Respondents Brief — EI Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Train
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2 A, ‘ePowt ‘DE NEMOURS {AND Company, ET AL.,
> Lae ane “a NVA AR PETITIONERS
PF «.: <h ; ,
see fe ; 4%.
ay.
ti “Rusa E. hon”) AS ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL
2 RE ee 4 Prorectioy AGENCY, BT AL.
we :
ms SN ‘ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 8T4TBS
ee ate COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CiROUIT
BBS ara Oe _ BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS
. ae ni a
*t
: ROBERT H. BORK,
ie Solicitor General,
3 . . PETER FP. TAFT, .
t Assistunt Attorney General,
os: } 4 DANIEL .M. FRIEDMAN,
ag aN, Deputy Solicitor General, |
sre | | . ,-HOWARD £. SHAPIRO,
e Assistant to the Solicitor General,
ut * * A its | EDMUND 8B. CLARK, - . :
mera > ; ‘KATHEYN A. OBERLY, -
RN “Attorneys,
uy : Bie te Department of Justice,
Bete Fs Pree Washington, D.C. 20580.
EE ERE er
DEL. tcthiimentantenteranemaeoemeeasaseennes
nnn eat eeeadneneennenanenaaet
Statutes and regulations involved__.........-...-------
RE ieee dadiolidineseneninnmtindasndiccnseenes
A. The background of the Amendments_---......----
LB. The statutory scheme:
1. The genera] prohibition against noncom-
i i tnenedemanamanenae
2. The national pollutant discharge elimina-
Eo
3. Effluent limitations and guidelines for efflu-
Se tn
4. Enforcement and review__.-.---..-------
C. The administrative and judicial proceedings in this
case :
1, The promulgation of effluent limitations for
the inorganic chemicals manufacturing
ee
2. The judicial proceedings_..........-.----
i
Argument :
I. Section 301 of the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act Amendments empowers the Adminis-
trator of the Environmental Protection Agency
to set, for various subcategories of particular
industries, uniform national effluent limitations
for existing point sources of pollutants:
PRE Sciethdnmndudtiienetsencenennnescce
A. The language and structure of the
Amendments show that the Adminis-
trator is authorized to promulgate
effluent limitations under Section 301
(Pa aR te a lll ca
14
21
Il
Argument—Continued
1. The language of various provi-
sions of the Amendments shows
that the Administrator has au-
thority to establish effluent lim-
itations under Section 301(b)_-
2. The interrelationship among var-
ious provisions of the Amend-
ments confirms the Administra-
tor’s authority to establish effiu-
ent limitations under Section
SERIE) ccoccanusnnemandedenn
3. The other statutory provisions
upon which petitioners rely are
not inconsistent with the Ad-
ministrator’s authority to estab-
lish effluent limitations under
Section 900 (0)....ccaccencesss
4. Section 304(b) does not require
the Administrator to establish
ranges of permissible pollution
for, or specific factors to be con-
sidered by, the issuers of per-
MED .o.cccntsseenenee
a. Section 304(b) does not re-
quire the Administrator to
establish ranges of permis-
sible polluting discharges
within which the issuer of
permits is to set separate
effluent limitations for par-
ticular dischargers______-_-
b. Section 304(b) does not re-
quire the Administrator to
specify in the guidelines the
factors that permit issuers
are to consider in granting
permits to individual dis-
RA .onciniaaene
B. The legislative history of the 1972
Amendments confirms that the Admin-
istrator has authority to establish efflu-
Page
36
44
46
48
iil
Argument—Continued
ent limitations under Section 301(b)
for classes and categories of point
a
C. Establishment by the Administartor
of generally applicable effluent limi-
tations would not curtail or weaken the
role Congress intended the States to
have in the administartion of the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act
AmemBmsGts ..<06c2ce2222--------e
II. The Administrator employed an appropriate pro-
cedure in combining the promulgation of
guidelines under Section 304 and the establish-
ment of effluent limitations under Section 301
into a single proceeding_-.........-.--------
III. The courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction
to review effluent limitations promulgated by
the Administrator under Section 301 of the
Amendments, which includes jurisdiction to
review the guidelines under Section 304,
which were promulgated in the same proceed-
ing as the effluent limitations.............----
ep ebeeeesoeuce
CITATIONS
Cases :
American Frozen Food Institute y. Train, C.A.D.C.,
Nos. 74-1464, 74-1513, 74-1840, decided May 11,
Page
59
67
Eh a a aaa a 31, 48, 49, 74, 83
American Tron & Steel Institute v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 526 F.2d 1047... 31, 38, 43, 49, 83-84
American Meat Institute vy. Environmental Protection
Agency, 526 F.2d 442...--....... 31, 43, 47, 49, 81, 83,
American Paper Institute v. Train, C.A.D.C., No.
74-1480, decided August 6, 1976__..........--_- 49, 52,
American Paper Institute vy. Train, 381 F. Supp. 553
petition for review, C.A.D.C., Nos. 74-1480, et a/.,
BE EE ae ee
American Petroleum Institute v. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, C.A. 10, Nos. 74-1465, 74-1466, 74-
1621, 74-1622, decided August 11, 1976... 31.
American Petroleum Institute v. Train 526 F.2d 1343_-
49,
S+
re
S+
v4
S4
Cases—Continued
American Petroleum Institute v. Train, 7 E.R.C. 1795
petition for review decided August 11, 1976, C.A.
Page
9B, Be. Fb 266 cnceccencancsesitesenncnsccease St
Anaconda Co., The v. Environmental Protection
Agency, D. Mont., No. CV 75-69-BV, appeal pend-
ing, C.A. 9, No. 76-1603, petition for review, C.A. 9,
No. 2170, transferred, C.A. 10, No. 75-1605__.__._-- 8+
Appalachian Power Co. y. Train, C.A. 4, No. 74-2096,
Goseies Gtley TA, Ween ccacsanencctesecnscsnsneeese 59
Cheng Fan Kwok v. Immigration and Naturalization
Beretes, Ge GI. Gicanccattenemmnnenaninannindes 85
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park vy. Volpe, 401 U.S.
GD cnnacencccsscenccestensnmanaetinionen 28, 78-79
CPC International Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032_-~-- 31, 43, 84
Environmental Protection Agency v. California ex rel.
State Water Resources Control Board, No. 74-1435,
Gnas Gane F, Wee kcacsnccnnnascdiitiiin 344, 7, 8, 12, 34
Federal Power Commission v. Moss, 424 U.S. 494... 28, 76
Fort Worth Nat. Corp. y. Federal Savings & Loan Ins.
Carp, GD FBR Gacccatnencscuncnnsnacsssesennee 78
Foti v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 375
We. $ER..nannccscpisnnmantnnsintimasaeiiiebiiiiniiasees 86
Grain Processing Corp. v. Train, 407 F. Supp. 96,
appeal pending, C.A. 8, No. 76-1233__......------- 85
Homestake Mining Co. vy. Train, D.S.D., No. CIV 76
501, petition for review, C.A. 10, Nos. 76-1287,
VO"GEE eacccacscnnnsdenesenssenanennens 8+
Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d
Te Ee 31, 48-49, 52, 74, 83
International Paper Co. v. Train, E.D. Ark., No. BP-
76-C-212, petition for review pending, C.A.D.C.,
Wen, FO-S5E, FO-SIe ncn cnnscceyesdmencasensne 84
Kesinger v. Universal Airlines, Inc., 474 F.2d 1127... = 85
Laupahoehoe Sugar Co. v. Train, D. Hawaii, No. 75-
0159, petition for review pending, C.A. 9, No. 75-
GEES eauceccccocanssusseeqnesseugesvedauseuasenes St
Mianus River Preservation Committee v. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, C.A. 2, No. 75-4253,
Gren’ Dilip Th, Web censnpencenennentancnmenees 42
Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411
Wah GRR acenccusnenansnssednanninesiseeeinntdeaad 36
Cases—Continued
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environ- page
mental Protection Agency, 537 F.2d 642___._...._-- 58, 59
Natural Resources Defense Council y. Train, 510 F.2d
OED caunictinewenensnenensevenussnmmentstnntibhiikes 14, 81
Oljato Chapter of the Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d
G56 anccccccncccecensccadesssconsssesesausacnsee 85
Romero v. International Terminal Co., 358 U.S. 354__ 85-86
Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 415 F. Supp. 70, appeal pending,
C.A. 9, No. 76-1870, petition for review dismissed,
Code D, Tis FE cceweccensntigetusiintnbation 84
Sierra Club v. Train, D.D.C., No. 76-1026, petition for
review pending, C.A. 3, No. 76-1749______.--____- 84
Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, No.
74-1270, decided June 1, 1976__......--.--.------- 66
Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S.
GD ecaucacacecstsecccancncesssencsnsesesessensen 35
Thorpe v. Housing Authority of the City of Durham,
i En 37
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1...............-....-.-- 74
Union Electric Co. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, No. 74-1542, decided June 25, 1976______-- 35
United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528_.......------ 43
Whitney Bank v. Bank of New Orleans, 379 U.S.411_. = 78
Statutes and regulations:
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, 86 Stat. 816, 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1251 et seq._- 3
NS TR TE 3, 6, 31, 34, 46
UCT BING GE ccc nececcccnnececasncasesese 6
I -SE etincenatscceccntdustinaadaséce 3, 67
SE BEE ccc nsumecsadedsccniisasius 69
BUNS GEG ccncceewecsccswcunscnceccceconeses passim
ES re 6, 7, 13, 44
EE SERED cncncwcenswccessccanssnessecin passim
SE SERS OR EDD cnceccenscwntesdatitidiitinn 10
Section 301(b) (1) (A) (ii) -----.-----_--- ~~~. 47
ee 10, 40
Section 301(b)(1)(C) --.--.--.---.----------. 52, 68
Section 301(b)(2)(A) ----..-..----------.- 10, 52, 53
Section 301(b) (2) (A) (ii)----.---------------- 48
Section 301(c)...---...-----... 10, 24, 37, 43, 44, 53, 58
| en 9, 24, 36, 38, 46
BONE GREED cceccncencescccssesccnsstecenss 43
VI VII
Statutes and regulations—Continued Page Statutes and regulations—Continued ae
Section 308 ............-----.-- ---2---------- passin Section €08(b) (1) ......-.-2- 222222 o sooo 71
Section 302 (b) (1) a ee ee eee ‘ Section 402 (b) (1) (A) we a oo 8, 13, 45
Section B4B(e) 2. ....2-cccecccuecenccscsesecce 39 DRS GETMAIN ecececnecncanansacepance 8, 45
ne 7, 52, 68 Section 402(b)(2)(B) --.:----.--.-....--..--- 72
Gestion SIREPIGA) <.cccacccccennennssesve 68 RE SIN ED ccttictinnnweyeinnepioneianen 70
To 68 TEED SEED wcacensewensanpancegeenapee 50
Section 906 ..w.ccccnnececccccewcnecescoe- passim DORE GEG) cnncwewsccsnccesssensdvenesacee 42, 72
nO 69 eR SIE OID cccccicncwnccecctccerptadens 45
Sestien SBOGD) .ncccnenccccccccnesnanctinacnce passim I ie cnewectyenssensctnenucdunnneuape 12, 14
| en 40 SNE Si inciscenissicsientienincecesisasdnqpeninsiapaicssieinlicmmmasciegmans 13, 69
Bestian SOEG(E(A) <20cccnccncccncceenesenn 27,77 ST GED cncccnsssninedaggansedageemne 37
Section 304(b) (1)(B) ................... 27, 53, 56, 58 REIL LTE SE Es Aller a ne inne ae 6, 43, 71
Bastien SERGE). <ccccscceccnsansnccrencucuse 40 EE ne 6
Desthen SEAGER IA) <ccccccccnwnnccnscessces 27,77 TET nc diainnceenncimarauniiinennasiclonpiamees 71
Section 304(b) (2) (B) wee ee e+ + 27, 56 Section TET sehen aneteneennebinmeitidinnecnienmeniin 13, 41
Bastion S56(R) (Bp ccnccccuewencpenncnceseseoese 53 DS SEEN qccawsdeucenseuensecnsessusimen 12, 44
Dee SIGE. .nncenscnsncnmisemnnnnimaetdin 19, 20 IE SE eeninciteneenncanseonsens 25, 41, 43
i 45 NS Pe OR ccnngneqanannensenmnmincigi: .
ING FEO oewecenensnadetenunqeminininntidn passim PE BEET cancqncnarcungsmnnnademmunenin 12. 43, 44
SEE GEEGR) cnawccnnecceucqwencescnaasecses 20, 47 a Le eee 25, 42, 43
Destjem SHSGHPCI}(A) onnnccacccecccuseccusses 14, 51 RUGS SE Ge Rc qnccusespeunwsccmneetienuens 42
Section 306(b)(1)(B) ---------..--------__-_- 46 | ithe ae AR RS CS 22, 41
Geatien GER6) ..0ccccceewescnensecnnnsevsesss 20 NE IED: Scenncvtnnicnnetamnentammmiatinntio 13, 85
Bet GET .ncnccccsscccessnensenesecssouusn passim I Tae ecinctenicteneadicineinadsean 13,
I HIN » citeeristinioniniecaniaiebbinnianndiidaliiaiinh 6 21, 25, 28, 42, 44, 77, 80, 81
OS GV EED ccccnsmecennccnssutemenannqanes 17 WER TIPTREE) occncanqusccmionsacace 85
BOR GID .ncnncenceencencsussnseueeneunenee 45, 69 Section 509(b) (1) (E) ------------------ 22, 23, 44, 47
ROS GED nccununcenceccencennsnnsceunbesie 13 ey 42, 44
Beth TIER) occccnncesceceeccewasensusnesse 12, 45 este GIP Gp GE cnccanwcwncecaussdenssounsnes 13, 81
ee ae 69 II ene ee 33, 41, 52, 72
SO GIP) cncccccnccncnnsencasnosmntionive 12 © Ce. Be cancencenancwensnsmnnernenpecsseas 70
BO TE ncncnnnneenanedemieaiinbiaeiees 12 Se Ge le Giceccinensecntaciesintentisianan 19
IE TEP OUN ERD ccnnccncwnnnsnitinnintimnenin 45 © Gish Ge tnccetcccnndanineeaenenntneanane 19
EER TIES). coccccecccunssnsunensdnendduatio 12, 45 D> Cr i rentnesaccannntncewnsedmansue 19
PRR GP cnonvuanccnnecesanceneninataintie 19, 47 OP Gare Ee GS anciciciandueonnssnennsneinis 56
I BO « ccccuuiischinstetaidiincdiatins 40, 69 Rar AS rae 56, 57, 70
UGE Ge acaccescacessnnetanndeiiiiiinnbunl passim 40 C.F.R. 415.72_..-.---- apiemennaaeinaaimetuni 56, 57
I SO. cervennsscepamciniiviciccnnaiiiiciaiinduanlaiaiin 8, 69 GP Ge Se initetenindednnmnaienanensaatnanue 56, 57
UNA GEGEN EE) accuncsceccesnenstion 8, 13, 25, 34, 45 © Cie Ga irecceetcnccunsssensnctatnsscence 11, 70
IEE II eieintitecceseinctnessninasanininsiibiceilea 8, 25, 55, 69 L,I 70
vu
Miscellaneous:
Administrative Conference of the United States Rec- page
ommendation No. 75-3 (adopted June 5-6,1975)_.. 83
Currie and Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Ad-
ministrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum,
TO CA & Eee icccuncanstendeneenatnnmnce 83
Executive Order No. 11574, 35 Fed. Reg. 19627_____- 5
GD FOR. TNR, Be nccencuccecsccsenwemieeninesnce 16
Se eis See Sees 00 SOE. cannnnndiesseiieeews 16
SP FU ee Gk OE. cccceceennnconnennsnnegeas 19
SP > Be Se OF OE dncunncccuncenewnsamneien 20
Oe Deeb Mt Gi nannennnedieennenadieemmnmgnes 58
th IE REE 36
H.R. 11896, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972)_--.---_-__- 60
H.R. Rep. No. 92-911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) ~-_- 60
I1.R. Rep. No. 2122, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) _____- 78
Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action
Ee et ie SI Trek Sse x Nl 83
Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, Committee Print (Vols.
1 and 2), Senate Committee on Public Works, 93d
Ci, SEB es Ce iciccccdemsnceninisininn passim
Note, Jurisdiction to Review Federal Administrative
Action: District Court or Court of Appeals, 88 Harv.
Ris, Tn i 83
S. Rep. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) ___4, 50, 60, 64
S. Conf. Rep. No 92-1236, 92d Cong, 2d Sess (1972)... 60
Zener, The Federal Law of Water Pollution Control,
in Federal Environmental Law (1974) ------------ 5
Gu the Supreme Court of the Gnited States
OcroperR Trim, 1976
No. 75-978
Ik. I. puPont pE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
v.
Russe_t bk. TRAIN, AS ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (A. 240-251) *
is reported at 528 F. 2d 1136. The opinion and order
of the district court (A. 219-239) are reported at 383
I’. Supp. 1244.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals (A. 252)
was entered on December 30, 1975. The petition for
1 “A.” refers to the Appendix. “App. Br.” refers to the separate
Appendices to Petitioners’ Brief. “A. Exh. Vol.” refers to the
Exhibit Volurae of the Appendix.
(1)
2
a writ of certiorari was filed on January 12, 1976, and
was granted on April 19, 1976 (A. 290). The jurisdic-
tion of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED*
1. Whether the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency may promulgate effluent limita-
tions for existing industrial sources of water pollu-
tion, uniform within industrial classes, categories and
subeategories, as national minimum requirements
under Section 301 of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972.
2. Whether the courts of appeals have exclusive
Jurisdiction to review effluent limitations promulgated
by the Administrator under Section 301 of the
*The court of appeals decided this case in two steps. The
first decision (“duPont J”) held only that the court of appeals
rather than the district court had jurisdiction to review the
actions of the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency here challenged. The second decision (“du2’ont //”)
decided the merits of petitioners’ challenges to those actions (A.
253-286). The present petition involves only duPont 7. It raises
both the jurisdictional issue and the merits. The chemical com-
pany’s petition in duPont J] (No. 74-1473) raises the same
questions. The government filed a cross-petition in duPont II
(No. 75-1705), raising an additional question.
The Court granted the petition and the cross-petition in du-
Pont 11 on June 21, 1976 (A. 291, 292). It consolidated the petition
and cross-petition in duPont J], provided that duPont 1/1 be
argued in tandem with duPont J (A. 291-292), but did not con-
solidate duPont J and duPont 11.
The parties have agreed that their opening briefs in the
present case will discuss both the jurisdictional and substantive
questions which the petition in No. 75-978 and the chemical
companies’ petition in duPont 1] (No. 74-1473) raise. The
gy vernment is filing a separate brief on the issue raised by its
petition in duPout 11 (No. 75-1705).
3
Amendments, which includes jurisdiction to review
the guidelines he promulgated under Section 304 in
the same proceeding as the effluent limitations.
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED
Pertinent provisions of the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 816
et seq., 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1251 et seq., and regula-
tions promulgated thereunder, are reproduced in the
separate appendices to petitioners’ brief (App. Br.
la—42a, 1b-79b, 1c-9c).
STATEMENT
This ease involves Titles III, IV and V of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, 86 Stat. 816, 844-896, 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1251,
1311-1376 (“the Amendments’’). These provisions
establish methods and procedures for achieving the
Amendments’ declared objective: “to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical and biological integ-
rity of the Nation’s waters.” Section 101(a), 33
U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1251(a). More particularly, the
case concerns the relationship between “effluent limi-
tations” promulgated under Section 301(b) of the
Amendments, 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1311(b), and
“regulations providing guidelines for effluent limita-
tions” under Section 304(b), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V)
1314(b). We explain these terms more fully below.
A. THE BACKGROUND OF THE AMENDMENTS
The Amendments’ origin and history were reviewed
last Term in Environmental Protection Agency v.
4
California ea rel. State Water Resources Control
Board, No. 74-1435, decided June 7, 1976 (herein-
after, State Water Board). The 1972 Amendments
were “prompted by the conclusion of the Senate Com-
mittee on Public Works * that ‘the Federal water pol-
lution control program ... has been inadequate in
every vital aspect’” (State Water Board, supra, slip
op. 3).
That program had relied upon (id. at 2-3)
ambient water quality standards specifying the
acceptable levels of pollution in a State’s inter-
state navigable waters * * *. * * * The prob-
lems stemmed from the character of the
standards themselves * * * rather than the
preventable causes of water pollution, from
the awkwardly shared federal and state re-
sponsibility for promulgating such standards,
and from the cumbrous enforcement proced-
aa > >
[T]o strengthen the abatement system federal
officials revived the Refuse Act of 1899, 30
Stat. 1152, 33 U.S.C. §407, which prohibits
the discharge of any matter into the Nation’s
navigable waters except with a federal permit.
Although this direct approach to water pollu-
tion abatement proved helpful, it also was
deficient in several respects: the goal of the
discharge permit conditions was to achieve
water quality standards rather than to require
individual polluters to minimize effluent dis-
*See S. Rep. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971), in 2
Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972, Committee Print, Senate Committee on Public
Works, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 1423 (1973) (hereinafter “Leg. Hist.”)..
5
charge, the permit program was applied only
to industrial polluters, some dischargers were.
required to obtain both federal and state per-
mits, and federal permit authority was shared
by two federal agencies.*
To remedy these deficiencies, Congress turned from
primary reliance upon water quality standards, al-
though these remain important,’ to effluent limitations
reflecting the least discharge of pollutants technologi-
cally practicable. They are to be imposed directly on
the sources discharging pollutants. Id. at 3-4. Water
quality standards define quality in terms of the body
of water’s designated use, and specify a maximuia de-
gree of tolerable pollution.’ An effluent limitation sets
the maximum amount of particular pollutants that a
given source may discharge into a body of water.
Thus pollution control based primarily on water
quality standards accepts discharge of wastes into a
body of water, up to a level deemed to interfere with
specified uses of the water, such as drinking, fishing,
or swimming. Technology-based effluent limitations, in
contrast, are grounded on the ‘‘view that all pollution
is undesirable and should be reduced to the maximum
extent that technology will permit.” ’
*The two agencies were the Corps of Engineers, which also
was empowered to issue permits, and the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, which was to advise the Corps with respect to water
quality. Executive Order No. 11574, 35 Fed. Reg. 19627.
*As the Court has noted, water quality standards supplement
effluent limitations so that more stringent standards may be im-
posed to preserve the level of local water quality. State Water
Board, supra, slip op. 4, n. 12.
* Zener, The Federal Law of Water Pollution Control, in Fed-
eral Environmental Law, pp. 682, 693-694 (1974).
* Zener, supra, at p. 694.
6
B. THE STATUTORY SCHEME
1. THE GENERAL PROHIBITION AGAINST NON-COMPLYING DISCHARGES
Congress declared ‘‘the national goal that ye
discharge of pollutants * * * be eliminated by 1985,
Section 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1251(a)(1).
To achieve this, in Section 301(a), 33 U.S.C. (Supp
V) 1311(a), it prohibited any discharge except in ac-
cordance with effluent limitations and other restric-
tions. This section makes unlawful the discharge of
any pollutant by any person except in compliance
with the sections of the Amendments providing for
effluent limitations, reports, inspection and monitor-
ing, and mandatory permits."
The Amendments define “effluent limitation” as any
restriction established by a state or the Administrator
on quantities, rates or concentrations of chemical,
physical, biological or other constituents that are dlis-
charged from point sources, including schedules of
compliance. Section 502(11), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V)
1362(11). These restrictions are to be applied to dis-
charges from existing point sources’ (governed by
Section 301(b)); from new point sources (governed
by Section 306, 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1316) ; and from
sources of toxic pollutants (governed by Section 307
(a), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1317(a)). Restrictions that
* Section 301(a) provides: “Except as in compliance with chis
section and sections 302, 306, 307, 318, 402 and 404 of tl.is Act,
the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlaw-
"'*a point source is a discrete outlet from. which pollutants
may be discharged. See Section 502(14), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V)
1362(14).
7
are more stringent than the generally applicable limi-
tations, based on state and federal water quality
standards under Section 303, 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V)
1313, also are ‘‘effluent limitations” with which Section
301(a) requires compliance.
Under this major change in the methods of control-
ling water pollution, ‘‘a discharger’s performance is
now measured against strict technology-based effluent
limitations—specified levels of treatment—to which it
must conform, rather than against limitations derived
from water quality standards to which it and other
polluters must collectively conform.” State Water
Board, supra, slip op. 4.
2. THE NATIONAL POLLUTANT DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM
The mandatory permits required by Section 301(a)
are issued under the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (“NPDES”) established by See-
tion 402, 35 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1342. This system is
intended to operate under effluent limitations of gen-
eral application. (State Water Board, supra, slip
op. 5):
An NPDES permit serves to transform gener-
ally applicable effluent limitations and other
standards—including those based on water
quality—into the obligations (including a time-
table for compliance) of the individual dis-
charger, and the Amendments provide for di-
rect administrative and judicial enforcement of
permits. §§ 309 and 505, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319,
1365 (Supp. IV). With few exceptions, for en-
forcement purposes a discharger in compliance
with the terms and conditions of an NPDES
Gmail ial
8
permit is deemed to be in compliance with
those sections of the Amendments on which the
permit eenditions are based. § 402(k), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(. ‘Supp. IV). In short, the permit
defin 3, «»°” facilitates compliance with and
enfor~ .** of, a preponderance of a dis-
charger’s obligations under the Amendments.
NPDES permits may be issued by the Administra-
tor (Section 402(a), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1342(a)),
or by a state which operates a permit program ap-
proved by the Administrator under specified statu-
tory criteria (Section 402(b), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V)
1342(b)) and guidelines issued by the Administrator
under Section 304(h) (2). Both federal and state per-
mits must “apply and insure compliance with’’ the
sections of the Amendments providing for effluent lim-
itations and standards, and must be for fixed terms
not to exceed five years. Sections 402(a)(1), (b)(1)
(A) and (B),° ‘T.S.C. (Supp. V) 1342(a) (1), (b)
(1)(A) and (B).”
*°In State Water Board, supra, the Court also noted (slip.
op. 8): “The EPA retains authority to review operation of a
State’s permit program. Unless the EPA waives review for
particular classes of point sources or for a particular permit
application, §402(d)(3), (e), 33 U.S.C. §1342(d)(3), (e)
(Supp. IV), a State is to forward a copy of each permit appli-
cation to EPA for review, and no permit may issue if EPA
objects that issuance of the permit would be ‘outside the guide-
lines and requirements’ of the Amendments. § 402(d)(1), (2),
33 U.S.C. §1342(d)(1), (2) (Supp. IV). In addition to this
review authority, after notice and opportunity to take action,
EPA may withdraw approval of a state permit program which
is not being administered in compliance with § 402. § 402(c) (3),
33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) (Supp. IV).”
3. EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS AND GUIDELINES FOR EFFLUENT
LIMITATIONS
The technological basis for effluent limitations to be
applied to existing point sources under Section 301 is
to be defined under Section 304(b), 33 U.S.C. (Supp.
V) 1314(b). This section directs the Administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency “for the pur-
pose of adopting or revising effluent limitations,’’ to
publish “regulations providing guidelines for effluent
limitations,” to be annually revised, if appropriate.
These regulations are to identify, in terms of amounts
and constituents and chemical, physical and bio-
logical characteristics of pollutants, the degree of
effluent reduction attainable through the anplica-
tion of the best control technology available for
classes and categories of point sources, and to specify
factors to be taken into account in determining the
control measures and practices to be applicable to
point sources within such categories or classes. Sec-
tion 304(b) also enumerates certain economic, tech-
nological and nonwater quality environmental
factors which must be considered.
The technological considerations defined under See-
tion 304(b) are converted into effluent lim:cations
under Section 301(b). That section directs that efiu-
ent limitations for existing point sources ‘‘be achieved”
according to a timetable providing for standards of in-
creasing stringency. The ‘‘[e]ffluent limitations estab-
lished [under section 301] * * * shall he applied to ali
point sources of discharge of pollutaiits * * *.’’ Sec-
tion 301(e), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1311(e). Aceord-
221-793-1762
10
ing to the statutory time table, these limitations must,
not later than July 1, 1977, “require the application
of the best practicable control technology currently
available as defined * * * pursuant to section 304(b)
of this Act’? (Seetion 301(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C.
(Supp. V) 1311(b)(1)(A)). Not later than July 1,
1983, the limitations must “require application of the
best available technology economically achievable for
such eategory or class, which will result in reasonable
further progress toward the national goal of eliminat-
ing the discharge of all pollutants, as determined in
accordance with regulations issued * * * pursuant to
section 304(b)(2) of this Act * * *” (Section 301(b)
(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1311(b) (2) (A)). How-
ever, the Administrator is authorized to modify the
1983 effluent limitations for individual dischargers
who apply for permits after July 1977. Section
301(¢), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1311(e¢).
The operation of this procedure is illustrated by the
development of the effluent limitations challenged in
this case. The administrative steps are described in
detail infra, at pp. 14-21. For present purposes, it is
sufficient to state that the Administrator developed
technological information concerning effluent control
and treatment in the inorganie chemicals manufac-
turing industry. He divided the industry into suheate-
gories reflecting the components and amounts of pol-
lutants in effluents discharged by plants manufactur-
ing like products with like processes. He examined
currently available treatment technologies used in the
industry, as well as those used in other industries with
similar wastes, to determine the degree to which ap-
ll
plication of the best of these, considered in the light
of relevant engineering, economic and other practical
factors listed in Section 304(b), will reduce the dis-
charge of the pollutants within each subcategory.
After considering public comments on the initial
technical analysis, the Administrator then proposed,
again considered public comment upon, and adopted
regulations setting forth specific numerical effluent
limitations based upon the technological information
developed.
A typical example of such an effluent limitation is
found in the hydrogen peroxide manufacturing sub-
category that uses the oxidation process (App. Br. 46b
to 47b). In this subcategory, total suspended solids
(TSS) which each point source may discharge per
day were 0.8 kilograms (“kg’’) for each thousand
kilograms (‘‘kkg’’) of hydrogen peroxide produced.
Total organic carbon was limited to a daily discharge
of 0.44 kg per kkg of product.
Plants in this subcategory that use the electrolytic
process discharge no organic carbon, but they do dis-
charge cyanide. The technology for the electrolytic
process permitted limits on TSS more stringent than
for the oxidation process (0.005 kg per kkg of prod-
uct per cay). Discharge of dissolved cvanide was
limited to 0.0004 kg per kkg of product daily. (App.
Br. 46b to T7b.) 40 C.F.R. 415.92."
"' Limitations on the relative concentration of hydrogen ion
which indicate acidity or alkalinity (“the pH factor”) (A. Exh.
Vol, 5934) were expressed as a fixed range reflecting the limits
within which acidity or alkalinity may be practicably main-
tained,
12
4. ENFORCEMENT AND REVIEW
The Amendments provide for government and pri-
vate enforcement of effluent limitations. The Adminis-
trator may issue an order or bring a civil action to
remedy a violation of Section 301, and other sections
establishing effluent limitations (i.e., Sections 302, 306,
307), or to remedy a violation of any permit condi-
tion or limitation implementing such sections in a
permit issued by the Administrator or a State.’* Vio-
lators are subject to injunction and to civil penalties
up to $25,000 per day; willful or negligent violation
initially is a misdemeanor; repetition is a felony
(Section 309(b), (ce), (d), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V)
1319(b), (¢), (d)).
Any adversely affected person may institute an ac-
tion in federal district court against any person ‘‘ who
is alleged to be in violation of * * * an effluent stand-
ard or limitation under this Act.” Sect'on 505(a), 33
U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1365(a). The term “effluent standard
or limitation” is defined for purposes of that section to
include an ‘‘effluent limitation or other limitation
under Section 301 * * *” and other sections author-
izing effluent limitations (Sections 302, 306, 307), and
a permit or condition thereof issued under Section
402. Section 505(f), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1365(f).
‘* For enforcement purposes, Section 402(k), 33 U.S.C. (Supp.
V) 1342(k), deems a permit holder who is in compliance with the
terms of its permit to be in compliance “with sections 301, 302,
306, 307 and 403, except any standard imposed under section 307
for a toxic pollutant injurious to human health.” 33 U.S.C. (Supp.
V) 1342(k). See State Water Board, supra, slip op. 22-23.
In the case of a state permit, the Administrator may defer
to state enforcement. Section 309(a).
13
The Administrator’s action in approving or promul-
gating effluent limitations and standards under Section
301 and other sections, as well as in issuing or deny-
ing any permit, is subject to judicial review in the
courts of appeals upon a petition filed within 90 days
of such action. Section 509(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. (Supp.
V) 1369(b)(1). Administrative action which is re-
viewable under this section is not subject to judicial
review in civil or criminal enforcement proceedings.
Section 909(b) (2), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1369(b) (2).
Section 304, which provides for regulations defining
technological considerations in guidelines for effluent
limitations (see pp. 8-11, supra) is not listed in See-
tion 301(a) as one of the sections with which a dis-
charger must comply in order lawfully to discharge
any pollutant. It is not enumerated among the sections
with which a permit must assure compliance under
Section 402(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A).” Nor is it listed
among the sections with which the government may
enforce compliance in civil or criminal proceedings
under Section 309, 32 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1319, or which
private citizens may enforce under Section 505, 33
U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1365. Further, regulations promul-
gated under Section 304 are not specifically identified
among the actions of the Administrator subject to
judicial review by the courts of appeals under Section
909(b), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1369(b).
* Those Sections are 301, 302, 306 and 307, each of which
provides for a form of effluent limitation and 403, 33 U.S.C.
(Supp. V) 1343, which deals with ocean discharges.
14
C. THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN
THIS CASE
1. THE PROMULGATION OF EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS FOR THE
INORGANIC CHEMICALS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY
The Amendments directed the Administrator to
implement them as expeditiously as possible. They
contemplate that after December 31, 1974, discharges
from point sources will be in conformity with a per-
mit, Section 402(k), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1342(k). To
facilitate promulgation of limitations for existing
point sources to meet the 1977 and 1983 requirements,
Section 304(b) directed that the regulations provid-
ing technological guidelines for effluent limitations be
published within one year of enactment.”
Two weeks after the enactment of the Amendments,
the Administrator requested, on October 31, 1972, the
submission of proposals for programs to aid him in
developing technological guidelines and effluent limi-
tations and standards for existing point sources (cov-
ered by Sections 301 and 304(b)) and new sources
(covered by Section 306) for various industrial cate-
gories (R. 6016). Among these were the Inorganic
Chemicals Manufacturing Point Source Category in-
volved in this ease (R. 6215).
The general directions accompanying the request
(Rt. 6015-6281) required that each industry be divide l
* See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.
2d 692, 696 (C.A.D.C.). Section 306(b) (1) (A), 33 U.S.C. (Supp.
V) 1316(b) (1) (A), also directed that standards of performance
be promulgated within one year for new sources in 27 specified in-
dustrial categories, one of which was the inorganic chemicals
manufacturing industry.
15
into categories and subcategories, aud that the techno-
logical factors to be applied under Sections 301 and
304(b) be identified. Those steps were intended to sup-
port the promulgation of effluent limitations by the
Adminisirator.” The Administrator entered into a
contract with a private firm to prepare a Develop-
ment Document for Effluent Limitations Guidelines
and Standards of Performance for the Inorganic
Chemicals, Alkali and Chlorine Industries. In June
1973, the Administrator circulated the resulting draft
development document for public comment (A. 1-20).
* The direction stated:
“[(R. 6027)] In order to promulgate the required guidelines
and standards, it is first necessary to (a) categorize each indus-
try; (b) characterize the waste resulting from discharges within
industrial categories and subcategories; and (c) identify the
range of control and treatment technology within each indus-
trial category and subcategory. Such technology will then be
evaluated in order to determine what constitutes the ‘best prac-
ticable control technology currently available,’ what is the ‘best
available technology economically achievable’ and, for new sources,
what is the ‘best available demonstrated control technology.’
“In identifying the technologies to be applied under Section
301, Section 304(b) of the Act requires that the cost of appli-
cation of such technologies be considered, as well as the non-
water quality environmental impact (including energy require-
ments) resulting from the application of such technologies. It
is imperative that the effluent limitations and standards to be
promulgated by the Administrator be supported by adequate,
verifiable data and that there be a sound rationa’) for the judg-
ments made. Such data must be readily identifiable and avail-
able and such rationale must be clearly set forth in the docu-
mentation supporting the regulations.
* * * *” * ” *
“The end result of the analysis undertaken by contractors will
be the suggestion of effluent limitations associated with the tech-
nology identified by the contractor * * *. [R. 6034.]”
16
On August 6, 1973, the Administrator published an
‘‘Advance Notice of Public Review Procedures” con-
cerning rulemaking with respect to ‘‘effluent limita-
tions guidelines,” and standards of performance for
new sources (A. 21). 38 Fed. Reg. 21202. This an-
nouncement described the basic legal authority for the
regulations to be proposed, the agency’s general meth-
odology in implementing its effluent limitations and the
means by which the agency was seeking to achieve
‘the widest possible public scrutiny of the technical
and legal basis for the regulations to be established
* * *.*’ including the availability of the draft devel-
opment reports on the various categories (A. 22). This
advance notice expressly relied upon Sections 301(b)
and 304(b) as authority for the regulations to be pro-
posed for existing point sources (A. 22, 40).
On October 11, 1973, the Administrator published a
formal notice of proposed rulemaking for effluent limi-
tations guidelines,"* new source standards of perform-
ance, and pretreatment standards, for the Inorganic
Chemicals Manufacturing Point Source Category (A.
61-151). 38 Fed. Reg. 28174 et seg. The notice
stated the statutory authority under which the
rules were to be promulgated: Section 301(b) with re-
spect to efiluent limitations for existing point sources;
Section 304(b) with respect to guidelines for these ef-
fluent limitations; Section 306 with respect to stand-
ards of performance for new sources; and Section
28The Administrator used the phrase “effluent limitations
guidelines” to encompass his combination of action under Sec-
tion 301(b) and Section 304(b) into a single proceeding.
17
307(¢c), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1317 (¢), for pre-
treatment standards for new sources (A. 62-64).
The notice explained the methodology which had
been followed in developing the effluent limita-
tions, and summarized the conclusions of the de-
velopment document for the industry with respect to
categories, process descriptions, water use and waste
water characteristics, pollution control and treatment
technology, and non-water quality (other environ-
mental) aspects of pollution control (A. 65-82).
The notice explained that the diversity of the indus-
try prevented establishment of one limitation for the
entire industry, but that separate limitations for each
plant would be inconsistent with the intent of the
Amendments and unworkable. The Administrator
therefore proposed limitations which were uniform
within “workable subcategories consistent with [the
industry’s] variations” (A. 83). Separate specific
** The notice stated (A. 83) :
“The inorganic chemicals manufacturing category is very
large and diverse. In establishing effluent guidelines it was
necessary to consider numerous factors which may predicate
varying the guidelines to accommodate differences in plant
size, age, geographical location, manufacturing processes em-
ployed and product mix. Comments from various industrial
concerns indicate that they feel these variables justify further
segmentation of the industry. The key issue is the degree to
which the inorganic chemicals manufacturing category should
be segmented for the purpose of establishing effluent guidelines
and standards of performance. One extreme is to establish one
limitation for the entire industry. Examination of the dis-
similarities in manufacturing processes and wasteloads gen-
erated for each chemical reveal that this approach is tech-
nically unsound. On the other extreme, each chemical plant is
18
limitations were proposed for each of 22 subcategories
of the inorganic chemicals manufacturing industry, es-
tablished on the basis of the product manufactured
and significant variations in manufacturing processes.
Within each subcategory, separate limitations were
proposed for each pollutant which was to be controlled
by the regulation. These subcategories ranged, in al-
phabetical order, from the aluminum chloride pro-
Anetion subcategory to the titanium dioxide produc-
tion subeategory (A. 61).
The Notice invited interested persons to participate
in the rulemaking proceeding by submitting within 30
days written comments on all aspects of the proposed
regulations, including alternative proposals. In invit-
ing the latter, the notice indicated the Administrator’s
view that he was required to issue effluent limitations
under Section 301 (A. 88):
In the event comments address the approach
taken by the agency in establishing an effluent
limitation guideline or standard of perform-
ance, EPA solicits suggestions as to what al-
ternative approach should be taken and why
and how this alternative better satisfies the de-
unique and presents specific treatment problems. If the regula-
tions presented herein are to reflect every variation, it is neces-
sary to have separate guidelines for each plant. This approach
does not reflect the intent of the Act and is unworkable.
“The approach selected was to examine all variables and
segment the industry into workable subcategories consistent with
these variations. Twenty-two subcategories have been estab-
lished based on the chemical product manufactured. In cases
where two dissimilar processes are used to manufacture the
same product, separate limitations have been established within
the subcategory.”
19
tailed requirements of sections 301{ 304(b), 306
and 307 of the Act. r
Several of the pet tioners in this case objected to the
proposed regulations on the ground that the Agency
had proposed specific and uniform effluent limitations
on a subeategory basis, rather than flexible ‘“‘guidance”’
to be applied on a plant-by-plant basis by the issuers
of permits under NPDES. F£.g., A. 155, 168-169, 188-
189. The Assistant Administartor for Enforcement
and General Counsel responded that the Agency
would not ‘‘redirect its approach” and explained in
greater detail the legal basis for the methodology
underlying that approach (A. 192-198).
On February 4, 1974, EPA promuigated general
provisions for effluent limitations to be applicable to
all industrial categories (App. Br. 1c). 39 Fed. Reg.
4532 et seq., 40 C.F.R. Part 401. These provisions in-
cluded a statement of the scope and purpose of the
eftluent limitations guidelines, general definitions and
the statutory authorization for such guidelines. The
regulation cited Sections 301, 304, 306, 307, 316, and
402 as the legal basis of the Administrator’s authority
to promulgate effluent limitations for existing sources,
standards of performance for new sources, and pre-
treatment standards for new and existing sources
(App. Br. 3e, Te-9e.). 40 C.F.R. 401.10, 401.12.
On Maich 12, 1974, the Administrator promulgated
regulations specifying the effluent limitations for
existing sources and standards of performance and
pretreatment standards for new sources for the inor-
ganie chemicals manufacturing industry (App. Br.
Pa
2 et seq. The preamble again
and ¢), 306(b and c), and
~Dasis for the Administrator’s ac-
tion thee Br. 2b). ™ The Administrator summarized
the comments of all participants and answered or com-
mented upon each related group of comments. The
preamble stated the revisions which had been made in
the proposed regulations in light of the comments. The
effluent limitations for each subcategory were ex-
pressed in terms of “‘single-number” quantities of
pollutant which could be discharged per quantity of
product per day. See p. 11, supra.
With the effluent limitations, the Administrator also
published in final form the technological and economic
basis upon which he had relied in developing them.
The technological considerations were set forth in the
‘Development Document for Effluent Limitations
Guidelines and New Souree Performance Standards
for the Major Inorganic Products Segment of the In-
organic Chemicals Manufacturing Point Source Cate-
gory’? (A. Exh. Vol. 5572), released March 1974.”
*® Ti also referred to the notice of public review procedures of
August 6, 1973, supra, p. 16, the notice of proposed rulemaking of
October 11, 1973, supra, p. 16, and two development documents.
#® This report specified subcategories within the industry (éd. at
61), characterized water use and waste discharges within those sub-
categories (id. at 65) ; determined the characteristics of pollutants
(id. at 183); and specified factors relating to control and treat-
ment technology (id. at 189), including cost, energy and non-
water quality aspects (id. at 229). It then described effluent reduc-
tion attainable through the application of the best practicable
21
In April 1974, the Administrator published an “Feo-
nomic Analysis of Effluent Guidelines for the Inor-
ganic Chemical Industry” (A. Exh. Vol. 5419A).
These two development documents were the final re-
vised versions of earlier draft reports which had been
circulated in connection with the proposed rulemak-
ing. Together with the preamble to the regulations,
and the regulations themselves, these documents set
forth the “guidelines for effluent limitations” required
by Section 304(b).
2. THE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
Petitioners, eight chemical companies (Br. 1, n.
1), filed in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit timely petitions for review of the
Administrator’s a¢tion in promulgating the March 12,
1974, effluent limitations and new source standards, or
intervened in such proceedings. See section 509(b) (1),
33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1369(b)(1). Insofar as existing
sources were concerned, petitioners called their peti-
tions for review “protective,’’ contending that the
Administrator had®acted beyond his authority in
promulgating single-number effluent limitations for
such sources pursuant to Section 301(b), and that he
was authorized only to promulgate flexible guidelines
for effluent limitations under Section 304(b), to be
control technology currently available in each subcategory (id. at
313) ; and the effluent reduction attainable through application of
the best available technology economically achieveable (id. at 331).
29 7
applied by issuers of permits to particular plants.
Such guidelines, according to petitioners, were review-
able in the district courts rather than the courts of
appeals.” ee
Some of the petitioners brought ‘suit in the United
States District Court for the Western District of
Virginia raising the same issues as the petitions for
review of the existing source regulations (A. 204).
After briefing and argument, the district court dis-
missed for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the Ad-
ministrator was authorized to promulgate effluent
limitations under Section 301(b), that he had in fact
done so, and that review of those regulations could be
had only in the courts of appeals. 2. I. du Pont de
Nemours and Co. vy. Train, 383 F. Supp. 1244 (App.
219-239).
Petitioners’ appeal from that decision Was consoli-
dated with the pending petitions for review of both the
new and existing source regulations. The court of
appeals, however, rendered two separate decisions. In
the first (duPont J ), the court affirmed the district
court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction (App. 240-
251. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. Train, 528
F.2d 1136. In duPont I, the eourt separated
the question of the Administrator’s authority to issue
* Section 509(b) (1) (E). 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1469(b) (1) (EB),
authorizes review in the courts of appeals of the Administrator's
action, inter alia, *in approving or promulgating any effluent limi-
tation or other limitation unde: section 301, 302, or 306 * * *>
Review of actions taken pursuant > Section 304 is not mentioned
in Section 509,
_—
23
regulations under Section 301 from the issue of juris-
diction. It held that even,if the Administrator’s au-
thority derived only from Section 304, the promulga-
tion of guidelines under that section, because of the
close interrelationship between Sections 301 and 304,
was an “action ‘in approving or promulgating any
effluent limitation * * * under f section] 301’’’ (A,
246) and, accordingly, reviewable in the courts of ap-
peals under Section 5909(h) (1) (E), 33 U.S.C. (Supp,
V) 1369(b) (1) (EB).
In the second decision (duPont II ) (App. 253-286),
the court of appeals decided the merits of the ques-
tions presented in the petitions for review. The court
held that the Administrator was authorized to promul-
gate effluent limitations under Section 301, that he had
permissibly promulgated such regulations simultane-
ously with the promulgation of effluent guidelines
under Section 304(b), and that the regulations need
not take the form of “ranges” of discharge levels but
could instead be issued as single-number limitations
(see infra, pp. 48-53). The court further held that, for
both existing and new sources, the Administrator's
regulations are only ‘presumptively applicable,” and
that any source may, at the time of permit-issuance,
rebut the application of the presumption to that par-
ticular plant.”
* The government's contention that the court’s rule of “pres
sumptive applicability” should not apply to new sources is the
subject of its cross-petition in No. 75-1705.
24
Some of the regulatiohs apply to more than one sub-
category. The court set aside portions of those regu-
lations dealing| with “process waste water” and
“process waste water pollutants” and with “cata-
strophic rainfall.” The court also set aside portions of
particular regulations dealing with 11 chemical prod-
ucts, on the ground that they were not adequately
supported by the administrative record. Those rulings
are not here challenged.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I
The language and structure of the 1972 Amend-
meuts show that the Administrator is authorized to
promulgate generally applicable effluent limitations
for existing point sources under Section 301(b). Con-
trary to petitioners’ contentions, Congress did not in-
tend that effluent limitations are to be established only
in individual permit proceedings under Section 402 by
application of the Administrator’s Section 304(b)
guidelines to the particular discharger.
This is shown by the language of Section 301 itself,
which not only directs that effluent limitations “estab-
lished pursuant to this section” shall be applied to all
point sources (Section 301(e)) but expressly provides
for waiver by the Administrator of the 1983 level efflu-
ent limitations upon a proper showing (Section 301
(¢))—a provision which would be surplusage under
petitioners’ view. wx sections also reflect the prem-
4
A
25
ise that the Administrator will establish generally ap-
plicable limitations. Indeed, Section 304(b) directs
that “[flor the purpose of adopting or revising eftlu-
ent limitations under this Act the Administrator
shall * * * publish * * * regulations providing guide-
limes for effluent limitations.” This indicates that it is
the Administrator who is to adopt or revise the limita-
tions required by Section 301. The same understand-
ing is also reflected in the provisions establishing the
state and federal permit systems (Section 402(a)(1),
402(b)); and in the requirement in Section 510, 33
U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1370, that states may not adopt less
stringent effluent limitations than those in effect
under the Amendments.
Finally, the statutory provisions for citizen enforce-
ment suits (Section 505(a)(1), (f) (2), 33 U.S.C.
(Supp. V) 1365 (a)(1), (f)(2)), and judicial review
(Section 509(b)(1)) expressly refer to effluent limita-
tions under Section 301. Section 909(b)(1) in fact
provides for review “of the Administrator’s action
** * in approving or promulgating any effluent limi-
tation or other limitation under section 301 * * ~~
Although the Amendments provide procedures for
the enforcement of the requirments of Section 301,
and requires that permits comply with applicable re-
quirements thereunder, it nowhere expressly provides
that guidelines published under Section 304(b) may
be enforced, or reviewed, or must be incorporated into
permits under Section 402.
26 -
Petitioners’ arguments that only permit-issuers may
establish effluent limitations are based upon hyper-
technical or insignificant distinctions in the wording
of the various sections of this complex statute. Sec-
tion 304(b), upon which they heavily rely, does not
support their position. That section does not confine
the Administrator to publication of guidelines that
state a numerical range of permissible effluent limi-
tations to be selected and applied only by permit
issuers in individual proceedings. Neither Section
304(b) nor Section 402 even refers to a “‘range”
requirement. Moreover, the “range” for the industry
as a whole is supplied by the differences among the
effluent limitations for the various subcategories.
Insofar as Section 304(b) requires the Adminis-
trator to specify factors to be considered in estab-
lishing effluent limitations, Congress intended such
specification to reflect his determination of the rele-
vant technological criteria he is to apply in establish-
ing effluent limitations under Section 301. It did not
intend that the factors specified be reconsidered by
permit issuers in individual permit proceedings, as
petitioners assert.
The legislative history of the 1972 Amendments,
particularly the Conference Report and the explana-
tions of it, confirms that Congress intended the
Administrator to establish nationally uniform mini-
mum effluent limitations under Section 301(b) on the
basis of industrial subeategories, not on a plant-by-
plant basis through the issuance of permits, and that
- SN tte i
27
it intended the effluent limitations to be uniform with-
in each subcategory. In this way it sought to reduce
the discharge of pollutants under a strict nationwide
time table with which all dischargers would comply.
This clearly defined policy would be defeated if efflu-
ent limitations could be established only in individual
permit proceedings under Section 402, as petitioners
contend.
The establishment of uniform national effluent limi-
tations by the Administrator does not curtail or
weaken the role Congress intended the states to have
in the administration of the Amendments. The states
still perform important functions, particularly in de-
termining whether a particular existing point source
comes withii a subcategory and whether it qualifies
for a variance from the generally applicable standards
under Section 301, and in establishing its schedule for
compliance. Moreover, the states retain the important
power to adopt more stringent limitations than those
established by the Administrator.
II
Because of the close inter-relationship between the
guidelines under Section 304(b) and the effluent limi-
tations under Section 301, the Administrator, for
reasous of time and efficiency, combined the establish-
ment of guidelines and effluent limitations into a single
proceeding, at the end of which he made a single de-
termination embodying the guidelines and the effluent
limitations. This Court approved a similar combina-
28
tion of separate steps into a single administrative
proceeding, adopted for reasons of administrative
practicality, in Federal Power Commission v. Moss,
424 U.S. 494. Moreover, the requirements of Section
304(b) were satisfied by the development documents
‘ontaining the technological data, the preamble to
the formal regulations in issue, and the regulations
themselves, which specify ‘tthe degree of effluent re-
duction attainable” as required by Section 304(b) (1)
(A), (b) (1) (B), (b) (2) (A), and (b) (2) (B).
III
Petitioners err in contending that since the Admin-
istrator has no authority to establish effluent limita-
tions under Section 301, the courts of appeals have no
jurisdiction to review them. First, he has such au-
thority. Second, the court of appeals’ statutory juris-
uction to review eftluent limitations under Section
209(b)(1) necessarily includes jurisdiction to deter-
mine whether the Administrator has power to estab-
lish them. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park vy.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415.
The efiluent limitations under Section 301 and the
suidelines under Section 304(b) were established in
a single proceeding and are inextricably intertwined.
They may be reviewed in a single proceeding by the
court of appeals. Review of the guidelines in the
district courts and the effluent limitations in the
courts of appeals, as urged by petitioners, would re-
sult in a bifurcated system of review producing econ-
29
fusion and delay in achieving the congressional
requirement that existing point sources comply with
strict, technology-hased effluent limitations by 1977,
stricter limitations by 1983, and would defeat attain-
ment of the statutory goal to eliminate the discharge
of pollutants by 1985.
ARGUMENT
I
SECTION 301 OF THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROTI,
ACT AMENDMENTS EMPOWERS THE ADMINISTRATOR OF
THE ENVIRON MENTAI PROTECTION AGENCY TO SET, FOR
VARIOUS SUBCATEGORIES OF PARTICULAR INDUSTRIES,
UNIFORM NATIONAL EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS FOR EXIST-
ING POINT SOURCES OF POLLUTANTS
INTRODUCTION
Although the statutory provisions involved in this
case are complex and intricate, the underlying legal is-
sue is relatively simple. Section 30] of the Amend-
ments provides for the establishment of “effluent limi-
tations” for ‘‘all point sources of discharge of pollu-
tants.” Section 304(b) requires the Administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency, “‘[f]or the pur-
pose of adopting or revising effluent limitations under
this Act,” to publish “regulations, providing guidelines
for effluent limitations.” Section 402 provides for the
issuance of permits by the Administrator or by a state
(under a state permit program approved by the Ad-
ministrator) “for the discharge of any pollutant, or
combination of pollutants,” upon condition that such
30
discharge will meet the requirements of specified sec-
tions of the Amendments relating to the discharge of
pollutants, including Section 301 but not Section 304.
The major question in the ease is whether the Amend-
ments empower the Administrator to adopt generally
applicable effluent limitations for subcategories of in-
dustries that set a Specific numerical limit upon the
amount of a particular pollutant that all members of
the subcategory may discharge—limitations waich will
then be incorporated in the individual permits that
the Administrator or a state will issue to each point
source, t.¢e., to each individual discharger. Petition-
ers contend that the Administrator has no authority
to issue such effluent limitations under Section 301,
and that the only method by which effluent limitations
may be established under Section 301 is through the
application by permit-issuers of technological data
specified in Section 304 guidelines. This is to be ac-
complished, according to petitioners, on a plant-by-
plant basis in individual permit-issuance proceedings
in which the permit-issuing authority establishes the
precise numerical amount of polluting substances each
point source may discharge,
Thus, in petitioners’ view the effluent limitations
may be established only in each of the 40,000 or more
individual permits to be issued to existing point
sources.~ The government submits—as six of the seven
** As of June 30, 1976, the Environmental Protection Agency's
Forma] Planning and Reporting System showed that 42,064
industrial permits had been issurd or applied for.
31
courts of appeals that have considered this question
have held *—that the Administrator’s authority is not
so moribund, and that he may adopt generally appli-
cable effluent limitations under Section 301 that set
the precise numerical amount of permissible pollution
for subcategories of industry.
The basic design of the Amendments was to provide
for the development of national standards by which
pollution of our waters would be controlled and
reduced and, by 1985, hopefully eliminated (Section
101(a), “declarations of goals and policy”). Earlier
attempts to deal with the water pollution problem had
failed, because both the methods used in the prior
legislation to improve water quality and the federal
permit system under the Refuse Act of 1899 had
proved inadequate. In the 1972 Amendments, Con-
gress adopted a new approach.
It undertook to control water pollution at the pol-
lution source by directly limiting the amount of pollu-
tants discharged to the minimum that technology
** In addition to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
the present case, the District of Columbia, Second, Third, Sev-
enth, and Tenth Circuits have upheld the Administrator’s au-
thority. American Frozen Food Institute vy. Train, C.A.D.C., N os.
74-1464, 74-1513, 74-1840, decided May 11, 1976; Hooker Chemi-
cals & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F. 2a 620 (C.A. 2); American
Iron & Steel Institute v. Environmental Protection A gency, 526
F. 2d 1027 (C.A. 3); American ifeat Institute v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 526 F. 2d 442 (C.A.7 ); American Petroleum
Institute v. Environmental Protection Agency, C.A. 10, Nos. 74-
1465, 74-1466, 74-1621, 74-1622, decided August 11, 1976. Only the
Eighth Circuit has held to the contrary. CPC International Inc. v.
Train, 515 F. 2d 1032.
32
permits. It thus shifted the approach to the problem
from the prior emphasis on water quality to technol-
ogy-based effluent limitations designed to restrict and
ultimately to end the discharge of pollutants into our
navigable waters.
The 1972 Amendments adopted a three-part plan to
deal with pollution from existing sources. First, it was
necessary to identify the particular pollutants that
-were creating the problem in particular industries,
to ascertain and evaluate the best technology avail-
able and acceptable to control such pollution, and to
estimate the extent of the control of pollution that
such technology could achieve by designated target
dates. This initial aspect of the program was dealt
with in Section 304, which required the Administrator
by specified dates to develop and publish information
about the causes of pollution and the best available
technology for dealing with it. The guidelines are
required to “identify, in terms of amounts of con-
stituents and chemical, physical, and biological char-
acteristics of pollutants, the degree of effluent reduc-
tion attainable through the application of the best
practicable control technology currently available for
classes and categories of point sources” and to “specify
factors to be taken into account in determining the
control measures and practices to be applicable to
point sources * * * within such categories or
classes,”
The next step in the program—the conversion of
the technological information set forth in the guide-
lines into binding, enforceable pollution limitations—
33
was to be accomplished through the promulgation of
‘‘effluent limitations” by the Administrator under
Section 301. The purpose of the effluent limitations
was to translate into specific figures the maximum per-
missible pollution by particular classes and categories
of polluters. The effluent limitations thus were based
upon and reflected the technological data developed
under Section 304(b).
Finally, the effluent limitations under Section 301
were to be applied to the approximately 40,000 ex-
isting industrial point sources through the NPDES
permit system. The permits to be issued either by the
Administrator or by the state under a permit pro-
gram the Administrator had approved, would specify
maximum permissible levels of pollution for each in-
dividual discharger through the application of the
effluent limitations to the particular point source.
State-issued permits at a minimum must meet the
federally-prescribed effluent limitations; the state,
however, may itself impose more stringent limitations
(Section 510).
As we shall show, both the language and the struc-
ture of the Amendments demonstrate that Congress
authorized the Administrator to promulgate effluent
limitations on the basis of industrial subcategories
that specify precise levels of permissible pollution for
all firms in the subeategory. We shall also show that
the legislative history of the 1972 Amendments con-
firms that the Administrator has this authority. This
history shows that Congress explicitly intended that
the Administrator would set effluent limitations on
34
this basis, and that he is not required to depend on the
issuance of individual permits in order to establish for
individual point sources the specific requirements for
controlling pollution in the particular industrial sub-
categories that are specified in the guidelines.” It
further shows that Congress intended there to be uni-
form national effluent limitations governing all mem-
bers of the particular subeategory—an objective that
could not be accomplished if the only method by which
effluent limitations could be applied is through the
permit system.
Finally, we shall show that the fact that in this case
the Administrator promulgated the guidelines and
adopted the effluent limitations in a single proceeding
was a permissible exercise of his broad statutory au-
thority to take effective measures “to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological in-
tegrity of the Nation’s waters” (Section 101(a) of the
Amendments).
. This Court has recognized that the Administrator’s
interpretation of the Water Pollution Control Act
like his interpretation of the Clean Air Act, is anti
tled to considerable weight if it is “‘reasonable” and
there is no “cogent argument that it is contrary to
congressional intentions * * *,” Environmental Pro-
tection Agency v. California ex rel. State Water Re-
sources Control Board, No. 74-1435, decided June %
oe If uniform limitations have not yet been issued for a particu-
Jar industrial category, the Amendments provide that the Ad-
ministrator may issue a permit containing “such conditions as * * *
are necessary to carry out the provisions of thi y i
seuntne P this Act.” Section
35
1976, slip op. 26 (Water Act); Unton Electric Co. v.
Environmental Protection Agency, No. 74-1542, de-
cided June 25, 1976, slip op. 8 (Clean Air Act) ; Train
v. Naturai Resources Defense Counéil, 421 U.S, 60, 75
(Clean Air Act). Since the Administrator’s construc-
tion of the 1972 Amendments satisfies both of these
criteria, the Court should uphold it.”
A. THE LANGUAGE AND STRUCTURE OF THE AMENDMENTS
SHOW THAT THE ADMINISTRATOR IS AUTHORIZED TO PRO-
MULGATE EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS UNDER SECTION 301
(b)
Numerous provisions of the statute, as well as its
overall structure and design, show that the Adminis-
2° Petitioners contend (Br. 73-75) that the Administrator's
interpretation is entitled to little, if any, weight because it was not
contemporaneous or consistent, but rather constituted a change
from his alleged original intention not to establish effluent limita-
tions under Section 301(b) but only to establish guidelines. From
the outset, however, the Administrator contemplated promulgat-
ing effluent limitations under Section 301(b). As detailed in the
Statement (pp. 14-21, supra), two weeks after the enactment of
the Amendments the Administrator requested the submission of
proposals to aid him in developing both guidelines under Section
304(b) and effluent limitations under Section 301. Throughout the
remainder of the proceedings, the various public notices specifi-
cally referred to both sections, and the Administrator’s final action
was taken under both of them. Although the Administrator ini-
tially may have stressed the Section 304 guidelines—because of
the requirement that they be promulgated within one year after
the enactment of the Amendments (Section 304 (b) )—from almost
the date of the enactment of this legislation the Administrator had
made clear his intention to establish both guidelines under Section
304(b) and effluent limitations under Section 301(b) and he did
precisely that, combining the two steps in a single set of regula-
thons.
36
trator is authorized to promulgate effluent limitations
under Section 301(b).
1. THE LANGUAGE OF VARIOUS PROVISIONS OF THE AMENDMENTS SHOWS
THAT THE ADMINISTRATOR HAS AUTHORITY To ESTABLISH EFFLUENT
LIMITATIONS UNDER SECTION 301(b)
a. The starting point is Section 301 itself. It pro-
vides that there shall be achieved by July 1, 1977, “‘ef-
fluent limitations for point sources * * * which shall
require the application of the best practicable control
technology currently available as defined by the Ad-
ministrator pursuant to section 304(b) of this Act,’’
and by July 1, 1983, “effluent limitations for catego-
ries and classes of point sources,” which also are to be
based upon the Administrator’s guidelines under Sec-
tion 304(b) (Section 301(b)). Subseetion (e) states:
Effluent limitations established pursuant to
this section or section 302 of this Act shall be
applied to all point sources of discharge of pol-
lutants in accordance with the provisions of
this Act.
These provisions unequivocally provide that “efflu-
ent limitations” are to be established under Section
301. Those limitations are separate and distinct from
the requirement in Section 402 that permits to be is-
sued for the discharge of pollutants by point sources
will *‘meet * * * all appropriate requirements under
section 301 * * *,” Indeed, the obvious intendment
of Section 402 is that permits cannot be issued unless
they require compliance with the “[e]ffuent limita-
tions established” under Section 301 (Section 301(e)).
Although Section 301 does not explicitly provide
37
that it is the Administrator who is to establish the
effluent limitations, that is its clear and necessary im-
plication. As sown below, Congress intended that the
effluent limitations be established on a uniform na-
tional basis (pp. 59-67); only the Administrator is
capable of accomplishing that objective. Uniform efflu-
ent limitations could not be achieved if the only way
to impose them was by the particularization of the
guidelines promulgated under Section 304 in the 40,000
permits for existing point sources, a large number of
which will be issued by the 27 states that now have
approved permit programs (Pet. Br. 6, n. 9).
The Administrator’s authority to establish generally
applicable effluent limitations under Section 301 is
confirmed by his power under Section 501(a), 33 U.S.C.
(Supp. V) 1361(a), of the Amendments “‘to prescribe
such regulations as are necessary to carry out his fune-
tions under this Act.” When a statute confers such
authority, “the validity of a regulation promulgated
thereunder will be sustained so long as it is ‘reasonably
related to the purposes of the enabling legislation.’ ”
Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411
U.S. 356, 369, quoting with approval Thorpe v. Hous-
ing Authority of the City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268,
280-281.
Unless Section 301 authorizes the Administrator to
promulgate effluent limitations for categories of point
sources, one subsection of that section would be sur-
plusage. Section 301(¢) provides that “(t]he Adminis-
* The Administrator has also approved a rmit-issuing pro-
gram for the Virgin Islands, 41 Fed. Reg. 30883.
38
trator may modify the requirements of subsection (b)
(2) (A) of this section [requiring the achievement by
1983 of ‘eftluent limitations for categories and classes
of point sources’] with respect to any point source
for which a permit application is filed after J uly 1,
1977, upon a showing” that the modification repre-
sents “the maximum use of technology within the eco-
nomic capability of the owner or operator” and “will
result in reasonable further progress toward the
elimination of the discharge of pollutants.’’ This pro-
vision authorizes the Administrator to grant relief on
a case-by-case basis from the general effluent limita-
tions then in effect, in order to allow a permit to im-
pose less stringent requirements.
If the only way that effluent limitations could be
imposed were through the permit procedures, there
would be no need for a statutory provision authoriz-
ing the Administrator to exempt from effluent limita-
tions a particular point source for which a permit is
sought. As the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit has noted, “§ 301(c¢) itself seems to support the
Administrator’s position by presupposing the exist-
ence of a section 301 effluent limitation which the
Administrator can relax.” American Iron & Steel
Lustitute v. Environmental Protection A gency, supra,
926 F. 2d at 1037, n. 15.
b. Section 302, to which, as noted, Section 301(e)
refers, deals with effluent limitations designed to at-
tain or maintain water quality. It provides that when-
ever the Administrator concludes that discharges of
pollutants from a point source or group of point
39
sources “with the application of effluent limitations
required under section 301(b)(2) * * * would interfere
with the attainment or maintenance of [the requisite
quality of water in particular waters],” then “effluent
limitations (including alternative effluent control
strategies) for such point source or sources shall be
established.” Section 302(b) (1) provides that “[p]rior
to establishment of any effluent limitation pursuant
to subsection (a) of this section, the Administrator
shall issue notice of intent to establish such limita-
tions” and hold a hearing. Section 302(¢) provides
that the establishment of water-quality related limita-
tions “shall not operate to delay the application of
any effluent limitation established under Section
301 * *# 7”
Section 302 thus unequivocally provides that the
Administrator is to establish effluent limitations under
that section designed to deal with the special impact
upon water quality of the discharge of pollutants by
particular point sources. It would be anomalous for
Congress to have given him this authority to deal
with the special situation covered by Section 302 but
to have denied him the authority to promulgate the
general effluent limitations required under Section
301, to which Section 302(¢) expressly refers.
ce. Section 304—the guideline section—itself recog-
nizes the authority of the Administrator to promulgate
effluent limitations under Section 301. Section 304
(b) directs that, “[f]or the purpose of adopting or
revising effluent limitations under this Act the Ad-
ministrator shall * * * publish * * * regulations, pro-
40
viding guidelines for effluent limitations.” The require-
ment that the Administrator publish guidelines “(flor
the purposes of adopting * * * effluent limitations un-
der this Act” indicates that it is the Administrator
who will adept the eftluent limitations expressly re-
quired by Section 301 for “classes and categories
of point sources,” and that those effluent limitations
will apply the standards and principles set forth in
the guidelines.
d. Section 401(a) (1) requires an applicant for a
federal permit to submit a certification from the state
involved that the discharge will comply with, among
other provisions, Section 301 or, in the case of “‘any
such activity for which there is not an applicable efflu-
ent limitation * * * under [section] 301(b),” the state
must so certify. This requirement recognizes that
there will be effluent limitations established under
Section 301(b) which the discharge authorized in a
federal permit issued subsequent to the establishment
of the efiluent limitations must satisfy.
e. The permit provisions in Section 402 of the Amend-
* The “effluent limitations” to be achieved by July 1977 are “for
point sources,” whereas those to be achieved by July 1983 are “for
classes and categories of point sources.” The difference in language
however, does not indicate that for the earlier period the “efiluent
limitations” were to be established for each individual] point source
separately, through the permits to be issued for them and that
eflluent limitations for “classes and categories of point sources”
Were not to be achieved until 1983. The omission of the term
“classes and categories” from Section 301(b)(1)(B) is of no
significance, because Section 304(b) requires “guidelines for”
classes and categories both in 1977 (Section 304( b) (1), 33 U.S.c.
(Supp. V) 1314(b) (1)), and 1983 (Section 304(} :
(Supp. V) 1314(b) (2)), ( ) (2), 33 U.S.c.
41
ments recognize that under Section 301—as under Sec-
tions 302, 306 and 307—eftluent limitations wil! be estab-
lished. The Administrator may issue permits, and
approve state permit programs, only if such permits
meet the “applicable requirements” of those four
sections. The major requirement of those four sec-
tions, as we have noted, is the effluent limitations that
the Administrator has promulgated thereunder.
f. Section 510 states that the ,amentinents, 33
U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1317, does not bar the states from
“adopt[ing] or enfore[ing] (A) any standard or
limitation respecting discharges of pollutants.” It
provides, however, that any state “effluent limi-
tation” or other limitation or prohibition shall not
be less stringent than any “effluent limitation, or other
limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment
standard, or standard of performance * * * in effect
under this Act.’’ The “effluent limitation{s] * * * in
effect under this Act’’ necessarily are the generally
applicable limitations for industrial categories estab-
lished under Section 301 and the other sections provid-
ing for effluent limitations (Sections 302, 306, 307).
They could not be the particular limitations on in-
dividual discharges contained in state-issued permits,
or the section would be meaningless.
g. Finally, the statutory provisions for citizen en-
forcement suits and judicial review explicitly recognize
the Administrator's authority to adopt effluent limita-
tions under Section 301. Section 505(a)(1) permits
any citizen to bring a civil action against any person
‘‘who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent
221-793—_76——4
42
standard or limitation under this Act * * *.” For pur-
poses of Section 505, the term “effluent standard or
limitation” is defined to include “an effluent limitation
or other limitation under Section 301 or 302 of this
Act” (Section 505(f)(2)). Section 509(b) (1) pro-
vides for judicial review in the court of appeals “of
the Administrator’s action * * * in approving or
promulgating any effluent limitation or other limita-
tion under section 301, 302 or 306 * * *.”* The for-
mer provision thus recognizes that effluent limitations
will be established under Section 301, and the latter
provision explicitly indicates that it is the Adminis-
trator who will promulgate them.
The foregoing provisions for citizen enforcement
and for judicial review also explicitly provide for en-
forcement of permit requirements under Section 402.”
~* Petitioners argue (Br. 82-83) that the term “approving * * *
any effluent limitation” refers to the failure of the Administrator
to veto a state permit under Section 402(d) and was designed to
provide opportunity for federal court review of state permits.
They ignore, however, the reference to the “promulgating” of an
effluent limitation; their explanation of this provision would not
cover the latter situation. Moreover, it is unlikely that Congress
intended by this language to provide for judicial review of the
Administrator’s refusal to veto a state permit. On the contrary,
this provision was designed to permit review of the Administra-
tor’s affirmative action in “approving or promulgating any effluent
(or other) limitation.” The failure to veto a state permit would
not normally be viewed as an approval of it. Mianus River Pres-
ervation Committee v. Environmental Protection A gency, C.A. 2,
No. 75-4253, decided July 12, 1976 (state-issued permit not re-
viewable as Administrator's action under Section 509).
° See Section 505(f) (6), defining “effluent standard or limita-
tion” for the purpose of citizens’ suits to include “a permit or con-
dition thereof issued under Section 402 of this Act,”; and Section
509(b)(1)(F), providing court of appeals review of the Admin-
istrator’s action “in issuing or denying any permit under Section
402.”
43
If, as petitioners contend, effluent limitations could
be established and applied only in permits under Sec-
tion 402, the provisions for review and enforcement
of Section 301 effluent limitations would be surplus-
age, contrary to the familiar principle that statutes
must be read to give effect to each provision. United
States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-539; American
Iron & Steel Institute v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 526 F. 2d 1027 (C.A. 3); American Meat In-
stitute v. Environmental Protection Agency, 526 F. 2d
442 (C.A. 7).
*° The Eighth Circuit attempted to avoid this problem by treat-
ing the references to Section 301 in the enforcement and review
sections as limited to Section 301(f), which prohibits discharge of
poison warfare agents and high level radiological wastes. CPC
International Inc., supra, 515 F. 2d at 1043. Section 502(11) defines
an effluent limitation as “any restriction established by a State or
the Administrator * * *.” Since the restriction on discharge of
poison warfare agents and radiological waste is established by the
statute itself and not by the Administrator, it is not an effluent
limitation. It is therefore “another limitation” under the provi-
sions in Sections 505(a) (1) and 505(f) that authorize citizen suits
to enforce “an effluent limitation or other limitation under Section
301 or 302 of this Act.” American Iron & Steel Institute, supra,
526 F. 2d at 1038. The references in the citizens enforcement and
judicial review provisions to the “effluent limitations” under Sec-
tion 301 therefore are to something other than the absolute pro-
hibition in Section 301(f) against the discharge of any poison
warfare agents or radiological wastes. As we have shown in the
text (supra, pp. 41-42), they are to the effluent limitations estab-
lished by the Administrator under Section 301(b).
Petitioners contend (Br. 80) that the reference in Section
505(f) (2) to “effluent limitation or other limitation under Sec-
tion 301” is to individual variances from the effluent limitations
under that section that may be granted to permit holders under
Section 301(c); and that the citizen suits that may be brought
44
2. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP AMONG VARIOUS PROVISIONS OF THE AMEND-
MENTS CONFIRMS THE ADMINISTRATOR'S AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH
EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS UNDER SECTION 301(b)
The interrelationship among the provisions of the
Act dealing with effluent limitations (Sections 301,
302, 306, 307), guidelines for such limitations (Section
304), federal enforcement (Section 309) and permits
(Section 402), confirms that the Administrator has
authority to establish effluent limitations under Section
301, and is not limited to promulgating guidelines for
such limitations under Section 304, which are to be
applied to particular point sources solely through
permits.
Section 301(a) makes unlawful the discharge of any
pollutant **[e]xcept * * * in compliance with this see-
under Section 505(a) to challenge effluent limitations may chal-
lenge only such variances, Although Section 505(f) defines an
effluent limitation to include “a permit or condition thereof,” a
citizen suit relating to the variance presumably would challenge
the relaxation of the effluent limitation under Section 301(b) that
the variance sanctions. Such a challenge would not appear to be a
claim of violation of the effluent limitation but rather a challenge
to the variance from the limitation. Similarly, the Administrator's
grant of a variance under Section 301(c) would not appear to be
challengeable as “a failure of the Administrator to perform any
act or duty under this Act which is not discretionary with the
Administrator,” which a citizen may challenge under Section
SS (a) (2).
The grant of a variance under Section 301(c) is reviewable in
the court of appeals under Section 509(b) (1) (E) and (F) as an
action “in approving * * * any effluent limitation or other limita-
tion under section 301 * * *” or “in issuing or denying any permit
under section 402,” and not in a citizen suit under Section 505(a).
Whether a citizen could maintain an action challenging such vari-
ance would depend upon whether he is an “interested part y” under
Section 509(b) (1).
45
tion and sections 302, 306, 307, 318, 402 and 404 of this
Act.” Section 309(a) authorizes the Administrator to
enter a compliance order and to seek injunctive relief
against any person who violates “section 301, 302, 306,
. 307, or 308 of this Act, or any permit condition or
limitation implementing any of such sections in a
permit issued under section 402 of this Act by [him]
or by a State”: it also imposes civil penalties
for violation and criminal penalties for willful and
negligent violation of those provisions or of such per-
mits (Sections 309(¢) (1), 309(d)). Finally, Sections
402(a)(1) and 402(b)(1)(A) and (B) require that
permits issued by the Administrator or State must
comply with all ‘applicable requirements under sec-
tions 301, 302, 306, 307, 308 and 403 of this Act.”
The significant thing about these provisions for this
case is that none of them requires compliance with the
guidelines promulgated under Section 304, authorizes
enforcement proceedings against noncompliance
therewith, or makes such noncompliance illegal. Dis-
charges of pollutants and permits for such discharges
are required to comply with the effluent limitations in
Sections 301, 302, 307 and 308, not with the guidelines
for such limitations under Section 304."
Petitioners’ argument grossly distorts and upsets
the entire statutory plan, since it authorizes only the
*
* Section 402(d) (2), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1342(d) (2), em-
powers the Administrator to veto permits “outside the guidelines
and requirements of this Act.” However, the term “guidelines”
here refers to guidelines under Section 304(h), concerning uni-
form monitoring, reporting and information requirements, not to
Section 304(b). See section 402(c) (2), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1342
(c) (2).
46
promulgation of nonenforeeable guidelines for effluent
limitations without the binding and enforceable limita-
tions themselves which the permits are required to
meet. Congress certainly did not intend to leave such
a gaping loophole in the statute when it provided in
Section 301(e) that ‘‘[e]ffluent limitations established
pursuant to this section or section 302 of this Act shall
be applied to all point sources of discharge of pollut-
ants in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”
3. THE OTHER STATUTORY PROVISIONS UPON WHICH PETITIONERS RELY
ARE NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE ADMINISTRATOR'S AUTHORITY TO
ESTABLISH EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS UNDER SECTION 301(b)
Petitioners seek to avoid the compelling effect of
the foregoing analysis by a series of hypertechnical
argunents that focus on minor distinctions in the
wording of various sections of the Act, largely ignore
the basic structure and design of the statute, and
would seriously weaken the effectiveness of the Amend-
ments to ‘‘restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters”
(Section 101(a)).
Petitioners point out (Br. 58-59) that Section 306
(b)(1)(B) requires the Administrator to “propose
and publish regulations establishing Federal stand-
ards of performance for new sources * * *,” They
argue that where Congress desired uniform national
standards, as in the case of new sources (Section 306),
it used the term “standards,” and that the absence of
that term in Sections 301 and 304 indicates that in
those sections Congress did not contemplate a uniform
standard for the entire country.
47
This semantic distinction, however, does not refute
the numerous statutory provisions discussed above
which recognize the authority of the Administrator to
promulgate effluent limitations om a national basis.
Moreover, the argument incorrectly assumes that Con-
gress intended the terms “‘limitation’’ and “standard”’
to have substantially different meanings. To the con-
trary, the statute as a whole shows that Congress used
these terms as equivalents, and did not intend the use
of one or the other to affect the scope of the Admin-
istrator’s authority.
Mor example, as shown above (p. 6), the “stand-
ards of performance” to be established for new
sources under Section 306(b), as restrictions on dis-
charge, are “effluent limitations.” Section 502(11), 33
U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1362 (11). Section 316 dealing with
thermal pollution, refers in subsection (b) to “[a]ny
standard established pursuant to section 301 or sec-
tion 306 * * *.”* Section 509(b)(1)(E), however,
provides for judicial review of the Administrator’s
action in approving or promulgating “any effluent lim-
ttation or other limitation under Section 301, 302 or
306” (emphasis added). See American Meat Institute
** Amicus Curiae American Petroleum Institute argues that the
reference to Section 301 standards means the pretreatment stand-
ards which are referred to in Sections 301(b) (1) (A) (ii) and
301(b) (2) (A) (ii). This explanation is implausible. If Congress
meant pretreatment standards, it would have referred directly to
Section 307, which governs both toxic pollutants and pretreatment
standards. Moreover, it would be anomalous for Section 301(b)
to apply to users of publicly owned treatment works, but not to
existing point sources which discharge directly to navigable
waters. See, 1 Leg. Hist. 263.
45
v. Environmental Protection Agency, supra, 526 F. 2d
at 450, n. 17.
The terms ‘‘stauidards” and ‘‘limitations’’ are also
used interchangeably in the legislative history.”
4. SECTION 2304(b) DOES NOT REQUIRE THE ADMINISTRATOR TO ESTAB-
LISH RANGES OF PERMISSIBLE POLLUTION FOR, OR SPECIFIC FACTORS
TO BE CONSIDERED BY, THE ISSUERS OF PERMITS
Petitioners also make an elaborate argument that
certain provisions of Section 304(b) are inconsistent
with the establishment of specific numerical effluent
limitations under Section 301, and therefore show that
Congress did not authorize the Administrator to es-
tablish such limitations. They centend that Section
304(b) requires the Administrator to publish guide-
lines that (1) state only a numerical range for per-
missible effluent limitations, which sets the upper and
lower limits that permits must specify, but leaves it
to the issuer of the permit to select within that range
the exact effluent limitations appropriate for the par-
ticular discharger; and (2) specify the factors upon
Which the permit issuer is to rely in setting effluent
limitations in individual permits. Both the language
of Section 304(b) and its legislative history refute
these contentions.”
* See, e.g., the Senate debate immediately preceding the vote to
override the President’s veto, where Senator Williams and Sena-
tor Percy referred to the need for uniform “effluent standards.” 1
Leg. Hist. 132, 134.
“* The court of appeals in this case and four other courts of ap-
peals have rejected this contention. American Frozen Food Insti-
tute v. Train, supra, slip op. 63; Hooker Chemicals & Plastics
49
a. Section 304(b) does not require the Administra-
tor to establish ranges of permissible polluting dis-
charges within which the issuer of permits is to set
separate effluent limitations, for particular discharg-
ers. Nothing in either Section 304(b) or Section 402
provides for the Administrator to establish a range
within which levels of permissible pollution are to be
determined, or suggests that the issuer of permits is
given discretion to set effluent limitations for partic-
ular dischargers on the basis of the Administrator's
guidelines. The statute nowhere uses the word ‘“‘range”
and, as the District of Columbia Circuit noted, ‘‘no
such requirement was enacted in statutory form.”
American Frozen Food Institute v. Train, supra, slip
op. 63.”
As noted (supra, pp. 7-8, 13, 44-45), both federai
and state permits must insure compliance with all
applicable requirements of the effluent limitations
contained in Sections 301, 302, 306 and 307; there is
no requirement, however, that such permits comply
with the guidelines for effluent limitations established
under Section 304(b). This omission of compliance
Corp. v. Train, 537 F. 2d 620, 628-629 (CLA, 2); American Meat
Institute v. Environmental Protection Agency, 526 F. 2d 442 (CLA.
7): American Petroleum Institute y. Environmental Protection
Agency, C.A. 10, No, 74-1465, decided August 11, 1976. The only
contrary decision, that of the Third Circuit in American Iron &
Steel Jastitute v. Environmental Protection Agency, 526 F. 2d
1045, upon which petitioners heavily rely, is, for the reasons set
forth in the text, erroneous.
** See also American Petroleum Institute v. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, supra, slip op. 18-22; American Pa per Lustitute y.
Train, C.A.D.C., No. 74-1480, decided August 6, 1976.
50
with the “guidelines for effluent limitations” is high-
lighted by the express requirement in Section 402(c)
(1) that state permits must comply with the Adminis-
trator’s “guidelines issued under section 304(h)(2)”
for establishing uniform application forms, minimum
reporting requirements for discharges, and minimum
procedural requirements for monitoring and report-
ing.
No requirement to establish *‘ranges” to guide per-
mit issuers can be implied from the direction to the
Administrator in Section 304(b) to “identify in terms
of amounts of constituents and chemical, physical and
biological characteristies of pollutants, the degree of
effluent reduction attainable through the application
of the best practicable control technology currentiy
available for classes and categories of point
sources * * *.” Measuring “the degree of effluent re-
duction attainable,” in terms of amounts of constitu-
ents and characteristics of pollutants, implies the es-
tablishment of specific effluent limitations, The word
“amounts” is in the plural form not to suggest a
range of values, but to be consistent with the plural
form of “‘constitutents,” “pollutants,” and ‘classes
and categories”.
The Senate Report on the Amendments twice refers
to a “range” of discharge levels (S. Rep. No. 92-414,
supra, at 50, 2 Leg. Hist. 1468) :
In defining best practicable for any given
industrial category, the Committee expects the
Administrator to take a number of factors into
account. These factors should include the age
of the plants, their size and the unit processes
51
involved and the cost of applying such controls.
In effect, for any industrial category, the Com-
mittee expects the Administrator to define a
range of discharge levels, above a certain base
level applicable to all plants within that
category. * * *
The Administrator should establish the range
of best practicable levels based upon the aver-
age of the best existing performance by plants
of various sizes, ages, and unit processes within
each industrial category.”
Insofar as Congress expected that there would be a
*‘range’’ of permissible amounts of pollution “above a
certain base level” within a category, its expectation
has been satisfied. The Administrator has promulgated
minimum effluent limitations for designated subcate-
gories. “Ranges” of permissible pollution automati-
eally result when an entire point source category (e.1.,
“iron and steel manufacturing,” “pulp and paper
mills,” or “inorganie chemicals manufacturing” (see
Section 306(b)(1)(A)) is subdivided, and uniform
levels are set to reflect the technological conditions
within each subcategory.
While Congress desired the maximum degree of uni-
formity possible (see discussion, infra, pp. 59-67), it
realized that broad industrial “classes and categories”
are complex and diverse. Establishment of a single
<lischarge level for pollutants in any riven “category”
of industry (e.¢., “iron and steel manufacturing’)
(see Section 306(b)(1)(A)) would be unworkable.
** Senator Muskie repeated this statement during che Senate
debate on the Conference Report. 1 Leg. Hist. 169-170.
52
For each category of industry, therefore, Congress
expected a range of subeategories within which uni-
form standards could be practicably applied. Effluent
limitations for each of these subeategories, deter-
mined on the basis of the best control technology in
effect (Section 301(b)), thus provide a range cover-
ing an entire industrial category. As the Second Cir-
euit recently noted in Hooker Chemicals & Plastics
Corp. Vv. Train, supra, 5387 F. 2d at 630:
* * * Congress intended that the regulations
establish a single discharge level for a given
subeategory. This is implicit in the Congres-
sional choice of the superlative form in the
statutory language requiring achievement of
the degree of effluent reduction attainable by
application of “best” technology. * * * We * * *
believe that whenever Congress spoke of
“ranges’’ in the debates over the Act, it meant
only the spectrum comprised of varying dis-
charge levels on a subeategorical, rather than
individual, basis. [Emphasis in original. ]
Accord, American Paper Institute v. Train, supra.
Moreover, even within subcategories, specific efflu-
ent limitations constitute a minimum requirement.
More stringent limitations may be imposed by the
state or the Administrator in order to meet state water
quality standards under Sections 301(b)(1)(C) and
303; and by the states under Section 510, 33 U.S.C.
(Supp. V) 1370. Thus, as the court of appeals noted
(A. 26), **the use of a single number limitacion for
discharge permits any discharge from 0 up to the al-
lowed amount.”
a3
Indeed, if petitioners are correct that the Adminis-
trator’s guidelines must include ranges within which
the issuers of permits may set the maximum amounts
of pollution for particular point sources, there would
he little reason for the authority given the Adminis-
trator in Section 301(¢) to modify the effluent limita-
tions for 1983 under Section 301(b)(2)(A) in a per-
mit for a particular point source. As we have shown
(supra, pp. 37-38), the variance provision in Section
301(¢) contemplates that the effluent limitations es-
tablished under Section 301(b) will provide a uni-
form numerical limitation for all point sources within
a particular industrial category or class. Moreover,
formulating the guidelines in terms of a range of per-
missible pollution rather than an exact numerical lim-
itation would be inconsistent with the congressional
objective of eliminating all discharge of pollutants by
1985; with the Administrator’s authority under See-
tion 301(b)(2)(A) to prohibit any discharge of pol-
lutants in the 1983 effluent limitations: and with his
authority under Section 304(b)(3) to “identify con-
trol measures and praetices available to eliminate the
discharge of pollutants from categories and classes
of point sourees * * *,”
b. Seelion 304(b) does not require the Administra-
tor to specify in the guidelines the factors that permit
issuers are to consider in granting permits to individ-
wal dischargers. Petitioners make a related contention
based upon the language in Section 304(b) (1) (B)
that the guidelines are to “specify factors to be taken
into account in determining the control measures and
54
practices to be applicable to point sources” and to
consider a list of “[f]actors relating to the assessment
of the best practicable control technology available.”
They argue (Br. 73) that these requirements were
intended “to assure that the wide range of differences
in individual plants [be] taken into account by thie
permit authority.’’ Under their theory, the permit
issuers, instead of applying general effluent limita-
tions framed in terms of industrial classes and cate-
gories, are to apply the factors plant by plant—a
procedure that inevitably will result in wide vari
ations in permissible discharge of pollutants among
members of the same subcategory.
This argument, like the contention with respect to
the specification of ranges of permissible pollution,
just discussed, similarly undermines the basic congres-
sional purpose of establishing uniform effluent limita-
tions for industrial subeategories, which the individual
permits must meet. Indeed, the requirement of speci-
fication of factors for permit issuers which petitioners
would read into the Amendments would be unneces-
sary unless the Administrator’s guidelines also are
required to provide ranges of permissible pollution—
which, as just shown, they are not required to do.
These requirements in Section 304(b) are not in-
tended to provide guidelines for the issuance of per-
mits, but to specify the factors the Administrator is
to consider in establishing ‘‘guidelines for effluent lim-
itations’’—upon which limitations themselves to be
established under Section 301(b) will be based. See
supra, pp. 43-45. As we have noted before, it is the
55
effluent limitations and not the guidelines therefor
that are to be applied in issuing the permits.
Section 304(b)’s requirement for regulations provid-
ing guidelines for effluent limitations is ‘‘[f]or the
purpose of adopting or revising effluent limitations.”
For the 1977 step, the statute directs the Administra-
tor to specify in the regulations “factors to be taken
into acount in determining the control measures and
practices to be applicable to point sources,” and to
assess the ‘‘best practicable control technology cur-
rently available to comply with subsection (b) (1)
of Section 301 * * *.” The Administrator is to take
these factors into account in establishing the guide-
lines upon which the effluent limitations will be based,
and not it. issuing permits. The statutory directive
with respect to factors instructs the Administrator
how to prepare the guidelines and apply them in
establishing the effluent limitations under Section
301(b); it does not purport to instruct him or the
states with respect to the issuance of permits under
Section 402(b). On the contrary, the very require-
ment that he “specify” indicates that he is to make
a choice as to which factors he deems relevant to the
determination he must make concerning “the control
measures and practices to be applicable to point
sources” (Section 304(b)(1)(B)).
In addition to requiring the Administrator to spec-
ify the factors he chooses to take into account, See-
tion 304 lists factors that he must consider (Sections
304(b)(1)(B) and (b)(2)(B)). For the 1977 step,
these are “the total cost of application of technology
56
in relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be
achieved fom such application * * * the age of equip-
ment and facilities involved, the process employed,
the engineering aspects of the application of various
types of control techniques, process changes, [and |
nonwater quality environmental impact (including
energy requirements) * * *.” |
In promulgating the effluent limitation guidelines
for the inorganic chemicals manufacturing industry,
the Administrator complied with these requirements
by specifying and analyzing all the relevant factors,
including those specifically mandated by the statute.
The development document for this industry contains
hundreds of pages analyzing the factors. See, e.g., A.
Exh. Vol. 5427-5569, 5593-5643, 5771-5809, 5810-5893.
The factors were further “specified” by defining sub-
categories and subdivisions within the industry which
reflect them.” These subeategories reflect, inter alia,
the production process, type of operation, type of
equipment, final product, scale of production, age of
the source, and other technological considerations (A.
67-82). The Administrator also took into account
various economic factors affecting the industry (A.
79-80; App. Br. 18b). Each section of the regulations
notes (¢.g., App. Br. 31b, 37b, 40b, 40 C.F. 415.62,
415.72, 415.82):
In establishing the limitations set forth in
this section, EPA took into account all infor-
3? The efluent limitation for each production subcategory among
the 22 constituting the Inorganic Chemicals Manufacturing Point
Source Category is defined in a separate section of Part 415, 40
C.F.R.
57
mation it was able to collect, develop and solicit
with respect to factors (such as age and size of
pliant, raw materials, manufacturing processes,
products produced, treatment technology avail-
able, energy requirements and costs) which can
affect the industry subeategorization and ef-
fluent levels established.
The Administrator provided by regulation for in-
dividualized treatment of particular existing point
sources by authorizing the issuer of a permit to grant,
subject to his approval, limited variances from the
1977 effluent limitations upon finding that the factors
applicable to the particular discharger are funda-
mentally different from those upon which the general
effluent limitations are based.” The statute itself pro-
** See generally the Development Document (A. Exh. Vol. 5644-
5646, 5593-5643, 5645, 5771-5809, 5810-5893) and the Economic
Analysis (A. Exh, Vol. 5419A-5569). These lengthy and detailed
documents explain how the effluent limitations were derived and
the consideration given to each factor listed in Section 304(b).
* £.g., App. Br. 31b, 37b, 40b; 40 C.F.R. 415.62; 415.72; 415.82.
The variance clause recites that despite consideration of relevant
technological and economic factors affecting subcategorization and
eflluent levels, relevant data may not “have been available and, as
a result, these limitations should be adjusted for certain plants in
this industry” (App. Br. 32b). A discharger may submit evi-
dence to the state or federal permit issuer that “factors related to
such discharger are fundamentally different from the factors con-
sidered in the establishment of the guidelines” (ibid.). Limitations
which are more or less stringent than the regulations then may be
established for that discharger by the permit issuer, upon finding
that such fundamental differences exist, and upon approval by the
Administrator. See also App. Br. 17b-18b.
Whether a discharger is “fundamentally different” is determined
by reference to the Development Document which accompanies
each set of regulations. In conformance with clear congressional
intent one factor, however, cannot be considered for purposes of
1977 level variance application : the economic situation of the dis-
221-793—76—_5
58
vides in Section 301(c) for variances from the 1983
limitations and not through the specification of
factors.
Thus, Section 304 does not contemplate that the
Administrator is simply to specify factors that may
be taken into account and converted into effluent lim-
itations only through the issuance of individual per-
mits. The legislative history confirms this. The Con-
ference Report emphasized that under Section 304
(b)(1)(B), which requires the Administrator to con-
sider the cost of technology in relation to the benefits
of the effluent reductions involved, the analysis cannot
be made on a plant-by-plant basis. It may be made
only in relation to categories and subcategories of par-
ticular industries. 1 Leg. Hist. 304. As Senator Mus-
kie stated in his written explanation of this aspect of
the Report (1 Leg. Hist. 170):
The Conferees agreed upon this limited cost-
benefit analysis in order to maintain uniformity
within a elass and category of point sources
subject to effluent limitations, and to avoid tn-
posing on the Administrator any requirement
to consider the location of sources within a
category or to ascertain water quality impact
of effluent controis, or to determine the eco-
nomic impact of controls on any individual
plant in a single community.”
charger. See 39 Fed. Reg. 30073 and discussion infra, p. 58.
Such variance provisions were upheld in Natural Resources
Defense Council, Ine. vy. Environmental Protection Agency, 537
F. 2d 642 (C.A. 2).
“In a recent decision (Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, No.
74-2096, et al., decided July 16, 1978), the Fourth Circuit indi-
cated a contrary view, Explaining the court’s holding in this case
59
As the Second Cireuit correctly held in Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, 537 F. 2d 642, 645-646, nothing
in the Act requires that effluent limitations, by vari-
ance or otherwise, must encompass wholesale reconsid-
eration at the permit granting stage of all the factors
that were assertedly considered initially by the EPA
in formulating the regulation. Such wholesale recon-
sideration was never the intent of Congress.
B. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1972 AMENDMENTS
CONFIRMS THAT THE ADMINISTRATOR HAS AUTHORITY
TO ESTABLISH EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS UNDER SECTION
301(b) FOR CLASSES AND CATEGORIES OF POINT SOURCES
Any doubt still remaining about the Administrator’s
authority under Section 301 to establish effluent limi-
tations for classes and cater “ies of point source pol-
lution is dispelled by the legistative history of the 1972
(A. 253) that the Administrator's effluent limitations are “pre-
sumptively applicable to permit applications,’ Appalachian
Power further states (slip op. 15) : “Thus, the issuer of a permit,
under § 402 may consider whether a particular applicant is to be
held strictly to the confines of the agency’s regulations. The burden
of proof remains upon the applicant, however. Only after he has
established the inappropriateness of the regulations as applied to
him, for example, employing the generic factors of $§ 304, 306 or
any specific variance clauses promulgated thereunder, need the
permit issuer go beyond the regulations” (emphasis added). In-
sofar as the foregoing language invites reconsideration by the
permit issuer of factors already considered by the Administrator
in establishing effluent limitations under Section 301 for existing
sources, and under Section 306 for new sources, the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s analysis is inconsistent with the statute. The correct view is
stated by the Second Circuit in Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Ine. v. Environmental Protection Agency, supra.
60
Amendments. That history shows that Congress in-
tended the Administrator to set effluent limitations
under Section 301(b) on the basis of industrial sub-
categories, not on a plant-by-plant basis, and that it
intended the effluent limitations to be uniform within
each subeategory—a uniformity that could not be
achieved if effluent limitations could be established
only in permits.
There were differences in the bills passed by the
House and the Senate,’ which were resolved in con-
ference (1 Leg. Hist. 161-279). S. Conf. Rep. No.
92-1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (1 Leg Hist. 281-
339). The bill was passed over the President’s veto “
(1 Leg. Hist. 95-136).
The Conference Report stated with respect to the
effluent limitations to be achieved under Section 301
(1 Leg. Hist. 304):
The conferees intend that the Administrator
or the State, as the case may be, will make the
determination of the economic impact of an
effluent limitation on the basis of classes and
categories of point sources, as distinguished
from a plant by plant determination.“
** See H.R. 11896, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (1 Leg. Hist. 893-
1110): and H.R. Rep. No. 92-911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (1
Leg. Ilist. 753-888); S. Rep. No. 92-414, supra (2 Leg. Hist.
1415-1533).
*? The President objected on budgetary grounds (1 Leg. Hist.
137).
nt he Conference Report also contemplated that the Admin-
istrator could waive applicable 1983 effluent limitations for par-
ticular existing point sources ( 1 Leg. Hist. 304) : “However, after
July 1, 1977, the owner or operator of a plant may seek relief from
61
In discussing the closely related provisions of Sec-
tion 304(b), governing regulations providing guide-
lines for effluent limitations, the report said (1 Leg.
Hist. 309):
Except as provided in section 301(c) of this
Act, the intent of the Conferees is that efflu-
ent limitations applicable to individual point
sources within a given category or class be
as uniform as possible. The Administrator is
expected to be precise in his guidelines under
subsection (b) of this section, so as to assure
that similar point sources with similar charac-
teristics, regardless of their location or the na-
ture of the water into which the discharge is
made, will meet similar effluent limitations.
Senator Muskie, on presenting the Conference Re-
port to the Senate, reiterated this purpose to require
each point source within a category or class to meet
nationally uniform effluent limitations (1 Leg. Hist.
162-163) :
Senators will recall from the November de-
bate on the Senate bill that there were three
essential elements to it: Uniformity, finality,
and enforceability. Without these elements a
new law would not constitute any improvement
on the old; we would not bring a conference
agreement to the floor without them.
the requirement to achieve effluent limitations based on best avail-
able technology economically achievable. The burden will be on
him to show that modified requirements will represent the maxi-
mum use of technology within his economic capability and will
result in reasonable further progress toward the elimination of
the discharge of pollutants, If he makes this showing, the Ad-
ministrator may modify the requirements applicable to him.”
62
As far as uniformity and finality are con-
cerned, the conference agreement provides that
each polluter within a category or class of in-
dustrial sources will be required to achieve
nationally uniform efiluent limitations based on
“best practicable” technology no later than
July 1, 1977. This does not mean that the Ad-
ministrator cannot require compliance by an
earlier date; it means that these limitations
must be achieved no later than July 1, 1977,
that they must be uniform, and that they will
be final upon the issuance of a permit under
63
as specifically authorized in the bill. The bill
establishes a Federal-State discharge permit
program. All permits issued under this pro-
gram shall be consistent with the specific re-
quirements of the bill, including effluent limita-
tions or other limitations, national standards of
performance, toxic and pretreatment standards,
and ocean discharge guidelines.
In explaining the provision of Section 402 requir-
ing permits to ensure compliance with “all the appli-
cable requirements of sections 301, 302, 306, 307, 308,
316 and 403 * * *”, the Report stated (1 Leg. Hist.
section 402 of the bill.
* * * * *
The third critical element that concerned the
Senate in its consideration of this legislation
was enforceability. Enforceability is assured
through the provisions of the permit program
and through section 309, the enforcement sec-
tion of the act. The Administrator has the re-
sponsibility to determine the effluent limitations |
to be applied to each category or class of polliu-
ter, to set forth those limitations in a permit
issued pursuant to section 402 of the act, and
to enforce those limitations through the provi-
sions of section 309.
The congressional intent shown in the Conference
Report that uniform effluent limitations would be es-
tablished also was reflected in the House and Senate
treatment of the bill. In its general synopsis of the
bill, the House Report characterized the relationship
between Sections 301 and 402 as follows (1 Leg. Hist.
761):
[The bill] [d]eclares to be unlawful the dis-
charge of any pollutant by any person except
812-813) :
The Committee points out * * * that the
term “applicable” used in section 402 has two
meanings. It means that the requirement which
the term “applicable” refers to must be perti-
nent and apply to the activity and the require-
ment must v2 in existence by having been pro-
mulgated or implemented.
The Committee further recognizes that the
requirements under sections 301, 302, 306, 307,
308, 316 and 403 will not all be promulgated im-
mediately upon enactment of this bill. Neverthe-
less, it would be unreasonable to delay issuing
of permits until all the implementing steps
are necessary. Therefore, subsection (a) (2)
provides that prior to the taking of the nec-
essary implementing actions relating to all
such requirements, the Administrator may
issue permits during this interim period with
such conditions as he determines are necessary
to carry out the provisions of this Act. [ Empha-
sis added. ]
64
Similarly, in discussing the provision that compli-
ance with a permit would be deemed compliance with
various statutory requirements, the Report again re-
flected the expectation that effluent limitations would
be promulgated under Section 301 (1 Leg. Hist. 815) :
Subsection (7) [now (k)] [of section 402]
provides that compliance with a permit issued
pursuant to section 402 shall be considered to
be compliance for purposes of sections 309 and
005, with section 301, 302, 306, 307, 316 and
403 * * *. The purpose of this provision is to
assure that the mere promulgation of any ef flu-
ent limitation or other limitation, a standard, or
a thermal discharge regulation, by itself will
not subject a person holding a valid permit to
prosecution. However, once such a requirement
is actually made a condition of the permit, then
the permittee will be held to comply with the
terms thereof. [Emphasis added. ]
The Senate Committee Report reflected the same
view. In discussing the two-step program in Section
301(b) “for applying effluent limits,” the first based on
the best practicable technology “to be implemented by
1976” and the second based on the best available tech-
nology, with a goal of no discharge “to be implemented
by 1981” (S. Rep. No. 92-414, supra, at 8, 2 Leg. Hist.
1426), the Report stated (2 Leg. Hist. 1468) :
It is the Committee’s intention that pursuant
to subsection 301(b)(1)(A), and Section 304(b)
the Administrator will interpret the term “best
practicable’? when applied to various categories
of industries as a basis for specifying clear and
precise effluent limitations to be implemented
by January 1, 1976. [Emphasis added.]
65
Senator Bentsen, a member of the Senate Public
Works Committee which drafted the bill, made clear
that the Administrator was to establish Section 301
limitations (2 Leg. Hist. 1283) :
In phase I, for point sources of pollutants,
effluent limits shall be established not later than
January 1, 1976 [now July 1, 1977], which
comply with specifically defined levels of efflu-
ent control and treatment. As defined in section
301(b)(1) of the bill, and as elaborated in the
regulations which we anticipate the Adminis-
trator shall issue pursuant to section 301 and
section 304, these 1976 [now 1977] goals shall
be at least * * * the “best practicable control
technology currently available’? for other [in-
dustrial] point sources * * *, [ Emphasis
added. |
When the President considered the bill, Mr. Ruck-
elshaus, who was the first Adininistrator of the En-
vironmental Protection Agency, advised the President
that ‘the Administration proposed that ‘standards be
amended to impose precise effluent requirements on all
industrial sources.’ The enrolled bill has done so’’ (1
Leg. Hist. 156).
The legislative history thus shows that Congress in-
tended to remedy the inadequacies of previous pollu-
tion control by having the Administrator promulgate
uniform national effluent standards under Section 301
(b), on the basis of subcategories of industry, and not
by applying generalized guidelines to individual pol-
luters through permits. The permit program was in-
tended to be the method for implementing and enfore-
66
ing the effluent limitations already established under
Section 301(b), not for establishing those limitations.“
Congress wisely adopted this procedure for achiev-
ing uniform national effluent standards. If effluent
limitations could be imposed only through the permit
program, it would be virtually impossible to produce
the national uniformity in controlling pollution that
Congress sought to achieve. Wide variations in per-
missible limits of pollution within a single subcate-
gory of industry would result.
In the absence of uniform, binding effluent limita-
tions, the permit issuing official would essentially start
over again, engaging in largely redundant reconsid-
eration of all the factors and information the Admin-
istrator considered in establishing the regulations. Not
only would the final permits reflect the varying views
of the 27 States with approved permit programs, but
each such State would be forced to hold lengthy ad-
judicatory procedures to consider anew the effluent
limitations which the Amendments require. Since each
point source must achieve the best practicable control
technology currently available by Ju!y 1, 1977, and the
best available technology economically achievable by
** Petitioners cha!!cige the authority of the foregoing legis-
lative history. relying primarily on an article by the former
General Ceunsel of the Environmental Protection Agency sug-
gesting that the legislative history contains so many conflict-
ing statements as to render it unreliable (Br. 61-63). This
Court, however, has always recognized the relevance and im-
portance of the statements in Committee Reports and by the
principal sponsors of, and spokesmen for, the legislation in de-
termining its meaning. See, e.g., Train v. Colorado Pubiic J-
terest Research Group, No. 74-1270, decided June 1, 1976.
67
July 1, 1983, Congress did not intend the Adminis-
trator and the State permit issuers to consider anew
in licensing proceedings the same factors that the Ad-
ministrator had already considered in promulgating
the guidelines under Section 304(b) and twice to
make the necessarily complex and difficult analyses
required.
Under petitioners’ approach, the nationally uni-
form control of pollution that Congress intended to
accomplish in the 1972 Amendments would be frus-
trated. Moreover, the delays resulting from petition-
ers’ interpretation would thwart, if not render
impossible, the attainment of the deadlines which
Congress established.
C. ESTABLISH MENT BY THE ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERALLY
APPLICABLE EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS WOULD NOT CUR-
TAIL OR WEAKEN THE ROLE CONGRESS INTENDED THE
STATES TO HAVE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE FED-
ERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS
Petitioners contend that establishment of generally
applicable effluent limitations by the Administrator is
inconsistent with the congressional policy reflected in
the Amendments to preserve the rights and respon-
sibilities of the states in controlling pollution, plan-
ning land use, and regulating their water resources.
Section 101(b), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1251(b). They
assert that state permit-issuing authorities will be re-
duced to “mere seriveners” (Pet. Br. 58), if they are
bound by nationally uniform minimum effluent limi-
tations.
68
The Amendments, however, contain elaborate and
complex provisions for the participation of the states
in the processes of formulating effluent limitations
and of issuing permits. These provisions are consist-
ent with, and indeed contemplate, the establishment of
hasie effluent limitations by the Administrator.
Section 303 of the Amendments, 33 U.S.C. (Supp.
V) 1313, requires the states to develop water quality
standards for all their waters, and then to survey those
waters to ascertain whether the Administrator’s eftlu-
ent limitations under Section 301(b) for the period
beginning in 1977 are sufficiently stringent to ensure
the attainment and maintenance of such quality. See-
tion 303(d)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1313(d) (1)
(A). If they are not, the state must establish for the
particular waters involved a total maximum daily load
of pollutants, which the discharges permitted under
federal or state permits cannot exceed. Section 303(d)
(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 13813 (d)(1)(C).
When a permit for a specific point source is under
consideration, the Administrator’s effluent limitations
under Section 301(b) will govern the permit only if
those limitations will meet the state water quality
standards.” If not, the permit must impose “more
stringent” limitations. Section 301(b)(1)(C), 33
U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1811(b)(1)(C). Thus, more string-
ent limitations based on state requirements may fre-
quently supersede the federal limitations.
**See 1 Leg. Hist. 209 (statement of Senator Tunney), 238,
353, 488, 724 (statements of Representatives Jones, Blatnik,
Wright and Robison).
69
Under Section 304(a) and (b), the Administrator is
required to consult with the states on water quality
criteria and effluent guidelines. Under Section 309
(a)(1), the Administrator may refer violations of a
state-issued permit to the state before he seeks to
remedy the violation. Although the Administrator has
the initial responsibility to issue NPDES permits
under Section 402(a), the states may assume this
function under a state permit program, approved by
the Administrator, which meets the standards speci-
fied in Section 402(b), including compliance with the
effluent limitation provisions of the Amendments in
Sections 301 (existing sources), 306 (new sources),
307 (toxic discharges), 308 (inspection, monitoring
and reports) and 403 (ocean discharge criteria). See-
tion 402(b). Conversely, the Administrator cannot
issue a permit unless the state in which the permit
applicant is located certifies, or refuses or fails to
certify, that the permit will assure compliance with
applicable provisions of Sections 301, 302, 306 and
307, state water quality requirements and any other
appropriate requirement of state law, or certifies that
there is no limitation or standard applicable under
these provisions." Section 40l(a)(1), 33 U.S.c.
(Supp. V) 1541(a) (1).
The 27 states operating approved programs
(“NPDES states”) (see p. 36, supra) perform the
* Under Section 208, states also have primary responsibility
for controlling “non-point sources” of pollution (e.g. run-off
from open lots). Section 208(b) (2), 33 U.S.C, (Supp. V)
1288(b) (2).
70
same fwnetions as the Regional Administrators of the
Environmental Protection Agency, to whom the Ad-
ministrator has delegated his permit-issuing author-
ity in the remaining states. 40 C.F.R. 125.4. These 27
states have important functions in applying the Ad-
ministrator’s effluent limitations in the permits they
issue to individual dischargers. They must “provide an
opportunity for public hearing before ruling on each
application.” Section 402(b) (3). They must determine
the subeategory in which the point source falls—a
task which may involve sophisticated technological
analysis, particularly when multi-process plants are in-
volved.” They must also determine such variables as
production rate or wastewater flow rate, in order to
translate limitations expressed, for example, in
pounds of pollutant per ton of production into an
exact number.”
A particularly important state function involves
application of the variance clause established by the
regulations for the 1977 level of effluent limitations
under Section 301 (see discussion supra, Pp. 57, n. 39).
The state NPDES authority must determine whether
for a particular point source there exists a “funda-
mentally different factor” and, if so, ascertain the ex-
* Quite frequently, the permit issuer will find that, while a
point source is generally subject to an EPA effluent limitation,
some portion of its discharge is not. The permit will, therefore,
in part reflect an ad hoc determination of the appropriate limi-
tations. In the case of complex sources, two or more effluent
limitations may apply and determination of the permit limita-
tions will require a weighted application of the limitations.
©The regulations challenged in this case are in this form.
See, e.g. 40 C.F.R, 415.62, 415.92, 415.152; App. Br. 33b, 46b, 54b.
71
tent to which the effluent limitations should be ad-
justed accordingly (ibid).
The NPDES state is also responsible for determin-
ing a very important type of “effluent limitation”—
the schedule of compliance.” A compliance schedule
is a “schedule of remedial measures including an en-
forceable sequence of actions or operations leading
to compliance with an effluent limitation, other limi-
tation, prohibition, or standard.” Section 502(17),
33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1362(17). The authority to set
compliance schedules is critical, since the timing by
which a source achieves compliance with the Admin-
istrator’s eftluent limitations will have important fiscal
and social implications. In establishing a compliance
schedule, NPDES states have the exclusive power to
set interim eftluent limitations which existing sources
must achieve prior to the effective dates of the federal
effluent limitations for 1977 and 1983. Sections 402
(b)(1) and 502(17), 33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1342(b)
(1) and 1362(17).”
Finally, the state permit-issuing authority also is
responsible for establishing specific monitoring and
* Qn this basis alone, the District of Columbia Circuit re-
jected the argument that state permit granting would be a “cleri-
cal rubber stamping exercise.” American Paper Institute v. Train,
No. 74-1480, decided August 6, 1976, slip op. 15-16.
Bs Section 502(11), 38 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1362(11), includes
“schedules of compliance” in the definition of eflluent limita-
tions.
* Although Congress anticipated that establishment of efflu-
ent limitations would precede issuance of most NPDES per-
mits, because of the short deadlines in the Amendments, federal
and state permit-issuers need not delay permits until those
limitations have been promulgated. See 1 Leg. Hist. 813.
72
reporting requirements, without which enforcement of
the permit would be impossible (Section 402(b) (2)
(B)).
The many ways in which states establish permit
conditions, including schedules of compliance and
Water quality-based effluent limitations, account for
the references in the Amendments and its legislative
history to the “establishment” of “limitations” by
states. But this power is supplementary to, not exelu-
sive of, the Administrator’s primary responsibility
under Sections 301, 304, 306 and 307 to establish mni-
form national technology-based limitations for point
sources of pollution. Section 510 declares that except
as expressly provided, nothing in the Amendments
shall preclude a state or political subdivision from
adopting or enforcing “any standard or limitation
respecting discharges of pollutants * * *,’ [¢ further
provides, however, that “if an effluent limitation * * *
is in effect under this Act,” the state and its subdi-
visions “may not adopt or enforce any effluent limi-
tation * * * which is less stringent * * *.’’ As noted
above (see discussion supra, p. 40), this provision
contemplates that minimum effluent limitations will
be established by someone other than the state, t.e., by
the Administrator.
** Petitioners argue (Br. 82-83) that if the Administrator has
authority to establish uniform effluent limitations that bind the
states in issuing permits, there would be no need for the Admin-
istrator’s authority under Section 402(d) to veto the issuance
of any particular state permit. That authority, however, serves
the importan: function of enabling the Administrator to bar
any state permit that does not comply with the effiuent limita-
73
II
THE ADMINISTRATOR EMPLOYED AN APPROPK.ATE PROCE-
DURE IN COMBINING THE PROMULGATION OF GUIDELINES
UNDER SECTION 304 AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS UNDER SECTION 301 INTO A
SINGLE PROCEEDING
Section 304(b) requires the Administrator to pub-
lish guidelines for effluent limitations within one year
of the enactment of the statute, i.e., by October 18,
1973. Section 301 requires the achievement of effluent
limitations for existing point sources, based on the
best practicable technology currently available, by
July 1, 1977. These requirements, which apply to the
whole of American industry, posed an enormous task,
which the Administrator was required to accomplish
within a short time.
As the record in this case shows, the kind of in-
depth analysis of the sources of pollution and the best
available technology for controlling it which the
Amendments intended required massive study. Al-
though the Amendments seemingly contemplate that
the Administrator first would promulgate the guide-
lines and then convert them to effluent limitations, the
short period within which he had to complete both of
these actions made it impracticable to do so. Instead,
he followed the preeminently practical procedure in
tions he has established under Section 301(b). Although hope-
fully all state authorities will comply with those limitations in
issuing permits, cases may arise where they fail to do so, and
the Administrator then can use his veto power to insure state
compliance with the effluent limitations in the particular case.
221-793—-746—_46
74
dealing with all industries of combining both steps
into a single proceeding at the end of which he made
a single determination embodying the guidelines and
the effluent limitations.
The Administrator’s decision to follow this pro-
cedure was a reasonable one in the circumstances. It
reflects his expert judgment as to the most effective
procedures for making this novel, complicated and
complex statute operative in a short time. His deter-
mination was an integral part of setting the statute’s
‘machinery in motion, of making the parts work ef-
ficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and
new,’’ and his view that the statute authorizes this
procedure is therefore entitled to substantial weight.
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16.
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the four
courts of appeals that have considered this question
have upheld the Administrator’s action in combining
into a single proceeding the establishment of the
guidelines under Section 304 and the effluent limita-
tions under Section 301. American Frozen Food Insti-
tute v. Train, C.A.D.C., No. 74-1464, et al., decided
May 11, 1976, slip op. 38-41; Hooker Chemical &: Plas-
fies Corp. v. Train, 537 F. 2d 620, 628-629 (C.A. 2);
American Petroleum Institute v. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, C.A. 10, No. 74-1465, et al., decided
August 11, 1976, slip op. 14-15, and the decision in
this case (A. 260).
Petitioners can point to no prejudice they suffered
75
from the procedures the Administrator followed. In
August 1973 the Administrator published a prelimi-
nary notice with respect to the promulgation of guide-
lines and effluent limitations, in which he explained the
procedures and methodology he proposed to follow
(supra, p. 1©) In October 1973, he published a
notice of proposed rulemaking which included spe-
cifie numerical effluent limitations for each of the
22 subcategories of the inorganie chemicals manu-
facturing industry (supra, p. 16). The notice
gave all interested parties the opportunity to com-
ment on the rules and petitioners did so. The actual
effuent limitations were promulgated in March 1974
(supra, p. 19).
Petitioners thus had full opportunity to be heard
with respect to both the guidelines and the effluent lim-
itations before the Administrator promulgated them.
They would have been no better off in making their
objections to the guidelines and limitations known to
the Administrator if he had dealt with these subjects
in two separate proceedings, and not established the
effuent limitations until after the guidelines had been
promulgated. The latter procedure, however, as we
have indieated, would have seriously interfered with
the Administrator’s ability to get under way the pol-
lution control program directed by Congress within
the time limits Congress had set.
This Court last Term upheld a similar combination
into a single proceeding of administrative determina-
76
tions which the statute seemingly contemplated would
be made in separate steps. Section 7(b) of the Natural
Gas Act, 52 Stat. 821, prohibits a natural-gas company
from abandoning any facility without a determination
by the Federal Power Commission that the public con-
venience and necessity permits the abandonment. In
Federal Power Commission vy. M oss, 424 U.S. 484, the
Court upheld a Commission order which “upon a
proper finding of publie convenience or necessity,
simultaneously authorize[d] both the sale of natural
gas in interstate commerce by a producer and the
abandonment of the sale at a future date certain”
(id. at 496). The Court reasoned that “ [i]n the absence
of an explicit direction [in the Natural Gas Act! the
inference may reasonably be made that Congress leit
the timing of the finding within the general disere-
tionary power granted the FPC ‘to regulate abandon-
ment of service’ * * * ‘(T]he Commission’s broad re-
sponsibilities ... demand a generous construction of
its statutory authority’ * * * and that inference is
plainly consistent with Congress’ regulatory goals.”
424 U.S. at 500. This reasoning is equally applicable
to the Administrator’s combining Sections 301 and
304(b) determinations into a single proceeding.
Petitioners argue (Br. 31-36), however, that the Ad-
ministrator did not comply with Section 304(b) be-
cause he did not issue formal “regulations” providing
“guidelines for effluent limitations,” as that section
requires him to do. Although the Development Doecu-
ments containing the technological data were not
formally designated as “regulations,” they, together
77
with the preamble to the formal regulations in issue
and the regulations themselves which specify “the de-
gree of effluent reduction’? to be achieved (Section
304(b)(1)(A) and (b) (2)(A), in practical effect
met the requirements of Section 304(b). As detailed
in the statement supra, pp. 10-11, 13-21), the proce-
dures the Administrator followed in promulgating
the guidelines were no different from those he would
have followed had he promulgated them as formal
“regulations.” The Administrator’s actions in this case
fully complied with the procedures and standards that
Congress contemplated and intended for the establish-
ment of guidelines and effluent limitations, and they
are not invalid merely because he failed to attach the
label “‘regulations” to all documents which constitute
the guidelines.”
It
THE COURTS OF APPEALS HAVE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION
TO REVIEW EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS PROMULGATED BY
THE ADMINISTRATOR UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE
AMENDMENTS, WHICH INCLUDES JURISDICTION TO RE-
VIEW THE GUIDELINES UNDER SECTION 304, WHICH
WERE PROMULGATED IN THE SAME PROCEEDING AS THE
EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS
Section 509(b)(1) of the Amendments, 33 U.S.C.
(Supp. V) 1369(b) (1), provides in pertinent part:
Review of the Administrator’s action * * * (E)
in approving or promulgating any effluent limi-
tation or other limitation under section 301
** As petitioners recognize, the effluent limitations were estab-
lished by regulations. App. Br. lb; see id. at 2b, 20b.
78
* * * may be had by any interested person in
the Circuit Court of Appeals * * *.
The foregoing provision in terms covers the Admin-
istrator’s promulgation of effluent limitations under
Section 301. Under well-settled principles, this juris-
diction of the court of appeals is exclusive. Cf. Whit-
ney Bank v. Bank of New Orleans, 379 U.S. 411, 420-
422; Fort Worth Nat. Corp. v. Federal Savings &
Loan Ins. Corp., 469 F. 2d 47, 52 (C.A. 5); H.R. Rep.
No. 2122, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
As this Court stated in Whitney Bank, supra, 379
U.S. at 420:
[W]here Congress has provided statutory re-
view procedures designed to permit agency ex-
pertise to be brought to bear on particular
problems, those procedures are to be exclusive.
* * * To permit a district court to make the
initial determination of a plan’s propriety
would substantially decrease the effectiveness
of the statutory design.
Petitioners argue (Br. 87), however, that since the
Administrator has no authority to establish effluent
limitations under Section 301, the courts of appeals
have no jurisdiction to review them. We have an-
swered the premise of that argument in points I and
II above; since, as we have shown, the Administrator
has that power, his exercise of it is reviewable in the
courts of appeals. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the
courts of appeals to review the Administrator’s eftlu-
ent limitations necessarily includes the threshold de-
termination whether he has the power to establish
79
them. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 415. Indeed, petitioners apparently recog-
nize (Br. 85) that, if the Administrator has that au-
thority, its exercise is reviewable in the courts of ap-
peals and not in the district courts.
Petitioners’ main contention on the jurisdictional
question relates to review of the Administrator’s
guidelines for effluent limitations promulgated under
Section 304(b). They argue that even if the Admin-
istrator has authority to promulgate effluent limiia-
tions under Section 301 (which are reviewable in the
courts of appeals), the guidelines upon which those
limitations are based are reviewable only in the dis-
trict courts. Their argument produces the anomalous
result that even though the Administrator promul-
gated the guidelines and limitations almost simulta-
neously in a single proceeding, and even though the
two are inextricably intertwined since the effluent lim-
itations are determined by applying the guidelines to
particular industrial subcategories, the two sets of
actions nevertheless are to be reviewed in different
courts.
The Administrator formulated the guidelines and
the effluent limitations in a single proceeding and
promulgated both of them simultaneously as compo-
nent parts of a single determination. The guidelines
contained the technological information upon which
the effluent limitations were based and which they in-
corporated; they were an integral part and an essen-
tial element of the effluent limitations. They were basi-
80
cally a preliminary but indispensable step in the Ad-
ministrator’s ultimate establishment of the effluent
limitations.
In these circumstances, the guidelines are review-
able together with the effluent limitations only in the
courts of appeals, and not in the district courts. This
conclusion follows from the language of the statute
and the seriously adverse consequences upon its proper
administration that would result from the bifureated
review that petitioners propose.
Section 509(b)(1) provides for review of “the Ad-
ministrator’s action * * * in promulgating any efflu-
ent limitation.” As the court of appeals held (A.
250), one of the Administrator’s actions in estab-
lishing the eftluent limitations for the inorganic
chemicals manufacturing industry was the issuance of
the guidelines upon which those limitations were
based. Those guidelines, it reasoned, are “the key to
the attainment of the objectives set forth in § 301”
(ibid.). They are therefore exclusively reviewable in
the courts of appeals under Section 509(b) (1).
The divided review that petitioners espouse would
thwart the congressional intent that reduction and
then elimination of pollution of the Nation’s waters
be accomplished as soon as possible. The first and
hasie step in meeting this objective is, as we have ex-
plained above, the establishment on a national uni-
form basis of (1) guidelines under Section 304 for
effluent limitations and (2) specifie numerical effluent
limitations based upon those guidelines. The limita-
tions, in turn, would be the basis for the specifie re-
81
ductions (specified in permits) that individual pol-
luters are required to make in their effluent discharges
by 1977 and 1983. If the national standards are to
accomplish their purpose, they must be final and
effective as soon as possible. See Natural Resources
Defense Council, Ine. v. Train, 510 F. 2d 692, 704-705
(C.A.D.C.).
Congress sought to accomplish the latter objective
by requiring in Section 909(b)(1) that any petition
to review the Administrator's action in approving or
promulgating any effluent limitation must be filed
within 90 days, unless based solely on grounds occur-
ring after the ninetieth day.* The Amendments
further provide that actions of the Administrator so
reviewable are not reviewable in any civil or criminal
enforcement proceeding (Section 509(b) (2)). As the
Senate Committee Report on the bill explained: ‘‘In
order to maintain the integrity of the time Sequences
provided throughout the Act, * * * any review sought
must be filed wickin 30 [now 90] days of the date of
the challenged promulation * * *” (2 Leg. Hist. 1503).
See also, American Meat Institute vy. Environmental
Protection Agency, su pra, 526 F.2d at 452."
= This 90-day limitation covers not only effluent limitations
for existing sources of pollution established under Section 301,
but also those for new sources established under Section 306, for
toxic pollutants and for users of municipally owned treatment
works established under Section 307, and for permits incorporat-
ing those limitations issued under Section 402.
be In this proceeding the Administrator promulgated guide-
lines for effluent limitations to be achieved by both 1977 and
1983. Petitioners argue (Br. 80-82) that Congress did not intend
82
Petitioners’ proposal for bifureated review would
upset the carefully drawn system of judicial review
that Congress provided in order to insure prompt de-
termination of the validity of the Administrator’s ac-
tions in setting national standards for effluent limita-
tions. Unlike the 90-day limit upon court of appeals’
review, there is no time limit for suits in the district
courts. Permitting review of the guidelines initially
in the district courts, followed hy court of appeals’ re-
view of those decisions, would delay the effectiveness
of the national standards. Furthermore, uniform
standards could be achieved more effectively and more
expeditiously by direct review in the 11 courts of
appeals than by initial review in the 94 district courts.
Petitioners’ theory would produce the anomalous s-:-
uation that, although the effluent limitations and the
permits applying them would be reviewed in the courts
of appeals, the underlying guidelines upon which those
limitations rest would be reviewed initially in the dis-
trict courts. As the court of appeals pointed out in this
the latter guidelines to be reviewed at this time, and that the
90-day limitation on court of appeals’ review thus shows that
those courts were not to review the guidelines.
There is nothing in the language of the Act, its design or its
legislative history that indicates that Congress intended to defer
review of the guidelines for 1983 to some future date. To the con-
trary, since the Administrator promulgated the guidelines for
both periods simultaneously, any review of them also should be
had simultaneously. Moreover, the arguments against permitting
the delay in implementing the Administrator’s limitations on
effluent discharges that petitioners’ bifurcated review would create
are equally applicable to the 1983 standards as to those for 1977.
Indeed, in selecting the methods by which they wili achieve the
latter restrictions, dischargers also will have to consider the
former,
83
case (A. 249), under petitioners’ theory an operator
of a single plant would be required to institute two
separate but concurrent actions—one in the district
court and one in the court of appeals—to challenge
the Administrator’s simultaneous actions under See-
tions 301, 304 and 306 affecting the plant (A. 250).
Congress did not intend the judicial review provisions
of the 1972 Amendments to produce such delaying
and cumbersome results. *
In view of these considerations, it is not surprising
that all but one of the seven circuits that have reviewed
challenges to the Administrator’s guidelines and eftlu-
ent limitations have held that they have jurisdiction
to review those regulations.” Indeed, in every case in
which the district court dismissed a suit challenging
those regulations for lack of jurisdiction, the plaintiff
**The Administrative Conference of the United States has
recommended direct review in the courts of appeals of agency
rules “whenever (i) an initial district court decision respecting
the validity of a rule will ordinarily be appealed or (ii) the
public interest requires prompt, authoritative determination of
the validity of the rule.” Administrative Conference of the
United States, Recommendation No. 75-3 (adopted June 5-6,
1975) 1974-75 Report, Administrative Conference of the United
States, March 1976, pp. 42-46. Both conditions apply here. See also
Currie and Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative
Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 Col. L. Rev. 1 (1975) ;
Jatte, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 158-159 (1965) ;
Note, Jurisdiction to Review Federal Administrative Action:
District Court or Court of Appeals, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 980, 984-
985 (1975).
*? In addition to the instant case, see American Frozen Food
Institute v. Train, C.A. D.C., Nos. 74-1464, et al., decided May 11,
1976; Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F. 2d 620
(C.A. 2) American Iron & Steel Institute vy. Environmen-
84
also had filed a petition to review in the court of
appeals, * as petitioners did here.”
tal Protection Agency, 526 F. 2d 1027 (C.A. 3) ; American Meat
Institute v. Environmental Protection Agency, 526 F. 2d 442
(C.A. 7); American Petroleum Institute v. Train. 526 F.2d 1343
(C.A. 10). Contra: CPC International Inc. v. T vain, 515 F. 2d
1032 (C.A. 8).
**In addition to the present case see: American Paper Insti-
tute v. Train, 381 F. Supp. 553 (D.D.C.) (pulp and paper
regulations), petition for review, C.A. D.C., Nos. 74-1480, et al.,
decided August 6, 1976; American Petroleum Institute v. Train,
7 E.R.C. 1795 (D. Colo.) (petroleum refining regulations), peti-
tion for review decided August 11, 1976, C.A. 10, No. 74-1465;
The Anaconda Co, v. Environmental Protection A gency, D. Mont.,
No. CV 75-69-BU (unreported) (appeal pending, C.A. 9, No. 76-
163) (nonferrous metals regulations), petition for review, C.A.
9, No. 75-2170, transferred, C.A. 10, No. 75-1605 ; HIomestake Min-
ing Co. v. Train, D. S.D., No. CIV 76-5011 (ore mining and dress-
ing regulations), petition for review, C.A. 10, Nos. 76-1287, 76-
1242; Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 415 F. Supp. 70 (W.D. Cal.) (petro-
leum refining regulations), appeal pending, C.A. 9, No. 76-1870,
petition for review dismissed, C.A. 9, No. 75-2070 because regula-
tions under review in Tenth Circuit.
Seven district court actions remain pending. In four of them,
petitions for review are also pending in the courts of appeals.
Laupahoehoe Sugar Co. v. Train, D. Hawaii, No. 75-0159,
petition for review of the sugar processing regulations pend-
ing in the Ninth Cireuit, No. 75-2252; Sierra Club vy. Train, TD.
D.C., No. 76-1026, petition for review of the iron and steel Phase
IT regulations pending in the Third Circuit. No. 76-1749; Interna-
tional Paper Co. v. Train, E.D. Ark., No. BP-76-C-212, petitions
for review pending, C.A. D.C., Nos. 76-1689, 76-1676. The remain-
ing four all arose in the Eighth Circuit. Two of them involve. in
part, challenges to a regulation which the Seventh Circuit
sustained in American Meat Institute v. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, 526 F. 2d 442; American Association of Meat Proces-
sors Vv. Train, D. Neb., No. 75-0-894; and N.I.M.P.A. v. Train. D.
Neb., No. 75-0-369. One of the two remaining actions is pending in
the district court and the other is on appeal to the Kigith
Circuit. National Renderers Ass'n vy. Train, D. Neb., No. 75-0-
(* Footnote 59 is on p. 85 of this brief.)
85
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court
of appeals should be affirmed, in part, except in the
482), Grain. Processing Corp. v. Train, 407 F. Supp. 96 (S.D.
Iowa), appeal pending, C.A. 8, No. 76-1233.
Although a decision by this Court that the district courts
have no jurisdiction to entertain those suits would deny the
plaintiffs in those four cases judicial review of their claims,
that does not mean that they have no chance of obtaining re-
dress if the regulations should prove to be unduly harsh in
operation. They may request the agency to modify its regula-
tions, and if it declines to «do so, may seek timely court of
appeals’ review of such refusal under Section 509(b). See Oljato
Chapter of the Navajo Tribe vy. Train, 515 F. 2d 654. 666-667
(C.A.D.C.); Hesinger v. Universal Airlines, Ine., 474 F, 2d
1127, 1182 (C.A. 6).
** Petitioners contend (Br. 94-96) that if this Court holds that
the courts of appeals have no jurisdiction to review the Admin-
istrator’s establishment of effluent limitations under Section 301
(b), it nevertheless should allow to stand the court of appeals’
action in this case in setting aside parts of those limitations.
(Except for the one issue involved in the government's petition
in No. 75-1705, the government has not sought review of those
modifications.) The argument rests upon the court of appeals’
admitted jurisdiction under Section 509(b) (1) (A), 33 U.S.C,
(Supp. V) 1369(b) (1) (A), to review effluent limitations for new
sources, which the statute terms “standards of performance.” Peti-
tioners invoked that jurisdiction in their petition to review in this
case, which challenged the Administrator’s effluent limitations for
both new and existing sources, They note that both sets of limita-
tions, as well as the guidelines for existing sources, are based upon
the same record made in a single proceeding and that the validity
of all three involves interrelated factual and legal issues. They
conclude that the court of appeals’ modifications of the effluent
limitations under Section 301 can be upheld as a proper exer-
cise of its pendent jurisdiction exercised in connection with its
review of new source effluent limitations established under See-
tion 306, under such cases as Cheng Fan Korek y. Immiqration
«and Naturalization Service, 392 US. 206, 216, n. 16, and Romero
86
respect in which the Administrator is challenging that
judgment in No, 75-1705.
Respectfully submitted.
Rosert H. Bork,
Solicitor General.
Peter R. Tart,
Assistant Attorney General.
DaNreEL M. FRIEDMAN,
Deputy Solicitor General.
Howarp E. SHAPIRO,
Assistant to the Solicitor General.
Epmunp B. CLARK,
KATHRYN A. OBERLY,
Attorneys.
G. WILLIAM FRICK,
General Counsel,
Bruce DIAMOND,
Attorney,
Environmental Protection Agency.
OcTOBEK 1976.
v. International Terminal Co., 358 U.S. 354, 380-381. Cf. also-
Foti v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 375 U.S. 216,
226-227.
As noted, the government has not challenged those r
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