Petitioners Reply Brief — EI Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Train

Supreme Court brief1977

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in the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

No. 75-978

E. I. pu Pont pE NEMours AND CoMPANY, et al.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

RUSSELL E. TraIn, as Administrator,

Environmental Protection Agency, et al.,

Respondents.

On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States

Court Of Appeals For The Fourth Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

RoBertT C. BARNARD

Douc.as E. KLIEVER

CHARLEs F. LEtrow

1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D. C. 20036

Attorneys for Petitioners

OF COUNSEL:

CLEARY, GOTTLIEB, STEEN & HAMILTON

1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D. C. 20036

NOVEMBER 26, 1976

SS aaansnnnnnsnnnnnn

ARGUMENT

I.

II.

Il.

IV.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EPA’s CURRENTLY ASSERTED POSITION ConstTI-

TUTES AN UNWARRANTED Volte Face From Its

ORIGINAL AND CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION

OF THE ACT

PUBLISHING A “DEVELOPMENT DOCUMENT” ALONG

WITH AN “ECONOMIC ANALYsIS” DoEs Not

SATISFY THE MANDATE OF SECTION 304(b) THat

GUIDELINE REGULATIONS BE IssUED

SECTION 301(b) SETs TECHNOLOGICAL OBJECTIVES

AND SPEAKS OF REGULATIONS TO BE ISSUED UNDER

SECTION 304(b); Ir Does Nor Provipe AN INDE-

PENDENT BASIS FOR REGULATIONS

THE ACT Is STRUCTURED FoR GUIDELINE REGULA-

TIONS, Not LIMITATIONS BY REGULATION __

A. Advisory Committee Review. st

B. Periodic Revision of Permits and of Regula-

PERERA SE Se eS eo

C. Enforcement and Judicial Review.

D. EPA Veto Power Over State Permits

THE JURISDICTIONAL IssUE Is WHETHER CourTs

OF APPEALS HAVE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO RE-

VIEW EFFLUENT GUIDELINE REGULATIONS UNDER

SECTION 304(b), WHERE THE CourT DETERMINES

THAT EPA CANNoT AccorD To ITSELF BY IMPLI-

CATION AN AUTHORITY TO PROMULGATE LIMITA-

TIONS BY REGULATION UNDER SECTION 301( =

A. Petitioners’ Arguments.

A Lae CE a tS

C. Congressional Action to Date.

CONCLUSION... ist SEN SN TIE Oy

12

32

33

38

39

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES:

American Frozen Food Institute v. Train, — U.S. App.

D.C. —, SD FBG WOT (BOB) accicsecwicesictntennt 21

American Iron & Steel Institute v. Environmental

Protection Agency, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir.

ERTS 15, 20, 21, 29, 30, 36, 40

American Iron & Steel Institute v. Environmental

Protection Agency, — F.2d —, Nos. 75-2124 and

75-2128 (3d Cir., decided October 5, 1976) ___. 41, 42

American Meat Institute v. Environmental Protection

Agency, 526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975) 21

Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, — F.2d —, 9 E.R.C.

Re tt |) ee ae 22, 30

Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) 0. 40

Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Environmental Protection

Agency, 538 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1976) 41

Cheng Fan Kwok v. Immigration and Naturalization

Service, 392 U.S. 206 (1968) 40

Continental — Co. v. United States, 314 U.S.

kt | ee m 27

CPC International Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032

(8th Cir. 1975) (“CPC I”) _ 24, 26, 27, 40

CPC International Inc. v. Train, — F.2d —, 9 E.R.C.

1301 (8th Cir. 1976) (“CPC IT”) es

Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) ss

Delicate, et al. v. Train, Civil Action No. 76-5028

(D.S.D., complaint filed April 15, 1976) . 4

Durousseau v. United States, 6 Cranch [10 U.S.] 307

CIID wcssicnceccmntiunenanl ‘ ; 27.

(ii)

Page

Federal Communications Commission v. Columbia

Broadcasting System of California, Inc.,

311 U.S. 132 (1940) _. 40

Fribourg — Co. v. Senssitistinen, 2 383 U.S.

272 (1966) _. sGieiatiieene sordid.

Grain Processing iia. v. Train, 407 F. F Supp. 8 96

(S.D. Iowa 1976), acti anit No. 76-1233

(8th Cir.) ions . 15, 40

Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d

620 (2d Cir. 1976) aiihiesisincstnmscsene, we

Mianus River Preservation Committee v. Environ-

mental Protection Agency, — F.2d —, 9 E.R.C.

1174 (2d Cir. 1976) 0 85, 4, 42

Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public

Service Co., 341 U.S.246(1951)_. —_— <a

National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Ass’n

of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974) 40

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environ-

mental Protection = 937 F.2d 642 (2d Cir.

a Ueitiabdebimlintednsn we

Natural Resources tins Suet b Inc. v. . Train, —_

F.Supp. —, 8 E.R.C. 2120 (D.D.C. 1976) 45, 46

Romero v. International Terminal Co., 358 U.S. 354

(1959) . eS lien ae

Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch [5 U.S.] 299 (1803) _ oa’ ae

Sun Enterprises, Ltd. v. Train, 532 F.2d 280 (24. Cir.

ee _.... 41, 42

Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research —— Inc.,

— US. —, 44 U.S.L.W. 4717 (June 1, 1976) _ 11

Union Electric Co. v. Environmental Protection

Agency, — U.S. —, 44 U.S.L.W. 5060 (June 25,

1976) ___.. we RE 0 SEE a ea 2, 42

Page

United States v. Adamo Wrecking Co., — F.2d —, No.

73-1967 (6th Cir., decided November 1, 1976) 35, 42

United States v. American Ry. Express Co.,

TG ae 22

United States v. Carolina Carriers ww 315 U.S. 475

(1942) ntinladiamateal ; iecebinils:... ~ Te

United States v. Independent Stave Co., 406 F. Sup.

886 (W.D. Mo. 1975) . insidalibaiiiviailiniilaaaiiaeg ae

Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). Goioieigniiea 42

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS:

Federal Water Pollution Control Act

§ 101(b), 33 U.S.C. §1251(b) 26

§ 301, 33 U.S.C. $131] 20 passim

§ 301(a), 33 U.S.C. §131l(a)_ 8

§ 301(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) passim

§ 301(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) 23

§ 301(b)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2) 33

§ 301(b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C.

$ 1311(b){(3)(A) 23, 28, 29

§ 301(c), 33 U.S.C.

§ Saeace) —............ 17, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35

§ 301(d), 33 U.S.C. §1311(d) 32, 33

§ 301(f), 33 U.S.C. §1311(f) 0

[on UAC. § 13 LLL 41

§ 304, 33 U.S.C. § 1314. . 9, 16, 17, 23, 34

§ 304(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) passim

$ 304(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(A) — 13, 19

§ 304(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C.

§ 1314(b)(1)(B) 7, 13, 14, 15, 17, 30

§ 304(b)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2) __ 13, 23, 29, 33

(iv)

Page

§ 304(b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(A) _ 13,19

§ 304(b)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C.

jo | Sr Ae 7, 15, 30

§ 304(f)(1), 33 U.S.C. §1314(f)(1)

§ 304(h), 33 U.S.C.§1314(h) 8

§ 304(h)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(h)(2)_. 7

§ 306, 33 U.S.C. § 1316. 5, 9, 32, 34, 39

§ 306(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(B) ___ 26

§ 306(e), 33 U.S.C. §1316(e) si

$ 307,33 US.C.$1317..0.

§ 307(a), 33 U.S.C. §1317(a) 8

§ 307(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2)_ 26

§ 307(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b) 26, 28, 34

§ 307(b)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b)(3)_ 28

§ 307(c), 33 U.S.C. §1317(c) (6, 34

§ 307(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(d) 07

§ 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 wibiie A tec RL 33, 34

§ 309(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1) . __.. 27, 34

§ 309(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3) 27, 34

§ 309(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) _..__. 27, 34

§ 309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) 27, 34

§ 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342.0 9 24, 28, 42

§ 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) 26

§ 402(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(B) __. 33

§ 402(b)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3)_ 18

§ 402(c), 33 U.S.C. §1342(c)

§ 402(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(1) 37

§ 402(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d) 26, 36, 37, 41

§ 402(d)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2) 36, 37

§ 402(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(e) 26, 37

(v)

Page

§ 402(f), 33 U.S.C. § se ET Mee 26

$405, 33U.S.C.§1345.000 42

$501,33US.C.§1361.000 = 42

§ 501(a), 33 U.S.C. § , Ee eR 27

§ 502(11), 33 U.S.C. § | a eee, 22, 24

$505, 33 U.S.C. §1365.0 34, 35, 36

§ 505(f)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f)(2)_ 35

$509, 33U.S.C.§1369. 34, 35, 36, 44

§ 509(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) .. 40, 41, 42, 44

§ 509(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) __ 39, 41, 42, 44

§ 909(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(A) NaS 42

§ 909(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(C) apa 44

§ 509(b)(1)(E), 33 U.S.C.

§ 1369(b)(1)(E) abtheotemmistiimba tae oS 34, 35, 42, 43

§ 509(b)(1)(F), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F) ___ 42

§ 509(b)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1360(b)(2)_. 42

$515,33US.C.§1374. 0 32

§ 515(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. §$ 1374(b)(1)_ 32

Pub. L. 93-207, 87 Stat. 906, § 1(6) (December 28,

OO nasacort dee, 44

CoDE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS:

ee Oe ee 18

oF Ore OO 18

peste stipe en A Be, 18

WCPR $ISM 18

EN OU i 11

I I siecle is) 11

40 CF.R. §$401.11(i) ssnttivenianediaittiiaisiiiit al 22

40 C.F.R. ecg, Sn ae 11

Oe NW a itis gs 11

OO Nr PN aclicsipih ii ice De i 30

FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICEs:

38 Fed. Reg. 21202 (August SEE ee 10

38 Fed. Reg. 28174 (October 1973) pbaseaidiadanie 10

41 Fed. Reg. 51598 (November Se 46

MISCELLANEOUs:

Casenote, IV Fordham Urban Law Journal, 623 (1976) 1

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:

118 Cong. Rec. 10206 ee 25, 26

118 Cong. Rec. 33698 ( PES Ca aes 37

122 Cong. Rec. H 5285-5288 (daily ed. June 3,

shen ee RTOS TOG NL aia 4A

122 Cong. Rec. S 15165 (daily ed. September 1,

og, EE. Tt Rana 44

122 Cong. Rec. § 15189 (daily ed. September 1,

Pe eentvmiienlihiling Mice 44

Congressional Research Service of the Library of

Congress, A Legislative Histury of the Water

Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972

a ae ae 16, 17, 20, 25, 26, 28, 37

Council on Environmental Quality, Fourth Annual

Report (September ea ala ailing 37

Environmental Protection Agency, No Small Task—

Establishing National Effluent Guidelines and

Standards (June SR Sa 12

Memorandum from Alan G. Kirk, II, to Acting Assistant

Administrator for Air and Water Program, repro-

duced in BNA, Environmental Reporter, Current

Developments, 1833-1834 (March 1, 1974) __ 39

Memorandum to All Regional Permit Program Direc-

tors from the Office of Permit Programs, Wash-

ington, D.C.,dated May 11,1973... 9,10

(vii)

Page

R. Zener, The Federal Law of Water Pollution Control,

in Federal Environmental Law (E. Dolgin and T.

IRI aera i ag Rte 25

H.R. 11896, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. ee 37

S. 2710, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. Se

S. Rep. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971)... 16, 28

S. Rep. No. 92-1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) _. 17, 20

(viii)

in the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

No. 75-978

E. I. pu PonT DE NEMouRS AND CoMPANY, et all.,

Petitioners,

Vv .

RUSSELL E. TRAIN, as Administrator,

Environmental Protection Agency, et al.,

Respondents.

On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States

Court Of Appeals For The Fourth Circuit

REPLY BRIEx FOR PETITIONERS

The implication running throughout respondents’

(“EPA's”) brief in this case is that Congress through a

“legislative oversight” simply omitted to specify in the

statute that EPA was to promulgate effluent limitations by

regulation for the existing industrial plants in this nation.'

EPA’s arguments by indirection ask this Court in effect

to supply the provisions which purportedly were inadver-

tently or erroneously omitted.

1 At one point in its brief EPA said—“Although Section 301 does not

explicitly provide that it is the Administrator who is to establish the

effluent limitations, that is its clear and necessary implication.” (EPA’s

Brief in No. 75-978 (“EPA’s Br.”), at 36-37.) Otherwise, EPA's brief

largely skirts the specific source for its asserted power to issue effluent

limitations directly by regulation for cxisting plants.

It was a student commentator who used the phrase “legislative over-

sight” in addressing Congress's failure to provide that effluent limitations

be issued by the Administrator through the mechanism of regulations.

Casenote, IV Fordham Urban Law Journal, 623, 631 (1976).

2

There is no gap or lacuna in the Act. This is therefore

not a situation where interim agency action is required

to cure an unintended legislative omission, pending dis-

positive action by Congress. Instead, EPA’s present argu-

ments in support of a statutory power to set effluent limi-

tations directly by regulation for existing plants stem

from its own general policy preferences. Because EPA

fears that States may be “lax” in applying the Act (App.

193, R. 6501), the Agency prefers not to accord meaningful

powers to States to prescribe effluent limitations as Con-

gress contemplated. To give effect to its preferences, EPA

has claimed the power to set binding across-the-board

effluent limitations, notwithstanding the fact that EPA’s

preferences have no statutory support.

EPA’s bare assertions should not govern this Court's

decision in the present case, especially since Congress did

not accept the policy underlying those assertions. This

Court has rejected similar efforts by agencies to rewrite

statutes, efforts premised on policy goals not accepted by

Congress and not written into legislation. This Court said

of one such effort by the Interstate Commerce Commis-

sion: “Neither the Court nor the Commission is warranted

in departing from those [statutory] standards because of

any doubts which may exist as to the wisdom of following

the course which Congress has chosen.” United States v.

Carolina Carriers Corp., 315 U.S. 475, 489 (1942). Cf.

Union Electric Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency,

U.S.__., 44 U.S.L.W. 5060, 5064-5065 (June 25,

1976).

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act as written by

Congress places substantial authority in States with EPA-

approved permit programs. These States are obliged to set

discharge permits for particular plants, and in these per-

mits the States are to apply the “guideline” regulations

which Section 304(b) of the Act explicitly requires EPA

to issue. The particular allocation of responsibility

between the States and the Federal EPA currently reflected

in the Act is a creation of Congress, reached after con-

3

sidering the statutory objectives in light of principles of

federalism. It should be given a chance to work. Unless

and until Congress acts to revise its handiwork, EPA

should be directed to follow “the course which Congress

has chosen.” (Id.)

EPA’s CURRENTLY ASSERTED POSITION CONSTI-

TUTES AN UNWARRANTED VOLTE FACE FROM ITS

ORIGINAL AND CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUC-

TION OF THE ACT

EPA strenuously argues that its construction of the Act

is “reasonable” and therefore that “the Court should uphold

it” without a great deal of questioning. (EPA's Brief at

34-35.) Petitioners’ arguments based upon the statutory

language are dismissed as “hypertechnical or insignificant

distinctions in the wording” of the Act. (Id. at 26.)

EPA also claims that the Administrator made known

shortly after the enactment of the 1972 Amendments that

it would “establish both guidelines under Section 304(b)

and effluent limitations under Section 301(b).” (Id. at 35

n.25.) EPA uses this factual claim as a basis for the argu-

ment that its present interpretation of the Act was adopted

contemporaneously with the enactment of the 1972 Amend-

ments, that it has been consistently followed thereafter,

and that its interpretation thus is entitled to be accorded

some weight. (Id.)

Petitioners contest EPA’s factual claims; petitioners also

controvert EPA’s arguments based on those claims.’ Fortu-

nately, the full administrative record is before the Court,’

2In a confusing footnote EPA cites the regulations reprinted in the

Appendix to petitioners’ brief (not the brief itself) as support for an

assertion that petitioners “recognize [that] the effluent limitations were

established by regulations.” (EPA's Br. at 77, n.53.) Petitioners cer-

tainly “recognize” that EPA has asserted that it has implied authority

under Section 301 to issue effluent limitations by regulations and that

EPA argues it has exercised that implied authority. Petitioners’ “recogni-

tion” ends there.

3 A complete copy of the administrative record is on file with the

Clerk of this Court. See Pet. Br. at 1 n.2.

4

and thus this factual dispute may be resolved with confi-

dence.

The record shows the following sequence of events:

Before the enactment of the 1972 Amendments in mid-

October 1972, EPA had developed what it called “guidance”

documents for use with the Refuse Act Permit Program.

EPA makes no mention of these documents. (Compare

Pet. Br. at 14-15.) Respecting the inorganic chemicals

industry, both the contractor’s July 1971 report (R. 3183-

3325, especially R. 3310-3314, 3316) and the October 1972

EPA guidance document (App. 8-20, R. 2550-2567) set out

the guidance as ranges of effluent values.‘ EPA also con-

templated that factors to guide the selection of a value

from the range for a particular plant would be supplied

via an EPA technical briefing. (App. 8-9, R. 2551.) The

value selected would become part of the particular plant's

permit. (R. 2552.) In short, the guidance documents

looked like guideline regulations to be issued under Sec-

tion 304(b). They were not bare single-number limitations

binding upon all relevant plants.

EPA looks to the request for proposals issued by EPA on

October 31, 1972, to obtain a contractor to study the inor-

ganic chemicals industry, and claims that this request

shows the Agency to have contemplated even at that early

date that it would issue limitations by regulation in addi-

tion to guideline regulations. (EPA's Br. at 14-15, 35 n.25. )

This claim does not withstand an examination of the

record.

EPA’s overall request for proposal is set out in the record

at R. 6016-6281. EPA’s own conception of its responsibili-

4In these guidance documents, EPA occasionally referred to the

actual range of numerical values set out for each pollutant parameter

as “limitations”. See, e.g., R. 2562, where EPA said, “The effluent guide-

lines are based on process wastewater .. .” in referring to the entire

guidance document, and at the same time said, “The effluent limitations

shown in Attachments A and B are average values .. .” in referring

to the range of numbers for the particular parameters making up the

guidelines.

5

ties in October of 1972 is set out at R. 6026. EPA then

spoke only of issuing regulations in the form of guidelines

_ for existing plants under Section 304(b) and standards for

new sources under Section 306:

“DESCRIPTION OF THE REQUIREMENT

“A. Introduction

“The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-

ments of 1972 (the “Act”) requires the United States

Environmental Protection Agency to establish effluent

limitations which must be achieved by point sources

of discharges into the navigable waters of the United

States. Section 301 of the Act requires the achicve-

ment by July 1, 1977, of effluent limitations which

require the application of the ‘best practicable control

technology currently available,’ and the achievement

by July 1, 1983, of effluent limitations which require

the application of the ‘best available technology eco-

nomically achievable.’

“Within one year of enactment, the Administrator

is required by Section 304(b) to promulgate regula-

tions providing guidelines for the effluent limitations

required to be achieved under Section 301 of the Act.

These regulations are to identify in terms of amounts

of constituents and chemical, physical, and biological

characteristics of pollutants, the degree of effluent

reduction attainable through the application of the

best practicable control technology currently available

and best available technology economically achievable.

The regulations must also specify factors to be taken

into account in identifying the two statutory tech-

nology levels and in determining the control measures

and practices which are to be applicable to point

sources within given industrial categories or classes

to which the effluent limitations apply.

(R. 6026 (emphasis added). )

Notably, EPA then viewed Section 301 as setting the

overall objective to be “achieved” by existing plants. It

stated that the regulations it was to issue were “guideline”

6

regulations under Section 304(b).° These guideline regula-

tions were to contain factors “to be taken into account” in

making determinations respecting the application of “tech-

nology levels” to “point sources”, i.e., to individual plants.

(Id.) The resulting effluent limitations for the plant were

those “required to be achieved under Section 301... .” (Id.)

Petitioners accept the interpretation of the Act adopted

by EPA at that time and argue in support of it here.

EPA cites two segments of the request for proposal as

evidence of an intent on its part to promulgate effluent

limitation regulations under Section 301. (See EPA’s Br.

at 15 & n.15, citing R. 6027, 6034.) These segments speak

of effluent limitations in terms of a “range of parameters”

to be “presented by the contractor.” (R. 6034.)* The seg-

5 The request for proposal also stated—“The Act requires the guide-

lines . . . to be developed within very strict deadlines... .” (Id.) The

only “deadlines” for guideline regulations are contained in Section

304(b). Section 301(b) fixes the dates when the b: oad technological

objectives are to be achieved but contains no “deadlines” for regulations.

6 The cited portion of EPA’s request is as follows:

“Item IV. Outline of Level I, II and III Control

and Treatment Technology

“EPA will of course exercise its independent judgment in deter-

mining what levels of technology satisfy these statutory terms for

each industry for which effluent limitations guidelines and stan-

ards of performance for new sources are to be promulgated. .. .

Therefore, the following description of Level I, II and III technology

is merely a suggested outline to be used by contractors in respond-

ing to Appendices A and B of Part II of this RFP which requires

the final report to set forth suggested effluent limitations and

standards of performance.

“The end result of the analysis undertaken by contractors will

be the suggestion of effluent limitations associated with the tech-

nology identified by the contractor as Level I, II and III technology.

In many, if not most instances, this assessment of Levels I, II and

III technology will vary slightly depending upon such factors as the

age and size of given plants within the industry and the type of

production process employed. The minimum factors which must

be taken into account in establishing Levels I, II and I'l technology

for each industrial category, and in ultimately applying such levels

to individual plants within the category in issued permits, are

included in the outline below. [See infra, n.7.] Other factors may

7

ments also state that certain “minimum factors” (which

were specified in the request)’ “should be identified” by

contractors for use “in ultimately applying such levels to

individual plants within the category in issued permits... .”

(Id.) EPA’s directions to its prospective technical contrac-

tors thus did not contemplate issuance of limitation regu-

lations under Section 301; that section is nowhere asso-

ciated with regulations. And where the Agency spoke in

terms of limitations it was using the term in the sense of

numbers for pollutant parameters which, along with the

concurrently specified factors, were to make up the guide-

line regulations issued under Section 304(b). (See also

supra, at 4n.4.) These guideline regulations would form

the basis for values fixed in permits. (R. 6034.)

The contract actually issued by EPA to General Tech-

nologies Corp. (“General Technologies”) is equally as

instructive respecting EPA’s contemporaneous construc-

tion of the Act. In the contract EPA required General

Technologies “to propose suggested draft effluent limita-

tions guidelines” which reflected ranges and specified fac-

tors. (R. 6399.) Permits for individual plants could then

be issued which could “require compliance with slightly

different effluent limitations depending upon the presence

of one or more of the factors specified.” (Id.) Again, the

also be pertinent and should be identified by the contractor where

appropriate. Since a range of techrology will satisfy the require-

ments of Levels I, II and III in some instances, effluent limitations

consistent with the application of such technology will also vary.

Consequently a range of parameters may be presented by the

contractor. Effluent limitations and standards of preformance [sic]

shall specify the quantity of pollutants which may be contained in

the effluent discharge. This quantity shall be related either to a

unit quantity of product produced or raw material used in the

production process, whichever shall most clearly determine the

maximum degree of pollution reduction. If the contractor finds that

expressing effluent limitations and standards of performance in

such terms is not possible, he shall indicate an alternative method

of expression and explain why such an alternative is necessary.”

(R. 6034-6035 (emphasis added ). )

T EPA’s request lists the factors identified in Sections 304(b)(1)(B)

and 304(b)(2)(B). (R. 6035.)

8

Agency used the words “effluent limitation”, but as adjec-

tives in the phrase “efflv.>* limitation parameters” in de-

scribing the numbers + ‘i: *ppear in the guidelines or,

alternatively, as a ‘se. *- term for the numerical

effluent conditions ir. . .- iicular permit selected as a

result of the application of the factors. (Id.)*

8 The relevant text of the contract is as follows:

“SUGGESTED EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS GUIDELINES—

FORMAT

“Once the range of technology is established for each industrial

category, then a determination must be made as to what constitutes

Level I and Level II control and treatment technology as outlined

under Item IV of the Scope of Work. In addition, factors similar

to those used in assessing what constitutes Level I and Level II

must be specified which should be taken into account in applying

the effluent limitation parameters associated with each of these

levels of technology. Permits issued to individual plants within the

industrial category may then require compliance with slightly

different effluent limitations depending upon the presence of one

or more of the factors specified. The contractor is to propose sug-

gested draft effluent limitations guidelines incorporating this analy-

sis and utilizing the suggested outline of technology Levels I and

Il set forth under Item IV ° the Scope of Work.”

(R. 6399 (emphasis added ).)

The contract then went on to require that the “suggested effluent limi-

tation guidelines” contain effluent limitations parameters and the list of

factors: i

“The suggested effluent limitation guidelines for each industrial

category must contain the following:

“A. An identification of the industrial categories and subcategories

covered.

“B. Effluent limitations required for each such category.

“1. An identification of Level I and II control and treatment

technologies.

“2. For each technology level identified, a statement of the

permissible amounts of discharge constituents expressed

in terms of (i) unit quantities per unit of either material

used in the industrial process or units of products result-

ing from that process, or (ii) concentrations, whichever

shall most clearly determine the maximum degree of

pollution reduction.

“3. List the factors which should be taken into account in

determining Level I and II control and treatment tech-

nology for particular plants and consequently in deter-

mining permissible effluent levels for such plants.”

(Id. (emphasis added ). )

9

The contract also contained an attachment setting out

a “Notice” which EPA required General Technologies to

include as a preface to its report. (R. 6424.) The report

resulting from the contract was to be distributed to the

public, and EPA wanted no doubts to arise respecting its

purpose or its standing. The notice again emphatically

states that EPA was looking toward guideline regulations

to be issued under Section 304(b), and not issuance of

limitations directly by regulation under Section 301:

“The requlations to be published by EPA under Sec-

tions 304(b) and 306 of the Federal Water Pollution

Control Act, as amended, wil! be based to a large

extent on the report and the comments received on it.

However, pursuant to Sections 304(b) and 306 of the

Act, EPA will also consider additional pertinent tech-

nical and economic information which is eter

in the course of review of this report by the pe lic

and within EPA. . . . |P ]rior to final promulgation of

regulations, an EPA report will be issued setting forth

EPA’s conclusions concerning the subject industry,

effluent limitations guidelines and standards of per-

formance applicable to such industry. Judgments nec-

essary to promulgation of regulations under Sections

304(b) and 306 of the Act, of course, remain the re-

sponsibility of EPA.”

(R. 6424 (emphasis added ). )

The EPA contract with General Technologies was effec-

tive January 9, 1973, and actually signed on May 21, 1973.

(R. 6378.) Pending completion of the contract and conse-

quent proposal and promulgation by the Agziicy of the

guideline regulations, EPA had to provide as:iistance to its

Regional Offices which were struggling with discharge

permit applications. That assistance took the form of a

Memorandum to All Regional Permit Program Directors

from the Office of Permit Programs, Washingtcn, D. C.,

dated May 1, 1973. A copy of this memorandum is on file

in the Library of this Court. The memorandum instructed

EPA’s regions to use the “effluent guidance documents” for

“the issuance of permits under Section 402” on an interim

basis “until effluent guidelines are promulgated under

Section 304.” (Id. at 1.) The “guidance package” attached

10

to the memorandum spoke of limitations only in the con-

text of the numerical values set for each of the relevant

pollutant parameters in a given plant's permit. (Id., at-

tached “interim effluent guidance” at 5.)

Subsequently, EPA’s “Advance Notice of Public Review

Procedures” issued in August 1973 (38 Fed. Reg. 21202,

App. 21, R. 4330), referred only to guideline regulations

to be issued under Section 304(b); it did not refer in any

respect to limitation regulations under Section 301. (Com-

pare Pet. Br. at 15-16 with EPA’s Br. at 16.) References to

Section 301 were to the fact that it required plants to

achieve the statutory technological objective by a speci-

fied date.

The same interpretation was expressed by EPA in its

October 1973 notice of proposed rulemaking respecting the

particular regulations at issue in these cases. (38 Fed. Reg.

28174, App. 61-62, R. 4861-4862.) EPA did not express a

contrary view until Assistant Administrator Kirk wrote his

letter of January 15, 1974, supporting “nationally uniform

standards” because he feared States would be too “lax” in

applying the guideline regulations. (App. 193, R. 6501.)

Even then, Assistant Administrator Kirk tried to fit such

“nationally uniform standards” into the framework of

guideline regulations. (App. 192-193, R. 6501.) The final

break with EPA’s contemporaneous construction of these

key sections did not come until Assistant Administrator

Kirk’s February 1974 memorandum, when he finally

claimed that the EPA regulations for existing plants were

also limitations being issued under Section 301. (See Pet.

Br. at 20.)

EPA seeks to avoid the thrust of.this history, detailed

on the record in these cases, by offering a redefinition of the

“phrase ‘effluent limitations guidelines’ to encompass

[EPA’s] combination of action under Section 301(b) and

Section 304(b) into a single proceeding.” (EPA's Br. at

16 n.16.) EPA’s effort at redefinition will not square with

its own regulations; it only demonstrates the weakness of

the Agency’s position. The general definitions in EPA’s

1]

regulations, applicable to all industry-category guidelines

and new source standards, explicitly define “effluent lim-

itations guidelines”, a term not used in the Act, as regula-

tions issued pursuant only to Section 304(b), not Sec-

tion 301:

“(j) The term ‘effluent limitations guidelines’ means

any effluent limitations guidelines issued by the Admin-

istrator pursuant to Section 304(b) of the Act.” ®

(40 C.F.R. § 401.11(j), Pet. Br. Appendix C, at 5c. )

See also Pet. Br. at 19-20.

The record in these cases thus demonstrates the “about

face” from the Agency's original, contemporaneous inter-

pretation of the Act. EPA’s present interpretation is entitled

to no judicial deference whatsoever. Fribourg Navigation

Co. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272, 279-280 (1966): cf.

Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc.,

U.S.___, 44 U.S.L.W. 4717, 4719 n.8 (June 1, 1976).

And because of the circumstances, no reliance by private

parties or by the Government has arisen to entrench a con-

struction of the statute which “ought not now to be dis-

turbed.” Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch [5 U.S.] 299, 309

(1803 ).*°

Indeed, some branches of EPA still have not adapted to

the new interpretation of the statute proffered by the

Agency. In June of this year, after this Court had granted

certiorari in the present case, EPA published a small book

of questions and answers respecting the Act. The first two

questions and answers were as follows:

® Section 401.10 sets forth the scope and purpose of these General

Provisions —

“This Part 401 sets forth the legal authority . . . which will apply

to all regulations issued concerning specific classes and categories

of point sources under Parts 402 through 699 of this subchapter

which follow.” (Id. at 3c.)

Part 415 of the subchapter contains the regulations for the inorganic

chemical category.

10 The doctrine of according deference to an agency's contemporaneous

construction of a statute is a refinement and offshoot of the early recog-

nition of the importance of reliance as a legitimate consideration in

statutory interpretation.

12

“What is an effluent limitation guideline?

“An effluent limitation guideline sets forth the degree

of reduction of a pollutant that is attainable ——

the application of various levels of technology.

idelines are developed by EPA based on the total

y of known information on effluents from a par-

ticular industry.

“What is an effluent limitation?

“An effluent limitation is a restriction on the amount

of a pollutant that may be released from a point source

into a body of water. These limitations, based on

EPA’s effluent limitations guidelines, are spelled out

in the discharge permits each industry must obtain in

order to discharge pollutants into the Nation’s water-

ways.”

(Environmental Protection Agency, No Small Task—

Establishing National Effluent Limitations Guidelines

and Standards, at 2 (June 1976) (emphasis in the

original.) ™

The foregoing quotation reflects EPA’s original interpreta-

tion of the statute, and not the interpretation presented in

the court of appeals and now in this Court. Petitioners

urge this Court to adopt EPA’s original interpretation as

constituting a faithful adherence to the mandate of the

Act.

Il.

PUBLISHING A “DEVELOPMENT DOCUMENT”’

ALONG WITH AN “ECONOMIC ANALYSIS” DOES

NOT SATISFY THE MANDATE OF SECTION 304(b)

THAT GUIDELINE REGULATIONS BE ISSUED

EPA never really comes to grips with Section 304(b).

Section 304(b) expressly provides that “the Administrator

shall... publish . . . regulations, providing guidelines for

effluent limitations ... .” The section further provides that

these regulations shall “identify . . . [the] effluent reduction

11 Copies of this EPA publication are on file with the Librarian of this

Court.

13

attainable through the application of best practicable con-

trol technology currently available for classes and cate-

gories of point sources .. .” (§ 304(b)(1)(A)), and

shall “specify factors to be taken into account in deter-

mining the control measures to be applicable point sources

. .. Within such categories or classes.” (§ 304(b)(1)(B).)

The section goes on to list in detail the factors to be speci-

fied. The guideline regulations are given purpose by Sec-

tion 301(b) which speaks of determining effluent limi-

tations “in accordance with regulations issued by the

Administrator pursuant to Section 304(b)(2) of this Act.”

(§$ 301(b)(2)(A), see also § 301(b)(1)(A).)

EPA has now at least acknowledged the statutory com-

mand that regulations be issued under Section 304(b).

(EPA’s Br. at 13, 48-59, and especially 55.) But in the

Agency’s view, these regulations take on a strange form

and have no practical purpose. EPA claims that the

Development Document and the Economic Analysis,"

while not “formally designated” as regulations, “in prac-

tical effect” meet the requirements of Section 304(b).

(EPA's Br. at 76-77; see also id. at 10, 21, and 26.)

The Exhibit Volume of the Appendix is made up solely

and entirely of EPA’s Development Document and its

Economic Analysis for the segments of the inorganic chem-

icals industry covered by the EPA regulations at issue here.

There are 519 pages of rambling verbiage in the two items.

These must be the strangest “regulations” any Federal

agency has ever issued. They are not codified in the Code

of Federal Regulations. They have no continuing purpose

or legal effect. At this juncture, copies of the documents

are not readily available, even from EPA itself. EPA’s brief

discusses these “regulations” only to explain them away.

The arguments by EPA underline the Agency’s efforts to

render Section 304(b) a dead letter, a statutory anachron-

ism. (See EPA’s Br. at 13, 48-59, 76-77.)

12 In EPA’s view, the guideline regulations apparently may include in

addition to these documents “the preamble to the formal regulations in

issue and the regulations themselves.” (EPA's Br. at 77; see also id.

at 21.)

14

There is nothing “compelling” about an interpretation

that would elide an entire section from the Act. (Compare

EPA’s Br. at 46.) By referring to Section 304(b), peti-

tioners are not putting forward “a series of hypertechnical

arguments that focus 01 minor distinctions in the wording

of various sections of the Act... .” (Id.) And particularly,

petitioners are not contending that any requirements be

“read into the Amendments.” (Id. at 54.) To the contrary,

petitioners argue only that explicit requirements in the

statutory words not be overriden and eliminated by EPA’s

implications. EPA would have this Court rewrite the sta-

tute to eliminate the mandate for guidline regulations in

Section 304(b) and to put in its stead through implication

a new permissive authorization for limitations by regula-

tion under Section 301.

EPA asserts that its implied authority under Section 301

allows it to look at the provisions of 304(b), to select cer-

tain of the requirements set out in that section, and to deal

with these selected requirements in its own way in regula-

tions purportedly issued under Section 301. For example,

petitioners have pointed out that Section 304(b) explicitly

requires guideline regulations to

“specify factors to be taken into account in determin-

ing the control measures and practices to be applicable

to point sources . . . within such categories or classes.”

(§ 304(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added). )

(See Pet. Br. at 63-73.) Notwithstanding this statutory

language, ERA argues that guideline regulations under

Section 304(b) were not intended for use by permit authori-

ties because no analysis of the factors is to be made in

the permit process to apply the factors to a particular

plant’s situation. (EPA’s Br. at 58-59.) Despite the fact

that Section 304(b) directs EPA to specify the factors in

regulations, EPA says it “considered” the factors in estab-

lishing subcategories and that ends the matter. (Id. at 58.)

To go any further, the Agency says, would be to “encom-

pass wholesale reconsideration at the permit granting stage

of all the factors.” (Id. at 59.) The discussion which fol-

15

lows demonstrates that EPA is trying to discredit the statu-

tory plan to achieve its goal of binding limitations issued

by regulation.

The subcategories adopted by EPA for the inorganic

chemicals industry reflect only differences in product

types, and in a very few cases, processes."* Section 304(b)

(1)(B) also lists as factors, to be specified in regulations,

“the age of equipment and facilities involved, . . . the

engineering aspects of the application of various types

of control techniques, process changes, non-water

quality environmental impact (including energy re-

quirements ), and such other factors as the Adminis-

trator deems appropriate... .” ™*

None of these factors is reflected in EPA’s subcategories.

And it is no answer to say that the Agency considered the

possible application of these other factors and rejected

them. As the court of appeals noted in du Pont II,

“[s]ome of the specified factors are of practical appli-

cability only to individual plants, for example, ‘age of

equipment and facilities involved.” (App. 266.) The dis-

trict court in the Grain Processing case reached precisely

the same conclusion. See Grain Processing Corp. v. Train,

407 F. Supp. 96, 103-104 (S.D. Iowa 1976), appeal pending,

No. 76-1233 (8th Cir.). The Third Circuit is in accord.

American Iron & Steel Institute v. Environmental Protec-

tion Agency, 526 F.2d 1027, 1043-1044 (3d Cir. 1975).

Moreover, the Act provides that the listed factors relate

to “the assessment of best practicable control technology

currently available” (Section 304(b)(1)(B)).* Thus both

13 A number of subcategories encompass plants making a variety

of products within one general product type. An example is the Sodium

Silicate Subcategory. See infra, at 19.

Process distinctions were made in the hydrogen peroxide and tita-

nium dioxide subcategories. (Pet. Br. Appendix B, at 44b-49b, 71b-79b. )

14 Cost is also a consideration. The Section lists as a factor “the total

cost of application of technology in relation to the effluent reduction

benefits to be achieved from such application.” (§ 304(b)(1)(B).)

15 Section 304(b)(2)(B) contains similar language regarding the

factors for 1983-step guideline regulations.

16

the Administrator and the permit-issuing authorities are

engaged in the assessment of technology, the Administra-

tor doing so for whole categories and classes (subcate-

gories) of sources »nd the permit-issuing authorities for

individual sources. Both must consider the enumerated

factors. The Administrator must specify them in the regu-

lations issued under Section 304 to guide the permit officer.

The permit-issuing authority must apply them in granting

permits for individual plants. If the Administrator con-

sults the factors listed in Section 304(b) to determine a

range of acceptable discharges for a group of sources, the

permit issuer can intelligently place an individual source

within that range only by reference to the same factors as

they bear on the individual source.

The Senate Public Works Committee, mentioning as

exainples several factors included in Section 304(b), made

it clear that Congress intended that both the Administrator

and the permit-issuing authority would apply the same

factors:

“In defining best practicable for any given industrial

category, the Committee expects the Administrator to

take a number of factors into account. These factors

should include the age of the plants, their size and

the unit processes involved and the cost of applying

such controls. In effect, . . . the Committee expects the

Administrator to define a range of discharge levels,

above a certain base level applicable to plants

within that category. In applying effluent limitations

to any individual plant, the factors cited above should

be applied to that specific plant.” (S. Rep. No. 92-414,

92d Cong., Ist Sess., at 50 (1971), 2 Leg. Hist. at 1468

(emphasis added). ) **

Secondly, EPA places great emphasis on the statement

in the Conference Report that effluent limitations applica-

16 As noted in Pet. Br. at 60, several of the courts of appeals have

been troubled by the fact that the legislative history is in conflict over

whether the factors set out in Section 304(b) should be applied to

particular plants in permit proceedings. Portions of the legislative

history in conflict with the above-quoted excerpt frum the Senate Report

are set out in EPA’s brief at 57-59. There is, however, no ambiguity in

the statute.

17

ble to individual plants within a category or class be “as

uniform as possible.” (EPA’s Br. at 61, citing S. Rep.

No. 92-1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 126 (1972), 1 Leg. Hist.

at 309.) But the Report made clear it did not mean identical

limitations applicable to all plants in a category or class.

Rather, the conferees, speaking of Section 304, indi-

cated that “the Administrator is expected to be precise

in his guidelines under subsection (b) of this section,” so

that “similar point sources with similar characteristics . . .

will meet similar effluent limitations.” (Id. (emphasis

added ).) '? The role of the guideline regulations was to

enable the permit authorities to identify which point

sources have “similar characteristics” so that. “similar

effluent limitations” could be imposed. Permit authorities

could thereby provide uniformity of treatment without

force-fitting plants into a single identical limitation regard-

less of differences in their “characteristics” as judged ac-

cording to the relevant “factors”.

In addition, because the statute speaks of applying the

factors “to point sources . . . within such categories or

classes” (§ 304(b)(1)(B)), EPA’s original interpretation

of the Act provided that the factors would be specified in

the regulations and would be taken into account in issuing

permits for particular plants. (See R. 6026, quoted supra

at 6; R. 6034-6035, quoted supra at 8 n.4; R. 6399, quoted

supra at 9-10 n.5.)

There is thus no “wholesale reconsideration” of factors

by permit authorities. (Compare EPA’s Br. at 59). The

permit authorities should be guided by the factors and

17 In view of the importance EPA attaches to this part of the Confer-

ence Report, the full text of the relevant paragraph in the Report is

set out for the court’s convenience:

“Except as provided in section 301(c) of this Act, the intent of the

C..nferees is that effluent limitations applicable to individual point

sources within a given category or class be as uniform as possible.

The Administrator is expected to be precise in his guidelines under

subsection (b) of this section, so as to assure that similar point

sources with similar characteristics, regardless of their location or

the nature of the water into which the discharge is made, will

meet similar effiuent limitations.” (S. Rep. No. 92-1236, 92d Cong.,

2d Sess. at 126 (1972), 1 Leg. Hist. at 309 (emphasis added ).)

18

apply them as EPA has specified them in proper guideline

regulations. Because EPA has issued bare single-number

limitations, it has barred any application of the factors to

individual plants.’* To support its actions EPA suggests

that “generalized guidelines” would not provide sufficient

specificity. (EPA’s Br. at 65.) The Agency also cites the

possibility of “varying views of the 27 States with approved

permit programs” (id. at 66), and impiies that some States

may be too lax. EPA also complains that “each such State

would be forced to hold lengthy adjudicatory procedures to

consider anew the effluent limitations which the Amend-

ments require.” (Id.) These are spurious arguments. No

cataclysmic series of events will occur if the statute is fol-

lowed. EPA now has regulations prescribing an opportu-

nity for hearings if a permit applicant disagrees with the

determinations of a permit authority. (See 40 C.F.R. Parts

124 and 125, and especially 40 C.F.R. §§ 124.36 (respecting

approved State authorities ), 125.36 (where authority rests

with EPA).) The statute itself contemplates such hearings.

(See § 402(b)(3)—“an opportunity for public hearing

before a ruling on each such application”.) And the permit

authorities are not to review the factors de novo; they are

to select a particular limitation for each relevant pollutant

parameter from the range provided in the regulations, upon

consideration of the factors specified in the regulations.

EPA seeks also to rebuff petitioners’ argument that the

statutory language and the legislative history support regu-

lations consisting of a range of pollutant values for each

parameter. (Compare Pet. Br. at 65-69 with EPA’s Br. at

18 As noted, the issuance of a voluminous Development Document and

Economic Analysis, both with no legal effect, does not comply with the

statutory mandate that the regulations “specify” the factors. See supra

at 12-13.

The present regulations do make an indirect reference to factors, but

the factors themselves remain unspecified. EPA inserted into the regu-

lations a provision allowing adjustment of the 1977-step values upon a

showing that there are “fundamentally different” factors applicable to

a particular plant. This provision likewise does not satisfy the specific

directions in Section 304(b) as to the form and content of the guideline

regulations. See infra at 30-31.

19

49-53.) EPA argues that Congress’ “expectation has been

satisfied.” (EPA's Br. at 51.)

The Agency relies on two inconsistent arguments (o

support its assertion that its duty to specify a range of

attainable pollution reduction for an industrial category

has been fulfilled. First EPA contends that it has estab-

lished ranges in the regulations by establishing subcate-

gories for an industry and by setting a single-number limit

for each subcategory, because the values for the subcate-

gories, taken together, define a “range” for the entire

category. (EPA’s Br. at 51.) This argument contradicts

the statute, which requires EPA to identify the reduction in

terms of amounts of constituents for “classes and cate-

gories” of point sources. (§ 304(b)(1)(A)) (emphasis

added); see also § 304(b)(2)(A).) A “class” is a sub-

category of sources within an overall industry category.

In addition, a “range” defined as EPA now would have it is

of no use to the permit-issuing authorities for whose aid

the guidelines are intended, for these authorities must

issue permits to single plants, not to subcategories. The

Act requires ranges of values in guideline regulations for

classes (subcategories ) as well as for categories because of

the differences among individual plants in the class (sub-

category). EPA’s approach attempts to establish by simple

fiat a non-existent homogeneity within each subcategory;

here, for example it simply assumes homogeneity for plants

producing a wide range of different types of sodium silicate

varying by form (liquid or anhydrous—solid or powder),

by chemical composition (sodium metasilicate, sodium

orthosilicate, or sodium tetrasilicate ), and by process (use

of furnace or non-thermal reaction with caustic solution),

where all plants fall within the same subcategory. (See

Ex. R. 5629-5631; see also the opinion of the court of

appeals in du Pont II at App. 281.)

EPA’s second argument is that there is an implicit range

of achievable effluent discharges, from the single-number

limit set by the Administrator down to zero, and that this

implicit range meets the requirements of the Act. (EPA's

20

Br. at 52.) The argument is without merit. The Section

304(b) regulations are meant to guide permit-issuing

authorities. Specification of the maximum attainable pol-

lution reductions, to guide permit issuers away from overly

harsh restrictions which are not “practicable”, is as impor-

tant as the specification of minimum attainable reductions,

to prevent unduly lax requirements for individual plants.

The Conference Committee report (quoted supra at 17,

n.17) shows the congressional intent that Section 304(b)

guideline regulations be precise, so that national uni-

formity could be achieved within the system of State-issued

permits established by the Act. As the report said, the goal

of Section 304(b) is that “similar point sources with similar

characteristics . . . will meet similar effluent limitations.”

(S. Rep. No. 92-1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 126 (1972),

1 Leg. Hist. at 309 (emphasis added).) Single-number

regulations with an implicit range down to zero are neces-

sarily ill-suited to guide permit-issuers called upon to grant

equitable permits to the various plants because nothing in

the regulations guides the permit officer in selecting a value

in an implied range.

Even if the Act allowed the use of an implicit range

defined by zero discharge at one extreme, such a range

cannot be sustained in guideline regulations for segments

of the inorganic chemicals industry. There is no evidence

in the record, and it cannot be assumed, that a level of

pollutant discharges at zero or close to it is attainable by

application of either 1977-step or 1983-step technology to

any existing point source in a number of subcategories.

Absent such evidence, an implicit range including zero

discharge cannot be sustained. See American Iron & Steel

Institute v. Environmental Protection Agency, 526 F.2d

1027, 1046 (3d Cir. 1975).’*

Overall, if EPA has never really come to grips with Sec-

tion 304(b) in these cases, it can also be said that the court

19 The courts of appeals have differed from one another over the

requirement of an explicit range, alues_in Section 304(b) regula-

tions. The Third Circuit, h g Glosely to the language and plan of

the Act, held that Section 304 guide /must specify permissible

21

)

of appeals in du Pont II achieved mixed results in its

grappling with the Section. The court’s formula of “pre-

sumptively applicable” single-number limitations draws a

compromise of sorts between the positions of the parties.

The court would at least give some effect to the congres-

sional requirement of Section 304(b) that factors be speci-

fied in the regulations. In the court’s view, while EPA would

not have to specify the factors in bare single-number limita-

tion regulations, the factors could be applied in permit

proceedings to set the permit limitations for a particular

plant. (App. 266.)

Both petitioners and EPA are dissatisfied with the

du Pont II decision. Yet while petitioners have sought

review of the ruling by the court of appeals respecting the

existing-plant regulations, EPA has not done so. EPA has

sought review only of the court’s ruling on new source

standards. EPA nonetheless asserts that the decision by

ranges of effluent reduction, in order to serve their intended purpose as

useful aids for permit-issuing authorities. American Iron & Steel Insti-

tute v. Environmental Protection Agency, 526 F.2d 1027, 1044-1045

(3d Cir. 1975). The Second Circuit, ignoring the purposes underlying

the requirement in this Act for ranges in the guidelines, concluded that

single-number limits for each subcategory of an industry satisfy the

statutory requirement because, taken together, they define a range for

the entire industrial category. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. v.

Train, 537 F.2d 620, 630 (2d Cir. 1976). The District of Columbia

Circuit concluded that the Administrator can promulgate single-number

effluent limitations pursuant to Section 301, and did not rule on any

requirements for Section 304(b) effluent guideline regulations. Amer-

ican Frozen Food Institute v. Train, U.S. App. D.C. , 539 F.2d

107, 131 (1976). The Seventh Circuit also did not address the issue.

American Meat Institute v. Environmental Protection Agency, 526 F.2d

442, 448 n.13 (7th Cir. 1975). The Fourth Circuit in the present cases,

du Pont II (App. 253-286), limited its holding on the point carefully by

concluding that, for some categories, single-number limits might be

permissible, as a statutory matter, but deciding whether a range is neces-

sary in any particular regulation would involve factual determinations

to be reviewed in other proceedings. (App. 265.) The court's holding

was further qualified by its decision that EPA’s regulations are only

“presumptively applicable” to any individual point source. (Id.,

App. 262.) Thus, the court envisicned a system of standards to be

adjusted by permit-issuers, but without the guideline regulations of

Section 304(b) to insure uniformity of treatment within the flexible

system.

22

the court of appeals in du Pont II “is inconsistent with

the statute”, at least where it “invites reconsideration by

the permit issuer of factors already considered by the Ad-

ministrator in establishing effluent limitations under Sec-

tion 301 for existing sources.” (EPA’s Br. at 59 n.40.) *° If

EPA was dissatisfied with the decision of the court of

appeals in du Pont II it should have said so in its cross-

petition for writ of certiorari, not in a footnote in its brief

filed on October 22, 1976.2 See United States v. American

Ry. Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435 (1924); cf. Dandridge v.

Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 475 n.6 (1970).

The regulations Congress required be issued under Sec-

tion 304(b) should not be relegated to the impotent form

of a bulky and obscure “Development Document” and a

similar “Economic Analysis”. The guideline regulations

were intended as the keystone for the Act’s system of regu-

lating discharges from existing plants. EPA should not be

aliowed, under the guise of exercising an implied authority

under Section 301, to pick and choose among the require-

ments set out in Section 304(b) as to the form and content

of the regulation and then to deal with these selected items

as’ though Section 304(b) did not exist. The authority

which EPA says can be implied from Section 301 cannot

provide a satisfactory basis to disregard completely the

statutory command in Section 304(b). Nor should im-

plication be used to convert statutory requirements, such

as the obligation to specify factors in the regulations,

20 EPA cannot claim that the fault with the Fourth Jircuit lies with

the interpretation accorded the du Pont II decision in a subsequent case,

Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, _F .2d , 9 ERC. 1033, 1038-

1039 (4th Cir. 1976). In du Pont I!. as in the Appalachian Power case,

the Fourth Circuit ruled that “[iJn -cting on permit applications, the

issuer will properly consider cost/vern *t analysis along with other fac-

tors specified in § 304(b).” (App. 2€

21 Portions of the judgment as well as the opinion of the court

of appeals are involved. The court of wppeals, among other things,

set aside the EPA’s definition of “effluent limitations” in the concurrently-

challenged genera] regulations (40 C.F.R. § 401.11(i), Pet. Br. Appen-

dix C at 5c), because the definition in the regulations did not conform

to the statutory definition in Section 502(11), nor to the court’s view

of “presumptively applicable” regulations. (See App. 261-262, 284.)

23

into permissive provisions contemplating mere “considera-

tion” of the statutorily specified items by EPA. The statute

is served neither by the compromise formulated by the

court of appeals nor by EPA’s more complete abandonment

of Section 304(b).

SECTION 301(b) SETS TECHNOLOGICAL OBJEC.

TIVES AND SPEAKS OF REGULATIONS TO BE

ISSUED UNDER SECTION 304(b); IT DOES NOT

PROVIDE AN INDEPENDENT BASIS FOR REGULA-

TIONS

EPA focusses on Section 301(b). Respecting regulatory

power, that section stands in stark contrast to Sec-

tion 304(b). Section 301(b) commands no regulations;

it has no timetable for regulatory promulgation; it is not

written with active verbs. The language of the section is

wholly passive. Section 301(b) provides that

“(There shall be achieved—

“(1)(A) [by July 1977] . . . effluent limitations for

point sources . . . which shall require the application

of the best practicable control technology currently

available as defined by the Administrator pursuant

to section 304 of this Act. .

“(2)(A [by July 1983] . . . effluent limitations for

catego and classes of point sources . . . which

(i) shall require application of the best available

technology economically achievable . . . as deter-

mined in accordance with regulations issued by the

Administrator pursuant to section 304(b)(2) of this

a

Section 301(b) does set technological objectives for dis-

charges from existing plants. And it refers to regulations,

but regulations required to be issued under Section 304(b),

not under its own terms.

Congress wrote Section 301 without specifying in that

Section who was to establish “effluent limitations” or how

24

such limitations were to be established. Congress’s use of

the passive voice in writing the Section allowed these key

elements to remain unspecified. EPA has seized upon this

circumstance to contend that it should be able to accord to

itself a power to promulgate “limitations” in the form of

regulations which have the effect of binding its regional

offices and especially state permit authorities to “mechan-

ically crank” the promulgated limitations into permits for

particular plants.”” EPA relies upon “clear and

implication” (EPA’s Br. at 37), “interrelationship” (id.

at 44), or assertions that such authority is “explicitly

intended.” (Id. at 33.)

Petitioners agree with EPA that Sections 301(b), 304(b)

and 402 should be construed together to constitute a har-

monious, corroborative statutory system. There is also

agreement in general that “[t]he technological considera-

tions defined under Section 304(b) are converted into

effluent limitations under Section 301(b)” (EPA’s Br. at 9),

because such a statement acknowledges the linkage be-

tween these sections. But agreement stops there. Certainly

there is no consensus on “[t]he operation of [EPA’s pres-

ent] procedure” (id. at 10.), as that procedure was modified

by the Agency in late 1973 and 1974.

As EPA's original interpretation of the Act recognized,

the roles of States and of permit proceedings are key con-

siderations in construing these most important sections of

the Act. The Act’s general definition of “effluent limita-

tion” puts these considerations ir proper perspective:

“The term ‘effluent limitation’ means any restriction

established by a State or the Administrator on quanti-

ties, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical,

biological, and other constituents which are discharged

from point sources into navigable waters, the waters

of the contiguous zone, or the ocean, including sched-

ules of compliance.”

(§ 502(11), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (emphasis added ).)

22 See CPC International Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032, 1037 (8th Cir.

1975) (“CPC I”).

25

Notably, the definition places States before, or at least on

the same footing with, the Administrator in addressing the

question of who is to establish the limitations. Also, the

definition bears on the matter of how the limitations are to

arise. It speaks of restrictions on “discharge[s] from point

sources”, i.e., particular plants, and it includes “schedules

of compliance”, which can only arise in discharge permits

for particular plants.

EPA’s present position bypasses these and many other

statutory indicia, in favor of an emphasis on “uniformity”

and “uniform national effluent limitations”. (EPA’s Br. at

26, 27, 34 n.24, 60, 62, 65.) EPA has carried its drive

toward uniformity well beyond the statutory bounds.

Congress did speak of “uniformity”. But it did not em-

brace the rigid, unbending uniformity EPA seeks; in the

discussion of Section 304(b), not Section 301(b), the Con-

ference Report spoke of limitations at individual plants

which were “as uniform as possible”. By that, the conferees

meant “similar” limitations for “similar point sources with

similar characteristics.” *

This is not the rigid, mechanical, by rote uniformity which

EPA would impose on the statute. “Similarity” does not

mean “identity”.*

Representative Blatnik, Chairman of the House Public

Works Committee, warned against precisely the type of

Federal “uniformity” which EPA’s about-face interpretation

seeks to invoke:

“... [L)et us not kid ourselves that the Federal estab-

lishment operating by itself can implement an effec-

tive water quay program. Unless we have mean-

ingful local and State participation and not a Federal

dictatorship, the program founder on the rocks

23 The text of the relevant part of the Conference Report is set out

supra, at 17 n.17.

24 Compare EPA’s Br. at 61 with Pet. Br. at 55, 57-61, and supra, at

16-17. See also R. Zener, The Federal Law of Water Pollution Control,

in Federal Environmental Law, at 703 n.98 (E. Dolgin and T. Guilbert

ed. 1974), quoted in Pet. Br. at 61.

26

of the generally inflexible[,] Washin dictated ap-

ees.) (118 Cong. Rec. 10206 (1972), 1 Leg. Hist.

at .

Representative Blatnik also addressed the cther side of the

coin—the matter of State adherence to EPA’s guideline

regulations:

“... [T)his bill requires that State and regional pro-

grams follow stringent Federal guidelines. It will not

allow the industrial equivalent of forum shopping.

Each State’s program will preclude this because

a8) be consistent with the guidelines.” (Id. at

In short, Congress did not share EPA’s subsequently-ex-

pressed fear that States would be too “lax”. (App. 193,

R. 6501.) Congress provided for States to accede to the

permit-issuing role ( § 402(b)-(f)), and Congress as a mat-

ter of policy recognized “the primary responsibilities and

rights of States” to regulate discharges. (§ 101(b).)

In the face of the statutory structure, EPA’s arguments

that Congress left to implication these most important reg-

ulations for existing plants are unpersuasive. When Con-

gress desired to have EPA write standards as such, it knew

how to express such a desire in explicit terms. As the Eighth

Circuit noted in the CPC I case, “[o]ther sections of the Act

demonstrate that the omission of such a provision [for

limitations by regulation] was not oversight, for Congress

provided unambiguously for the promulgation of national

standards in other sections of the Act.” CPC International

Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032, 1038 (8th Cir. 1975) (“CPC I”).

The Eighth Circuit cited national standards of performance

for new sources (§ 306(b)(1)(B)), national standards for

toxic pollucants (§ 307(a)(2)), and national pretreatment

standards for both new and existing sources (§ 307(b) and

(c)). As the Eighth Circuit said,

“In providing for national standards in these areas,

Congress did four things: (1) it used the term ‘stan-

dards,’ a word which takes on a special meaning be-

cause of its use under the Act; (2) it expressely

provided that the standards were to be published by

27

regulation; (3) it put deadlines on the process, requir-

ing that the Administrator publish the standards

within fixed periods of time; and (4) it provided that

standards were to be enforceable a of the

t system. See § 306(e); § 307(d).” (Id., 515

.2d at 1038.)

Congress did none of these things for limitations by regu-

lations—it never spoke of such regulations at all. By way

of contrast, for the guideline regulations under Sec-

tion 304(b) it did all of the listed things except the last.

And then, respecting enforceability, Congress provided that

the limitations in the permits were to be the enforceable

regulatory measures. (See § 309(a)(1), (a)(3), (c)(1),

and (d).)

EPA’s argument is especially difficult to accept because it

would override a specific statutory mandate for guideline

regulations with an authority which must be drawn purely

from implication. As discussed in the opening brief (Pet.

Br. at 35, 40), the fact that Congress so explicitly set out

EPA’s obligation to issue guideline regulations implies

strongly that it denied to the Agency the power to do some-

thing different. Durousseau v. United States, 6 Cranch

[10 U.S.] 307, 314 (1810); see also Continental Casualty

Co. v. United States, 314 U.S. 527, 533 (1942).** Especially

is this so where Congress has in other areas of the statute

provided explicitly for the type of specific standards which

EPA here seeks to imply.

There is one further circumstance which is even more

compelling. With one exception, Congress never required

EPA to issue both regulations in the form of guidelines and

regulations in the form of standards for the same subject

matter. It chose one or the other. For the one exceptional

case, the legislative history notes carefully that EPA is to

25 Under the circumstances, EPA’s position receives no support from

Section 501(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1361(a), which grants the EPA Admin-

istrator authority “to prescribe such regulations as are necessary to

carry out his functions under the Act.” The question presented here

is whether one of EPA’s functions under the Act is to issue limitations

by regulation. Compare EPA’s Br. at 37.

28

issue both types of regulations and that the one authority

is in addition to the other. The exceptional case arises

respecting pretreatment standards for existing plants.

Section 304(f)(1) vequires EPA to issue pretreatment

guidelines :

“(f)(1) For the pupae of assisting States in carry-

ing Out programs under Section 402 of this Act, the

Administrator shall publish within one hundred and

twenty days after the enactment of this title, and re-

view at least annually thereafter and, if appropriate,

revise guidelines for pretreatment of pollutants which

he determines are not susceptible to treatment by

publicly owned treatment works.” *°

Then Section 307(b) directs the Administrator in addition

to issue proposed pretreatment standards within 180 days

and to issue final pretreatment standards within 90 days

thereaiter. (Section 307(b)(3) authorizes the pretreatment

standards to be published by categories of sources.) With

reference to these provisions the Senate Report states:

“(The Administrator] is also required to publish guide-

lines for establishing pre-treatment standards for pol-

lutants discharged into publicly owned treatment

works, and guidelines for establishing procedures and

test protocols for the analysis of pollutants in permit

applications. It should be noted that this authority

is in addition to the authority of the Administrator to

establish pre-treatment standards directly under Sec-

tion 307.” (S. Rep. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.,

at 54, 2 Leg. Hist. at 1472 (emphasis added ). )

Finally, EPA relies (EPA’s Br. at 37-38) heavily on Sec-

tion 301(c) which provides that

“The Administrator may modify the requirements of

subsection (b)(2)(A) [1983 step] with respect to any

point source for which a permit application is filed

after July 1, 1977 upon a showing that . . . such modi-

fied requirement (1) will represent the maximum use

26 Furthermore, the pretreatment guidelines to be issued under Sec-

tion 304(f)(1) are not specifically required by the statute to be issued in

the form of regulations. In contrast, Section 304(b) mandates promul-

gation of guideline regulations with a very explicit content.

29

of technology within the economic capability of the

owner or operator; and (2) will result in reasonable

further progress toward the elimination the dis-

charge of pollutants.”

EPA argues that there would be no need for this pravision

for case-L ,-case relief if the only way effluent limi

could be imposed is in permits rather than by regula

(EPA’s Br. at 38.)

EPA mistakes the thrust of Section 301(c). Section

301(c) authorizes the Administrator on a showing specified

by the statute to relieve a particular point source from

complying with the 1983-step technological criterion, re-

flected in the guideline regulations by ranges of pollutant

values and by a specification of factors. In other words,

Section 301(c) authorizes the Administrator to prescribe

limitations for a particular “point source” which are more

lenient than the most permissive of the values in the tech-

nology-based range set out in the guidelines. Section 301(c)

thus gives the Administrator authority to sanction limita-

tions for a particular plant which rest on a technology more

lenient than the “best available technology economically

achievable” which is specified as the objective for 1983 by

Section 301(b)(2)(A).

Moreover, the language of Section 301(c) makes no ref-

erence whatsoever to “effluent limitations”. Instead, the

section refers to the “requirements of subsection (b)(2)

(A)”. In subsection (b)(2)(A), the requirements are

spelled out as being the achievement of technology-based

limitations “determined in accordance with regulations

issued by the Administrator pursuant to section 304(b)(2)

of this Act”. Thus by speaking of “requirements”, Sec-

tion 301(c) is in fact speaking of the 1983-step guideline

regulations, as described in the foregoing paragraph. Un-

deterred, EPA points to the Third Circuit’s remark that

“§$ 301(c) itself seems to support the Administrator's posi-

tion by presupposing the existence of a section 301 effluent

limitation which the Administrator cai. .clax.” EPA’s Br.

at 38, quoting American Iron & Steel Institute v. Environ-

30

mental Protection Agency, 526 F.2d 1027, 1037 n.15 (3d

Cir. 1975). EPA then seeks to convert Section 301(c) into

an argument for effluent limitations by regulation under

Section 301(b). Both the comment by the court in the

American lron & Steel case and EPA’s bootstrap argument

ignore the precise language of Section 301(c), and try to

make over the words of the Section into a different type of

provision entirely.

Much the same difficulty arises with respect to a pro-

vision in all of EPA’s 1977-step guideline regulations, re-

ferred to variously as a “modification” provision or a “vari-

ance” clause. The provision allows a permit authority to

propose to the Administrator for his approval limitations

for a particular plant different from the guideline values

if “fundamentally different” factors are found to be present.

(E.g., 40 C.F.R. § 415.62, Pet. Br. Appendix B, at 31b-32b. )

The Fourth Circuit has ruled that this clause is too restric-

tive because it does not allow permit authorities sufficient

latitude to consider the factors required to be taken into

account by Section 304(b)(1)(B) and (b)(2)(B). See

e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, __F.2d_, 9 E.R.C.

1033, 1038-1039 (4th Cir. 1976). On the other hand, the

provision was upheld in Natural Resources Defense Coun-

cil, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 537 F.2d 642,

645-646 (2d Cir. 1976), but the Second Circuit there stated

that it was not passing on the validity of the EPA modifica-

tion provision as applied in a particular case. The Second

Circuit expressed its reservations by observing that “[ w ]Jith-

out variance flexibility, the program might well founder on

the rocks of illegality.” (Id., 537 F.2d at 647.) 77

Arguments respecting whether or not the EPA modifica-

tion clause is too restrictive have an artificial ring in the

context of the present cases, because these arguments are

“7 As the Second Circuit said: “Not all of the thousands of plants in

operation can be expected to fit into prefabricated molds or templates.

By specifying a permit procedure, Congress implicitly conferred on the

permit-grantor the privilege of construing the broader regulations in

light of the specific type of plant applying for the permit.” (Id.,

537 F.2d at 647 (emphasis added). )

31

entirely dependent upon acceptance of EPA’s basic con-

tention that it can promulgate bare single-number limita-

tions under Section 301(b). If the Act is properly con-

strued, there should be no need for such a clause at all.

EPA should issue guideline regulations complying with the

explicit mandate of Section 304(b). Those guidelines

would not need a special clause because they ordinarily

would contain ranges of values for pollutant parameters

and would always contain a specification of factors to guide

selection of a number from each range.

The unnecessary controversy over the validity of the

modification clause serves to emphasize the difficulties

arising in trying to accommodate EPA's present position

to the statute. If EPA can promulgate limitations by regu-

lation, rather than having them set by permit authorities

based upon guideline regulations, a number of statutory

provisions either require strained interpretation to become

workable, or become dead letters, or have unintended harsh

effects.

IV

THE ACT IS STRUCTURED FOR GUIDELINE REGU-

LATIONS, NOT LIMITATIONS BY REGULATION

In the opening brief, petitioners pointed to a number of

adverse collateral consequences which would arise with

various provisions in the Act if guideline regulations were

replaced by a force-fit promulgation of limitations by regu-

lation. (Pet. Br. at 75-85.) EPA has responded by contend-

ing that “the other statutory provisions upon which peti-

tioners rely are not inconsistent with promulgation of

limitations by regulation” (EPA’s Br. at 46 (capitalization

omitted) ), and further that “the interrelationship among

various provisions” confirms EPA’s authority. (Id. at 44

(capitalization omitted ). )

EPA’s response, however, conspicuously omits any men-

tion of a number of the affected collateral provisions of

the Act.

32

A. Advisory Committee Review

For example, EPA nowhere cites Section 515, which

expressly calls for Advisory Committee review of proposed

guideline regulations, along with new source standards and

other mandated standards, but does not refer in any way

to limitations by regulation. In pertinent part, Section 515

provides—

“(b)(1) No later than one hundred and eighty days

nord y the os on which ™ ae is “

uired to publish any proposed regulations require

ie section 304(b) of this Act, any proposed standard

of performance for new sources required by section

306 of this Act, or ine toxic effluent standard

required by section of this Act, he shall transmit

to the Committee a notice of intent to propose such

regulations. The Chairman of the Committee within

ten days after receipt of such notice may publish a

notice of a public hearing by the Committee, to be

held within thirty days.” (Emphasis added. )

Surely if Congress had intended the guideline regulations

to be overridden by limitations regulations, it would have

focussed the Advisory Committee’s attention on the limita-

tions regulations. It makes utterly no sense for the Com-

mittee to be concerned on the one hand with important

new source standards and toxic effluent standards and on

the other hand with guidelines which according to EPA do

not even take on the form of actual regulations.

B. Periodic Revision of Permits and of Regulations

Similarly, EPA does not cite nor refer in any respect to

Section 301(d). That Section calls for periodic review of

limitations: .

“Any effluent limitation required by paragraph (2)

of subsection (b) of this section sh reviewed at

least every five years and, if appropriate, revised under

such paragraph.”

EPA would rather ignore this Section because it, like Sec-

tion 301(c), does not speak of limitations promulgated

33

by regulation under Section 301(b). (See supra, at 28-30. )

Instead, Section 301(d) also carefully is written in terms of

“(a]ny effluent limitation required by paragraph (2) of sub-

section (b) of this section.” That precisely worded cross-

reference, like the comparable reference in Section 301(c),

is to technology-based limitations “determined in accor-

dance with regulations issued by the Administrator pur-

suant to section 304(b)(2) of this Act.” (§ 301(b)(2).)

Thus again, Section 301(d) in fact draws upon the 1983-

step guideline regulations promulgated under Section

304(b).

And there is no conflict in the fact that Section 301(d)

calls for periodic five-year review of limitations while Sec-

tion 304 calls for review of the guideline regulations “at

least annually.” Section 301(d) is concerned with limita-

tions determined in accordance with the guideline regula-

tions. Those limitations actually appear in discharge

permits. The permits are issued “for fixed terms not

exceeding five years.” (§ 402(b)(1)(B).) In sum, the

guideline regulations themselves are to be reviewed at least

annually, but because permits have up to five-year terms,

review of the resulting limitations can occur on a periodic

five-year basis and can reflect application of the revised

guidelines in effect at the time of the permit renewal.

Provisions such as Section 301(d) illustrate that the

statute may not be written in elegant or concise language

but that the provisions do make sense if they are con-

strued together.

C. Enforcement and Judicial Review

EPA also mangles Section 309, which provides for Fed-

eral enforcement of the Act. The Agency does not say so

directly, but it appears to claim that power has to be

implied for it to issue limitations by regulation or otherwise

it will not be able to enforce directly any effluent regula-

tions against existing plants. (See EPA’s Br. at 45.) EPA

at least complains that

34

“none of [the provisions of Section 309] requires com-

pliance with the guidelines promulgated under Sec-

tion 304, authorizes enforcement proceedings against

noncompliance therewith, or makes such noncompli-

ance illegal.” (EPA’s Br. at 45.)

The complaint is not valid. Congress did not intend that

the guideline regulations be directly enforceable, in con-

trast to national standards such as those issued under

Section 306 (for new sources), 307(a) (for toxic pollu-

tants), and 307(b) and (c) (for pretreatment). Direct

enforcement would not be practicable for regulations which

were written in terms of ranges of values with a specifica-

tion of factors. Congress instead provided for enforcement

of the limitations in the permits, which limitations would

be derived from the guideline regulations. Section 309

explicitly so provides. See § 309(a)(1), (a)(3), (c)(1),

and (d). Several portions of Section 309 do refer directly

to a “violation of Section 301” (e.g., § 309(c)(1)), but

these references have nothing to do with effluent limita-

tions by regulation; the references allow for enforcement

by EPA of the bar in Section 301(a) against making any

discharge without a permit, and of the bar in Section

301(f) against any discharge of “radiological, chemical,

or biological warfare agent or high-level radioactive

waste.”

In the past, EPA has abjured any intent to create a

massive new criminal code by implication. It should main-

tain that course. (See Pet. Br. at 79 n.69.)

EPA’s about-face interpretation also creates problems

with Sections 505 and 509, the provisions for citizen

enforcement suits and for judicial review, apart from the

jurisdictional issue in this case discussed infra. (See Pet.

Br. at 80-84.) EPA’s response (EPA's Br. at 41-43) mis-

states petitioners’ arguments in several material respects,

especially regarding the interplay of these sections with

Section 301(c).7* Both Sections 505(f)(2) and 509(b)

28 Section 301(c) authorizes the Administrator to depart from the

1983-step requirements for a particular plant upon economic grounds,

where a specified factual showing has been made. See supra, at 28-30.

35

(1)(E) refer to an “effluent limitation or other limitation

under section 301 . . . [and other sections].” Both of these

references encompass the Administrator’s action pursuant

to Section 301(c) to issue limitations for an individual

point source. (Compare Pet. Br. at 80, 82 n.72, 84 n.74

with EPA’s Br. at 42 n.28.) EPA wrongly asserts that peti-

tioners would accord no meaning to the reference in Sec-

tion 509(b)(1)(E) to “promulgating” limitations (EPA’s

Br. at 42 n.28); in fact petitioners argue that the reference

is necessary to provide review of the Administrator’s action

to issue limitations under Section 301(c).”” The reference

does not support any implied limitations regulations under

Section 301(b).

EPA also errs in stating petitioners’ views respecting

Section 505(f)(2). As EPA would have it, petitioners are

arguing that Section 505(f)(2) allows citizens to “chal-

lenge” or seek review of the Administrator's action to issue

limitations for a particular plant under Section 301(c).

(See EPA’s Br. at 43-44 n.30.) Petitioners do not take such

a position. Section 505(f)(2) was included by Congress in

the Act to allow citizens to sue to enforce limitations set by

the Administrator acting under Section 301(c). If a citizen

desired to seek review of the Administrator’s action under

Section 301(c), the citizen could bring a petition for review

in a court of appeals under the authority provided by Sec-

tion 509(b)(1)(E), as described supra, in the immedi-

ately preceding paragraph.

EPA in short has tried to turn aside petitioners’ argu-

ment that EPA’s present theory of implied authority for

regulations would render useless portions of Sections

505 and 509, by making the same argument in reverse.

(See EPA’s Br. at 43.) Because EPA’s attempt rests upon

a double misstatement of petitioners’ views, however, the

29 Respecting a somewhat similar provision in the Clean Air Act, the

word “promulgating” has been construed to include both the procedural

and substantive aspects of a covered EPA action. See United States v.

Adamo Wrecking Co., —F.2d—, No. 75-1967 (6th Cir., decided Novem-

ber 1, 1976). See also infra, at 41 n.36, discussing Micnus River

Preservation Committee v. Environmental Protection Agency, —F.2d—,

9 E.R.C. 1174 (2d Cir. 1976).

36

Agency has not addressed the real problems its position

creates with the operation of Sections 505 and 509.

D. EPA Veto Power Over State Permits

Finally, EPA devotes only a brief footnote to Section

402(d). This Section empowers EPA to veto State dis-

charge permits which are “outside the guidelines and

requirements of the Act.” (§ 402(d)(2).) This provision

was the subject of intense consideration and debate in the

House of Representatives. (See Pet. Br. at 51-55.) It was

also the focus in the Conference Committee for resolving

the relative allocation of power to the States and to EPA

respecting permits. (Pet. Br. at 55-57.) Congressional

action on Section 402(d) is most pertinent to this Court’s

resolution of this case. As the Eighth Circuit said in its

CPC II decision :

“Section 402(d)(2) expressly provides that the EPA

may halt issuance of any state-issued permit if it

determines that the conditions of the permit do not

comply with the guidelines issued under § 304(b).

See id. [515 F.2d] at 1037 n.11, 1038 and 1038 n.14.

The reference in this veto provision to the § 304(b)

guidelines and the extensive debate which preceded

the addition of § 402(d\ 2) to the final draft of the stat-

ute are inconsistent with the EPA’s contention that it

has the power to issue effluent limitations for existing

plants by regulation under § 301. The District of

Columbia Circuit and the Seventh Circuit ignore this

language. The Third Circuit deals with the language,

see American Iron & Steel Institute v. E.P.A., supra,

at 1040-1041, but its reasoning is unpersuasive.”

(CPC International Inc. v. Train, F.2d, 9

E.R.C. 1301, 1302 n.1 (8th Cir. 1976) (emphasis

added ).)

Without discussion, EPA summarily asserts in its foot-

note that “the term ‘guidelines’ here [in Section 402(d)]

refers to guidelines under Section 304(h), concerning uni-

form monitoring, reporting, and information requirements,

37

not to Section 304(b).” (EPA's Br. at 45n.31.) This is not

correct.*® Section 402(d)(2) was added to the bill during

the Conference Committee deliberations, specifically to

respond to the House debate over EPA’s role in State-issued

permits and over the weight to be ascribed to the guideline

regulations under Section 304(b). (See Pet. Br. at 54-55;

see also supra, at 25-26.) The summary offered by Senator

Muskie during floor debate on the Conference Report in the

Senate was not only explicit on the matter; it was emphatic.

(See 118 Cong. Rec. 33698 (1972), 1 Leg. Hist. at 176,

quoted in Pet. Br. at 56.) Moreover, EPA’s original, con-

temporary construction of Section 402(d)(2) contradicts

its present position. In September 1973, EPA’s position was

that—

“After a state program is approved by EPA, each

it (except in categories that may be waived by

A) is subject to EPA review and veto to ensure its

consistency with requirements of the law, including

deadlines, and with EPA’s effluent guidelines.”

Council on Environmental Quality, Fourth Annual

eport, at 175 (September 1973) (emphasis added ). )

Again, EPA has had to distort the words of the statute and

the intent of Congress to force-fit promulgation of limita-

tions by regulation. This Court should not sanction EPA’s

about-face construction.

80 Congress made an express and explicit designation of guidelines

under Section 304(h)(2) whenever it decided to refer to those “pro-

cedural” guidelines. § 304(h)(2); see §§ 402(c)(1); 402(e). Also,

the explicit references to Section 304(h)(2) occur in the statute when

the context indicates procedural matters would be pertinent. Still

further, the references to Section 304(h)(2) were in the bill long before

the Conference Committee revised Section 402(d) to resolve the matter

of EPA veto of State-issued permits based upon the Section 304(b)

guidelines. See, e.g., H. R. 11896, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at §§ 402(c)(1)

and (e) (which even at that time already contained references to Sec-

tion 304(h)(2)), and § 402(d)(2) (which then contained no reference

to any guidelines, because this House-passed bill limited any EPA veto

of a State-issued permit to instances where a discharge in one State

affected the waters of another State) (1972), 1 Leg. Hist. at 893,

1057-1059.

38

Vv.

THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE IS WHETHER COURTS

OF APPEALS HAVE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO

REVIEW EFFLUENT GUIDELINE REGULATIONS UN-

DER SECTION 304(b), WHERE THE COURT DETER-

MINES THAT EPA CANNOT ACCORD TO ITSELF BY

IMPLICATION AN AUTHORITY TO PROMULGATE

LIMITATIONS BY REGULATION UNDER SECTION

301(b)

EPA’s arguments respecting jurisdiction miss the mark

entirely. Petitioners did not and do not take the jurisdic-

tional positions ascribed to them in EPA’s brief. EPA has

set up its own straw-man argument and has duly knocked

it down.

Petitioners do not argue, as EPA says petitioners do,

“that even if the Administrator has authority to

promulgate effluent limitations under Section 301

(which are reviewable in the courts of appeals . the

guidelines upon which those limitations are

are reviewable only in district courts.”

(EPA’s Br. at 79.)

Most of EPA’s argument on the jurisdictional issue is

directed toward this faulty statement. (See EPA’s Br. at

79-83.)*' In fact, if the focus of the jurisdictional issue

were on the argumentative point as stated by EPA in the

foregoing quotation, petitioners would agree with the

Agency. If one were to accept EPA’s assertion that effluent

limitations can be promulgated by regulation, it would

make no sense to split review of limitations regulations

from the effluent guidelines “regulations” which the limi-

tations regulations would override. (In this event, EPA’s

guideline regulations under Section 304(b) virtually dis-

appear anyway. EPA says it can find them in the “Develop-

ment Document” and the “Economic Analysis” but aside

from the fact that those books have no legal effect, the

31 EPA restates the matter at one point as “Petitioners’ proposal for

bifurcated review.” (Id. at 82.)

39

prospect of a court’s having to search for “regulations” in

those voluminous documents would bar any real review. )

Given this error in EPA’s brief, petitioners in this reply

brief will focus only on making a correct comparative

statement of the positions of the parties.

A. Petitioners’ Arguments

Petitioners argue as follows:

As a consequence of Assistant Administrator Kirk’s well-

publicized February 1974 memorandum,” petitioners

recognized that “protective” petitions for review would

have to be filed in a court of appeals. EPA had announced

in the memorandum that it intended to claim that its regu-

lations were limitations and to argue further that the

90-day time limitation in Section 509(b)(1) applied to

such review. Petitioners filed such “protective” petitions

in timely fashion in the Fourth Circuit. Those petitions

are now before this Court as No. 75-1473.** Concurrently,

petitioners filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court

for the Western District of Virginia, seeking review of

several of the same effluent regulations for which review

was sought in the Fourth Circuit, but on the basis that

EPA’s regulations were guidelines issued under Section

304(b). This district court action has come before this

Court as No. 75-978.

Respecting the “protective” petitions for review, peti-

tioners have never questioned that the courts of appeals had

jurisdiction to resolve their own jurisdiction. And to resolve

the jurisdictional question, the structure of the statute and

especially Section 509(b)(1) requires the court of appeals

to consider the threshold question whether EPA can accord

to itself by implication an authority to promulgate limita-

32 See Pet. Br. at 20, citing and quoting from Memorandum from

Alan G. Kirk, II, to Acting Assistant Administrator for Air and Water

Programs, at 2, February 25, 1974, reproduced in BNA Environment

Reporter, Current Developments, at 1833-1834 (March 1, 1974).

33 A separate set of petitions for review of EPA’s new source standards

issued under Section 306 were timely filed in the Fourth Circuit. No

jurisdictional question arises respecting those petitions, and they are

before this Court in No. 75-1705, the EPA’s cross-petition.

40

tions by regulation under Section 301(b). This Court's

prior decisions so provide. See Federal Communications

Commission v. Columbia Broadcasting System of Cali-

fornia, Inc., 311 U.S. 132 (1940); Cheng Fan Kwok v.

Immigration and Naturalization Service, 392 U.S. 206

(1968); cf. National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National

Ass'n of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 456 (1974);

Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Ser-

vice Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678

(1946). If the court of appeals decided that under the

Act EPA could draw upon implications and accord to itself

a power to issue limitations by regulation, then it would

take jurisdiction over the petitions and resolve all ques-

tions relating to the regulations. See, e.g., American Iron

& Steel Institute v. Environmental Protection Agency, 526

F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975). If the court of appeals decided

that the Act required EPA to issue guidelines and not limi-

tations, then it should dismiss the petitions for lack of

jurisdiction, CPC International Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032

(8th Cir. 1975),* although it could conceivably exercise

jurisdiction to review the guideline regulations either under

an expansive reading of Section 509(b), du Pont I (App.

250), or, more preferably, under a pendent jurisdiction

exercised where the parties had sought review of new

source standards concurrently issued on the same record.

Romero v. International Terminal Co., 358 U.S. 354, 380-

381 (1959); cf. Cheng Fan Kwok v. Immigration and

Naturalization Service, 392 U.S. 206, 216 n.16 (1968).*

34 Review would then be had in a district court action. See, e.g.,

Grain Processing Corp. v. Train, 407 F. Supp. 96 (S.D. lowa 1976),

appeal pending, No. 76-1233 (8th Cir.).

35 EPA’s brief seems to imply that the Administrator's mere assertion

of authority to issue limitations by regulation grants power to the court

of appeals to resolve all questions relating to a “protective” petition

which pertains to such regulations. (EPA’s Br. at 78-79.) EPA’s brief

states petitioners “apparently recognize” this position. (Id. at 79.)

Petitioners do nothing of the sort. EPA’s mere assertion grants to the

court of appeals the power only to decide those matters necessary to

resolving its own jurisdiction. Consideration and decision of all other

matters of whatever nature must rest upon a prior determination that

jurisdiction exists.

41

In this Court, petitioners adhere to the foregoing posi-

tions. (Pet. Br. at 85-96.) As a matter of emphasis, peti-

tioners here argue that this Court (1) should follow the

Act’s mandate to issue guideline regulations under Section

304(b) and reject EPA’s claim of power to issue limita-

tions by regulation, and (2) should then construe the Act,

and especially Section 509(b)(1), to allow courts of

appeals to take pendent jurisdiction to review guideline

regulations where the petitioning parties seek review of

new source standards concurrently issued on the same

administrative record.

Recognition of jurisdiction in courts of appeals based

upon pendent jurisdiction would preserve the work of the

court of appeals in du Pont II in reviewing painstakingly

the record support for EPA’s specific actions in the eleven

of the twenty-two subcategories of the inorganic chemicals

industry involved in this case. It would do so on a basis

which would not involve an expansive reading of Sec-

tion 509(b)(1). Such an expansive reading, as made by

the court of appeals in du Pont I (App. 250), would create

even more difficulty than that already present for other

jurisdictional matters arising under Section 509(b)(1).*°

36 Section 509(b) is a procedural minefield. Even apart from the

jurisdictional issue posed in this case, problems of interpreting the pro-

vision have plagued both district courts and courts of appeals. To date,

four decisions have been rendered by the Second and Third Circuits

construing Section 509(b) in factual situations other than that presented

here, and in each case the court ruled that the would-be petitioner or

plaintiff had started in the wrong court. In chronological order, those

cases are: Sun Enterprises, Ltd. v. Train, 532 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1976)

(district court has no jurisdiction to review EPA's issuance of a discharge

permit; later-filed petition for review in court of appeals was barred by

Act’s 90-day time limitation on bringing such petitions); Bethlehem

Steel Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 538 F 2d 513 (2d Cir.

1976) (court of appeals does not have jurisdiction over petition to

review EPA’s action under Section 303 approving portion of New

York’s water quality standards); Mianus River Preservation Committee

v. Environmental Protection Agency, __F.2d__, 9 E.R.C. 1174 (2d Cir.

1976) (where the EPA failed to take affirmative action within 90 days

under Section 402(d) to veto a discharge permit issued by Connecticut,

the court of appeals does not have jurisdiction to review the issuance of

the discharge permit); American Iron & Steel Institute v. Environmental

Protection Agency, _.F.2d__, Nos. 75-2124 and 75-2128 (3d Cir.,

42

It would also expand the scope of the very harsh review-

preclusion ** and limitation clauses in Section 509(b),**

to the detriment of the unsuspecting. See Pet. Br. at 92

n.79, discussing Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414

(1944). On the other hand, exercise of pendent jurisdic-

tion would allow the Court to serve the same interest in

judicial economy expressed by Judge Widener in his

opinion for the court of appeals in du Pont I, but without

these adverse collateral consequences. Judge Widener’s

opinion noted that petitions to review new source standards

had to be brought in courts of appeals under Section 509(b)

(1)(A), and observed that review by district courts of

guideline regulations could waste judicial manpower where

the new source standards were issued on the same admin-

decided October 5, 1976) (court of appeals has no jurisdiction to review

EPA’s promulgation of Net-Gross Adjustment Regulations issued under

Sections 402, 405 and 501 of the Act).

Of these cases, the Mianus River decision appears to be incorrect at

least in part, because the “approving” language of Section 509(b) (1)

(E) gives jurisdiction to a court of appeals to review a State-issued

permit at least insofar as the Administrator’s review of such a permit

is concerned. (See Pet. Br. at 87; compare EPA’s Br. at 42 n.28.) Peti-

tioners in the Mianus River case argued for jurisdiction in the court of

appeals on the ground that EPA’s review of the permit, however per-

functory, was an “Administrator’s action . . . in issuing . . . [a] permit”

reviewable under § 509(h)(1)(F); the court did not consider or discuss

the question whether the Administrator's action was reviewable under

§ 509(b)(1)(E) because EPA’s action had the effect of “approving” the

limitations in the permit.

37 See Section 509(b)(2). Respecting a similar provision in the Clean

Air Act, courts have held that the validity of an emission standard

promulgated by EPA in the form of regulations is not reviewable in a

criminal action for violation of the standard. E.g., United States v.

Adamo Wrecking Co., __F.2d__, No. 75-1967 (6th Cir., decided No-

vember 1, 1976); but cf. United States v. Independent Stave Co.,

406 F. Supp. 886 (W.D.Mo. 1975).

38 The requirement in Section 509(b)(1) that any petition for review

of the actions there specified be brought within 90 days has been

construed as a statute of limitations. See Sun Enterprises, Ltd. v. Train,

532 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1976). It might, however, more properly be

considered a jurisdictional requirement. Cf. Union Electric Co. v. En-

vironmental Protection Agency, __U.S._., 44 U.S.L.W. 5060, 5062-

5063 & n.4 (June 25, 1976).

43

istrative record concurrently with the guideline regulations.

(App. 249-250.) See Pet. Br. at 89-91."

B. EPA’s Arguments

EPA says that it has implied authority to promulgate

effluent limitations by regulation under Section 301 and

that under Section 509(b)(1)(E) review of such regula-

tions is exclusively in the courts of appeals. (EPA's Br. a*

78.)*

In the main, the remainder of EPA’s argument on juris-

diction is irrelevant, resting as it does on a misstatement of

petitioners arguments.

EPA does include a long footnote setting out the numer-

Ous Cases various parties have brought in district courts

to review EPA's regulations for existing plants, on the basis

that those regulations are guideline regulations issued

under Section 304(b). (See EPA’s Br. at 83-84 n.57)*

In another long footnote, EPA addresses itself to peti-

tioners’ arguments directed toward exercise by courts of

appeals of a pendent jurisdiction. (See EPA’s Br. at 85,

86 n.59.) EPA says, among other things, “we agree that

it would be inappropriate to vacate the judgment of the

court of appeals insofar as it made those modifications in

the effluent limitations {or guidelines, depending upon one’s

views} and remand the case to the district court to consider

those issues.” (Id. at 86 n.59.) Beyond setting out the

89 EPA’s brief ignores entirely the divided-review considerations ex-

pressed in Judge Widener’s opinion. Compare EPA’s Br. at 79-83, where

EPA addresses at great length the false divided-review issue involving

the Section 304(b) regulations and regulations implied from Sec-

tion 301(b), which rests on EPA’s misstatement of petitioners’ argu-

ments. See supra, at 38-41.

*° Assuming arguendo that the premise is correct, petitioners woul

not contest the conclusion, even as to and including guideline regula-

tions. See supra, at 38.

*! Respecting EPA’s footnote, petitioners would add to EPA’s enumera-

tion one further district court case: Delicate, et al. v. Train, Civil

Action No. 76-5028 (D.S.D., complaint filed April 15, 1976) (ore mining

and dressing regulations ).

44

foregoing quotation, petitioners will not attempt to restate

EPA’s views on pendent | urisdiction.

C. Congressional Action To Date

Congress could resolve for the future the jurisdictional

issue in these cases by amending the Act to specify the

forum in which actions to review EPA’s guideline regula-

tions could be brought. Congress in 1973 made such an

amendment to Section 509(b) to specify that actions to

review pretreatment standards promulgated under Sec-

tion 307 could be brought in the courts of appeals. See

Pub. L. 93-207, 87 Stat. 906, § 1(6) (December 28, 1973),

amending Section 509(b)(1)(C).

Earlier this year, on June 3, 1976, the House of Repre-

sentatives passed a bill which would have amended the

Act to provide that review of guideline regulations issued

under Section 304(b) was in the courts of appeals under

the terms of Section 509(b)(1). See 122 Cong. Rec.

H 5285-5288 (daily ed. June 3, 1976) (passage of House

version of S. 2710, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975), section 18

of which would have amended Section 509 of the Act).

The bill did not go immediately to a Conference Commit-

tee. Rather, on September 1, 1976, the Senate considered

and adopted a motion to concur in the House amendments

to S. 2710, with further amendments. (122 Cong. Rec.

S 15189 (daily ed. September 1, 1976).) Among other

things, the Senate stripped from the bill a variety of pro-

visions including the House-passed Section 18 which would

have given jurisdiction to courts of appeals to review by

petition EPA’s promulgation of guideline regulations under

Section 304(b). See 122 Cong. Rec. S 15165 (daily ed.

September 1, 1976) (the cited summary of “Provisions

Of House Amendment Not Adopted By Committee” wrongly

states the effect of the House-passed Section 18). There-

after, agreement could not be reached on the different

versions of S. 2710 passed by the Senate and House, and

the bill died upon the adjournment of the 94th Congress.

45

The jurisdictional issue thus remains in these cases,

both as to previously-filed actions and as to actions which

may be brought in the future.

CONCLUSION

In this case, and the companion cases—Nos. 75-1473

and 75-1705, the issues of statutory construction concern

a very detailed statute filled with cross-references and

dependent phrases and clauses. Similarly, the Court has

before it a large administrative record which sets out in

considerable detail EPA’s step-by-step actions in issuing

the regulations before the Court, and in so doing, in arriv-

ing at the position it now espouses. These cases are quite

complex because of EPA’s efforts to evade or avoid the

express commands of Section 304(b), but the Court has the

great advantage of having before it the materials necessary

to reach its decision.

These cases are unusual in that the issues as to the effect

and content both of the guideline regulations and of the

new source standards are before this Court just as EPA

has launched a new program to review, revise, and reissue

inter alia the 1983-step regulations and the new source

standards for 21 broad industry categories, including inor-

ganic chemicals manufacturing. This program to review

and reissue the regulations is apart from and in addition

to review on remand of the regulations in this case, and

in other similar cases. On June 7, 1976, EPA entered into

an agreement with the Natural Resources Defense Council,

Inc. and others to settle four cases pending in the District

Court for the District of Columbia. See Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, ___F Supp. , 8 ERC

2120 (D.D.C. 1976).** The settlement agreement, which

was approved by the Court, provides a timetable under

42 The text of the settlement agreement providing the detailed pro-

gram for issuing the new regulations is set out as an addendum to the

district court’s opinion. (Id., 8 E.R.C. at 2122-2136.) Under the terms

of the agreement, the revised guideline regulations and new source stan-

dards for the inorganic chemicals category are to be promulgated in

final form no later than December 31, 1978. (Id., 8 E.R.C. at 2125,

2131.)

46

which EPA will study the 21 broad industry categories and

then propose and issue the new 1983-step and new source

regulations. Under the timetable, the entire process is to

be concluded and the new regulations are to be issued for

all 21 categories by December 1979. (Id., 8 E.R.C. at 2125-

2126.) The decision of this Court, therefore, will resolve

basic questions respecting the effect and content of the new

regulations before they are formulated, rather than after

vast amounts of administrative and private-party time and

effort have been expended in developing new regulations

based on EPA’s faulty legal theory.

Several days before the filing of this brief, one fur-

ther development occurred which has a bearing on this

litigation. Without prior announcement or notice, EPA

promulgated a series of “specialized definitions” in an

“interim final amendment” to its regulations for the in-

organic chemicals category. (41 Fed. Reg. 51598-51601

(November 23, 1976).) Among other things, the “special-

ized definitions” set out yet a new meaning for “effluent

limitations.” ** This new definition also fails to comply with

the statute. While the definition does provide that effluent

limitations may be established by States as well as EPA,

the definition omits any reference to “schedules of com-

pliance.” The statutory definition in Section 502(11) speci-

43In du Pont II the court of appeals set aside EPA’s general regula-

tion defining “effluent limitations” for all industrial categories, on the

grounds that EPA’s definitions did not provide for such limitations to

be established by States as the statute required and also that the defini-

tion did not square with “presumptively applicable” limitation regula-

tions. See supra, at 21-22 & n.21.

Petitioners had timely petitioned for review of EPA’s general regula-

tions in 40 C.F.R. Part 401, in addition to the regulations specifically

relating to the inorganic chemicals category, 40 C.F.R. Part 415. (See,

e.g., App. 200-201.) The court of appeals thus had jurisdiction to set

aside the general definition of “effluent limitation” in the regulations.

(See App. 262, 284.) EPA errs when in the most recent rulemaking

notice it asserted that the court of appeals had remanded certain “defini-

tions as they pertain to portions of the Inorganic Chemicals Manufactur-

ing Point Source Category ... .” (41 Fed. Reg. 51598 (November 23,

1976).) The action by the court of appeals was not so limited.

47

fied that effluent limitations “includ[e] schedules of com-

pliance.”

Even putting aside the contradiction between the new

definition and the statute, this most recent action by EPA

underscores the Agency’s efforts to reduce the role of States

in carrying out the Act. In EPA’s brief, much was made of

the fact that States still could set schedules of compliance.

(See EPA’s Br. at 71-72.) Relegating States to setting sched-

ules of compliance does not satisfy the congressional inten-

tion “to recognize [and] preserve . . . the primary responsi-

bilities and rights of States” to control discharges. ‘§ 101

(b).) The newest regulations, by omitting any reference

even to the schedule-of-compliance function, raise addi-

tional doubts as to the role which EPA would allot to States.

Petitioners’ proposed disposition of these cases is set

forth in Pet. Br. at 96-97.

Respectfully submitted,

RoBERT C. BARNARD

Douc tas E. KLIEVER

CHARLES F. LETTow

1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D. C. 20036

Attorneys for Petitioners

OF COUNSEL:

CLEARY, GOTTLIEB, STEEN & HAMILTON

1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D. C. 20036

NOVEMBER 26, 1976

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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