Petitioners Reply Brief — EI Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Train
Supreme Court brief1977
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in the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1976
No. 75-978
E. I. pu Pont pE NEMours AND CoMPANY, et al.,
Petitioners,
Vv.
RUSSELL E. TraIn, as Administrator,
Environmental Protection Agency, et al.,
Respondents.
On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States
Court Of Appeals For The Fourth Circuit
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
RoBertT C. BARNARD
Douc.as E. KLIEVER
CHARLEs F. LEtrow
1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
Attorneys for Petitioners
OF COUNSEL:
CLEARY, GOTTLIEB, STEEN & HAMILTON
1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
NOVEMBER 26, 1976
SS aaansnnnnnsnnnnnn
ARGUMENT
I.
II.
Il.
IV.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EPA’s CURRENTLY ASSERTED POSITION ConstTI-
TUTES AN UNWARRANTED Volte Face From Its
ORIGINAL AND CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION
OF THE ACT
PUBLISHING A “DEVELOPMENT DOCUMENT” ALONG
WITH AN “ECONOMIC ANALYsIS” DoEs Not
SATISFY THE MANDATE OF SECTION 304(b) THat
GUIDELINE REGULATIONS BE IssUED
SECTION 301(b) SETs TECHNOLOGICAL OBJECTIVES
AND SPEAKS OF REGULATIONS TO BE ISSUED UNDER
SECTION 304(b); Ir Does Nor Provipe AN INDE-
PENDENT BASIS FOR REGULATIONS
THE ACT Is STRUCTURED FoR GUIDELINE REGULA-
TIONS, Not LIMITATIONS BY REGULATION __
A. Advisory Committee Review. st
B. Periodic Revision of Permits and of Regula-
PERERA SE Se eS eo
C. Enforcement and Judicial Review.
D. EPA Veto Power Over State Permits
THE JURISDICTIONAL IssUE Is WHETHER CourTs
OF APPEALS HAVE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO RE-
VIEW EFFLUENT GUIDELINE REGULATIONS UNDER
SECTION 304(b), WHERE THE CourT DETERMINES
THAT EPA CANNoT AccorD To ITSELF BY IMPLI-
CATION AN AUTHORITY TO PROMULGATE LIMITA-
TIONS BY REGULATION UNDER SECTION 301( =
A. Petitioners’ Arguments.
A Lae CE a tS
C. Congressional Action to Date.
CONCLUSION... ist SEN SN TIE Oy
12
32
33
38
39
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES:
American Frozen Food Institute v. Train, — U.S. App.
D.C. —, SD FBG WOT (BOB) accicsecwicesictntennt 21
American Iron & Steel Institute v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir.
ERTS 15, 20, 21, 29, 30, 36, 40
American Iron & Steel Institute v. Environmental
Protection Agency, — F.2d —, Nos. 75-2124 and
75-2128 (3d Cir., decided October 5, 1976) ___. 41, 42
American Meat Institute v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975) 21
Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, — F.2d —, 9 E.R.C.
Re tt |) ee ae 22, 30
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) 0. 40
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 538 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1976) 41
Cheng Fan Kwok v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, 392 U.S. 206 (1968) 40
Continental — Co. v. United States, 314 U.S.
kt | ee m 27
CPC International Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032
(8th Cir. 1975) (“CPC I”) _ 24, 26, 27, 40
CPC International Inc. v. Train, — F.2d —, 9 E.R.C.
1301 (8th Cir. 1976) (“CPC IT”) es
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) ss
Delicate, et al. v. Train, Civil Action No. 76-5028
(D.S.D., complaint filed April 15, 1976) . 4
Durousseau v. United States, 6 Cranch [10 U.S.] 307
CIID wcssicnceccmntiunenanl ‘ ; 27.
(ii)
Page
Federal Communications Commission v. Columbia
Broadcasting System of California, Inc.,
311 U.S. 132 (1940) _. 40
Fribourg — Co. v. Senssitistinen, 2 383 U.S.
272 (1966) _. sGieiatiieene sordid.
Grain Processing iia. v. Train, 407 F. F Supp. 8 96
(S.D. Iowa 1976), acti anit No. 76-1233
(8th Cir.) ions . 15, 40
Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d
620 (2d Cir. 1976) aiihiesisincstnmscsene, we
Mianus River Preservation Committee v. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, — F.2d —, 9 E.R.C.
1174 (2d Cir. 1976) 0 85, 4, 42
Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public
Service Co., 341 U.S.246(1951)_. —_— <a
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Ass’n
of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974) 40
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environ-
mental Protection = 937 F.2d 642 (2d Cir.
a Ueitiabdebimlintednsn we
Natural Resources tins Suet b Inc. v. . Train, —_
F.Supp. —, 8 E.R.C. 2120 (D.D.C. 1976) 45, 46
Romero v. International Terminal Co., 358 U.S. 354
(1959) . eS lien ae
Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch [5 U.S.] 299 (1803) _ oa’ ae
Sun Enterprises, Ltd. v. Train, 532 F.2d 280 (24. Cir.
ee _.... 41, 42
Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research —— Inc.,
— US. —, 44 U.S.L.W. 4717 (June 1, 1976) _ 11
Union Electric Co. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, — U.S. —, 44 U.S.L.W. 5060 (June 25,
1976) ___.. we RE 0 SEE a ea 2, 42
Page
United States v. Adamo Wrecking Co., — F.2d —, No.
73-1967 (6th Cir., decided November 1, 1976) 35, 42
United States v. American Ry. Express Co.,
TG ae 22
United States v. Carolina Carriers ww 315 U.S. 475
(1942) ntinladiamateal ; iecebinils:... ~ Te
United States v. Independent Stave Co., 406 F. Sup.
886 (W.D. Mo. 1975) . insidalibaiiiviailiniilaaaiiaeg ae
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). Goioieigniiea 42
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS:
Federal Water Pollution Control Act
§ 101(b), 33 U.S.C. §1251(b) 26
§ 301, 33 U.S.C. $131] 20 passim
§ 301(a), 33 U.S.C. §131l(a)_ 8
§ 301(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) passim
§ 301(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) 23
§ 301(b)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2) 33
§ 301(b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C.
$ 1311(b){(3)(A) 23, 28, 29
§ 301(c), 33 U.S.C.
§ Saeace) —............ 17, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35
§ 301(d), 33 U.S.C. §1311(d) 32, 33
§ 301(f), 33 U.S.C. §1311(f) 0
[on UAC. § 13 LLL 41
§ 304, 33 U.S.C. § 1314. . 9, 16, 17, 23, 34
§ 304(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) passim
$ 304(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(A) — 13, 19
§ 304(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1314(b)(1)(B) 7, 13, 14, 15, 17, 30
§ 304(b)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2) __ 13, 23, 29, 33
(iv)
Page
§ 304(b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(A) _ 13,19
§ 304(b)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C.
jo | Sr Ae 7, 15, 30
§ 304(f)(1), 33 U.S.C. §1314(f)(1)
§ 304(h), 33 U.S.C.§1314(h) 8
§ 304(h)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(h)(2)_. 7
§ 306, 33 U.S.C. § 1316. 5, 9, 32, 34, 39
§ 306(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(B) ___ 26
§ 306(e), 33 U.S.C. §1316(e) si
$ 307,33 US.C.$1317..0.
§ 307(a), 33 U.S.C. §1317(a) 8
§ 307(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2)_ 26
§ 307(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b) 26, 28, 34
§ 307(b)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b)(3)_ 28
§ 307(c), 33 U.S.C. §1317(c) (6, 34
§ 307(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(d) 07
§ 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 wibiie A tec RL 33, 34
§ 309(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1) . __.. 27, 34
§ 309(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3) 27, 34
§ 309(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) _..__. 27, 34
§ 309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) 27, 34
§ 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342.0 9 24, 28, 42
§ 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) 26
§ 402(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(B) __. 33
§ 402(b)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3)_ 18
§ 402(c), 33 U.S.C. §1342(c)
§ 402(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(1) 37
§ 402(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d) 26, 36, 37, 41
§ 402(d)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2) 36, 37
§ 402(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(e) 26, 37
(v)
Page
§ 402(f), 33 U.S.C. § se ET Mee 26
$405, 33U.S.C.§1345.000 42
$501,33US.C.§1361.000 = 42
§ 501(a), 33 U.S.C. § , Ee eR 27
§ 502(11), 33 U.S.C. § | a eee, 22, 24
$505, 33 U.S.C. §1365.0 34, 35, 36
§ 505(f)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f)(2)_ 35
$509, 33U.S.C.§1369. 34, 35, 36, 44
§ 509(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) .. 40, 41, 42, 44
§ 509(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) __ 39, 41, 42, 44
§ 909(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(A) NaS 42
§ 909(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(C) apa 44
§ 509(b)(1)(E), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1369(b)(1)(E) abtheotemmistiimba tae oS 34, 35, 42, 43
§ 509(b)(1)(F), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F) ___ 42
§ 509(b)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1360(b)(2)_. 42
$515,33US.C.§1374. 0 32
§ 515(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. §$ 1374(b)(1)_ 32
Pub. L. 93-207, 87 Stat. 906, § 1(6) (December 28,
OO nasacort dee, 44
CoDE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS:
ee Oe ee 18
oF Ore OO 18
peste stipe en A Be, 18
WCPR $ISM 18
EN OU i 11
I I siecle is) 11
40 CF.R. §$401.11(i) ssnttivenianediaittiiaisiiiit al 22
40 C.F.R. ecg, Sn ae 11
Oe NW a itis gs 11
OO Nr PN aclicsipih ii ice De i 30
FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICEs:
38 Fed. Reg. 21202 (August SEE ee 10
38 Fed. Reg. 28174 (October 1973) pbaseaidiadanie 10
41 Fed. Reg. 51598 (November Se 46
MISCELLANEOUs:
Casenote, IV Fordham Urban Law Journal, 623 (1976) 1
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:
118 Cong. Rec. 10206 ee 25, 26
118 Cong. Rec. 33698 ( PES Ca aes 37
122 Cong. Rec. H 5285-5288 (daily ed. June 3,
shen ee RTOS TOG NL aia 4A
122 Cong. Rec. S 15165 (daily ed. September 1,
og, EE. Tt Rana 44
122 Cong. Rec. § 15189 (daily ed. September 1,
Pe eentvmiienlihiling Mice 44
Congressional Research Service of the Library of
Congress, A Legislative Histury of the Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
a ae ae 16, 17, 20, 25, 26, 28, 37
Council on Environmental Quality, Fourth Annual
Report (September ea ala ailing 37
Environmental Protection Agency, No Small Task—
Establishing National Effluent Guidelines and
Standards (June SR Sa 12
Memorandum from Alan G. Kirk, II, to Acting Assistant
Administrator for Air and Water Program, repro-
duced in BNA, Environmental Reporter, Current
Developments, 1833-1834 (March 1, 1974) __ 39
Memorandum to All Regional Permit Program Direc-
tors from the Office of Permit Programs, Wash-
ington, D.C.,dated May 11,1973... 9,10
(vii)
Page
R. Zener, The Federal Law of Water Pollution Control,
in Federal Environmental Law (E. Dolgin and T.
IRI aera i ag Rte 25
H.R. 11896, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. ee 37
S. 2710, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. Se
S. Rep. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971)... 16, 28
S. Rep. No. 92-1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) _. 17, 20
(viii)
in the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1976
No. 75-978
E. I. pu PonT DE NEMouRS AND CoMPANY, et all.,
Petitioners,
Vv .
RUSSELL E. TRAIN, as Administrator,
Environmental Protection Agency, et al.,
Respondents.
On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States
Court Of Appeals For The Fourth Circuit
REPLY BRIEx FOR PETITIONERS
The implication running throughout respondents’
(“EPA's”) brief in this case is that Congress through a
“legislative oversight” simply omitted to specify in the
statute that EPA was to promulgate effluent limitations by
regulation for the existing industrial plants in this nation.'
EPA’s arguments by indirection ask this Court in effect
to supply the provisions which purportedly were inadver-
tently or erroneously omitted.
1 At one point in its brief EPA said—“Although Section 301 does not
explicitly provide that it is the Administrator who is to establish the
effluent limitations, that is its clear and necessary implication.” (EPA’s
Brief in No. 75-978 (“EPA’s Br.”), at 36-37.) Otherwise, EPA's brief
largely skirts the specific source for its asserted power to issue effluent
limitations directly by regulation for cxisting plants.
It was a student commentator who used the phrase “legislative over-
sight” in addressing Congress's failure to provide that effluent limitations
be issued by the Administrator through the mechanism of regulations.
Casenote, IV Fordham Urban Law Journal, 623, 631 (1976).
2
There is no gap or lacuna in the Act. This is therefore
not a situation where interim agency action is required
to cure an unintended legislative omission, pending dis-
positive action by Congress. Instead, EPA’s present argu-
ments in support of a statutory power to set effluent limi-
tations directly by regulation for existing plants stem
from its own general policy preferences. Because EPA
fears that States may be “lax” in applying the Act (App.
193, R. 6501), the Agency prefers not to accord meaningful
powers to States to prescribe effluent limitations as Con-
gress contemplated. To give effect to its preferences, EPA
has claimed the power to set binding across-the-board
effluent limitations, notwithstanding the fact that EPA’s
preferences have no statutory support.
EPA’s bare assertions should not govern this Court's
decision in the present case, especially since Congress did
not accept the policy underlying those assertions. This
Court has rejected similar efforts by agencies to rewrite
statutes, efforts premised on policy goals not accepted by
Congress and not written into legislation. This Court said
of one such effort by the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion: “Neither the Court nor the Commission is warranted
in departing from those [statutory] standards because of
any doubts which may exist as to the wisdom of following
the course which Congress has chosen.” United States v.
Carolina Carriers Corp., 315 U.S. 475, 489 (1942). Cf.
Union Electric Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency,
U.S.__., 44 U.S.L.W. 5060, 5064-5065 (June 25,
1976).
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act as written by
Congress places substantial authority in States with EPA-
approved permit programs. These States are obliged to set
discharge permits for particular plants, and in these per-
mits the States are to apply the “guideline” regulations
which Section 304(b) of the Act explicitly requires EPA
to issue. The particular allocation of responsibility
between the States and the Federal EPA currently reflected
in the Act is a creation of Congress, reached after con-
3
sidering the statutory objectives in light of principles of
federalism. It should be given a chance to work. Unless
and until Congress acts to revise its handiwork, EPA
should be directed to follow “the course which Congress
has chosen.” (Id.)
EPA’s CURRENTLY ASSERTED POSITION CONSTI-
TUTES AN UNWARRANTED VOLTE FACE FROM ITS
ORIGINAL AND CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUC-
TION OF THE ACT
EPA strenuously argues that its construction of the Act
is “reasonable” and therefore that “the Court should uphold
it” without a great deal of questioning. (EPA's Brief at
34-35.) Petitioners’ arguments based upon the statutory
language are dismissed as “hypertechnical or insignificant
distinctions in the wording” of the Act. (Id. at 26.)
EPA also claims that the Administrator made known
shortly after the enactment of the 1972 Amendments that
it would “establish both guidelines under Section 304(b)
and effluent limitations under Section 301(b).” (Id. at 35
n.25.) EPA uses this factual claim as a basis for the argu-
ment that its present interpretation of the Act was adopted
contemporaneously with the enactment of the 1972 Amend-
ments, that it has been consistently followed thereafter,
and that its interpretation thus is entitled to be accorded
some weight. (Id.)
Petitioners contest EPA’s factual claims; petitioners also
controvert EPA’s arguments based on those claims.’ Fortu-
nately, the full administrative record is before the Court,’
2In a confusing footnote EPA cites the regulations reprinted in the
Appendix to petitioners’ brief (not the brief itself) as support for an
assertion that petitioners “recognize [that] the effluent limitations were
established by regulations.” (EPA's Br. at 77, n.53.) Petitioners cer-
tainly “recognize” that EPA has asserted that it has implied authority
under Section 301 to issue effluent limitations by regulations and that
EPA argues it has exercised that implied authority. Petitioners’ “recogni-
tion” ends there.
3 A complete copy of the administrative record is on file with the
Clerk of this Court. See Pet. Br. at 1 n.2.
4
and thus this factual dispute may be resolved with confi-
dence.
The record shows the following sequence of events:
Before the enactment of the 1972 Amendments in mid-
October 1972, EPA had developed what it called “guidance”
documents for use with the Refuse Act Permit Program.
EPA makes no mention of these documents. (Compare
Pet. Br. at 14-15.) Respecting the inorganic chemicals
industry, both the contractor’s July 1971 report (R. 3183-
3325, especially R. 3310-3314, 3316) and the October 1972
EPA guidance document (App. 8-20, R. 2550-2567) set out
the guidance as ranges of effluent values.‘ EPA also con-
templated that factors to guide the selection of a value
from the range for a particular plant would be supplied
via an EPA technical briefing. (App. 8-9, R. 2551.) The
value selected would become part of the particular plant's
permit. (R. 2552.) In short, the guidance documents
looked like guideline regulations to be issued under Sec-
tion 304(b). They were not bare single-number limitations
binding upon all relevant plants.
EPA looks to the request for proposals issued by EPA on
October 31, 1972, to obtain a contractor to study the inor-
ganic chemicals industry, and claims that this request
shows the Agency to have contemplated even at that early
date that it would issue limitations by regulation in addi-
tion to guideline regulations. (EPA's Br. at 14-15, 35 n.25. )
This claim does not withstand an examination of the
record.
EPA’s overall request for proposal is set out in the record
at R. 6016-6281. EPA’s own conception of its responsibili-
4In these guidance documents, EPA occasionally referred to the
actual range of numerical values set out for each pollutant parameter
as “limitations”. See, e.g., R. 2562, where EPA said, “The effluent guide-
lines are based on process wastewater .. .” in referring to the entire
guidance document, and at the same time said, “The effluent limitations
shown in Attachments A and B are average values .. .” in referring
to the range of numbers for the particular parameters making up the
guidelines.
5
ties in October of 1972 is set out at R. 6026. EPA then
spoke only of issuing regulations in the form of guidelines
_ for existing plants under Section 304(b) and standards for
new sources under Section 306:
“DESCRIPTION OF THE REQUIREMENT
“A. Introduction
“The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972 (the “Act”) requires the United States
Environmental Protection Agency to establish effluent
limitations which must be achieved by point sources
of discharges into the navigable waters of the United
States. Section 301 of the Act requires the achicve-
ment by July 1, 1977, of effluent limitations which
require the application of the ‘best practicable control
technology currently available,’ and the achievement
by July 1, 1983, of effluent limitations which require
the application of the ‘best available technology eco-
nomically achievable.’
“Within one year of enactment, the Administrator
is required by Section 304(b) to promulgate regula-
tions providing guidelines for the effluent limitations
required to be achieved under Section 301 of the Act.
These regulations are to identify in terms of amounts
of constituents and chemical, physical, and biological
characteristics of pollutants, the degree of effluent
reduction attainable through the application of the
best practicable control technology currently available
and best available technology economically achievable.
The regulations must also specify factors to be taken
into account in identifying the two statutory tech-
nology levels and in determining the control measures
and practices which are to be applicable to point
sources within given industrial categories or classes
to which the effluent limitations apply.
(R. 6026 (emphasis added). )
Notably, EPA then viewed Section 301 as setting the
overall objective to be “achieved” by existing plants. It
stated that the regulations it was to issue were “guideline”
6
regulations under Section 304(b).° These guideline regula-
tions were to contain factors “to be taken into account” in
making determinations respecting the application of “tech-
nology levels” to “point sources”, i.e., to individual plants.
(Id.) The resulting effluent limitations for the plant were
those “required to be achieved under Section 301... .” (Id.)
Petitioners accept the interpretation of the Act adopted
by EPA at that time and argue in support of it here.
EPA cites two segments of the request for proposal as
evidence of an intent on its part to promulgate effluent
limitation regulations under Section 301. (See EPA’s Br.
at 15 & n.15, citing R. 6027, 6034.) These segments speak
of effluent limitations in terms of a “range of parameters”
to be “presented by the contractor.” (R. 6034.)* The seg-
5 The request for proposal also stated—“The Act requires the guide-
lines . . . to be developed within very strict deadlines... .” (Id.) The
only “deadlines” for guideline regulations are contained in Section
304(b). Section 301(b) fixes the dates when the b: oad technological
objectives are to be achieved but contains no “deadlines” for regulations.
6 The cited portion of EPA’s request is as follows:
“Item IV. Outline of Level I, II and III Control
and Treatment Technology
“EPA will of course exercise its independent judgment in deter-
mining what levels of technology satisfy these statutory terms for
each industry for which effluent limitations guidelines and stan-
ards of performance for new sources are to be promulgated. .. .
Therefore, the following description of Level I, II and III technology
is merely a suggested outline to be used by contractors in respond-
ing to Appendices A and B of Part II of this RFP which requires
the final report to set forth suggested effluent limitations and
standards of performance.
“The end result of the analysis undertaken by contractors will
be the suggestion of effluent limitations associated with the tech-
nology identified by the contractor as Level I, II and III technology.
In many, if not most instances, this assessment of Levels I, II and
III technology will vary slightly depending upon such factors as the
age and size of given plants within the industry and the type of
production process employed. The minimum factors which must
be taken into account in establishing Levels I, II and I'l technology
for each industrial category, and in ultimately applying such levels
to individual plants within the category in issued permits, are
included in the outline below. [See infra, n.7.] Other factors may
7
ments also state that certain “minimum factors” (which
were specified in the request)’ “should be identified” by
contractors for use “in ultimately applying such levels to
individual plants within the category in issued permits... .”
(Id.) EPA’s directions to its prospective technical contrac-
tors thus did not contemplate issuance of limitation regu-
lations under Section 301; that section is nowhere asso-
ciated with regulations. And where the Agency spoke in
terms of limitations it was using the term in the sense of
numbers for pollutant parameters which, along with the
concurrently specified factors, were to make up the guide-
line regulations issued under Section 304(b). (See also
supra, at 4n.4.) These guideline regulations would form
the basis for values fixed in permits. (R. 6034.)
The contract actually issued by EPA to General Tech-
nologies Corp. (“General Technologies”) is equally as
instructive respecting EPA’s contemporaneous construc-
tion of the Act. In the contract EPA required General
Technologies “to propose suggested draft effluent limita-
tions guidelines” which reflected ranges and specified fac-
tors. (R. 6399.) Permits for individual plants could then
be issued which could “require compliance with slightly
different effluent limitations depending upon the presence
of one or more of the factors specified.” (Id.) Again, the
also be pertinent and should be identified by the contractor where
appropriate. Since a range of techrology will satisfy the require-
ments of Levels I, II and III in some instances, effluent limitations
consistent with the application of such technology will also vary.
Consequently a range of parameters may be presented by the
contractor. Effluent limitations and standards of preformance [sic]
shall specify the quantity of pollutants which may be contained in
the effluent discharge. This quantity shall be related either to a
unit quantity of product produced or raw material used in the
production process, whichever shall most clearly determine the
maximum degree of pollution reduction. If the contractor finds that
expressing effluent limitations and standards of performance in
such terms is not possible, he shall indicate an alternative method
of expression and explain why such an alternative is necessary.”
(R. 6034-6035 (emphasis added ). )
T EPA’s request lists the factors identified in Sections 304(b)(1)(B)
and 304(b)(2)(B). (R. 6035.)
8
Agency used the words “effluent limitation”, but as adjec-
tives in the phrase “efflv.>* limitation parameters” in de-
scribing the numbers + ‘i: *ppear in the guidelines or,
alternatively, as a ‘se. *- term for the numerical
effluent conditions ir. . .- iicular permit selected as a
result of the application of the factors. (Id.)*
8 The relevant text of the contract is as follows:
“SUGGESTED EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS GUIDELINES—
FORMAT
“Once the range of technology is established for each industrial
category, then a determination must be made as to what constitutes
Level I and Level II control and treatment technology as outlined
under Item IV of the Scope of Work. In addition, factors similar
to those used in assessing what constitutes Level I and Level II
must be specified which should be taken into account in applying
the effluent limitation parameters associated with each of these
levels of technology. Permits issued to individual plants within the
industrial category may then require compliance with slightly
different effluent limitations depending upon the presence of one
or more of the factors specified. The contractor is to propose sug-
gested draft effluent limitations guidelines incorporating this analy-
sis and utilizing the suggested outline of technology Levels I and
Il set forth under Item IV ° the Scope of Work.”
(R. 6399 (emphasis added ).)
The contract then went on to require that the “suggested effluent limi-
tation guidelines” contain effluent limitations parameters and the list of
factors: i
“The suggested effluent limitation guidelines for each industrial
category must contain the following:
“A. An identification of the industrial categories and subcategories
covered.
“B. Effluent limitations required for each such category.
“1. An identification of Level I and II control and treatment
technologies.
“2. For each technology level identified, a statement of the
permissible amounts of discharge constituents expressed
in terms of (i) unit quantities per unit of either material
used in the industrial process or units of products result-
ing from that process, or (ii) concentrations, whichever
shall most clearly determine the maximum degree of
pollution reduction.
“3. List the factors which should be taken into account in
determining Level I and II control and treatment tech-
nology for particular plants and consequently in deter-
mining permissible effluent levels for such plants.”
(Id. (emphasis added ). )
9
The contract also contained an attachment setting out
a “Notice” which EPA required General Technologies to
include as a preface to its report. (R. 6424.) The report
resulting from the contract was to be distributed to the
public, and EPA wanted no doubts to arise respecting its
purpose or its standing. The notice again emphatically
states that EPA was looking toward guideline regulations
to be issued under Section 304(b), and not issuance of
limitations directly by regulation under Section 301:
“The requlations to be published by EPA under Sec-
tions 304(b) and 306 of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, as amended, wil! be based to a large
extent on the report and the comments received on it.
However, pursuant to Sections 304(b) and 306 of the
Act, EPA will also consider additional pertinent tech-
nical and economic information which is eter
in the course of review of this report by the pe lic
and within EPA. . . . |P ]rior to final promulgation of
regulations, an EPA report will be issued setting forth
EPA’s conclusions concerning the subject industry,
effluent limitations guidelines and standards of per-
formance applicable to such industry. Judgments nec-
essary to promulgation of regulations under Sections
304(b) and 306 of the Act, of course, remain the re-
sponsibility of EPA.”
(R. 6424 (emphasis added ). )
The EPA contract with General Technologies was effec-
tive January 9, 1973, and actually signed on May 21, 1973.
(R. 6378.) Pending completion of the contract and conse-
quent proposal and promulgation by the Agziicy of the
guideline regulations, EPA had to provide as:iistance to its
Regional Offices which were struggling with discharge
permit applications. That assistance took the form of a
Memorandum to All Regional Permit Program Directors
from the Office of Permit Programs, Washingtcn, D. C.,
dated May 1, 1973. A copy of this memorandum is on file
in the Library of this Court. The memorandum instructed
EPA’s regions to use the “effluent guidance documents” for
“the issuance of permits under Section 402” on an interim
basis “until effluent guidelines are promulgated under
Section 304.” (Id. at 1.) The “guidance package” attached
10
to the memorandum spoke of limitations only in the con-
text of the numerical values set for each of the relevant
pollutant parameters in a given plant's permit. (Id., at-
tached “interim effluent guidance” at 5.)
Subsequently, EPA’s “Advance Notice of Public Review
Procedures” issued in August 1973 (38 Fed. Reg. 21202,
App. 21, R. 4330), referred only to guideline regulations
to be issued under Section 304(b); it did not refer in any
respect to limitation regulations under Section 301. (Com-
pare Pet. Br. at 15-16 with EPA’s Br. at 16.) References to
Section 301 were to the fact that it required plants to
achieve the statutory technological objective by a speci-
fied date.
The same interpretation was expressed by EPA in its
October 1973 notice of proposed rulemaking respecting the
particular regulations at issue in these cases. (38 Fed. Reg.
28174, App. 61-62, R. 4861-4862.) EPA did not express a
contrary view until Assistant Administrator Kirk wrote his
letter of January 15, 1974, supporting “nationally uniform
standards” because he feared States would be too “lax” in
applying the guideline regulations. (App. 193, R. 6501.)
Even then, Assistant Administrator Kirk tried to fit such
“nationally uniform standards” into the framework of
guideline regulations. (App. 192-193, R. 6501.) The final
break with EPA’s contemporaneous construction of these
key sections did not come until Assistant Administrator
Kirk’s February 1974 memorandum, when he finally
claimed that the EPA regulations for existing plants were
also limitations being issued under Section 301. (See Pet.
Br. at 20.)
EPA seeks to avoid the thrust of.this history, detailed
on the record in these cases, by offering a redefinition of the
“phrase ‘effluent limitations guidelines’ to encompass
[EPA’s] combination of action under Section 301(b) and
Section 304(b) into a single proceeding.” (EPA's Br. at
16 n.16.) EPA’s effort at redefinition will not square with
its own regulations; it only demonstrates the weakness of
the Agency’s position. The general definitions in EPA’s
1]
regulations, applicable to all industry-category guidelines
and new source standards, explicitly define “effluent lim-
itations guidelines”, a term not used in the Act, as regula-
tions issued pursuant only to Section 304(b), not Sec-
tion 301:
“(j) The term ‘effluent limitations guidelines’ means
any effluent limitations guidelines issued by the Admin-
istrator pursuant to Section 304(b) of the Act.” ®
(40 C.F.R. § 401.11(j), Pet. Br. Appendix C, at 5c. )
See also Pet. Br. at 19-20.
The record in these cases thus demonstrates the “about
face” from the Agency's original, contemporaneous inter-
pretation of the Act. EPA’s present interpretation is entitled
to no judicial deference whatsoever. Fribourg Navigation
Co. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272, 279-280 (1966): cf.
Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc.,
U.S.___, 44 U.S.L.W. 4717, 4719 n.8 (June 1, 1976).
And because of the circumstances, no reliance by private
parties or by the Government has arisen to entrench a con-
struction of the statute which “ought not now to be dis-
turbed.” Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch [5 U.S.] 299, 309
(1803 ).*°
Indeed, some branches of EPA still have not adapted to
the new interpretation of the statute proffered by the
Agency. In June of this year, after this Court had granted
certiorari in the present case, EPA published a small book
of questions and answers respecting the Act. The first two
questions and answers were as follows:
® Section 401.10 sets forth the scope and purpose of these General
Provisions —
“This Part 401 sets forth the legal authority . . . which will apply
to all regulations issued concerning specific classes and categories
of point sources under Parts 402 through 699 of this subchapter
which follow.” (Id. at 3c.)
Part 415 of the subchapter contains the regulations for the inorganic
chemical category.
10 The doctrine of according deference to an agency's contemporaneous
construction of a statute is a refinement and offshoot of the early recog-
nition of the importance of reliance as a legitimate consideration in
statutory interpretation.
12
“What is an effluent limitation guideline?
“An effluent limitation guideline sets forth the degree
of reduction of a pollutant that is attainable ——
the application of various levels of technology.
idelines are developed by EPA based on the total
y of known information on effluents from a par-
ticular industry.
“What is an effluent limitation?
“An effluent limitation is a restriction on the amount
of a pollutant that may be released from a point source
into a body of water. These limitations, based on
EPA’s effluent limitations guidelines, are spelled out
in the discharge permits each industry must obtain in
order to discharge pollutants into the Nation’s water-
ways.”
(Environmental Protection Agency, No Small Task—
Establishing National Effluent Limitations Guidelines
and Standards, at 2 (June 1976) (emphasis in the
original.) ™
The foregoing quotation reflects EPA’s original interpreta-
tion of the statute, and not the interpretation presented in
the court of appeals and now in this Court. Petitioners
urge this Court to adopt EPA’s original interpretation as
constituting a faithful adherence to the mandate of the
Act.
Il.
PUBLISHING A “DEVELOPMENT DOCUMENT”’
ALONG WITH AN “ECONOMIC ANALYSIS” DOES
NOT SATISFY THE MANDATE OF SECTION 304(b)
THAT GUIDELINE REGULATIONS BE ISSUED
EPA never really comes to grips with Section 304(b).
Section 304(b) expressly provides that “the Administrator
shall... publish . . . regulations, providing guidelines for
effluent limitations ... .” The section further provides that
these regulations shall “identify . . . [the] effluent reduction
11 Copies of this EPA publication are on file with the Librarian of this
Court.
13
attainable through the application of best practicable con-
trol technology currently available for classes and cate-
gories of point sources .. .” (§ 304(b)(1)(A)), and
shall “specify factors to be taken into account in deter-
mining the control measures to be applicable point sources
. .. Within such categories or classes.” (§ 304(b)(1)(B).)
The section goes on to list in detail the factors to be speci-
fied. The guideline regulations are given purpose by Sec-
tion 301(b) which speaks of determining effluent limi-
tations “in accordance with regulations issued by the
Administrator pursuant to Section 304(b)(2) of this Act.”
(§$ 301(b)(2)(A), see also § 301(b)(1)(A).)
EPA has now at least acknowledged the statutory com-
mand that regulations be issued under Section 304(b).
(EPA’s Br. at 13, 48-59, and especially 55.) But in the
Agency’s view, these regulations take on a strange form
and have no practical purpose. EPA claims that the
Development Document and the Economic Analysis,"
while not “formally designated” as regulations, “in prac-
tical effect” meet the requirements of Section 304(b).
(EPA's Br. at 76-77; see also id. at 10, 21, and 26.)
The Exhibit Volume of the Appendix is made up solely
and entirely of EPA’s Development Document and its
Economic Analysis for the segments of the inorganic chem-
icals industry covered by the EPA regulations at issue here.
There are 519 pages of rambling verbiage in the two items.
These must be the strangest “regulations” any Federal
agency has ever issued. They are not codified in the Code
of Federal Regulations. They have no continuing purpose
or legal effect. At this juncture, copies of the documents
are not readily available, even from EPA itself. EPA’s brief
discusses these “regulations” only to explain them away.
The arguments by EPA underline the Agency’s efforts to
render Section 304(b) a dead letter, a statutory anachron-
ism. (See EPA’s Br. at 13, 48-59, 76-77.)
12 In EPA’s view, the guideline regulations apparently may include in
addition to these documents “the preamble to the formal regulations in
issue and the regulations themselves.” (EPA's Br. at 77; see also id.
at 21.)
14
There is nothing “compelling” about an interpretation
that would elide an entire section from the Act. (Compare
EPA’s Br. at 46.) By referring to Section 304(b), peti-
tioners are not putting forward “a series of hypertechnical
arguments that focus 01 minor distinctions in the wording
of various sections of the Act... .” (Id.) And particularly,
petitioners are not contending that any requirements be
“read into the Amendments.” (Id. at 54.) To the contrary,
petitioners argue only that explicit requirements in the
statutory words not be overriden and eliminated by EPA’s
implications. EPA would have this Court rewrite the sta-
tute to eliminate the mandate for guidline regulations in
Section 304(b) and to put in its stead through implication
a new permissive authorization for limitations by regula-
tion under Section 301.
EPA asserts that its implied authority under Section 301
allows it to look at the provisions of 304(b), to select cer-
tain of the requirements set out in that section, and to deal
with these selected requirements in its own way in regula-
tions purportedly issued under Section 301. For example,
petitioners have pointed out that Section 304(b) explicitly
requires guideline regulations to
“specify factors to be taken into account in determin-
ing the control measures and practices to be applicable
to point sources . . . within such categories or classes.”
(§ 304(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added). )
(See Pet. Br. at 63-73.) Notwithstanding this statutory
language, ERA argues that guideline regulations under
Section 304(b) were not intended for use by permit authori-
ties because no analysis of the factors is to be made in
the permit process to apply the factors to a particular
plant’s situation. (EPA’s Br. at 58-59.) Despite the fact
that Section 304(b) directs EPA to specify the factors in
regulations, EPA says it “considered” the factors in estab-
lishing subcategories and that ends the matter. (Id. at 58.)
To go any further, the Agency says, would be to “encom-
pass wholesale reconsideration at the permit granting stage
of all the factors.” (Id. at 59.) The discussion which fol-
15
lows demonstrates that EPA is trying to discredit the statu-
tory plan to achieve its goal of binding limitations issued
by regulation.
The subcategories adopted by EPA for the inorganic
chemicals industry reflect only differences in product
types, and in a very few cases, processes."* Section 304(b)
(1)(B) also lists as factors, to be specified in regulations,
“the age of equipment and facilities involved, . . . the
engineering aspects of the application of various types
of control techniques, process changes, non-water
quality environmental impact (including energy re-
quirements ), and such other factors as the Adminis-
trator deems appropriate... .” ™*
None of these factors is reflected in EPA’s subcategories.
And it is no answer to say that the Agency considered the
possible application of these other factors and rejected
them. As the court of appeals noted in du Pont II,
“[s]ome of the specified factors are of practical appli-
cability only to individual plants, for example, ‘age of
equipment and facilities involved.” (App. 266.) The dis-
trict court in the Grain Processing case reached precisely
the same conclusion. See Grain Processing Corp. v. Train,
407 F. Supp. 96, 103-104 (S.D. Iowa 1976), appeal pending,
No. 76-1233 (8th Cir.). The Third Circuit is in accord.
American Iron & Steel Institute v. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, 526 F.2d 1027, 1043-1044 (3d Cir. 1975).
Moreover, the Act provides that the listed factors relate
to “the assessment of best practicable control technology
currently available” (Section 304(b)(1)(B)).* Thus both
13 A number of subcategories encompass plants making a variety
of products within one general product type. An example is the Sodium
Silicate Subcategory. See infra, at 19.
Process distinctions were made in the hydrogen peroxide and tita-
nium dioxide subcategories. (Pet. Br. Appendix B, at 44b-49b, 71b-79b. )
14 Cost is also a consideration. The Section lists as a factor “the total
cost of application of technology in relation to the effluent reduction
benefits to be achieved from such application.” (§ 304(b)(1)(B).)
15 Section 304(b)(2)(B) contains similar language regarding the
factors for 1983-step guideline regulations.
16
the Administrator and the permit-issuing authorities are
engaged in the assessment of technology, the Administra-
tor doing so for whole categories and classes (subcate-
gories) of sources »nd the permit-issuing authorities for
individual sources. Both must consider the enumerated
factors. The Administrator must specify them in the regu-
lations issued under Section 304 to guide the permit officer.
The permit-issuing authority must apply them in granting
permits for individual plants. If the Administrator con-
sults the factors listed in Section 304(b) to determine a
range of acceptable discharges for a group of sources, the
permit issuer can intelligently place an individual source
within that range only by reference to the same factors as
they bear on the individual source.
The Senate Public Works Committee, mentioning as
exainples several factors included in Section 304(b), made
it clear that Congress intended that both the Administrator
and the permit-issuing authority would apply the same
factors:
“In defining best practicable for any given industrial
category, the Committee expects the Administrator to
take a number of factors into account. These factors
should include the age of the plants, their size and
the unit processes involved and the cost of applying
such controls. In effect, . . . the Committee expects the
Administrator to define a range of discharge levels,
above a certain base level applicable to plants
within that category. In applying effluent limitations
to any individual plant, the factors cited above should
be applied to that specific plant.” (S. Rep. No. 92-414,
92d Cong., Ist Sess., at 50 (1971), 2 Leg. Hist. at 1468
(emphasis added). ) **
Secondly, EPA places great emphasis on the statement
in the Conference Report that effluent limitations applica-
16 As noted in Pet. Br. at 60, several of the courts of appeals have
been troubled by the fact that the legislative history is in conflict over
whether the factors set out in Section 304(b) should be applied to
particular plants in permit proceedings. Portions of the legislative
history in conflict with the above-quoted excerpt frum the Senate Report
are set out in EPA’s brief at 57-59. There is, however, no ambiguity in
the statute.
17
ble to individual plants within a category or class be “as
uniform as possible.” (EPA’s Br. at 61, citing S. Rep.
No. 92-1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 126 (1972), 1 Leg. Hist.
at 309.) But the Report made clear it did not mean identical
limitations applicable to all plants in a category or class.
Rather, the conferees, speaking of Section 304, indi-
cated that “the Administrator is expected to be precise
in his guidelines under subsection (b) of this section,” so
that “similar point sources with similar characteristics . . .
will meet similar effluent limitations.” (Id. (emphasis
added ).) '? The role of the guideline regulations was to
enable the permit authorities to identify which point
sources have “similar characteristics” so that. “similar
effluent limitations” could be imposed. Permit authorities
could thereby provide uniformity of treatment without
force-fitting plants into a single identical limitation regard-
less of differences in their “characteristics” as judged ac-
cording to the relevant “factors”.
In addition, because the statute speaks of applying the
factors “to point sources . . . within such categories or
classes” (§ 304(b)(1)(B)), EPA’s original interpretation
of the Act provided that the factors would be specified in
the regulations and would be taken into account in issuing
permits for particular plants. (See R. 6026, quoted supra
at 6; R. 6034-6035, quoted supra at 8 n.4; R. 6399, quoted
supra at 9-10 n.5.)
There is thus no “wholesale reconsideration” of factors
by permit authorities. (Compare EPA’s Br. at 59). The
permit authorities should be guided by the factors and
17 In view of the importance EPA attaches to this part of the Confer-
ence Report, the full text of the relevant paragraph in the Report is
set out for the court’s convenience:
“Except as provided in section 301(c) of this Act, the intent of the
C..nferees is that effluent limitations applicable to individual point
sources within a given category or class be as uniform as possible.
The Administrator is expected to be precise in his guidelines under
subsection (b) of this section, so as to assure that similar point
sources with similar characteristics, regardless of their location or
the nature of the water into which the discharge is made, will
meet similar effiuent limitations.” (S. Rep. No. 92-1236, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. at 126 (1972), 1 Leg. Hist. at 309 (emphasis added ).)
18
apply them as EPA has specified them in proper guideline
regulations. Because EPA has issued bare single-number
limitations, it has barred any application of the factors to
individual plants.’* To support its actions EPA suggests
that “generalized guidelines” would not provide sufficient
specificity. (EPA’s Br. at 65.) The Agency also cites the
possibility of “varying views of the 27 States with approved
permit programs” (id. at 66), and impiies that some States
may be too lax. EPA also complains that “each such State
would be forced to hold lengthy adjudicatory procedures to
consider anew the effluent limitations which the Amend-
ments require.” (Id.) These are spurious arguments. No
cataclysmic series of events will occur if the statute is fol-
lowed. EPA now has regulations prescribing an opportu-
nity for hearings if a permit applicant disagrees with the
determinations of a permit authority. (See 40 C.F.R. Parts
124 and 125, and especially 40 C.F.R. §§ 124.36 (respecting
approved State authorities ), 125.36 (where authority rests
with EPA).) The statute itself contemplates such hearings.
(See § 402(b)(3)—“an opportunity for public hearing
before a ruling on each such application”.) And the permit
authorities are not to review the factors de novo; they are
to select a particular limitation for each relevant pollutant
parameter from the range provided in the regulations, upon
consideration of the factors specified in the regulations.
EPA seeks also to rebuff petitioners’ argument that the
statutory language and the legislative history support regu-
lations consisting of a range of pollutant values for each
parameter. (Compare Pet. Br. at 65-69 with EPA’s Br. at
18 As noted, the issuance of a voluminous Development Document and
Economic Analysis, both with no legal effect, does not comply with the
statutory mandate that the regulations “specify” the factors. See supra
at 12-13.
The present regulations do make an indirect reference to factors, but
the factors themselves remain unspecified. EPA inserted into the regu-
lations a provision allowing adjustment of the 1977-step values upon a
showing that there are “fundamentally different” factors applicable to
a particular plant. This provision likewise does not satisfy the specific
directions in Section 304(b) as to the form and content of the guideline
regulations. See infra at 30-31.
19
49-53.) EPA argues that Congress’ “expectation has been
satisfied.” (EPA's Br. at 51.)
The Agency relies on two inconsistent arguments (o
support its assertion that its duty to specify a range of
attainable pollution reduction for an industrial category
has been fulfilled. First EPA contends that it has estab-
lished ranges in the regulations by establishing subcate-
gories for an industry and by setting a single-number limit
for each subcategory, because the values for the subcate-
gories, taken together, define a “range” for the entire
category. (EPA’s Br. at 51.) This argument contradicts
the statute, which requires EPA to identify the reduction in
terms of amounts of constituents for “classes and cate-
gories” of point sources. (§ 304(b)(1)(A)) (emphasis
added); see also § 304(b)(2)(A).) A “class” is a sub-
category of sources within an overall industry category.
In addition, a “range” defined as EPA now would have it is
of no use to the permit-issuing authorities for whose aid
the guidelines are intended, for these authorities must
issue permits to single plants, not to subcategories. The
Act requires ranges of values in guideline regulations for
classes (subcategories ) as well as for categories because of
the differences among individual plants in the class (sub-
category). EPA’s approach attempts to establish by simple
fiat a non-existent homogeneity within each subcategory;
here, for example it simply assumes homogeneity for plants
producing a wide range of different types of sodium silicate
varying by form (liquid or anhydrous—solid or powder),
by chemical composition (sodium metasilicate, sodium
orthosilicate, or sodium tetrasilicate ), and by process (use
of furnace or non-thermal reaction with caustic solution),
where all plants fall within the same subcategory. (See
Ex. R. 5629-5631; see also the opinion of the court of
appeals in du Pont II at App. 281.)
EPA’s second argument is that there is an implicit range
of achievable effluent discharges, from the single-number
limit set by the Administrator down to zero, and that this
implicit range meets the requirements of the Act. (EPA's
20
Br. at 52.) The argument is without merit. The Section
304(b) regulations are meant to guide permit-issuing
authorities. Specification of the maximum attainable pol-
lution reductions, to guide permit issuers away from overly
harsh restrictions which are not “practicable”, is as impor-
tant as the specification of minimum attainable reductions,
to prevent unduly lax requirements for individual plants.
The Conference Committee report (quoted supra at 17,
n.17) shows the congressional intent that Section 304(b)
guideline regulations be precise, so that national uni-
formity could be achieved within the system of State-issued
permits established by the Act. As the report said, the goal
of Section 304(b) is that “similar point sources with similar
characteristics . . . will meet similar effluent limitations.”
(S. Rep. No. 92-1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 126 (1972),
1 Leg. Hist. at 309 (emphasis added).) Single-number
regulations with an implicit range down to zero are neces-
sarily ill-suited to guide permit-issuers called upon to grant
equitable permits to the various plants because nothing in
the regulations guides the permit officer in selecting a value
in an implied range.
Even if the Act allowed the use of an implicit range
defined by zero discharge at one extreme, such a range
cannot be sustained in guideline regulations for segments
of the inorganic chemicals industry. There is no evidence
in the record, and it cannot be assumed, that a level of
pollutant discharges at zero or close to it is attainable by
application of either 1977-step or 1983-step technology to
any existing point source in a number of subcategories.
Absent such evidence, an implicit range including zero
discharge cannot be sustained. See American Iron & Steel
Institute v. Environmental Protection Agency, 526 F.2d
1027, 1046 (3d Cir. 1975).’*
Overall, if EPA has never really come to grips with Sec-
tion 304(b) in these cases, it can also be said that the court
19 The courts of appeals have differed from one another over the
requirement of an explicit range, alues_in Section 304(b) regula-
tions. The Third Circuit, h g Glosely to the language and plan of
the Act, held that Section 304 guide /must specify permissible
21
)
of appeals in du Pont II achieved mixed results in its
grappling with the Section. The court’s formula of “pre-
sumptively applicable” single-number limitations draws a
compromise of sorts between the positions of the parties.
The court would at least give some effect to the congres-
sional requirement of Section 304(b) that factors be speci-
fied in the regulations. In the court’s view, while EPA would
not have to specify the factors in bare single-number limita-
tion regulations, the factors could be applied in permit
proceedings to set the permit limitations for a particular
plant. (App. 266.)
Both petitioners and EPA are dissatisfied with the
du Pont II decision. Yet while petitioners have sought
review of the ruling by the court of appeals respecting the
existing-plant regulations, EPA has not done so. EPA has
sought review only of the court’s ruling on new source
standards. EPA nonetheless asserts that the decision by
ranges of effluent reduction, in order to serve their intended purpose as
useful aids for permit-issuing authorities. American Iron & Steel Insti-
tute v. Environmental Protection Agency, 526 F.2d 1027, 1044-1045
(3d Cir. 1975). The Second Circuit, ignoring the purposes underlying
the requirement in this Act for ranges in the guidelines, concluded that
single-number limits for each subcategory of an industry satisfy the
statutory requirement because, taken together, they define a range for
the entire industrial category. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. v.
Train, 537 F.2d 620, 630 (2d Cir. 1976). The District of Columbia
Circuit concluded that the Administrator can promulgate single-number
effluent limitations pursuant to Section 301, and did not rule on any
requirements for Section 304(b) effluent guideline regulations. Amer-
ican Frozen Food Institute v. Train, U.S. App. D.C. , 539 F.2d
107, 131 (1976). The Seventh Circuit also did not address the issue.
American Meat Institute v. Environmental Protection Agency, 526 F.2d
442, 448 n.13 (7th Cir. 1975). The Fourth Circuit in the present cases,
du Pont II (App. 253-286), limited its holding on the point carefully by
concluding that, for some categories, single-number limits might be
permissible, as a statutory matter, but deciding whether a range is neces-
sary in any particular regulation would involve factual determinations
to be reviewed in other proceedings. (App. 265.) The court's holding
was further qualified by its decision that EPA’s regulations are only
“presumptively applicable” to any individual point source. (Id.,
App. 262.) Thus, the court envisicned a system of standards to be
adjusted by permit-issuers, but without the guideline regulations of
Section 304(b) to insure uniformity of treatment within the flexible
system.
22
the court of appeals in du Pont II “is inconsistent with
the statute”, at least where it “invites reconsideration by
the permit issuer of factors already considered by the Ad-
ministrator in establishing effluent limitations under Sec-
tion 301 for existing sources.” (EPA’s Br. at 59 n.40.) *° If
EPA was dissatisfied with the decision of the court of
appeals in du Pont II it should have said so in its cross-
petition for writ of certiorari, not in a footnote in its brief
filed on October 22, 1976.2 See United States v. American
Ry. Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435 (1924); cf. Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 475 n.6 (1970).
The regulations Congress required be issued under Sec-
tion 304(b) should not be relegated to the impotent form
of a bulky and obscure “Development Document” and a
similar “Economic Analysis”. The guideline regulations
were intended as the keystone for the Act’s system of regu-
lating discharges from existing plants. EPA should not be
aliowed, under the guise of exercising an implied authority
under Section 301, to pick and choose among the require-
ments set out in Section 304(b) as to the form and content
of the regulation and then to deal with these selected items
as’ though Section 304(b) did not exist. The authority
which EPA says can be implied from Section 301 cannot
provide a satisfactory basis to disregard completely the
statutory command in Section 304(b). Nor should im-
plication be used to convert statutory requirements, such
as the obligation to specify factors in the regulations,
20 EPA cannot claim that the fault with the Fourth Jircuit lies with
the interpretation accorded the du Pont II decision in a subsequent case,
Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, _F .2d , 9 ERC. 1033, 1038-
1039 (4th Cir. 1976). In du Pont I!. as in the Appalachian Power case,
the Fourth Circuit ruled that “[iJn -cting on permit applications, the
issuer will properly consider cost/vern *t analysis along with other fac-
tors specified in § 304(b).” (App. 2€
21 Portions of the judgment as well as the opinion of the court
of appeals are involved. The court of wppeals, among other things,
set aside the EPA’s definition of “effluent limitations” in the concurrently-
challenged genera] regulations (40 C.F.R. § 401.11(i), Pet. Br. Appen-
dix C at 5c), because the definition in the regulations did not conform
to the statutory definition in Section 502(11), nor to the court’s view
of “presumptively applicable” regulations. (See App. 261-262, 284.)
23
into permissive provisions contemplating mere “considera-
tion” of the statutorily specified items by EPA. The statute
is served neither by the compromise formulated by the
court of appeals nor by EPA’s more complete abandonment
of Section 304(b).
SECTION 301(b) SETS TECHNOLOGICAL OBJEC.
TIVES AND SPEAKS OF REGULATIONS TO BE
ISSUED UNDER SECTION 304(b); IT DOES NOT
PROVIDE AN INDEPENDENT BASIS FOR REGULA-
TIONS
EPA focusses on Section 301(b). Respecting regulatory
power, that section stands in stark contrast to Sec-
tion 304(b). Section 301(b) commands no regulations;
it has no timetable for regulatory promulgation; it is not
written with active verbs. The language of the section is
wholly passive. Section 301(b) provides that
“(There shall be achieved—
“(1)(A) [by July 1977] . . . effluent limitations for
point sources . . . which shall require the application
of the best practicable control technology currently
available as defined by the Administrator pursuant
to section 304 of this Act. .
“(2)(A [by July 1983] . . . effluent limitations for
catego and classes of point sources . . . which
(i) shall require application of the best available
technology economically achievable . . . as deter-
mined in accordance with regulations issued by the
Administrator pursuant to section 304(b)(2) of this
a
Section 301(b) does set technological objectives for dis-
charges from existing plants. And it refers to regulations,
but regulations required to be issued under Section 304(b),
not under its own terms.
Congress wrote Section 301 without specifying in that
Section who was to establish “effluent limitations” or how
24
such limitations were to be established. Congress’s use of
the passive voice in writing the Section allowed these key
elements to remain unspecified. EPA has seized upon this
circumstance to contend that it should be able to accord to
itself a power to promulgate “limitations” in the form of
regulations which have the effect of binding its regional
offices and especially state permit authorities to “mechan-
ically crank” the promulgated limitations into permits for
particular plants.”” EPA relies upon “clear and
implication” (EPA’s Br. at 37), “interrelationship” (id.
at 44), or assertions that such authority is “explicitly
intended.” (Id. at 33.)
Petitioners agree with EPA that Sections 301(b), 304(b)
and 402 should be construed together to constitute a har-
monious, corroborative statutory system. There is also
agreement in general that “[t]he technological considera-
tions defined under Section 304(b) are converted into
effluent limitations under Section 301(b)” (EPA’s Br. at 9),
because such a statement acknowledges the linkage be-
tween these sections. But agreement stops there. Certainly
there is no consensus on “[t]he operation of [EPA’s pres-
ent] procedure” (id. at 10.), as that procedure was modified
by the Agency in late 1973 and 1974.
As EPA's original interpretation of the Act recognized,
the roles of States and of permit proceedings are key con-
siderations in construing these most important sections of
the Act. The Act’s general definition of “effluent limita-
tion” puts these considerations ir proper perspective:
“The term ‘effluent limitation’ means any restriction
established by a State or the Administrator on quanti-
ties, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical,
biological, and other constituents which are discharged
from point sources into navigable waters, the waters
of the contiguous zone, or the ocean, including sched-
ules of compliance.”
(§ 502(11), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (emphasis added ).)
22 See CPC International Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032, 1037 (8th Cir.
1975) (“CPC I”).
25
Notably, the definition places States before, or at least on
the same footing with, the Administrator in addressing the
question of who is to establish the limitations. Also, the
definition bears on the matter of how the limitations are to
arise. It speaks of restrictions on “discharge[s] from point
sources”, i.e., particular plants, and it includes “schedules
of compliance”, which can only arise in discharge permits
for particular plants.
EPA’s present position bypasses these and many other
statutory indicia, in favor of an emphasis on “uniformity”
and “uniform national effluent limitations”. (EPA’s Br. at
26, 27, 34 n.24, 60, 62, 65.) EPA has carried its drive
toward uniformity well beyond the statutory bounds.
Congress did speak of “uniformity”. But it did not em-
brace the rigid, unbending uniformity EPA seeks; in the
discussion of Section 304(b), not Section 301(b), the Con-
ference Report spoke of limitations at individual plants
which were “as uniform as possible”. By that, the conferees
meant “similar” limitations for “similar point sources with
similar characteristics.” *
This is not the rigid, mechanical, by rote uniformity which
EPA would impose on the statute. “Similarity” does not
mean “identity”.*
Representative Blatnik, Chairman of the House Public
Works Committee, warned against precisely the type of
Federal “uniformity” which EPA’s about-face interpretation
seeks to invoke:
“... [L)et us not kid ourselves that the Federal estab-
lishment operating by itself can implement an effec-
tive water quay program. Unless we have mean-
ingful local and State participation and not a Federal
dictatorship, the program founder on the rocks
23 The text of the relevant part of the Conference Report is set out
supra, at 17 n.17.
24 Compare EPA’s Br. at 61 with Pet. Br. at 55, 57-61, and supra, at
16-17. See also R. Zener, The Federal Law of Water Pollution Control,
in Federal Environmental Law, at 703 n.98 (E. Dolgin and T. Guilbert
ed. 1974), quoted in Pet. Br. at 61.
26
of the generally inflexible[,] Washin dictated ap-
ees.) (118 Cong. Rec. 10206 (1972), 1 Leg. Hist.
at .
Representative Blatnik also addressed the cther side of the
coin—the matter of State adherence to EPA’s guideline
regulations:
“... [T)his bill requires that State and regional pro-
grams follow stringent Federal guidelines. It will not
allow the industrial equivalent of forum shopping.
Each State’s program will preclude this because
a8) be consistent with the guidelines.” (Id. at
In short, Congress did not share EPA’s subsequently-ex-
pressed fear that States would be too “lax”. (App. 193,
R. 6501.) Congress provided for States to accede to the
permit-issuing role ( § 402(b)-(f)), and Congress as a mat-
ter of policy recognized “the primary responsibilities and
rights of States” to regulate discharges. (§ 101(b).)
In the face of the statutory structure, EPA’s arguments
that Congress left to implication these most important reg-
ulations for existing plants are unpersuasive. When Con-
gress desired to have EPA write standards as such, it knew
how to express such a desire in explicit terms. As the Eighth
Circuit noted in the CPC I case, “[o]ther sections of the Act
demonstrate that the omission of such a provision [for
limitations by regulation] was not oversight, for Congress
provided unambiguously for the promulgation of national
standards in other sections of the Act.” CPC International
Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032, 1038 (8th Cir. 1975) (“CPC I”).
The Eighth Circuit cited national standards of performance
for new sources (§ 306(b)(1)(B)), national standards for
toxic pollucants (§ 307(a)(2)), and national pretreatment
standards for both new and existing sources (§ 307(b) and
(c)). As the Eighth Circuit said,
“In providing for national standards in these areas,
Congress did four things: (1) it used the term ‘stan-
dards,’ a word which takes on a special meaning be-
cause of its use under the Act; (2) it expressely
provided that the standards were to be published by
27
regulation; (3) it put deadlines on the process, requir-
ing that the Administrator publish the standards
within fixed periods of time; and (4) it provided that
standards were to be enforceable a of the
t system. See § 306(e); § 307(d).” (Id., 515
.2d at 1038.)
Congress did none of these things for limitations by regu-
lations—it never spoke of such regulations at all. By way
of contrast, for the guideline regulations under Sec-
tion 304(b) it did all of the listed things except the last.
And then, respecting enforceability, Congress provided that
the limitations in the permits were to be the enforceable
regulatory measures. (See § 309(a)(1), (a)(3), (c)(1),
and (d).)
EPA’s argument is especially difficult to accept because it
would override a specific statutory mandate for guideline
regulations with an authority which must be drawn purely
from implication. As discussed in the opening brief (Pet.
Br. at 35, 40), the fact that Congress so explicitly set out
EPA’s obligation to issue guideline regulations implies
strongly that it denied to the Agency the power to do some-
thing different. Durousseau v. United States, 6 Cranch
[10 U.S.] 307, 314 (1810); see also Continental Casualty
Co. v. United States, 314 U.S. 527, 533 (1942).** Especially
is this so where Congress has in other areas of the statute
provided explicitly for the type of specific standards which
EPA here seeks to imply.
There is one further circumstance which is even more
compelling. With one exception, Congress never required
EPA to issue both regulations in the form of guidelines and
regulations in the form of standards for the same subject
matter. It chose one or the other. For the one exceptional
case, the legislative history notes carefully that EPA is to
25 Under the circumstances, EPA’s position receives no support from
Section 501(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1361(a), which grants the EPA Admin-
istrator authority “to prescribe such regulations as are necessary to
carry out his functions under the Act.” The question presented here
is whether one of EPA’s functions under the Act is to issue limitations
by regulation. Compare EPA’s Br. at 37.
28
issue both types of regulations and that the one authority
is in addition to the other. The exceptional case arises
respecting pretreatment standards for existing plants.
Section 304(f)(1) vequires EPA to issue pretreatment
guidelines :
“(f)(1) For the pupae of assisting States in carry-
ing Out programs under Section 402 of this Act, the
Administrator shall publish within one hundred and
twenty days after the enactment of this title, and re-
view at least annually thereafter and, if appropriate,
revise guidelines for pretreatment of pollutants which
he determines are not susceptible to treatment by
publicly owned treatment works.” *°
Then Section 307(b) directs the Administrator in addition
to issue proposed pretreatment standards within 180 days
and to issue final pretreatment standards within 90 days
thereaiter. (Section 307(b)(3) authorizes the pretreatment
standards to be published by categories of sources.) With
reference to these provisions the Senate Report states:
“(The Administrator] is also required to publish guide-
lines for establishing pre-treatment standards for pol-
lutants discharged into publicly owned treatment
works, and guidelines for establishing procedures and
test protocols for the analysis of pollutants in permit
applications. It should be noted that this authority
is in addition to the authority of the Administrator to
establish pre-treatment standards directly under Sec-
tion 307.” (S. Rep. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.,
at 54, 2 Leg. Hist. at 1472 (emphasis added ). )
Finally, EPA relies (EPA’s Br. at 37-38) heavily on Sec-
tion 301(c) which provides that
“The Administrator may modify the requirements of
subsection (b)(2)(A) [1983 step] with respect to any
point source for which a permit application is filed
after July 1, 1977 upon a showing that . . . such modi-
fied requirement (1) will represent the maximum use
26 Furthermore, the pretreatment guidelines to be issued under Sec-
tion 304(f)(1) are not specifically required by the statute to be issued in
the form of regulations. In contrast, Section 304(b) mandates promul-
gation of guideline regulations with a very explicit content.
29
of technology within the economic capability of the
owner or operator; and (2) will result in reasonable
further progress toward the elimination the dis-
charge of pollutants.”
EPA argues that there would be no need for this pravision
for case-L ,-case relief if the only way effluent limi
could be imposed is in permits rather than by regula
(EPA’s Br. at 38.)
EPA mistakes the thrust of Section 301(c). Section
301(c) authorizes the Administrator on a showing specified
by the statute to relieve a particular point source from
complying with the 1983-step technological criterion, re-
flected in the guideline regulations by ranges of pollutant
values and by a specification of factors. In other words,
Section 301(c) authorizes the Administrator to prescribe
limitations for a particular “point source” which are more
lenient than the most permissive of the values in the tech-
nology-based range set out in the guidelines. Section 301(c)
thus gives the Administrator authority to sanction limita-
tions for a particular plant which rest on a technology more
lenient than the “best available technology economically
achievable” which is specified as the objective for 1983 by
Section 301(b)(2)(A).
Moreover, the language of Section 301(c) makes no ref-
erence whatsoever to “effluent limitations”. Instead, the
section refers to the “requirements of subsection (b)(2)
(A)”. In subsection (b)(2)(A), the requirements are
spelled out as being the achievement of technology-based
limitations “determined in accordance with regulations
issued by the Administrator pursuant to section 304(b)(2)
of this Act”. Thus by speaking of “requirements”, Sec-
tion 301(c) is in fact speaking of the 1983-step guideline
regulations, as described in the foregoing paragraph. Un-
deterred, EPA points to the Third Circuit’s remark that
“§$ 301(c) itself seems to support the Administrator's posi-
tion by presupposing the existence of a section 301 effluent
limitation which the Administrator cai. .clax.” EPA’s Br.
at 38, quoting American Iron & Steel Institute v. Environ-
30
mental Protection Agency, 526 F.2d 1027, 1037 n.15 (3d
Cir. 1975). EPA then seeks to convert Section 301(c) into
an argument for effluent limitations by regulation under
Section 301(b). Both the comment by the court in the
American lron & Steel case and EPA’s bootstrap argument
ignore the precise language of Section 301(c), and try to
make over the words of the Section into a different type of
provision entirely.
Much the same difficulty arises with respect to a pro-
vision in all of EPA’s 1977-step guideline regulations, re-
ferred to variously as a “modification” provision or a “vari-
ance” clause. The provision allows a permit authority to
propose to the Administrator for his approval limitations
for a particular plant different from the guideline values
if “fundamentally different” factors are found to be present.
(E.g., 40 C.F.R. § 415.62, Pet. Br. Appendix B, at 31b-32b. )
The Fourth Circuit has ruled that this clause is too restric-
tive because it does not allow permit authorities sufficient
latitude to consider the factors required to be taken into
account by Section 304(b)(1)(B) and (b)(2)(B). See
e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, __F.2d_, 9 E.R.C.
1033, 1038-1039 (4th Cir. 1976). On the other hand, the
provision was upheld in Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 537 F.2d 642,
645-646 (2d Cir. 1976), but the Second Circuit there stated
that it was not passing on the validity of the EPA modifica-
tion provision as applied in a particular case. The Second
Circuit expressed its reservations by observing that “[ w ]Jith-
out variance flexibility, the program might well founder on
the rocks of illegality.” (Id., 537 F.2d at 647.) 77
Arguments respecting whether or not the EPA modifica-
tion clause is too restrictive have an artificial ring in the
context of the present cases, because these arguments are
“7 As the Second Circuit said: “Not all of the thousands of plants in
operation can be expected to fit into prefabricated molds or templates.
By specifying a permit procedure, Congress implicitly conferred on the
permit-grantor the privilege of construing the broader regulations in
light of the specific type of plant applying for the permit.” (Id.,
537 F.2d at 647 (emphasis added). )
31
entirely dependent upon acceptance of EPA’s basic con-
tention that it can promulgate bare single-number limita-
tions under Section 301(b). If the Act is properly con-
strued, there should be no need for such a clause at all.
EPA should issue guideline regulations complying with the
explicit mandate of Section 304(b). Those guidelines
would not need a special clause because they ordinarily
would contain ranges of values for pollutant parameters
and would always contain a specification of factors to guide
selection of a number from each range.
The unnecessary controversy over the validity of the
modification clause serves to emphasize the difficulties
arising in trying to accommodate EPA's present position
to the statute. If EPA can promulgate limitations by regu-
lation, rather than having them set by permit authorities
based upon guideline regulations, a number of statutory
provisions either require strained interpretation to become
workable, or become dead letters, or have unintended harsh
effects.
IV
THE ACT IS STRUCTURED FOR GUIDELINE REGU-
LATIONS, NOT LIMITATIONS BY REGULATION
In the opening brief, petitioners pointed to a number of
adverse collateral consequences which would arise with
various provisions in the Act if guideline regulations were
replaced by a force-fit promulgation of limitations by regu-
lation. (Pet. Br. at 75-85.) EPA has responded by contend-
ing that “the other statutory provisions upon which peti-
tioners rely are not inconsistent with promulgation of
limitations by regulation” (EPA’s Br. at 46 (capitalization
omitted) ), and further that “the interrelationship among
various provisions” confirms EPA’s authority. (Id. at 44
(capitalization omitted ). )
EPA’s response, however, conspicuously omits any men-
tion of a number of the affected collateral provisions of
the Act.
32
A. Advisory Committee Review
For example, EPA nowhere cites Section 515, which
expressly calls for Advisory Committee review of proposed
guideline regulations, along with new source standards and
other mandated standards, but does not refer in any way
to limitations by regulation. In pertinent part, Section 515
provides—
“(b)(1) No later than one hundred and eighty days
nord y the os on which ™ ae is “
uired to publish any proposed regulations require
ie section 304(b) of this Act, any proposed standard
of performance for new sources required by section
306 of this Act, or ine toxic effluent standard
required by section of this Act, he shall transmit
to the Committee a notice of intent to propose such
regulations. The Chairman of the Committee within
ten days after receipt of such notice may publish a
notice of a public hearing by the Committee, to be
held within thirty days.” (Emphasis added. )
Surely if Congress had intended the guideline regulations
to be overridden by limitations regulations, it would have
focussed the Advisory Committee’s attention on the limita-
tions regulations. It makes utterly no sense for the Com-
mittee to be concerned on the one hand with important
new source standards and toxic effluent standards and on
the other hand with guidelines which according to EPA do
not even take on the form of actual regulations.
B. Periodic Revision of Permits and of Regulations
Similarly, EPA does not cite nor refer in any respect to
Section 301(d). That Section calls for periodic review of
limitations: .
“Any effluent limitation required by paragraph (2)
of subsection (b) of this section sh reviewed at
least every five years and, if appropriate, revised under
such paragraph.”
EPA would rather ignore this Section because it, like Sec-
tion 301(c), does not speak of limitations promulgated
33
by regulation under Section 301(b). (See supra, at 28-30. )
Instead, Section 301(d) also carefully is written in terms of
“(a]ny effluent limitation required by paragraph (2) of sub-
section (b) of this section.” That precisely worded cross-
reference, like the comparable reference in Section 301(c),
is to technology-based limitations “determined in accor-
dance with regulations issued by the Administrator pur-
suant to section 304(b)(2) of this Act.” (§ 301(b)(2).)
Thus again, Section 301(d) in fact draws upon the 1983-
step guideline regulations promulgated under Section
304(b).
And there is no conflict in the fact that Section 301(d)
calls for periodic five-year review of limitations while Sec-
tion 304 calls for review of the guideline regulations “at
least annually.” Section 301(d) is concerned with limita-
tions determined in accordance with the guideline regula-
tions. Those limitations actually appear in discharge
permits. The permits are issued “for fixed terms not
exceeding five years.” (§ 402(b)(1)(B).) In sum, the
guideline regulations themselves are to be reviewed at least
annually, but because permits have up to five-year terms,
review of the resulting limitations can occur on a periodic
five-year basis and can reflect application of the revised
guidelines in effect at the time of the permit renewal.
Provisions such as Section 301(d) illustrate that the
statute may not be written in elegant or concise language
but that the provisions do make sense if they are con-
strued together.
C. Enforcement and Judicial Review
EPA also mangles Section 309, which provides for Fed-
eral enforcement of the Act. The Agency does not say so
directly, but it appears to claim that power has to be
implied for it to issue limitations by regulation or otherwise
it will not be able to enforce directly any effluent regula-
tions against existing plants. (See EPA’s Br. at 45.) EPA
at least complains that
34
“none of [the provisions of Section 309] requires com-
pliance with the guidelines promulgated under Sec-
tion 304, authorizes enforcement proceedings against
noncompliance therewith, or makes such noncompli-
ance illegal.” (EPA’s Br. at 45.)
The complaint is not valid. Congress did not intend that
the guideline regulations be directly enforceable, in con-
trast to national standards such as those issued under
Section 306 (for new sources), 307(a) (for toxic pollu-
tants), and 307(b) and (c) (for pretreatment). Direct
enforcement would not be practicable for regulations which
were written in terms of ranges of values with a specifica-
tion of factors. Congress instead provided for enforcement
of the limitations in the permits, which limitations would
be derived from the guideline regulations. Section 309
explicitly so provides. See § 309(a)(1), (a)(3), (c)(1),
and (d). Several portions of Section 309 do refer directly
to a “violation of Section 301” (e.g., § 309(c)(1)), but
these references have nothing to do with effluent limita-
tions by regulation; the references allow for enforcement
by EPA of the bar in Section 301(a) against making any
discharge without a permit, and of the bar in Section
301(f) against any discharge of “radiological, chemical,
or biological warfare agent or high-level radioactive
waste.”
In the past, EPA has abjured any intent to create a
massive new criminal code by implication. It should main-
tain that course. (See Pet. Br. at 79 n.69.)
EPA’s about-face interpretation also creates problems
with Sections 505 and 509, the provisions for citizen
enforcement suits and for judicial review, apart from the
jurisdictional issue in this case discussed infra. (See Pet.
Br. at 80-84.) EPA’s response (EPA's Br. at 41-43) mis-
states petitioners’ arguments in several material respects,
especially regarding the interplay of these sections with
Section 301(c).7* Both Sections 505(f)(2) and 509(b)
28 Section 301(c) authorizes the Administrator to depart from the
1983-step requirements for a particular plant upon economic grounds,
where a specified factual showing has been made. See supra, at 28-30.
35
(1)(E) refer to an “effluent limitation or other limitation
under section 301 . . . [and other sections].” Both of these
references encompass the Administrator’s action pursuant
to Section 301(c) to issue limitations for an individual
point source. (Compare Pet. Br. at 80, 82 n.72, 84 n.74
with EPA’s Br. at 42 n.28.) EPA wrongly asserts that peti-
tioners would accord no meaning to the reference in Sec-
tion 509(b)(1)(E) to “promulgating” limitations (EPA’s
Br. at 42 n.28); in fact petitioners argue that the reference
is necessary to provide review of the Administrator’s action
to issue limitations under Section 301(c).”” The reference
does not support any implied limitations regulations under
Section 301(b).
EPA also errs in stating petitioners’ views respecting
Section 505(f)(2). As EPA would have it, petitioners are
arguing that Section 505(f)(2) allows citizens to “chal-
lenge” or seek review of the Administrator's action to issue
limitations for a particular plant under Section 301(c).
(See EPA’s Br. at 43-44 n.30.) Petitioners do not take such
a position. Section 505(f)(2) was included by Congress in
the Act to allow citizens to sue to enforce limitations set by
the Administrator acting under Section 301(c). If a citizen
desired to seek review of the Administrator’s action under
Section 301(c), the citizen could bring a petition for review
in a court of appeals under the authority provided by Sec-
tion 509(b)(1)(E), as described supra, in the immedi-
ately preceding paragraph.
EPA in short has tried to turn aside petitioners’ argu-
ment that EPA’s present theory of implied authority for
regulations would render useless portions of Sections
505 and 509, by making the same argument in reverse.
(See EPA’s Br. at 43.) Because EPA’s attempt rests upon
a double misstatement of petitioners’ views, however, the
29 Respecting a somewhat similar provision in the Clean Air Act, the
word “promulgating” has been construed to include both the procedural
and substantive aspects of a covered EPA action. See United States v.
Adamo Wrecking Co., —F.2d—, No. 75-1967 (6th Cir., decided Novem-
ber 1, 1976). See also infra, at 41 n.36, discussing Micnus River
Preservation Committee v. Environmental Protection Agency, —F.2d—,
9 E.R.C. 1174 (2d Cir. 1976).
36
Agency has not addressed the real problems its position
creates with the operation of Sections 505 and 509.
D. EPA Veto Power Over State Permits
Finally, EPA devotes only a brief footnote to Section
402(d). This Section empowers EPA to veto State dis-
charge permits which are “outside the guidelines and
requirements of the Act.” (§ 402(d)(2).) This provision
was the subject of intense consideration and debate in the
House of Representatives. (See Pet. Br. at 51-55.) It was
also the focus in the Conference Committee for resolving
the relative allocation of power to the States and to EPA
respecting permits. (Pet. Br. at 55-57.) Congressional
action on Section 402(d) is most pertinent to this Court’s
resolution of this case. As the Eighth Circuit said in its
CPC II decision :
“Section 402(d)(2) expressly provides that the EPA
may halt issuance of any state-issued permit if it
determines that the conditions of the permit do not
comply with the guidelines issued under § 304(b).
See id. [515 F.2d] at 1037 n.11, 1038 and 1038 n.14.
The reference in this veto provision to the § 304(b)
guidelines and the extensive debate which preceded
the addition of § 402(d\ 2) to the final draft of the stat-
ute are inconsistent with the EPA’s contention that it
has the power to issue effluent limitations for existing
plants by regulation under § 301. The District of
Columbia Circuit and the Seventh Circuit ignore this
language. The Third Circuit deals with the language,
see American Iron & Steel Institute v. E.P.A., supra,
at 1040-1041, but its reasoning is unpersuasive.”
(CPC International Inc. v. Train, F.2d, 9
E.R.C. 1301, 1302 n.1 (8th Cir. 1976) (emphasis
added ).)
Without discussion, EPA summarily asserts in its foot-
note that “the term ‘guidelines’ here [in Section 402(d)]
refers to guidelines under Section 304(h), concerning uni-
form monitoring, reporting, and information requirements,
37
not to Section 304(b).” (EPA's Br. at 45n.31.) This is not
correct.*® Section 402(d)(2) was added to the bill during
the Conference Committee deliberations, specifically to
respond to the House debate over EPA’s role in State-issued
permits and over the weight to be ascribed to the guideline
regulations under Section 304(b). (See Pet. Br. at 54-55;
see also supra, at 25-26.) The summary offered by Senator
Muskie during floor debate on the Conference Report in the
Senate was not only explicit on the matter; it was emphatic.
(See 118 Cong. Rec. 33698 (1972), 1 Leg. Hist. at 176,
quoted in Pet. Br. at 56.) Moreover, EPA’s original, con-
temporary construction of Section 402(d)(2) contradicts
its present position. In September 1973, EPA’s position was
that—
“After a state program is approved by EPA, each
it (except in categories that may be waived by
A) is subject to EPA review and veto to ensure its
consistency with requirements of the law, including
deadlines, and with EPA’s effluent guidelines.”
Council on Environmental Quality, Fourth Annual
eport, at 175 (September 1973) (emphasis added ). )
Again, EPA has had to distort the words of the statute and
the intent of Congress to force-fit promulgation of limita-
tions by regulation. This Court should not sanction EPA’s
about-face construction.
80 Congress made an express and explicit designation of guidelines
under Section 304(h)(2) whenever it decided to refer to those “pro-
cedural” guidelines. § 304(h)(2); see §§ 402(c)(1); 402(e). Also,
the explicit references to Section 304(h)(2) occur in the statute when
the context indicates procedural matters would be pertinent. Still
further, the references to Section 304(h)(2) were in the bill long before
the Conference Committee revised Section 402(d) to resolve the matter
of EPA veto of State-issued permits based upon the Section 304(b)
guidelines. See, e.g., H. R. 11896, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at §§ 402(c)(1)
and (e) (which even at that time already contained references to Sec-
tion 304(h)(2)), and § 402(d)(2) (which then contained no reference
to any guidelines, because this House-passed bill limited any EPA veto
of a State-issued permit to instances where a discharge in one State
affected the waters of another State) (1972), 1 Leg. Hist. at 893,
1057-1059.
38
Vv.
THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE IS WHETHER COURTS
OF APPEALS HAVE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO
REVIEW EFFLUENT GUIDELINE REGULATIONS UN-
DER SECTION 304(b), WHERE THE COURT DETER-
MINES THAT EPA CANNOT ACCORD TO ITSELF BY
IMPLICATION AN AUTHORITY TO PROMULGATE
LIMITATIONS BY REGULATION UNDER SECTION
301(b)
EPA’s arguments respecting jurisdiction miss the mark
entirely. Petitioners did not and do not take the jurisdic-
tional positions ascribed to them in EPA’s brief. EPA has
set up its own straw-man argument and has duly knocked
it down.
Petitioners do not argue, as EPA says petitioners do,
“that even if the Administrator has authority to
promulgate effluent limitations under Section 301
(which are reviewable in the courts of appeals . the
guidelines upon which those limitations are
are reviewable only in district courts.”
(EPA’s Br. at 79.)
Most of EPA’s argument on the jurisdictional issue is
directed toward this faulty statement. (See EPA’s Br. at
79-83.)*' In fact, if the focus of the jurisdictional issue
were on the argumentative point as stated by EPA in the
foregoing quotation, petitioners would agree with the
Agency. If one were to accept EPA’s assertion that effluent
limitations can be promulgated by regulation, it would
make no sense to split review of limitations regulations
from the effluent guidelines “regulations” which the limi-
tations regulations would override. (In this event, EPA’s
guideline regulations under Section 304(b) virtually dis-
appear anyway. EPA says it can find them in the “Develop-
ment Document” and the “Economic Analysis” but aside
from the fact that those books have no legal effect, the
31 EPA restates the matter at one point as “Petitioners’ proposal for
bifurcated review.” (Id. at 82.)
39
prospect of a court’s having to search for “regulations” in
those voluminous documents would bar any real review. )
Given this error in EPA’s brief, petitioners in this reply
brief will focus only on making a correct comparative
statement of the positions of the parties.
A. Petitioners’ Arguments
Petitioners argue as follows:
As a consequence of Assistant Administrator Kirk’s well-
publicized February 1974 memorandum,” petitioners
recognized that “protective” petitions for review would
have to be filed in a court of appeals. EPA had announced
in the memorandum that it intended to claim that its regu-
lations were limitations and to argue further that the
90-day time limitation in Section 509(b)(1) applied to
such review. Petitioners filed such “protective” petitions
in timely fashion in the Fourth Circuit. Those petitions
are now before this Court as No. 75-1473.** Concurrently,
petitioners filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Virginia, seeking review of
several of the same effluent regulations for which review
was sought in the Fourth Circuit, but on the basis that
EPA’s regulations were guidelines issued under Section
304(b). This district court action has come before this
Court as No. 75-978.
Respecting the “protective” petitions for review, peti-
tioners have never questioned that the courts of appeals had
jurisdiction to resolve their own jurisdiction. And to resolve
the jurisdictional question, the structure of the statute and
especially Section 509(b)(1) requires the court of appeals
to consider the threshold question whether EPA can accord
to itself by implication an authority to promulgate limita-
32 See Pet. Br. at 20, citing and quoting from Memorandum from
Alan G. Kirk, II, to Acting Assistant Administrator for Air and Water
Programs, at 2, February 25, 1974, reproduced in BNA Environment
Reporter, Current Developments, at 1833-1834 (March 1, 1974).
33 A separate set of petitions for review of EPA’s new source standards
issued under Section 306 were timely filed in the Fourth Circuit. No
jurisdictional question arises respecting those petitions, and they are
before this Court in No. 75-1705, the EPA’s cross-petition.
40
tions by regulation under Section 301(b). This Court's
prior decisions so provide. See Federal Communications
Commission v. Columbia Broadcasting System of Cali-
fornia, Inc., 311 U.S. 132 (1940); Cheng Fan Kwok v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 392 U.S. 206
(1968); cf. National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National
Ass'n of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 456 (1974);
Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Ser-
vice Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678
(1946). If the court of appeals decided that under the
Act EPA could draw upon implications and accord to itself
a power to issue limitations by regulation, then it would
take jurisdiction over the petitions and resolve all ques-
tions relating to the regulations. See, e.g., American Iron
& Steel Institute v. Environmental Protection Agency, 526
F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975). If the court of appeals decided
that the Act required EPA to issue guidelines and not limi-
tations, then it should dismiss the petitions for lack of
jurisdiction, CPC International Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032
(8th Cir. 1975),* although it could conceivably exercise
jurisdiction to review the guideline regulations either under
an expansive reading of Section 509(b), du Pont I (App.
250), or, more preferably, under a pendent jurisdiction
exercised where the parties had sought review of new
source standards concurrently issued on the same record.
Romero v. International Terminal Co., 358 U.S. 354, 380-
381 (1959); cf. Cheng Fan Kwok v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 392 U.S. 206, 216 n.16 (1968).*
34 Review would then be had in a district court action. See, e.g.,
Grain Processing Corp. v. Train, 407 F. Supp. 96 (S.D. lowa 1976),
appeal pending, No. 76-1233 (8th Cir.).
35 EPA’s brief seems to imply that the Administrator's mere assertion
of authority to issue limitations by regulation grants power to the court
of appeals to resolve all questions relating to a “protective” petition
which pertains to such regulations. (EPA’s Br. at 78-79.) EPA’s brief
states petitioners “apparently recognize” this position. (Id. at 79.)
Petitioners do nothing of the sort. EPA’s mere assertion grants to the
court of appeals the power only to decide those matters necessary to
resolving its own jurisdiction. Consideration and decision of all other
matters of whatever nature must rest upon a prior determination that
jurisdiction exists.
41
In this Court, petitioners adhere to the foregoing posi-
tions. (Pet. Br. at 85-96.) As a matter of emphasis, peti-
tioners here argue that this Court (1) should follow the
Act’s mandate to issue guideline regulations under Section
304(b) and reject EPA’s claim of power to issue limita-
tions by regulation, and (2) should then construe the Act,
and especially Section 509(b)(1), to allow courts of
appeals to take pendent jurisdiction to review guideline
regulations where the petitioning parties seek review of
new source standards concurrently issued on the same
administrative record.
Recognition of jurisdiction in courts of appeals based
upon pendent jurisdiction would preserve the work of the
court of appeals in du Pont II in reviewing painstakingly
the record support for EPA’s specific actions in the eleven
of the twenty-two subcategories of the inorganic chemicals
industry involved in this case. It would do so on a basis
which would not involve an expansive reading of Sec-
tion 509(b)(1). Such an expansive reading, as made by
the court of appeals in du Pont I (App. 250), would create
even more difficulty than that already present for other
jurisdictional matters arising under Section 509(b)(1).*°
36 Section 509(b) is a procedural minefield. Even apart from the
jurisdictional issue posed in this case, problems of interpreting the pro-
vision have plagued both district courts and courts of appeals. To date,
four decisions have been rendered by the Second and Third Circuits
construing Section 509(b) in factual situations other than that presented
here, and in each case the court ruled that the would-be petitioner or
plaintiff had started in the wrong court. In chronological order, those
cases are: Sun Enterprises, Ltd. v. Train, 532 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1976)
(district court has no jurisdiction to review EPA's issuance of a discharge
permit; later-filed petition for review in court of appeals was barred by
Act’s 90-day time limitation on bringing such petitions); Bethlehem
Steel Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 538 F 2d 513 (2d Cir.
1976) (court of appeals does not have jurisdiction over petition to
review EPA’s action under Section 303 approving portion of New
York’s water quality standards); Mianus River Preservation Committee
v. Environmental Protection Agency, __F.2d__, 9 E.R.C. 1174 (2d Cir.
1976) (where the EPA failed to take affirmative action within 90 days
under Section 402(d) to veto a discharge permit issued by Connecticut,
the court of appeals does not have jurisdiction to review the issuance of
the discharge permit); American Iron & Steel Institute v. Environmental
Protection Agency, _.F.2d__, Nos. 75-2124 and 75-2128 (3d Cir.,
42
It would also expand the scope of the very harsh review-
preclusion ** and limitation clauses in Section 509(b),**
to the detriment of the unsuspecting. See Pet. Br. at 92
n.79, discussing Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414
(1944). On the other hand, exercise of pendent jurisdic-
tion would allow the Court to serve the same interest in
judicial economy expressed by Judge Widener in his
opinion for the court of appeals in du Pont I, but without
these adverse collateral consequences. Judge Widener’s
opinion noted that petitions to review new source standards
had to be brought in courts of appeals under Section 509(b)
(1)(A), and observed that review by district courts of
guideline regulations could waste judicial manpower where
the new source standards were issued on the same admin-
decided October 5, 1976) (court of appeals has no jurisdiction to review
EPA’s promulgation of Net-Gross Adjustment Regulations issued under
Sections 402, 405 and 501 of the Act).
Of these cases, the Mianus River decision appears to be incorrect at
least in part, because the “approving” language of Section 509(b) (1)
(E) gives jurisdiction to a court of appeals to review a State-issued
permit at least insofar as the Administrator’s review of such a permit
is concerned. (See Pet. Br. at 87; compare EPA’s Br. at 42 n.28.) Peti-
tioners in the Mianus River case argued for jurisdiction in the court of
appeals on the ground that EPA’s review of the permit, however per-
functory, was an “Administrator’s action . . . in issuing . . . [a] permit”
reviewable under § 509(h)(1)(F); the court did not consider or discuss
the question whether the Administrator's action was reviewable under
§ 509(b)(1)(E) because EPA’s action had the effect of “approving” the
limitations in the permit.
37 See Section 509(b)(2). Respecting a similar provision in the Clean
Air Act, courts have held that the validity of an emission standard
promulgated by EPA in the form of regulations is not reviewable in a
criminal action for violation of the standard. E.g., United States v.
Adamo Wrecking Co., __F.2d__, No. 75-1967 (6th Cir., decided No-
vember 1, 1976); but cf. United States v. Independent Stave Co.,
406 F. Supp. 886 (W.D.Mo. 1975).
38 The requirement in Section 509(b)(1) that any petition for review
of the actions there specified be brought within 90 days has been
construed as a statute of limitations. See Sun Enterprises, Ltd. v. Train,
532 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1976). It might, however, more properly be
considered a jurisdictional requirement. Cf. Union Electric Co. v. En-
vironmental Protection Agency, __U.S._., 44 U.S.L.W. 5060, 5062-
5063 & n.4 (June 25, 1976).
43
istrative record concurrently with the guideline regulations.
(App. 249-250.) See Pet. Br. at 89-91."
B. EPA’s Arguments
EPA says that it has implied authority to promulgate
effluent limitations by regulation under Section 301 and
that under Section 509(b)(1)(E) review of such regula-
tions is exclusively in the courts of appeals. (EPA's Br. a*
78.)*
In the main, the remainder of EPA’s argument on juris-
diction is irrelevant, resting as it does on a misstatement of
petitioners arguments.
EPA does include a long footnote setting out the numer-
Ous Cases various parties have brought in district courts
to review EPA's regulations for existing plants, on the basis
that those regulations are guideline regulations issued
under Section 304(b). (See EPA’s Br. at 83-84 n.57)*
In another long footnote, EPA addresses itself to peti-
tioners’ arguments directed toward exercise by courts of
appeals of a pendent jurisdiction. (See EPA’s Br. at 85,
86 n.59.) EPA says, among other things, “we agree that
it would be inappropriate to vacate the judgment of the
court of appeals insofar as it made those modifications in
the effluent limitations {or guidelines, depending upon one’s
views} and remand the case to the district court to consider
those issues.” (Id. at 86 n.59.) Beyond setting out the
89 EPA’s brief ignores entirely the divided-review considerations ex-
pressed in Judge Widener’s opinion. Compare EPA’s Br. at 79-83, where
EPA addresses at great length the false divided-review issue involving
the Section 304(b) regulations and regulations implied from Sec-
tion 301(b), which rests on EPA’s misstatement of petitioners’ argu-
ments. See supra, at 38-41.
*° Assuming arguendo that the premise is correct, petitioners woul
not contest the conclusion, even as to and including guideline regula-
tions. See supra, at 38.
*! Respecting EPA’s footnote, petitioners would add to EPA’s enumera-
tion one further district court case: Delicate, et al. v. Train, Civil
Action No. 76-5028 (D.S.D., complaint filed April 15, 1976) (ore mining
and dressing regulations ).
44
foregoing quotation, petitioners will not attempt to restate
EPA’s views on pendent | urisdiction.
C. Congressional Action To Date
Congress could resolve for the future the jurisdictional
issue in these cases by amending the Act to specify the
forum in which actions to review EPA’s guideline regula-
tions could be brought. Congress in 1973 made such an
amendment to Section 509(b) to specify that actions to
review pretreatment standards promulgated under Sec-
tion 307 could be brought in the courts of appeals. See
Pub. L. 93-207, 87 Stat. 906, § 1(6) (December 28, 1973),
amending Section 509(b)(1)(C).
Earlier this year, on June 3, 1976, the House of Repre-
sentatives passed a bill which would have amended the
Act to provide that review of guideline regulations issued
under Section 304(b) was in the courts of appeals under
the terms of Section 509(b)(1). See 122 Cong. Rec.
H 5285-5288 (daily ed. June 3, 1976) (passage of House
version of S. 2710, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975), section 18
of which would have amended Section 509 of the Act).
The bill did not go immediately to a Conference Commit-
tee. Rather, on September 1, 1976, the Senate considered
and adopted a motion to concur in the House amendments
to S. 2710, with further amendments. (122 Cong. Rec.
S 15189 (daily ed. September 1, 1976).) Among other
things, the Senate stripped from the bill a variety of pro-
visions including the House-passed Section 18 which would
have given jurisdiction to courts of appeals to review by
petition EPA’s promulgation of guideline regulations under
Section 304(b). See 122 Cong. Rec. S 15165 (daily ed.
September 1, 1976) (the cited summary of “Provisions
Of House Amendment Not Adopted By Committee” wrongly
states the effect of the House-passed Section 18). There-
after, agreement could not be reached on the different
versions of S. 2710 passed by the Senate and House, and
the bill died upon the adjournment of the 94th Congress.
45
The jurisdictional issue thus remains in these cases,
both as to previously-filed actions and as to actions which
may be brought in the future.
CONCLUSION
In this case, and the companion cases—Nos. 75-1473
and 75-1705, the issues of statutory construction concern
a very detailed statute filled with cross-references and
dependent phrases and clauses. Similarly, the Court has
before it a large administrative record which sets out in
considerable detail EPA’s step-by-step actions in issuing
the regulations before the Court, and in so doing, in arriv-
ing at the position it now espouses. These cases are quite
complex because of EPA’s efforts to evade or avoid the
express commands of Section 304(b), but the Court has the
great advantage of having before it the materials necessary
to reach its decision.
These cases are unusual in that the issues as to the effect
and content both of the guideline regulations and of the
new source standards are before this Court just as EPA
has launched a new program to review, revise, and reissue
inter alia the 1983-step regulations and the new source
standards for 21 broad industry categories, including inor-
ganic chemicals manufacturing. This program to review
and reissue the regulations is apart from and in addition
to review on remand of the regulations in this case, and
in other similar cases. On June 7, 1976, EPA entered into
an agreement with the Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. and others to settle four cases pending in the District
Court for the District of Columbia. See Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, ___F Supp. , 8 ERC
2120 (D.D.C. 1976).** The settlement agreement, which
was approved by the Court, provides a timetable under
42 The text of the settlement agreement providing the detailed pro-
gram for issuing the new regulations is set out as an addendum to the
district court’s opinion. (Id., 8 E.R.C. at 2122-2136.) Under the terms
of the agreement, the revised guideline regulations and new source stan-
dards for the inorganic chemicals category are to be promulgated in
final form no later than December 31, 1978. (Id., 8 E.R.C. at 2125,
2131.)
46
which EPA will study the 21 broad industry categories and
then propose and issue the new 1983-step and new source
regulations. Under the timetable, the entire process is to
be concluded and the new regulations are to be issued for
all 21 categories by December 1979. (Id., 8 E.R.C. at 2125-
2126.) The decision of this Court, therefore, will resolve
basic questions respecting the effect and content of the new
regulations before they are formulated, rather than after
vast amounts of administrative and private-party time and
effort have been expended in developing new regulations
based on EPA’s faulty legal theory.
Several days before the filing of this brief, one fur-
ther development occurred which has a bearing on this
litigation. Without prior announcement or notice, EPA
promulgated a series of “specialized definitions” in an
“interim final amendment” to its regulations for the in-
organic chemicals category. (41 Fed. Reg. 51598-51601
(November 23, 1976).) Among other things, the “special-
ized definitions” set out yet a new meaning for “effluent
limitations.” ** This new definition also fails to comply with
the statute. While the definition does provide that effluent
limitations may be established by States as well as EPA,
the definition omits any reference to “schedules of com-
pliance.” The statutory definition in Section 502(11) speci-
43In du Pont II the court of appeals set aside EPA’s general regula-
tion defining “effluent limitations” for all industrial categories, on the
grounds that EPA’s definitions did not provide for such limitations to
be established by States as the statute required and also that the defini-
tion did not square with “presumptively applicable” limitation regula-
tions. See supra, at 21-22 & n.21.
Petitioners had timely petitioned for review of EPA’s general regula-
tions in 40 C.F.R. Part 401, in addition to the regulations specifically
relating to the inorganic chemicals category, 40 C.F.R. Part 415. (See,
e.g., App. 200-201.) The court of appeals thus had jurisdiction to set
aside the general definition of “effluent limitation” in the regulations.
(See App. 262, 284.) EPA errs when in the most recent rulemaking
notice it asserted that the court of appeals had remanded certain “defini-
tions as they pertain to portions of the Inorganic Chemicals Manufactur-
ing Point Source Category ... .” (41 Fed. Reg. 51598 (November 23,
1976).) The action by the court of appeals was not so limited.
47
fied that effluent limitations “includ[e] schedules of com-
pliance.”
Even putting aside the contradiction between the new
definition and the statute, this most recent action by EPA
underscores the Agency’s efforts to reduce the role of States
in carrying out the Act. In EPA’s brief, much was made of
the fact that States still could set schedules of compliance.
(See EPA’s Br. at 71-72.) Relegating States to setting sched-
ules of compliance does not satisfy the congressional inten-
tion “to recognize [and] preserve . . . the primary responsi-
bilities and rights of States” to control discharges. ‘§ 101
(b).) The newest regulations, by omitting any reference
even to the schedule-of-compliance function, raise addi-
tional doubts as to the role which EPA would allot to States.
Petitioners’ proposed disposition of these cases is set
forth in Pet. Br. at 96-97.
Respectfully submitted,
RoBERT C. BARNARD
Douc tas E. KLIEVER
CHARLES F. LETTow
1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
Attorneys for Petitioners
OF COUNSEL:
CLEARY, GOTTLIEB, STEEN & HAMILTON
1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
NOVEMBER 26, 1976
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.