Petition — Davis v. Marathon Oil Co.
Supreme Court brief1976
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
] Supreme Court, U. &
' FILED
|
MAY 12 1976
rat Ari MAnaYW tbe
’ mead ‘ ’ :
ee
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1975
No.2 5~164 5
MARION DAVIS,
Petitioner,
vs.
MARATHON OIL COMPANY,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To The United States Court of Appeals
For the Sixth Circuit
Cart WILLIAM HINTON
Joun D. Nose
Tuomas F. Bryant
Hinton, Nosie & Bryant
1330 Building P.O. Box 208
1330 North Main Street
Findlay, Ohio 45840
Telephone (419) 422-0909
Ricuarp A. Betts
101% West Sandusky Street
Findlay, Ohio 45840
Telephone (419) 422-5565
Attorneys for Petitioner
THE GATES LEGAL PUBLISHING CO., CLEVELAND, OHIO-——-TEL. (216) @21-8647
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I Te isitiebhncdiaieintabsiaictdheh tianithsnhieiitiintdidoesishiegeen
Jurisdiction ..... ~..-.--_..--... -
Ae
Constitution and Statutes Involved
EE IE oe a
Reasons for Granting the Writ - . 10
I. To review in the light of the United States Consti-
tution, Amendment VII, the denial of a new trial
to Petitioner after entry of judgment notwith-
standing the verdict for insufficient evidence by
the trial judge who as a sanction excluded relevant
material evidence without a hearing to determine
that sanctions were warranted _._..._.._____..._ 10
II. To resolve an apparent conflict between the hold-
ing of the Court of Appeals in this case and the
prior holdings of this Court permitting proof by
circumstantial evidence of the existence and en-
forcement of illegal tying arrangements in a pri-
vate treble damage suit for violation of 15 U.S.C.
$1 and 15 U.S.C. §14 ' 15
Conclusion 18
o won Nw’
APPENDIX:
Order of the Court of Appeals Denying Petition
for Rehearing (February 12, 1976) _Al
Judgment Entry of the Court of Appeals (De-
cember 12, 1975) | A2
Opinion of the Court of Appeals (December 12,
1975) .. AZ
Judgment of the District Court (September 18,
1974) Al19
Order of the District Court (September 17, 1974) A21
Opinion of the District Court (September 17,
1974) A22
Judgment of the District Court (December 11,
1973) A32
Memorandum of the District Court (October 25,
1972) A34
Order of the District Court (October 25, 1972) A37
United States Constitution, Amendment VII A38
15 U.S.C. $1 A38
15 U.S.C. §14 A39
m
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Beacon Theaters v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) . 10
Federal Trade Commission v. Texaco, Inc., et al., 393
U.S. 223, 21 L. Ed. 2d 394, 89 S. Ct. 429 (1968) 16,17
Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964) 17
Neely v. Eby Construction Co., 386 U.S. 317, 18 L. Ed.
2d 75, 87 S. Ct. 1072 (1967) 14
Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1
(1958)
Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 963 (1961) —
Simpson v. Union Oil Company, 377 U.S. 13, 12 L. Ed.
2d 98, 84S. Ct. 1051 (1964) 13-14
17
Constitutions, Statutes and Rules
Constitution of the United States, Amendment VII _— 3, 10
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 33(a) 11
15 U.S.C. $1 (Section 1 of the Sherman Act) 3,15, 17
15 U.S.C. $14 (Section 3 of the Clayton Act) 3, 15,17
28 U.S.C. §1254(1) 2
28 U.S.C. $1291 : 4
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1975
* a
MARION DAVIS,
Petitioner,
vs.
MARATHON OIL COMPANY,
Respondent.
<a
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To The United States Court of Appeals
For the Sixth Circuit
Petitioner prays that a writ of certiorari issue to re-
view the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit entered in the above-entitled case on
February 12, 1976.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals entered in this
matter is reported at 528 F.2d 395 and appears in the
Appendix at p. A3. The order denying petition for re-
hearing appears at p. Al. The opinion of the District
Court entered October 25, 1972, is reported at 35 Ohio
Misc. 73 and is printed in the Appendix at p. A34 to this
petition. The opinion of the District Court entered
September 17, 1974 is not yet reported and appears in the
Appendix at p. A22 to this petition.
2
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered
on February 12, 1976. The jurisdiction of this Court is
invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Did the court of appeals err in denying a new trial
where the proceedings as a whole in the district court had,
in effect, though not in form, denied Petitioner a trial by
jury in a private antitrust case in which the trial court,
prior to trial, expressed its view that a jury trial was in-
appropriate, although required, had, during trial, summa-
rily excluded Petitioner’s lately discovered material wit-
nesses without permitting Petitioner to show by evidence
or authority that imposition of sanctions was not only
undeserved and unwarranted but also unreasonably op-
pressive and prejudicial to Petitioner, and had, more than
eleven months after trial, after drawing conclusions of
fact from conflicting proofs of the parties, entered judg-
ment for Respondent notwithstanding the jury’s verdict
uwarding damages to Petitioner?
2. Must a lessee service station déaler plaintiff in a
private antitrust case wherein he claims damages from
enforcement of a covert tying arrangement prove by tes-
timony of other lessee-dealers a general plan of defendant
to enforce its tying arrangement where his own testimony
is corroborated by an eyewitness to veiled threats to him
for non-compliance with the tying arrangement and where
cancellation of his lease is prompted at least in part by his
failure to buy more TBA in compliance with the tying
arrangement enforced by an oil company Respondent
whose relatively large size in its marketing area is shown
and whose former management employee testified that
3
Respondent was entitled to the profits from TBA (tied
product) because of its investment in the land and build-
ings it leased to its dealers (tying product).
CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES INVOLVED
This case presented questions arising under United
States Constitution Amendment VII, and under 15 U.S.C.
$1 (Section 1 of the Sherman Act) and 15 U.S.C. §14
(Section 3 of the Clayton Act) which are set forth in
the Appendix at p. A38.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Marion E. Davis, a former Marathon Oil Company
lessee-dealer service station operator, filed this action
against Marathon Oil Company, seeking treble damages
for non-renewal of his service-station lease claiming
Marathon’s violation of 15 U.S.C. §1 (Section 1 of the
Sherman Act), and of 15 U.S.C. §14 (Section 3 of the
Clayton Act). Asa basis for relief, Davis alleged a covert
tying arrangement enforced by Marathon, whereby Mar-
athon (vendor) would sell its gasoline and lease its service
stations (the tying products) only on condition that the
buyer (lessee-dealer) also purchase Mara:hon-sponsored
tires, batteries and accessories (the tied product). This
allegation was denied by Marathon. Trial was had from
September 24, 1973, through October 4, 1973. During
trial, upon motion of Marathon, the trial court excluded
the testimony of five of Davis’ witnesses. At the close
of Petitioner’s case, and again upon renewal at the con-
clusion of Marathon’s evidence in defense and Davis’ re-
buttal evidence, the trial court overruled Marathon’s mo-
tion for a directed verdict against Davis and the case was
submitted to the jury under proper instructions. The
4
jury returned its general verdict in favor of Davis on his
claims. Judgment was entered on the verdict December
11, 1973. Thereafter, on December 19, 1913, Marathon
served its motion in the alternative for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict or for a new trial, contending that
the evidence upon trial failed to establish Davis’ claim, or,
alternatively, that the jury had insufficient evidence from
which to make its findings. On September 17, 1974,
nearly a year after the jury’s verdict, the trial court
entered its order and opinion granting Marathon’s motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, vacating the
judgment on the verdict entered December 11, 1973, en-
tering judgment notwithstanding the verdict of the jury
in favor of Merathon and against Davis, and dismissing
the action at Davis’ cost. Judgment was entered the same
day. An appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit was timely perfected, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §1291. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the District Court by its order entered Decem-
ber 12, 1975, and thereafter denied Davis’ petition for re-
hearing by its order entered February 12, 1976. A brief
history follows:
1. At a pretrial conference in this private antitrust
treble damage action, the trial judge, sua sponte, raised
the question of Davis’ right to a trial by jury, granting
Davis leave to file a brief in support of his written jury
demand. After considering briefs of counsel for both Davis
and Marathon, the trial judge reluctantly “sustained”
Davis’ jury demand and entered his written opinion ex-
plaining therein his belief that jury trials are inappropriate
in antitrust cases.
2. One week before trial, Davis’ attorneys learned
that Marathon had been sued by a lessee-dealer some time
previously in a suit then pending in the United States
5
District Court in Columbus, Ohio, a different judicial
district, in a case raising similar issues. Investigation re-
vealed that the plaintiff therein and one of his key wit-
nesses were lessee-dealers who would be unafraid to
testify in Davis’ behalf respecting the existence and en-
forcement of the tying arrangements claimed by Davis.
The names and the nature of the enforcement activities of
their Marathon sales representatives were also learned,
together with the information that such Marathon agents
were directly subordinate to the Marathon district man-
ager who was to be Marathon’s corporate representative
at Davis’ trial. These sales representatives were thought
to possess relevant documentary evidence tending to prove
Davis’ claims. Within forty-eight hours thereafter, writ-
ten supplemental answers to interrogatories were served
upon Marathon trial counsel, setting forth in full the
names, addresses and substance of these witnesses’ ex-
pected testimony and other evidence. At trial, Marathon
moved to exclude the testimony of the witnesses as a sanc-
tion for late discovery, which motion the trial court
granted in spite of the attempted explanation by Davis’
counsel and without consideration of the relative potential
harm to be suffered by the parties.
3. Some of the material facts adduced at trial are
that, from the spring of 1961 until August, 1966, Marion
Davis was the lessee-operator of service stations in Find-
lay, Ohio, under leases with Pure Oil Company. In the
course of running these businesses, Davis provided a truck
and trailer rental service, engaged in motor tune-up,
brake repair, vehicle washing, and muffler and tail pipe
replacement. Davis sold tires, batteries and replacement
automobile and truck parts as required to supply the
needs of his customers. One of these customers was a
forty-five car and truck fleet of the Ohio Bell Telephone
Company office located in Findlay. Davis performed
6
such repair work for this customer as he was requested
by it to do, and which he was able to perform at his Pure
Oil Station.
4. During July, 1966, Marathon representatives in-
terviewed Davis at his Pure Oil station and at his home
and solicited him to assume operation of College Marathon
service station, also in Findlay, Ohio. Prior to execution
by Davis of the Marathon service station lease, certain
proposed points of agreement were written at the direc-
tion of the Marathon district manager, by the terms of
which, among others, Davis agreed to purchase from
Marathon the existing inventory of the former lessee, and
was assured that his qualified Pure Oil customers would be
issued Marathon credit cards. The hours of operation of
the service station were fixed by this letter agreement,
Davis agreed to utilize Marathon’s recommended book-
keeping service, and to participate in all Marathon-spon-
sored advertising programs. The letter designated the
Marathon sales representative to be responsible for this
operation and to handle all matters and dealings between
Davis and Marathon. Davis was verbally assured that he
could continue to operate his truck and trailer leasing
business and to service his fleet customers.
5. During the years 1966 through 1970, Marathon
marketed its brand of products and its sponsored brands
in the states of Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois, Ohio, Ken-
tucky and Florida, among others. The Marathon Ohio
region, a marketing unit, encompassed the entire State
of Ohio, a portion of Kentucky and a stretch of Interstate
Highway I-75 down through Florida. In the State of Ohio,
Marathon, with over one thousand service stations, ranked
second or third in sales of branded gasoline during the
year 1970. Ninety percent of Marathon’s service stations
were lessee-operated. From mid-1966 through mid-1970,
7
Marathon pursued a program of selling at wholesale to its
dealers selected brands of tires, batteries and accessories
referred to as TBA. Ninety percent of these TBA sales
were accomplished by Marathon sales representatives re-
ferring their orders from dealers to Marathon’s authorized
B. F. Goodrich or Firestone Tire and Rubber Company
suppliers for delivery. Marathon sold both B. F. Goodrich
and Firestone brand tires. A dealer could choose to stock
either one of these two brands. Marathon supplied Delco
brand automobile batteries. The term “accessories” as
applied to Marathon’s program applied to a limited num-
ber of kinds of replacement parts, including, p incipally,
Fram brand oil and air filters, Anco brand windshield
wiper blades, Champion brand spark plugs, B. F. Goodrich
or Firestone fanbelts and radiator hoses, together with
shock absorbers, sealed beam headlights, automobile lamp
bulbs, antifreeze, polishes, auto chemicals and the like.
These are the fast-moving multi-application replacement
parts ordinarily stocked and sold by service station
dealers.
6. Non-oil company automobile parts suppliers stock
and supply to service stations many more replacement
parts slower moving than these, not ordinarily stocked
by service station dealers, such as mufflers and tail pipes,
water pumps, generators, alternators, regulators, gaskets,
wheel bearings, hydraulic parts, brake shoes and ignition
parts, although some service station dealers stock supplies
of ignition parts. Marathon did not offer these slow-mov-
ing items for sale as part of its TBA program.
7. Marathon promoted its TBA program to present
to the public a consistent image in its leased stations.
The former Ohio Region sales manager testified on direct
examination that TBA sales were “frosting on the cake” to
which Marathon was entitled because of its investment
in the land and buildings leased to dealers.
8
8. On October 11, 1966, Davis bought an order of
fifteen Delco Brand batteries from an independent jobber.
On October 14, 1966, Davis requested that jobber to accept
return of the order, saying that his Marathon representa-
tive had told him to return them immediately. The jobber
accepted the return. On October 17, 1966, an identical
order of fifteen Delco brand batteries was shipped to Davis
by B. F. Goodrich upon order by James Day, and was
billed to Davis by Marathon. Thereafter, Davis’ orders
for Marathon TBA were prepared by his Marathon repre-
sentatives until February, 1970, when Davis returned a
large quantity of accessories delivered by B. F. Goodrich
Company. The sales representative arrived later the
same day to investigate the return. Although, with the
consent of Marathon’s sales representative, he discon-
tinued buying radiator hoses from Marathon during 1969,
after October, 1966, Davis made his large purchases of
TBA for stocking purposes, only from Marathon until
March 5, 1970, when he purchased, from an independent
jobber, $752.00 worth of shock absorbers for stock, and
March 12, 1970, when he bought for shelf stock twelve
non-Marathon sponsored tires from an independent tire
distributor. Within the hearing of Davis’ employee, which
employee so testified at trial, the Marathon sales repre-
sentative told Davis that his lease might be cancelled un-
less he bought more of his TBA from Marathon. The
Marathon representative testified that he verbally recom-
mended to his district manager that Davis’ lease be termi-
nated. On March 16, 1970, the Marathon district manager
in writing sought permission of higher management to
cancel Davis’ lease, relating that for six months the com-
pany had had operating and volume problems with Davis,
that his station was dirty, that Davis was hard to counsel,
that his gallonage was declining, and that Marathon sold
him very little TBA. In March, 1970, Davis learned from a
+)
Shell Oil Company representative that Marathon was con-
sidering cancellation of his lease. On June 15, 1970,
Marathon notified Davis that his lease was being cancelled,
effective August 31, 1970, and on August 31, 1970, Mara-
thon took possession of College Marathon station.
9. Marathon introduced evidence of purchases by
Davis and other Marathon dealers from two non-oil com-
pany replacement parts suppliers. No segregation of items
purchased by the dealers could be established at trial in
order to determine how much of such purchases was of
TBA items offered by Marathon and how much was of
merchandise Marathon did not carry in its line. Marathon
also introduced testimony of five presently subsisting
Marathon lessee-dealers, all of whom bought principally
from Marathon those items of TBA Marathon offered in
its line, purchasing non-competing items from other sup-
pliers. None claimed to have been instructed to buy TBA
only from Marathon. Cross examination developed that
three dealers were former Marathon employees, one of
these having owed Marathon up to thirty thousand dollars
for TBA at one time and having made payments on the
indebtedness of up to five thousand dollars per month to
Marathon, and that another, hearing of Davis’ lease can-
cellation, had doubled his TBA purchases from Marathon
during the year 1970. Marathon offered testimony of its
employees that Davis’ station was dirty. Davis introduced
evidence that he had a full-time janitor on the premises
and, in rebuttal, offered testimony of an independent
daily customer witness that the Davis station was an un-
usually clean one.
10. Davis introduced evidence showing that his
morketing area had been substantially reduced by the
opening nearby of a modern new Marathon station with
resultant loss of gallonage to Davis. Also introduced was
10
testimony of Davis and an employee that no heavy repair
work was done at College Marathon. In support of its
contention that Davis was doing heavy repair work con-
trary to policy, Marathon elicited testimony of its sales
representatives that Davis had “tied up” one bay of his
station for one evening to work on the engine of his own
truck.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I. To review in the light of the United States Constitu-
tion, Amendment VII, the denial of a new trial to
Petitioner after entry of judgment notwithstanding
the verdict for insufficient evidence by the trial judge
who as a sanction excluded relevant material evidence
without a hearing to determine that sanctions were
warranted.
Beacon Theaters v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) un-
questionably confirms the right to trial by jury in an anti-
trust case. However, the total effect of the proceedings
in the District Court in this case as affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, and especially in view of the Court of Appeal’s
denial to Petitioner of a new trial is to completely subvert
the jury process by permitting a trial judge to summarily
exclude relevant evidence and to draw conclusions of fact
from selected conflicting proofs of the parties, ignore other
relevant evidence and thereby substitute his judgment for
that of the jury’s in entering judgment notwithstanding
the jury’s verdict awarding damages to Petitioner.
On appeal from the District Court’s judgment not-
withstanding the jury’s verdict for Petitioner, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court, hold-
ing in part that Davis had failed to introduce evidence
that could support the conclusion that it was a general
ll
practice of Marathon imposed upon many or all of its
lessee-dealers to purchase its TBA as a condition of re-
ceiving petroleum products or of retaining leases.
During trial, the District Court, as a sanction for
Davis’ presumed failure to make timely discovery, ex-
cluded the testimony of certain of Davis’ witnesses recently
discovered, whose testimony would have accomplished
corroboration of Davis’ claim of Marathon’s imposition and
enforcement upon its dealers of covert tying arrangements.
In holding that the trial court properly exercised its
discretion in excluding the testimony of such witnesses,
the Court of Appeals noted that, in January, 1973, Mara-
thon served interrogatories upon Davis requesting the
names of all persons acquainted with the facts of the case,
and that on September 10, 1973, after the time provided
in Rule 33(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Petitioner
filed its answers. The Court further noted that on Sep-
tember 21, three days before trial was scheduled to begin,
Petitioner filed supplemental answers listing the five new
witnesses. The Court of Appeals ignored the likelihood that
new evidence might be discovered requiring supplemental
answers to interrogatories under the Rules. The Court of
Appeals did not note, however, and Davis was never given
a chance to explain to the District Court, for the trial
record, that also in January, 1973, Davis served interroga-
tories on Marathon with answers received September 14,
1973, which answers consisted, principally, of objections
to the relevancy and materiality of Davis’ request for in-
formation respecting Marathon business statistics, dealer
complaints, dealers’ names, similar pending litigation, and
other matters which Marathon did not deem to be con-
cerned directly with Marathon’s marketing operations in
Findlay, Ohio to which it sought to limit trial. Davis did
not. however, seek an order of compulsion against Mara-
thon in view of the shortness of time, but to obtain the
12
evidence sought, proceeded to issue subpoenas duces
tecum to get such evidence during trial. The Court of Ap-
peals characterized Davis’ proferred witnesses as “‘sur-
prise” witnesses, and further observed there is no credible
support for Davis’ contention that he had just discovered
these witnesses and that reasonable diligence would have
disclosed the additional witnesses far in advance of the
trial, stating erroneously that all such persons were either
friends or employees of Davis’ or were working in the
Findlay area during the pendency of Davis’ suit. There
is no evidence in the record, or in fact, to support such a
finding by the Court of Appeals and such misapprehension
of that Court was the basis of Davis’ petition for rehearing
which the Court of Appeals denied by its order entered
February 12, 1976. The Court of Appeals further charac-
terized the filing by Davis of supplemental answers to in-
terrogatories as unfair surprise contrary to the policy of
the Federal Rules, again without supporting evidence.
The Court of Appeals apparently assumed that the brief
statement of trial counsel was a sufficient argument to set
forth Davis’ full defense to Marathon’s motion.
Of course, there is no evidence in the record to sup-
port the observations and findings by the Court of Appeals,
for the District Court permitted no explanation, save a
brief attempt by counsel which was rejected out of hand
or ignored. It is disclosed by the record that the trial judge
presumed the bad faith of Davis, asserted that it would be
unfair to Marathon to permit such witnesses to testify,
doing so without consideration of or affording an opportu-
nity to Petitioner to demonstrate Marathon’s knowledge of
the testimony of these witnesses or, indeed, even to permit
counsel for Davis to thoroughly explain that the substance
of all witnesses’ testimony had been furnished to Marathon
trial counsel in writing at the earliest possible moment.
Davis had no opportunity to present evidence or argument
13
to the Court disclosing that as Davis then believed, the ex-
istence of the Marathon related witnesses had been con-
cealed by Marathon’s objections in lieu of answers to Davis’
interrogatories. Davis was afforded no opportunity to
present evidence to the Court that the two Marathon
lessee-dealers and the two Marathon sales representatives
were from the Columbus, Ohio area, that the two sales
representatives were directly subordinate to Marathon’s
corporate representative at trial, the Marathon Columbus
district manager, nor that the lessee-dealers operated serv-
ice stations in the Marathon Columbus district and that
one of the lessee-dealers was involved in litigation with
Marathon in Columbus in a case involving similar issues.
The trial court never learned that these four persons had
never worked in Findlay, Ohio, in the Marathon Toledo
district, and that all were strangers to Davis, or that the
name of the single employee of Davis had been previously
disclosed to Marathon in earlier discovery and was in-
cluded in the supplemental answers pro forma.
In its order denying Davis’ petition for rehearing, the
Court of Appeals stated that Davis would have been ex-
pected to contact other Marathon lessee-dealers in the
Findlay area, which area it apparently intended should
include Columbus, Ohio, and beyond.
Petitioner submits that by requiring Davis to canvass
other Marathon lessee-dealers over a wide area of more
than one hundred miles radius and present their direct
evidence at trial as suggested in its opinion denying Davis’
petition for rehearing, the Court of Appeals has, in essence,
required Davis to prepare and prosecute a class action,
contrary to his wishes, contrary to the apparent wishes
of many members of the prospective class, and, indeed,
contrary to the prior holdings of this Court respecting the
maintenance of private antitrust enforcement actions by
single individuals. Simpson v. Union Oil Company, 377
14
U.S. 13, 12 L. Ed. 2d 98, 84S. Ct. 1051 (1964). It defies
reality to expect that in view of the lesson presented to
them b: the apparently punitive cancellation of Davis’
lease, that other lessee-dealers within Davis’ immediate
marketing area, and in the shadow of Marathon’s home
office would be willing to risk their business investments
to testify upon a matter of principal.
In Neely v. Eby Construction Co., 386 U.S. 317, 18
L. Ed. 2d 75, 87 S. Ct. 1072 (1967), it was held that where
a Court of Appeals sets aside a jury’s verdict or affirms
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the evi-
dence was insufficient to send the case to the jury, it is
not clear that the litigation should be terminated, for the
erroneous exclusion of evidence at trial which would have
strengthened Petitioner’s case is an important possibility,
and that another is that the trial court itself caused the
insufficiency in Petitioner’s case by erroneously placing
too high a burden of proof on him at trial. The power of
the Court of Appeals, under the rules, to order a new trial
in such a case is therein confirmed.
Therefore, Petitioner urges that the Court of Appeals
erred in failing to grant Davis a new trial in consequence
of the District Court’s abuse of discretion in the summary
exclusion of the testimony of material witnesses without
affording an adequate opportunity for Davis to demon-
strate that the sanctions imposed were undeserved, inap-
propriate, unwarranted, excessively harsh and oppressive.
15
II. To resolve an apparent conflict between the holding of
the Court of Appeals in this case and the prior hold-
ings of this Court permitting proof by circumstantial
evidence of the existence and enforcement of illegal
tying arrangements in a private treble damage suit
for violation of 15 U.S.C. §1 and 15 U.S.C. §14.
The decisions below are directly contrary to the ap-
plicable decisions of this Court and of the Courts of Ap-
peals for the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, as to the nature
of the proof required to establish the existence of and en-
forcement of a covert tying arrangement by an oil com-
pany in a lessee-dealer TBA antitrust case.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held in
this case that Davis was required to prove the general
practice of Marathon to require purchase of TBA as a con-
dition of continued availability of petroleum products to
or the continuation of the leases of many or all of its lessee-
dealers, apparently by direct testimony of other dealers
corroborating Davis’ testimony as to the existence of the
tie in. Furthermore, the Court of Apneals adopted the
truncated version of the evidence from which the trial
judge drew his conclusions of fact in granting judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, both courts ignoring not only
conflicts between Petitioner’s and Respondent’s testimony
regarding threats, declining gallonage, housekeeping and
the nature of repair work done by Davis, but also wholly
avoiding the plain language of the documentary evidence
tending to show domination by Marathon of the conduct
of Davis’ business and further establishing that one of the
considerations for cancellation of his lease was the fact
that Davis bought little TBA from Marathon.
Davis’ proofs showed that during the years of 1969
and 1970, respectively, Marathon, nationally, operated
3,615 and 3,705 service stations, of which approximately
16
1,000 were operated in Ohio. National net sales of refined
products in 1970 were of a value of $513,505,000.00.
Marathon national TBA sales in the years 1969 and 1970,
respectively, were $6,088,137.75 and $5,975,287.58, of
which sales in the Ohio region for the years were $2,106,-
986.40 and $2,142,965.33, respectively. Marathon ranked
second or third among oil companies in volume of sales in
Ohio in 1970. Davis’ evidence showed that Marathon’s
TBA program was intended to provide a consistent image
to the public of merchandise stocked and sold by Marathon
lessee-dealers; that as early as the initial interview, Mara-
thon lessees were informed that they were expected to
participate in uniform advertising programs; that they
were sold an initial stock of sponsored merchandise; that
lessee-dealers operate their service stations on short-term
year-to-year leases; and that Marathon kept track of
Marathon sponsored TBA purchases by its dealers. Mara-
thon’s former Ohio region sales manager testified in Davis’
case in chief that Marathon was entitled to net profits from
TBA sales as “frosting on the cake” because of its invest-
ment in the land and buildings it leased to dealers.
The testimony of Marathon’s former Ohio region sales
manager, offered by Davis, also disclosed the manner of
the operation of the Marathon TBA sales program, where-
by Marathon representatives took dealer orders for de-
livery by B. F. Goodrich Company outlets, B. F. Goodrich
thereafter billing Marathon for the purchases, and Mara-
thon, in turn, billing the dealer for the merchandise de-
livered by Goodrich. The same procedure applied to
dealers choosing Marathon’s alternative Firestone Tire
and Rubber Company TBA stocking program.
The difference to be perceived between this purchase-
sales scheme and the sales commission agreement found
to be inherently coercive in Federal Trade Commission v.
Texaco, Inc., et al., 393 U.S. 223, 21 L. Ed. 2d 394, 89 S. Ct.
17
429 (1968), is insignificant when it is considered that the
lessee-dealer is just as certain under either scheme that
the oil company holding dominant economic power over
him is getting the TBA profits. Marathon supplied the
customers to whom Goodrich or Firestone shipped the
goods.
In Federal Trade Commission v. Texaco, Inc., et al.,
supra, it was held that the sales commission agreement
existing between Texaco and Goodrich was inherently co-
ercive and that it was therefore clear that the oil company’s
dominant economic power was used in a manner which
tended to foreclose competition in marketing, even though
there was no showing of direct overt practices by the oil
company designed to force its dealers to buy sponsored
products. In Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 286 F.2d
832, 837 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 963 (1961),
it was held that the existence of cther factors which might
have contributed to the oil company’s decision to cancel
the lessee-dealer’s lease will not affect the Petitioner’s
cause where the oil company’s “illegal motive substantially
contributed to the decision to cancel.”
It is evident from the opinions below that the courts
in this case have isolated the individual elements of Clay-
ton Act and Sherman Act violations for purposes of testing
the evidence on trial, rather than correctly viewing Peti-
tioner’s proofs upon trial as a whole, as taught by the opin-
ion in Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 466 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964). In Lessig, it was
held also that plaintiff need prove only a tacit tying ar-
rangement by circumstantial evidence.
The standard of per se illegality of tying arrangements
was summarized in Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1 (1958) as:
They are unreasonable in and of themselves whenever
a party has sufficient economic power with respect to
13
the tying product to appreciably restrain free com-
petition in the market for the tied product and a ‘not
insubstantial’ amount of interstate commerce is af-
fected. 356 US. at 6.
Petitioner submits that the evidence presented at trial
meets all the foregoing tests for establishment of a covert
tying arrangement and is sufficient to permit the inference
of covert enforcement of such tying arrangements. It is
further asserted that, upon questions of conflicting evi-
dence as to the reasons for Marathon’s cancellation of
Davis’ lease, the question was properly submitted to the
jury and the jury having decided in favor of Davis, its ver-
dict should not have been disturbed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, a writ of certiorari should
issue.
Respectfully submitted,
Cart WILLIAM HINTON
JOHN D. Nose
THomMAsS F. Bryant
Hinton, Nosie & BryAnt
1330 Building P.O. Box 208
1330 North Main Street
Findlay, Ohio 45840
RicHArp A. BEtTTs
1014. West Sandusky Street
Findlay, Ohio 45840
Attorneys for Petitioner
Al
APPENDIX
ORDER OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DENYING
PETITION FOR REHEARING
(Filed February 12, 1976)
No. 75-1037
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For THE SixtTH CrIRcuIT
MARION DAVIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
MARATHON OIL COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER
Before: CELEBREZZE, Peck, and McCresg, Circuit Judges.
Upon consideration of the petition for rehearing, the
court concludes that although petitioner is correct in his
contention that proffered witness Poston was not a friend
of Davis as stated in our opinion,’ this error does not re-
quire a change in our decision. The resolution of this issue
turned on Davis’ failure to exercise due diligence in dis-
covering witnesses before the eve of trial. At a minimum
he would have been expected to contact other Marathon
lessee-dealers in the Findlay area, which in our view is
not as narrowly circumscribed for this purpose as Davis
would restrict it.
Accoraingly, the petition is DeNnrep.
ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT
Joun P. HEHMAN
Clerk
'The proffered testimony was that Poston was a friend of
Dennis Smith, who was involved in a suit against Marathon
similar to the one brought by Davis. His suit involved “Mara-
thon Oil Company’s gasoline allocation and business practices.”
A2
JUDGMENT ENTRY OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
(Filed December 12, 1975)
No. 75-1037
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For THE SrxtH CIRCUIT
MARION DAVIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
MARATHON OIL COMPANY,
Defendant-Anpellee.
JUDGMENT
APPEAL from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio.
THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the record from
the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio and was argued by counsel.
On CONSIDERATION WHEREFORE, It is now here
ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of
the said District Court in this cause be and the same is
hereby affirmed.
It is further ordered that Defendant-Appellee recover
from Plaintiff-Appellant the costs on appeal, as itemized
below, and that execution therefor issue out of said Dis-
trict Court if necessary.
ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE CouRT
JoHn P. HEHMAN
Clerk
A3
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
(Filed December 12, 1975)
No. 75-1037
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For THE S1xTH Circuit
MARION DAVIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
MARATHON OIL COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
On APPEAL from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division.
Before: CELEBREZZE, Peck and McCree, Circuit Judges.
McCrez, Circuit Judge. This appeal from an order
granting Marathon Oil Company’s motion for judgment
n.0.v. presents two questions for review: (1) whether the
district court erred in holding that reasonable minds could
not have found that Marathon Oil Company violated either
section 1 of the Sherman Act,’ 15 U.S.C. §1, or section 3
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §14,” in cancelling appellant’s
' Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in relevant part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.
* Section 3 of the Clayton Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce,
in the course of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or
contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery,
supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or un-
patented, for use, consumption, or resale within the United
States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia
(Footnote continued on following page)
A4
service station lease, and, (2) whether the district court
erred in refusing to permit the testimony of five witnesses
“discovered” by appellant only three days before trial
despite Marathon’s eight month old request for a list of
all prospective witnesses. We hold that the district court
did not err in entering judgment n.o.v., and that it did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the testimony of
five witnesses disclosed to Marathon only three days before
trial.
Marion Davis, plaintiff-appellant, commenced this ac-
tion on December 29, 1971, in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The complaint
charged that Marathon had violated sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act by, inter
alia, “impos|ing| upon its hundreds of lessee-dealers ex-
clusive dealing arrangements which require that the
dealers secure their entire requirements of petroleum
products and tires, batteries and other automobile acces-
sories exclusively from the defendant... .’”
ee
——— ee ———
(Continued from previous page)
or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdic-
tion of the United States, or fix a price charged therefor, or
discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition,
agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser
thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchan-
dise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a competi-
ior or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of
such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agree-
ment, or understanding may be to substantially lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of com-
merce.
*The complaint continues:
These contracts and agreements are forced upon service sta-
tion operators against their desires and are enforced by
employees or agents of the said defendant, who constantly
watch the products which are sold by the dealers. The serv-
ice station operator knows that his lease will not be renewed
at the end of the one-year-period, should he refuse to follow
dictated prices or exclusive dealing arrangements of the
defendant.
(Footnote continued on following page)
A5
Nearly two years later, the case went to trial before a
jury, and proofs were submitted from September 24 until
October 4, 1973. On September 21, Davis attempted to
amend the list of his prospective witnesses that had already
been submitted to Marathon by adding five witnesses —
two Marathon dealers, his former employee, and two Mara-
thon employees. Marathon moved to preclude the testi-
mony of these additional witnesses and, after argument,
the court granted the motion. At the conclusion of appel-
lant’s case and again at the conclusion of all the proofs,
Marathon moved for a directed verdict. The district court
denied the motion. The case was thereupon submitted to
the jury upon proper instructiens, and it returned a verdict
for Davis. Judgment on the verdict was entered on De-
cember 1, 1973.
Shortly thereafter, Marathon moved for a judgment
n.o.v. or, in the alternative, for a new trial, and the district
court entered an order granting the motion for judgment
n.o.v., dismissing the action, and assessing costs against
Davis. In its memorandum opinion, the district court
stated that “there was not a scintilla of evidence” to sup-
port the jury’s verdict. It held, to the contrary, that the
evidence demonstrated that Marathon did not require its
service station lessees to purchase tires, batteries and ac-
(Continued from previous page)
7. Marathon has informed its retail dealers, including the
plaintiff, that they are required to buy the T. B. A. brand
items handled by Marathon in preference to any other and
that they must buy such T. B. A. items from Marathon exclu-
sively. These requirements were not reduced to writing,
but are commonly made orally by Marathon representatives
who visit the dealers. The representatives inspect the
dealers’ stations for competing mechandise and merchandise
purchased from distributors other than Marathon — often
requiring that such be returned, if found and threaten non-
renewal of an offending dealer’s lease. The tying arrange-
ments are imposed as a matter of general practice, and
therefore affect a substantial volume of T. B. A. sold by
Marathon dealers.
A6
cessories (TBA) as a condition of receiving gasoline or of
retaining their leases; that Davis purchased TBA from
whomever he pleased; and that Davis’ lease was ter-
minated because he had been neglecting his service station
to pursue other business interests with the consequence
that the quality of services at the station deteriorated and
it became unprofitable.
Appellant contends that the evidence was sufficient
to permit reasonable persons to find that Marathon had
impermissibly tied sales of gasoline to the lessee-operators
of its service stations to sales of its TBA. Our examination
of the record, however, demonstrates that although the
complaint contained allegations of antitrust violations suffi-
cient to withstand a motion to dismiss, appellant’s evidence
would not permit a reasonable person to find that these
allegations had been proved.
“Tying arrangements” have been defined as “agree-
ments under which the vendor will sell one product only
if the purchaser agrees to buy another product as well.”
Advance Business Systems & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp.,
415 F.2d 55, 60 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920
(1970). An illegal tiein arrangement need not be ex-
pressed in a written contract, but the complainant must
show that the seller would not make available to a pur-
chaser one commodity unless the purchaser agrees to buy
another. Advance Business Systems & Supply, supra, Les-
sig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 467-68 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964), Mc™lhenney v. Western
Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 332, 338 (4th Cir. 1959).
A tie-in arrangement may violate either section 3 of
the Clayton Act or section 1 of the Sherman Act. Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594
(1953), Advance Business Systems & Supply Co., supra.
The standards of illegality under the two statutes are sim-
ilar. The Clayton Act makes it unlawful for a person en-
A7
gaged in commerce to make a sale or contract for the sale
of goods on the “condition, agreement, or understanding”
that the “purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the
goods .. . of a competitor or competitors of the lessee or
seller, where the effect of such . . . sale, or contract for sale
or such condition, agreement or understanding may be
to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a mo-
nopoly in any line of commerce.” 15 U.S.C. §14. | Emphasis
added. }
In Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S.
1, 6 (1958) (footnote omitted), the Supreme Court stated
a similar standard under the Sherman Act:
Indeed “tying agreements serve hardly any pur-
pose beyond the suppression of competition.” Stand-
ard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 US.
293, 305-306. They deny competitors free access to
the market for the tied product, not because the party
imposing the tying requirements has a better product
or a lower price but because of his power or leverage
in another market. At the same time buyers are
forced to forego their free choice between competing
products. For these reasons “tying agreements fare
harshly under the laws forbidding restraints of trade.”
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345
U.S. 594, 606. They are unreasonable in and of them-
selves whenever a party has sufficient economic power
with respect to the tying product to appreciably re-
strain free competition in the market for the tied
product and a “not insubstantial” amount of interstate
commerce is affected. International Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392. Cf. United States v. Paramount
Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 156-159: United States v. Grif-
fith, 334 U.S. 100. Of course where the seller has no
control or dominance over the tying product so that
it does not represent an effectual weapon to pressure
buyers into taking the tied item any restraint of trade
attributable to such tying arrangements would ob-
viously be insignificant at most.
A8
In light of these standards, we consider whether there
was sufficient evidence presented in this case to permit
reasonable minds to conclude: (1) that Marathon violated
the Sherman Act by having sufficient economic power to
appreciably restrain free competition and imposing upon
its lessee-operators a tying arrangeinent that restrained
a not “insubstantial” volume of interstate commerce, or
(2) that Marathon violated the Clayton Act by a tying
agreement that tended to “substantially lessen competi-
tion” or “create a monopoly in any line of commerce.”
THE PROOFS SUBMITTED AT TRIAL
For the five years before August 1966, Marion Davis
was a lessee-operator of Pure Oil Company service stations
in Findlay, Ohio. In addition to selling oil products, he op-
erated a trailer and truck rental service and a vehicle
washing service, performed motor tune-ups, brake repair,
muffler and tailpipe replacements, and sold tires, batteries,
and replacement automobile and truck parts.
In July 1966, Marathon Oil Company representatives
asked Davis to assume operation of the College Marathon
Service Station in Findlay. As a condition of becoming
a Marathon lessee, Davis was required to purchase the sta-
tion inventory that had been ordered but not sold by his
predecessor. Davis cancelled his lease with Pure Oil and
assumed operation of the Marathon station on August 22,
1966. The Marathon lease, signed four days later, was a
standard year-to-year contract containing the usual 30 day
termination provision that either lessor or lessee could
exercise. It was renewed annually in 1967, 1968, and 1969
until Marathon exercised its right to cancel in 1970.
From 1966 to 1970, Marathon marketed its petroleum
products and its sponsored TBA brands primarily in Wis-
consin, Michigan, Illinois, Ohio, Kentucky and Florida.
AY
The Marathon “Ohio Region’ included the entire state of
Ohio, a portion of Kentucky, and a part of interstate high-
way “I-75,” from Ohio through Florida. Marathon had
over one thousand stations in Ohio, where it ranked either
second or third in sales of branded gasoline. Approxi-
mately ninety percent of Marathon service stations were
owner-operated.
During the four year period in question, Marathon
sold to its dealers at wholesale prices certain brands of
tires, batteries and accessories (TBA). It sold both “B. F.
Goodrich” and “Firestone’’ tires, sponsored “Delco” bat-
teries, and made available to its dealers accessories nor-
mally stocked by service stations including “Fram” air
and oil filters, “Anco” windshield wiper blades, “Cham-
pion” spark plugs, “B. F. Goodrich” fan belts, radiator
hoses, shock absorbers, sealed beam headlamps and auto-
mobile light bulbs.
Marathon encouraged its TBA sales by offering its
dealers special promotions, discounts and other incentives,
including a bonus rebate from seven to ten percent of his
total annual TBA purchases.
Marathon did not provide its dealers with replace-
ment parts not ordinarily stocked by service stations in-
cluding, for example, mufflers, tail pipes, water pumps,
generators, alternators, regulators, gaskets, wheel bear-
ings, hydraulic parts, brake shoes and ignition parts. When
necessary, a dealer ordered these parts from automotive
suppliers whose primary business was not the sale and
distribution of petroleum products.
During the period in question, there were three major
automotive equipment suppliers in the Findlay area:
Sparton Distributing Company, Inc., The Ohio Automotive
Supply Company, and Steele’s Automotive, Inc. The
record does not show that Davis made any purchases from
Steele’s either while he was a Pure Oil dealer or while he
Al10
was a Marathon dealer. It does show, however, that al-
though he purchased almost nothing from Sparton when
he was a Pure Oil dealer, he made substantial purchases
from Sparton after he became a Marathon dealer. For
example, from January through July 1966, Davis pur-
chased $12.15 worth of goods from Sparton. From August
until December 1966, while Davis was operating the Col-
lege Marathon station, he purchased $1,640.79 worth of
goods from Sparton. His annual battery and accessory pur-
chases from Sparton totaled $2,447.53 in 1967, $3,439.32
in 1968, $2,733.03 in 1969, and $5,321.30 in the first eight
months of 1970. Davis’ battery and accessory purchases
from Marathon totaled $2,897 in 1967, $3,416 in 1968,
$3,707 in 1969, and $1,662 in the first eight months of
1970. In addition, each year during which he operated
the College Marathon station, his purchases from Mara-
thon were approximately $1,000 less than his purchases
from Ohio Automotive Supply.
There was no significant difference between Davis’
acquisition and sale of Marathon TBA and his acquisition
and sale of Ohio Distributing and Sparton TBA. Sales
representatives from Sparton, Ohio Distributing, and
Marathon visited his station each week to check inven-
tories, to determine his needs, and to prepare orders for
goods. Sometimes Davis did not even sign the orders be-
cause he relied on the sales representatives to determine
his needs. He displayed the supplies purchased from Spar-
ton and Ohio Distributing in the same manner as the sup-
plies purchased through Marathon. In describing how he
ordered his TBA, Davis testified that he purchased TBA
from whomever he wanted.
The evidence also disclosed that the other nine Mara-
thon station lessees in Findlay purchased batteries and
accessories from both Ohio Automotive and Marathon.
Five of them purchased a greater dollar amount of these
All
items from Ohio Distributing than they did from Mara-
thon. Moreover, five dealers also testified that although
they bought their TBA primarily from Marathon when
available, they had never been required by Marathon to
purchase these items exclusively from it.
In order to show that Marathon imposed upon its
hundreds of service station lessees an illegal arrangement
tying the sale of its sponsored TBA items to the sale of its
petroleum products, Davis relied primarily upon four in-
cidents.
The first incident occurred approximately two months
after Davis took over the Marathon station. On October
11, 1966, appellant ordered 15 “Delco” batteries from
Sparton. He testified that he returned the batteries three
days later because James Day, the Marathon sales repre-
sentative, had instructed him to do so. Then, pursuant to
the Marathon representative’s order, on October 17, B. F.
Goodrich Company shipped and billed to appellant 15
identical “Delco” batteries, charging an average of two
dollars less per battery than Sparton’s price. Whatever
the significance of this event, the record discloses also that
Davis made four additional purchases of “Delco” batteries
from Sparton during the same month.
The second incident occurred four years later in Feb-
ruary 1970. Day’s successor as the Marathon representa-
tive, Gary Burocker, ordered some TBA, including a quan-
tity of obsolete air filters for appellant without obtaining
his signature. When appellant returned them, Burocker
visited the station the same day to inquire about them,
and told appellant that he should have accepted the order.
It does not appear that anything further occurred in con-
nection with this incident.
The third and fourth incidents relied upon by appel-
lant to show an illegal tying arrangement occurred in 1970,
when appellant purchased shock absorbers and tires from
Al2
Sparton and Buckeye Distributing Co. Burocker told him
about that time that his lease might be cancelled unless
he purchased more TBA from Marathon.
After Octuber 1966, Davis testified that he made no
large purchases from other suppliers of items offered for
sale by Marathon until March 1970 when he purchased
$752 worth of shock absorbers from Sparton and twelve
tires from Buckeye Distributing Company.
During the same month, March 1970, that Davis made
the purchases from Buckeye and Sparton, the Marathon
district manager sought permission from his superiors to
cancel Davis’ lease for the stated reasons that for six
months he had operating and volume problems, that his
station was dirty, that he was unwilling to accept advice
from Marathon representatives, that his sales of gasoline
were declining and that his sales of Marathon-sponsored
TBA were insufficient. When Davis learned of the pro-
posed cancellation from a Shell Oil Company representa-
tive. he contacted an attorney. The attorney advised Mara-
thon of Davis’ inclination to bring an antitrust suit against
it charging that it had tied its sales of gasoline or the leas-
ing of its stations to sales of its TBA. Shortly thereafter,
the Marathon district manager wrote two memoranda to
his superiors, one outlining the procedure to be followed
in cancelling Davis’ lease in accordance with the terms of
the lease agreement, and the second listing the brands of
TBA stocked by Davis and the names of the suppliers.
On June 15, 1970, Marathon notified Davis that his
lease would be cancelled on August 31, 1970, and on that
date. Marathon took possession of the station.
This evidence, even when construed most favorably
to Davis, does not permit a finding that Marathon tied its
sales of petroleum products to appellant to his purchases
of its TBA, or that continuation of his lease was condi-
tioned upon the purchase of TBA exclusively from Mara-
Al3
thon. There is no evidence in the record that Marathon
refused at any time during the four year period to supply
Davis’ requirements of petroleum products. And there
is insufficient evidence to permit a determination that
Davis’ lease was cancelled because he refused to purchase
Marathon-sponsored TBA in preference to the TBA sold
by other suppliers.
Of the four incidents relied upon by appellant to show
Marathon’s liability the first two offer no support for his
position. The 1966 incident concerning the “Delco” bat-
teries shows only that the Marathon sales representative
convinced appellant to return 15 batteries which were
then reordered from Marathon at a savings of $2 per bat-
tery. The 1970 incident concerned the unordered air filters.
However, after Burocker’s initial pique when appellant
returned the unordered and obsolete TBA, nothing more
appears to have come from the incident.
The last two incidents concerned Burocker’s com-
plaint in 1970 about the low volume of appellant’s TBA
sales and Burocker’s intimation that this could result in
the loss of the lease. This evidence is as consistent with
Marathon’s claim that appellant was neglecting the station
and losing business as it is with appellant’s allegations
about a tying arrangement. Significantly, no express
threats to cancel the lease were made by the salesmen and
there was no communication from any other Marathon
employee or officer.
But more importantly, as the trial judge emphasized:
Although plaintiff testified that in 1969 he started
buying more TBA from others, and this led to the
cancellation of his lease, the documentary evidence
showed that in fact plaintiff had increased his TBA
purchases from defendant in 1969.
The defendant’s evidence showed that in the last
year of his lease, plaintiff was devoting much of his
Al4
time to other business interests which he had; that
gasoline sales at the station had fallen off markedly;
that the housekeeping at the station was very poor;
and that the plaintiff was tying up the service bays
at the station by doing heavy repair work of the type
which is not appropriate for a full-service gasoline
station. Plaintiff was warned about these findings,
but seeks to excuse or minimize them, and to convert
the warnings into threats that would be in violation
of the antitrust laws.
However, even if Davis had shown that Marathon had
required him to purchase Marathon TBA in order to retain
his lease and to purchase Marathon petroleum products,
there is no evidence in the record that could support the
conclusion that it was a general practice of Marathon, im-
posed upon many or all of its lessee-operators, to purchase
its TBA as a condition of receiving petroleum products or
of retaining leases. The only evidence about the experi-
ences of other lessee-operators of Marathon was the tes-
timony of five Marathon dealers who said that they had
never been threatened with the loss of their leases if they
did not purchase Marathon-sponsored TBA exclusively.
The most that can be said for appellant’s proofs is that they
show that Day and Burocker were aggressive salesmen
who were interested in increasing their sales of Marathon
TBA.
We hold that Davis clearly failed to present sufficient
evidence to permit a determination that the “total volume
of sales tied by the sales policy under challenge” was not
“insubstantial.” Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States
Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969). Likewise there was
no evidence permitting a determination that Marathon’s
actious tended to “create a monopoly” or “substantially
lessen competition.” Accordingly, there was no evidence
that required submission to the jury, and the district court
did not err in granting the motion for judgment n.o.v- See
Al5
e.g., Atlantic Refining Co. v. F.T.C., 381 U.S. 357 (1965),
Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., supra.-'
* Compare the evidence of a Clayion Act and a Sherman Act
violation adduced in Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., supra, at 467-68:
Lessig offered evidence of the following circumstances
in support of his allegation that Tidewater imposed upon its
dealers a system of exclusive dealing and tying arrangements
applicable to petroleum products, and to tires, batteries, and
automotive accessories (TBA) which Tidewater sold or
sponsored.'"
Tidewater’s service station leases were renewable an-
nually, and were subject to cancellation at six-month inter-
vals on thirty days’ notice. Each dealer contract ended auto-
matically upon termination of that dealer’s lease. The dealer
was required by his contract to purchase from Tidewater
“his total requirements of gasoline, motor oils and greases,
regularly manufactured and sold by” Tidewater, to an
amount specified in the contract; and the amount specified in
each dealer contract was the estimated full requirements
of that dealer’s station. When the service station lease and
dealer contract were executed Tidewater’s representatives
told the dealer that he was to purchase from Tidewater his
requirements of petroleum products and of those TBA items
which it sponsored or sold. Tidewater’s representatives ac-
companied salesmen of sponsored merchandise while the
latter secured orders from dealers. Tidewater’s representa-
tives inspected dealers’ stations for competing merchandise,
required that it be returned, and threatened nonrenewal of
the offending dealer’s lease. Credit card sales of nonspon-
sored merchandise were charged back to the dealer if the
customer failed to pay. New dealers were required to
purchase from outgoing dealers only inventory purchased
from Tidewater.
The record disclosed the disproportionate size and
economic strength of the parties.'* There was evidence that
Tidewater imposed exclusive dealing and tying arrangements
against the dealers’ wishes to provide Tidewater with non-
competitive access to the portion of the market which the
dealers’ stations represented. Dealers testified that they
feared to buy competing brands of oil and sponsored TBA
items even when requested by customers and even though
the cost to dealers was less, and that when they purchased
competing merchandise they hid it.
Evidence was offered that Tidewater entered into leases
and dealer contracts, containing provisions similar to those
described, with about 2,700 service station operators in eight
western states. Some of the practices described admittedly
were followed with respect to all Tidewater dealers, and the
(Footnote continued on following page)
Al6
Finally, we consider whether the district court abused
its discretion in refusing to permit the “eleventh hour”
witnesses to testify because their names had been furnished
in supplemental answers to interrogatories only three days
before trial was scheduled to begin. A trial court has broad
discretion in its choice of sanctions for failure to comply
with discovery orders and, in appropriate circumstances,
it may even dismiss the case. We hold that the trial court
properly exercised its discretion here.
In January 1973, Marathon served interrogatories on
appellant requesting the names of all persons acquainted
with the facts of this case. On September 10, 1973, well
after the time period provided in Rule 33(a) F.R. Civ. P.,
appellant filed an answer to these interrogatories. Then,
on Friday, September 21, only three days before the trial
was scheduled to begin on Monday, September 24, appel-
(Continued from previous page)
others appeared to be of quite general applicaticu. Thus,
the jury could conclude that the restrictive provisions and
practices affected a substantial portion of Tidewater’s sales
to its dealers of about 310 million gallons of gasoline an-
nually (about five per cent of the gasoline sold through
dealers in the area), and four to five million dollars worth
of TBA.
From this evidence the jury could conclude that Tide-
water sold petroleum products and sponsored TBA to its
dealers upon conditions and understandings — express and
tacit, oral and written — that they not deal in commodities
sold by competitors of Tidewater. The only serious question
is whether the jury could also conclude that these conditions
and understandings might lessen competition substantially
or tend to create a monopoly in a line of commerce, as
required by the Clayton Act.
'’ Tidewater produced the gasoline and other petroleum
products which it sold to dealers for resale. It purchased
tires and batteries and resold them to dealers. It also dis-
tributed selected automotive accessories under agreements
with manufacturers providing that Tidewater was to have
a stipulated discount or rebate on sales to dealers.
'’ Tidewater is one of the country’s major oil companies.
It does business in 32 states, and its assets exceed $800
million. It sold about 6.5% of the total gasoline sold in the
eight western states.
we
OEE A Dacdneeihtivte alo
We Rae Mor eebartbe wot
Sermo
Al7
lant filed supplemental answers listing five new witnesses,
one of whom was his former employee.
The district court, in precluding the calling of the wit-
nesses, observed that Davis’ case had been pending for
nearly two years, and expressed its concern that the pri-
mary purpose of the liberalized civil discovery rules, the
prevention of surprise to one’s opponent, would be under-
mined if these witnesses were permitted to testify.
We also observe that there was no credible support
for Davis’ contention that he had just “discovered” these
wi'nesses. Reasonable diligence would have disclosed the
additional witnesses far in advance of trial. One was a
former employee, two were Marathon lessees, one of whom
was a friend of Davis, and the other two were Marathon
employees working in the Findlay area during the pend-
ency of Davis’ suit. No reason is offered and none appears
why they could not have been found sooner than three
days before trial.”
* A proffer was made that the precluded witnesses would have
testified to the following effect:
The proffered testimony of Charles Trautwein, an employee of
Davis at the College Marathon station in 1969 and 1970, would
have shown only that Trautwein believed that Marathon operated
a poor TBA service, that he encouraged Davis to buy TBA from
other suppliers, that the Marathon sales representative was an
aggressive salesman, and that Davis continued to purchase
certain items of TBA from Marathon. Dennis Smith, a Marathon
lessee in Ohio since 1969, was expected to testify that although
he purchased the inventory already at his station when he leased
it, he had not purchased any Marathon TBA for four years
despite pressure from Marathon sales representatives and that
he was told by one of them a month before trial that he “would
be participating in the Marathon TBA program by the end of
the year.” Smith was also expected to testify that he was told
that he would not receive a Marathon lease for a second station
because Marathon had decided to award it to a person who
participated in its TBA program and that he furtively searched
the briefcase of a Marathon sales representative and discovered
a document entitled “Goals and Objectives” that apparently sug-
gested that unless a certain lessee purchased Marathon TBA, a
new dealer would be found. Finally, Robert Poston, another
(Footnote continued on following page)
Al8
In the short time afforded, there was virtually no way
for Marathon to prepare adequately to respond to the tes-
timony of the surprise witnesses. Unfair surprise of this
sort is contrary to the policy of the federal rules, which
sanction extensive discovery. If appellant had refused to
answer the interrogatory in question, Marathon could have
obtained an order requiring appellant to answer under
Rule 37(a). Then, if appellant still refused to answer, or
answered incompletely, Rule 37(b) provides that the court
could issue “{a]n order .. . prohibiting . . . [the disobedient
party| from introducing designated matters in evidence
.’ Since Marathon did not know that the original
answer was incomplete, it did not move for an order under
Rule 37(b) to compel appellant to complete it. Even
though Rule 37(b) is not directly applicable, we hold that
the trial judge properly exercised discretion in regard to
the surprise witnesses, and that any other decision would
be contrary to the policy of Rule 37. In a similar situation,
the district court for the Southern District of New York
refused to permit the testimony of two witnesses. Newsum
v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co., 97 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court will be affirmed.
(Continued from previous page)
Marathon lessee, was expected to testify that he purchased nearly
all of his TBA requirements from Marathon because he believed
it was expected of him and that a Marathon sales representative
told him that if a dealer did not buy TBA from Marathon, they
would find a new dealer, and that dealers who did not buy
Marathon TBA would not receive gasoline, while dealers who
did would receive “extras” from the company including extra
gasoline.
Disiirirnn..
Alg
JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT
(Filed September 18, 1974)
Civil No. C 71-388
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
For THE NorTHERN District oF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
MARION DAVIS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
MARATHON OIL COMPANY,
Defendant.
JUDGMENT
This action came on for trial before the Court, Hon-
orable Don J. Young, United States District Judge, pre-
siding, and the issues having been duly tried and a deci-
sion having been duly rendered.
It is Ordered and Adjudged that motion of the de-
fendant for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should
be and hereby is granted, and it is
Ordered and Adjudged that judgment in this case
filed December 11, 1973 is hereby vacated, and it is
Ordered and Adjudged that judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict of the jury should be and hereby is entered
in favor of the defendant Marathon Oil Company against
plaintiff Marion Davis, and it is
Ordered and Adjudged that the action should be and
hereby is dismissed at plaintiffs cost.
A20
Dated at Toledo, Ohio, this 17th day of September,
1974.
Mark SCHLACHET
Clerk of Court
/s/ Beatrice L. Rerminc
Deputy Clerk
APPROVED:
/s/ Don J. Younc
United States District Judge
A21
ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT
(Filed September 17, 1974)
Civil No. C 71-388
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
For THE NorTHERN DIsTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
MARION DAVIS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
MARATHON OIL COMPANY,
Deferdant.
This cause came to be heard upon motion of the de-
fendant for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for
a new trial. For the reasons stated in the accompanying
opinion and for good cause appearing, it is
Orperep that the motion of the defendant for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict should be and hereby
is granted, and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the judgment in this case filed
December 11, 1973 should be and hereby is vacated, and
it is
FURTHER ORDERED that judgment notwithstanding
the verdict of the jury should be and hereby is entered
in favor of the defendant Marathon Oil Company against
plaintiff Marion Davis, and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the action should be and here-
by is dismissed.
It Is So OrpeEReEp.
Don J. Younc
United States District Judge
ToLepo, OxnI0
A22
OPINION OF THE DISTRICT COURT
(Filed September 17, 1974)
Civil No. C 71-388
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
For THE NorTHERN District oF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
MARION DAVIS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
MARATHON OIL COMPANY,
Defendant.
OPINION
Youne, J:
This action was originally commenced on December
29. 1971, by Marion Davis, hereinafter referred to as plain-
tiff. and the Spartan Distributing Company against the
Marathon Oil Company, hereinafter referred to as the de-
fendant, alleging violations of the Clayton Act and the
Sherman Act.
The case was tried to a jury, commencing on Sep-
tember 24, 1973. The trial concluded on October 4, 1973.
At the close of the plaintiffs’ case, the Court rendered
judgment in favor of the defendant against the Spartan
Distributing Company. The jury returned a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff. Defendant has filed a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alterna-
tive. for a new trial, which has been fully argued by briefs.
Plaintiff had for a number of years operated gasoline
filling stations in Findlay, Ohio. On August 22, 1966, he
A23
leased from the defendant a gasoline service station on
the corner of North Main and Frazer Streets in Findlay,
Ohio. The lease, as was standard in the gasoline station
business, was for the term of one year, with automatic
renewals for a like period unless either of the parties gave
notice of termination not less than thirty days prior to
the expiration of any term.
The defendant gave timely notice of termination to
the plaintiff, and the lease was terminated on August 22,
1970. Ten days after receiving notice of termination of
the lease, plaintiff entered into a similar one year lease
with another oil company. Prior to entering into the lease
with defendant, plaintiff had himself given notice of termi-
nation of leases he had entered into with other oil com-
panies. All of the leases plaintiff ever had with any com-
pany had a thirty-day termination notice provision. Plain-
tiff regarded this as being favorable to him as well as to
the lessors, and took advantage of it when it seemed ad-
vantageous to him.
Plaintiff’s contention is that the defendant terminated
its lease because he bought tires, batteries and accessories
(hereinafter referred to as TBA) from suppliers other than
the defendant, and that the defendant violated the Clayton
and Sherman Acts by requiring all its lessees, as a condi-
tion of being supplied with gasoline and oil, to buy all their
requirements of TBA from the defendant.
Practically the only evidence which really appeared
to support this contention related to an episode which oc-
curred in October of 1966, shortly after plaintiff first leased
from defendant. On that occasion plaintiff had purchased
fifteen batteries from a wholesaler. Shortly thereafter the
defendant’s sales representative came to the station and
saw the batteries, and complained that plaintiff had not
purchased them from the defendant. Plaintiff thereupon
returned the batteries, and got the same batteries from
A24
the deiendant. It is noteworthy that the defendant’s price
was two dollars per battery lower than the price charged
by the other supplier. There were three other episodes
involving difficulties over TBA purchases, but they added
nothing to support the plaintiff's contentions. There is
considerable question whether this episode, which may
be as consistently explained by a misunderstanding by a
new lessee of the advantages of buying from his lessor as
by a violation of the anti-trust laws, is admissible at all in
evidence or as a basis for relief, since it occurred more
than four years prior to the commencement of this action,
and thus was beyond the statute of limitations. However,
it seems unimportant to resolve this problem, and the
Court does not decide it.
Although the plaintiff contended that he was con-
stantly threatened with the loss of his lease if he did not
purchase all his TBA from the defendant, the evidence
leaves no doubt whatever that the plaintiff continued to
purchase TBA from whome~er he pleased, and the de-
fendant’s salesmen were entirely aware of this. All sales-
men, defendant’s and others, followed the practice of com-
ing to the plaintiff’s station, checking his stock, writing
up orders, and sending him the TBA they thought he
needed. On one occasion plaintiff was irritated because
defendant sent him a quantity of goods which included
some obsolete oil filters. In a fit of pique, plaintiff returned
the whole order, but no issue was made of it by anyone.
Again, the testimony which tended to show complaints by
defendant’s salesmen about the volume of TBA purchases
is as consistent with the picture of plaintiff as a poor and
unprofitable lessee as it is with attempts to violate the
anti-trust laws. The burden is on the plaintiff to overcome
this ambivalence in the evidence.
Although plaintiff testified that in 1969 he started
buying more TBA from others, and this led to the cancel-
A25
lation of his lease, the documentary evidence showed that
in fact plaintiff had increased his TBA purchases from
defendant in 1969.
The defendant’s evidence showed that in the last year
of his lease, plaintiff was devoting much of his time to
other business interests which he had; that gasoline sales
at the station had fallen off markedly: that the housekeep-
ing at the station was very poor; and that the plaintiff was
tying up the service bays at the station by doing heavy
repair work of the type which is not appropriate for a full-
service gasoline station. Plaintiff was warned about these
findings, but seeks to excuse or minimize them, and to
convert the warnings into threats that would be in viola-
tion of the anti-trust laws.
The defendant also offered evidence that its TBA
business, while extensive and somewhat profitable, was
conducted primarily for the benefit of the lessees of its
stations, who could get their merchandise at very favorable
prices if they bought in volume; and secondarily to main-
tain its image with its customers, who could get the prod-
ucts and service they were used to anywhere that the de-
fendant operated, not just in their own communities.
A number of other lessees of defendant testified that
they were not aware of any requirement to buy TBA from
the defendant, and that they did in fact buy TBA when
and from whom they pleased, and could do so most profit-
ably.
In his arguments opposing defendant’s motion, plain-
tiff contends that the testimony of these lessees is not en-
titled to any probative force because of their continuing
relationships with the defendant. This contention over-
looks the fact that in order to succeed in his suit, the bur-
den is upon plaintiff to show that his experience was not
unique, but that the defendant, as alleged in the complaint:
A26
|I|mposes upon its hundreds of lessee-dealers exclu-
sive dealing arrangements which require that the
dealers secure their entire requirements of petroleum
products and tires, batteries and other automotive
accessories exclusively from the defendant . . . . These
contracts and agreements are forced upon service sta-
tion operators against their desires and are enforced
by employees or agents of the said defendant, who
constantly watch the products which are sold by
the dealers. The service station operator knows that
his lease will not be renewed at the end of the one year
period, should he refuse to follow dictated prices or
exclusive dealing arrangements of the defendant.
If the testimony of the other station operators is totally
discarded, the plaintiff has still failed in his proof of these
essential allegations of his complaint. Plaintiff ingeniously
argues that if an interested witness testifies one way, the
finder of the facts has a right to conclude that the truth
is just the opposite, even though there is no other probative
evidence to this effect. No authority is cited for so novel
a proposition. Standard jury instructions give the jury
the option of rejecting entirely testimony which they find
is biased or untruthful. But they are not permitted to
guess or speculate as to what the truth is, IF THERE IS
NO PROBATIVE EVIDENCE AFTER THE SUSPECT
TESTIMONY IS REJECTED.
Not only can plaintiff gain no support from the testi-
mony of the other local dealers, but he called as his own
witness Gary Burocker, the defendant’s sales representa-
tive, who testified that he recommended termination of
the lease for lack of gasoline sales, improper housekeeping,
heavy repair work done in the service bays, and failure
to use advertising displays, and that the termination had
no relationship to plaintiff's TBA purchases. He testified
as follows:
“Q. You were fully conscious of the fact that he did
buy from independent suppliers, were you not?
Ne ne SS Pe tres « aie) ——
a te
A27
“A. Yes, I was.
“Q. You had no objection to that?
“A. No, I did not.
“Q. You did not expect him to buy all his TBA that
was available from Marathon, did you?
“A. No, I did not.”
Thus, a careful analysis of the evidence, taken as a
whole, shows that the plaintiff’s picture of himself as a
small businessman crushed by a giant corporation is in-
accurate. The evidence totally fails to support the wildly
exaggerated allegations of the complaint. Actually, the
evidence shows plaintiff neglecting the service station to
pursue other interests until the business had deteriorated
and become unprofitable to both parties to the lease. He
was not driven from the service station business by the
termination of the lease, for he signed a lease with another
oil company ten days after he received the notice of termi-
nation from the defendant. His action thus appears to be
more of an attempt to get money out of the defendant by
a nuisance lawsuit than a legitimate anti-trust case.
Plaintiff relies principally upon the case of Lessig v.
Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 993 (1964). Factually, however, Lessig is entire-
ly distinguishable from the present case. Specifically, it
deals with the fixing of gasoline prices, which is in no way
involved in the present case. The real distinction how-
ever, is found in the court’s statement on page 467.
Dealers testified that they feared to buy competing
brands of oil and sponsored TBA items even when
requested by customers and even though the cost
to dealers was less, and that when they purchased
competing merchandise they hid it.
As previously pointed out, the only other dealers
who testified in this case gave testimony exactly contrary
A28
to this, and even in the October, 1966 episode, upon which
plaintiff now lays much stress, the price of the defendant's
batteries was substantially less than that of the rival bat-
teries, again the exact opposite of the situation in Lessig.
Plaintiff also relies upon Osborn v. Sinclair Refining
Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U'S.
963 (1961). In that case again, the facts bear no resem-
blance to those actually shown in the present case. There
Sinclair had an agreement with Goodyear to sell Good-
vear’s TBA and other products exclusively in its service
stations, for which Goodyear paid Sinclair a substantial
commission. The evidence established that all of Sinclair’s
dealers were ordered to sell Goodyear TBA on penalty
of losing their leases. Here there is no evidence from any
other dealers than the plaintiff. Another major distinc-
tion appears in the court’s language on page 834 of the
opinion,
It is considered, however, that there were competing
brands, and there is no suggestion that Goodyear was
superior to other brands of TBA or that there was any
benefit to the dealers handling Goodyear rather than
one of the other lines.
On the contrary, in the present case the evidence showed
conclusively that those dealers who sold larger volumes of
the defendant’s TBA were given, in addition to very favor-
able prices, special and increasing refund discounts. The
plaintiff's witness Whitman’s testimony also established
that rather than getting a kick-back from its suppliers of
TBA, defendant was trying to create favorable customer
relations by its TBA program. This would of course fur-
ther advance the dealers’ interests as well as its own. It
seems rather implicit from the facts of Osborn that in the
background was the old commercial struggle between
Goodyear and Firestone, for Osborn himself was a Fire-
DP Ee ene
A29
stone dealer, in addition to leasing Sinclair’s service sta-
tion.
Plaintiff also relies on Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377
U.S. 13 (1964). There again the real problem was gasoline
price fixing, a matter not involved in the present case. In
this plaintiff relies primarily on the Supreme Court’s
statement that “it matters not that the complainant may
be only one merchant.” However, even though there was
only one complainant, the illegality involved ‘a vast gaso-
line distribution system, fixing prices through many retail
outlets.” In the present case, there was not a scintilla of evi-
dence involving any dealer but the plaintiff in anything,
much less gasoline price fixing. This distinction is clearly
made in Quinn v. Mobil Oil Co., 375 F.2d 273 (1st Cir.
1967), although that case again concerned only gasoline
prices.
In the case of Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. F.T.C.,
299 F.2d 839 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 371 U.S. 861 (1962),
the court holds that the showing of a single jobber that
his contract was cancelled by Timken for dealing in com-
petitive bearings, even if true, would not constitute sub-
stantial evidence of a consistent policy of exclusive dealing.
In the case of South End Oil Company v. Texaco, Inc.,
237 F. Supp. 650 (N.D. Ill. 1965), the court says,
We are not aware of any case in which a finding of
‘unlawful conduct’ rests on the isolated experiences
of one businessman.
In a case very similar upon its facts to the present
one, the District Court refused to enjoin the defendant
from terminating plaintiff’s service station lease, saying,
Moreover, the record indicates that the defendant
chose not to renew the plaintiff's lease for reasons
other than plaintiff’s refusal to buy T.B.A. products,
such as declining gasoline sales and failing to keep
A30
the gas station clean. Hollander v. American Oil Co.,
329 F. Supp. 1300, 1302 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
This case is an example of an increasingly frequent
and highly disturbing practice of trying to bring simple
tort or contract cases of little or no merit into the federal
courts by pleading an antitrust or civil liberties claim. It
is easy to distort the true facts into pleadings which are
facially valid, just as the plaintiff did here, and thus com-
pel the court to bring the matter to a trial which is often
very time consuming. In the present case eight court days
were required for trial.
In what in retrospect appears to have been an over-
abundance ot caution, this Court overruled the defendant’s
motions for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff’s
case, and at the close of all the evidence. The jury, ap-
parently more swayed by the emotional appeal of a poor
little filling station operator allegedly oppressed by a giant
corporation, disregarded the law given to it in the Court’s
instructions, and reached an unjustified and untenable
verdict. It cannot be allowed to stand. Viewed in the
cold light of reason, reasonable minds could not find from
the evidence in this case that the defendant made a lease
or a contract for the sale of goods on the understanding
that the plaintiff not deal in goods of a competitor, and
that the effect of the agreement was substantially to lessen
competition or to tend to create a monopoly, the essential
elements of a violation of the Clayton Act. Nor could
reasonable minds find from the evidence in this case the
existence of a contract, combination, or conspiracy, suf-
ficient economic power with respect to the tying product
(gasoline) to impose an appreciable restraint on free com-
petition in the tied product (TBA), and a substantial vol-
ume of interstate commerce in the tied product, the es-
sential elements of a violation of the Sherman Act.
rime ——_o
arte wat ae . eee
Benin PREM tues
A31
The motion filed by defendant for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict will therefore be granted, and an
order will be entered expressing of this ruling.
/s/ Don J. Younc
United States District Judge
a
A32 A33
JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT Dated at Toledo, Ohio, this 11th day of December,
(Filed December 11, 1973) 1973.
Civil No. C 71-388 APPROVED:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT /s/ Don J. Younc
For THE NorTHERN District oF OHIO U.S. District Judge
WESTERN DIVISION
/s/ Dominic J. Crm1no
Clerk of Court
MARION DAVIS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
MARATHON OIL COMPANY,
Defendant.
JUDGMENT
This action came on for trial before the Court and a
jury, Honorable Don J. Young, United States District
Judge, presiding, and the issues having been duly tried
and the jury having duly rendered its verdict.
It is Ordered and Adjudged that pursuant to 15 U.S.C.
Sec. 15 the Court is required to treble $15,000 verdict
returned by the jury which results in a judgment of
$45,000 in favor of the plaintiff and it is
FuRTHER ORDERED and ApJuDGED that for the reasons
stated in the Court’s accompanying memorandum the
costs, including a reasonable attorney’s fee, will be assessed
at $17,841.42.
In conformity with Rule 77(d) F.R.C.P. please take
notice that the following order of judgment was entered
in this court on December 11, 1973.
ee. eS ee a
Deities nee
A34
MEMORANDUM OF THE DISTRICT COURT
(Filed October 25, 1972)
Civil No. C 71-388
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
For THE NorTHERN DIsTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
MARION DAVIS, et al.,
F.aintiffs,
VS.
MARATHON OIL COMPANY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM
Youne, J:
This is an action for an alleged antitrust violation
under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The sole question
now before this Court is whether plaintiffs’ demand for a
jury trial should be sustained.
The syllogism which supports defendant's position is
a nice piece of tight reasoning. It is said that one has a
right to a trial by jury only when the action is one which
existed at common law, thus coming within the provision
of the Seventh Amendment, or when a statute specifically
provides for a trial by jury. There can be little dispute
that the present action did not exist at common law.
Nor does it appear that Congress has specifically provided
for the right to trial by jury in the Acts. The conclusion
would, therefore, seem to be clear that there is no right to
a jury trial in an antitrust case.
A35
In spite of this compelling logic, however, there is a
plethora of cases which specifically hold that a jury trial
is required in an antitrust case. See Beacon Theatres, Inc.
v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), and the line of cases
stemming from this decision.
In view of this overwhelming body of law which has
consistently held that there is a right to a jury trial, this
Court concludes, with considerable reluctance, that in this
case, plaintiff should be afforded a trial by jury. This
Court is troubled because a critical examination of the
decisions of the Supreme Court shows clearly that what
was a bit of dictum thrown into that Court’s reasoning in
Fleitmann v. Welsback Street Lighting Company of Amer-
ica, 240 U.S. 27, 28, 29 (1916), is accepted very offhand-
edly as expressing the law in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, U.S. District Judge, supra, until finally the
lower courts accept it as unquestioned law, Lah v. Shell
Oil Company, 50 F.R.D. 198, 199 (S.D. Ohio 1970). Be-
cause of the sheer weight of authority, this Court feels
constrained to follow a rule which is sound neither in
logic nor in law.
Admittedly, in this particular case, no particular prac-
tical difficulties will be presented in trying the case to a
jury. What would happen if this case presented the
complexities usually found in antitrust litigation is another
question. This Court has the greatest respect and ad-
miration for the institution of trial by jury, and under-
stands the zeal of appellate courts which are emotionally
involved with the question of the liberties of the subject
to extend the right. But as Mr. Justice Holmes, whose
dictum in Fleitmann is responsible for the present prob-
lem, said in another connection, “Not logic, but experience,
is the lifeblood of the law.” Logic and experience do not
always conflict, and trial court judges, who are far more
A36
intimately experienced with jury trials than are their
superiors on the appellate benches, recognize that there
are a great many areas in which a jury is by no means
superior to an experienced judge as a fact finder. In gen-
eral. antitrust actions would seem to fall into this category.
However. as previously stated, this Court feels required
to follow the majority of opinion, in spite of its personal
conviction that the opinion is wrong, and will grant the
demand of the plaintiffs for a jury trial. An order will be
entered accordingly.
/s/ Don J. Younc
United States District Judge
Toledo, Ohio.
a
A37
ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT
(Filed October 25, 1972)
Civil No. C 71-388
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
For THE NorTHERN District oF OHIO
WESTERN DIvISsION
MARION DAVIS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
MARATHON OIL COMPANY,
Defendant.
ORDER
This cause came to be heard upon the question of
whether plaintiffs’ demand for a trial by jury should be
sustained. The defendant filed opposition to plaintiffs’
motion. For the reasons stated in the accompanying
memorandum, good cause therefor appearing, it is
OrpERED that the demand of plaintiffs for trial by
jury should be and hereby is sustained.
/s/ Don J. Younc
United States District Judge
Toledo, Ohio.
A38
CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES INVOLVED
United States Constitution, Amendment VII
In suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be
otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law.
15 US.C. §1
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is de-
clared to be illegal: Provided, That nothing contained in
sections 1 to 7 of this title shall render illegal, contracts
or agreements prescribing minimum prices for the resale
of a commodity which bears, or the label or container of
which bears, the trademark, brand, or name of the pro-
ducer or distributor of such commodity, and which is in
free and open competition with commodities of the same
general class produced or distributed by others, when
contracts or agreements of that description are lawful as
applied to intrastate transactions, under any statute, law,
or public policy now or hereafter in effect in any State,
Territory, or the District of Columbia in which such resale
is to be made, or to which the commodity is to be trans-
ported for such resale, and the making of such contracts
or agreements shall not be an unfair method of competition
under section 45 of this title: Provided further, That the
preceding proviso shall not make lawfui any contract or
agreement, providing for the establishment or maintenance
of minimum resale prices on any commodity herein in-
volved. between manufacturers, or between producers,
a ee a ee ee ee ae ee vo Td ee ahr
— —
~~ ee
A39
or between wholesalers, or between brokers, or between
factors, or between re:ailers, or between persons, firms, or
corporations in competition with each other. Every person
who shall make any contract or engage in any combination
or conspiracy declared by sections 1 to 7 of this title to be
illegal shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding
one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion
of the court.
15 U.S.C. §14
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in com-
merce, in the course of such commerce, to lease or make
a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether pat-
ented or unpatented, for use, consumption, or resale within
the United States or any Territory thereof or the District
of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under
the jurisdiction of the United States, or fix a price charged
therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on
the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee
or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods,
wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other com-
modities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or
seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract
for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding
may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly in any line of commerce.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.