Petition — Davis v. Marathon Oil Co.

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Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

No.2 5~164 5

MARION DAVIS,

Petitioner,

vs.

MARATHON OIL COMPANY,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To The United States Court of Appeals

For the Sixth Circuit

Cart WILLIAM HINTON

Joun D. Nose

Tuomas F. Bryant

Hinton, Nosie & Bryant

1330 Building P.O. Box 208

1330 North Main Street

Findlay, Ohio 45840

Telephone (419) 422-0909

Ricuarp A. Betts

101% West Sandusky Street

Findlay, Ohio 45840

Telephone (419) 422-5565

Attorneys for Petitioner

THE GATES LEGAL PUBLISHING CO., CLEVELAND, OHIO-——-TEL. (216) @21-8647

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I Te isitiebhncdiaieintabsiaictdheh tianithsnhieiitiintdidoesishiegeen

Jurisdiction ..... ~..-.--_..--... -

Ae

Constitution and Statutes Involved

EE IE oe a

Reasons for Granting the Writ - . 10

I. To review in the light of the United States Consti-

tution, Amendment VII, the denial of a new trial

to Petitioner after entry of judgment notwith-

standing the verdict for insufficient evidence by

the trial judge who as a sanction excluded relevant

material evidence without a hearing to determine

that sanctions were warranted _._..._.._____..._ 10

II. To resolve an apparent conflict between the hold-

ing of the Court of Appeals in this case and the

prior holdings of this Court permitting proof by

circumstantial evidence of the existence and en-

forcement of illegal tying arrangements in a pri-

vate treble damage suit for violation of 15 U.S.C.

$1 and 15 U.S.C. §14 ' 15

Conclusion 18

o won Nw’

APPENDIX:

Order of the Court of Appeals Denying Petition

for Rehearing (February 12, 1976) _Al

Judgment Entry of the Court of Appeals (De-

cember 12, 1975) | A2

Opinion of the Court of Appeals (December 12,

1975) .. AZ

Judgment of the District Court (September 18,

1974) Al19

Order of the District Court (September 17, 1974) A21

Opinion of the District Court (September 17,

1974) A22

Judgment of the District Court (December 11,

1973) A32

Memorandum of the District Court (October 25,

1972) A34

Order of the District Court (October 25, 1972) A37

United States Constitution, Amendment VII A38

15 U.S.C. $1 A38

15 U.S.C. §14 A39

m

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Beacon Theaters v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) . 10

Federal Trade Commission v. Texaco, Inc., et al., 393

U.S. 223, 21 L. Ed. 2d 394, 89 S. Ct. 429 (1968) 16,17

Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964) 17

Neely v. Eby Construction Co., 386 U.S. 317, 18 L. Ed.

2d 75, 87 S. Ct. 1072 (1967) 14

Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1

(1958)

Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir.

1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 963 (1961) —

Simpson v. Union Oil Company, 377 U.S. 13, 12 L. Ed.

2d 98, 84S. Ct. 1051 (1964) 13-14

17

Constitutions, Statutes and Rules

Constitution of the United States, Amendment VII _— 3, 10

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 33(a) 11

15 U.S.C. $1 (Section 1 of the Sherman Act) 3,15, 17

15 U.S.C. $14 (Section 3 of the Clayton Act) 3, 15,17

28 U.S.C. §1254(1) 2

28 U.S.C. $1291 : 4

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

* a

MARION DAVIS,

Petitioner,

vs.

MARATHON OIL COMPANY,

Respondent.

<a

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To The United States Court of Appeals

For the Sixth Circuit

Petitioner prays that a writ of certiorari issue to re-

view the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit entered in the above-entitled case on

February 12, 1976.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals entered in this

matter is reported at 528 F.2d 395 and appears in the

Appendix at p. A3. The order denying petition for re-

hearing appears at p. Al. The opinion of the District

Court entered October 25, 1972, is reported at 35 Ohio

Misc. 73 and is printed in the Appendix at p. A34 to this

petition. The opinion of the District Court entered

September 17, 1974 is not yet reported and appears in the

Appendix at p. A22 to this petition.

2

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered

on February 12, 1976. The jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Did the court of appeals err in denying a new trial

where the proceedings as a whole in the district court had,

in effect, though not in form, denied Petitioner a trial by

jury in a private antitrust case in which the trial court,

prior to trial, expressed its view that a jury trial was in-

appropriate, although required, had, during trial, summa-

rily excluded Petitioner’s lately discovered material wit-

nesses without permitting Petitioner to show by evidence

or authority that imposition of sanctions was not only

undeserved and unwarranted but also unreasonably op-

pressive and prejudicial to Petitioner, and had, more than

eleven months after trial, after drawing conclusions of

fact from conflicting proofs of the parties, entered judg-

ment for Respondent notwithstanding the jury’s verdict

uwarding damages to Petitioner?

2. Must a lessee service station déaler plaintiff in a

private antitrust case wherein he claims damages from

enforcement of a covert tying arrangement prove by tes-

timony of other lessee-dealers a general plan of defendant

to enforce its tying arrangement where his own testimony

is corroborated by an eyewitness to veiled threats to him

for non-compliance with the tying arrangement and where

cancellation of his lease is prompted at least in part by his

failure to buy more TBA in compliance with the tying

arrangement enforced by an oil company Respondent

whose relatively large size in its marketing area is shown

and whose former management employee testified that

3

Respondent was entitled to the profits from TBA (tied

product) because of its investment in the land and build-

ings it leased to its dealers (tying product).

CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES INVOLVED

This case presented questions arising under United

States Constitution Amendment VII, and under 15 U.S.C.

$1 (Section 1 of the Sherman Act) and 15 U.S.C. §14

(Section 3 of the Clayton Act) which are set forth in

the Appendix at p. A38.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Marion E. Davis, a former Marathon Oil Company

lessee-dealer service station operator, filed this action

against Marathon Oil Company, seeking treble damages

for non-renewal of his service-station lease claiming

Marathon’s violation of 15 U.S.C. §1 (Section 1 of the

Sherman Act), and of 15 U.S.C. §14 (Section 3 of the

Clayton Act). Asa basis for relief, Davis alleged a covert

tying arrangement enforced by Marathon, whereby Mar-

athon (vendor) would sell its gasoline and lease its service

stations (the tying products) only on condition that the

buyer (lessee-dealer) also purchase Mara:hon-sponsored

tires, batteries and accessories (the tied product). This

allegation was denied by Marathon. Trial was had from

September 24, 1973, through October 4, 1973. During

trial, upon motion of Marathon, the trial court excluded

the testimony of five of Davis’ witnesses. At the close

of Petitioner’s case, and again upon renewal at the con-

clusion of Marathon’s evidence in defense and Davis’ re-

buttal evidence, the trial court overruled Marathon’s mo-

tion for a directed verdict against Davis and the case was

submitted to the jury under proper instructions. The

4

jury returned its general verdict in favor of Davis on his

claims. Judgment was entered on the verdict December

11, 1973. Thereafter, on December 19, 1913, Marathon

served its motion in the alternative for judgment notwith-

standing the verdict or for a new trial, contending that

the evidence upon trial failed to establish Davis’ claim, or,

alternatively, that the jury had insufficient evidence from

which to make its findings. On September 17, 1974,

nearly a year after the jury’s verdict, the trial court

entered its order and opinion granting Marathon’s motion

for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, vacating the

judgment on the verdict entered December 11, 1973, en-

tering judgment notwithstanding the verdict of the jury

in favor of Merathon and against Davis, and dismissing

the action at Davis’ cost. Judgment was entered the same

day. An appeal to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit was timely perfected, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. §1291. The Court of Appeals affirmed the

judgment of the District Court by its order entered Decem-

ber 12, 1975, and thereafter denied Davis’ petition for re-

hearing by its order entered February 12, 1976. A brief

history follows:

1. At a pretrial conference in this private antitrust

treble damage action, the trial judge, sua sponte, raised

the question of Davis’ right to a trial by jury, granting

Davis leave to file a brief in support of his written jury

demand. After considering briefs of counsel for both Davis

and Marathon, the trial judge reluctantly “sustained”

Davis’ jury demand and entered his written opinion ex-

plaining therein his belief that jury trials are inappropriate

in antitrust cases.

2. One week before trial, Davis’ attorneys learned

that Marathon had been sued by a lessee-dealer some time

previously in a suit then pending in the United States

5

District Court in Columbus, Ohio, a different judicial

district, in a case raising similar issues. Investigation re-

vealed that the plaintiff therein and one of his key wit-

nesses were lessee-dealers who would be unafraid to

testify in Davis’ behalf respecting the existence and en-

forcement of the tying arrangements claimed by Davis.

The names and the nature of the enforcement activities of

their Marathon sales representatives were also learned,

together with the information that such Marathon agents

were directly subordinate to the Marathon district man-

ager who was to be Marathon’s corporate representative

at Davis’ trial. These sales representatives were thought

to possess relevant documentary evidence tending to prove

Davis’ claims. Within forty-eight hours thereafter, writ-

ten supplemental answers to interrogatories were served

upon Marathon trial counsel, setting forth in full the

names, addresses and substance of these witnesses’ ex-

pected testimony and other evidence. At trial, Marathon

moved to exclude the testimony of the witnesses as a sanc-

tion for late discovery, which motion the trial court

granted in spite of the attempted explanation by Davis’

counsel and without consideration of the relative potential

harm to be suffered by the parties.

3. Some of the material facts adduced at trial are

that, from the spring of 1961 until August, 1966, Marion

Davis was the lessee-operator of service stations in Find-

lay, Ohio, under leases with Pure Oil Company. In the

course of running these businesses, Davis provided a truck

and trailer rental service, engaged in motor tune-up,

brake repair, vehicle washing, and muffler and tail pipe

replacement. Davis sold tires, batteries and replacement

automobile and truck parts as required to supply the

needs of his customers. One of these customers was a

forty-five car and truck fleet of the Ohio Bell Telephone

Company office located in Findlay. Davis performed

6

such repair work for this customer as he was requested

by it to do, and which he was able to perform at his Pure

Oil Station.

4. During July, 1966, Marathon representatives in-

terviewed Davis at his Pure Oil station and at his home

and solicited him to assume operation of College Marathon

service station, also in Findlay, Ohio. Prior to execution

by Davis of the Marathon service station lease, certain

proposed points of agreement were written at the direc-

tion of the Marathon district manager, by the terms of

which, among others, Davis agreed to purchase from

Marathon the existing inventory of the former lessee, and

was assured that his qualified Pure Oil customers would be

issued Marathon credit cards. The hours of operation of

the service station were fixed by this letter agreement,

Davis agreed to utilize Marathon’s recommended book-

keeping service, and to participate in all Marathon-spon-

sored advertising programs. The letter designated the

Marathon sales representative to be responsible for this

operation and to handle all matters and dealings between

Davis and Marathon. Davis was verbally assured that he

could continue to operate his truck and trailer leasing

business and to service his fleet customers.

5. During the years 1966 through 1970, Marathon

marketed its brand of products and its sponsored brands

in the states of Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois, Ohio, Ken-

tucky and Florida, among others. The Marathon Ohio

region, a marketing unit, encompassed the entire State

of Ohio, a portion of Kentucky and a stretch of Interstate

Highway I-75 down through Florida. In the State of Ohio,

Marathon, with over one thousand service stations, ranked

second or third in sales of branded gasoline during the

year 1970. Ninety percent of Marathon’s service stations

were lessee-operated. From mid-1966 through mid-1970,

7

Marathon pursued a program of selling at wholesale to its

dealers selected brands of tires, batteries and accessories

referred to as TBA. Ninety percent of these TBA sales

were accomplished by Marathon sales representatives re-

ferring their orders from dealers to Marathon’s authorized

B. F. Goodrich or Firestone Tire and Rubber Company

suppliers for delivery. Marathon sold both B. F. Goodrich

and Firestone brand tires. A dealer could choose to stock

either one of these two brands. Marathon supplied Delco

brand automobile batteries. The term “accessories” as

applied to Marathon’s program applied to a limited num-

ber of kinds of replacement parts, including, p incipally,

Fram brand oil and air filters, Anco brand windshield

wiper blades, Champion brand spark plugs, B. F. Goodrich

or Firestone fanbelts and radiator hoses, together with

shock absorbers, sealed beam headlights, automobile lamp

bulbs, antifreeze, polishes, auto chemicals and the like.

These are the fast-moving multi-application replacement

parts ordinarily stocked and sold by service station

dealers.

6. Non-oil company automobile parts suppliers stock

and supply to service stations many more replacement

parts slower moving than these, not ordinarily stocked

by service station dealers, such as mufflers and tail pipes,

water pumps, generators, alternators, regulators, gaskets,

wheel bearings, hydraulic parts, brake shoes and ignition

parts, although some service station dealers stock supplies

of ignition parts. Marathon did not offer these slow-mov-

ing items for sale as part of its TBA program.

7. Marathon promoted its TBA program to present

to the public a consistent image in its leased stations.

The former Ohio Region sales manager testified on direct

examination that TBA sales were “frosting on the cake” to

which Marathon was entitled because of its investment

in the land and buildings leased to dealers.

8

8. On October 11, 1966, Davis bought an order of

fifteen Delco Brand batteries from an independent jobber.

On October 14, 1966, Davis requested that jobber to accept

return of the order, saying that his Marathon representa-

tive had told him to return them immediately. The jobber

accepted the return. On October 17, 1966, an identical

order of fifteen Delco brand batteries was shipped to Davis

by B. F. Goodrich upon order by James Day, and was

billed to Davis by Marathon. Thereafter, Davis’ orders

for Marathon TBA were prepared by his Marathon repre-

sentatives until February, 1970, when Davis returned a

large quantity of accessories delivered by B. F. Goodrich

Company. The sales representative arrived later the

same day to investigate the return. Although, with the

consent of Marathon’s sales representative, he discon-

tinued buying radiator hoses from Marathon during 1969,

after October, 1966, Davis made his large purchases of

TBA for stocking purposes, only from Marathon until

March 5, 1970, when he purchased, from an independent

jobber, $752.00 worth of shock absorbers for stock, and

March 12, 1970, when he bought for shelf stock twelve

non-Marathon sponsored tires from an independent tire

distributor. Within the hearing of Davis’ employee, which

employee so testified at trial, the Marathon sales repre-

sentative told Davis that his lease might be cancelled un-

less he bought more of his TBA from Marathon. The

Marathon representative testified that he verbally recom-

mended to his district manager that Davis’ lease be termi-

nated. On March 16, 1970, the Marathon district manager

in writing sought permission of higher management to

cancel Davis’ lease, relating that for six months the com-

pany had had operating and volume problems with Davis,

that his station was dirty, that Davis was hard to counsel,

that his gallonage was declining, and that Marathon sold

him very little TBA. In March, 1970, Davis learned from a

+)

Shell Oil Company representative that Marathon was con-

sidering cancellation of his lease. On June 15, 1970,

Marathon notified Davis that his lease was being cancelled,

effective August 31, 1970, and on August 31, 1970, Mara-

thon took possession of College Marathon station.

9. Marathon introduced evidence of purchases by

Davis and other Marathon dealers from two non-oil com-

pany replacement parts suppliers. No segregation of items

purchased by the dealers could be established at trial in

order to determine how much of such purchases was of

TBA items offered by Marathon and how much was of

merchandise Marathon did not carry in its line. Marathon

also introduced testimony of five presently subsisting

Marathon lessee-dealers, all of whom bought principally

from Marathon those items of TBA Marathon offered in

its line, purchasing non-competing items from other sup-

pliers. None claimed to have been instructed to buy TBA

only from Marathon. Cross examination developed that

three dealers were former Marathon employees, one of

these having owed Marathon up to thirty thousand dollars

for TBA at one time and having made payments on the

indebtedness of up to five thousand dollars per month to

Marathon, and that another, hearing of Davis’ lease can-

cellation, had doubled his TBA purchases from Marathon

during the year 1970. Marathon offered testimony of its

employees that Davis’ station was dirty. Davis introduced

evidence that he had a full-time janitor on the premises

and, in rebuttal, offered testimony of an independent

daily customer witness that the Davis station was an un-

usually clean one.

10. Davis introduced evidence showing that his

morketing area had been substantially reduced by the

opening nearby of a modern new Marathon station with

resultant loss of gallonage to Davis. Also introduced was

10

testimony of Davis and an employee that no heavy repair

work was done at College Marathon. In support of its

contention that Davis was doing heavy repair work con-

trary to policy, Marathon elicited testimony of its sales

representatives that Davis had “tied up” one bay of his

station for one evening to work on the engine of his own

truck.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. To review in the light of the United States Constitu-

tion, Amendment VII, the denial of a new trial to

Petitioner after entry of judgment notwithstanding

the verdict for insufficient evidence by the trial judge

who as a sanction excluded relevant material evidence

without a hearing to determine that sanctions were

warranted.

Beacon Theaters v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) un-

questionably confirms the right to trial by jury in an anti-

trust case. However, the total effect of the proceedings

in the District Court in this case as affirmed by the Court

of Appeals, and especially in view of the Court of Appeal’s

denial to Petitioner of a new trial is to completely subvert

the jury process by permitting a trial judge to summarily

exclude relevant evidence and to draw conclusions of fact

from selected conflicting proofs of the parties, ignore other

relevant evidence and thereby substitute his judgment for

that of the jury’s in entering judgment notwithstanding

the jury’s verdict awarding damages to Petitioner.

On appeal from the District Court’s judgment not-

withstanding the jury’s verdict for Petitioner, the Court

of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court, hold-

ing in part that Davis had failed to introduce evidence

that could support the conclusion that it was a general

ll

practice of Marathon imposed upon many or all of its

lessee-dealers to purchase its TBA as a condition of re-

ceiving petroleum products or of retaining leases.

During trial, the District Court, as a sanction for

Davis’ presumed failure to make timely discovery, ex-

cluded the testimony of certain of Davis’ witnesses recently

discovered, whose testimony would have accomplished

corroboration of Davis’ claim of Marathon’s imposition and

enforcement upon its dealers of covert tying arrangements.

In holding that the trial court properly exercised its

discretion in excluding the testimony of such witnesses,

the Court of Appeals noted that, in January, 1973, Mara-

thon served interrogatories upon Davis requesting the

names of all persons acquainted with the facts of the case,

and that on September 10, 1973, after the time provided

in Rule 33(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Petitioner

filed its answers. The Court further noted that on Sep-

tember 21, three days before trial was scheduled to begin,

Petitioner filed supplemental answers listing the five new

witnesses. The Court of Appeals ignored the likelihood that

new evidence might be discovered requiring supplemental

answers to interrogatories under the Rules. The Court of

Appeals did not note, however, and Davis was never given

a chance to explain to the District Court, for the trial

record, that also in January, 1973, Davis served interroga-

tories on Marathon with answers received September 14,

1973, which answers consisted, principally, of objections

to the relevancy and materiality of Davis’ request for in-

formation respecting Marathon business statistics, dealer

complaints, dealers’ names, similar pending litigation, and

other matters which Marathon did not deem to be con-

cerned directly with Marathon’s marketing operations in

Findlay, Ohio to which it sought to limit trial. Davis did

not. however, seek an order of compulsion against Mara-

thon in view of the shortness of time, but to obtain the

12

evidence sought, proceeded to issue subpoenas duces

tecum to get such evidence during trial. The Court of Ap-

peals characterized Davis’ proferred witnesses as “‘sur-

prise” witnesses, and further observed there is no credible

support for Davis’ contention that he had just discovered

these witnesses and that reasonable diligence would have

disclosed the additional witnesses far in advance of the

trial, stating erroneously that all such persons were either

friends or employees of Davis’ or were working in the

Findlay area during the pendency of Davis’ suit. There

is no evidence in the record, or in fact, to support such a

finding by the Court of Appeals and such misapprehension

of that Court was the basis of Davis’ petition for rehearing

which the Court of Appeals denied by its order entered

February 12, 1976. The Court of Appeals further charac-

terized the filing by Davis of supplemental answers to in-

terrogatories as unfair surprise contrary to the policy of

the Federal Rules, again without supporting evidence.

The Court of Appeals apparently assumed that the brief

statement of trial counsel was a sufficient argument to set

forth Davis’ full defense to Marathon’s motion.

Of course, there is no evidence in the record to sup-

port the observations and findings by the Court of Appeals,

for the District Court permitted no explanation, save a

brief attempt by counsel which was rejected out of hand

or ignored. It is disclosed by the record that the trial judge

presumed the bad faith of Davis, asserted that it would be

unfair to Marathon to permit such witnesses to testify,

doing so without consideration of or affording an opportu-

nity to Petitioner to demonstrate Marathon’s knowledge of

the testimony of these witnesses or, indeed, even to permit

counsel for Davis to thoroughly explain that the substance

of all witnesses’ testimony had been furnished to Marathon

trial counsel in writing at the earliest possible moment.

Davis had no opportunity to present evidence or argument

13

to the Court disclosing that as Davis then believed, the ex-

istence of the Marathon related witnesses had been con-

cealed by Marathon’s objections in lieu of answers to Davis’

interrogatories. Davis was afforded no opportunity to

present evidence to the Court that the two Marathon

lessee-dealers and the two Marathon sales representatives

were from the Columbus, Ohio area, that the two sales

representatives were directly subordinate to Marathon’s

corporate representative at trial, the Marathon Columbus

district manager, nor that the lessee-dealers operated serv-

ice stations in the Marathon Columbus district and that

one of the lessee-dealers was involved in litigation with

Marathon in Columbus in a case involving similar issues.

The trial court never learned that these four persons had

never worked in Findlay, Ohio, in the Marathon Toledo

district, and that all were strangers to Davis, or that the

name of the single employee of Davis had been previously

disclosed to Marathon in earlier discovery and was in-

cluded in the supplemental answers pro forma.

In its order denying Davis’ petition for rehearing, the

Court of Appeals stated that Davis would have been ex-

pected to contact other Marathon lessee-dealers in the

Findlay area, which area it apparently intended should

include Columbus, Ohio, and beyond.

Petitioner submits that by requiring Davis to canvass

other Marathon lessee-dealers over a wide area of more

than one hundred miles radius and present their direct

evidence at trial as suggested in its opinion denying Davis’

petition for rehearing, the Court of Appeals has, in essence,

required Davis to prepare and prosecute a class action,

contrary to his wishes, contrary to the apparent wishes

of many members of the prospective class, and, indeed,

contrary to the prior holdings of this Court respecting the

maintenance of private antitrust enforcement actions by

single individuals. Simpson v. Union Oil Company, 377

14

U.S. 13, 12 L. Ed. 2d 98, 84S. Ct. 1051 (1964). It defies

reality to expect that in view of the lesson presented to

them b: the apparently punitive cancellation of Davis’

lease, that other lessee-dealers within Davis’ immediate

marketing area, and in the shadow of Marathon’s home

office would be willing to risk their business investments

to testify upon a matter of principal.

In Neely v. Eby Construction Co., 386 U.S. 317, 18

L. Ed. 2d 75, 87 S. Ct. 1072 (1967), it was held that where

a Court of Appeals sets aside a jury’s verdict or affirms

a judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the evi-

dence was insufficient to send the case to the jury, it is

not clear that the litigation should be terminated, for the

erroneous exclusion of evidence at trial which would have

strengthened Petitioner’s case is an important possibility,

and that another is that the trial court itself caused the

insufficiency in Petitioner’s case by erroneously placing

too high a burden of proof on him at trial. The power of

the Court of Appeals, under the rules, to order a new trial

in such a case is therein confirmed.

Therefore, Petitioner urges that the Court of Appeals

erred in failing to grant Davis a new trial in consequence

of the District Court’s abuse of discretion in the summary

exclusion of the testimony of material witnesses without

affording an adequate opportunity for Davis to demon-

strate that the sanctions imposed were undeserved, inap-

propriate, unwarranted, excessively harsh and oppressive.

15

II. To resolve an apparent conflict between the holding of

the Court of Appeals in this case and the prior hold-

ings of this Court permitting proof by circumstantial

evidence of the existence and enforcement of illegal

tying arrangements in a private treble damage suit

for violation of 15 U.S.C. §1 and 15 U.S.C. §14.

The decisions below are directly contrary to the ap-

plicable decisions of this Court and of the Courts of Ap-

peals for the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, as to the nature

of the proof required to establish the existence of and en-

forcement of a covert tying arrangement by an oil com-

pany in a lessee-dealer TBA antitrust case.

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held in

this case that Davis was required to prove the general

practice of Marathon to require purchase of TBA as a con-

dition of continued availability of petroleum products to

or the continuation of the leases of many or all of its lessee-

dealers, apparently by direct testimony of other dealers

corroborating Davis’ testimony as to the existence of the

tie in. Furthermore, the Court of Apneals adopted the

truncated version of the evidence from which the trial

judge drew his conclusions of fact in granting judgment

notwithstanding the verdict, both courts ignoring not only

conflicts between Petitioner’s and Respondent’s testimony

regarding threats, declining gallonage, housekeeping and

the nature of repair work done by Davis, but also wholly

avoiding the plain language of the documentary evidence

tending to show domination by Marathon of the conduct

of Davis’ business and further establishing that one of the

considerations for cancellation of his lease was the fact

that Davis bought little TBA from Marathon.

Davis’ proofs showed that during the years of 1969

and 1970, respectively, Marathon, nationally, operated

3,615 and 3,705 service stations, of which approximately

16

1,000 were operated in Ohio. National net sales of refined

products in 1970 were of a value of $513,505,000.00.

Marathon national TBA sales in the years 1969 and 1970,

respectively, were $6,088,137.75 and $5,975,287.58, of

which sales in the Ohio region for the years were $2,106,-

986.40 and $2,142,965.33, respectively. Marathon ranked

second or third among oil companies in volume of sales in

Ohio in 1970. Davis’ evidence showed that Marathon’s

TBA program was intended to provide a consistent image

to the public of merchandise stocked and sold by Marathon

lessee-dealers; that as early as the initial interview, Mara-

thon lessees were informed that they were expected to

participate in uniform advertising programs; that they

were sold an initial stock of sponsored merchandise; that

lessee-dealers operate their service stations on short-term

year-to-year leases; and that Marathon kept track of

Marathon sponsored TBA purchases by its dealers. Mara-

thon’s former Ohio region sales manager testified in Davis’

case in chief that Marathon was entitled to net profits from

TBA sales as “frosting on the cake” because of its invest-

ment in the land and buildings it leased to dealers.

The testimony of Marathon’s former Ohio region sales

manager, offered by Davis, also disclosed the manner of

the operation of the Marathon TBA sales program, where-

by Marathon representatives took dealer orders for de-

livery by B. F. Goodrich Company outlets, B. F. Goodrich

thereafter billing Marathon for the purchases, and Mara-

thon, in turn, billing the dealer for the merchandise de-

livered by Goodrich. The same procedure applied to

dealers choosing Marathon’s alternative Firestone Tire

and Rubber Company TBA stocking program.

The difference to be perceived between this purchase-

sales scheme and the sales commission agreement found

to be inherently coercive in Federal Trade Commission v.

Texaco, Inc., et al., 393 U.S. 223, 21 L. Ed. 2d 394, 89 S. Ct.

17

429 (1968), is insignificant when it is considered that the

lessee-dealer is just as certain under either scheme that

the oil company holding dominant economic power over

him is getting the TBA profits. Marathon supplied the

customers to whom Goodrich or Firestone shipped the

goods.

In Federal Trade Commission v. Texaco, Inc., et al.,

supra, it was held that the sales commission agreement

existing between Texaco and Goodrich was inherently co-

ercive and that it was therefore clear that the oil company’s

dominant economic power was used in a manner which

tended to foreclose competition in marketing, even though

there was no showing of direct overt practices by the oil

company designed to force its dealers to buy sponsored

products. In Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 286 F.2d

832, 837 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 963 (1961),

it was held that the existence of cther factors which might

have contributed to the oil company’s decision to cancel

the lessee-dealer’s lease will not affect the Petitioner’s

cause where the oil company’s “illegal motive substantially

contributed to the decision to cancel.”

It is evident from the opinions below that the courts

in this case have isolated the individual elements of Clay-

ton Act and Sherman Act violations for purposes of testing

the evidence on trial, rather than correctly viewing Peti-

tioner’s proofs upon trial as a whole, as taught by the opin-

ion in Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 466 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964). In Lessig, it was

held also that plaintiff need prove only a tacit tying ar-

rangement by circumstantial evidence.

The standard of per se illegality of tying arrangements

was summarized in Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States,

356 U.S. 1 (1958) as:

They are unreasonable in and of themselves whenever

a party has sufficient economic power with respect to

13

the tying product to appreciably restrain free com-

petition in the market for the tied product and a ‘not

insubstantial’ amount of interstate commerce is af-

fected. 356 US. at 6.

Petitioner submits that the evidence presented at trial

meets all the foregoing tests for establishment of a covert

tying arrangement and is sufficient to permit the inference

of covert enforcement of such tying arrangements. It is

further asserted that, upon questions of conflicting evi-

dence as to the reasons for Marathon’s cancellation of

Davis’ lease, the question was properly submitted to the

jury and the jury having decided in favor of Davis, its ver-

dict should not have been disturbed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, a writ of certiorari should

issue.

Respectfully submitted,

Cart WILLIAM HINTON

JOHN D. Nose

THomMAsS F. Bryant

Hinton, Nosie & BryAnt

1330 Building P.O. Box 208

1330 North Main Street

Findlay, Ohio 45840

RicHArp A. BEtTTs

1014. West Sandusky Street

Findlay, Ohio 45840

Attorneys for Petitioner

Al

APPENDIX

ORDER OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DENYING

PETITION FOR REHEARING

(Filed February 12, 1976)

No. 75-1037

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For THE SixtTH CrIRcuIT

MARION DAVIS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

MARATHON OIL COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee.

ORDER

Before: CELEBREZZE, Peck, and McCresg, Circuit Judges.

Upon consideration of the petition for rehearing, the

court concludes that although petitioner is correct in his

contention that proffered witness Poston was not a friend

of Davis as stated in our opinion,’ this error does not re-

quire a change in our decision. The resolution of this issue

turned on Davis’ failure to exercise due diligence in dis-

covering witnesses before the eve of trial. At a minimum

he would have been expected to contact other Marathon

lessee-dealers in the Findlay area, which in our view is

not as narrowly circumscribed for this purpose as Davis

would restrict it.

Accoraingly, the petition is DeNnrep.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

Joun P. HEHMAN

Clerk

'The proffered testimony was that Poston was a friend of

Dennis Smith, who was involved in a suit against Marathon

similar to the one brought by Davis. His suit involved “Mara-

thon Oil Company’s gasoline allocation and business practices.”

A2

JUDGMENT ENTRY OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

(Filed December 12, 1975)

No. 75-1037

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For THE SrxtH CIRCUIT

MARION DAVIS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

MARATHON OIL COMPANY,

Defendant-Anpellee.

JUDGMENT

APPEAL from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Ohio.

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the record from

the United States District Court for the Northern District

of Ohio and was argued by counsel.

On CONSIDERATION WHEREFORE, It is now here

ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of

the said District Court in this cause be and the same is

hereby affirmed.

It is further ordered that Defendant-Appellee recover

from Plaintiff-Appellant the costs on appeal, as itemized

below, and that execution therefor issue out of said Dis-

trict Court if necessary.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE CouRT

JoHn P. HEHMAN

Clerk

A3

OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

(Filed December 12, 1975)

No. 75-1037

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For THE S1xTH Circuit

MARION DAVIS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

V.

MARATHON OIL COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee.

On APPEAL from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division.

Before: CELEBREZZE, Peck and McCree, Circuit Judges.

McCrez, Circuit Judge. This appeal from an order

granting Marathon Oil Company’s motion for judgment

n.0.v. presents two questions for review: (1) whether the

district court erred in holding that reasonable minds could

not have found that Marathon Oil Company violated either

section 1 of the Sherman Act,’ 15 U.S.C. §1, or section 3

of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §14,” in cancelling appellant’s

' Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in relevant part:

Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,

or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the

several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.

* Section 3 of the Clayton Act provides:

It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce,

in the course of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or

contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery,

supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or un-

patented, for use, consumption, or resale within the United

States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia

(Footnote continued on following page)

A4

service station lease, and, (2) whether the district court

erred in refusing to permit the testimony of five witnesses

“discovered” by appellant only three days before trial

despite Marathon’s eight month old request for a list of

all prospective witnesses. We hold that the district court

did not err in entering judgment n.o.v., and that it did not

abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the testimony of

five witnesses disclosed to Marathon only three days before

trial.

Marion Davis, plaintiff-appellant, commenced this ac-

tion on December 29, 1971, in the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The complaint

charged that Marathon had violated sections 1 and 2 of the

Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act by, inter

alia, “impos|ing| upon its hundreds of lessee-dealers ex-

clusive dealing arrangements which require that the

dealers secure their entire requirements of petroleum

products and tires, batteries and other automobile acces-

sories exclusively from the defendant... .’”

ee

——— ee ———

(Continued from previous page)

or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdic-

tion of the United States, or fix a price charged therefor, or

discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition,

agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser

thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchan-

dise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a competi-

ior or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of

such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agree-

ment, or understanding may be to substantially lessen com-

petition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of com-

merce.

*The complaint continues:

These contracts and agreements are forced upon service sta-

tion operators against their desires and are enforced by

employees or agents of the said defendant, who constantly

watch the products which are sold by the dealers. The serv-

ice station operator knows that his lease will not be renewed

at the end of the one-year-period, should he refuse to follow

dictated prices or exclusive dealing arrangements of the

defendant.

(Footnote continued on following page)

A5

Nearly two years later, the case went to trial before a

jury, and proofs were submitted from September 24 until

October 4, 1973. On September 21, Davis attempted to

amend the list of his prospective witnesses that had already

been submitted to Marathon by adding five witnesses —

two Marathon dealers, his former employee, and two Mara-

thon employees. Marathon moved to preclude the testi-

mony of these additional witnesses and, after argument,

the court granted the motion. At the conclusion of appel-

lant’s case and again at the conclusion of all the proofs,

Marathon moved for a directed verdict. The district court

denied the motion. The case was thereupon submitted to

the jury upon proper instructiens, and it returned a verdict

for Davis. Judgment on the verdict was entered on De-

cember 1, 1973.

Shortly thereafter, Marathon moved for a judgment

n.o.v. or, in the alternative, for a new trial, and the district

court entered an order granting the motion for judgment

n.o.v., dismissing the action, and assessing costs against

Davis. In its memorandum opinion, the district court

stated that “there was not a scintilla of evidence” to sup-

port the jury’s verdict. It held, to the contrary, that the

evidence demonstrated that Marathon did not require its

service station lessees to purchase tires, batteries and ac-

(Continued from previous page)

7. Marathon has informed its retail dealers, including the

plaintiff, that they are required to buy the T. B. A. brand

items handled by Marathon in preference to any other and

that they must buy such T. B. A. items from Marathon exclu-

sively. These requirements were not reduced to writing,

but are commonly made orally by Marathon representatives

who visit the dealers. The representatives inspect the

dealers’ stations for competing mechandise and merchandise

purchased from distributors other than Marathon — often

requiring that such be returned, if found and threaten non-

renewal of an offending dealer’s lease. The tying arrange-

ments are imposed as a matter of general practice, and

therefore affect a substantial volume of T. B. A. sold by

Marathon dealers.

A6

cessories (TBA) as a condition of receiving gasoline or of

retaining their leases; that Davis purchased TBA from

whomever he pleased; and that Davis’ lease was ter-

minated because he had been neglecting his service station

to pursue other business interests with the consequence

that the quality of services at the station deteriorated and

it became unprofitable.

Appellant contends that the evidence was sufficient

to permit reasonable persons to find that Marathon had

impermissibly tied sales of gasoline to the lessee-operators

of its service stations to sales of its TBA. Our examination

of the record, however, demonstrates that although the

complaint contained allegations of antitrust violations suffi-

cient to withstand a motion to dismiss, appellant’s evidence

would not permit a reasonable person to find that these

allegations had been proved.

“Tying arrangements” have been defined as “agree-

ments under which the vendor will sell one product only

if the purchaser agrees to buy another product as well.”

Advance Business Systems & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp.,

415 F.2d 55, 60 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920

(1970). An illegal tiein arrangement need not be ex-

pressed in a written contract, but the complainant must

show that the seller would not make available to a pur-

chaser one commodity unless the purchaser agrees to buy

another. Advance Business Systems & Supply, supra, Les-

sig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 467-68 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964), Mc™lhenney v. Western

Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 332, 338 (4th Cir. 1959).

A tie-in arrangement may violate either section 3 of

the Clayton Act or section 1 of the Sherman Act. Times-

Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594

(1953), Advance Business Systems & Supply Co., supra.

The standards of illegality under the two statutes are sim-

ilar. The Clayton Act makes it unlawful for a person en-

A7

gaged in commerce to make a sale or contract for the sale

of goods on the “condition, agreement, or understanding”

that the “purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the

goods .. . of a competitor or competitors of the lessee or

seller, where the effect of such . . . sale, or contract for sale

or such condition, agreement or understanding may be

to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a mo-

nopoly in any line of commerce.” 15 U.S.C. §14. | Emphasis

added. }

In Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S.

1, 6 (1958) (footnote omitted), the Supreme Court stated

a similar standard under the Sherman Act:

Indeed “tying agreements serve hardly any pur-

pose beyond the suppression of competition.” Stand-

ard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 US.

293, 305-306. They deny competitors free access to

the market for the tied product, not because the party

imposing the tying requirements has a better product

or a lower price but because of his power or leverage

in another market. At the same time buyers are

forced to forego their free choice between competing

products. For these reasons “tying agreements fare

harshly under the laws forbidding restraints of trade.”

Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345

U.S. 594, 606. They are unreasonable in and of them-

selves whenever a party has sufficient economic power

with respect to the tying product to appreciably re-

strain free competition in the market for the tied

product and a “not insubstantial” amount of interstate

commerce is affected. International Salt Co. v. United

States, 332 U.S. 392. Cf. United States v. Paramount

Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 156-159: United States v. Grif-

fith, 334 U.S. 100. Of course where the seller has no

control or dominance over the tying product so that

it does not represent an effectual weapon to pressure

buyers into taking the tied item any restraint of trade

attributable to such tying arrangements would ob-

viously be insignificant at most.

A8

In light of these standards, we consider whether there

was sufficient evidence presented in this case to permit

reasonable minds to conclude: (1) that Marathon violated

the Sherman Act by having sufficient economic power to

appreciably restrain free competition and imposing upon

its lessee-operators a tying arrangeinent that restrained

a not “insubstantial” volume of interstate commerce, or

(2) that Marathon violated the Clayton Act by a tying

agreement that tended to “substantially lessen competi-

tion” or “create a monopoly in any line of commerce.”

THE PROOFS SUBMITTED AT TRIAL

For the five years before August 1966, Marion Davis

was a lessee-operator of Pure Oil Company service stations

in Findlay, Ohio. In addition to selling oil products, he op-

erated a trailer and truck rental service and a vehicle

washing service, performed motor tune-ups, brake repair,

muffler and tailpipe replacements, and sold tires, batteries,

and replacement automobile and truck parts.

In July 1966, Marathon Oil Company representatives

asked Davis to assume operation of the College Marathon

Service Station in Findlay. As a condition of becoming

a Marathon lessee, Davis was required to purchase the sta-

tion inventory that had been ordered but not sold by his

predecessor. Davis cancelled his lease with Pure Oil and

assumed operation of the Marathon station on August 22,

1966. The Marathon lease, signed four days later, was a

standard year-to-year contract containing the usual 30 day

termination provision that either lessor or lessee could

exercise. It was renewed annually in 1967, 1968, and 1969

until Marathon exercised its right to cancel in 1970.

From 1966 to 1970, Marathon marketed its petroleum

products and its sponsored TBA brands primarily in Wis-

consin, Michigan, Illinois, Ohio, Kentucky and Florida.

AY

The Marathon “Ohio Region’ included the entire state of

Ohio, a portion of Kentucky, and a part of interstate high-

way “I-75,” from Ohio through Florida. Marathon had

over one thousand stations in Ohio, where it ranked either

second or third in sales of branded gasoline. Approxi-

mately ninety percent of Marathon service stations were

owner-operated.

During the four year period in question, Marathon

sold to its dealers at wholesale prices certain brands of

tires, batteries and accessories (TBA). It sold both “B. F.

Goodrich” and “Firestone’’ tires, sponsored “Delco” bat-

teries, and made available to its dealers accessories nor-

mally stocked by service stations including “Fram” air

and oil filters, “Anco” windshield wiper blades, “Cham-

pion” spark plugs, “B. F. Goodrich” fan belts, radiator

hoses, shock absorbers, sealed beam headlamps and auto-

mobile light bulbs.

Marathon encouraged its TBA sales by offering its

dealers special promotions, discounts and other incentives,

including a bonus rebate from seven to ten percent of his

total annual TBA purchases.

Marathon did not provide its dealers with replace-

ment parts not ordinarily stocked by service stations in-

cluding, for example, mufflers, tail pipes, water pumps,

generators, alternators, regulators, gaskets, wheel bear-

ings, hydraulic parts, brake shoes and ignition parts. When

necessary, a dealer ordered these parts from automotive

suppliers whose primary business was not the sale and

distribution of petroleum products.

During the period in question, there were three major

automotive equipment suppliers in the Findlay area:

Sparton Distributing Company, Inc., The Ohio Automotive

Supply Company, and Steele’s Automotive, Inc. The

record does not show that Davis made any purchases from

Steele’s either while he was a Pure Oil dealer or while he

Al10

was a Marathon dealer. It does show, however, that al-

though he purchased almost nothing from Sparton when

he was a Pure Oil dealer, he made substantial purchases

from Sparton after he became a Marathon dealer. For

example, from January through July 1966, Davis pur-

chased $12.15 worth of goods from Sparton. From August

until December 1966, while Davis was operating the Col-

lege Marathon station, he purchased $1,640.79 worth of

goods from Sparton. His annual battery and accessory pur-

chases from Sparton totaled $2,447.53 in 1967, $3,439.32

in 1968, $2,733.03 in 1969, and $5,321.30 in the first eight

months of 1970. Davis’ battery and accessory purchases

from Marathon totaled $2,897 in 1967, $3,416 in 1968,

$3,707 in 1969, and $1,662 in the first eight months of

1970. In addition, each year during which he operated

the College Marathon station, his purchases from Mara-

thon were approximately $1,000 less than his purchases

from Ohio Automotive Supply.

There was no significant difference between Davis’

acquisition and sale of Marathon TBA and his acquisition

and sale of Ohio Distributing and Sparton TBA. Sales

representatives from Sparton, Ohio Distributing, and

Marathon visited his station each week to check inven-

tories, to determine his needs, and to prepare orders for

goods. Sometimes Davis did not even sign the orders be-

cause he relied on the sales representatives to determine

his needs. He displayed the supplies purchased from Spar-

ton and Ohio Distributing in the same manner as the sup-

plies purchased through Marathon. In describing how he

ordered his TBA, Davis testified that he purchased TBA

from whomever he wanted.

The evidence also disclosed that the other nine Mara-

thon station lessees in Findlay purchased batteries and

accessories from both Ohio Automotive and Marathon.

Five of them purchased a greater dollar amount of these

All

items from Ohio Distributing than they did from Mara-

thon. Moreover, five dealers also testified that although

they bought their TBA primarily from Marathon when

available, they had never been required by Marathon to

purchase these items exclusively from it.

In order to show that Marathon imposed upon its

hundreds of service station lessees an illegal arrangement

tying the sale of its sponsored TBA items to the sale of its

petroleum products, Davis relied primarily upon four in-

cidents.

The first incident occurred approximately two months

after Davis took over the Marathon station. On October

11, 1966, appellant ordered 15 “Delco” batteries from

Sparton. He testified that he returned the batteries three

days later because James Day, the Marathon sales repre-

sentative, had instructed him to do so. Then, pursuant to

the Marathon representative’s order, on October 17, B. F.

Goodrich Company shipped and billed to appellant 15

identical “Delco” batteries, charging an average of two

dollars less per battery than Sparton’s price. Whatever

the significance of this event, the record discloses also that

Davis made four additional purchases of “Delco” batteries

from Sparton during the same month.

The second incident occurred four years later in Feb-

ruary 1970. Day’s successor as the Marathon representa-

tive, Gary Burocker, ordered some TBA, including a quan-

tity of obsolete air filters for appellant without obtaining

his signature. When appellant returned them, Burocker

visited the station the same day to inquire about them,

and told appellant that he should have accepted the order.

It does not appear that anything further occurred in con-

nection with this incident.

The third and fourth incidents relied upon by appel-

lant to show an illegal tying arrangement occurred in 1970,

when appellant purchased shock absorbers and tires from

Al2

Sparton and Buckeye Distributing Co. Burocker told him

about that time that his lease might be cancelled unless

he purchased more TBA from Marathon.

After Octuber 1966, Davis testified that he made no

large purchases from other suppliers of items offered for

sale by Marathon until March 1970 when he purchased

$752 worth of shock absorbers from Sparton and twelve

tires from Buckeye Distributing Company.

During the same month, March 1970, that Davis made

the purchases from Buckeye and Sparton, the Marathon

district manager sought permission from his superiors to

cancel Davis’ lease for the stated reasons that for six

months he had operating and volume problems, that his

station was dirty, that he was unwilling to accept advice

from Marathon representatives, that his sales of gasoline

were declining and that his sales of Marathon-sponsored

TBA were insufficient. When Davis learned of the pro-

posed cancellation from a Shell Oil Company representa-

tive. he contacted an attorney. The attorney advised Mara-

thon of Davis’ inclination to bring an antitrust suit against

it charging that it had tied its sales of gasoline or the leas-

ing of its stations to sales of its TBA. Shortly thereafter,

the Marathon district manager wrote two memoranda to

his superiors, one outlining the procedure to be followed

in cancelling Davis’ lease in accordance with the terms of

the lease agreement, and the second listing the brands of

TBA stocked by Davis and the names of the suppliers.

On June 15, 1970, Marathon notified Davis that his

lease would be cancelled on August 31, 1970, and on that

date. Marathon took possession of the station.

This evidence, even when construed most favorably

to Davis, does not permit a finding that Marathon tied its

sales of petroleum products to appellant to his purchases

of its TBA, or that continuation of his lease was condi-

tioned upon the purchase of TBA exclusively from Mara-

Al3

thon. There is no evidence in the record that Marathon

refused at any time during the four year period to supply

Davis’ requirements of petroleum products. And there

is insufficient evidence to permit a determination that

Davis’ lease was cancelled because he refused to purchase

Marathon-sponsored TBA in preference to the TBA sold

by other suppliers.

Of the four incidents relied upon by appellant to show

Marathon’s liability the first two offer no support for his

position. The 1966 incident concerning the “Delco” bat-

teries shows only that the Marathon sales representative

convinced appellant to return 15 batteries which were

then reordered from Marathon at a savings of $2 per bat-

tery. The 1970 incident concerned the unordered air filters.

However, after Burocker’s initial pique when appellant

returned the unordered and obsolete TBA, nothing more

appears to have come from the incident.

The last two incidents concerned Burocker’s com-

plaint in 1970 about the low volume of appellant’s TBA

sales and Burocker’s intimation that this could result in

the loss of the lease. This evidence is as consistent with

Marathon’s claim that appellant was neglecting the station

and losing business as it is with appellant’s allegations

about a tying arrangement. Significantly, no express

threats to cancel the lease were made by the salesmen and

there was no communication from any other Marathon

employee or officer.

But more importantly, as the trial judge emphasized:

Although plaintiff testified that in 1969 he started

buying more TBA from others, and this led to the

cancellation of his lease, the documentary evidence

showed that in fact plaintiff had increased his TBA

purchases from defendant in 1969.

The defendant’s evidence showed that in the last

year of his lease, plaintiff was devoting much of his

Al4

time to other business interests which he had; that

gasoline sales at the station had fallen off markedly;

that the housekeeping at the station was very poor;

and that the plaintiff was tying up the service bays

at the station by doing heavy repair work of the type

which is not appropriate for a full-service gasoline

station. Plaintiff was warned about these findings,

but seeks to excuse or minimize them, and to convert

the warnings into threats that would be in violation

of the antitrust laws.

However, even if Davis had shown that Marathon had

required him to purchase Marathon TBA in order to retain

his lease and to purchase Marathon petroleum products,

there is no evidence in the record that could support the

conclusion that it was a general practice of Marathon, im-

posed upon many or all of its lessee-operators, to purchase

its TBA as a condition of receiving petroleum products or

of retaining leases. The only evidence about the experi-

ences of other lessee-operators of Marathon was the tes-

timony of five Marathon dealers who said that they had

never been threatened with the loss of their leases if they

did not purchase Marathon-sponsored TBA exclusively.

The most that can be said for appellant’s proofs is that they

show that Day and Burocker were aggressive salesmen

who were interested in increasing their sales of Marathon

TBA.

We hold that Davis clearly failed to present sufficient

evidence to permit a determination that the “total volume

of sales tied by the sales policy under challenge” was not

“insubstantial.” Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States

Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969). Likewise there was

no evidence permitting a determination that Marathon’s

actious tended to “create a monopoly” or “substantially

lessen competition.” Accordingly, there was no evidence

that required submission to the jury, and the district court

did not err in granting the motion for judgment n.o.v- See

Al5

e.g., Atlantic Refining Co. v. F.T.C., 381 U.S. 357 (1965),

Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., supra.-'

* Compare the evidence of a Clayion Act and a Sherman Act

violation adduced in Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., supra, at 467-68:

Lessig offered evidence of the following circumstances

in support of his allegation that Tidewater imposed upon its

dealers a system of exclusive dealing and tying arrangements

applicable to petroleum products, and to tires, batteries, and

automotive accessories (TBA) which Tidewater sold or

sponsored.'"

Tidewater’s service station leases were renewable an-

nually, and were subject to cancellation at six-month inter-

vals on thirty days’ notice. Each dealer contract ended auto-

matically upon termination of that dealer’s lease. The dealer

was required by his contract to purchase from Tidewater

“his total requirements of gasoline, motor oils and greases,

regularly manufactured and sold by” Tidewater, to an

amount specified in the contract; and the amount specified in

each dealer contract was the estimated full requirements

of that dealer’s station. When the service station lease and

dealer contract were executed Tidewater’s representatives

told the dealer that he was to purchase from Tidewater his

requirements of petroleum products and of those TBA items

which it sponsored or sold. Tidewater’s representatives ac-

companied salesmen of sponsored merchandise while the

latter secured orders from dealers. Tidewater’s representa-

tives inspected dealers’ stations for competing merchandise,

required that it be returned, and threatened nonrenewal of

the offending dealer’s lease. Credit card sales of nonspon-

sored merchandise were charged back to the dealer if the

customer failed to pay. New dealers were required to

purchase from outgoing dealers only inventory purchased

from Tidewater.

The record disclosed the disproportionate size and

economic strength of the parties.'* There was evidence that

Tidewater imposed exclusive dealing and tying arrangements

against the dealers’ wishes to provide Tidewater with non-

competitive access to the portion of the market which the

dealers’ stations represented. Dealers testified that they

feared to buy competing brands of oil and sponsored TBA

items even when requested by customers and even though

the cost to dealers was less, and that when they purchased

competing merchandise they hid it.

Evidence was offered that Tidewater entered into leases

and dealer contracts, containing provisions similar to those

described, with about 2,700 service station operators in eight

western states. Some of the practices described admittedly

were followed with respect to all Tidewater dealers, and the

(Footnote continued on following page)

Al6

Finally, we consider whether the district court abused

its discretion in refusing to permit the “eleventh hour”

witnesses to testify because their names had been furnished

in supplemental answers to interrogatories only three days

before trial was scheduled to begin. A trial court has broad

discretion in its choice of sanctions for failure to comply

with discovery orders and, in appropriate circumstances,

it may even dismiss the case. We hold that the trial court

properly exercised its discretion here.

In January 1973, Marathon served interrogatories on

appellant requesting the names of all persons acquainted

with the facts of this case. On September 10, 1973, well

after the time period provided in Rule 33(a) F.R. Civ. P.,

appellant filed an answer to these interrogatories. Then,

on Friday, September 21, only three days before the trial

was scheduled to begin on Monday, September 24, appel-

(Continued from previous page)

others appeared to be of quite general applicaticu. Thus,

the jury could conclude that the restrictive provisions and

practices affected a substantial portion of Tidewater’s sales

to its dealers of about 310 million gallons of gasoline an-

nually (about five per cent of the gasoline sold through

dealers in the area), and four to five million dollars worth

of TBA.

From this evidence the jury could conclude that Tide-

water sold petroleum products and sponsored TBA to its

dealers upon conditions and understandings — express and

tacit, oral and written — that they not deal in commodities

sold by competitors of Tidewater. The only serious question

is whether the jury could also conclude that these conditions

and understandings might lessen competition substantially

or tend to create a monopoly in a line of commerce, as

required by the Clayton Act.

'’ Tidewater produced the gasoline and other petroleum

products which it sold to dealers for resale. It purchased

tires and batteries and resold them to dealers. It also dis-

tributed selected automotive accessories under agreements

with manufacturers providing that Tidewater was to have

a stipulated discount or rebate on sales to dealers.

'’ Tidewater is one of the country’s major oil companies.

It does business in 32 states, and its assets exceed $800

million. It sold about 6.5% of the total gasoline sold in the

eight western states.

we

OEE A Dacdneeihtivte alo

We Rae Mor eebartbe wot

Sermo

Al7

lant filed supplemental answers listing five new witnesses,

one of whom was his former employee.

The district court, in precluding the calling of the wit-

nesses, observed that Davis’ case had been pending for

nearly two years, and expressed its concern that the pri-

mary purpose of the liberalized civil discovery rules, the

prevention of surprise to one’s opponent, would be under-

mined if these witnesses were permitted to testify.

We also observe that there was no credible support

for Davis’ contention that he had just “discovered” these

wi'nesses. Reasonable diligence would have disclosed the

additional witnesses far in advance of trial. One was a

former employee, two were Marathon lessees, one of whom

was a friend of Davis, and the other two were Marathon

employees working in the Findlay area during the pend-

ency of Davis’ suit. No reason is offered and none appears

why they could not have been found sooner than three

days before trial.”

* A proffer was made that the precluded witnesses would have

testified to the following effect:

The proffered testimony of Charles Trautwein, an employee of

Davis at the College Marathon station in 1969 and 1970, would

have shown only that Trautwein believed that Marathon operated

a poor TBA service, that he encouraged Davis to buy TBA from

other suppliers, that the Marathon sales representative was an

aggressive salesman, and that Davis continued to purchase

certain items of TBA from Marathon. Dennis Smith, a Marathon

lessee in Ohio since 1969, was expected to testify that although

he purchased the inventory already at his station when he leased

it, he had not purchased any Marathon TBA for four years

despite pressure from Marathon sales representatives and that

he was told by one of them a month before trial that he “would

be participating in the Marathon TBA program by the end of

the year.” Smith was also expected to testify that he was told

that he would not receive a Marathon lease for a second station

because Marathon had decided to award it to a person who

participated in its TBA program and that he furtively searched

the briefcase of a Marathon sales representative and discovered

a document entitled “Goals and Objectives” that apparently sug-

gested that unless a certain lessee purchased Marathon TBA, a

new dealer would be found. Finally, Robert Poston, another

(Footnote continued on following page)

Al8

In the short time afforded, there was virtually no way

for Marathon to prepare adequately to respond to the tes-

timony of the surprise witnesses. Unfair surprise of this

sort is contrary to the policy of the federal rules, which

sanction extensive discovery. If appellant had refused to

answer the interrogatory in question, Marathon could have

obtained an order requiring appellant to answer under

Rule 37(a). Then, if appellant still refused to answer, or

answered incompletely, Rule 37(b) provides that the court

could issue “{a]n order .. . prohibiting . . . [the disobedient

party| from introducing designated matters in evidence

.’ Since Marathon did not know that the original

answer was incomplete, it did not move for an order under

Rule 37(b) to compel appellant to complete it. Even

though Rule 37(b) is not directly applicable, we hold that

the trial judge properly exercised discretion in regard to

the surprise witnesses, and that any other decision would

be contrary to the policy of Rule 37. In a similar situation,

the district court for the Southern District of New York

refused to permit the testimony of two witnesses. Newsum

v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co., 97 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

court will be affirmed.

(Continued from previous page)

Marathon lessee, was expected to testify that he purchased nearly

all of his TBA requirements from Marathon because he believed

it was expected of him and that a Marathon sales representative

told him that if a dealer did not buy TBA from Marathon, they

would find a new dealer, and that dealers who did not buy

Marathon TBA would not receive gasoline, while dealers who

did would receive “extras” from the company including extra

gasoline.

Disiirirnn..

Alg

JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT

(Filed September 18, 1974)

Civil No. C 71-388

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

For THE NorTHERN District oF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

MARION DAVIS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

MARATHON OIL COMPANY,

Defendant.

JUDGMENT

This action came on for trial before the Court, Hon-

orable Don J. Young, United States District Judge, pre-

siding, and the issues having been duly tried and a deci-

sion having been duly rendered.

It is Ordered and Adjudged that motion of the de-

fendant for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should

be and hereby is granted, and it is

Ordered and Adjudged that judgment in this case

filed December 11, 1973 is hereby vacated, and it is

Ordered and Adjudged that judgment notwithstand-

ing the verdict of the jury should be and hereby is entered

in favor of the defendant Marathon Oil Company against

plaintiff Marion Davis, and it is

Ordered and Adjudged that the action should be and

hereby is dismissed at plaintiffs cost.

A20

Dated at Toledo, Ohio, this 17th day of September,

1974.

Mark SCHLACHET

Clerk of Court

/s/ Beatrice L. Rerminc

Deputy Clerk

APPROVED:

/s/ Don J. Younc

United States District Judge

A21

ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT

(Filed September 17, 1974)

Civil No. C 71-388

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

For THE NorTHERN DIsTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

MARION DAVIS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

MARATHON OIL COMPANY,

Deferdant.

This cause came to be heard upon motion of the de-

fendant for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for

a new trial. For the reasons stated in the accompanying

opinion and for good cause appearing, it is

Orperep that the motion of the defendant for judg-

ment notwithstanding the verdict should be and hereby

is granted, and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that the judgment in this case filed

December 11, 1973 should be and hereby is vacated, and

it is

FURTHER ORDERED that judgment notwithstanding

the verdict of the jury should be and hereby is entered

in favor of the defendant Marathon Oil Company against

plaintiff Marion Davis, and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that the action should be and here-

by is dismissed.

It Is So OrpeEReEp.

Don J. Younc

United States District Judge

ToLepo, OxnI0

A22

OPINION OF THE DISTRICT COURT

(Filed September 17, 1974)

Civil No. C 71-388

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

For THE NorTHERN District oF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

MARION DAVIS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

MARATHON OIL COMPANY,

Defendant.

OPINION

Youne, J:

This action was originally commenced on December

29. 1971, by Marion Davis, hereinafter referred to as plain-

tiff. and the Spartan Distributing Company against the

Marathon Oil Company, hereinafter referred to as the de-

fendant, alleging violations of the Clayton Act and the

Sherman Act.

The case was tried to a jury, commencing on Sep-

tember 24, 1973. The trial concluded on October 4, 1973.

At the close of the plaintiffs’ case, the Court rendered

judgment in favor of the defendant against the Spartan

Distributing Company. The jury returned a verdict in

favor of the plaintiff. Defendant has filed a motion for

judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alterna-

tive. for a new trial, which has been fully argued by briefs.

Plaintiff had for a number of years operated gasoline

filling stations in Findlay, Ohio. On August 22, 1966, he

A23

leased from the defendant a gasoline service station on

the corner of North Main and Frazer Streets in Findlay,

Ohio. The lease, as was standard in the gasoline station

business, was for the term of one year, with automatic

renewals for a like period unless either of the parties gave

notice of termination not less than thirty days prior to

the expiration of any term.

The defendant gave timely notice of termination to

the plaintiff, and the lease was terminated on August 22,

1970. Ten days after receiving notice of termination of

the lease, plaintiff entered into a similar one year lease

with another oil company. Prior to entering into the lease

with defendant, plaintiff had himself given notice of termi-

nation of leases he had entered into with other oil com-

panies. All of the leases plaintiff ever had with any com-

pany had a thirty-day termination notice provision. Plain-

tiff regarded this as being favorable to him as well as to

the lessors, and took advantage of it when it seemed ad-

vantageous to him.

Plaintiff’s contention is that the defendant terminated

its lease because he bought tires, batteries and accessories

(hereinafter referred to as TBA) from suppliers other than

the defendant, and that the defendant violated the Clayton

and Sherman Acts by requiring all its lessees, as a condi-

tion of being supplied with gasoline and oil, to buy all their

requirements of TBA from the defendant.

Practically the only evidence which really appeared

to support this contention related to an episode which oc-

curred in October of 1966, shortly after plaintiff first leased

from defendant. On that occasion plaintiff had purchased

fifteen batteries from a wholesaler. Shortly thereafter the

defendant’s sales representative came to the station and

saw the batteries, and complained that plaintiff had not

purchased them from the defendant. Plaintiff thereupon

returned the batteries, and got the same batteries from

A24

the deiendant. It is noteworthy that the defendant’s price

was two dollars per battery lower than the price charged

by the other supplier. There were three other episodes

involving difficulties over TBA purchases, but they added

nothing to support the plaintiff's contentions. There is

considerable question whether this episode, which may

be as consistently explained by a misunderstanding by a

new lessee of the advantages of buying from his lessor as

by a violation of the anti-trust laws, is admissible at all in

evidence or as a basis for relief, since it occurred more

than four years prior to the commencement of this action,

and thus was beyond the statute of limitations. However,

it seems unimportant to resolve this problem, and the

Court does not decide it.

Although the plaintiff contended that he was con-

stantly threatened with the loss of his lease if he did not

purchase all his TBA from the defendant, the evidence

leaves no doubt whatever that the plaintiff continued to

purchase TBA from whome~er he pleased, and the de-

fendant’s salesmen were entirely aware of this. All sales-

men, defendant’s and others, followed the practice of com-

ing to the plaintiff’s station, checking his stock, writing

up orders, and sending him the TBA they thought he

needed. On one occasion plaintiff was irritated because

defendant sent him a quantity of goods which included

some obsolete oil filters. In a fit of pique, plaintiff returned

the whole order, but no issue was made of it by anyone.

Again, the testimony which tended to show complaints by

defendant’s salesmen about the volume of TBA purchases

is as consistent with the picture of plaintiff as a poor and

unprofitable lessee as it is with attempts to violate the

anti-trust laws. The burden is on the plaintiff to overcome

this ambivalence in the evidence.

Although plaintiff testified that in 1969 he started

buying more TBA from others, and this led to the cancel-

A25

lation of his lease, the documentary evidence showed that

in fact plaintiff had increased his TBA purchases from

defendant in 1969.

The defendant’s evidence showed that in the last year

of his lease, plaintiff was devoting much of his time to

other business interests which he had; that gasoline sales

at the station had fallen off markedly: that the housekeep-

ing at the station was very poor; and that the plaintiff was

tying up the service bays at the station by doing heavy

repair work of the type which is not appropriate for a full-

service gasoline station. Plaintiff was warned about these

findings, but seeks to excuse or minimize them, and to

convert the warnings into threats that would be in viola-

tion of the anti-trust laws.

The defendant also offered evidence that its TBA

business, while extensive and somewhat profitable, was

conducted primarily for the benefit of the lessees of its

stations, who could get their merchandise at very favorable

prices if they bought in volume; and secondarily to main-

tain its image with its customers, who could get the prod-

ucts and service they were used to anywhere that the de-

fendant operated, not just in their own communities.

A number of other lessees of defendant testified that

they were not aware of any requirement to buy TBA from

the defendant, and that they did in fact buy TBA when

and from whom they pleased, and could do so most profit-

ably.

In his arguments opposing defendant’s motion, plain-

tiff contends that the testimony of these lessees is not en-

titled to any probative force because of their continuing

relationships with the defendant. This contention over-

looks the fact that in order to succeed in his suit, the bur-

den is upon plaintiff to show that his experience was not

unique, but that the defendant, as alleged in the complaint:

A26

|I|mposes upon its hundreds of lessee-dealers exclu-

sive dealing arrangements which require that the

dealers secure their entire requirements of petroleum

products and tires, batteries and other automotive

accessories exclusively from the defendant . . . . These

contracts and agreements are forced upon service sta-

tion operators against their desires and are enforced

by employees or agents of the said defendant, who

constantly watch the products which are sold by

the dealers. The service station operator knows that

his lease will not be renewed at the end of the one year

period, should he refuse to follow dictated prices or

exclusive dealing arrangements of the defendant.

If the testimony of the other station operators is totally

discarded, the plaintiff has still failed in his proof of these

essential allegations of his complaint. Plaintiff ingeniously

argues that if an interested witness testifies one way, the

finder of the facts has a right to conclude that the truth

is just the opposite, even though there is no other probative

evidence to this effect. No authority is cited for so novel

a proposition. Standard jury instructions give the jury

the option of rejecting entirely testimony which they find

is biased or untruthful. But they are not permitted to

guess or speculate as to what the truth is, IF THERE IS

NO PROBATIVE EVIDENCE AFTER THE SUSPECT

TESTIMONY IS REJECTED.

Not only can plaintiff gain no support from the testi-

mony of the other local dealers, but he called as his own

witness Gary Burocker, the defendant’s sales representa-

tive, who testified that he recommended termination of

the lease for lack of gasoline sales, improper housekeeping,

heavy repair work done in the service bays, and failure

to use advertising displays, and that the termination had

no relationship to plaintiff's TBA purchases. He testified

as follows:

“Q. You were fully conscious of the fact that he did

buy from independent suppliers, were you not?

Ne ne SS Pe tres « aie) ——

a te

A27

“A. Yes, I was.

“Q. You had no objection to that?

“A. No, I did not.

“Q. You did not expect him to buy all his TBA that

was available from Marathon, did you?

“A. No, I did not.”

Thus, a careful analysis of the evidence, taken as a

whole, shows that the plaintiff’s picture of himself as a

small businessman crushed by a giant corporation is in-

accurate. The evidence totally fails to support the wildly

exaggerated allegations of the complaint. Actually, the

evidence shows plaintiff neglecting the service station to

pursue other interests until the business had deteriorated

and become unprofitable to both parties to the lease. He

was not driven from the service station business by the

termination of the lease, for he signed a lease with another

oil company ten days after he received the notice of termi-

nation from the defendant. His action thus appears to be

more of an attempt to get money out of the defendant by

a nuisance lawsuit than a legitimate anti-trust case.

Plaintiff relies principally upon the case of Lessig v.

Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

377 U.S. 993 (1964). Factually, however, Lessig is entire-

ly distinguishable from the present case. Specifically, it

deals with the fixing of gasoline prices, which is in no way

involved in the present case. The real distinction how-

ever, is found in the court’s statement on page 467.

Dealers testified that they feared to buy competing

brands of oil and sponsored TBA items even when

requested by customers and even though the cost

to dealers was less, and that when they purchased

competing merchandise they hid it.

As previously pointed out, the only other dealers

who testified in this case gave testimony exactly contrary

A28

to this, and even in the October, 1966 episode, upon which

plaintiff now lays much stress, the price of the defendant's

batteries was substantially less than that of the rival bat-

teries, again the exact opposite of the situation in Lessig.

Plaintiff also relies upon Osborn v. Sinclair Refining

Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U'S.

963 (1961). In that case again, the facts bear no resem-

blance to those actually shown in the present case. There

Sinclair had an agreement with Goodyear to sell Good-

vear’s TBA and other products exclusively in its service

stations, for which Goodyear paid Sinclair a substantial

commission. The evidence established that all of Sinclair’s

dealers were ordered to sell Goodyear TBA on penalty

of losing their leases. Here there is no evidence from any

other dealers than the plaintiff. Another major distinc-

tion appears in the court’s language on page 834 of the

opinion,

It is considered, however, that there were competing

brands, and there is no suggestion that Goodyear was

superior to other brands of TBA or that there was any

benefit to the dealers handling Goodyear rather than

one of the other lines.

On the contrary, in the present case the evidence showed

conclusively that those dealers who sold larger volumes of

the defendant’s TBA were given, in addition to very favor-

able prices, special and increasing refund discounts. The

plaintiff's witness Whitman’s testimony also established

that rather than getting a kick-back from its suppliers of

TBA, defendant was trying to create favorable customer

relations by its TBA program. This would of course fur-

ther advance the dealers’ interests as well as its own. It

seems rather implicit from the facts of Osborn that in the

background was the old commercial struggle between

Goodyear and Firestone, for Osborn himself was a Fire-

DP Ee ene

A29

stone dealer, in addition to leasing Sinclair’s service sta-

tion.

Plaintiff also relies on Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377

U.S. 13 (1964). There again the real problem was gasoline

price fixing, a matter not involved in the present case. In

this plaintiff relies primarily on the Supreme Court’s

statement that “it matters not that the complainant may

be only one merchant.” However, even though there was

only one complainant, the illegality involved ‘a vast gaso-

line distribution system, fixing prices through many retail

outlets.” In the present case, there was not a scintilla of evi-

dence involving any dealer but the plaintiff in anything,

much less gasoline price fixing. This distinction is clearly

made in Quinn v. Mobil Oil Co., 375 F.2d 273 (1st Cir.

1967), although that case again concerned only gasoline

prices.

In the case of Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. F.T.C.,

299 F.2d 839 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 371 U.S. 861 (1962),

the court holds that the showing of a single jobber that

his contract was cancelled by Timken for dealing in com-

petitive bearings, even if true, would not constitute sub-

stantial evidence of a consistent policy of exclusive dealing.

In the case of South End Oil Company v. Texaco, Inc.,

237 F. Supp. 650 (N.D. Ill. 1965), the court says,

We are not aware of any case in which a finding of

‘unlawful conduct’ rests on the isolated experiences

of one businessman.

In a case very similar upon its facts to the present

one, the District Court refused to enjoin the defendant

from terminating plaintiff’s service station lease, saying,

Moreover, the record indicates that the defendant

chose not to renew the plaintiff's lease for reasons

other than plaintiff’s refusal to buy T.B.A. products,

such as declining gasoline sales and failing to keep

A30

the gas station clean. Hollander v. American Oil Co.,

329 F. Supp. 1300, 1302 (W.D. Pa. 1971).

This case is an example of an increasingly frequent

and highly disturbing practice of trying to bring simple

tort or contract cases of little or no merit into the federal

courts by pleading an antitrust or civil liberties claim. It

is easy to distort the true facts into pleadings which are

facially valid, just as the plaintiff did here, and thus com-

pel the court to bring the matter to a trial which is often

very time consuming. In the present case eight court days

were required for trial.

In what in retrospect appears to have been an over-

abundance ot caution, this Court overruled the defendant’s

motions for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff’s

case, and at the close of all the evidence. The jury, ap-

parently more swayed by the emotional appeal of a poor

little filling station operator allegedly oppressed by a giant

corporation, disregarded the law given to it in the Court’s

instructions, and reached an unjustified and untenable

verdict. It cannot be allowed to stand. Viewed in the

cold light of reason, reasonable minds could not find from

the evidence in this case that the defendant made a lease

or a contract for the sale of goods on the understanding

that the plaintiff not deal in goods of a competitor, and

that the effect of the agreement was substantially to lessen

competition or to tend to create a monopoly, the essential

elements of a violation of the Clayton Act. Nor could

reasonable minds find from the evidence in this case the

existence of a contract, combination, or conspiracy, suf-

ficient economic power with respect to the tying product

(gasoline) to impose an appreciable restraint on free com-

petition in the tied product (TBA), and a substantial vol-

ume of interstate commerce in the tied product, the es-

sential elements of a violation of the Sherman Act.

rime ——_o

arte wat ae . eee

Benin PREM tues

A31

The motion filed by defendant for judgment notwith-

standing the verdict will therefore be granted, and an

order will be entered expressing of this ruling.

/s/ Don J. Younc

United States District Judge

a

A32 A33

JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT Dated at Toledo, Ohio, this 11th day of December,

(Filed December 11, 1973) 1973.

Civil No. C 71-388 APPROVED:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT /s/ Don J. Younc

For THE NorTHERN District oF OHIO U.S. District Judge

WESTERN DIVISION

/s/ Dominic J. Crm1no

Clerk of Court

MARION DAVIS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

MARATHON OIL COMPANY,

Defendant.

JUDGMENT

This action came on for trial before the Court and a

jury, Honorable Don J. Young, United States District

Judge, presiding, and the issues having been duly tried

and the jury having duly rendered its verdict.

It is Ordered and Adjudged that pursuant to 15 U.S.C.

Sec. 15 the Court is required to treble $15,000 verdict

returned by the jury which results in a judgment of

$45,000 in favor of the plaintiff and it is

FuRTHER ORDERED and ApJuDGED that for the reasons

stated in the Court’s accompanying memorandum the

costs, including a reasonable attorney’s fee, will be assessed

at $17,841.42.

In conformity with Rule 77(d) F.R.C.P. please take

notice that the following order of judgment was entered

in this court on December 11, 1973.

ee. eS ee a

Deities nee

A34

MEMORANDUM OF THE DISTRICT COURT

(Filed October 25, 1972)

Civil No. C 71-388

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

For THE NorTHERN DIsTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

MARION DAVIS, et al.,

F.aintiffs,

VS.

MARATHON OIL COMPANY,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

Youne, J:

This is an action for an alleged antitrust violation

under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The sole question

now before this Court is whether plaintiffs’ demand for a

jury trial should be sustained.

The syllogism which supports defendant's position is

a nice piece of tight reasoning. It is said that one has a

right to a trial by jury only when the action is one which

existed at common law, thus coming within the provision

of the Seventh Amendment, or when a statute specifically

provides for a trial by jury. There can be little dispute

that the present action did not exist at common law.

Nor does it appear that Congress has specifically provided

for the right to trial by jury in the Acts. The conclusion

would, therefore, seem to be clear that there is no right to

a jury trial in an antitrust case.

A35

In spite of this compelling logic, however, there is a

plethora of cases which specifically hold that a jury trial

is required in an antitrust case. See Beacon Theatres, Inc.

v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), and the line of cases

stemming from this decision.

In view of this overwhelming body of law which has

consistently held that there is a right to a jury trial, this

Court concludes, with considerable reluctance, that in this

case, plaintiff should be afforded a trial by jury. This

Court is troubled because a critical examination of the

decisions of the Supreme Court shows clearly that what

was a bit of dictum thrown into that Court’s reasoning in

Fleitmann v. Welsback Street Lighting Company of Amer-

ica, 240 U.S. 27, 28, 29 (1916), is accepted very offhand-

edly as expressing the law in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.

Westover, U.S. District Judge, supra, until finally the

lower courts accept it as unquestioned law, Lah v. Shell

Oil Company, 50 F.R.D. 198, 199 (S.D. Ohio 1970). Be-

cause of the sheer weight of authority, this Court feels

constrained to follow a rule which is sound neither in

logic nor in law.

Admittedly, in this particular case, no particular prac-

tical difficulties will be presented in trying the case to a

jury. What would happen if this case presented the

complexities usually found in antitrust litigation is another

question. This Court has the greatest respect and ad-

miration for the institution of trial by jury, and under-

stands the zeal of appellate courts which are emotionally

involved with the question of the liberties of the subject

to extend the right. But as Mr. Justice Holmes, whose

dictum in Fleitmann is responsible for the present prob-

lem, said in another connection, “Not logic, but experience,

is the lifeblood of the law.” Logic and experience do not

always conflict, and trial court judges, who are far more

A36

intimately experienced with jury trials than are their

superiors on the appellate benches, recognize that there

are a great many areas in which a jury is by no means

superior to an experienced judge as a fact finder. In gen-

eral. antitrust actions would seem to fall into this category.

However. as previously stated, this Court feels required

to follow the majority of opinion, in spite of its personal

conviction that the opinion is wrong, and will grant the

demand of the plaintiffs for a jury trial. An order will be

entered accordingly.

/s/ Don J. Younc

United States District Judge

Toledo, Ohio.

a

A37

ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT

(Filed October 25, 1972)

Civil No. C 71-388

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

For THE NorTHERN District oF OHIO

WESTERN DIvISsION

MARION DAVIS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

MARATHON OIL COMPANY,

Defendant.

ORDER

This cause came to be heard upon the question of

whether plaintiffs’ demand for a trial by jury should be

sustained. The defendant filed opposition to plaintiffs’

motion. For the reasons stated in the accompanying

memorandum, good cause therefor appearing, it is

OrpERED that the demand of plaintiffs for trial by

jury should be and hereby is sustained.

/s/ Don J. Younc

United States District Judge

Toledo, Ohio.

A38

CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES INVOLVED

United States Constitution, Amendment VII

In suits at common law, where the value in contro-

versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by

jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be

otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States,

than according to the rules of the common law.

15 US.C. §1

Every contract, combination in the form of trust or

otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce

among the several States, or with foreign nations, is de-

clared to be illegal: Provided, That nothing contained in

sections 1 to 7 of this title shall render illegal, contracts

or agreements prescribing minimum prices for the resale

of a commodity which bears, or the label or container of

which bears, the trademark, brand, or name of the pro-

ducer or distributor of such commodity, and which is in

free and open competition with commodities of the same

general class produced or distributed by others, when

contracts or agreements of that description are lawful as

applied to intrastate transactions, under any statute, law,

or public policy now or hereafter in effect in any State,

Territory, or the District of Columbia in which such resale

is to be made, or to which the commodity is to be trans-

ported for such resale, and the making of such contracts

or agreements shall not be an unfair method of competition

under section 45 of this title: Provided further, That the

preceding proviso shall not make lawfui any contract or

agreement, providing for the establishment or maintenance

of minimum resale prices on any commodity herein in-

volved. between manufacturers, or between producers,

a ee a ee ee ee ae ee vo Td ee ahr

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A39

or between wholesalers, or between brokers, or between

factors, or between re:ailers, or between persons, firms, or

corporations in competition with each other. Every person

who shall make any contract or engage in any combination

or conspiracy declared by sections 1 to 7 of this title to be

illegal shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on

conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding

fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding

one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion

of the court.

15 U.S.C. §14

It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in com-

merce, in the course of such commerce, to lease or make

a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise,

machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether pat-

ented or unpatented, for use, consumption, or resale within

the United States or any Territory thereof or the District

of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under

the jurisdiction of the United States, or fix a price charged

therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on

the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee

or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods,

wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other com-

modities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or

seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract

for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding

may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create

a monopoly in any line of commerce.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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