Petition — City of New York v. United States

Supreme Court brief1976

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term 1975

No. @5- ] 684

THE CITY OF NEW YORK,

Petitioner,

~against-

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

W. BERNARD RICHLAND

Corporation Counsel of

the City of New York,

Attorney for Petitioner,

Municipal Building

New York, New York 10007

(212) 566-3326

SAMUEL J. WARMS,

CORNELIUS F. ROCHE,

of Counsel.

TF ewe. eee eee

‘

"

Beesve

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Page

Petition for Certiorari

Evansville Airport v. Delta Airlines,

405 U.S. 707 (1972) ======2=2ll=lSL 32

Introductory Statement --------------- 1

Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214

Opinion Below ------------------------ - (1934) ----==--=5------~---- +e 14

Jurisdiction --------<---------------- - New York v. United States, 326

: U.S. 672 (1946) --==-==-~~------_... 10,11,13

Questions Presented ------------------ : 17,19,27

Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360

Constitutional Provisions and ae TY a a 14

Statutes Involved ------------------ 4

The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7

Statement of the Case ---------------- 8 oe ee) pe ene ee 32

Reasons for Granting the Writ -------- 16 South Carolina v. United States,

oe 199 U.S. 437 (1905) -=====-===------- 14

Conclusion “<< sesso < serene eee eree--- 34

State of Texas v. United States,

Appendix 72-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 916,040 --------- 22,23,26

Opinion of United States State of Texas v. United States,

District Court for the Southern ~ J3—-L U.S.. Tax Cas. 916,085 cnoncenne 22,23,

District of New York -~------------- la

Tait v. Western Maryland Ry. Co.,

Judgment of the United States 9 U.S. 620 C1533) wana ------- 25

Court of Appeals, Second Circuit ----- 15a

STATUTES AND RULES CITED

TABLE OF CASES

Internal Revenue Code, §4261l (a) ----- 5

Allen v. Regents, 304 U.S. oe

439 (1938) ---=----------------------- 14 Internal Revenue Code, §4262 --------- 5

Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. Internal Revenue Code, §4292 --------- 5

S91 (1948) -------------------------- 25

Airport and Airway Revenue Act

Crandall v. State of Nevada, 73 (Po. Bi—-988) 6206 acccconcacccnccnn 6,28

U.S. (6 Wall) 35 (1967) ------------ 32

28 U.S.C. §1254 (1) --------------~-~-- 2 IN THE

28 U.S.C. §1346 (a)(1) --------------- 9 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, October Term 1975

12(b)(6) ------------------------ 2

AUTHORITIES CITED ° No.

j United a

TRGMME THRUET anesmeedeeae et ncienens 18 THE CITY OF NEW YORK,

Scott, Collateral Estoppel ing Petitioner,

t, 56 Harv. L. Rev. .

tT Tedd en nnn nen n= = - === 25 ~against-

U. S. Code Cong. Ad. News, 9lst UNITED STATES OP AMERICA,

“Con . 2, (1970)<----- 29,31

Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. 2, ( ) i ae aa

U. S. Constitution Art. I §8, a

oe nae er ee PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

U. S. Constitution Art. IV §2 -------- 32 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

The petitioner, the City of New York,

respectfully prays that @ writ of certiorari

issue to review a judgment and order of the

United States Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit entered in this proceeding

on February 1l, 1976, which judgment affirmed

the judgment of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of New York

on the opinion of that District Court. The

District Court judgment dismissed petitioner's

complaint with prejudice pursuant to Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

OPINION BELOW

The Court of Appeals did not render an

Opinion. The District Court rendered an

opinion on May 14, 1975 which is reported

in Volume 394 of the Federal Supplement at

page 641. A copy of that opinion appears

in the appendix to this petition.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of opeals

for the Second Circuit was entered oe. February

11, 1976, and this petition will be filed

within 90 days of that date. This Court's

jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

l. May the Federal Government impose

taxes on the City of New York for air trans-

portation by the City's officials and employees

On governmental business?

2. Is the complaint in an action for

refund of these taxes, which alleges that the

airline travel was a part of and necessary

to the performance of required governmental

duties, sufficiently specific so that it can

be assumed to include and permit proof of,

duties which were both uniquely governmental

and an exercise of the delegated sovereignty

of the State of New York?

3. Can the tax in question, after the

repeal of a provision excluding State and local

governments from tax, be considered a "user

charge", where an amount equal to the tax

proceeds was appropriated to the Airport and

Airway Trust Fund but might be removed from

that Fund at any time by an act of Congress?

~3<

4. Assuming, arguendo, that the tax

is a “user charge", can it be imposed on

the City where:

a. The travel involved is in the

performance of (I) uniquely

governmental duties, or (II)

duties which are uniquely

governmental and an exercise

of state sovereignty; or

6b. There is no known relationship

between the the amount of the

tax paid by, and the value or

cost of the benefits bestowed

by the taxing authority upon,

the taxpayer?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

AND STATUTES INVOLVED

United States Constitution:

No specific constitutional provision is

involved; rather the case involves application

of the doctrine of intergovernmental immunities

as enunciated in the decisions of this Court.

Internal Revenue Code:

—

Section 4261, subdivision (a) reads as

follows:

"(a) In general.- There is hereby

imposed upon the amount paid for tax-

able transportation (as defined in

section 4262) of any person which begins

after June 30, 1970, a tax equal to

8 percent of the amount so paid. In

the case of amounts paid outside of

the United States for taxable trans-

portation, the tax imposed by this

subsection shall apply only if such

transportation begins and ends in

the United States."

Section 4262 reads in part as follows:

" * * * the term ‘taxable transporta-

tion’ means * * * (1) transportation

by air * * *,"

Section 4292, as amended by Public Law

91-258, 84 Stat. 219, §205(a)(2), reads as

follows (the material in brackets was deleted

by the 1970 Act):

"4292. State and local governmental

exemption. Under regulations prescribed

by the Secretary or his delegate, no

tax shall be imposed under section 4251

(or 4261] upon any payment received for

services or facilities furnished to the

Government of any State, Territory of

the United States, or any political

subdivision of the foregoing or the

District of Columbia."

=_s

Airport and Airway Revenue Act of 1970:

Section 208 of this Act (P.L. 91-258, July 1, 1980, under subsections

84 Stat. 250, 49 U.S.C. §1742) reads in (c) and (d) of section 4041 (taxes

pertinent part as follows: on aviation fuel) and under sections

“Sec. 208. Airport and Airway Trust Fund. 4261, 4271, and 4491 (taxes on

(a) Creation of Trust Fund.-- There is transportation by air and on use

established in the Treasury of the of civil aircraft) of the Internal

United States a trust fund to be known Revenue Code of 1954;

as the "Airport and Airway Trust Fund' (2) amounts determined by the

Secretary of the Treasury to be

(hereinafter in this section referred

to as the “Trust Fund'), consisting equivalent to the taxes received

ob east amounts as may be appropriated in the Treasury after June 30,

or credited to the Trust Fund as pro- 1970, and before July 1, 1980,

eited tm thie eookinn. under section 4081 of such Code,

(b) Transfer to Trust Fund of Amounts with respect to gasoline used in

Equivalent to Certain Taxes.-- There aircraft; and

is hereby appropriated to the Trust (3) amounts determined by the

— Secretary of the Treasury to be

(1) amounts equivalent to the equivalent to the taxes received

taxes received in the Treasury in the Treasury after June 30,

after June 30, 1970, and before 1970, and before July 1, 1980,

alice under paragraphs (2) and (3) of

aBe

section 407l1(a) of such Code, with

respect to tires and tubes of the

types used on aircraft.

The amounts appropriated by paragraphs (1),

(2), and (3) shall be transferred at least

Quarterly from the general fund of the

Treasury to the Trust Fund on the basis of

estimates made by the Secretary of the

Treasury of the amounts referred to in para-

Graphs (1), (2), and (3) received in the

Treasury. Proper adjustments shall be made

in the amounts subsequently transferred to

the extent prior estimates were in excess

of or less than the amount required to be

transferred."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The complaint in this case, alleges that

certain City officials and employees who

travel on official City governmental business

paid the excise tax on their airline fares

imposed by Internal Revenue Code §4261 and

were reimbursed fr those payments by the

City.

During the period July 1, 1970 to May

31, 1972, the City, as a result of such

reimbursement paid to the United States of

America, the respondent, $80,500, for these

excise taxes on the airline fares of its

officials and employees.

On July 23, 1972, the City of New York

filed a refund claim in that emount and on

September 7, 1972, at the request of the

United States Internal Revenue Service,

filed amended claims for refund aggregating

the same amount. On Jariuary 19, 1973, the

Internal Revenue Service notified the City

that its claims for refund were rejected.

On or about April 3, 1974, the peti-

tioner commenced this action for a refund

of those taxes in the District Court, pur-

Suant to 28 U,.S.C. §1346(a)(1). On motion

-9-

of the respondent, the District Court dis-

missed the complaint with prejudice. The

Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of

dismissal.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The Decisions Below

The complaint alleged that employees

of the City had used airplane travel in the

prosecution of necessary governmental busi-

ness. It did not specify whether or not

that business, or which part of it, was

uniquely governmental or the exercise of

State sovereignty. Neither did the com-

plaint state any facts which could be con-

Strued to negate that uniqueness or sov-

ereign quality. The first of these two

characteristics is required, if the tax is

not discriminatory, by the minority

Opinion of Justice FRANKFURTER in New York

v. United States, 326 U.S. 672.(1946); the

second by the minority opinion of Chief

-10-

Justice STONE in that case. While each of

these opinions expressed dissatisfaction

with the then existing doctrine which denied

Or granted immunity depending upon whether

the activities taxed were proprietary or

governmental, the two opinions were, as we

shall show more fully later, in irreconcil-

able conflict.

Despite this, and despite the lack of

specific allegations describing the precise

kinds of activities involved, the District

Court viewed New York v. United States,

Supra as “[a] particularly crushing blow to

the pre-existing doctrine." The Court then

purported to apply the conditions set forth

for immunity in both the opinions of Justice

FRANKFURTER and Chief Justice STONE. It

found that the City met none of those criteria,

Stating "it is clear that the excise tax is

neither discriminatory nor does it unduly

interfere with the governmental functions

@jj«

of New York City."

We are unable to understand how the

District Court could, on the bare complaint,

conclude that none of the taxed transactions

described in the broadest of terms in that

complaint, met the criteria formulated in

those two inconsistent minority opinions.

There were no answers to interrogatories to

describe the nature of those transactions.

There was nothing in the nature of a bill

of particulars to describe them. All that

the pleading said, was that they were

governmental in nature. That could have

meant that they were "uniquely governmental"

within the meaning of Justice FRANKFURTER's

Opinion. It could have meant that they were

pure exercises of sovereignty - as, indeed

in many instances they were - e.g. travel

to a distant state by a police officer to

return a person in extradition proceedings -

thus meeting Chief Justice STONE's criteria;

ol2@

or, as in the case of extradition, they could -

have met the criteria of both opinions.

The District Court's cpinion was, thus,

a non seguitur. Because the Court of Appeals

affirmed expressly on the District Court's

opinion, it too, engaged in the same non

sequitur.

1. THE DECISION BELOW IS BASED ON THE

DISPARATE AND CONFLICTING REASONING OF TWO

MINORITY OPINIONS IN THIS COURT. THIS

COURT'S HOLDING IN NEW YORK V. UNITED STATES,

326 U.S. 672 (1946) BECAUSE OF THE DIVERSE

VIEWS OF THE JUSTICES, CALLS FOR CLARIFICATION

SO THAT STATES AND THEIR POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS

CAN BE PROPERLY GUIDED IN THE CONDUCT OF THEIR

AFFAIRS.

The case of New York v. United States,

326 U.S. 672 (1946), involved the tax on

mineral waters imposed by §615(a)(5) of the

Revenue Act of 1932, 47 Stat. 169, 264.

New York resisted imposition of such a tax

ol3eq

on its sale of mineral waters obtained from

Saratoga Springs in that state, and sought

their refund. Aside from the argument that

the preservation of the springs at Saratoga

related to the accomplishment of the govern-

mental function of conservation, the case

presented a simple question of whether the

activity taxed was a proprietary one or a

governmental one. Under the law as it had

been developed up to that point, it was

clear - the conservation argument aside -

that no immunity from taxes could be

bestowed on an activity so essentially

proprietary and non-governmental. Mr.

Justice FRANKFURTER, in his opinion said:

"On the basis of authority, the case is

quickly disposed of", citing South

Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437

(1905), Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360

(1934), Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214

(1934) and Allen v. Regents, 304 U.S. 439

alge

(1938). But in that opinion, which was con-

curred in only by Justice RUTLEDGE, Justice

PRANKFURTER, expressing dissatisfaction with

those authorities, sought to set forth a new

doctrine of immunity which in essence per-

mitted the Federal government to tax a state

when the tax involved did not discriminate

against the state, i.e. was applicable to

the state as well as private parties, pro-

vided that it did not impinge upon state

activities which partake of "uniqueness from

the point of view of intergovernmental re-

lations" (326 U.S. at p. 582).

Chief Justice STONE wrote a concurring

Opinion for a Plurality of the Court.* ze

agreed with Justice FRANKFURTER that a new

formulation of the rule of immunity was needed.

*Justices REED, MURPHY and BURTON concurred

with Justice STONE. Justice JACKSON took no

Part in the case. Justices BLACK and DOUGLAS

dissented.

-15-

But he disagreed sharply with the notion

which would permit taxation of the States

so long as the tax was non-discriminatory.

Instead he set up yet another set of criteria

for tax immunity which, in summary, would

peoser tie taxes which would "interfere unduly

with the State's performance of its sovereign

functions of government," or “impair the sov-

ereign status of the State". (326 U.S. at

p. 587).

The Courts below had little difficulty

in wrestling with these inconsistent views.

Perhaps they felt that one of them would

eventually emerge as the rule of this Court,

not considering that this Court might have a

different formulation of its own. Then they

Simply, and wrongly, assumed that the City's

undisclosed and undelineated taxed activities

met neither of these criteria.

ol 6e

While those Courts may have experienced

little difficulty in dealing with two dis-

Parate minority opinions, the States and their

political subdivisions experience no such ease

in evaluating and applying them. New York v.

United States, 326 U.S. 672 (1946) remains

an unexplained enigma and the latest important

word of this Court in the area of state tax

immunity. It creates difficulties of a kind

that are exemplified by the case at bar.

Strictly speaking, the opinions of Justices

STONE and FRANKFURTER, at best, constitute

obiter dicta. On its facts, New York v. United

States is no more than a holding which follows

the previously developed rule which immunized

governmental transactions but taxed those of

@ proprietary nature. It did not solve or

resolve any of the problems to which that

rule gave rise. Nor did it do anything more

olJe

than express dissatisfaction with that rule.

Because of the disharmony between Justice

FRANKFURTER'S and Chief Justice STONE'S

criteria, the case did not even lay down

proper guidelines for future action.

In the present confused state of the

law, those guidelines are necessary for the

proper conduct of the affairs of the states

and their political subdivisions. We believe

that the present case offers an opportunity

for this Court to settle the law in this

presently confused area.

In the work entitled, THE CONSTITUTION

OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, prepared

pursuant to P.L. 91-589, 84 Stat. 1585; 2

U.S.C. §168, by the Congressional Research

Service, Library of Congress (1973), in

treating of the scope of State immunity

from federal taxation, the authors state

-18<

(pp. 131-132):

"Although there have been sharp

differences of opinion among

members of the Supreme Court in

recent cases dealing with tax

immunity of state functions and

instrumentalities, it has been

Stated that ‘all agree that not

all of the former immunity is

gone." Twice, the Court has

made an effort to express its

new point of view in a statement

of general principles by which

the right to such immunity shall

be determined. However, the

failure to muster a majority in

concurrence with any single

opinion in the more recent of

these cases leaves the question

very much in doubt.

* . * * .

The second attempt to formulate

a general doctrine was made in New

York v. United States, where, on

review of a judgment affirming the

right of the United States to tax

the sale of mineral waters taken

from property owned and operated

by the State of New York, the

Court reconsidered the right of

Congress to tax business enter-

prises carried on by the States.

Justice Frankfurter, speaking for

himself and Justice Rutledge,

ol9q

made the question of discrimination

vel non against state activities STONE'S or whether it wi if-

the test of the validity of such ) = WEES Chast © Cif

a tax. They found 'no restriction ferent formulation of its own. Our chief

upon Congress to include the States

in levying a tax exacted equally interest is that the Present uncertainty

from private persons upon the same

subject matter.' In a concurring in this field be dispelled and replaced

Opinion in which Justices Reed,

‘Murphy, and Burton joined, Chief by a doctrine by which the States and

Justice Stone rejected the criter-

ion of discrimination. He repeated their political subdivisions may be

what he had said in an earlier case

to the effect that '...the limitation guided.

upon the taxing power of each, so

far as it affects the other, must We also believe that, whatever cri-

receive a practical construction

which permits both to function with teria may result from a decision of the

the minimum of interference each with

the other; and that limitation can- case at bar, many of the City's activities

not be so varied or extended as ser-

iously to impair either the taxing subjected to the tax will be found to par-

power of the government imposing the

tax...or the appropriate exercise of take of the sovereign immunity which the

the functions of the government af-

fected by it.'” City seeks.

We do not know whether this Court, 2. RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION RAISED

should it grant this petition, will adhere IN THIS CASE WILL AID IN THE SOLUTION OF

to the earlier "proprietary versus govern- A RECURRENT PROBLEM FOR ALL OF THE STATES

mental" rule, whether it will accept Justice AND MANY OF THEIR POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS.

FRANKFURTER'S formulation or Chief Justice The uncertainty which Dresently per-

" vades the field of governmental immunity

-2l-

presents problems not only for the petitioner,

whose problem may be, as we shall later show,

exacerbated by the rule of collateral estop-

pel, but for all of the other states and

their political subdivisions as well. Air

travel is the means most frequently used in

today's conduct of business, including gov-

ernmental business. We think it is no ex-

aggeration to surmise that every state gov-

ernment uses it, and every one of those

governments, if the decision below is to

be followed, is taxable on its travel.

Whether the burden of taxation on the state

governments is large or small is aside from

the point. The uncertainty created by the

decision below as well as that in State of

Texas v. United States, 72-2 U.S. Tax Cas.,

q16,048, at 86,128 (W.D. Tex., 1972) aff'd

Mem. 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas., {16,085 at 81,394

o220

(S Cir., 1972), of which more will be said

later, casts an administrative burden on

those government units, for until it is

affirmed or reversed or until the proper

guidelines are outlined by this Court,

those governments, like the petitioner,

will be under a recurrent obligation to

file claims for refund of taxes paid on

air transportation.

We urge this Court to grant a writ

of certiorari in this case so that the

atmosphere may be cleared of its murkiness.

Whatever this Court may decide, its de-

cision will have the salutary virtue of.

certainty, which will be of enormous help

to the governments affected.

o230

3. THE CITY OF NEW YORK, HAVING

LOST ITS CASE BELOW, WILL BE

ESPECIALLY DISADVANTAGED IN ANY

LATER ATTEMPTS TO SEEK REFUND OF

AIR TRANSPORTATION TAXES IN THE

ABSENCE OF A DECISION BY THIS COURT

OR A STATUTORY CHANGE, BECAUSE THE.

DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL MAY

BE ASSERTED TO FORECLOSE FUTURE RE-

FUNDS.

The tax in question is a recurring tax

and not an isolated instance of the appli-

cation of a tax law. The City continues

and will continue to use air travel. It

will continue to pay the tax on that travel.

It will, indeed it has, continue to seek

a refund of the taxes which it pays. It

will continue to have those refund appli-

cations denied and will continue to bring

o24<

actions to review those denials.

Those actions, in the absence of a de-

cision by this Court, in this or another

case, may be doomed to dismissal by the

assertion of the doctrine of collateral

estoppel which this Courc has applied in

tax cases. In the absence of new judicial

decisions or trends, that doctrine may pre-

Clude fruitful litigation for later periods,

of the issue decided with resvect to the

instant tax period. See Scott, Collateral

Estoppel by Judgment, 56 Harv. L. Rev l

(1942); Tait v. The Western Maryland Ry.

Co., 289 U.S. 620 (1933); cf. Commissioner

v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948).

This potential plight of the peti-

tioner, when viewed in the light of the

dubious quality of the holdings below,

and the uncertainty that exists in fore-

-25-

casting this Court's ultimate view, pre-

sents a further reason for the exercise

of this Court's discretionary jurisdiction

in granting the writ which we seek.

4, IF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE IS

NOT REACHED BECAUSE THE TAX IN QUES-

TION IS VALID AS A "USER CHARGE",

THAT ISSUE SHOULD BE PASSED UPON BY

THIS COURT.

Neither of the Courts below dealt

with the respondent's argument that the

tax in question is validly imposed as a

"user charge". Decision was based en-

tirely on the constitutional issue.

But the United States had also relied on

the case of State of Texas v. U.S., 72-2

U.S. Tax Cas., 416,048, at 86,128 (W.D.

Tex., 1972) aff'd mem. 73-1 U.S. Tax

Cas., 416,085, at 81,394 (5 Cir., 1972).

o26e

The District Court concluded that although

that case related mainly to the “user

charge" issue, it contained dicta which

followed the “nondiscriminatory" test of

Justice PRANKFURTER in New York v. United

States.

The intrusive “user charge" issue is,

we believe, based on an untenable founda-

tion. Nevertheless, if it presents a

means of resolving taxability in this

case, that resolution is as important to

the states and political subdivisions

which pay these taxes as would be the

more desirable resolution of the consti-

tutional issue. If this case is reviewed,

its eventual decision will, regardless of

its basis, erase the uncertainty which

the present confused state of the law has

created.

-27-

We think there is little merit to the

“user charge" argument. In the Texas case,

counsel for the state accepted the char-

acterization and agreed in its Stipulation

of Facts that "The excise taxes***represent

a user charge***"(72 USTC at p.86129).

The question raised is simply whether

the creation by the 1970 legislation of an

Airport and Airway Trust Fund (p. 2, 9l-

258, §208, 84 Stat. 250, 49 USC §1743),

which was supported by appropriations re-

flecting the amounts of the air trans-

portation taxes collected, converted what

had for years been a tax, into a charge.

In the report of the House Committee which

recommended the repeal of the provision

exempting states and their subdivisions

from the tax, we find the genesis of the

thought that the tax was a charge. That

-28<

Statement said (U.S. Code Cong. Ad. News,

Slst Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. 2, (1970):

"***this tax is now generally

viewed as a user charge." (Under-

scoring supplied)

The lack of foundation for this statement

is matched only by its inaccuracy. It

was plainly inaccurate because it was

made before the 1970 legislation was

passed, before the trust fund was set

up, before the Internal Revenue Code

was amended and yet it said that the

tax which had always been a tax is

now; 1.e., at the time of the report,

viewed as a charge. The statement con-

flicts with the whole super-structure

of the government's argument which is

to the effect that the 1970 legislation

converted what had been a tax into a

charge. The Committee's words indicate

-29-

that it had always been a charge, or,

at least, it had come to be considered

a charge, even before there was a trust

fund.

The taxes in question were origin-

ally enacted in 1942 as taxes, and so

remained as taxes. The language by

which they are imposed was not changed

substantially by the 1970 legislation

which repealed the exemption. The law

still calls them taxes. They are still

part of the Internal Revenue Code and

are subject to all of that Code's ap-

plicable procedural provisions, most

of which call the imposts taxes. To

call them charges when nothing was

done to the statute imposing them to

change their character from the taxes

which they were is utterly unrealistic.

-30-

While it may be proper to aévert to Com-

mittee reports to resolve an ambiguity,

there is no ambiguity in the Statute

under consideration. The report of the

committee which calls the tax a user

charge on at least 150 separate occas-

ions speaks of the tax as a tax. ([U.S.

Code, Cong. Ad. News, 9lst Cong., 2d

Sess., Vol. 2, 3076 to 3125, (1970)].

If the Congress had intended to con-

vert what had always been a tax into

a user charge, it could have readily

done so by appropriate language in the

Statute which it was considering and

passing, not in its committee renvort.

Nor do we believe that even had

the tax been designated as a charge

in the legislation, it could have been

levied against activities which consti-

=3)<

tute an exercise of the states' sovereign

duties.

In two recent cases, reported under

the title of Evansville Airport v. Delta

Airlines, 405 U.S. 707 (1972), it was

held that states and their political

subdivisions which operated airvorts

might impose a head tax on passengers

departing from those airports. Normally,

such taxes would have been an unconsti-

tutional impairment of the right to

travel under the Privileges and Immuni-

ties Clause (U.S. Const., Art. IV, §2),

Or the Commerce Clause (U.S. Const.,

Art. I, §8, Cl.3). Crandall v. State

of Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867),

and the Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7

How.) 283 (1849). But in upholding

these imposts, which were to be used

@32<

for the improvement and maintenance of

the airports, this Court was careful to

find that the charges made were a fair,

albeit imperfect, approximation of the

value of the use of the facilities by

those upon whom they were imposed.

In short, the charges were found to be

not excessive in relation to the costs

incurred in Providing the services to

which they were related. We believe

that even were the tax involved here

to be considered a charge rather than

a tax, it would not be sustained with-

out a2 showing that the amount of the

so-called charges bore a fair relation-

Ship to the benefits received by the

governmental taxpayers. To sustain

its tax in this case, there must be

some factual background of which the

-33-

Court can take judicial notice to show

the commensurateness of the services

rendered and the charges imposed. There

is no such factual background.

CONCLUSION

A writ of certiorari to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit should be granted.

April 30, 1976

Respectfully submitted,

W. BERNARD RICHLAND

Corporation Counsel

Attorney for Petitioner

City of New York

Samuel J. Warms

Cornelius F. Roche,

of Counsel.

-34-

la

Opinion of Cannella, D.J.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

CIT “OF NEW YORK,

Plaintiff,

“against-

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

Appearances:

W. Bernard Richland, Corporation Coun-

sel of the City of New York (Samuel J. Warms

and Raymond Herzog, Asst. Corp. Counsels,

of counsel), for plaintiff.

Paul J. Curran, U.S. Attorney for the

Southern District of New York (John S.

Siffert, Asst. U.S. Attorney, of counsel),

for defendant.

CANNELLA, D.J.:

This action was commenced by the City

of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1346 for

the refund of certain excise taxes which

2a

Opinion of Cannella, D.J.

have been paid to the Federal Government.

The sole issue presented for our determina-

esas is whether the excise tax on amounts

paid for transportation of persons by air

under § 4261 of the Internal Revenue Code,

26 U.S.C. §4261, may constitutionally be

imposed on city expenditures for employees

traveling on official city business. As

we find that the constitutional doctrine

of intergovernmer 1 tax immunity does not

bar the imposition of this tax, the motion

of the United States to dismiss the com-

plaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)

is hereby granted.

THE FACTS

The City claims that during the period

of July 1, 1970 through May 31, 1972 certain

of its employees traveled by air while con-

ducting necessary, official New York City

3a

Opinion of Cannella, D.J.

business. These employees purchased and

paid for air transportation and such air

face included the federal excise tax speci-

fied in § 4261. The employees were later

reimbursed by the City for the expenses in-

curred.

On July 23, 1972, the City filed a

Claim for refund of the taxes now in Suit-

$80,500. On January 19, 1973, the Internal

Revenue Service notified the City that its

claim had been rejected. Thereafter, on

April 3, 1974, the instant action was

ccntianes.”

THE STATUTORY SCHEME

The excise tax provision here at issue

(§ 4261), while a long-standing part of the

1

The action appears to have been timely

filed under 26 U.S.C. § 6532(a)(1) and

venue is proper, 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(2).

4a

Opinion of Cannella, D.J.

Code, was significantly amended as part of .

the Airport and Airway Revenue Act of 1970;

legislation which was passed in conjunction

with the Airport and Airway Development Act

3

of 1970. The stated purpose of these enact-

ments was to aid in the substantial expansion,

improvement and development of the American

airport and airway system in order to meet

future needs and demands for these facili-

+

ties.

With regard to the instant dispute,

the changes which the 1970 Act effected upon

2

Title II, Pub.L. 91-258, 84 Stat. 236

(effective July 1, 1970).

3

Title I, Pub.L. 91-258, 84 Stat. 219

=

See, § 2, Title I, Pub.L. 91-258; supra;

H. Red. No. 91-601, 91st Cong., lst Sess.

in 1970 U.S. Code Cong, and Admin. News

at 3047 and 3082.

5a

Opinion of Cannella, D.J.

5

§ 4261 are not as important

5 :

In its oresent form, §426l(a) of the Code

States:

(a) IN GENERAL.-There is hereby im-

posed upon the amount paid for taxable

transportation (as defined in section

4262) of any person which "egins after

June 30, 1970, a tax equal co 8 percent

of the amount so paid. In the case of

amounts paid outside of the United States

for taxable transportation, the tax

imposed by this subsection shall apply

Only if such transportation begins and

ends in the United States.

§4262, in turn, defines "taxable transpor-

tation” as “transportation by air" and

further states:

(a) TAXABLE TRANSPORTATION; IN GENERAL. -

For purposes of this part, except as pro-

vided in subsection (6b), the term "tax-

able transportation" means-

(1) transportation by air which

begins in the United States or in the

225-mile zone and ends in the United

States or in the 225-mile zone; and

(2) in the case of transportation

by air other than transportation de-

Scribed in paragraph (1), that portion

(Footnote continued on following page)

6a

Opinion of Cannella, D.J.

(Footnote continued from preceding page)

of such transportation which is di-

rectly or indirectly from one port

Or station in the United States to

another port or station in the United

States, but only if such portion is

not apart of uninterrupted inter-

national air transportation. ...

(C) DEFINITIONS.-For purposes of this

section-

(1) CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES .-The

term “continental United States" means

the District of Columbia and the States

other than Alaska and Hawaii.

(2) 225-MILE ZONE.-The term "225-

mile zone" means that portion of Canada

and Mexico which is not more than 225

miles from the nearest point in the

continental United States.

(3) UNINTERRUPTED INTERNATIONAL AIR

TRANSPORTATION.- The term "unin-

terrupted international air transporta-

tion” means any transportation by air

which is not transportation described

in subsection (a)(1) and in which-

(A) the scheduled interval be

tween (i) the beginning or end of the

portion of such transportation which

is directly or indirectly from one

port or staticn in the United States

to another port or station in the

(Footnote continued on following page)

7a

Opinion of Cannella, D.J.

as the impact which it had upon §4292 of the

Code (26 U.S.C. §4292). Prior to July l,

1970 (the effective date of the amendments),

§4292 exempted from the excise tax imposed

under § 4261 “any payment received for ser-

vices or facilities furnished to the Govern-

ment of any State, Territory of the United

States, or any political subdivision of the

foregoing or the District of Columbia."

The Airport and Airway Revenue Act of 1970,

however, deleted the reference to § 4261

6

from § 4292, thus completely withdrawing

(Footnote continued from preceding page)

United States and (ii) the end or

beginning of the other portion of such

transportation is not more than 6

hours, and

(B) The scheduled interval between

the beginning or end and the end Or

beginning of any two segments of the

portion of such transportation referred

to in subparagraph (A) (i) is not more

than 6 hours. ...

6

Prior to the 1970 amendment §4292 stated:

(Footnote continued on following page)

8a

Opinion of Cannella, D.J.

from the law the previous statutory grant

of immunity accorded to New York City and

other political entities. The rationale

for this legislative decision is made abun-

dantly clear in the House Report, which

states:

Present law provides a series of .

exemptions from the tax on transportation

of persons by air. These include ex-

emptions: .. . (5) for transportation

furnished to the United States (at the

discretion of the Secretary of the

(Footnote continued on preceding page)

Under regulations prescribed by the

Secretary or his delegate, no tax shall

be imposed under section 4251 or 4261

upon any payment received for services

or facilities furnished to the Government

of any State, Territory of the United

States, or any political subdivision of

the foregoing or the District of Columbia.

§205(a)(2) of the Airport and Airway Revenue

Act of 1970 (Title II, Pub.L. 91-258, 84 Stat.

236) deleted the phrase "or 4261" from the

Statute. (§ 4251 imposes a tax on certain

communications services, such as telephone

services, and is not here relevant.)

9a

Opinion of Cannella, D.J.

Treasury) and to State and local

governments. ...

The Ways and Means Committee has

deleted most of these exemptions

either as obsolete provisions or as

unnecessary complications of existing

. eae ae

The exemptions for transporation fur-

nished to State and local governments,

the United States, and nonprofit educa-

tional organizations are terminated. ..

It did not seem appropriate to continue

Special exemptions for these govern-

mental and educational organizations

Since this tax is now generally viewed

as a user charge. In this situation

there would appear to be no reason

why these governmental and educational

Organizations should not pay for their

Share of the use of the airway facil-

ities. Moreover, should these exemp-

tions be retained where now applicable,

it would be difficult to see why other

equally meritorious nonprofit organiza-

tions should not also be granted

exemption.

H. Rep. No. 91-601, 9lst Cong., lst Sess. in

1970 U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News at 3090-9:

For further discussion of the legislative

(Footnote continued on following Page)

10a

Opinion of Cannella, D.J.

Hence, under the present statutory scheme

the only basis upon which the City might

avoid the air transportation excise tax is

under the constitutional doctrine . of

intergovernmental tax immunity.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX IMMUNITY

The City premises its present claim upon

the assertion that “a political subdivision

of a state which exercises governmental

functions may not be subjected in performing

8

those functions to a federal tax." Thus,

relies upon the intergovernmental tax immunity

which is said to arise by implication from

(Footnote continued from preceding page)

isi Texas

history of the provisions at bar, see,

Vv. United States, 72-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ¥ 16,048

'd mem.

at 86,128 (W.D. Tex. 1972), aff

73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 4 16,085 at 61,394

(§ Cie. 1972).

8

City's Brief at 8.

lia

Opinion of Cannella, D.J.

the federal constitution; a doctrine which

finds its origin in McCulloch Vv. Maryland,

17 U.S. 316 (1819). ‘The doctrine enjoyed

great success and was frequently invoked

by courts during the late nineteenth and

early twentieth centuries and it is upon

the case law generated during this earlier

period _ the City places Drincipal re-

liance. However, as Professors Freeland

and Stephens have observed: "Despite its

9

In chronological order, the cases cited

by the City are: Collector: v. Day, 78

U.S. 113 (1870); South Carolina v. United

States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905); Ohio v.

Helvering, 292 U.S. 360 (1934); Helvering

v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938); Allen

Vv. Regents of the University System of

Georgia, 304 U.S. 439 (1939); and Graves

V. New York ex rel, O'Keefe, 306 U.S.

466 (1939). These decisions, together

with other leading immunity cases and New

York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946),

are digested and discussed in: BF. Barrett

& P. Bruton, Constitutional Law 483-495

(4th ed. 1973); Pl Kauper, Constitutional

(Footnote continued on following page)

lza

Opinion of Cannella, D.J.

bold beginning and vigorous earlier life, the

doctrine of intergovernmental immunity has

suffered a marked decline over the past half

century." J. Freeland & R. Stephens, Funda-

mentals of Federal Income Taxation 247 (1972).

A particularly crushing blow to the pre-

existing doctrine came in 1946, when the

Supreme Court decided New York v. United

“(Footnote continued from preceding page)

452-488 (4th ed. 1972); G. Gunther &

f-“powling, Constitutional Law, 752-765 (8th

ed. 1970); W. Lockhart, Y. Kamisar & J.

Choper, Constitutional Law, 440-460 (2nd

ed. 1967); McCormack, Intergovernmental

Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment, 51

N.c.L. Rev. 405, 400-493 (1973). Each of

these authors recognizes that the immunity

doctrine is only a shadow of its former

self and that the courts have, during the

more recent years, restricted its scope

with each decision.

The leading pre-New York v. United States

articles in this area are those of Professor

Thomas Reed Powell. Powell, The Waning of

Intergovernmental Tax Immunities 58 Harv. L.

Rev. 033; and The Remnant of -.ntergovern-

mental Tax Immunities, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 75/7

(1945).

l3a

Opinion of Cannella, D.J.

States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946). That case

Stands as the Court's most recent pronounce-

ment in this area and is, in the opinion of

this Court, clearly preclusive of the City's

claim. The opinions of the several Justices

in New York v. United States render the

earlier decisions of but historical interest

and, to use Professor Griswold's Phrase, “the

doctrine of immunity was limited" in scope and

utility by the views there expressed. €E.

Griswold, Federal Taxation 29 (6th ed. 1966).

The Court's decision in New York v.

United States is itself somewhat curious pre-

cedent because no opinion of the Court actually

exists. Mr. Justice Frankfurter "announced

the judgment of the Court and delivered an

Opinion in which Mr. Justice Rutledge joined.”

326 U.S. at 573. Mr. Justice Rutledge sepa-

rately concurred and Chief Justice Stone,

l4a

Opinion of Cannella, D.J.

joined by Justices Reed, Murphy and Burton,

issued a concurring opinion. Mr. Justice

Douglas, joined by Mr. Justice Black, dis-

sented. This division of the Court and

the policy considerations which are at-

tendant thereon, while of significance in

a close case, are without impact in the

matter at bar since no difference in result

is obtained when the present facts are

viewed through either the Frankfurter or

Stone formulation.

Mr. Justice Frankfurter, after first

noting that Article I, § 9 of the Consti-

tution ("Congress can lay no tax ‘on Arti-

cles exported from any State'” (326 U.S.

at 575)) imposed the only direct consti-

tutional limitation upon the federal taxing

power viz-a-viz the states, recognized

that other tax immunity doctrines derived

15a

Opinion of Cannella, D.J.

from Chief Justice Marshall's famous phrase

“the power to tax involves the vower to de-

Stroy." Id. at 575-76. The Justice, in

an apparent effort to simplify the immunity

doctrine and advance a more workable stan-

dard, began his endeavor by outrightly

rejecting the older premise of reciprocal

intergovernmental tax immunity. Placing

emphasis upon Mr. Justice Bradley's dis-

senting opinion in Collector v. Day, 78 U.S.

113, 128-29 (1870), Frankfurter concluded

that reciprocity of tax. immunities was an

unwarranted inhibition upon the federal

System of government. Id. at 577-82. In

its place, Justice Frankfurter promulgated

a new test of tax immunity-a standard which

validates a federal tax which falls upon a

State entity when the tax is found to be

nondiscriminatory.

Id.

l6a

Opinion of Cannella, D.J.

There are, of course, State activities

and State-owned property that partake

of uniqueness from the point of view

of intergovernmental relations. These

inherently constitute a class by them-

selves. Only a State can own a State-

house; only a State can get income by

taxing. These could not be included

for purposes of federal taxation in

any abstract category of taxpayers

without taxing the State as a State.

But so long as Congress generally taps

a scucce of revenue by whomsoever

earnea and not uniquely capable of

being earned only by a State, the

Constitution of the United States does

not forbid it merely because its

incidence falls also on a State.

If Congress desires, it may of course

leave untaxed enterprises pursued

by States for the public good while

it taxes like enterprises organized

for private ends. [Citations omitted.]

If Congress makes- no such differentia-

tion and, as in this case, taxes all

vendors of mineral water alike, whether

State vendors or private vendors, it

simply says, in effect, to a State:

"You may carry out your own notions

of social policy in engaging in what

is called business, but you must pay

your share in having a nation which

enables you to pursue your policy."

at 582. Moreover, Justice Frankfurter ex-

pressly rejected the distinctions previously

l7a

Opinion of Cannella, D.J.

drawn between the “governmental” and "pro-

prietary" functions of state and local

entities as “to shifting a basis for deter-

mining constitutional power and too entangled

in expediency to serve as a dependable legal

Criterion.” Id. at 580. He concluded by

Stating:

we decide enough when we reject limita-

tions upon the taxing power of Congress

derived from such untenable criteria

as “proprietary" against "governmental"

activities of the States, or histori-

cally sanctioned activities of govern-

ment, Or activities conducted merely

for profit, ard find no restriction

upon Congress to include the States

in levying a tax exacted equally from

private persons upon the same subject

matter.

Id. at 583-84 (footnote omitted).

Justice Frankfurter's brethren in the

Majority refused to accept all of the views

that he had offered. Even Justice Rutledge,

who concurred in the opinion, felt a need

18a

Opinion of Canneila, D.J.

to express himself separately. Id. at 584-

86. Four other Justices, in an opinion by

Chief Justice Stone, felt compelled to limit

the per se “nondiscriminatory test" formu-

lated by Frankfurter.

While joining Justice Frankfurter in

finding “untenable the distinction between

‘'governmental' and 'proprietary' interests,"

id. at 586, the Chief Justice expressed his

reservations with regard to placing ex-

clusive reliance upon the nondiscriminatory

nature of a tax in the following words:

[W]e are not prepared to say that the

national government may constitutionally

lay non-discriminatory tax on every

class of property and activities of

States and individuals alike.

. . -(O]luc difficulty with the formula,

now first suggested as offering a new

solution for an old problem, is that

a federal tax which is not discrimina-

tory as to the subject matter may

nevertheless so affect the State, ~

merely because it is a State that is

19a

Opinion of Cannella, D.J.

being taxed, as to interfere unduly

with the State's performance of its

sovereign functions of government.

Id. at 586-87. The difficulty encountered

by the Chief Justice and his colleagues with

Frankfurter's formulation is evidenced by

the following passage:

If the phrase "non-discriminatory

tax" is to be taken in its long

accepted meaning as referring to a

tax laid on a like subject matter,

without regard to the personality of

the taxpayer, whether a State, a

corporation or a private individual,

it is plain that there may be non-

discriminatory taxes which, when laid

on a State, would nevertheless impair

the sovereign status of the State

quite as much as a like tax imposed

by a State on property or activities

of the national government. Mayo v.

United States, 319 U.S. 441, 447-448.

This is not because the tax can be

regarded as discriminatory but be-

cause a sovereign government is the

taxpayer, and the tax, even though

non-discriminatory, may be regarded

as infringing its sovereignty.

Id. at 587. Thus, Chief Justice Stone con-

cluded that the mere nondiscriminatory nature

20a

Opinion of Cannella, D.J.

of a tax would not be enough to sustain its

levy upon a state or locality. In addition,

the Chief Justice indicated that "we [must]

consider whether such a non-discriminatory

tax unduly interferes with the verformance

of the State's functions of government.

If it does, then the fact that the tax is

non-discriminatory does not save it." Id.

at 588.

Returning, then, to the matter at bar,

we reiterate that these distinctions are

not determinative to the outcome of this

case. Clearly, the excise tax imoosed by

§ 4261 of the Code is nondiscriminatory in

mature. Ali users of air transportation

facilities (with the limited exception of

an international organization of the Red

Cross) are equally subject to this tax.

We cannot perceive any undue interference

2la

Opinion of Cannella, D.J.

with the sovereign functions of City govern-

ment as the result of its being compelled

to contribute to the federal tax coffers

in this particular instance. While it is

difficult for us to conceive of a federal

tax, other than those suggested in the

Opinions of the Court (i.e., a tax on state-

houses aand cityhalls), which is both non-

discriminatory and yet unduly restrictive

10

against a municipality, it is clear that

10

While perhaps not entirely Satisfactory,

we offer the following example to illustrate

this concept: A federal tax on all .38

caliber handguns (or bullets). Such a

tax would apply to all who own such pistols:

private citizens, detective agencies, and

the like, as well as state and local govern-

ments. However, owing to the fact that

the incidence of .38 caliber handgun owner-

Ship is greatest among state and local law

enforcement agencies and that the pos-

session of such firearms is vital to their

Proper functioning, it might well be said

that although nondiscriminatory in scope,

(Footnote continued on following page)

22a

Opinion of Cannella, D.J.

the air transportation excise tax is neither

discriminatory nor does it unduly interfere

ith the governmental functions of New York

City. As one commentator has put it, “any

challenge to federal taxation of a state

[or city] activity would require a showing

of actual impairment of state [or city]

functions." McCormack, supra n. 9 at 493.

Plainly, no actual impairment of the City's

functions has been demonstrated in this case.

The statutory exemption previously en-

joyed by the City having been abrogated in

1970, we conclude that the constitutional

doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity

will not properly assume its place. The

City's claim of immunity from the excise

(Footnote continued from preceding page)

the tax, if of sufficient magnitude, could

indeed unduly interfere with the sovereign

functions of government.

23a

Opinion of Cannella, D.J.

tax imposed under § 4261 must be rejected.

We add only that our view with regard to

New York v. United States is fully supported

by the following cases: Murphy v. O'Brien,

485 F. 2d 671, 674-75 (T.E.C.A. 1973); United

States v. Washington Toll Bridge Authority,

307 F. 2d 330, 334 (9 Cir. 1962) (en banc),

cert. denied, 372 U.S. 911 (1963); Texas

v. United States, 72-2 U.S. Tax Cas. q 16,048

at 86, 128 (W.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd mem.,

73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ¥ 16,085 at 81,394

ll

(5 Cir. 1972); Iowa State Univ. of Science

il

The decision of Judge Roberts in Texas

v. United States squarely addresses the

question of immunity for states and local-

ities from the § 4261 tax. However, the

Judge there placed emphasis upon the user

charge aspect of the § 4261 levy, as con-

trasted with analyzing it as a true tax,

and thus concluded that it was "as such...

Outside the scope of the doctrine of

implied intergovernmental tax immunity."

(Footnote continued on followng page)

25a

24a

ie Opinion of Cannella, D.J.

Opinion of Cannella, D.J.

CONCLUSION

& Technology v. United States, 500 F.2d

The motion of the United States pur-

508, 523 (Ct. Cl. 1974).

Suant to Fed. R. Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is hereby

granted. The Clerk of the Court shall enter

judgment dismissing the complaint with pre-

ueemen, judice and costs.

(Footnote continued from preceding page)

It is SO ORDERED.

72-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,131. The Court

went further and in what might be con-

sidered dictum recognized that JOHN M. CANNELLA

Even if the airway user charge is United States District Judge

considered to be a tax within the

general confines of the doctrine of

implied intergovernmental tax immunity,

plaintiff has now shown that the tax Dated: New York, N.Y.

is invalid where it is nondiscriminatory, May 14, 1975.

Congress specifically intended to tax

this activity whether or not carried

on directly by the State, and there

exists no undue burden upon the per-

formance of plaintiff's functions as

a government which have long been

recognized by the Constitution as

sovereign. New York v. United States

supra.

As our discussion in the text supra in-

dicates, we are in complete agreement with

these views.

26a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE

SECOND CIRCUIT

At a Stated Term of the United States

Court of Appeals, in and for the Second

Circuit, held at the United States Court-

house in the City of New York, on the

lith day of February, one thousand nine

hundred and seventy-six.

Present:

HON. WILLIAM H. TIMBERS

Circuit Judge

HON. FREDERICK vP. BRYAN

HON. JAMES S. HOLDEN

District Judges Sitting by

Designation

CITY OF NEW YORK,

Plaintiff-Appvellant,

75-6065

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant~-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of New York.

27a

This cause came on to be heard on the

transcript of record from the United States

District Court for the Southern District

of New York, and was argued by counsel.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now

hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that

the judgment of said District Court be and

it hereby is affirmed on the opinion of

Judge Cannella dated May 14, 1975.

Wm. H. Timbers

WILLIAM H. TIMBERS

United States Circuit Judge

Frederick vP. Bryan

~ FREDERICK vP. BRYAN

United States District Judge

James S. Holden

AMES S. HO N

United States District Judge

Sitting by Designation

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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