Petition — City of New York v. United States
Supreme Court brief1976
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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term 1975
No. @5- ] 684
THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
Petitioner,
~against-
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
W. BERNARD RICHLAND
Corporation Counsel of
the City of New York,
Attorney for Petitioner,
Municipal Building
New York, New York 10007
(212) 566-3326
SAMUEL J. WARMS,
CORNELIUS F. ROCHE,
of Counsel.
TF ewe. eee eee
‘
"
Beesve
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Page
Petition for Certiorari
Evansville Airport v. Delta Airlines,
405 U.S. 707 (1972) ======2=2ll=lSL 32
Introductory Statement --------------- 1
Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214
Opinion Below ------------------------ - (1934) ----==--=5------~---- +e 14
Jurisdiction --------<---------------- - New York v. United States, 326
: U.S. 672 (1946) --==-==-~~------_... 10,11,13
Questions Presented ------------------ : 17,19,27
Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360
Constitutional Provisions and ae TY a a 14
Statutes Involved ------------------ 4
The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7
Statement of the Case ---------------- 8 oe ee) pe ene ee 32
Reasons for Granting the Writ -------- 16 South Carolina v. United States,
oe 199 U.S. 437 (1905) -=====-===------- 14
Conclusion “<< sesso < serene eee eree--- 34
State of Texas v. United States,
Appendix 72-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 916,040 --------- 22,23,26
Opinion of United States State of Texas v. United States,
District Court for the Southern ~ J3—-L U.S.. Tax Cas. 916,085 cnoncenne 22,23,
District of New York -~------------- la
Tait v. Western Maryland Ry. Co.,
Judgment of the United States 9 U.S. 620 C1533) wana ------- 25
Court of Appeals, Second Circuit ----- 15a
STATUTES AND RULES CITED
TABLE OF CASES
Internal Revenue Code, §4261l (a) ----- 5
Allen v. Regents, 304 U.S. oe
439 (1938) ---=----------------------- 14 Internal Revenue Code, §4262 --------- 5
Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. Internal Revenue Code, §4292 --------- 5
S91 (1948) -------------------------- 25
Airport and Airway Revenue Act
Crandall v. State of Nevada, 73 (Po. Bi—-988) 6206 acccconcacccnccnn 6,28
U.S. (6 Wall) 35 (1967) ------------ 32
28 U.S.C. §1254 (1) --------------~-~-- 2 IN THE
28 U.S.C. §1346 (a)(1) --------------- 9 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, October Term 1975
12(b)(6) ------------------------ 2
AUTHORITIES CITED ° No.
j United a
TRGMME THRUET anesmeedeeae et ncienens 18 THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
Scott, Collateral Estoppel ing Petitioner,
t, 56 Harv. L. Rev. .
tT Tedd en nnn nen n= = - === 25 ~against-
U. S. Code Cong. Ad. News, 9lst UNITED STATES OP AMERICA,
“Con . 2, (1970)<----- 29,31
Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. 2, ( ) i ae aa
U. S. Constitution Art. I §8, a
oe nae er ee PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
U. S. Constitution Art. IV §2 -------- 32 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
The petitioner, the City of New York,
respectfully prays that @ writ of certiorari
issue to review a judgment and order of the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit entered in this proceeding
on February 1l, 1976, which judgment affirmed
the judgment of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York
on the opinion of that District Court. The
District Court judgment dismissed petitioner's
complaint with prejudice pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
OPINION BELOW
The Court of Appeals did not render an
Opinion. The District Court rendered an
opinion on May 14, 1975 which is reported
in Volume 394 of the Federal Supplement at
page 641. A copy of that opinion appears
in the appendix to this petition.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of opeals
for the Second Circuit was entered oe. February
11, 1976, and this petition will be filed
within 90 days of that date. This Court's
jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
1254(1).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
l. May the Federal Government impose
taxes on the City of New York for air trans-
portation by the City's officials and employees
On governmental business?
2. Is the complaint in an action for
refund of these taxes, which alleges that the
airline travel was a part of and necessary
to the performance of required governmental
duties, sufficiently specific so that it can
be assumed to include and permit proof of,
duties which were both uniquely governmental
and an exercise of the delegated sovereignty
of the State of New York?
3. Can the tax in question, after the
repeal of a provision excluding State and local
governments from tax, be considered a "user
charge", where an amount equal to the tax
proceeds was appropriated to the Airport and
Airway Trust Fund but might be removed from
that Fund at any time by an act of Congress?
~3<
4. Assuming, arguendo, that the tax
is a “user charge", can it be imposed on
the City where:
a. The travel involved is in the
performance of (I) uniquely
governmental duties, or (II)
duties which are uniquely
governmental and an exercise
of state sovereignty; or
6b. There is no known relationship
between the the amount of the
tax paid by, and the value or
cost of the benefits bestowed
by the taxing authority upon,
the taxpayer?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
AND STATUTES INVOLVED
United States Constitution:
No specific constitutional provision is
involved; rather the case involves application
of the doctrine of intergovernmental immunities
as enunciated in the decisions of this Court.
Internal Revenue Code:
—
Section 4261, subdivision (a) reads as
follows:
"(a) In general.- There is hereby
imposed upon the amount paid for tax-
able transportation (as defined in
section 4262) of any person which begins
after June 30, 1970, a tax equal to
8 percent of the amount so paid. In
the case of amounts paid outside of
the United States for taxable trans-
portation, the tax imposed by this
subsection shall apply only if such
transportation begins and ends in
the United States."
Section 4262 reads in part as follows:
" * * * the term ‘taxable transporta-
tion’ means * * * (1) transportation
by air * * *,"
Section 4292, as amended by Public Law
91-258, 84 Stat. 219, §205(a)(2), reads as
follows (the material in brackets was deleted
by the 1970 Act):
"4292. State and local governmental
exemption. Under regulations prescribed
by the Secretary or his delegate, no
tax shall be imposed under section 4251
(or 4261] upon any payment received for
services or facilities furnished to the
Government of any State, Territory of
the United States, or any political
subdivision of the foregoing or the
District of Columbia."
=_s
Airport and Airway Revenue Act of 1970:
Section 208 of this Act (P.L. 91-258, July 1, 1980, under subsections
84 Stat. 250, 49 U.S.C. §1742) reads in (c) and (d) of section 4041 (taxes
pertinent part as follows: on aviation fuel) and under sections
“Sec. 208. Airport and Airway Trust Fund. 4261, 4271, and 4491 (taxes on
(a) Creation of Trust Fund.-- There is transportation by air and on use
established in the Treasury of the of civil aircraft) of the Internal
United States a trust fund to be known Revenue Code of 1954;
as the "Airport and Airway Trust Fund' (2) amounts determined by the
Secretary of the Treasury to be
(hereinafter in this section referred
to as the “Trust Fund'), consisting equivalent to the taxes received
ob east amounts as may be appropriated in the Treasury after June 30,
or credited to the Trust Fund as pro- 1970, and before July 1, 1980,
eited tm thie eookinn. under section 4081 of such Code,
(b) Transfer to Trust Fund of Amounts with respect to gasoline used in
Equivalent to Certain Taxes.-- There aircraft; and
is hereby appropriated to the Trust (3) amounts determined by the
— Secretary of the Treasury to be
(1) amounts equivalent to the equivalent to the taxes received
taxes received in the Treasury in the Treasury after June 30,
after June 30, 1970, and before 1970, and before July 1, 1980,
alice under paragraphs (2) and (3) of
aBe
section 407l1(a) of such Code, with
respect to tires and tubes of the
types used on aircraft.
The amounts appropriated by paragraphs (1),
(2), and (3) shall be transferred at least
Quarterly from the general fund of the
Treasury to the Trust Fund on the basis of
estimates made by the Secretary of the
Treasury of the amounts referred to in para-
Graphs (1), (2), and (3) received in the
Treasury. Proper adjustments shall be made
in the amounts subsequently transferred to
the extent prior estimates were in excess
of or less than the amount required to be
transferred."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The complaint in this case, alleges that
certain City officials and employees who
travel on official City governmental business
paid the excise tax on their airline fares
imposed by Internal Revenue Code §4261 and
were reimbursed fr those payments by the
City.
During the period July 1, 1970 to May
31, 1972, the City, as a result of such
reimbursement paid to the United States of
America, the respondent, $80,500, for these
excise taxes on the airline fares of its
officials and employees.
On July 23, 1972, the City of New York
filed a refund claim in that emount and on
September 7, 1972, at the request of the
United States Internal Revenue Service,
filed amended claims for refund aggregating
the same amount. On Jariuary 19, 1973, the
Internal Revenue Service notified the City
that its claims for refund were rejected.
On or about April 3, 1974, the peti-
tioner commenced this action for a refund
of those taxes in the District Court, pur-
Suant to 28 U,.S.C. §1346(a)(1). On motion
-9-
of the respondent, the District Court dis-
missed the complaint with prejudice. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of
dismissal.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
The Decisions Below
The complaint alleged that employees
of the City had used airplane travel in the
prosecution of necessary governmental busi-
ness. It did not specify whether or not
that business, or which part of it, was
uniquely governmental or the exercise of
State sovereignty. Neither did the com-
plaint state any facts which could be con-
Strued to negate that uniqueness or sov-
ereign quality. The first of these two
characteristics is required, if the tax is
not discriminatory, by the minority
Opinion of Justice FRANKFURTER in New York
v. United States, 326 U.S. 672.(1946); the
second by the minority opinion of Chief
-10-
Justice STONE in that case. While each of
these opinions expressed dissatisfaction
with the then existing doctrine which denied
Or granted immunity depending upon whether
the activities taxed were proprietary or
governmental, the two opinions were, as we
shall show more fully later, in irreconcil-
able conflict.
Despite this, and despite the lack of
specific allegations describing the precise
kinds of activities involved, the District
Court viewed New York v. United States,
Supra as “[a] particularly crushing blow to
the pre-existing doctrine." The Court then
purported to apply the conditions set forth
for immunity in both the opinions of Justice
FRANKFURTER and Chief Justice STONE. It
found that the City met none of those criteria,
Stating "it is clear that the excise tax is
neither discriminatory nor does it unduly
interfere with the governmental functions
@jj«
of New York City."
We are unable to understand how the
District Court could, on the bare complaint,
conclude that none of the taxed transactions
described in the broadest of terms in that
complaint, met the criteria formulated in
those two inconsistent minority opinions.
There were no answers to interrogatories to
describe the nature of those transactions.
There was nothing in the nature of a bill
of particulars to describe them. All that
the pleading said, was that they were
governmental in nature. That could have
meant that they were "uniquely governmental"
within the meaning of Justice FRANKFURTER's
Opinion. It could have meant that they were
pure exercises of sovereignty - as, indeed
in many instances they were - e.g. travel
to a distant state by a police officer to
return a person in extradition proceedings -
thus meeting Chief Justice STONE's criteria;
ol2@
or, as in the case of extradition, they could -
have met the criteria of both opinions.
The District Court's cpinion was, thus,
a non seguitur. Because the Court of Appeals
affirmed expressly on the District Court's
opinion, it too, engaged in the same non
sequitur.
1. THE DECISION BELOW IS BASED ON THE
DISPARATE AND CONFLICTING REASONING OF TWO
MINORITY OPINIONS IN THIS COURT. THIS
COURT'S HOLDING IN NEW YORK V. UNITED STATES,
326 U.S. 672 (1946) BECAUSE OF THE DIVERSE
VIEWS OF THE JUSTICES, CALLS FOR CLARIFICATION
SO THAT STATES AND THEIR POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS
CAN BE PROPERLY GUIDED IN THE CONDUCT OF THEIR
AFFAIRS.
The case of New York v. United States,
326 U.S. 672 (1946), involved the tax on
mineral waters imposed by §615(a)(5) of the
Revenue Act of 1932, 47 Stat. 169, 264.
New York resisted imposition of such a tax
ol3eq
on its sale of mineral waters obtained from
Saratoga Springs in that state, and sought
their refund. Aside from the argument that
the preservation of the springs at Saratoga
related to the accomplishment of the govern-
mental function of conservation, the case
presented a simple question of whether the
activity taxed was a proprietary one or a
governmental one. Under the law as it had
been developed up to that point, it was
clear - the conservation argument aside -
that no immunity from taxes could be
bestowed on an activity so essentially
proprietary and non-governmental. Mr.
Justice FRANKFURTER, in his opinion said:
"On the basis of authority, the case is
quickly disposed of", citing South
Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437
(1905), Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360
(1934), Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214
(1934) and Allen v. Regents, 304 U.S. 439
alge
(1938). But in that opinion, which was con-
curred in only by Justice RUTLEDGE, Justice
PRANKFURTER, expressing dissatisfaction with
those authorities, sought to set forth a new
doctrine of immunity which in essence per-
mitted the Federal government to tax a state
when the tax involved did not discriminate
against the state, i.e. was applicable to
the state as well as private parties, pro-
vided that it did not impinge upon state
activities which partake of "uniqueness from
the point of view of intergovernmental re-
lations" (326 U.S. at p. 582).
Chief Justice STONE wrote a concurring
Opinion for a Plurality of the Court.* ze
agreed with Justice FRANKFURTER that a new
formulation of the rule of immunity was needed.
*Justices REED, MURPHY and BURTON concurred
with Justice STONE. Justice JACKSON took no
Part in the case. Justices BLACK and DOUGLAS
dissented.
-15-
But he disagreed sharply with the notion
which would permit taxation of the States
so long as the tax was non-discriminatory.
Instead he set up yet another set of criteria
for tax immunity which, in summary, would
peoser tie taxes which would "interfere unduly
with the State's performance of its sovereign
functions of government," or “impair the sov-
ereign status of the State". (326 U.S. at
p. 587).
The Courts below had little difficulty
in wrestling with these inconsistent views.
Perhaps they felt that one of them would
eventually emerge as the rule of this Court,
not considering that this Court might have a
different formulation of its own. Then they
Simply, and wrongly, assumed that the City's
undisclosed and undelineated taxed activities
met neither of these criteria.
ol 6e
While those Courts may have experienced
little difficulty in dealing with two dis-
Parate minority opinions, the States and their
political subdivisions experience no such ease
in evaluating and applying them. New York v.
United States, 326 U.S. 672 (1946) remains
an unexplained enigma and the latest important
word of this Court in the area of state tax
immunity. It creates difficulties of a kind
that are exemplified by the case at bar.
Strictly speaking, the opinions of Justices
STONE and FRANKFURTER, at best, constitute
obiter dicta. On its facts, New York v. United
States is no more than a holding which follows
the previously developed rule which immunized
governmental transactions but taxed those of
@ proprietary nature. It did not solve or
resolve any of the problems to which that
rule gave rise. Nor did it do anything more
olJe
than express dissatisfaction with that rule.
Because of the disharmony between Justice
FRANKFURTER'S and Chief Justice STONE'S
criteria, the case did not even lay down
proper guidelines for future action.
In the present confused state of the
law, those guidelines are necessary for the
proper conduct of the affairs of the states
and their political subdivisions. We believe
that the present case offers an opportunity
for this Court to settle the law in this
presently confused area.
In the work entitled, THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, prepared
pursuant to P.L. 91-589, 84 Stat. 1585; 2
U.S.C. §168, by the Congressional Research
Service, Library of Congress (1973), in
treating of the scope of State immunity
from federal taxation, the authors state
-18<
(pp. 131-132):
"Although there have been sharp
differences of opinion among
members of the Supreme Court in
recent cases dealing with tax
immunity of state functions and
instrumentalities, it has been
Stated that ‘all agree that not
all of the former immunity is
gone." Twice, the Court has
made an effort to express its
new point of view in a statement
of general principles by which
the right to such immunity shall
be determined. However, the
failure to muster a majority in
concurrence with any single
opinion in the more recent of
these cases leaves the question
very much in doubt.
* . * * .
The second attempt to formulate
a general doctrine was made in New
York v. United States, where, on
review of a judgment affirming the
right of the United States to tax
the sale of mineral waters taken
from property owned and operated
by the State of New York, the
Court reconsidered the right of
Congress to tax business enter-
prises carried on by the States.
Justice Frankfurter, speaking for
himself and Justice Rutledge,
ol9q
made the question of discrimination
vel non against state activities STONE'S or whether it wi if-
the test of the validity of such ) = WEES Chast © Cif
a tax. They found 'no restriction ferent formulation of its own. Our chief
upon Congress to include the States
in levying a tax exacted equally interest is that the Present uncertainty
from private persons upon the same
subject matter.' In a concurring in this field be dispelled and replaced
Opinion in which Justices Reed,
‘Murphy, and Burton joined, Chief by a doctrine by which the States and
Justice Stone rejected the criter-
ion of discrimination. He repeated their political subdivisions may be
what he had said in an earlier case
to the effect that '...the limitation guided.
upon the taxing power of each, so
far as it affects the other, must We also believe that, whatever cri-
receive a practical construction
which permits both to function with teria may result from a decision of the
the minimum of interference each with
the other; and that limitation can- case at bar, many of the City's activities
not be so varied or extended as ser-
iously to impair either the taxing subjected to the tax will be found to par-
power of the government imposing the
tax...or the appropriate exercise of take of the sovereign immunity which the
the functions of the government af-
fected by it.'” City seeks.
We do not know whether this Court, 2. RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION RAISED
should it grant this petition, will adhere IN THIS CASE WILL AID IN THE SOLUTION OF
to the earlier "proprietary versus govern- A RECURRENT PROBLEM FOR ALL OF THE STATES
mental" rule, whether it will accept Justice AND MANY OF THEIR POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS.
FRANKFURTER'S formulation or Chief Justice The uncertainty which Dresently per-
" vades the field of governmental immunity
-2l-
presents problems not only for the petitioner,
whose problem may be, as we shall later show,
exacerbated by the rule of collateral estop-
pel, but for all of the other states and
their political subdivisions as well. Air
travel is the means most frequently used in
today's conduct of business, including gov-
ernmental business. We think it is no ex-
aggeration to surmise that every state gov-
ernment uses it, and every one of those
governments, if the decision below is to
be followed, is taxable on its travel.
Whether the burden of taxation on the state
governments is large or small is aside from
the point. The uncertainty created by the
decision below as well as that in State of
Texas v. United States, 72-2 U.S. Tax Cas.,
q16,048, at 86,128 (W.D. Tex., 1972) aff'd
Mem. 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas., {16,085 at 81,394
o220
(S Cir., 1972), of which more will be said
later, casts an administrative burden on
those government units, for until it is
affirmed or reversed or until the proper
guidelines are outlined by this Court,
those governments, like the petitioner,
will be under a recurrent obligation to
file claims for refund of taxes paid on
air transportation.
We urge this Court to grant a writ
of certiorari in this case so that the
atmosphere may be cleared of its murkiness.
Whatever this Court may decide, its de-
cision will have the salutary virtue of.
certainty, which will be of enormous help
to the governments affected.
o230
3. THE CITY OF NEW YORK, HAVING
LOST ITS CASE BELOW, WILL BE
ESPECIALLY DISADVANTAGED IN ANY
LATER ATTEMPTS TO SEEK REFUND OF
AIR TRANSPORTATION TAXES IN THE
ABSENCE OF A DECISION BY THIS COURT
OR A STATUTORY CHANGE, BECAUSE THE.
DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL MAY
BE ASSERTED TO FORECLOSE FUTURE RE-
FUNDS.
The tax in question is a recurring tax
and not an isolated instance of the appli-
cation of a tax law. The City continues
and will continue to use air travel. It
will continue to pay the tax on that travel.
It will, indeed it has, continue to seek
a refund of the taxes which it pays. It
will continue to have those refund appli-
cations denied and will continue to bring
o24<
actions to review those denials.
Those actions, in the absence of a de-
cision by this Court, in this or another
case, may be doomed to dismissal by the
assertion of the doctrine of collateral
estoppel which this Courc has applied in
tax cases. In the absence of new judicial
decisions or trends, that doctrine may pre-
Clude fruitful litigation for later periods,
of the issue decided with resvect to the
instant tax period. See Scott, Collateral
Estoppel by Judgment, 56 Harv. L. Rev l
(1942); Tait v. The Western Maryland Ry.
Co., 289 U.S. 620 (1933); cf. Commissioner
v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948).
This potential plight of the peti-
tioner, when viewed in the light of the
dubious quality of the holdings below,
and the uncertainty that exists in fore-
-25-
casting this Court's ultimate view, pre-
sents a further reason for the exercise
of this Court's discretionary jurisdiction
in granting the writ which we seek.
4, IF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE IS
NOT REACHED BECAUSE THE TAX IN QUES-
TION IS VALID AS A "USER CHARGE",
THAT ISSUE SHOULD BE PASSED UPON BY
THIS COURT.
Neither of the Courts below dealt
with the respondent's argument that the
tax in question is validly imposed as a
"user charge". Decision was based en-
tirely on the constitutional issue.
But the United States had also relied on
the case of State of Texas v. U.S., 72-2
U.S. Tax Cas., 416,048, at 86,128 (W.D.
Tex., 1972) aff'd mem. 73-1 U.S. Tax
Cas., 416,085, at 81,394 (5 Cir., 1972).
o26e
The District Court concluded that although
that case related mainly to the “user
charge" issue, it contained dicta which
followed the “nondiscriminatory" test of
Justice PRANKFURTER in New York v. United
States.
The intrusive “user charge" issue is,
we believe, based on an untenable founda-
tion. Nevertheless, if it presents a
means of resolving taxability in this
case, that resolution is as important to
the states and political subdivisions
which pay these taxes as would be the
more desirable resolution of the consti-
tutional issue. If this case is reviewed,
its eventual decision will, regardless of
its basis, erase the uncertainty which
the present confused state of the law has
created.
-27-
We think there is little merit to the
“user charge" argument. In the Texas case,
counsel for the state accepted the char-
acterization and agreed in its Stipulation
of Facts that "The excise taxes***represent
a user charge***"(72 USTC at p.86129).
The question raised is simply whether
the creation by the 1970 legislation of an
Airport and Airway Trust Fund (p. 2, 9l-
258, §208, 84 Stat. 250, 49 USC §1743),
which was supported by appropriations re-
flecting the amounts of the air trans-
portation taxes collected, converted what
had for years been a tax, into a charge.
In the report of the House Committee which
recommended the repeal of the provision
exempting states and their subdivisions
from the tax, we find the genesis of the
thought that the tax was a charge. That
-28<
Statement said (U.S. Code Cong. Ad. News,
Slst Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. 2, (1970):
"***this tax is now generally
viewed as a user charge." (Under-
scoring supplied)
The lack of foundation for this statement
is matched only by its inaccuracy. It
was plainly inaccurate because it was
made before the 1970 legislation was
passed, before the trust fund was set
up, before the Internal Revenue Code
was amended and yet it said that the
tax which had always been a tax is
now; 1.e., at the time of the report,
viewed as a charge. The statement con-
flicts with the whole super-structure
of the government's argument which is
to the effect that the 1970 legislation
converted what had been a tax into a
charge. The Committee's words indicate
-29-
that it had always been a charge, or,
at least, it had come to be considered
a charge, even before there was a trust
fund.
The taxes in question were origin-
ally enacted in 1942 as taxes, and so
remained as taxes. The language by
which they are imposed was not changed
substantially by the 1970 legislation
which repealed the exemption. The law
still calls them taxes. They are still
part of the Internal Revenue Code and
are subject to all of that Code's ap-
plicable procedural provisions, most
of which call the imposts taxes. To
call them charges when nothing was
done to the statute imposing them to
change their character from the taxes
which they were is utterly unrealistic.
-30-
While it may be proper to aévert to Com-
mittee reports to resolve an ambiguity,
there is no ambiguity in the Statute
under consideration. The report of the
committee which calls the tax a user
charge on at least 150 separate occas-
ions speaks of the tax as a tax. ([U.S.
Code, Cong. Ad. News, 9lst Cong., 2d
Sess., Vol. 2, 3076 to 3125, (1970)].
If the Congress had intended to con-
vert what had always been a tax into
a user charge, it could have readily
done so by appropriate language in the
Statute which it was considering and
passing, not in its committee renvort.
Nor do we believe that even had
the tax been designated as a charge
in the legislation, it could have been
levied against activities which consti-
=3)<
tute an exercise of the states' sovereign
duties.
In two recent cases, reported under
the title of Evansville Airport v. Delta
Airlines, 405 U.S. 707 (1972), it was
held that states and their political
subdivisions which operated airvorts
might impose a head tax on passengers
departing from those airports. Normally,
such taxes would have been an unconsti-
tutional impairment of the right to
travel under the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause (U.S. Const., Art. IV, §2),
Or the Commerce Clause (U.S. Const.,
Art. I, §8, Cl.3). Crandall v. State
of Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867),
and the Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 283 (1849). But in upholding
these imposts, which were to be used
@32<
for the improvement and maintenance of
the airports, this Court was careful to
find that the charges made were a fair,
albeit imperfect, approximation of the
value of the use of the facilities by
those upon whom they were imposed.
In short, the charges were found to be
not excessive in relation to the costs
incurred in Providing the services to
which they were related. We believe
that even were the tax involved here
to be considered a charge rather than
a tax, it would not be sustained with-
out a2 showing that the amount of the
so-called charges bore a fair relation-
Ship to the benefits received by the
governmental taxpayers. To sustain
its tax in this case, there must be
some factual background of which the
-33-
Court can take judicial notice to show
the commensurateness of the services
rendered and the charges imposed. There
is no such factual background.
CONCLUSION
A writ of certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit should be granted.
April 30, 1976
Respectfully submitted,
W. BERNARD RICHLAND
Corporation Counsel
Attorney for Petitioner
City of New York
Samuel J. Warms
Cornelius F. Roche,
of Counsel.
-34-
la
Opinion of Cannella, D.J.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
CIT “OF NEW YORK,
Plaintiff,
“against-
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
Appearances:
W. Bernard Richland, Corporation Coun-
sel of the City of New York (Samuel J. Warms
and Raymond Herzog, Asst. Corp. Counsels,
of counsel), for plaintiff.
Paul J. Curran, U.S. Attorney for the
Southern District of New York (John S.
Siffert, Asst. U.S. Attorney, of counsel),
for defendant.
CANNELLA, D.J.:
This action was commenced by the City
of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1346 for
the refund of certain excise taxes which
2a
Opinion of Cannella, D.J.
have been paid to the Federal Government.
The sole issue presented for our determina-
esas is whether the excise tax on amounts
paid for transportation of persons by air
under § 4261 of the Internal Revenue Code,
26 U.S.C. §4261, may constitutionally be
imposed on city expenditures for employees
traveling on official city business. As
we find that the constitutional doctrine
of intergovernmer 1 tax immunity does not
bar the imposition of this tax, the motion
of the United States to dismiss the com-
plaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)
is hereby granted.
THE FACTS
The City claims that during the period
of July 1, 1970 through May 31, 1972 certain
of its employees traveled by air while con-
ducting necessary, official New York City
3a
Opinion of Cannella, D.J.
business. These employees purchased and
paid for air transportation and such air
face included the federal excise tax speci-
fied in § 4261. The employees were later
reimbursed by the City for the expenses in-
curred.
On July 23, 1972, the City filed a
Claim for refund of the taxes now in Suit-
$80,500. On January 19, 1973, the Internal
Revenue Service notified the City that its
claim had been rejected. Thereafter, on
April 3, 1974, the instant action was
ccntianes.”
THE STATUTORY SCHEME
The excise tax provision here at issue
(§ 4261), while a long-standing part of the
1
The action appears to have been timely
filed under 26 U.S.C. § 6532(a)(1) and
venue is proper, 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(2).
4a
Opinion of Cannella, D.J.
Code, was significantly amended as part of .
the Airport and Airway Revenue Act of 1970;
legislation which was passed in conjunction
with the Airport and Airway Development Act
3
of 1970. The stated purpose of these enact-
ments was to aid in the substantial expansion,
improvement and development of the American
airport and airway system in order to meet
future needs and demands for these facili-
+
ties.
With regard to the instant dispute,
the changes which the 1970 Act effected upon
2
Title II, Pub.L. 91-258, 84 Stat. 236
(effective July 1, 1970).
3
Title I, Pub.L. 91-258, 84 Stat. 219
=
See, § 2, Title I, Pub.L. 91-258; supra;
H. Red. No. 91-601, 91st Cong., lst Sess.
in 1970 U.S. Code Cong, and Admin. News
at 3047 and 3082.
5a
Opinion of Cannella, D.J.
5
§ 4261 are not as important
5 :
In its oresent form, §426l(a) of the Code
States:
(a) IN GENERAL.-There is hereby im-
posed upon the amount paid for taxable
transportation (as defined in section
4262) of any person which "egins after
June 30, 1970, a tax equal co 8 percent
of the amount so paid. In the case of
amounts paid outside of the United States
for taxable transportation, the tax
imposed by this subsection shall apply
Only if such transportation begins and
ends in the United States.
§4262, in turn, defines "taxable transpor-
tation” as “transportation by air" and
further states:
(a) TAXABLE TRANSPORTATION; IN GENERAL. -
For purposes of this part, except as pro-
vided in subsection (6b), the term "tax-
able transportation" means-
(1) transportation by air which
begins in the United States or in the
225-mile zone and ends in the United
States or in the 225-mile zone; and
(2) in the case of transportation
by air other than transportation de-
Scribed in paragraph (1), that portion
(Footnote continued on following page)
6a
Opinion of Cannella, D.J.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
of such transportation which is di-
rectly or indirectly from one port
Or station in the United States to
another port or station in the United
States, but only if such portion is
not apart of uninterrupted inter-
national air transportation. ...
(C) DEFINITIONS.-For purposes of this
section-
(1) CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES .-The
term “continental United States" means
the District of Columbia and the States
other than Alaska and Hawaii.
(2) 225-MILE ZONE.-The term "225-
mile zone" means that portion of Canada
and Mexico which is not more than 225
miles from the nearest point in the
continental United States.
(3) UNINTERRUPTED INTERNATIONAL AIR
TRANSPORTATION.- The term "unin-
terrupted international air transporta-
tion” means any transportation by air
which is not transportation described
in subsection (a)(1) and in which-
(A) the scheduled interval be
tween (i) the beginning or end of the
portion of such transportation which
is directly or indirectly from one
port or staticn in the United States
to another port or station in the
(Footnote continued on following page)
7a
Opinion of Cannella, D.J.
as the impact which it had upon §4292 of the
Code (26 U.S.C. §4292). Prior to July l,
1970 (the effective date of the amendments),
§4292 exempted from the excise tax imposed
under § 4261 “any payment received for ser-
vices or facilities furnished to the Govern-
ment of any State, Territory of the United
States, or any political subdivision of the
foregoing or the District of Columbia."
The Airport and Airway Revenue Act of 1970,
however, deleted the reference to § 4261
6
from § 4292, thus completely withdrawing
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
United States and (ii) the end or
beginning of the other portion of such
transportation is not more than 6
hours, and
(B) The scheduled interval between
the beginning or end and the end Or
beginning of any two segments of the
portion of such transportation referred
to in subparagraph (A) (i) is not more
than 6 hours. ...
6
Prior to the 1970 amendment §4292 stated:
(Footnote continued on following page)
8a
Opinion of Cannella, D.J.
from the law the previous statutory grant
of immunity accorded to New York City and
other political entities. The rationale
for this legislative decision is made abun-
dantly clear in the House Report, which
states:
Present law provides a series of .
exemptions from the tax on transportation
of persons by air. These include ex-
emptions: .. . (5) for transportation
furnished to the United States (at the
discretion of the Secretary of the
(Footnote continued on preceding page)
Under regulations prescribed by the
Secretary or his delegate, no tax shall
be imposed under section 4251 or 4261
upon any payment received for services
or facilities furnished to the Government
of any State, Territory of the United
States, or any political subdivision of
the foregoing or the District of Columbia.
§205(a)(2) of the Airport and Airway Revenue
Act of 1970 (Title II, Pub.L. 91-258, 84 Stat.
236) deleted the phrase "or 4261" from the
Statute. (§ 4251 imposes a tax on certain
communications services, such as telephone
services, and is not here relevant.)
9a
Opinion of Cannella, D.J.
Treasury) and to State and local
governments. ...
The Ways and Means Committee has
deleted most of these exemptions
either as obsolete provisions or as
unnecessary complications of existing
. eae ae
The exemptions for transporation fur-
nished to State and local governments,
the United States, and nonprofit educa-
tional organizations are terminated. ..
It did not seem appropriate to continue
Special exemptions for these govern-
mental and educational organizations
Since this tax is now generally viewed
as a user charge. In this situation
there would appear to be no reason
why these governmental and educational
Organizations should not pay for their
Share of the use of the airway facil-
ities. Moreover, should these exemp-
tions be retained where now applicable,
it would be difficult to see why other
equally meritorious nonprofit organiza-
tions should not also be granted
exemption.
H. Rep. No. 91-601, 9lst Cong., lst Sess. in
1970 U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News at 3090-9:
For further discussion of the legislative
(Footnote continued on following Page)
10a
Opinion of Cannella, D.J.
Hence, under the present statutory scheme
the only basis upon which the City might
avoid the air transportation excise tax is
under the constitutional doctrine . of
intergovernmental tax immunity.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX IMMUNITY
The City premises its present claim upon
the assertion that “a political subdivision
of a state which exercises governmental
functions may not be subjected in performing
8
those functions to a federal tax." Thus,
relies upon the intergovernmental tax immunity
which is said to arise by implication from
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
isi Texas
history of the provisions at bar, see,
Vv. United States, 72-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ¥ 16,048
'd mem.
at 86,128 (W.D. Tex. 1972), aff
73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 4 16,085 at 61,394
(§ Cie. 1972).
8
City's Brief at 8.
lia
Opinion of Cannella, D.J.
the federal constitution; a doctrine which
finds its origin in McCulloch Vv. Maryland,
17 U.S. 316 (1819). ‘The doctrine enjoyed
great success and was frequently invoked
by courts during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries and it is upon
the case law generated during this earlier
period _ the City places Drincipal re-
liance. However, as Professors Freeland
and Stephens have observed: "Despite its
9
In chronological order, the cases cited
by the City are: Collector: v. Day, 78
U.S. 113 (1870); South Carolina v. United
States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905); Ohio v.
Helvering, 292 U.S. 360 (1934); Helvering
v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938); Allen
Vv. Regents of the University System of
Georgia, 304 U.S. 439 (1939); and Graves
V. New York ex rel, O'Keefe, 306 U.S.
466 (1939). These decisions, together
with other leading immunity cases and New
York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946),
are digested and discussed in: BF. Barrett
& P. Bruton, Constitutional Law 483-495
(4th ed. 1973); Pl Kauper, Constitutional
(Footnote continued on following page)
lza
Opinion of Cannella, D.J.
bold beginning and vigorous earlier life, the
doctrine of intergovernmental immunity has
suffered a marked decline over the past half
century." J. Freeland & R. Stephens, Funda-
mentals of Federal Income Taxation 247 (1972).
A particularly crushing blow to the pre-
existing doctrine came in 1946, when the
Supreme Court decided New York v. United
“(Footnote continued from preceding page)
452-488 (4th ed. 1972); G. Gunther &
f-“powling, Constitutional Law, 752-765 (8th
ed. 1970); W. Lockhart, Y. Kamisar & J.
Choper, Constitutional Law, 440-460 (2nd
ed. 1967); McCormack, Intergovernmental
Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment, 51
N.c.L. Rev. 405, 400-493 (1973). Each of
these authors recognizes that the immunity
doctrine is only a shadow of its former
self and that the courts have, during the
more recent years, restricted its scope
with each decision.
The leading pre-New York v. United States
articles in this area are those of Professor
Thomas Reed Powell. Powell, The Waning of
Intergovernmental Tax Immunities 58 Harv. L.
Rev. 033; and The Remnant of -.ntergovern-
mental Tax Immunities, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 75/7
(1945).
l3a
Opinion of Cannella, D.J.
States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946). That case
Stands as the Court's most recent pronounce-
ment in this area and is, in the opinion of
this Court, clearly preclusive of the City's
claim. The opinions of the several Justices
in New York v. United States render the
earlier decisions of but historical interest
and, to use Professor Griswold's Phrase, “the
doctrine of immunity was limited" in scope and
utility by the views there expressed. €E.
Griswold, Federal Taxation 29 (6th ed. 1966).
The Court's decision in New York v.
United States is itself somewhat curious pre-
cedent because no opinion of the Court actually
exists. Mr. Justice Frankfurter "announced
the judgment of the Court and delivered an
Opinion in which Mr. Justice Rutledge joined.”
326 U.S. at 573. Mr. Justice Rutledge sepa-
rately concurred and Chief Justice Stone,
l4a
Opinion of Cannella, D.J.
joined by Justices Reed, Murphy and Burton,
issued a concurring opinion. Mr. Justice
Douglas, joined by Mr. Justice Black, dis-
sented. This division of the Court and
the policy considerations which are at-
tendant thereon, while of significance in
a close case, are without impact in the
matter at bar since no difference in result
is obtained when the present facts are
viewed through either the Frankfurter or
Stone formulation.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, after first
noting that Article I, § 9 of the Consti-
tution ("Congress can lay no tax ‘on Arti-
cles exported from any State'” (326 U.S.
at 575)) imposed the only direct consti-
tutional limitation upon the federal taxing
power viz-a-viz the states, recognized
that other tax immunity doctrines derived
15a
Opinion of Cannella, D.J.
from Chief Justice Marshall's famous phrase
“the power to tax involves the vower to de-
Stroy." Id. at 575-76. The Justice, in
an apparent effort to simplify the immunity
doctrine and advance a more workable stan-
dard, began his endeavor by outrightly
rejecting the older premise of reciprocal
intergovernmental tax immunity. Placing
emphasis upon Mr. Justice Bradley's dis-
senting opinion in Collector v. Day, 78 U.S.
113, 128-29 (1870), Frankfurter concluded
that reciprocity of tax. immunities was an
unwarranted inhibition upon the federal
System of government. Id. at 577-82. In
its place, Justice Frankfurter promulgated
a new test of tax immunity-a standard which
validates a federal tax which falls upon a
State entity when the tax is found to be
nondiscriminatory.
Id.
l6a
Opinion of Cannella, D.J.
There are, of course, State activities
and State-owned property that partake
of uniqueness from the point of view
of intergovernmental relations. These
inherently constitute a class by them-
selves. Only a State can own a State-
house; only a State can get income by
taxing. These could not be included
for purposes of federal taxation in
any abstract category of taxpayers
without taxing the State as a State.
But so long as Congress generally taps
a scucce of revenue by whomsoever
earnea and not uniquely capable of
being earned only by a State, the
Constitution of the United States does
not forbid it merely because its
incidence falls also on a State.
If Congress desires, it may of course
leave untaxed enterprises pursued
by States for the public good while
it taxes like enterprises organized
for private ends. [Citations omitted.]
If Congress makes- no such differentia-
tion and, as in this case, taxes all
vendors of mineral water alike, whether
State vendors or private vendors, it
simply says, in effect, to a State:
"You may carry out your own notions
of social policy in engaging in what
is called business, but you must pay
your share in having a nation which
enables you to pursue your policy."
at 582. Moreover, Justice Frankfurter ex-
pressly rejected the distinctions previously
l7a
Opinion of Cannella, D.J.
drawn between the “governmental” and "pro-
prietary" functions of state and local
entities as “to shifting a basis for deter-
mining constitutional power and too entangled
in expediency to serve as a dependable legal
Criterion.” Id. at 580. He concluded by
Stating:
we decide enough when we reject limita-
tions upon the taxing power of Congress
derived from such untenable criteria
as “proprietary" against "governmental"
activities of the States, or histori-
cally sanctioned activities of govern-
ment, Or activities conducted merely
for profit, ard find no restriction
upon Congress to include the States
in levying a tax exacted equally from
private persons upon the same subject
matter.
Id. at 583-84 (footnote omitted).
Justice Frankfurter's brethren in the
Majority refused to accept all of the views
that he had offered. Even Justice Rutledge,
who concurred in the opinion, felt a need
18a
Opinion of Canneila, D.J.
to express himself separately. Id. at 584-
86. Four other Justices, in an opinion by
Chief Justice Stone, felt compelled to limit
the per se “nondiscriminatory test" formu-
lated by Frankfurter.
While joining Justice Frankfurter in
finding “untenable the distinction between
‘'governmental' and 'proprietary' interests,"
id. at 586, the Chief Justice expressed his
reservations with regard to placing ex-
clusive reliance upon the nondiscriminatory
nature of a tax in the following words:
[W]e are not prepared to say that the
national government may constitutionally
lay non-discriminatory tax on every
class of property and activities of
States and individuals alike.
. . -(O]luc difficulty with the formula,
now first suggested as offering a new
solution for an old problem, is that
a federal tax which is not discrimina-
tory as to the subject matter may
nevertheless so affect the State, ~
merely because it is a State that is
19a
Opinion of Cannella, D.J.
being taxed, as to interfere unduly
with the State's performance of its
sovereign functions of government.
Id. at 586-87. The difficulty encountered
by the Chief Justice and his colleagues with
Frankfurter's formulation is evidenced by
the following passage:
If the phrase "non-discriminatory
tax" is to be taken in its long
accepted meaning as referring to a
tax laid on a like subject matter,
without regard to the personality of
the taxpayer, whether a State, a
corporation or a private individual,
it is plain that there may be non-
discriminatory taxes which, when laid
on a State, would nevertheless impair
the sovereign status of the State
quite as much as a like tax imposed
by a State on property or activities
of the national government. Mayo v.
United States, 319 U.S. 441, 447-448.
This is not because the tax can be
regarded as discriminatory but be-
cause a sovereign government is the
taxpayer, and the tax, even though
non-discriminatory, may be regarded
as infringing its sovereignty.
Id. at 587. Thus, Chief Justice Stone con-
cluded that the mere nondiscriminatory nature
20a
Opinion of Cannella, D.J.
of a tax would not be enough to sustain its
levy upon a state or locality. In addition,
the Chief Justice indicated that "we [must]
consider whether such a non-discriminatory
tax unduly interferes with the verformance
of the State's functions of government.
If it does, then the fact that the tax is
non-discriminatory does not save it." Id.
at 588.
Returning, then, to the matter at bar,
we reiterate that these distinctions are
not determinative to the outcome of this
case. Clearly, the excise tax imoosed by
§ 4261 of the Code is nondiscriminatory in
mature. Ali users of air transportation
facilities (with the limited exception of
an international organization of the Red
Cross) are equally subject to this tax.
We cannot perceive any undue interference
2la
Opinion of Cannella, D.J.
with the sovereign functions of City govern-
ment as the result of its being compelled
to contribute to the federal tax coffers
in this particular instance. While it is
difficult for us to conceive of a federal
tax, other than those suggested in the
Opinions of the Court (i.e., a tax on state-
houses aand cityhalls), which is both non-
discriminatory and yet unduly restrictive
10
against a municipality, it is clear that
10
While perhaps not entirely Satisfactory,
we offer the following example to illustrate
this concept: A federal tax on all .38
caliber handguns (or bullets). Such a
tax would apply to all who own such pistols:
private citizens, detective agencies, and
the like, as well as state and local govern-
ments. However, owing to the fact that
the incidence of .38 caliber handgun owner-
Ship is greatest among state and local law
enforcement agencies and that the pos-
session of such firearms is vital to their
Proper functioning, it might well be said
that although nondiscriminatory in scope,
(Footnote continued on following page)
22a
Opinion of Cannella, D.J.
the air transportation excise tax is neither
discriminatory nor does it unduly interfere
ith the governmental functions of New York
City. As one commentator has put it, “any
challenge to federal taxation of a state
[or city] activity would require a showing
of actual impairment of state [or city]
functions." McCormack, supra n. 9 at 493.
Plainly, no actual impairment of the City's
functions has been demonstrated in this case.
The statutory exemption previously en-
joyed by the City having been abrogated in
1970, we conclude that the constitutional
doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity
will not properly assume its place. The
City's claim of immunity from the excise
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
the tax, if of sufficient magnitude, could
indeed unduly interfere with the sovereign
functions of government.
23a
Opinion of Cannella, D.J.
tax imposed under § 4261 must be rejected.
We add only that our view with regard to
New York v. United States is fully supported
by the following cases: Murphy v. O'Brien,
485 F. 2d 671, 674-75 (T.E.C.A. 1973); United
States v. Washington Toll Bridge Authority,
307 F. 2d 330, 334 (9 Cir. 1962) (en banc),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 911 (1963); Texas
v. United States, 72-2 U.S. Tax Cas. q 16,048
at 86, 128 (W.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd mem.,
73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ¥ 16,085 at 81,394
ll
(5 Cir. 1972); Iowa State Univ. of Science
il
The decision of Judge Roberts in Texas
v. United States squarely addresses the
question of immunity for states and local-
ities from the § 4261 tax. However, the
Judge there placed emphasis upon the user
charge aspect of the § 4261 levy, as con-
trasted with analyzing it as a true tax,
and thus concluded that it was "as such...
Outside the scope of the doctrine of
implied intergovernmental tax immunity."
(Footnote continued on followng page)
25a
24a
ie Opinion of Cannella, D.J.
Opinion of Cannella, D.J.
CONCLUSION
& Technology v. United States, 500 F.2d
The motion of the United States pur-
508, 523 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
Suant to Fed. R. Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is hereby
granted. The Clerk of the Court shall enter
judgment dismissing the complaint with pre-
ueemen, judice and costs.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
It is SO ORDERED.
72-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,131. The Court
went further and in what might be con-
sidered dictum recognized that JOHN M. CANNELLA
Even if the airway user charge is United States District Judge
considered to be a tax within the
general confines of the doctrine of
implied intergovernmental tax immunity,
plaintiff has now shown that the tax Dated: New York, N.Y.
is invalid where it is nondiscriminatory, May 14, 1975.
Congress specifically intended to tax
this activity whether or not carried
on directly by the State, and there
exists no undue burden upon the per-
formance of plaintiff's functions as
a government which have long been
recognized by the Constitution as
sovereign. New York v. United States
supra.
As our discussion in the text supra in-
dicates, we are in complete agreement with
these views.
26a
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT
At a Stated Term of the United States
Court of Appeals, in and for the Second
Circuit, held at the United States Court-
house in the City of New York, on the
lith day of February, one thousand nine
hundred and seventy-six.
Present:
HON. WILLIAM H. TIMBERS
Circuit Judge
HON. FREDERICK vP. BRYAN
HON. JAMES S. HOLDEN
District Judges Sitting by
Designation
CITY OF NEW YORK,
Plaintiff-Appvellant,
75-6065
Vv.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant~-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York.
27a
This cause came on to be heard on the
transcript of record from the United States
District Court for the Southern District
of New York, and was argued by counsel.
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now
hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that
the judgment of said District Court be and
it hereby is affirmed on the opinion of
Judge Cannella dated May 14, 1975.
Wm. H. Timbers
WILLIAM H. TIMBERS
United States Circuit Judge
Frederick vP. Bryan
~ FREDERICK vP. BRYAN
United States District Judge
James S. Holden
AMES S. HO N
United States District Judge
Sitting by Designation
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.