police power of the State and its control of
intrastate commerce, has left to New York and New Jersey a broad
field within which they may act without express Federal consent. It
is hoped, of course, by securing congressional approval of any plan
which may be adopted, to avoid future conflict with the Federal
authority over interstate unification and control of the Port. But
for the present the States may act alone. [Report at 446]
Prophetically tne Commission noted that
{o]ur port problem is primarily a railroad problem. * * * There-
fore the comprehensive plan to evolve which this Commission was
created is essentially a railroad plan. With the proper network of
rail facilities, the development of other terminal facilities can follow
along rational lines * * *. A complete reorganization of the railroad
system is the most fundamental physical need of the Port of New
York. [Report at 3]
However, the railroad problem upon which the Commis-
sion focused was not that of passenger transit but the hand-
ling and distribution of freight and cargo into and out of
the Port District, and the comprehensive plan recommended
by the Commission addressed itself exclusively to the trans-
portation and distribution, not of persons but of freight
ena —— aO- for a Compact between the States was
rs) y contained in the Commission's prelimin -
mitted in 1918. . ieeaing
A48
and cargo by rail, and to a lesser extent by ship and motor
truck. In its 474 pages plus appendices the only signifi-
cant discussion of passenger traffic in the Report is con-
tained in the section dealing with ferries and vehicular tun-
nels. After noting that the bulk of interstate passenger
traffic was accommodated by the Hudson River ferries and
that the impact of the Holland Tunnel (started in 1920)
could not be forecast, the Report opined:
Vehicular tunnels offer little promise as a means of conveying pas-
sengers, and the one rapid-transit facility in existence between ‘he two
States, while operated to near capacity, is not sufficiently profitable
to warrant optimism that others will be built. [Report at 330)
Following the submission of the Commission’s Report,
the Port of New York Authority’ was created pursuant to
an interstate compact, signed April 30, 1921, between the
States of New Jersey and New York. N. J. S. A. 32:1-1
et seq. The consent of Congress “to each and every part and
article” of the Port Authority Compact was obtained effec-
tive August 23. 1921. Pub. Res. Vo. 1%, 6%th Cong. 1st
Sess. The preamble of the Port Authority Compact states
that “a better coordination of the terminal, transportation
and other facilities of commerce in, about and through the
port of New York, will result in great economies, benefiting
the nation, as well as the states of New York and New Jer-
sey,” and that “the future development of such terminal,
transportation and other facilities of commerce will require
the expenditure of large sums of money, and the cordial
co-operation of the States of New York and New Jersey in
the encouragement of the investment of capital, and in the
formulation and execution of the necessary physical plans.”
Article I of the Compact contains the agreement and
pledge by the two states of their “faithful co-operation in
7TThe name of the Port of New York Authority was changed to
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey on July 1, 1972.
N. J. 8. A. 32:1-4.
A49
the future planning and development of the port of New
York, holding in high trust for the benefit of the nation the
special blessings and natural advantages thereof”. Article
II defines the Port of New York District, comprising an
area of about 1500 square miles in both states within a
radius of about 25 miles from the Statue of Liberty. Ar-
ticle III establishes the Port Aythority’as “a body cor-
porate and politic, having the powers and jurisdiction here-
inafter enumerated, and such other akd additional powers
as shall be conferred upon it by the legislature of either
state concurred in by the legislature of the other, or by act
or acts of congress.” Article VI vests in the Port Author-
ity “full power and authority to purchase, construct, lease
and/or operate any terminal or transportation facility
within [the Port] district”; to make charges for the use
of such facilities, and “to borrow money and secure the
same by bonds or by mortgages upon any property” held by
the Port Authority. Article VII provides that the Port
Authority “shall have such additional powers and duties
as may hereafter be delegated to or imposed upon it from
time to time by the action of the legislature of either state
concurred in by the legislature of the other,” and mandates
that the Port Authority shall not pledge the credit of either
State except with the consent of its legislature. Article XI
requires the Port Authority to make plans for the develop-
ment of the Port District supplementary to or amendatory
of any plan theretofore adopted, and Article XII authorizes
the Port Authority to “make recommendations to the legis-
latures of the two states or to the congress of the United
States, based upon study and analysis, for the better con-
duct of the commerce passing in and through the port of
New York.”
Article XXII of the Compact defines “transportation fa-
cility” to include “railroads, steam or electric * * * and
every kind of transportation facility now in use or hereafter
designed for use for the transportation or carriage of per-
A50
sons or property”, and defines “railroad” as “includ [ing]
railways, extensions thereof, tunnels, subways, bridges, ele-
vated structures, tracks, poles, wires, conduits, power houses,
substations, lines for the transmission of power, car barns,
shops, vards, sidings, turnouts, switches, stations and ap-
proaches thereto, cars and motive equipment.”
In 1922 the states, with the consent of Congress, adopted
a Comprehensive Plan for the development of the Port of
New York. N. J. 8S. A. 32:1-25 et seq.; Pub. Res. No. 66,
67th Cong., 2d Sess. The Comprehensive Plan sets forth
the development program initially envisioned by the Com-
mission for implementation by the Port Authority.
In the Plan, like the Report upon which it was based,
unification of terminal operations and facilities, consolida-
tion of shipments, adaptation and coordination of existing fa-
cilities, improvement of commercial rail, truck and water fa-
cilities and other freight handling improvements are set
forth as principles to govern the development of the Port
Authority. The Comprehensive Plan proposed to establish
direct rail freight connections between New Jersey and Man-
hattan to furnish “the most expeditious, economical and
practical transportation of freight especially meat, produce,
milk and other commodities comprising the daily needs of
the people.” WN. J. S. A. 32:1-29. Section 8 of the 1922
Comprehensive Plan statute denies to the Authority the
power to levy taxes or assessments, and provides that the
bonds or other securities issued by the Port Authority shall
at all times be free from taxation by either state. N. J. S. A.
32:1-33. Finally, it should be noted that the power was re-
served to the states to add to, modify or change any part of
the Plan. W. J. S. A. 32 :1-26.
Pursuant to the Compact, the Comprehensive Plan and
subsequent amendments and supplements thereto, the Port
Authority operates all of the interstate vehicular tunnels
and bridges in the Port District, which include the Holland
A51
Tunnel®, the Lincoln Tunnel, the George Washington Bridge,
the Bayonne Bridge and the Arthur Kill Bridges. In addi-
tion, the Port Authority owns and/or operates the following
facilities: Newark International Airport, Teterboro Airport,
LaGuardia Airport, John F. Kennedy International Airport
and two heliports; Port Newark, the Hoboken Port Author-
ity Marine Terminal, the Elizabeth Port Authority Marine
Terminal, the Columbia Street Marine Terminal, the Erie
Basin Port Authority Marine Terminal and a Mid-Man-
hattan Consolidated Passenger Ship Terminal: the Port
Authority Bus Terminal, the George Washington Bridge Bus
Station and the Newark and New York Union Motor Truck
Terminals; the Port Authority Trans-Hudson system (op-
erated for the Port Authority through its wholly-owned sub-
sidiary, the Port Authority Trans-Husdon Corporation) and
the World Trade Center.
Excluding the 1921 Compact and the 1922 Comprehensive
Plan, the Legislatures of New Jersey and New York have
adopted 39 separately enacted, concurrent statutes authoriz-
ing the construction and financing of the foregoing facilities,
the issuance of bonds and notes by the Authority, the regula-
tion of suits against it, and the establishment of a general re-
serve fund for the payment of the Authority’s obligations.
None of these 39 statutes received specific Congressional con-
sent.
2. The Financial Structure of the Port Authority
Under the terms of the Compact the power to levy taxes
or to pledge the credit of either state was expressly withheld
from the Authority. From its inception, with the exception
of monies advanced as loans by the states, the Authority was
8The Holland Tunnel had been constructed by state commissions
pursuant to a compact between the states which received tle con-
sent of Congress. In 1930 the Holland Tunnel was transferred to
the Port Authority in order to enable it to honor its obligations to
bondholders in the face of deficits incurred in connection with the
Arthur Kill, George Washington and Bayonne Bridges. L. 1980,
c. 247.
A52
required to finance its facilities solely with money borrowed
from the public and to be repaid out of the revenues derived
from its operations. By reason of these financial limitations
two concepts initially emerged which have played an im-
portant role in the realization of the purposes for which the
Authority was created: first, the specific projects under-
taken by the Authority should be self-supporting, +. ¢., the rev-
enues of each should be sufficient to cover its operating ex-
penses and debt service requirements; and second, since the
Authority is a public agency over which its creditors have no
direct control, the bondholders should be protected by
covenants with the Authority and with the states which have
ultimate control over its operations.
The first facilities constructed by the Authority were ve-
hicular spans linking Staten Island and New Jersey — the
Arthur Kill Bridges — which were opened to traffic in 1928.
A third Staten Island-New Jersey crossing, the Bayonne
Bridge, was placed in operation in 1931. In that same year
the George Washington Bridge was opened to traffic. With
respect to each of these facilities the Port Authority was au-
thorized to and did issue bonds in separate series to pay for
the cost of acquisition of lands and construction. The reve-
nues and tolls from each facility were statutorily pledged as
security for the repayment of the series bonds issued in con-
junction with the specific facility involved. N. J. 8. A. 32:1-
39, 62, 86. The States of New Jersey and New York advanced
additional moneys to pay for the costs of construction, and
the funds so advanced were accorded a subordinated status
to the funds raised by the Authority from the sale of its own
bonds to the public. NV. J. 9. A. 32:1-60, 63, 81, 87. The
statutory authorizations for each project and its funding
were declared to be “a contract or agreement between the two
states for the benefit of those lending money to the port au-
thority.” N. J. 8. A. 32 :1-65, 89.
The first bonds issued to the public by the Authority were
“closed-end” bonds based on the estimated costs of each
facility, and the Authority was prohibited from issuing more
A53
bonds than the amount initially authorized for the project.
See Goldberg, A History of the Port of New York Authority
Financial Structure (1964), at 3 (hereafter cited as Gold-
berg). The gross revenues from each bridge were applied
first to the payment of expenses of operation and maintenance
of the bridge, then to the payment of debt service on its
bonds, and the surplus, if any, was to be deposited in a
separate reserve fund available only to the bondholders of
that series. Goldberg, at 4.
As noted earlier, the initial facilities were not self-sustain-
ing, and in 1930 the states transferred the control, operation
and the revenues of the Holland Tunnel to the Port Au-
thority to help place the Port Authority on a self-sustaining
basis. NV. J. §. A. 32:1-119. Simultaneously, the states en-
acted legislation, commonly called the General Reserve Fund
Act, N. J. 8. A. 32:1-142, and by the terms of that act the
surplus revenues derived by the Authority from all facilities
built with the proceeds of sale of its bonds are pooled so as to
create a general reserve fund in an amount equal to 10%
of the par value of all bonds issued by the Authority. The
act pledges the general reserve fund as security for the
payment of interest and principal on all bonds theretofore or
thereafter issued by the Authority. Surplus moneys of the
Authority in excess of the general reserve fund requirements
may be used for any purpose authorized by the states.
The general reserve fund thus becomes available to bond-
holders to pay the debt service requirements of facilities which
were not self-supporting. By this device the surplus revenues
of the Holland Tunnel were used to pay the debt service re-
quirements of the Arthur Kill and Bayonne Bridges and the
George Washington Bridge. The general reserve fund was
also envisioned as a security device to induce the public
to invest in future facilities such as the then contemplated
Lincoln Tunnel project. See Goldberg, at 7.
Following the enactment of the General Reserve Fund Act
the Port Authority issued additional series of bonds to finance
the construction of the Inland Terminal Building and to repay
A54
the states for the amounts expended by them to construct
the Holland Tunnel. Goldberg, at 5. In 1935 the Authority
commenced the issuance of a new series of bonds, known as
general and refunding bonds, the proceeds of which were used
to refund all of the original bridge bonds issued by the Au-
thority and to finance the initial construction of the Lincoln
Tunnel. These bonds were secured by a pledge of the net
revenues of all of the Authority’s then existing facilities and
by the general reserve fund. Under the terms of the resolu-
tion authorizing the issuance of general and refunding bonds
the Authority also contracted to create a special reserve fund
into wh
This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.