Respondents Brief — EI Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Train

Supreme Court brief1977

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

2 A, ‘ePowt ‘DE NEMOURS {AND Company, ET AL.,

> Lae ane “a NVA AR PETITIONERS

PF «.: <h ; ,

see fe ; 4%.

ay.

ti “Rusa E. hon”) AS ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL

2 RE ee 4 Prorectioy AGENCY, BT AL.

we :

ms SN ‘ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 8T4TBS

ee ate COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CiROUIT

BBS ara Oe _ BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS

. ae ni a

*t

: ROBERT H. BORK,

ie Solicitor General,

3 . . PETER FP. TAFT, .

t Assistunt Attorney General,

os: } 4 DANIEL .M. FRIEDMAN,

ag aN, Deputy Solicitor General, |

sre | | . ,-HOWARD £. SHAPIRO,

e Assistant to the Solicitor General,

ut * * A its | EDMUND 8B. CLARK, - . :

mera > ; ‘KATHEYN A. OBERLY, -

RN “Attorneys,

uy : Bie te Department of Justice,

Bete Fs Pree Washington, D.C. 20580.

EE ERE er

DEL. tcthiimentantenteranemaeoemeeasaseennes

nnn eat eeeadneneennenanenaaet

Statutes and regulations involved__.........-...-------

RE ieee dadiolidineseneninnmtindasndiccnseenes

A. The background of the Amendments_---......----

LB. The statutory scheme:

1. The genera] prohibition against noncom-

i i tnenedemanamanenae

2. The national pollutant discharge elimina-

Eo

3. Effluent limitations and guidelines for efflu-

Se tn

4. Enforcement and review__.-.---..-------

C. The administrative and judicial proceedings in this

case :

1, The promulgation of effluent limitations for

the inorganic chemicals manufacturing

ee

2. The judicial proceedings_..........-.----

i

Argument :

I. Section 301 of the Federal Water Pollution Con-

trol Act Amendments empowers the Adminis-

trator of the Environmental Protection Agency

to set, for various subcategories of particular

industries, uniform national effluent limitations

for existing point sources of pollutants:

PRE Sciethdnmndudtiienetsencenennnescce

A. The language and structure of the

Amendments show that the Adminis-

trator is authorized to promulgate

effluent limitations under Section 301

(Pa aR te a lll ca

14

21

Il

Argument—Continued

1. The language of various provi-

sions of the Amendments shows

that the Administrator has au-

thority to establish effluent lim-

itations under Section 301(b)_-

2. The interrelationship among var-

ious provisions of the Amend-

ments confirms the Administra-

tor’s authority to establish effiu-

ent limitations under Section

SERIE) ccoccanusnnemandedenn

3. The other statutory provisions

upon which petitioners rely are

not inconsistent with the Ad-

ministrator’s authority to estab-

lish effluent limitations under

Section 900 (0)....ccaccencesss

4. Section 304(b) does not require

the Administrator to establish

ranges of permissible pollution

for, or specific factors to be con-

sidered by, the issuers of per-

MED .o.cccntsseenenee

a. Section 304(b) does not re-

quire the Administrator to

establish ranges of permis-

sible polluting discharges

within which the issuer of

permits is to set separate

effluent limitations for par-

ticular dischargers______-_-

b. Section 304(b) does not re-

quire the Administrator to

specify in the guidelines the

factors that permit issuers

are to consider in granting

permits to individual dis-

RA .onciniaaene

B. The legislative history of the 1972

Amendments confirms that the Admin-

istrator has authority to establish efflu-

Page

36

44

46

48

iil

Argument—Continued

ent limitations under Section 301(b)

for classes and categories of point

a

C. Establishment by the Administartor

of generally applicable effluent limi-

tations would not curtail or weaken the

role Congress intended the States to

have in the administartion of the Fed-

eral Water Pollution Control Act

AmemBmsGts ..<06c2ce2222--------e

II. The Administrator employed an appropriate pro-

cedure in combining the promulgation of

guidelines under Section 304 and the establish-

ment of effluent limitations under Section 301

into a single proceeding_-.........-.--------

III. The courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction

to review effluent limitations promulgated by

the Administrator under Section 301 of the

Amendments, which includes jurisdiction to

review the guidelines under Section 304,

which were promulgated in the same proceed-

ing as the effluent limitations.............----

ep ebeeeesoeuce

CITATIONS

Cases :

American Frozen Food Institute y. Train, C.A.D.C.,

Nos. 74-1464, 74-1513, 74-1840, decided May 11,

Page

59

67

Eh a a aaa a 31, 48, 49, 74, 83

American Tron & Steel Institute v. Environmental

Protection Agency, 526 F.2d 1047... 31, 38, 43, 49, 83-84

American Meat Institute vy. Environmental Protection

Agency, 526 F.2d 442...--....... 31, 43, 47, 49, 81, 83,

American Paper Institute v. Train, C.A.D.C., No.

74-1480, decided August 6, 1976__..........--_- 49, 52,

American Paper Institute vy. Train, 381 F. Supp. 553

petition for review, C.A.D.C., Nos. 74-1480, et a/.,

BE EE ae ee

American Petroleum Institute v. Environmental Pro-

tection Agency, C.A. 10, Nos. 74-1465, 74-1466, 74-

1621, 74-1622, decided August 11, 1976... 31.

American Petroleum Institute v. Train 526 F.2d 1343_-

49,

S+

re

S+

v4

S4

Cases—Continued

American Petroleum Institute v. Train, 7 E.R.C. 1795

petition for review decided August 11, 1976, C.A.

Page

9B, Be. Fb 266 cnceccencancsesitesenncnsccease St

Anaconda Co., The v. Environmental Protection

Agency, D. Mont., No. CV 75-69-BV, appeal pend-

ing, C.A. 9, No. 76-1603, petition for review, C.A. 9,

No. 2170, transferred, C.A. 10, No. 75-1605__.__._-- 8+

Appalachian Power Co. y. Train, C.A. 4, No. 74-2096,

Goseies Gtley TA, Ween ccacsanencctesecnscsnsneeese 59

Cheng Fan Kwok v. Immigration and Naturalization

Beretes, Ge GI. Gicanccattenemmnnenaninannindes 85

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park vy. Volpe, 401 U.S.

GD cnnacencccsscenccestensnmanaetinionen 28, 78-79

CPC International Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032_-~-- 31, 43, 84

Environmental Protection Agency v. California ex rel.

State Water Resources Control Board, No. 74-1435,

Gnas Gane F, Wee kcacsnccnnnascdiitiiin 344, 7, 8, 12, 34

Federal Power Commission v. Moss, 424 U.S. 494... 28, 76

Fort Worth Nat. Corp. y. Federal Savings & Loan Ins.

Carp, GD FBR Gacccatnencscuncnnsnacsssesennee 78

Foti v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 375

We. $ER..nannccscpisnnmantnnsintimasaeiiiebiiiiniiasees 86

Grain Processing Corp. v. Train, 407 F. Supp. 96,

appeal pending, C.A. 8, No. 76-1233__......------- 85

Homestake Mining Co. vy. Train, D.S.D., No. CIV 76

501, petition for review, C.A. 10, Nos. 76-1287,

VO"GEE eacccacscnnnsdenesenssenanennens 8+

Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d

Te Ee 31, 48-49, 52, 74, 83

International Paper Co. v. Train, E.D. Ark., No. BP-

76-C-212, petition for review pending, C.A.D.C.,

Wen, FO-S5E, FO-SIe ncn cnnscceyesdmencasensne 84

Kesinger v. Universal Airlines, Inc., 474 F.2d 1127... = 85

Laupahoehoe Sugar Co. v. Train, D. Hawaii, No. 75-

0159, petition for review pending, C.A. 9, No. 75-

GEES eauceccccocanssusseeqnesseugesvedauseuasenes St

Mianus River Preservation Committee v. Environ-

mental Protection Agency, C.A. 2, No. 75-4253,

Gren’ Dilip Th, Web censnpencenennentancnmenees 42

Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411

Wah GRR acenccusnenansnssednanninesiseeeinntdeaad 36

Cases—Continued

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environ- page

mental Protection Agency, 537 F.2d 642___._...._-- 58, 59

Natural Resources Defense Council y. Train, 510 F.2d

OED caunictinewenensnenensevenussnmmentstnntibhiikes 14, 81

Oljato Chapter of the Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d

G56 anccccccncccecensccadesssconsssesesausacnsee 85

Romero v. International Terminal Co., 358 U.S. 354__ 85-86

Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 415 F. Supp. 70, appeal pending,

C.A. 9, No. 76-1870, petition for review dismissed,

Code D, Tis FE cceweccensntigetusiintnbation 84

Sierra Club v. Train, D.D.C., No. 76-1026, petition for

review pending, C.A. 3, No. 76-1749______.--____- 84

Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, No.

74-1270, decided June 1, 1976__......--.--.------- 66

Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S.

GD ecaucacacecstsecccancncesssencsnsesesessensen 35

Thorpe v. Housing Authority of the City of Durham,

i En 37

Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1...............-....-.-- 74

Union Electric Co. v. Environmental Protection

Agency, No. 74-1542, decided June 25, 1976______-- 35

United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528_.......------ 43

Whitney Bank v. Bank of New Orleans, 379 U.S.411_. = 78

Statutes and regulations:

Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of

1972, 86 Stat. 816, 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1251 et seq._- 3

NS TR TE 3, 6, 31, 34, 46

UCT BING GE ccc nececcccnnececasncasesese 6

I -SE etincenatscceccntdustinaadaséce 3, 67

SE BEE ccc nsumecsadedsccniisasius 69

BUNS GEG ccncceewecsccswcunscnceccceconeses passim

ES re 6, 7, 13, 44

EE SERED cncncwcenswccessccanssnessecin passim

SE SERS OR EDD cnceccenscwntesdatitidiitinn 10

Section 301(b) (1) (A) (ii) -----.-----_--- ~~~. 47

ee 10, 40

Section 301(b)(1)(C) --.--.--.---.----------. 52, 68

Section 301(b)(2)(A) ----..-..----------.- 10, 52, 53

Section 301(b) (2) (A) (ii)----.---------------- 48

Section 301(c)...---...-----... 10, 24, 37, 43, 44, 53, 58

| en 9, 24, 36, 38, 46

BONE GREED cceccncencescccssesccnsstecenss 43

VI VII

Statutes and regulations—Continued Page Statutes and regulations—Continued ae

Section 308 ............-----.-- ---2---------- passin Section €08(b) (1) ......-.-2- 222222 o sooo 71

Section 302 (b) (1) a ee ee eee ‘ Section 402 (b) (1) (A) we a oo 8, 13, 45

Section B4B(e) 2. ....2-cccecccuecenccscsesecce 39 DRS GETMAIN ecececnecncanansacepance 8, 45

ne 7, 52, 68 Section 402(b)(2)(B) --.:----.--.-....--..--- 72

Gestion SIREPIGA) <.cccacccccennennssesve 68 RE SIN ED ccttictinnnweyeinnepioneianen 70

To 68 TEED SEED wcacensewensanpancegeenapee 50

Section 906 ..w.ccccnnececccccewcnecescoe- passim DORE GEG) cnncwewsccsnccesssensdvenesacee 42, 72

nO 69 eR SIE OID cccccicncwnccecctccerptadens 45

Sestien SBOGD) .ncccnenccccccccnesnanctinacnce passim I ie cnewectyenssensctnenucdunnneuape 12, 14

| en 40 SNE Si inciscenissicsientienincecesisasdnqpeninsiapaicssieinlicmmmasciegmans 13, 69

Bestian SOEG(E(A) <20cccnccncccncceenesenn 27,77 ST GED cncccnsssninedaggansedageemne 37

Section 304(b) (1)(B) ................... 27, 53, 56, 58 REIL LTE SE Es Aller a ne inne ae 6, 43, 71

Bastien SERGE). <ccccscceccnsansnccrencucuse 40 EE ne 6

Desthen SEAGER IA) <ccccccccnwnnccnscessces 27,77 TET nc diainnceenncimarauniiinennasiclonpiamees 71

Section 304(b) (2) (B) wee ee e+ + 27, 56 Section TET sehen aneteneennebinmeitidinnecnienmeniin 13, 41

Bastion S56(R) (Bp ccnccccuewencpenncnceseseoese 53 DS SEEN qccawsdeucenseuensecnsessusimen 12, 44

Dee SIGE. .nncenscnsncnmisemnnnnimaetdin 19, 20 IE SE eeninciteneenncanseonsens 25, 41, 43

i 45 NS Pe OR ccnngneqanannensenmnmincigi: .

ING FEO oewecenensnadetenunqeminininntidn passim PE BEET cancqncnarcungsmnnnademmunenin 12. 43, 44

SEE GEEGR) cnawccnnecceucqwencescnaasecses 20, 47 a Le eee 25, 42, 43

Destjem SHSGHPCI}(A) onnnccacccecccuseccusses 14, 51 RUGS SE Ge Rc qnccusespeunwsccmneetienuens 42

Section 306(b)(1)(B) ---------..--------__-_- 46 | ithe ae AR RS CS 22, 41

Geatien GER6) ..0ccccceewescnensecnnnsevsesss 20 NE IED: Scenncvtnnicnnetamnentammmiatinntio 13, 85

Bet GET .ncnccccsscccessnensenesecssouusn passim I Tae ecinctenicteneadicineinadsean 13,

I HIN » citeeristinioniniecaniaiebbinnianndiidaliiaiinh 6 21, 25, 28, 42, 44, 77, 80, 81

OS GV EED ccccnsmecennccnssutemenannqanes 17 WER TIPTREE) occncanqusccmionsacace 85

BOR GID .ncnncenceencencsussnseueeneunenee 45, 69 Section 509(b) (1) (E) ------------------ 22, 23, 44, 47

ROS GED nccununcenceccencennsnnsceunbesie 13 ey 42, 44

Beth TIER) occccnncesceceeccewasensusnesse 12, 45 este GIP Gp GE cnccanwcwncecaussdenssounsnes 13, 81

ee ae 69 II ene ee 33, 41, 52, 72

SO GIP) cncccccnccncnnsencasnosmntionive 12 © Ce. Be cancencenancwensnsmnnernenpecsseas 70

BO TE ncncnnnneenanedemieaiinbiaeiees 12 Se Ge le Giceccinensecntaciesintentisianan 19

IE TEP OUN ERD ccnnccncwnnnsnitinnintimnenin 45 © Gish Ge tnccetcccnndanineeaenenntneanane 19

EER TIES). coccccecccunssnsunensdnendduatio 12, 45 D> Cr i rentnesaccannntncewnsedmansue 19

PRR GP cnonvuanccnnecesanceneninataintie 19, 47 OP Gare Ee GS anciciciandueonnssnennsneinis 56

I BO « ccccuuiischinstetaidiincdiatins 40, 69 Rar AS rae 56, 57, 70

UGE Ge acaccescacessnnetanndeiiiiiinnbunl passim 40 C.F.R. 415.72_..-.---- apiemennaaeinaaimetuni 56, 57

I SO. cervennsscepamciniiviciccnnaiiiiciaiinduanlaiaiin 8, 69 GP Ge Se initetenindednnmnaienanensaatnanue 56, 57

UNA GEGEN EE) accuncsceccesnenstion 8, 13, 25, 34, 45 © Cie Ga irecceetcnccunsssensnctatnsscence 11, 70

IEE II eieintitecceseinctnessninasanininsiibiceilea 8, 25, 55, 69 L,I 70

vu

Miscellaneous:

Administrative Conference of the United States Rec- page

ommendation No. 75-3 (adopted June 5-6,1975)_.. 83

Currie and Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Ad-

ministrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum,

TO CA & Eee icccuncanstendeneenatnnmnce 83

Executive Order No. 11574, 35 Fed. Reg. 19627_____- 5

GD FOR. TNR, Be nccencuccecsccsenwemieeninesnce 16

Se eis See Sees 00 SOE. cannnnndiesseiieeews 16

SP FU ee Gk OE. cccceceennnconnennsnnegeas 19

SP > Be Se OF OE dncunncccuncenewnsamneien 20

Oe Deeb Mt Gi nannennnedieennenadieemmnmgnes 58

th IE REE 36

H.R. 11896, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972)_--.---_-__- 60

H.R. Rep. No. 92-911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) ~-_- 60

I1.R. Rep. No. 2122, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) _____- 78

Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action

Ee et ie SI Trek Sse x Nl 83

Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control

Act Amendments of 1972, Committee Print (Vols.

1 and 2), Senate Committee on Public Works, 93d

Ci, SEB es Ce iciccccdemsnceninisininn passim

Note, Jurisdiction to Review Federal Administrative

Action: District Court or Court of Appeals, 88 Harv.

Ris, Tn i 83

S. Rep. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) ___4, 50, 60, 64

S. Conf. Rep. No 92-1236, 92d Cong, 2d Sess (1972)... 60

Zener, The Federal Law of Water Pollution Control,

in Federal Environmental Law (1974) ------------ 5

Gu the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OcroperR Trim, 1976

No. 75-978

Ik. I. puPont pE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS

v.

Russe_t bk. TRAIN, AS ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (A. 240-251) *

is reported at 528 F. 2d 1136. The opinion and order

of the district court (A. 219-239) are reported at 383

I’. Supp. 1244.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals (A. 252)

was entered on December 30, 1975. The petition for

1 “A.” refers to the Appendix. “App. Br.” refers to the separate

Appendices to Petitioners’ Brief. “A. Exh. Vol.” refers to the

Exhibit Volurae of the Appendix.

(1)

2

a writ of certiorari was filed on January 12, 1976, and

was granted on April 19, 1976 (A. 290). The jurisdic-

tion of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED*

1. Whether the Administrator of the Environmental

Protection Agency may promulgate effluent limita-

tions for existing industrial sources of water pollu-

tion, uniform within industrial classes, categories and

subeategories, as national minimum requirements

under Section 301 of the Federal Water Pollution

Control Act Amendments of 1972.

2. Whether the courts of appeals have exclusive

Jurisdiction to review effluent limitations promulgated

by the Administrator under Section 301 of the

*The court of appeals decided this case in two steps. The

first decision (“duPont J”) held only that the court of appeals

rather than the district court had jurisdiction to review the

actions of the Administrator of the Environmental Protection

Agency here challenged. The second decision (“du2’ont //”)

decided the merits of petitioners’ challenges to those actions (A.

253-286). The present petition involves only duPont 7. It raises

both the jurisdictional issue and the merits. The chemical com-

pany’s petition in duPont J] (No. 74-1473) raises the same

questions. The government filed a cross-petition in duPont II

(No. 75-1705), raising an additional question.

The Court granted the petition and the cross-petition in du-

Pont 11 on June 21, 1976 (A. 291, 292). It consolidated the petition

and cross-petition in duPont J], provided that duPont 1/1 be

argued in tandem with duPont J (A. 291-292), but did not con-

solidate duPont J and duPont 11.

The parties have agreed that their opening briefs in the

present case will discuss both the jurisdictional and substantive

questions which the petition in No. 75-978 and the chemical

companies’ petition in duPont 1] (No. 74-1473) raise. The

gy vernment is filing a separate brief on the issue raised by its

petition in duPout 11 (No. 75-1705).

3

Amendments, which includes jurisdiction to review

the guidelines he promulgated under Section 304 in

the same proceeding as the effluent limitations.

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

Pertinent provisions of the Federal Water Pollu-

tion Control Act Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 816

et seq., 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1251 et seq., and regula-

tions promulgated thereunder, are reproduced in the

separate appendices to petitioners’ brief (App. Br.

la—42a, 1b-79b, 1c-9c).

STATEMENT

This ease involves Titles III, IV and V of the

Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of

1972, 86 Stat. 816, 844-896, 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1251,

1311-1376 (“the Amendments’’). These provisions

establish methods and procedures for achieving the

Amendments’ declared objective: “to restore and

maintain the chemical, physical and biological integ-

rity of the Nation’s waters.” Section 101(a), 33

U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1251(a). More particularly, the

case concerns the relationship between “effluent limi-

tations” promulgated under Section 301(b) of the

Amendments, 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1311(b), and

“regulations providing guidelines for effluent limita-

tions” under Section 304(b), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V)

1314(b). We explain these terms more fully below.

A. THE BACKGROUND OF THE AMENDMENTS

The Amendments’ origin and history were reviewed

last Term in Environmental Protection Agency v.

4

California ea rel. State Water Resources Control

Board, No. 74-1435, decided June 7, 1976 (herein-

after, State Water Board). The 1972 Amendments

were “prompted by the conclusion of the Senate Com-

mittee on Public Works * that ‘the Federal water pol-

lution control program ... has been inadequate in

every vital aspect’” (State Water Board, supra, slip

op. 3).

That program had relied upon (id. at 2-3)

ambient water quality standards specifying the

acceptable levels of pollution in a State’s inter-

state navigable waters * * *. * * * The prob-

lems stemmed from the character of the

standards themselves * * * rather than the

preventable causes of water pollution, from

the awkwardly shared federal and state re-

sponsibility for promulgating such standards,

and from the cumbrous enforcement proced-

aa > >

[T]o strengthen the abatement system federal

officials revived the Refuse Act of 1899, 30

Stat. 1152, 33 U.S.C. §407, which prohibits

the discharge of any matter into the Nation’s

navigable waters except with a federal permit.

Although this direct approach to water pollu-

tion abatement proved helpful, it also was

deficient in several respects: the goal of the

discharge permit conditions was to achieve

water quality standards rather than to require

individual polluters to minimize effluent dis-

*See S. Rep. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971), in 2

Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amend-

ments of 1972, Committee Print, Senate Committee on Public

Works, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 1423 (1973) (hereinafter “Leg. Hist.”)..

5

charge, the permit program was applied only

to industrial polluters, some dischargers were.

required to obtain both federal and state per-

mits, and federal permit authority was shared

by two federal agencies.*

To remedy these deficiencies, Congress turned from

primary reliance upon water quality standards, al-

though these remain important,’ to effluent limitations

reflecting the least discharge of pollutants technologi-

cally practicable. They are to be imposed directly on

the sources discharging pollutants. Id. at 3-4. Water

quality standards define quality in terms of the body

of water’s designated use, and specify a maximuia de-

gree of tolerable pollution.’ An effluent limitation sets

the maximum amount of particular pollutants that a

given source may discharge into a body of water.

Thus pollution control based primarily on water

quality standards accepts discharge of wastes into a

body of water, up to a level deemed to interfere with

specified uses of the water, such as drinking, fishing,

or swimming. Technology-based effluent limitations, in

contrast, are grounded on the ‘‘view that all pollution

is undesirable and should be reduced to the maximum

extent that technology will permit.” ’

*The two agencies were the Corps of Engineers, which also

was empowered to issue permits, and the Environmental Protec-

tion Agency, which was to advise the Corps with respect to water

quality. Executive Order No. 11574, 35 Fed. Reg. 19627.

*As the Court has noted, water quality standards supplement

effluent limitations so that more stringent standards may be im-

posed to preserve the level of local water quality. State Water

Board, supra, slip op. 4, n. 12.

* Zener, The Federal Law of Water Pollution Control, in Fed-

eral Environmental Law, pp. 682, 693-694 (1974).

* Zener, supra, at p. 694.

6

B. THE STATUTORY SCHEME

1. THE GENERAL PROHIBITION AGAINST NON-COMPLYING DISCHARGES

Congress declared ‘‘the national goal that ye

discharge of pollutants * * * be eliminated by 1985,

Section 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1251(a)(1).

To achieve this, in Section 301(a), 33 U.S.C. (Supp

V) 1311(a), it prohibited any discharge except in ac-

cordance with effluent limitations and other restric-

tions. This section makes unlawful the discharge of

any pollutant by any person except in compliance

with the sections of the Amendments providing for

effluent limitations, reports, inspection and monitor-

ing, and mandatory permits."

The Amendments define “effluent limitation” as any

restriction established by a state or the Administrator

on quantities, rates or concentrations of chemical,

physical, biological or other constituents that are dlis-

charged from point sources, including schedules of

compliance. Section 502(11), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V)

1362(11). These restrictions are to be applied to dis-

charges from existing point sources’ (governed by

Section 301(b)); from new point sources (governed

by Section 306, 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1316) ; and from

sources of toxic pollutants (governed by Section 307

(a), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1317(a)). Restrictions that

* Section 301(a) provides: “Except as in compliance with chis

section and sections 302, 306, 307, 318, 402 and 404 of tl.is Act,

the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlaw-

"'*a point source is a discrete outlet from. which pollutants

may be discharged. See Section 502(14), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V)

1362(14).

7

are more stringent than the generally applicable limi-

tations, based on state and federal water quality

standards under Section 303, 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V)

1313, also are ‘‘effluent limitations” with which Section

301(a) requires compliance.

Under this major change in the methods of control-

ling water pollution, ‘‘a discharger’s performance is

now measured against strict technology-based effluent

limitations—specified levels of treatment—to which it

must conform, rather than against limitations derived

from water quality standards to which it and other

polluters must collectively conform.” State Water

Board, supra, slip op. 4.

2. THE NATIONAL POLLUTANT DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM

The mandatory permits required by Section 301(a)

are issued under the National Pollutant Discharge

Elimination System (“NPDES”) established by See-

tion 402, 35 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1342. This system is

intended to operate under effluent limitations of gen-

eral application. (State Water Board, supra, slip

op. 5):

An NPDES permit serves to transform gener-

ally applicable effluent limitations and other

standards—including those based on water

quality—into the obligations (including a time-

table for compliance) of the individual dis-

charger, and the Amendments provide for di-

rect administrative and judicial enforcement of

permits. §§ 309 and 505, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319,

1365 (Supp. IV). With few exceptions, for en-

forcement purposes a discharger in compliance

with the terms and conditions of an NPDES

Gmail ial

8

permit is deemed to be in compliance with

those sections of the Amendments on which the

permit eenditions are based. § 402(k), 33 U.S.C.

§ 1342(. ‘Supp. IV). In short, the permit

defin 3, «»°” facilitates compliance with and

enfor~ .** of, a preponderance of a dis-

charger’s obligations under the Amendments.

NPDES permits may be issued by the Administra-

tor (Section 402(a), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1342(a)),

or by a state which operates a permit program ap-

proved by the Administrator under specified statu-

tory criteria (Section 402(b), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V)

1342(b)) and guidelines issued by the Administrator

under Section 304(h) (2). Both federal and state per-

mits must “apply and insure compliance with’’ the

sections of the Amendments providing for effluent lim-

itations and standards, and must be for fixed terms

not to exceed five years. Sections 402(a)(1), (b)(1)

(A) and (B),° ‘T.S.C. (Supp. V) 1342(a) (1), (b)

(1)(A) and (B).”

*°In State Water Board, supra, the Court also noted (slip.

op. 8): “The EPA retains authority to review operation of a

State’s permit program. Unless the EPA waives review for

particular classes of point sources or for a particular permit

application, §402(d)(3), (e), 33 U.S.C. §1342(d)(3), (e)

(Supp. IV), a State is to forward a copy of each permit appli-

cation to EPA for review, and no permit may issue if EPA

objects that issuance of the permit would be ‘outside the guide-

lines and requirements’ of the Amendments. § 402(d)(1), (2),

33 U.S.C. §1342(d)(1), (2) (Supp. IV). In addition to this

review authority, after notice and opportunity to take action,

EPA may withdraw approval of a state permit program which

is not being administered in compliance with § 402. § 402(c) (3),

33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) (Supp. IV).”

3. EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS AND GUIDELINES FOR EFFLUENT

LIMITATIONS

The technological basis for effluent limitations to be

applied to existing point sources under Section 301 is

to be defined under Section 304(b), 33 U.S.C. (Supp.

V) 1314(b). This section directs the Administrator of

the Environmental Protection Agency “for the pur-

pose of adopting or revising effluent limitations,’’ to

publish “regulations providing guidelines for effluent

limitations,” to be annually revised, if appropriate.

These regulations are to identify, in terms of amounts

and constituents and chemical, physical and bio-

logical characteristics of pollutants, the degree of

effluent reduction attainable through the anplica-

tion of the best control technology available for

classes and categories of point sources, and to specify

factors to be taken into account in determining the

control measures and practices to be applicable to

point sources within such categories or classes. Sec-

tion 304(b) also enumerates certain economic, tech-

nological and nonwater quality environmental

factors which must be considered.

The technological considerations defined under See-

tion 304(b) are converted into effluent lim:cations

under Section 301(b). That section directs that efiu-

ent limitations for existing point sources ‘‘be achieved”

according to a timetable providing for standards of in-

creasing stringency. The ‘‘[e]ffluent limitations estab-

lished [under section 301] * * * shall he applied to ali

point sources of discharge of pollutaiits * * *.’’ Sec-

tion 301(e), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1311(e). Aceord-

221-793-1762

10

ing to the statutory time table, these limitations must,

not later than July 1, 1977, “require the application

of the best practicable control technology currently

available as defined * * * pursuant to section 304(b)

of this Act’? (Seetion 301(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C.

(Supp. V) 1311(b)(1)(A)). Not later than July 1,

1983, the limitations must “require application of the

best available technology economically achievable for

such eategory or class, which will result in reasonable

further progress toward the national goal of eliminat-

ing the discharge of all pollutants, as determined in

accordance with regulations issued * * * pursuant to

section 304(b)(2) of this Act * * *” (Section 301(b)

(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1311(b) (2) (A)). How-

ever, the Administrator is authorized to modify the

1983 effluent limitations for individual dischargers

who apply for permits after July 1977. Section

301(¢), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1311(e¢).

The operation of this procedure is illustrated by the

development of the effluent limitations challenged in

this case. The administrative steps are described in

detail infra, at pp. 14-21. For present purposes, it is

sufficient to state that the Administrator developed

technological information concerning effluent control

and treatment in the inorganie chemicals manufac-

turing industry. He divided the industry into suheate-

gories reflecting the components and amounts of pol-

lutants in effluents discharged by plants manufactur-

ing like products with like processes. He examined

currently available treatment technologies used in the

industry, as well as those used in other industries with

similar wastes, to determine the degree to which ap-

ll

plication of the best of these, considered in the light

of relevant engineering, economic and other practical

factors listed in Section 304(b), will reduce the dis-

charge of the pollutants within each subcategory.

After considering public comments on the initial

technical analysis, the Administrator then proposed,

again considered public comment upon, and adopted

regulations setting forth specific numerical effluent

limitations based upon the technological information

developed.

A typical example of such an effluent limitation is

found in the hydrogen peroxide manufacturing sub-

category that uses the oxidation process (App. Br. 46b

to 47b). In this subcategory, total suspended solids

(TSS) which each point source may discharge per

day were 0.8 kilograms (“kg’’) for each thousand

kilograms (‘‘kkg’’) of hydrogen peroxide produced.

Total organic carbon was limited to a daily discharge

of 0.44 kg per kkg of product.

Plants in this subcategory that use the electrolytic

process discharge no organic carbon, but they do dis-

charge cyanide. The technology for the electrolytic

process permitted limits on TSS more stringent than

for the oxidation process (0.005 kg per kkg of prod-

uct per cay). Discharge of dissolved cvanide was

limited to 0.0004 kg per kkg of product daily. (App.

Br. 46b to T7b.) 40 C.F.R. 415.92."

"' Limitations on the relative concentration of hydrogen ion

which indicate acidity or alkalinity (“the pH factor”) (A. Exh.

Vol, 5934) were expressed as a fixed range reflecting the limits

within which acidity or alkalinity may be practicably main-

tained,

12

4. ENFORCEMENT AND REVIEW

The Amendments provide for government and pri-

vate enforcement of effluent limitations. The Adminis-

trator may issue an order or bring a civil action to

remedy a violation of Section 301, and other sections

establishing effluent limitations (i.e., Sections 302, 306,

307), or to remedy a violation of any permit condi-

tion or limitation implementing such sections in a

permit issued by the Administrator or a State.’* Vio-

lators are subject to injunction and to civil penalties

up to $25,000 per day; willful or negligent violation

initially is a misdemeanor; repetition is a felony

(Section 309(b), (ce), (d), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V)

1319(b), (¢), (d)).

Any adversely affected person may institute an ac-

tion in federal district court against any person ‘‘ who

is alleged to be in violation of * * * an effluent stand-

ard or limitation under this Act.” Sect'on 505(a), 33

U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1365(a). The term “effluent standard

or limitation” is defined for purposes of that section to

include an ‘‘effluent limitation or other limitation

under Section 301 * * *” and other sections author-

izing effluent limitations (Sections 302, 306, 307), and

a permit or condition thereof issued under Section

402. Section 505(f), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1365(f).

‘* For enforcement purposes, Section 402(k), 33 U.S.C. (Supp.

V) 1342(k), deems a permit holder who is in compliance with the

terms of its permit to be in compliance “with sections 301, 302,

306, 307 and 403, except any standard imposed under section 307

for a toxic pollutant injurious to human health.” 33 U.S.C. (Supp.

V) 1342(k). See State Water Board, supra, slip op. 22-23.

In the case of a state permit, the Administrator may defer

to state enforcement. Section 309(a).

13

The Administrator’s action in approving or promul-

gating effluent limitations and standards under Section

301 and other sections, as well as in issuing or deny-

ing any permit, is subject to judicial review in the

courts of appeals upon a petition filed within 90 days

of such action. Section 509(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. (Supp.

V) 1369(b)(1). Administrative action which is re-

viewable under this section is not subject to judicial

review in civil or criminal enforcement proceedings.

Section 909(b) (2), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1369(b) (2).

Section 304, which provides for regulations defining

technological considerations in guidelines for effluent

limitations (see pp. 8-11, supra) is not listed in See-

tion 301(a) as one of the sections with which a dis-

charger must comply in order lawfully to discharge

any pollutant. It is not enumerated among the sections

with which a permit must assure compliance under

Section 402(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A).” Nor is it listed

among the sections with which the government may

enforce compliance in civil or criminal proceedings

under Section 309, 32 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1319, or which

private citizens may enforce under Section 505, 33

U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1365. Further, regulations promul-

gated under Section 304 are not specifically identified

among the actions of the Administrator subject to

judicial review by the courts of appeals under Section

909(b), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1369(b).

* Those Sections are 301, 302, 306 and 307, each of which

provides for a form of effluent limitation and 403, 33 U.S.C.

(Supp. V) 1343, which deals with ocean discharges.

14

C. THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN

THIS CASE

1. THE PROMULGATION OF EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS FOR THE

INORGANIC CHEMICALS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY

The Amendments directed the Administrator to

implement them as expeditiously as possible. They

contemplate that after December 31, 1974, discharges

from point sources will be in conformity with a per-

mit, Section 402(k), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1342(k). To

facilitate promulgation of limitations for existing

point sources to meet the 1977 and 1983 requirements,

Section 304(b) directed that the regulations provid-

ing technological guidelines for effluent limitations be

published within one year of enactment.”

Two weeks after the enactment of the Amendments,

the Administrator requested, on October 31, 1972, the

submission of proposals for programs to aid him in

developing technological guidelines and effluent limi-

tations and standards for existing point sources (cov-

ered by Sections 301 and 304(b)) and new sources

(covered by Section 306) for various industrial cate-

gories (R. 6016). Among these were the Inorganic

Chemicals Manufacturing Point Source Category in-

volved in this ease (R. 6215).

The general directions accompanying the request

(Rt. 6015-6281) required that each industry be divide l

* See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.

2d 692, 696 (C.A.D.C.). Section 306(b) (1) (A), 33 U.S.C. (Supp.

V) 1316(b) (1) (A), also directed that standards of performance

be promulgated within one year for new sources in 27 specified in-

dustrial categories, one of which was the inorganic chemicals

manufacturing industry.

15

into categories and subcategories, aud that the techno-

logical factors to be applied under Sections 301 and

304(b) be identified. Those steps were intended to sup-

port the promulgation of effluent limitations by the

Adminisirator.” The Administrator entered into a

contract with a private firm to prepare a Develop-

ment Document for Effluent Limitations Guidelines

and Standards of Performance for the Inorganic

Chemicals, Alkali and Chlorine Industries. In June

1973, the Administrator circulated the resulting draft

development document for public comment (A. 1-20).

* The direction stated:

“[(R. 6027)] In order to promulgate the required guidelines

and standards, it is first necessary to (a) categorize each indus-

try; (b) characterize the waste resulting from discharges within

industrial categories and subcategories; and (c) identify the

range of control and treatment technology within each indus-

trial category and subcategory. Such technology will then be

evaluated in order to determine what constitutes the ‘best prac-

ticable control technology currently available,’ what is the ‘best

available technology economically achievable’ and, for new sources,

what is the ‘best available demonstrated control technology.’

“In identifying the technologies to be applied under Section

301, Section 304(b) of the Act requires that the cost of appli-

cation of such technologies be considered, as well as the non-

water quality environmental impact (including energy require-

ments) resulting from the application of such technologies. It

is imperative that the effluent limitations and standards to be

promulgated by the Administrator be supported by adequate,

verifiable data and that there be a sound rationa’) for the judg-

ments made. Such data must be readily identifiable and avail-

able and such rationale must be clearly set forth in the docu-

mentation supporting the regulations.

* * * *” * ” *

“The end result of the analysis undertaken by contractors will

be the suggestion of effluent limitations associated with the tech-

nology identified by the contractor * * *. [R. 6034.]”

16

On August 6, 1973, the Administrator published an

‘‘Advance Notice of Public Review Procedures” con-

cerning rulemaking with respect to ‘‘effluent limita-

tions guidelines,” and standards of performance for

new sources (A. 21). 38 Fed. Reg. 21202. This an-

nouncement described the basic legal authority for the

regulations to be proposed, the agency’s general meth-

odology in implementing its effluent limitations and the

means by which the agency was seeking to achieve

‘the widest possible public scrutiny of the technical

and legal basis for the regulations to be established

* * *.*’ including the availability of the draft devel-

opment reports on the various categories (A. 22). This

advance notice expressly relied upon Sections 301(b)

and 304(b) as authority for the regulations to be pro-

posed for existing point sources (A. 22, 40).

On October 11, 1973, the Administrator published a

formal notice of proposed rulemaking for effluent limi-

tations guidelines,"* new source standards of perform-

ance, and pretreatment standards, for the Inorganic

Chemicals Manufacturing Point Source Category (A.

61-151). 38 Fed. Reg. 28174 et seg. The notice

stated the statutory authority under which the

rules were to be promulgated: Section 301(b) with re-

spect to efiluent limitations for existing point sources;

Section 304(b) with respect to guidelines for these ef-

fluent limitations; Section 306 with respect to stand-

ards of performance for new sources; and Section

28The Administrator used the phrase “effluent limitations

guidelines” to encompass his combination of action under Sec-

tion 301(b) and Section 304(b) into a single proceeding.

17

307(¢c), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1317 (¢), for pre-

treatment standards for new sources (A. 62-64).

The notice explained the methodology which had

been followed in developing the effluent limita-

tions, and summarized the conclusions of the de-

velopment document for the industry with respect to

categories, process descriptions, water use and waste

water characteristics, pollution control and treatment

technology, and non-water quality (other environ-

mental) aspects of pollution control (A. 65-82).

The notice explained that the diversity of the indus-

try prevented establishment of one limitation for the

entire industry, but that separate limitations for each

plant would be inconsistent with the intent of the

Amendments and unworkable. The Administrator

therefore proposed limitations which were uniform

within “workable subcategories consistent with [the

industry’s] variations” (A. 83). Separate specific

** The notice stated (A. 83) :

“The inorganic chemicals manufacturing category is very

large and diverse. In establishing effluent guidelines it was

necessary to consider numerous factors which may predicate

varying the guidelines to accommodate differences in plant

size, age, geographical location, manufacturing processes em-

ployed and product mix. Comments from various industrial

concerns indicate that they feel these variables justify further

segmentation of the industry. The key issue is the degree to

which the inorganic chemicals manufacturing category should

be segmented for the purpose of establishing effluent guidelines

and standards of performance. One extreme is to establish one

limitation for the entire industry. Examination of the dis-

similarities in manufacturing processes and wasteloads gen-

erated for each chemical reveal that this approach is tech-

nically unsound. On the other extreme, each chemical plant is

18

limitations were proposed for each of 22 subcategories

of the inorganic chemicals manufacturing industry, es-

tablished on the basis of the product manufactured

and significant variations in manufacturing processes.

Within each subcategory, separate limitations were

proposed for each pollutant which was to be controlled

by the regulation. These subcategories ranged, in al-

phabetical order, from the aluminum chloride pro-

Anetion subcategory to the titanium dioxide produc-

tion subeategory (A. 61).

The Notice invited interested persons to participate

in the rulemaking proceeding by submitting within 30

days written comments on all aspects of the proposed

regulations, including alternative proposals. In invit-

ing the latter, the notice indicated the Administrator’s

view that he was required to issue effluent limitations

under Section 301 (A. 88):

In the event comments address the approach

taken by the agency in establishing an effluent

limitation guideline or standard of perform-

ance, EPA solicits suggestions as to what al-

ternative approach should be taken and why

and how this alternative better satisfies the de-

unique and presents specific treatment problems. If the regula-

tions presented herein are to reflect every variation, it is neces-

sary to have separate guidelines for each plant. This approach

does not reflect the intent of the Act and is unworkable.

“The approach selected was to examine all variables and

segment the industry into workable subcategories consistent with

these variations. Twenty-two subcategories have been estab-

lished based on the chemical product manufactured. In cases

where two dissimilar processes are used to manufacture the

same product, separate limitations have been established within

the subcategory.”

19

tailed requirements of sections 301{ 304(b), 306

and 307 of the Act. r

Several of the pet tioners in this case objected to the

proposed regulations on the ground that the Agency

had proposed specific and uniform effluent limitations

on a subeategory basis, rather than flexible ‘“‘guidance”’

to be applied on a plant-by-plant basis by the issuers

of permits under NPDES. F£.g., A. 155, 168-169, 188-

189. The Assistant Administartor for Enforcement

and General Counsel responded that the Agency

would not ‘‘redirect its approach” and explained in

greater detail the legal basis for the methodology

underlying that approach (A. 192-198).

On February 4, 1974, EPA promuigated general

provisions for effluent limitations to be applicable to

all industrial categories (App. Br. 1c). 39 Fed. Reg.

4532 et seq., 40 C.F.R. Part 401. These provisions in-

cluded a statement of the scope and purpose of the

eftluent limitations guidelines, general definitions and

the statutory authorization for such guidelines. The

regulation cited Sections 301, 304, 306, 307, 316, and

402 as the legal basis of the Administrator’s authority

to promulgate effluent limitations for existing sources,

standards of performance for new sources, and pre-

treatment standards for new and existing sources

(App. Br. 3e, Te-9e.). 40 C.F.R. 401.10, 401.12.

On Maich 12, 1974, the Administrator promulgated

regulations specifying the effluent limitations for

existing sources and standards of performance and

pretreatment standards for new sources for the inor-

ganie chemicals manufacturing industry (App. Br.

Pa

2 et seq. The preamble again

and ¢), 306(b and c), and

~Dasis for the Administrator’s ac-

tion thee Br. 2b). ™ The Administrator summarized

the comments of all participants and answered or com-

mented upon each related group of comments. The

preamble stated the revisions which had been made in

the proposed regulations in light of the comments. The

effluent limitations for each subcategory were ex-

pressed in terms of “‘single-number” quantities of

pollutant which could be discharged per quantity of

product per day. See p. 11, supra.

With the effluent limitations, the Administrator also

published in final form the technological and economic

basis upon which he had relied in developing them.

The technological considerations were set forth in the

‘Development Document for Effluent Limitations

Guidelines and New Souree Performance Standards

for the Major Inorganic Products Segment of the In-

organic Chemicals Manufacturing Point Source Cate-

gory’? (A. Exh. Vol. 5572), released March 1974.”

*® Ti also referred to the notice of public review procedures of

August 6, 1973, supra, p. 16, the notice of proposed rulemaking of

October 11, 1973, supra, p. 16, and two development documents.

#® This report specified subcategories within the industry (éd. at

61), characterized water use and waste discharges within those sub-

categories (id. at 65) ; determined the characteristics of pollutants

(id. at 183); and specified factors relating to control and treat-

ment technology (id. at 189), including cost, energy and non-

water quality aspects (id. at 229). It then described effluent reduc-

tion attainable through the application of the best practicable

21

In April 1974, the Administrator published an “Feo-

nomic Analysis of Effluent Guidelines for the Inor-

ganic Chemical Industry” (A. Exh. Vol. 5419A).

These two development documents were the final re-

vised versions of earlier draft reports which had been

circulated in connection with the proposed rulemak-

ing. Together with the preamble to the regulations,

and the regulations themselves, these documents set

forth the “guidelines for effluent limitations” required

by Section 304(b).

2. THE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

Petitioners, eight chemical companies (Br. 1, n.

1), filed in the United States Court of Appeals for

the Fourth Circuit timely petitions for review of the

Administrator’s a¢tion in promulgating the March 12,

1974, effluent limitations and new source standards, or

intervened in such proceedings. See section 509(b) (1),

33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1369(b)(1). Insofar as existing

sources were concerned, petitioners called their peti-

tions for review “protective,’’ contending that the

Administrator had®acted beyond his authority in

promulgating single-number effluent limitations for

such sources pursuant to Section 301(b), and that he

was authorized only to promulgate flexible guidelines

for effluent limitations under Section 304(b), to be

control technology currently available in each subcategory (id. at

313) ; and the effluent reduction attainable through application of

the best available technology economically achieveable (id. at 331).

29 7

applied by issuers of permits to particular plants.

Such guidelines, according to petitioners, were review-

able in the district courts rather than the courts of

appeals.” ee

Some of the petitioners brought ‘suit in the United

States District Court for the Western District of

Virginia raising the same issues as the petitions for

review of the existing source regulations (A. 204).

After briefing and argument, the district court dis-

missed for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the Ad-

ministrator was authorized to promulgate effluent

limitations under Section 301(b), that he had in fact

done so, and that review of those regulations could be

had only in the courts of appeals. 2. I. du Pont de

Nemours and Co. vy. Train, 383 F. Supp. 1244 (App.

219-239).

Petitioners’ appeal from that decision Was consoli-

dated with the pending petitions for review of both the

new and existing source regulations. The court of

appeals, however, rendered two separate decisions. In

the first (duPont J ), the court affirmed the district

court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction (App. 240-

251. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. Train, 528

F.2d 1136. In duPont I, the eourt separated

the question of the Administrator’s authority to issue

* Section 509(b) (1) (E). 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1469(b) (1) (EB),

authorizes review in the courts of appeals of the Administrator's

action, inter alia, *in approving or promulgating any effluent limi-

tation or other limitation unde: section 301, 302, or 306 * * *>

Review of actions taken pursuant > Section 304 is not mentioned

in Section 509,

_—

23

regulations under Section 301 from the issue of juris-

diction. It held that even,if the Administrator’s au-

thority derived only from Section 304, the promulga-

tion of guidelines under that section, because of the

close interrelationship between Sections 301 and 304,

was an “action ‘in approving or promulgating any

effluent limitation * * * under f section] 301’’’ (A,

246) and, accordingly, reviewable in the courts of ap-

peals under Section 5909(h) (1) (E), 33 U.S.C. (Supp,

V) 1369(b) (1) (EB).

In the second decision (duPont II ) (App. 253-286),

the court of appeals decided the merits of the ques-

tions presented in the petitions for review. The court

held that the Administrator was authorized to promul-

gate effluent limitations under Section 301, that he had

permissibly promulgated such regulations simultane-

ously with the promulgation of effluent guidelines

under Section 304(b), and that the regulations need

not take the form of “ranges” of discharge levels but

could instead be issued as single-number limitations

(see infra, pp. 48-53). The court further held that, for

both existing and new sources, the Administrator's

regulations are only ‘presumptively applicable,” and

that any source may, at the time of permit-issuance,

rebut the application of the presumption to that par-

ticular plant.”

* The government's contention that the court’s rule of “pres

sumptive applicability” should not apply to new sources is the

subject of its cross-petition in No. 75-1705.

24

Some of the regulatiohs apply to more than one sub-

category. The court set aside portions of those regu-

lations dealing| with “process waste water” and

“process waste water pollutants” and with “cata-

strophic rainfall.” The court also set aside portions of

particular regulations dealing with 11 chemical prod-

ucts, on the ground that they were not adequately

supported by the administrative record. Those rulings

are not here challenged.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I

The language and structure of the 1972 Amend-

meuts show that the Administrator is authorized to

promulgate generally applicable effluent limitations

for existing point sources under Section 301(b). Con-

trary to petitioners’ contentions, Congress did not in-

tend that effluent limitations are to be established only

in individual permit proceedings under Section 402 by

application of the Administrator’s Section 304(b)

guidelines to the particular discharger.

This is shown by the language of Section 301 itself,

which not only directs that effluent limitations “estab-

lished pursuant to this section” shall be applied to all

point sources (Section 301(e)) but expressly provides

for waiver by the Administrator of the 1983 level efflu-

ent limitations upon a proper showing (Section 301

(¢))—a provision which would be surplusage under

petitioners’ view. wx sections also reflect the prem-

4

A

25

ise that the Administrator will establish generally ap-

plicable limitations. Indeed, Section 304(b) directs

that “[flor the purpose of adopting or revising eftlu-

ent limitations under this Act the Administrator

shall * * * publish * * * regulations providing guide-

limes for effluent limitations.” This indicates that it is

the Administrator who is to adopt or revise the limita-

tions required by Section 301. The same understand-

ing is also reflected in the provisions establishing the

state and federal permit systems (Section 402(a)(1),

402(b)); and in the requirement in Section 510, 33

U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1370, that states may not adopt less

stringent effluent limitations than those in effect

under the Amendments.

Finally, the statutory provisions for citizen enforce-

ment suits (Section 505(a)(1), (f) (2), 33 U.S.C.

(Supp. V) 1365 (a)(1), (f)(2)), and judicial review

(Section 509(b)(1)) expressly refer to effluent limita-

tions under Section 301. Section 909(b)(1) in fact

provides for review “of the Administrator’s action

** * in approving or promulgating any effluent limi-

tation or other limitation under section 301 * * ~~

Although the Amendments provide procedures for

the enforcement of the requirments of Section 301,

and requires that permits comply with applicable re-

quirements thereunder, it nowhere expressly provides

that guidelines published under Section 304(b) may

be enforced, or reviewed, or must be incorporated into

permits under Section 402.

26 -

Petitioners’ arguments that only permit-issuers may

establish effluent limitations are based upon hyper-

technical or insignificant distinctions in the wording

of the various sections of this complex statute. Sec-

tion 304(b), upon which they heavily rely, does not

support their position. That section does not confine

the Administrator to publication of guidelines that

state a numerical range of permissible effluent limi-

tations to be selected and applied only by permit

issuers in individual proceedings. Neither Section

304(b) nor Section 402 even refers to a “‘range”

requirement. Moreover, the “range” for the industry

as a whole is supplied by the differences among the

effluent limitations for the various subcategories.

Insofar as Section 304(b) requires the Adminis-

trator to specify factors to be considered in estab-

lishing effluent limitations, Congress intended such

specification to reflect his determination of the rele-

vant technological criteria he is to apply in establish-

ing effluent limitations under Section 301. It did not

intend that the factors specified be reconsidered by

permit issuers in individual permit proceedings, as

petitioners assert.

The legislative history of the 1972 Amendments,

particularly the Conference Report and the explana-

tions of it, confirms that Congress intended the

Administrator to establish nationally uniform mini-

mum effluent limitations under Section 301(b) on the

basis of industrial subeategories, not on a plant-by-

plant basis through the issuance of permits, and that

- SN tte i

27

it intended the effluent limitations to be uniform with-

in each subcategory. In this way it sought to reduce

the discharge of pollutants under a strict nationwide

time table with which all dischargers would comply.

This clearly defined policy would be defeated if efflu-

ent limitations could be established only in individual

permit proceedings under Section 402, as petitioners

contend.

The establishment of uniform national effluent limi-

tations by the Administrator does not curtail or

weaken the role Congress intended the states to have

in the administration of the Amendments. The states

still perform important functions, particularly in de-

termining whether a particular existing point source

comes withii a subcategory and whether it qualifies

for a variance from the generally applicable standards

under Section 301, and in establishing its schedule for

compliance. Moreover, the states retain the important

power to adopt more stringent limitations than those

established by the Administrator.

II

Because of the close inter-relationship between the

guidelines under Section 304(b) and the effluent limi-

tations under Section 301, the Administrator, for

reasous of time and efficiency, combined the establish-

ment of guidelines and effluent limitations into a single

proceeding, at the end of which he made a single de-

termination embodying the guidelines and the effluent

limitations. This Court approved a similar combina-

28

tion of separate steps into a single administrative

proceeding, adopted for reasons of administrative

practicality, in Federal Power Commission v. Moss,

424 U.S. 494. Moreover, the requirements of Section

304(b) were satisfied by the development documents

‘ontaining the technological data, the preamble to

the formal regulations in issue, and the regulations

themselves, which specify ‘tthe degree of effluent re-

duction attainable” as required by Section 304(b) (1)

(A), (b) (1) (B), (b) (2) (A), and (b) (2) (B).

III

Petitioners err in contending that since the Admin-

istrator has no authority to establish effluent limita-

tions under Section 301, the courts of appeals have no

jurisdiction to review them. First, he has such au-

thority. Second, the court of appeals’ statutory juris-

uction to review eftluent limitations under Section

209(b)(1) necessarily includes jurisdiction to deter-

mine whether the Administrator has power to estab-

lish them. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park vy.

Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415.

The efiluent limitations under Section 301 and the

suidelines under Section 304(b) were established in

a single proceeding and are inextricably intertwined.

They may be reviewed in a single proceeding by the

court of appeals. Review of the guidelines in the

district courts and the effluent limitations in the

courts of appeals, as urged by petitioners, would re-

sult in a bifurcated system of review producing econ-

29

fusion and delay in achieving the congressional

requirement that existing point sources comply with

strict, technology-hased effluent limitations by 1977,

stricter limitations by 1983, and would defeat attain-

ment of the statutory goal to eliminate the discharge

of pollutants by 1985.

ARGUMENT

I

SECTION 301 OF THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROTI,

ACT AMENDMENTS EMPOWERS THE ADMINISTRATOR OF

THE ENVIRON MENTAI PROTECTION AGENCY TO SET, FOR

VARIOUS SUBCATEGORIES OF PARTICULAR INDUSTRIES,

UNIFORM NATIONAL EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS FOR EXIST-

ING POINT SOURCES OF POLLUTANTS

INTRODUCTION

Although the statutory provisions involved in this

case are complex and intricate, the underlying legal is-

sue is relatively simple. Section 30] of the Amend-

ments provides for the establishment of “effluent limi-

tations” for ‘‘all point sources of discharge of pollu-

tants.” Section 304(b) requires the Administrator of

the Environmental Protection Agency, “‘[f]or the pur-

pose of adopting or revising effluent limitations under

this Act,” to publish “regulations, providing guidelines

for effluent limitations.” Section 402 provides for the

issuance of permits by the Administrator or by a state

(under a state permit program approved by the Ad-

ministrator) “for the discharge of any pollutant, or

combination of pollutants,” upon condition that such

30

discharge will meet the requirements of specified sec-

tions of the Amendments relating to the discharge of

pollutants, including Section 301 but not Section 304.

The major question in the ease is whether the Amend-

ments empower the Administrator to adopt generally

applicable effluent limitations for subcategories of in-

dustries that set a Specific numerical limit upon the

amount of a particular pollutant that all members of

the subcategory may discharge—limitations waich will

then be incorporated in the individual permits that

the Administrator or a state will issue to each point

source, t.¢e., to each individual discharger. Petition-

ers contend that the Administrator has no authority

to issue such effluent limitations under Section 301,

and that the only method by which effluent limitations

may be established under Section 301 is through the

application by permit-issuers of technological data

specified in Section 304 guidelines. This is to be ac-

complished, according to petitioners, on a plant-by-

plant basis in individual permit-issuance proceedings

in which the permit-issuing authority establishes the

precise numerical amount of polluting substances each

point source may discharge,

Thus, in petitioners’ view the effluent limitations

may be established only in each of the 40,000 or more

individual permits to be issued to existing point

sources.~ The government submits—as six of the seven

** As of June 30, 1976, the Environmental Protection Agency's

Forma] Planning and Reporting System showed that 42,064

industrial permits had been issurd or applied for.

31

courts of appeals that have considered this question

have held *—that the Administrator’s authority is not

so moribund, and that he may adopt generally appli-

cable effluent limitations under Section 301 that set

the precise numerical amount of permissible pollution

for subcategories of industry.

The basic design of the Amendments was to provide

for the development of national standards by which

pollution of our waters would be controlled and

reduced and, by 1985, hopefully eliminated (Section

101(a), “declarations of goals and policy”). Earlier

attempts to deal with the water pollution problem had

failed, because both the methods used in the prior

legislation to improve water quality and the federal

permit system under the Refuse Act of 1899 had

proved inadequate. In the 1972 Amendments, Con-

gress adopted a new approach.

It undertook to control water pollution at the pol-

lution source by directly limiting the amount of pollu-

tants discharged to the minimum that technology

** In addition to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in

the present case, the District of Columbia, Second, Third, Sev-

enth, and Tenth Circuits have upheld the Administrator’s au-

thority. American Frozen Food Institute vy. Train, C.A.D.C., N os.

74-1464, 74-1513, 74-1840, decided May 11, 1976; Hooker Chemi-

cals & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F. 2a 620 (C.A. 2); American

Iron & Steel Institute v. Environmental Protection A gency, 526

F. 2d 1027 (C.A. 3); American ifeat Institute v. Environmental

Protection Agency, 526 F. 2d 442 (C.A.7 ); American Petroleum

Institute v. Environmental Protection Agency, C.A. 10, Nos. 74-

1465, 74-1466, 74-1621, 74-1622, decided August 11, 1976. Only the

Eighth Circuit has held to the contrary. CPC International Inc. v.

Train, 515 F. 2d 1032.

32

permits. It thus shifted the approach to the problem

from the prior emphasis on water quality to technol-

ogy-based effluent limitations designed to restrict and

ultimately to end the discharge of pollutants into our

navigable waters.

The 1972 Amendments adopted a three-part plan to

deal with pollution from existing sources. First, it was

necessary to identify the particular pollutants that

-were creating the problem in particular industries,

to ascertain and evaluate the best technology avail-

able and acceptable to control such pollution, and to

estimate the extent of the control of pollution that

such technology could achieve by designated target

dates. This initial aspect of the program was dealt

with in Section 304, which required the Administrator

by specified dates to develop and publish information

about the causes of pollution and the best available

technology for dealing with it. The guidelines are

required to “identify, in terms of amounts of con-

stituents and chemical, physical, and biological char-

acteristics of pollutants, the degree of effluent reduc-

tion attainable through the application of the best

practicable control technology currently available for

classes and categories of point sources” and to “specify

factors to be taken into account in determining the

control measures and practices to be applicable to

point sources * * * within such categories or

classes,”

The next step in the program—the conversion of

the technological information set forth in the guide-

lines into binding, enforceable pollution limitations—

33

was to be accomplished through the promulgation of

‘‘effluent limitations” by the Administrator under

Section 301. The purpose of the effluent limitations

was to translate into specific figures the maximum per-

missible pollution by particular classes and categories

of polluters. The effluent limitations thus were based

upon and reflected the technological data developed

under Section 304(b).

Finally, the effluent limitations under Section 301

were to be applied to the approximately 40,000 ex-

isting industrial point sources through the NPDES

permit system. The permits to be issued either by the

Administrator or by the state under a permit pro-

gram the Administrator had approved, would specify

maximum permissible levels of pollution for each in-

dividual discharger through the application of the

effluent limitations to the particular point source.

State-issued permits at a minimum must meet the

federally-prescribed effluent limitations; the state,

however, may itself impose more stringent limitations

(Section 510).

As we shall show, both the language and the struc-

ture of the Amendments demonstrate that Congress

authorized the Administrator to promulgate effluent

limitations on the basis of industrial subcategories

that specify precise levels of permissible pollution for

all firms in the subeategory. We shall also show that

the legislative history of the 1972 Amendments con-

firms that the Administrator has this authority. This

history shows that Congress explicitly intended that

the Administrator would set effluent limitations on

34

this basis, and that he is not required to depend on the

issuance of individual permits in order to establish for

individual point sources the specific requirements for

controlling pollution in the particular industrial sub-

categories that are specified in the guidelines.” It

further shows that Congress intended there to be uni-

form national effluent limitations governing all mem-

bers of the particular subeategory—an objective that

could not be accomplished if the only method by which

effluent limitations could be applied is through the

permit system.

Finally, we shall show that the fact that in this case

the Administrator promulgated the guidelines and

adopted the effluent limitations in a single proceeding

was a permissible exercise of his broad statutory au-

thority to take effective measures “to restore and

maintain the chemical, physical, and biological in-

tegrity of the Nation’s waters” (Section 101(a) of the

Amendments).

. This Court has recognized that the Administrator’s

interpretation of the Water Pollution Control Act

like his interpretation of the Clean Air Act, is anti

tled to considerable weight if it is “‘reasonable” and

there is no “cogent argument that it is contrary to

congressional intentions * * *,” Environmental Pro-

tection Agency v. California ex rel. State Water Re-

sources Control Board, No. 74-1435, decided June %

oe If uniform limitations have not yet been issued for a particu-

Jar industrial category, the Amendments provide that the Ad-

ministrator may issue a permit containing “such conditions as * * *

are necessary to carry out the provisions of thi y i

seuntne P this Act.” Section

35

1976, slip op. 26 (Water Act); Unton Electric Co. v.

Environmental Protection Agency, No. 74-1542, de-

cided June 25, 1976, slip op. 8 (Clean Air Act) ; Train

v. Naturai Resources Defense Counéil, 421 U.S, 60, 75

(Clean Air Act). Since the Administrator’s construc-

tion of the 1972 Amendments satisfies both of these

criteria, the Court should uphold it.”

A. THE LANGUAGE AND STRUCTURE OF THE AMENDMENTS

SHOW THAT THE ADMINISTRATOR IS AUTHORIZED TO PRO-

MULGATE EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS UNDER SECTION 301

(b)

Numerous provisions of the statute, as well as its

overall structure and design, show that the Adminis-

2° Petitioners contend (Br. 73-75) that the Administrator's

interpretation is entitled to little, if any, weight because it was not

contemporaneous or consistent, but rather constituted a change

from his alleged original intention not to establish effluent limita-

tions under Section 301(b) but only to establish guidelines. From

the outset, however, the Administrator contemplated promulgat-

ing effluent limitations under Section 301(b). As detailed in the

Statement (pp. 14-21, supra), two weeks after the enactment of

the Amendments the Administrator requested the submission of

proposals to aid him in developing both guidelines under Section

304(b) and effluent limitations under Section 301. Throughout the

remainder of the proceedings, the various public notices specifi-

cally referred to both sections, and the Administrator’s final action

was taken under both of them. Although the Administrator ini-

tially may have stressed the Section 304 guidelines—because of

the requirement that they be promulgated within one year after

the enactment of the Amendments (Section 304 (b) )—from almost

the date of the enactment of this legislation the Administrator had

made clear his intention to establish both guidelines under Section

304(b) and effluent limitations under Section 301(b) and he did

precisely that, combining the two steps in a single set of regula-

thons.

36

trator is authorized to promulgate effluent limitations

under Section 301(b).

1. THE LANGUAGE OF VARIOUS PROVISIONS OF THE AMENDMENTS SHOWS

THAT THE ADMINISTRATOR HAS AUTHORITY To ESTABLISH EFFLUENT

LIMITATIONS UNDER SECTION 301(b)

a. The starting point is Section 301 itself. It pro-

vides that there shall be achieved by July 1, 1977, “‘ef-

fluent limitations for point sources * * * which shall

require the application of the best practicable control

technology currently available as defined by the Ad-

ministrator pursuant to section 304(b) of this Act,’’

and by July 1, 1983, “effluent limitations for catego-

ries and classes of point sources,” which also are to be

based upon the Administrator’s guidelines under Sec-

tion 304(b) (Section 301(b)). Subseetion (e) states:

Effluent limitations established pursuant to

this section or section 302 of this Act shall be

applied to all point sources of discharge of pol-

lutants in accordance with the provisions of

this Act.

These provisions unequivocally provide that “efflu-

ent limitations” are to be established under Section

301. Those limitations are separate and distinct from

the requirement in Section 402 that permits to be is-

sued for the discharge of pollutants by point sources

will *‘meet * * * all appropriate requirements under

section 301 * * *,” Indeed, the obvious intendment

of Section 402 is that permits cannot be issued unless

they require compliance with the “[e]ffuent limita-

tions established” under Section 301 (Section 301(e)).

Although Section 301 does not explicitly provide

37

that it is the Administrator who is to establish the

effluent limitations, that is its clear and necessary im-

plication. As sown below, Congress intended that the

effluent limitations be established on a uniform na-

tional basis (pp. 59-67); only the Administrator is

capable of accomplishing that objective. Uniform efflu-

ent limitations could not be achieved if the only way

to impose them was by the particularization of the

guidelines promulgated under Section 304 in the 40,000

permits for existing point sources, a large number of

which will be issued by the 27 states that now have

approved permit programs (Pet. Br. 6, n. 9).

The Administrator’s authority to establish generally

applicable effluent limitations under Section 301 is

confirmed by his power under Section 501(a), 33 U.S.C.

(Supp. V) 1361(a), of the Amendments “‘to prescribe

such regulations as are necessary to carry out his fune-

tions under this Act.” When a statute confers such

authority, “the validity of a regulation promulgated

thereunder will be sustained so long as it is ‘reasonably

related to the purposes of the enabling legislation.’ ”

Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411

U.S. 356, 369, quoting with approval Thorpe v. Hous-

ing Authority of the City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268,

280-281.

Unless Section 301 authorizes the Administrator to

promulgate effluent limitations for categories of point

sources, one subsection of that section would be sur-

plusage. Section 301(¢) provides that “(t]he Adminis-

* The Administrator has also approved a rmit-issuing pro-

gram for the Virgin Islands, 41 Fed. Reg. 30883.

38

trator may modify the requirements of subsection (b)

(2) (A) of this section [requiring the achievement by

1983 of ‘eftluent limitations for categories and classes

of point sources’] with respect to any point source

for which a permit application is filed after J uly 1,

1977, upon a showing” that the modification repre-

sents “the maximum use of technology within the eco-

nomic capability of the owner or operator” and “will

result in reasonable further progress toward the

elimination of the discharge of pollutants.’’ This pro-

vision authorizes the Administrator to grant relief on

a case-by-case basis from the general effluent limita-

tions then in effect, in order to allow a permit to im-

pose less stringent requirements.

If the only way that effluent limitations could be

imposed were through the permit procedures, there

would be no need for a statutory provision authoriz-

ing the Administrator to exempt from effluent limita-

tions a particular point source for which a permit is

sought. As the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-

cuit has noted, “§ 301(c¢) itself seems to support the

Administrator’s position by presupposing the exist-

ence of a section 301 effluent limitation which the

Administrator can relax.” American Iron & Steel

Lustitute v. Environmental Protection A gency, supra,

926 F. 2d at 1037, n. 15.

b. Section 302, to which, as noted, Section 301(e)

refers, deals with effluent limitations designed to at-

tain or maintain water quality. It provides that when-

ever the Administrator concludes that discharges of

pollutants from a point source or group of point

39

sources “with the application of effluent limitations

required under section 301(b)(2) * * * would interfere

with the attainment or maintenance of [the requisite

quality of water in particular waters],” then “effluent

limitations (including alternative effluent control

strategies) for such point source or sources shall be

established.” Section 302(b) (1) provides that “[p]rior

to establishment of any effluent limitation pursuant

to subsection (a) of this section, the Administrator

shall issue notice of intent to establish such limita-

tions” and hold a hearing. Section 302(¢) provides

that the establishment of water-quality related limita-

tions “shall not operate to delay the application of

any effluent limitation established under Section

301 * *# 7”

Section 302 thus unequivocally provides that the

Administrator is to establish effluent limitations under

that section designed to deal with the special impact

upon water quality of the discharge of pollutants by

particular point sources. It would be anomalous for

Congress to have given him this authority to deal

with the special situation covered by Section 302 but

to have denied him the authority to promulgate the

general effluent limitations required under Section

301, to which Section 302(¢) expressly refers.

ce. Section 304—the guideline section—itself recog-

nizes the authority of the Administrator to promulgate

effluent limitations under Section 301. Section 304

(b) directs that, “[f]or the purpose of adopting or

revising effluent limitations under this Act the Ad-

ministrator shall * * * publish * * * regulations, pro-

40

viding guidelines for effluent limitations.” The require-

ment that the Administrator publish guidelines “(flor

the purposes of adopting * * * effluent limitations un-

der this Act” indicates that it is the Administrator

who will adept the eftluent limitations expressly re-

quired by Section 301 for “classes and categories

of point sources,” and that those effluent limitations

will apply the standards and principles set forth in

the guidelines.

d. Section 401(a) (1) requires an applicant for a

federal permit to submit a certification from the state

involved that the discharge will comply with, among

other provisions, Section 301 or, in the case of “‘any

such activity for which there is not an applicable efflu-

ent limitation * * * under [section] 301(b),” the state

must so certify. This requirement recognizes that

there will be effluent limitations established under

Section 301(b) which the discharge authorized in a

federal permit issued subsequent to the establishment

of the efiluent limitations must satisfy.

e. The permit provisions in Section 402 of the Amend-

* The “effluent limitations” to be achieved by July 1977 are “for

point sources,” whereas those to be achieved by July 1983 are “for

classes and categories of point sources.” The difference in language

however, does not indicate that for the earlier period the “efiluent

limitations” were to be established for each individual] point source

separately, through the permits to be issued for them and that

eflluent limitations for “classes and categories of point sources”

Were not to be achieved until 1983. The omission of the term

“classes and categories” from Section 301(b)(1)(B) is of no

significance, because Section 304(b) requires “guidelines for”

classes and categories both in 1977 (Section 304( b) (1), 33 U.S.c.

(Supp. V) 1314(b) (1)), and 1983 (Section 304(} :

(Supp. V) 1314(b) (2)), ( ) (2), 33 U.S.c.

41

ments recognize that under Section 301—as under Sec-

tions 302, 306 and 307—eftluent limitations wil! be estab-

lished. The Administrator may issue permits, and

approve state permit programs, only if such permits

meet the “applicable requirements” of those four

sections. The major requirement of those four sec-

tions, as we have noted, is the effluent limitations that

the Administrator has promulgated thereunder.

f. Section 510 states that the ,amentinents, 33

U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1317, does not bar the states from

“adopt[ing] or enfore[ing] (A) any standard or

limitation respecting discharges of pollutants.” It

provides, however, that any state “effluent limi-

tation” or other limitation or prohibition shall not

be less stringent than any “effluent limitation, or other

limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment

standard, or standard of performance * * * in effect

under this Act.’’ The “effluent limitation{s] * * * in

effect under this Act’’ necessarily are the generally

applicable limitations for industrial categories estab-

lished under Section 301 and the other sections provid-

ing for effluent limitations (Sections 302, 306, 307).

They could not be the particular limitations on in-

dividual discharges contained in state-issued permits,

or the section would be meaningless.

g. Finally, the statutory provisions for citizen en-

forcement suits and judicial review explicitly recognize

the Administrator's authority to adopt effluent limita-

tions under Section 301. Section 505(a)(1) permits

any citizen to bring a civil action against any person

‘‘who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent

221-793—_76——4

42

standard or limitation under this Act * * *.” For pur-

poses of Section 505, the term “effluent standard or

limitation” is defined to include “an effluent limitation

or other limitation under Section 301 or 302 of this

Act” (Section 505(f)(2)). Section 509(b) (1) pro-

vides for judicial review in the court of appeals “of

the Administrator’s action * * * in approving or

promulgating any effluent limitation or other limita-

tion under section 301, 302 or 306 * * *.”* The for-

mer provision thus recognizes that effluent limitations

will be established under Section 301, and the latter

provision explicitly indicates that it is the Adminis-

trator who will promulgate them.

The foregoing provisions for citizen enforcement

and for judicial review also explicitly provide for en-

forcement of permit requirements under Section 402.”

~* Petitioners argue (Br. 82-83) that the term “approving * * *

any effluent limitation” refers to the failure of the Administrator

to veto a state permit under Section 402(d) and was designed to

provide opportunity for federal court review of state permits.

They ignore, however, the reference to the “promulgating” of an

effluent limitation; their explanation of this provision would not

cover the latter situation. Moreover, it is unlikely that Congress

intended by this language to provide for judicial review of the

Administrator’s refusal to veto a state permit. On the contrary,

this provision was designed to permit review of the Administra-

tor’s affirmative action in “approving or promulgating any effluent

(or other) limitation.” The failure to veto a state permit would

not normally be viewed as an approval of it. Mianus River Pres-

ervation Committee v. Environmental Protection A gency, C.A. 2,

No. 75-4253, decided July 12, 1976 (state-issued permit not re-

viewable as Administrator's action under Section 509).

° See Section 505(f) (6), defining “effluent standard or limita-

tion” for the purpose of citizens’ suits to include “a permit or con-

dition thereof issued under Section 402 of this Act,”; and Section

509(b)(1)(F), providing court of appeals review of the Admin-

istrator’s action “in issuing or denying any permit under Section

402.”

43

If, as petitioners contend, effluent limitations could

be established and applied only in permits under Sec-

tion 402, the provisions for review and enforcement

of Section 301 effluent limitations would be surplus-

age, contrary to the familiar principle that statutes

must be read to give effect to each provision. United

States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-539; American

Iron & Steel Institute v. Environmental Protection

Agency, 526 F. 2d 1027 (C.A. 3); American Meat In-

stitute v. Environmental Protection Agency, 526 F. 2d

442 (C.A. 7).

*° The Eighth Circuit attempted to avoid this problem by treat-

ing the references to Section 301 in the enforcement and review

sections as limited to Section 301(f), which prohibits discharge of

poison warfare agents and high level radiological wastes. CPC

International Inc., supra, 515 F. 2d at 1043. Section 502(11) defines

an effluent limitation as “any restriction established by a State or

the Administrator * * *.” Since the restriction on discharge of

poison warfare agents and radiological waste is established by the

statute itself and not by the Administrator, it is not an effluent

limitation. It is therefore “another limitation” under the provi-

sions in Sections 505(a) (1) and 505(f) that authorize citizen suits

to enforce “an effluent limitation or other limitation under Section

301 or 302 of this Act.” American Iron & Steel Institute, supra,

526 F. 2d at 1038. The references in the citizens enforcement and

judicial review provisions to the “effluent limitations” under Sec-

tion 301 therefore are to something other than the absolute pro-

hibition in Section 301(f) against the discharge of any poison

warfare agents or radiological wastes. As we have shown in the

text (supra, pp. 41-42), they are to the effluent limitations estab-

lished by the Administrator under Section 301(b).

Petitioners contend (Br. 80) that the reference in Section

505(f) (2) to “effluent limitation or other limitation under Sec-

tion 301” is to individual variances from the effluent limitations

under that section that may be granted to permit holders under

Section 301(c); and that the citizen suits that may be brought

44

2. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP AMONG VARIOUS PROVISIONS OF THE AMEND-

MENTS CONFIRMS THE ADMINISTRATOR'S AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH

EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS UNDER SECTION 301(b)

The interrelationship among the provisions of the

Act dealing with effluent limitations (Sections 301,

302, 306, 307), guidelines for such limitations (Section

304), federal enforcement (Section 309) and permits

(Section 402), confirms that the Administrator has

authority to establish effluent limitations under Section

301, and is not limited to promulgating guidelines for

such limitations under Section 304, which are to be

applied to particular point sources solely through

permits.

Section 301(a) makes unlawful the discharge of any

pollutant **[e]xcept * * * in compliance with this see-

under Section 505(a) to challenge effluent limitations may chal-

lenge only such variances, Although Section 505(f) defines an

effluent limitation to include “a permit or condition thereof,” a

citizen suit relating to the variance presumably would challenge

the relaxation of the effluent limitation under Section 301(b) that

the variance sanctions. Such a challenge would not appear to be a

claim of violation of the effluent limitation but rather a challenge

to the variance from the limitation. Similarly, the Administrator's

grant of a variance under Section 301(c) would not appear to be

challengeable as “a failure of the Administrator to perform any

act or duty under this Act which is not discretionary with the

Administrator,” which a citizen may challenge under Section

SS (a) (2).

The grant of a variance under Section 301(c) is reviewable in

the court of appeals under Section 509(b) (1) (E) and (F) as an

action “in approving * * * any effluent limitation or other limita-

tion under section 301 * * *” or “in issuing or denying any permit

under section 402,” and not in a citizen suit under Section 505(a).

Whether a citizen could maintain an action challenging such vari-

ance would depend upon whether he is an “interested part y” under

Section 509(b) (1).

45

tion and sections 302, 306, 307, 318, 402 and 404 of this

Act.” Section 309(a) authorizes the Administrator to

enter a compliance order and to seek injunctive relief

against any person who violates “section 301, 302, 306,

. 307, or 308 of this Act, or any permit condition or

limitation implementing any of such sections in a

permit issued under section 402 of this Act by [him]

or by a State”: it also imposes civil penalties

for violation and criminal penalties for willful and

negligent violation of those provisions or of such per-

mits (Sections 309(¢) (1), 309(d)). Finally, Sections

402(a)(1) and 402(b)(1)(A) and (B) require that

permits issued by the Administrator or State must

comply with all ‘applicable requirements under sec-

tions 301, 302, 306, 307, 308 and 403 of this Act.”

The significant thing about these provisions for this

case is that none of them requires compliance with the

guidelines promulgated under Section 304, authorizes

enforcement proceedings against noncompliance

therewith, or makes such noncompliance illegal. Dis-

charges of pollutants and permits for such discharges

are required to comply with the effluent limitations in

Sections 301, 302, 307 and 308, not with the guidelines

for such limitations under Section 304."

Petitioners’ argument grossly distorts and upsets

the entire statutory plan, since it authorizes only the

*

* Section 402(d) (2), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1342(d) (2), em-

powers the Administrator to veto permits “outside the guidelines

and requirements of this Act.” However, the term “guidelines”

here refers to guidelines under Section 304(h), concerning uni-

form monitoring, reporting and information requirements, not to

Section 304(b). See section 402(c) (2), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1342

(c) (2).

46

promulgation of nonenforeeable guidelines for effluent

limitations without the binding and enforceable limita-

tions themselves which the permits are required to

meet. Congress certainly did not intend to leave such

a gaping loophole in the statute when it provided in

Section 301(e) that ‘‘[e]ffluent limitations established

pursuant to this section or section 302 of this Act shall

be applied to all point sources of discharge of pollut-

ants in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”

3. THE OTHER STATUTORY PROVISIONS UPON WHICH PETITIONERS RELY

ARE NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE ADMINISTRATOR'S AUTHORITY TO

ESTABLISH EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS UNDER SECTION 301(b)

Petitioners seek to avoid the compelling effect of

the foregoing analysis by a series of hypertechnical

argunents that focus on minor distinctions in the

wording of various sections of the Act, largely ignore

the basic structure and design of the statute, and

would seriously weaken the effectiveness of the Amend-

ments to ‘‘restore and maintain the chemical, physical,

and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters”

(Section 101(a)).

Petitioners point out (Br. 58-59) that Section 306

(b)(1)(B) requires the Administrator to “propose

and publish regulations establishing Federal stand-

ards of performance for new sources * * *,” They

argue that where Congress desired uniform national

standards, as in the case of new sources (Section 306),

it used the term “standards,” and that the absence of

that term in Sections 301 and 304 indicates that in

those sections Congress did not contemplate a uniform

standard for the entire country.

47

This semantic distinction, however, does not refute

the numerous statutory provisions discussed above

which recognize the authority of the Administrator to

promulgate effluent limitations om a national basis.

Moreover, the argument incorrectly assumes that Con-

gress intended the terms “‘limitation’’ and “standard”’

to have substantially different meanings. To the con-

trary, the statute as a whole shows that Congress used

these terms as equivalents, and did not intend the use

of one or the other to affect the scope of the Admin-

istrator’s authority.

Mor example, as shown above (p. 6), the “stand-

ards of performance” to be established for new

sources under Section 306(b), as restrictions on dis-

charge, are “effluent limitations.” Section 502(11), 33

U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1362 (11). Section 316 dealing with

thermal pollution, refers in subsection (b) to “[a]ny

standard established pursuant to section 301 or sec-

tion 306 * * *.”* Section 509(b)(1)(E), however,

provides for judicial review of the Administrator’s

action in approving or promulgating “any effluent lim-

ttation or other limitation under Section 301, 302 or

306” (emphasis added). See American Meat Institute

** Amicus Curiae American Petroleum Institute argues that the

reference to Section 301 standards means the pretreatment stand-

ards which are referred to in Sections 301(b) (1) (A) (ii) and

301(b) (2) (A) (ii). This explanation is implausible. If Congress

meant pretreatment standards, it would have referred directly to

Section 307, which governs both toxic pollutants and pretreatment

standards. Moreover, it would be anomalous for Section 301(b)

to apply to users of publicly owned treatment works, but not to

existing point sources which discharge directly to navigable

waters. See, 1 Leg. Hist. 263.

45

v. Environmental Protection Agency, supra, 526 F. 2d

at 450, n. 17.

The terms ‘‘stauidards” and ‘‘limitations’’ are also

used interchangeably in the legislative history.”

4. SECTION 2304(b) DOES NOT REQUIRE THE ADMINISTRATOR TO ESTAB-

LISH RANGES OF PERMISSIBLE POLLUTION FOR, OR SPECIFIC FACTORS

TO BE CONSIDERED BY, THE ISSUERS OF PERMITS

Petitioners also make an elaborate argument that

certain provisions of Section 304(b) are inconsistent

with the establishment of specific numerical effluent

limitations under Section 301, and therefore show that

Congress did not authorize the Administrator to es-

tablish such limitations. They centend that Section

304(b) requires the Administrator to publish guide-

lines that (1) state only a numerical range for per-

missible effluent limitations, which sets the upper and

lower limits that permits must specify, but leaves it

to the issuer of the permit to select within that range

the exact effluent limitations appropriate for the par-

ticular discharger; and (2) specify the factors upon

Which the permit issuer is to rely in setting effluent

limitations in individual permits. Both the language

of Section 304(b) and its legislative history refute

these contentions.”

* See, e.g., the Senate debate immediately preceding the vote to

override the President’s veto, where Senator Williams and Sena-

tor Percy referred to the need for uniform “effluent standards.” 1

Leg. Hist. 132, 134.

“* The court of appeals in this case and four other courts of ap-

peals have rejected this contention. American Frozen Food Insti-

tute v. Train, supra, slip op. 63; Hooker Chemicals & Plastics

49

a. Section 304(b) does not require the Administra-

tor to establish ranges of permissible polluting dis-

charges within which the issuer of permits is to set

separate effluent limitations, for particular discharg-

ers. Nothing in either Section 304(b) or Section 402

provides for the Administrator to establish a range

within which levels of permissible pollution are to be

determined, or suggests that the issuer of permits is

given discretion to set effluent limitations for partic-

ular dischargers on the basis of the Administrator's

guidelines. The statute nowhere uses the word ‘“‘range”

and, as the District of Columbia Circuit noted, ‘‘no

such requirement was enacted in statutory form.”

American Frozen Food Institute v. Train, supra, slip

op. 63.”

As noted (supra, pp. 7-8, 13, 44-45), both federai

and state permits must insure compliance with all

applicable requirements of the effluent limitations

contained in Sections 301, 302, 306 and 307; there is

no requirement, however, that such permits comply

with the guidelines for effluent limitations established

under Section 304(b). This omission of compliance

Corp. v. Train, 537 F. 2d 620, 628-629 (CLA, 2); American Meat

Institute v. Environmental Protection Agency, 526 F. 2d 442 (CLA.

7): American Petroleum Institute y. Environmental Protection

Agency, C.A. 10, No, 74-1465, decided August 11, 1976. The only

contrary decision, that of the Third Circuit in American Iron &

Steel Jastitute v. Environmental Protection Agency, 526 F. 2d

1045, upon which petitioners heavily rely, is, for the reasons set

forth in the text, erroneous.

** See also American Petroleum Institute v. Environmental Pro-

tection Agency, supra, slip op. 18-22; American Pa per Lustitute y.

Train, C.A.D.C., No. 74-1480, decided August 6, 1976.

50

with the “guidelines for effluent limitations” is high-

lighted by the express requirement in Section 402(c)

(1) that state permits must comply with the Adminis-

trator’s “guidelines issued under section 304(h)(2)”

for establishing uniform application forms, minimum

reporting requirements for discharges, and minimum

procedural requirements for monitoring and report-

ing.

No requirement to establish *‘ranges” to guide per-

mit issuers can be implied from the direction to the

Administrator in Section 304(b) to “identify in terms

of amounts of constituents and chemical, physical and

biological characteristies of pollutants, the degree of

effluent reduction attainable through the application

of the best practicable control technology currentiy

available for classes and categories of point

sources * * *.” Measuring “the degree of effluent re-

duction attainable,” in terms of amounts of constitu-

ents and characteristics of pollutants, implies the es-

tablishment of specific effluent limitations, The word

“amounts” is in the plural form not to suggest a

range of values, but to be consistent with the plural

form of “‘constitutents,” “pollutants,” and ‘classes

and categories”.

The Senate Report on the Amendments twice refers

to a “range” of discharge levels (S. Rep. No. 92-414,

supra, at 50, 2 Leg. Hist. 1468) :

In defining best practicable for any given

industrial category, the Committee expects the

Administrator to take a number of factors into

account. These factors should include the age

of the plants, their size and the unit processes

51

involved and the cost of applying such controls.

In effect, for any industrial category, the Com-

mittee expects the Administrator to define a

range of discharge levels, above a certain base

level applicable to all plants within that

category. * * *

The Administrator should establish the range

of best practicable levels based upon the aver-

age of the best existing performance by plants

of various sizes, ages, and unit processes within

each industrial category.”

Insofar as Congress expected that there would be a

*‘range’’ of permissible amounts of pollution “above a

certain base level” within a category, its expectation

has been satisfied. The Administrator has promulgated

minimum effluent limitations for designated subcate-

gories. “Ranges” of permissible pollution automati-

eally result when an entire point source category (e.1.,

“iron and steel manufacturing,” “pulp and paper

mills,” or “inorganie chemicals manufacturing” (see

Section 306(b)(1)(A)) is subdivided, and uniform

levels are set to reflect the technological conditions

within each subcategory.

While Congress desired the maximum degree of uni-

formity possible (see discussion, infra, pp. 59-67), it

realized that broad industrial “classes and categories”

are complex and diverse. Establishment of a single

<lischarge level for pollutants in any riven “category”

of industry (e.¢., “iron and steel manufacturing’)

(see Section 306(b)(1)(A)) would be unworkable.

** Senator Muskie repeated this statement during che Senate

debate on the Conference Report. 1 Leg. Hist. 169-170.

52

For each category of industry, therefore, Congress

expected a range of subeategories within which uni-

form standards could be practicably applied. Effluent

limitations for each of these subeategories, deter-

mined on the basis of the best control technology in

effect (Section 301(b)), thus provide a range cover-

ing an entire industrial category. As the Second Cir-

euit recently noted in Hooker Chemicals & Plastics

Corp. Vv. Train, supra, 5387 F. 2d at 630:

* * * Congress intended that the regulations

establish a single discharge level for a given

subeategory. This is implicit in the Congres-

sional choice of the superlative form in the

statutory language requiring achievement of

the degree of effluent reduction attainable by

application of “best” technology. * * * We * * *

believe that whenever Congress spoke of

“ranges’’ in the debates over the Act, it meant

only the spectrum comprised of varying dis-

charge levels on a subeategorical, rather than

individual, basis. [Emphasis in original. ]

Accord, American Paper Institute v. Train, supra.

Moreover, even within subcategories, specific efflu-

ent limitations constitute a minimum requirement.

More stringent limitations may be imposed by the

state or the Administrator in order to meet state water

quality standards under Sections 301(b)(1)(C) and

303; and by the states under Section 510, 33 U.S.C.

(Supp. V) 1370. Thus, as the court of appeals noted

(A. 26), **the use of a single number limitacion for

discharge permits any discharge from 0 up to the al-

lowed amount.”

a3

Indeed, if petitioners are correct that the Adminis-

trator’s guidelines must include ranges within which

the issuers of permits may set the maximum amounts

of pollution for particular point sources, there would

he little reason for the authority given the Adminis-

trator in Section 301(¢) to modify the effluent limita-

tions for 1983 under Section 301(b)(2)(A) in a per-

mit for a particular point source. As we have shown

(supra, pp. 37-38), the variance provision in Section

301(¢) contemplates that the effluent limitations es-

tablished under Section 301(b) will provide a uni-

form numerical limitation for all point sources within

a particular industrial category or class. Moreover,

formulating the guidelines in terms of a range of per-

missible pollution rather than an exact numerical lim-

itation would be inconsistent with the congressional

objective of eliminating all discharge of pollutants by

1985; with the Administrator’s authority under See-

tion 301(b)(2)(A) to prohibit any discharge of pol-

lutants in the 1983 effluent limitations: and with his

authority under Section 304(b)(3) to “identify con-

trol measures and praetices available to eliminate the

discharge of pollutants from categories and classes

of point sourees * * *,”

b. Seelion 304(b) does not require the Administra-

tor to specify in the guidelines the factors that permit

issuers are to consider in granting permits to individ-

wal dischargers. Petitioners make a related contention

based upon the language in Section 304(b) (1) (B)

that the guidelines are to “specify factors to be taken

into account in determining the control measures and

54

practices to be applicable to point sources” and to

consider a list of “[f]actors relating to the assessment

of the best practicable control technology available.”

They argue (Br. 73) that these requirements were

intended “to assure that the wide range of differences

in individual plants [be] taken into account by thie

permit authority.’’ Under their theory, the permit

issuers, instead of applying general effluent limita-

tions framed in terms of industrial classes and cate-

gories, are to apply the factors plant by plant—a

procedure that inevitably will result in wide vari

ations in permissible discharge of pollutants among

members of the same subcategory.

This argument, like the contention with respect to

the specification of ranges of permissible pollution,

just discussed, similarly undermines the basic congres-

sional purpose of establishing uniform effluent limita-

tions for industrial subeategories, which the individual

permits must meet. Indeed, the requirement of speci-

fication of factors for permit issuers which petitioners

would read into the Amendments would be unneces-

sary unless the Administrator’s guidelines also are

required to provide ranges of permissible pollution—

which, as just shown, they are not required to do.

These requirements in Section 304(b) are not in-

tended to provide guidelines for the issuance of per-

mits, but to specify the factors the Administrator is

to consider in establishing ‘‘guidelines for effluent lim-

itations’’—upon which limitations themselves to be

established under Section 301(b) will be based. See

supra, pp. 43-45. As we have noted before, it is the

55

effluent limitations and not the guidelines therefor

that are to be applied in issuing the permits.

Section 304(b)’s requirement for regulations provid-

ing guidelines for effluent limitations is ‘‘[f]or the

purpose of adopting or revising effluent limitations.”

For the 1977 step, the statute directs the Administra-

tor to specify in the regulations “factors to be taken

into acount in determining the control measures and

practices to be applicable to point sources,” and to

assess the ‘‘best practicable control technology cur-

rently available to comply with subsection (b) (1)

of Section 301 * * *.” The Administrator is to take

these factors into account in establishing the guide-

lines upon which the effluent limitations will be based,

and not it. issuing permits. The statutory directive

with respect to factors instructs the Administrator

how to prepare the guidelines and apply them in

establishing the effluent limitations under Section

301(b); it does not purport to instruct him or the

states with respect to the issuance of permits under

Section 402(b). On the contrary, the very require-

ment that he “specify” indicates that he is to make

a choice as to which factors he deems relevant to the

determination he must make concerning “the control

measures and practices to be applicable to point

sources” (Section 304(b)(1)(B)).

In addition to requiring the Administrator to spec-

ify the factors he chooses to take into account, See-

tion 304 lists factors that he must consider (Sections

304(b)(1)(B) and (b)(2)(B)). For the 1977 step,

these are “the total cost of application of technology

56

in relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be

achieved fom such application * * * the age of equip-

ment and facilities involved, the process employed,

the engineering aspects of the application of various

types of control techniques, process changes, [and |

nonwater quality environmental impact (including

energy requirements) * * *.” |

In promulgating the effluent limitation guidelines

for the inorganic chemicals manufacturing industry,

the Administrator complied with these requirements

by specifying and analyzing all the relevant factors,

including those specifically mandated by the statute.

The development document for this industry contains

hundreds of pages analyzing the factors. See, e.g., A.

Exh. Vol. 5427-5569, 5593-5643, 5771-5809, 5810-5893.

The factors were further “specified” by defining sub-

categories and subdivisions within the industry which

reflect them.” These subeategories reflect, inter alia,

the production process, type of operation, type of

equipment, final product, scale of production, age of

the source, and other technological considerations (A.

67-82). The Administrator also took into account

various economic factors affecting the industry (A.

79-80; App. Br. 18b). Each section of the regulations

notes (¢.g., App. Br. 31b, 37b, 40b, 40 C.F. 415.62,

415.72, 415.82):

In establishing the limitations set forth in

this section, EPA took into account all infor-

3? The efluent limitation for each production subcategory among

the 22 constituting the Inorganic Chemicals Manufacturing Point

Source Category is defined in a separate section of Part 415, 40

C.F.R.

57

mation it was able to collect, develop and solicit

with respect to factors (such as age and size of

pliant, raw materials, manufacturing processes,

products produced, treatment technology avail-

able, energy requirements and costs) which can

affect the industry subeategorization and ef-

fluent levels established.

The Administrator provided by regulation for in-

dividualized treatment of particular existing point

sources by authorizing the issuer of a permit to grant,

subject to his approval, limited variances from the

1977 effluent limitations upon finding that the factors

applicable to the particular discharger are funda-

mentally different from those upon which the general

effluent limitations are based.” The statute itself pro-

** See generally the Development Document (A. Exh. Vol. 5644-

5646, 5593-5643, 5645, 5771-5809, 5810-5893) and the Economic

Analysis (A. Exh, Vol. 5419A-5569). These lengthy and detailed

documents explain how the effluent limitations were derived and

the consideration given to each factor listed in Section 304(b).

* £.g., App. Br. 31b, 37b, 40b; 40 C.F.R. 415.62; 415.72; 415.82.

The variance clause recites that despite consideration of relevant

technological and economic factors affecting subcategorization and

eflluent levels, relevant data may not “have been available and, as

a result, these limitations should be adjusted for certain plants in

this industry” (App. Br. 32b). A discharger may submit evi-

dence to the state or federal permit issuer that “factors related to

such discharger are fundamentally different from the factors con-

sidered in the establishment of the guidelines” (ibid.). Limitations

which are more or less stringent than the regulations then may be

established for that discharger by the permit issuer, upon finding

that such fundamental differences exist, and upon approval by the

Administrator. See also App. Br. 17b-18b.

Whether a discharger is “fundamentally different” is determined

by reference to the Development Document which accompanies

each set of regulations. In conformance with clear congressional

intent one factor, however, cannot be considered for purposes of

1977 level variance application : the economic situation of the dis-

221-793—76—_5

58

vides in Section 301(c) for variances from the 1983

limitations and not through the specification of

factors.

Thus, Section 304 does not contemplate that the

Administrator is simply to specify factors that may

be taken into account and converted into effluent lim-

itations only through the issuance of individual per-

mits. The legislative history confirms this. The Con-

ference Report emphasized that under Section 304

(b)(1)(B), which requires the Administrator to con-

sider the cost of technology in relation to the benefits

of the effluent reductions involved, the analysis cannot

be made on a plant-by-plant basis. It may be made

only in relation to categories and subcategories of par-

ticular industries. 1 Leg. Hist. 304. As Senator Mus-

kie stated in his written explanation of this aspect of

the Report (1 Leg. Hist. 170):

The Conferees agreed upon this limited cost-

benefit analysis in order to maintain uniformity

within a elass and category of point sources

subject to effluent limitations, and to avoid tn-

posing on the Administrator any requirement

to consider the location of sources within a

category or to ascertain water quality impact

of effluent controis, or to determine the eco-

nomic impact of controls on any individual

plant in a single community.”

charger. See 39 Fed. Reg. 30073 and discussion infra, p. 58.

Such variance provisions were upheld in Natural Resources

Defense Council, Ine. vy. Environmental Protection Agency, 537

F. 2d 642 (C.A. 2).

“In a recent decision (Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, No.

74-2096, et al., decided July 16, 1978), the Fourth Circuit indi-

cated a contrary view, Explaining the court’s holding in this case

59

As the Second Cireuit correctly held in Natural Re-

sources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environmental Pro-

tection Agency, 537 F. 2d 642, 645-646, nothing

in the Act requires that effluent limitations, by vari-

ance or otherwise, must encompass wholesale reconsid-

eration at the permit granting stage of all the factors

that were assertedly considered initially by the EPA

in formulating the regulation. Such wholesale recon-

sideration was never the intent of Congress.

B. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1972 AMENDMENTS

CONFIRMS THAT THE ADMINISTRATOR HAS AUTHORITY

TO ESTABLISH EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS UNDER SECTION

301(b) FOR CLASSES AND CATEGORIES OF POINT SOURCES

Any doubt still remaining about the Administrator’s

authority under Section 301 to establish effluent limi-

tations for classes and cater “ies of point source pol-

lution is dispelled by the legistative history of the 1972

(A. 253) that the Administrator's effluent limitations are “pre-

sumptively applicable to permit applications,’ Appalachian

Power further states (slip op. 15) : “Thus, the issuer of a permit,

under § 402 may consider whether a particular applicant is to be

held strictly to the confines of the agency’s regulations. The burden

of proof remains upon the applicant, however. Only after he has

established the inappropriateness of the regulations as applied to

him, for example, employing the generic factors of $§ 304, 306 or

any specific variance clauses promulgated thereunder, need the

permit issuer go beyond the regulations” (emphasis added). In-

sofar as the foregoing language invites reconsideration by the

permit issuer of factors already considered by the Administrator

in establishing effluent limitations under Section 301 for existing

sources, and under Section 306 for new sources, the Fourth Cir-

cuit’s analysis is inconsistent with the statute. The correct view is

stated by the Second Circuit in Natural Resources Defense Coun-

cil, Ine. v. Environmental Protection Agency, supra.

60

Amendments. That history shows that Congress in-

tended the Administrator to set effluent limitations

under Section 301(b) on the basis of industrial sub-

categories, not on a plant-by-plant basis, and that it

intended the effluent limitations to be uniform within

each subeategory—a uniformity that could not be

achieved if effluent limitations could be established

only in permits.

There were differences in the bills passed by the

House and the Senate,’ which were resolved in con-

ference (1 Leg. Hist. 161-279). S. Conf. Rep. No.

92-1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (1 Leg Hist. 281-

339). The bill was passed over the President’s veto “

(1 Leg. Hist. 95-136).

The Conference Report stated with respect to the

effluent limitations to be achieved under Section 301

(1 Leg. Hist. 304):

The conferees intend that the Administrator

or the State, as the case may be, will make the

determination of the economic impact of an

effluent limitation on the basis of classes and

categories of point sources, as distinguished

from a plant by plant determination.“

** See H.R. 11896, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (1 Leg. Hist. 893-

1110): and H.R. Rep. No. 92-911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (1

Leg. Ilist. 753-888); S. Rep. No. 92-414, supra (2 Leg. Hist.

1415-1533).

*? The President objected on budgetary grounds (1 Leg. Hist.

137).

nt he Conference Report also contemplated that the Admin-

istrator could waive applicable 1983 effluent limitations for par-

ticular existing point sources ( 1 Leg. Hist. 304) : “However, after

July 1, 1977, the owner or operator of a plant may seek relief from

61

In discussing the closely related provisions of Sec-

tion 304(b), governing regulations providing guide-

lines for effluent limitations, the report said (1 Leg.

Hist. 309):

Except as provided in section 301(c) of this

Act, the intent of the Conferees is that efflu-

ent limitations applicable to individual point

sources within a given category or class be

as uniform as possible. The Administrator is

expected to be precise in his guidelines under

subsection (b) of this section, so as to assure

that similar point sources with similar charac-

teristics, regardless of their location or the na-

ture of the water into which the discharge is

made, will meet similar effluent limitations.

Senator Muskie, on presenting the Conference Re-

port to the Senate, reiterated this purpose to require

each point source within a category or class to meet

nationally uniform effluent limitations (1 Leg. Hist.

162-163) :

Senators will recall from the November de-

bate on the Senate bill that there were three

essential elements to it: Uniformity, finality,

and enforceability. Without these elements a

new law would not constitute any improvement

on the old; we would not bring a conference

agreement to the floor without them.

the requirement to achieve effluent limitations based on best avail-

able technology economically achievable. The burden will be on

him to show that modified requirements will represent the maxi-

mum use of technology within his economic capability and will

result in reasonable further progress toward the elimination of

the discharge of pollutants, If he makes this showing, the Ad-

ministrator may modify the requirements applicable to him.”

62

As far as uniformity and finality are con-

cerned, the conference agreement provides that

each polluter within a category or class of in-

dustrial sources will be required to achieve

nationally uniform efiluent limitations based on

“best practicable” technology no later than

July 1, 1977. This does not mean that the Ad-

ministrator cannot require compliance by an

earlier date; it means that these limitations

must be achieved no later than July 1, 1977,

that they must be uniform, and that they will

be final upon the issuance of a permit under

63

as specifically authorized in the bill. The bill

establishes a Federal-State discharge permit

program. All permits issued under this pro-

gram shall be consistent with the specific re-

quirements of the bill, including effluent limita-

tions or other limitations, national standards of

performance, toxic and pretreatment standards,

and ocean discharge guidelines.

In explaining the provision of Section 402 requir-

ing permits to ensure compliance with “all the appli-

cable requirements of sections 301, 302, 306, 307, 308,

316 and 403 * * *”, the Report stated (1 Leg. Hist.

section 402 of the bill.

* * * * *

The third critical element that concerned the

Senate in its consideration of this legislation

was enforceability. Enforceability is assured

through the provisions of the permit program

and through section 309, the enforcement sec-

tion of the act. The Administrator has the re-

sponsibility to determine the effluent limitations |

to be applied to each category or class of polliu-

ter, to set forth those limitations in a permit

issued pursuant to section 402 of the act, and

to enforce those limitations through the provi-

sions of section 309.

The congressional intent shown in the Conference

Report that uniform effluent limitations would be es-

tablished also was reflected in the House and Senate

treatment of the bill. In its general synopsis of the

bill, the House Report characterized the relationship

between Sections 301 and 402 as follows (1 Leg. Hist.

761):

[The bill] [d]eclares to be unlawful the dis-

charge of any pollutant by any person except

812-813) :

The Committee points out * * * that the

term “applicable” used in section 402 has two

meanings. It means that the requirement which

the term “applicable” refers to must be perti-

nent and apply to the activity and the require-

ment must v2 in existence by having been pro-

mulgated or implemented.

The Committee further recognizes that the

requirements under sections 301, 302, 306, 307,

308, 316 and 403 will not all be promulgated im-

mediately upon enactment of this bill. Neverthe-

less, it would be unreasonable to delay issuing

of permits until all the implementing steps

are necessary. Therefore, subsection (a) (2)

provides that prior to the taking of the nec-

essary implementing actions relating to all

such requirements, the Administrator may

issue permits during this interim period with

such conditions as he determines are necessary

to carry out the provisions of this Act. [ Empha-

sis added. ]

64

Similarly, in discussing the provision that compli-

ance with a permit would be deemed compliance with

various statutory requirements, the Report again re-

flected the expectation that effluent limitations would

be promulgated under Section 301 (1 Leg. Hist. 815) :

Subsection (7) [now (k)] [of section 402]

provides that compliance with a permit issued

pursuant to section 402 shall be considered to

be compliance for purposes of sections 309 and

005, with section 301, 302, 306, 307, 316 and

403 * * *. The purpose of this provision is to

assure that the mere promulgation of any ef flu-

ent limitation or other limitation, a standard, or

a thermal discharge regulation, by itself will

not subject a person holding a valid permit to

prosecution. However, once such a requirement

is actually made a condition of the permit, then

the permittee will be held to comply with the

terms thereof. [Emphasis added. ]

The Senate Committee Report reflected the same

view. In discussing the two-step program in Section

301(b) “for applying effluent limits,” the first based on

the best practicable technology “to be implemented by

1976” and the second based on the best available tech-

nology, with a goal of no discharge “to be implemented

by 1981” (S. Rep. No. 92-414, supra, at 8, 2 Leg. Hist.

1426), the Report stated (2 Leg. Hist. 1468) :

It is the Committee’s intention that pursuant

to subsection 301(b)(1)(A), and Section 304(b)

the Administrator will interpret the term “best

practicable’? when applied to various categories

of industries as a basis for specifying clear and

precise effluent limitations to be implemented

by January 1, 1976. [Emphasis added.]

65

Senator Bentsen, a member of the Senate Public

Works Committee which drafted the bill, made clear

that the Administrator was to establish Section 301

limitations (2 Leg. Hist. 1283) :

In phase I, for point sources of pollutants,

effluent limits shall be established not later than

January 1, 1976 [now July 1, 1977], which

comply with specifically defined levels of efflu-

ent control and treatment. As defined in section

301(b)(1) of the bill, and as elaborated in the

regulations which we anticipate the Adminis-

trator shall issue pursuant to section 301 and

section 304, these 1976 [now 1977] goals shall

be at least * * * the “best practicable control

technology currently available’? for other [in-

dustrial] point sources * * *, [ Emphasis

added. |

When the President considered the bill, Mr. Ruck-

elshaus, who was the first Adininistrator of the En-

vironmental Protection Agency, advised the President

that ‘the Administration proposed that ‘standards be

amended to impose precise effluent requirements on all

industrial sources.’ The enrolled bill has done so’’ (1

Leg. Hist. 156).

The legislative history thus shows that Congress in-

tended to remedy the inadequacies of previous pollu-

tion control by having the Administrator promulgate

uniform national effluent standards under Section 301

(b), on the basis of subcategories of industry, and not

by applying generalized guidelines to individual pol-

luters through permits. The permit program was in-

tended to be the method for implementing and enfore-

66

ing the effluent limitations already established under

Section 301(b), not for establishing those limitations.“

Congress wisely adopted this procedure for achiev-

ing uniform national effluent standards. If effluent

limitations could be imposed only through the permit

program, it would be virtually impossible to produce

the national uniformity in controlling pollution that

Congress sought to achieve. Wide variations in per-

missible limits of pollution within a single subcate-

gory of industry would result.

In the absence of uniform, binding effluent limita-

tions, the permit issuing official would essentially start

over again, engaging in largely redundant reconsid-

eration of all the factors and information the Admin-

istrator considered in establishing the regulations. Not

only would the final permits reflect the varying views

of the 27 States with approved permit programs, but

each such State would be forced to hold lengthy ad-

judicatory procedures to consider anew the effluent

limitations which the Amendments require. Since each

point source must achieve the best practicable control

technology currently available by Ju!y 1, 1977, and the

best available technology economically achievable by

** Petitioners cha!!cige the authority of the foregoing legis-

lative history. relying primarily on an article by the former

General Ceunsel of the Environmental Protection Agency sug-

gesting that the legislative history contains so many conflict-

ing statements as to render it unreliable (Br. 61-63). This

Court, however, has always recognized the relevance and im-

portance of the statements in Committee Reports and by the

principal sponsors of, and spokesmen for, the legislation in de-

termining its meaning. See, e.g., Train v. Colorado Pubiic J-

terest Research Group, No. 74-1270, decided June 1, 1976.

67

July 1, 1983, Congress did not intend the Adminis-

trator and the State permit issuers to consider anew

in licensing proceedings the same factors that the Ad-

ministrator had already considered in promulgating

the guidelines under Section 304(b) and twice to

make the necessarily complex and difficult analyses

required.

Under petitioners’ approach, the nationally uni-

form control of pollution that Congress intended to

accomplish in the 1972 Amendments would be frus-

trated. Moreover, the delays resulting from petition-

ers’ interpretation would thwart, if not render

impossible, the attainment of the deadlines which

Congress established.

C. ESTABLISH MENT BY THE ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERALLY

APPLICABLE EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS WOULD NOT CUR-

TAIL OR WEAKEN THE ROLE CONGRESS INTENDED THE

STATES TO HAVE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE FED-

ERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS

Petitioners contend that establishment of generally

applicable effluent limitations by the Administrator is

inconsistent with the congressional policy reflected in

the Amendments to preserve the rights and respon-

sibilities of the states in controlling pollution, plan-

ning land use, and regulating their water resources.

Section 101(b), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1251(b). They

assert that state permit-issuing authorities will be re-

duced to “mere seriveners” (Pet. Br. 58), if they are

bound by nationally uniform minimum effluent limi-

tations.

68

The Amendments, however, contain elaborate and

complex provisions for the participation of the states

in the processes of formulating effluent limitations

and of issuing permits. These provisions are consist-

ent with, and indeed contemplate, the establishment of

hasie effluent limitations by the Administrator.

Section 303 of the Amendments, 33 U.S.C. (Supp.

V) 1313, requires the states to develop water quality

standards for all their waters, and then to survey those

waters to ascertain whether the Administrator’s eftlu-

ent limitations under Section 301(b) for the period

beginning in 1977 are sufficiently stringent to ensure

the attainment and maintenance of such quality. See-

tion 303(d)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1313(d) (1)

(A). If they are not, the state must establish for the

particular waters involved a total maximum daily load

of pollutants, which the discharges permitted under

federal or state permits cannot exceed. Section 303(d)

(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 13813 (d)(1)(C).

When a permit for a specific point source is under

consideration, the Administrator’s effluent limitations

under Section 301(b) will govern the permit only if

those limitations will meet the state water quality

standards.” If not, the permit must impose “more

stringent” limitations. Section 301(b)(1)(C), 33

U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1811(b)(1)(C). Thus, more string-

ent limitations based on state requirements may fre-

quently supersede the federal limitations.

**See 1 Leg. Hist. 209 (statement of Senator Tunney), 238,

353, 488, 724 (statements of Representatives Jones, Blatnik,

Wright and Robison).

69

Under Section 304(a) and (b), the Administrator is

required to consult with the states on water quality

criteria and effluent guidelines. Under Section 309

(a)(1), the Administrator may refer violations of a

state-issued permit to the state before he seeks to

remedy the violation. Although the Administrator has

the initial responsibility to issue NPDES permits

under Section 402(a), the states may assume this

function under a state permit program, approved by

the Administrator, which meets the standards speci-

fied in Section 402(b), including compliance with the

effluent limitation provisions of the Amendments in

Sections 301 (existing sources), 306 (new sources),

307 (toxic discharges), 308 (inspection, monitoring

and reports) and 403 (ocean discharge criteria). See-

tion 402(b). Conversely, the Administrator cannot

issue a permit unless the state in which the permit

applicant is located certifies, or refuses or fails to

certify, that the permit will assure compliance with

applicable provisions of Sections 301, 302, 306 and

307, state water quality requirements and any other

appropriate requirement of state law, or certifies that

there is no limitation or standard applicable under

these provisions." Section 40l(a)(1), 33 U.S.c.

(Supp. V) 1541(a) (1).

The 27 states operating approved programs

(“NPDES states”) (see p. 36, supra) perform the

* Under Section 208, states also have primary responsibility

for controlling “non-point sources” of pollution (e.g. run-off

from open lots). Section 208(b) (2), 33 U.S.C, (Supp. V)

1288(b) (2).

70

same fwnetions as the Regional Administrators of the

Environmental Protection Agency, to whom the Ad-

ministrator has delegated his permit-issuing author-

ity in the remaining states. 40 C.F.R. 125.4. These 27

states have important functions in applying the Ad-

ministrator’s effluent limitations in the permits they

issue to individual dischargers. They must “provide an

opportunity for public hearing before ruling on each

application.” Section 402(b) (3). They must determine

the subeategory in which the point source falls—a

task which may involve sophisticated technological

analysis, particularly when multi-process plants are in-

volved.” They must also determine such variables as

production rate or wastewater flow rate, in order to

translate limitations expressed, for example, in

pounds of pollutant per ton of production into an

exact number.”

A particularly important state function involves

application of the variance clause established by the

regulations for the 1977 level of effluent limitations

under Section 301 (see discussion supra, Pp. 57, n. 39).

The state NPDES authority must determine whether

for a particular point source there exists a “funda-

mentally different factor” and, if so, ascertain the ex-

* Quite frequently, the permit issuer will find that, while a

point source is generally subject to an EPA effluent limitation,

some portion of its discharge is not. The permit will, therefore,

in part reflect an ad hoc determination of the appropriate limi-

tations. In the case of complex sources, two or more effluent

limitations may apply and determination of the permit limita-

tions will require a weighted application of the limitations.

©The regulations challenged in this case are in this form.

See, e.g. 40 C.F.R, 415.62, 415.92, 415.152; App. Br. 33b, 46b, 54b.

71

tent to which the effluent limitations should be ad-

justed accordingly (ibid).

The NPDES state is also responsible for determin-

ing a very important type of “effluent limitation”—

the schedule of compliance.” A compliance schedule

is a “schedule of remedial measures including an en-

forceable sequence of actions or operations leading

to compliance with an effluent limitation, other limi-

tation, prohibition, or standard.” Section 502(17),

33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1362(17). The authority to set

compliance schedules is critical, since the timing by

which a source achieves compliance with the Admin-

istrator’s eftluent limitations will have important fiscal

and social implications. In establishing a compliance

schedule, NPDES states have the exclusive power to

set interim eftluent limitations which existing sources

must achieve prior to the effective dates of the federal

effluent limitations for 1977 and 1983. Sections 402

(b)(1) and 502(17), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1342(b)

(1) and 1362(17).”

Finally, the state permit-issuing authority also is

responsible for establishing specific monitoring and

* Qn this basis alone, the District of Columbia Circuit re-

jected the argument that state permit granting would be a “cleri-

cal rubber stamping exercise.” American Paper Institute v. Train,

No. 74-1480, decided August 6, 1976, slip op. 15-16.

Bs Section 502(11), 38 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1362(11), includes

“schedules of compliance” in the definition of eflluent limita-

tions.

* Although Congress anticipated that establishment of efflu-

ent limitations would precede issuance of most NPDES per-

mits, because of the short deadlines in the Amendments, federal

and state permit-issuers need not delay permits until those

limitations have been promulgated. See 1 Leg. Hist. 813.

72

reporting requirements, without which enforcement of

the permit would be impossible (Section 402(b) (2)

(B)).

The many ways in which states establish permit

conditions, including schedules of compliance and

Water quality-based effluent limitations, account for

the references in the Amendments and its legislative

history to the “establishment” of “limitations” by

states. But this power is supplementary to, not exelu-

sive of, the Administrator’s primary responsibility

under Sections 301, 304, 306 and 307 to establish mni-

form national technology-based limitations for point

sources of pollution. Section 510 declares that except

as expressly provided, nothing in the Amendments

shall preclude a state or political subdivision from

adopting or enforcing “any standard or limitation

respecting discharges of pollutants * * *,’ [¢ further

provides, however, that “if an effluent limitation * * *

is in effect under this Act,” the state and its subdi-

visions “may not adopt or enforce any effluent limi-

tation * * * which is less stringent * * *.’’ As noted

above (see discussion supra, p. 40), this provision

contemplates that minimum effluent limitations will

be established by someone other than the state, t.e., by

the Administrator.

** Petitioners argue (Br. 82-83) that if the Administrator has

authority to establish uniform effluent limitations that bind the

states in issuing permits, there would be no need for the Admin-

istrator’s authority under Section 402(d) to veto the issuance

of any particular state permit. That authority, however, serves

the importan: function of enabling the Administrator to bar

any state permit that does not comply with the effiuent limita-

73

II

THE ADMINISTRATOR EMPLOYED AN APPROPK.ATE PROCE-

DURE IN COMBINING THE PROMULGATION OF GUIDELINES

UNDER SECTION 304 AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF

EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS UNDER SECTION 301 INTO A

SINGLE PROCEEDING

Section 304(b) requires the Administrator to pub-

lish guidelines for effluent limitations within one year

of the enactment of the statute, i.e., by October 18,

1973. Section 301 requires the achievement of effluent

limitations for existing point sources, based on the

best practicable technology currently available, by

July 1, 1977. These requirements, which apply to the

whole of American industry, posed an enormous task,

which the Administrator was required to accomplish

within a short time.

As the record in this case shows, the kind of in-

depth analysis of the sources of pollution and the best

available technology for controlling it which the

Amendments intended required massive study. Al-

though the Amendments seemingly contemplate that

the Administrator first would promulgate the guide-

lines and then convert them to effluent limitations, the

short period within which he had to complete both of

these actions made it impracticable to do so. Instead,

he followed the preeminently practical procedure in

tions he has established under Section 301(b). Although hope-

fully all state authorities will comply with those limitations in

issuing permits, cases may arise where they fail to do so, and

the Administrator then can use his veto power to insure state

compliance with the effluent limitations in the particular case.

221-793—-746—_46

74

dealing with all industries of combining both steps

into a single proceeding at the end of which he made

a single determination embodying the guidelines and

the effluent limitations.

The Administrator’s decision to follow this pro-

cedure was a reasonable one in the circumstances. It

reflects his expert judgment as to the most effective

procedures for making this novel, complicated and

complex statute operative in a short time. His deter-

mination was an integral part of setting the statute’s

‘machinery in motion, of making the parts work ef-

ficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and

new,’’ and his view that the statute authorizes this

procedure is therefore entitled to substantial weight.

Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the four

courts of appeals that have considered this question

have upheld the Administrator’s action in combining

into a single proceeding the establishment of the

guidelines under Section 304 and the effluent limita-

tions under Section 301. American Frozen Food Insti-

tute v. Train, C.A.D.C., No. 74-1464, et al., decided

May 11, 1976, slip op. 38-41; Hooker Chemical &: Plas-

fies Corp. v. Train, 537 F. 2d 620, 628-629 (C.A. 2);

American Petroleum Institute v. Environmental Pro-

tection Agency, C.A. 10, No. 74-1465, et al., decided

August 11, 1976, slip op. 14-15, and the decision in

this case (A. 260).

Petitioners can point to no prejudice they suffered

75

from the procedures the Administrator followed. In

August 1973 the Administrator published a prelimi-

nary notice with respect to the promulgation of guide-

lines and effluent limitations, in which he explained the

procedures and methodology he proposed to follow

(supra, p. 1©) In October 1973, he published a

notice of proposed rulemaking which included spe-

cifie numerical effluent limitations for each of the

22 subcategories of the inorganie chemicals manu-

facturing industry (supra, p. 16). The notice

gave all interested parties the opportunity to com-

ment on the rules and petitioners did so. The actual

effuent limitations were promulgated in March 1974

(supra, p. 19).

Petitioners thus had full opportunity to be heard

with respect to both the guidelines and the effluent lim-

itations before the Administrator promulgated them.

They would have been no better off in making their

objections to the guidelines and limitations known to

the Administrator if he had dealt with these subjects

in two separate proceedings, and not established the

effuent limitations until after the guidelines had been

promulgated. The latter procedure, however, as we

have indieated, would have seriously interfered with

the Administrator’s ability to get under way the pol-

lution control program directed by Congress within

the time limits Congress had set.

This Court last Term upheld a similar combination

into a single proceeding of administrative determina-

76

tions which the statute seemingly contemplated would

be made in separate steps. Section 7(b) of the Natural

Gas Act, 52 Stat. 821, prohibits a natural-gas company

from abandoning any facility without a determination

by the Federal Power Commission that the public con-

venience and necessity permits the abandonment. In

Federal Power Commission vy. M oss, 424 U.S. 484, the

Court upheld a Commission order which “upon a

proper finding of publie convenience or necessity,

simultaneously authorize[d] both the sale of natural

gas in interstate commerce by a producer and the

abandonment of the sale at a future date certain”

(id. at 496). The Court reasoned that “ [i]n the absence

of an explicit direction [in the Natural Gas Act! the

inference may reasonably be made that Congress leit

the timing of the finding within the general disere-

tionary power granted the FPC ‘to regulate abandon-

ment of service’ * * * ‘(T]he Commission’s broad re-

sponsibilities ... demand a generous construction of

its statutory authority’ * * * and that inference is

plainly consistent with Congress’ regulatory goals.”

424 U.S. at 500. This reasoning is equally applicable

to the Administrator’s combining Sections 301 and

304(b) determinations into a single proceeding.

Petitioners argue (Br. 31-36), however, that the Ad-

ministrator did not comply with Section 304(b) be-

cause he did not issue formal “regulations” providing

“guidelines for effluent limitations,” as that section

requires him to do. Although the Development Doecu-

ments containing the technological data were not

formally designated as “regulations,” they, together

77

with the preamble to the formal regulations in issue

and the regulations themselves which specify “the de-

gree of effluent reduction’? to be achieved (Section

304(b)(1)(A) and (b) (2)(A), in practical effect

met the requirements of Section 304(b). As detailed

in the statement supra, pp. 10-11, 13-21), the proce-

dures the Administrator followed in promulgating

the guidelines were no different from those he would

have followed had he promulgated them as formal

“regulations.” The Administrator’s actions in this case

fully complied with the procedures and standards that

Congress contemplated and intended for the establish-

ment of guidelines and effluent limitations, and they

are not invalid merely because he failed to attach the

label “‘regulations” to all documents which constitute

the guidelines.”

It

THE COURTS OF APPEALS HAVE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION

TO REVIEW EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS PROMULGATED BY

THE ADMINISTRATOR UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE

AMENDMENTS, WHICH INCLUDES JURISDICTION TO RE-

VIEW THE GUIDELINES UNDER SECTION 304, WHICH

WERE PROMULGATED IN THE SAME PROCEEDING AS THE

EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS

Section 509(b)(1) of the Amendments, 33 U.S.C.

(Supp. V) 1369(b) (1), provides in pertinent part:

Review of the Administrator’s action * * * (E)

in approving or promulgating any effluent limi-

tation or other limitation under section 301

** As petitioners recognize, the effluent limitations were estab-

lished by regulations. App. Br. lb; see id. at 2b, 20b.

78

* * * may be had by any interested person in

the Circuit Court of Appeals * * *.

The foregoing provision in terms covers the Admin-

istrator’s promulgation of effluent limitations under

Section 301. Under well-settled principles, this juris-

diction of the court of appeals is exclusive. Cf. Whit-

ney Bank v. Bank of New Orleans, 379 U.S. 411, 420-

422; Fort Worth Nat. Corp. v. Federal Savings &

Loan Ins. Corp., 469 F. 2d 47, 52 (C.A. 5); H.R. Rep.

No. 2122, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).

As this Court stated in Whitney Bank, supra, 379

U.S. at 420:

[W]here Congress has provided statutory re-

view procedures designed to permit agency ex-

pertise to be brought to bear on particular

problems, those procedures are to be exclusive.

* * * To permit a district court to make the

initial determination of a plan’s propriety

would substantially decrease the effectiveness

of the statutory design.

Petitioners argue (Br. 87), however, that since the

Administrator has no authority to establish effluent

limitations under Section 301, the courts of appeals

have no jurisdiction to review them. We have an-

swered the premise of that argument in points I and

II above; since, as we have shown, the Administrator

has that power, his exercise of it is reviewable in the

courts of appeals. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the

courts of appeals to review the Administrator’s eftlu-

ent limitations necessarily includes the threshold de-

termination whether he has the power to establish

79

them. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401

U.S. 402, 415. Indeed, petitioners apparently recog-

nize (Br. 85) that, if the Administrator has that au-

thority, its exercise is reviewable in the courts of ap-

peals and not in the district courts.

Petitioners’ main contention on the jurisdictional

question relates to review of the Administrator’s

guidelines for effluent limitations promulgated under

Section 304(b). They argue that even if the Admin-

istrator has authority to promulgate effluent limiia-

tions under Section 301 (which are reviewable in the

courts of appeals), the guidelines upon which those

limitations are based are reviewable only in the dis-

trict courts. Their argument produces the anomalous

result that even though the Administrator promul-

gated the guidelines and limitations almost simulta-

neously in a single proceeding, and even though the

two are inextricably intertwined since the effluent lim-

itations are determined by applying the guidelines to

particular industrial subcategories, the two sets of

actions nevertheless are to be reviewed in different

courts.

The Administrator formulated the guidelines and

the effluent limitations in a single proceeding and

promulgated both of them simultaneously as compo-

nent parts of a single determination. The guidelines

contained the technological information upon which

the effluent limitations were based and which they in-

corporated; they were an integral part and an essen-

tial element of the effluent limitations. They were basi-

80

cally a preliminary but indispensable step in the Ad-

ministrator’s ultimate establishment of the effluent

limitations.

In these circumstances, the guidelines are review-

able together with the effluent limitations only in the

courts of appeals, and not in the district courts. This

conclusion follows from the language of the statute

and the seriously adverse consequences upon its proper

administration that would result from the bifureated

review that petitioners propose.

Section 509(b)(1) provides for review of “the Ad-

ministrator’s action * * * in promulgating any efflu-

ent limitation.” As the court of appeals held (A.

250), one of the Administrator’s actions in estab-

lishing the eftluent limitations for the inorganic

chemicals manufacturing industry was the issuance of

the guidelines upon which those limitations were

based. Those guidelines, it reasoned, are “the key to

the attainment of the objectives set forth in § 301”

(ibid.). They are therefore exclusively reviewable in

the courts of appeals under Section 509(b) (1).

The divided review that petitioners espouse would

thwart the congressional intent that reduction and

then elimination of pollution of the Nation’s waters

be accomplished as soon as possible. The first and

hasie step in meeting this objective is, as we have ex-

plained above, the establishment on a national uni-

form basis of (1) guidelines under Section 304 for

effluent limitations and (2) specifie numerical effluent

limitations based upon those guidelines. The limita-

tions, in turn, would be the basis for the specifie re-

81

ductions (specified in permits) that individual pol-

luters are required to make in their effluent discharges

by 1977 and 1983. If the national standards are to

accomplish their purpose, they must be final and

effective as soon as possible. See Natural Resources

Defense Council, Ine. v. Train, 510 F. 2d 692, 704-705

(C.A.D.C.).

Congress sought to accomplish the latter objective

by requiring in Section 909(b)(1) that any petition

to review the Administrator's action in approving or

promulgating any effluent limitation must be filed

within 90 days, unless based solely on grounds occur-

ring after the ninetieth day.* The Amendments

further provide that actions of the Administrator so

reviewable are not reviewable in any civil or criminal

enforcement proceeding (Section 509(b) (2)). As the

Senate Committee Report on the bill explained: ‘‘In

order to maintain the integrity of the time Sequences

provided throughout the Act, * * * any review sought

must be filed wickin 30 [now 90] days of the date of

the challenged promulation * * *” (2 Leg. Hist. 1503).

See also, American Meat Institute vy. Environmental

Protection Agency, su pra, 526 F.2d at 452."

= This 90-day limitation covers not only effluent limitations

for existing sources of pollution established under Section 301,

but also those for new sources established under Section 306, for

toxic pollutants and for users of municipally owned treatment

works established under Section 307, and for permits incorporat-

ing those limitations issued under Section 402.

be In this proceeding the Administrator promulgated guide-

lines for effluent limitations to be achieved by both 1977 and

1983. Petitioners argue (Br. 80-82) that Congress did not intend

82

Petitioners’ proposal for bifureated review would

upset the carefully drawn system of judicial review

that Congress provided in order to insure prompt de-

termination of the validity of the Administrator’s ac-

tions in setting national standards for effluent limita-

tions. Unlike the 90-day limit upon court of appeals’

review, there is no time limit for suits in the district

courts. Permitting review of the guidelines initially

in the district courts, followed hy court of appeals’ re-

view of those decisions, would delay the effectiveness

of the national standards. Furthermore, uniform

standards could be achieved more effectively and more

expeditiously by direct review in the 11 courts of

appeals than by initial review in the 94 district courts.

Petitioners’ theory would produce the anomalous s-:-

uation that, although the effluent limitations and the

permits applying them would be reviewed in the courts

of appeals, the underlying guidelines upon which those

limitations rest would be reviewed initially in the dis-

trict courts. As the court of appeals pointed out in this

the latter guidelines to be reviewed at this time, and that the

90-day limitation on court of appeals’ review thus shows that

those courts were not to review the guidelines.

There is nothing in the language of the Act, its design or its

legislative history that indicates that Congress intended to defer

review of the guidelines for 1983 to some future date. To the con-

trary, since the Administrator promulgated the guidelines for

both periods simultaneously, any review of them also should be

had simultaneously. Moreover, the arguments against permitting

the delay in implementing the Administrator’s limitations on

effluent discharges that petitioners’ bifurcated review would create

are equally applicable to the 1983 standards as to those for 1977.

Indeed, in selecting the methods by which they wili achieve the

latter restrictions, dischargers also will have to consider the

former,

83

case (A. 249), under petitioners’ theory an operator

of a single plant would be required to institute two

separate but concurrent actions—one in the district

court and one in the court of appeals—to challenge

the Administrator’s simultaneous actions under See-

tions 301, 304 and 306 affecting the plant (A. 250).

Congress did not intend the judicial review provisions

of the 1972 Amendments to produce such delaying

and cumbersome results. *

In view of these considerations, it is not surprising

that all but one of the seven circuits that have reviewed

challenges to the Administrator’s guidelines and eftlu-

ent limitations have held that they have jurisdiction

to review those regulations.” Indeed, in every case in

which the district court dismissed a suit challenging

those regulations for lack of jurisdiction, the plaintiff

**The Administrative Conference of the United States has

recommended direct review in the courts of appeals of agency

rules “whenever (i) an initial district court decision respecting

the validity of a rule will ordinarily be appealed or (ii) the

public interest requires prompt, authoritative determination of

the validity of the rule.” Administrative Conference of the

United States, Recommendation No. 75-3 (adopted June 5-6,

1975) 1974-75 Report, Administrative Conference of the United

States, March 1976, pp. 42-46. Both conditions apply here. See also

Currie and Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative

Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 Col. L. Rev. 1 (1975) ;

Jatte, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 158-159 (1965) ;

Note, Jurisdiction to Review Federal Administrative Action:

District Court or Court of Appeals, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 980, 984-

985 (1975).

*? In addition to the instant case, see American Frozen Food

Institute v. Train, C.A. D.C., Nos. 74-1464, et al., decided May 11,

1976; Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F. 2d 620

(C.A. 2) American Iron & Steel Institute vy. Environmen-

84

also had filed a petition to review in the court of

appeals, * as petitioners did here.”

tal Protection Agency, 526 F. 2d 1027 (C.A. 3) ; American Meat

Institute v. Environmental Protection Agency, 526 F. 2d 442

(C.A. 7); American Petroleum Institute v. Train. 526 F.2d 1343

(C.A. 10). Contra: CPC International Inc. v. T vain, 515 F. 2d

1032 (C.A. 8).

**In addition to the present case see: American Paper Insti-

tute v. Train, 381 F. Supp. 553 (D.D.C.) (pulp and paper

regulations), petition for review, C.A. D.C., Nos. 74-1480, et al.,

decided August 6, 1976; American Petroleum Institute v. Train,

7 E.R.C. 1795 (D. Colo.) (petroleum refining regulations), peti-

tion for review decided August 11, 1976, C.A. 10, No. 74-1465;

The Anaconda Co, v. Environmental Protection A gency, D. Mont.,

No. CV 75-69-BU (unreported) (appeal pending, C.A. 9, No. 76-

163) (nonferrous metals regulations), petition for review, C.A.

9, No. 75-2170, transferred, C.A. 10, No. 75-1605 ; HIomestake Min-

ing Co. v. Train, D. S.D., No. CIV 76-5011 (ore mining and dress-

ing regulations), petition for review, C.A. 10, Nos. 76-1287, 76-

1242; Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 415 F. Supp. 70 (W.D. Cal.) (petro-

leum refining regulations), appeal pending, C.A. 9, No. 76-1870,

petition for review dismissed, C.A. 9, No. 75-2070 because regula-

tions under review in Tenth Circuit.

Seven district court actions remain pending. In four of them,

petitions for review are also pending in the courts of appeals.

Laupahoehoe Sugar Co. v. Train, D. Hawaii, No. 75-0159,

petition for review of the sugar processing regulations pend-

ing in the Ninth Cireuit, No. 75-2252; Sierra Club vy. Train, TD.

D.C., No. 76-1026, petition for review of the iron and steel Phase

IT regulations pending in the Third Circuit. No. 76-1749; Interna-

tional Paper Co. v. Train, E.D. Ark., No. BP-76-C-212, petitions

for review pending, C.A. D.C., Nos. 76-1689, 76-1676. The remain-

ing four all arose in the Eighth Circuit. Two of them involve. in

part, challenges to a regulation which the Seventh Circuit

sustained in American Meat Institute v. Environmental Protec-

tion Agency, 526 F. 2d 442; American Association of Meat Proces-

sors Vv. Train, D. Neb., No. 75-0-894; and N.I.M.P.A. v. Train. D.

Neb., No. 75-0-369. One of the two remaining actions is pending in

the district court and the other is on appeal to the Kigith

Circuit. National Renderers Ass'n vy. Train, D. Neb., No. 75-0-

(* Footnote 59 is on p. 85 of this brief.)

85

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court

of appeals should be affirmed, in part, except in the

482), Grain. Processing Corp. v. Train, 407 F. Supp. 96 (S.D.

Iowa), appeal pending, C.A. 8, No. 76-1233.

Although a decision by this Court that the district courts

have no jurisdiction to entertain those suits would deny the

plaintiffs in those four cases judicial review of their claims,

that does not mean that they have no chance of obtaining re-

dress if the regulations should prove to be unduly harsh in

operation. They may request the agency to modify its regula-

tions, and if it declines to «do so, may seek timely court of

appeals’ review of such refusal under Section 509(b). See Oljato

Chapter of the Navajo Tribe vy. Train, 515 F. 2d 654. 666-667

(C.A.D.C.); Hesinger v. Universal Airlines, Ine., 474 F, 2d

1127, 1182 (C.A. 6).

** Petitioners contend (Br. 94-96) that if this Court holds that

the courts of appeals have no jurisdiction to review the Admin-

istrator’s establishment of effluent limitations under Section 301

(b), it nevertheless should allow to stand the court of appeals’

action in this case in setting aside parts of those limitations.

(Except for the one issue involved in the government's petition

in No. 75-1705, the government has not sought review of those

modifications.) The argument rests upon the court of appeals’

admitted jurisdiction under Section 509(b) (1) (A), 33 U.S.C,

(Supp. V) 1369(b) (1) (A), to review effluent limitations for new

sources, which the statute terms “standards of performance.” Peti-

tioners invoked that jurisdiction in their petition to review in this

case, which challenged the Administrator’s effluent limitations for

both new and existing sources, They note that both sets of limita-

tions, as well as the guidelines for existing sources, are based upon

the same record made in a single proceeding and that the validity

of all three involves interrelated factual and legal issues. They

conclude that the court of appeals’ modifications of the effluent

limitations under Section 301 can be upheld as a proper exer-

cise of its pendent jurisdiction exercised in connection with its

review of new source effluent limitations established under See-

tion 306, under such cases as Cheng Fan Korek y. Immiqration

«and Naturalization Service, 392 US. 206, 216, n. 16, and Romero

86

respect in which the Administrator is challenging that

judgment in No, 75-1705.

Respectfully submitted.

Rosert H. Bork,

Solicitor General.

Peter R. Tart,

Assistant Attorney General.

DaNreEL M. FRIEDMAN,

Deputy Solicitor General.

Howarp E. SHAPIRO,

Assistant to the Solicitor General.

Epmunp B. CLARK,

KATHRYN A. OBERLY,

Attorneys.

G. WILLIAM FRICK,

General Counsel,

Bruce DIAMOND,

Attorney,

Environmental Protection Agency.

OcTOBEK 1976.

v. International Terminal Co., 358 U.S. 354, 380-381. Cf. also-

Foti v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 375 U.S. 216,

226-227.

As noted, the government has not challenged those r

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.